ISLAM AND POLITICS: A COMPENDIUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300110003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

I .
Directorate of
Intelligence
Islam and Politics:
A Compendium
NESA 84-10092
April 1984
25X1
Copy
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~ Directorate of
Is` r 9 Intelligence FS9
Islam and Politics:
A Compendium
This paper was prepared by ~ffice
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations 0
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
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NESA 84-10092
April 1984
 I
Preface
Information available
as of 2 April 1984
was used in this report.
This directory is designed as a reference aid for the policymaker or analyst
interested in charting the course of the Islamic revival since the Iranian
revolution in countries with significant Muslim populations. We have
chronicled the extent to which Islam, especially in its militant and radical
forms, is an influence on the politics of those countries and offer a brief
prognosis of each nation's prospects for future stability, with emphasis on
the role of Islamic fundamentalism. 25X1
Our study examines all countries with Muslim populations that comprise a
significant part of the social fabric. Although the Muslim heartland of the
Middle East is undoubtedly the locus of the most politically active
fundamentalist movements, it contains less than one-fourth of the world's
nearly 1 billion believers. We did not set a minimum percentage of
Muslims to total country population for inclusion in the study; such a
restriction would have eliminated the approximately 80 million Muslims
who live and practice their faith in China and the Soviet Union. We did
omit many countries with small pockets of Muslims that are statistically as
well as politically insignificant 25X1
We examined a large number of intelligence reports and State Department
communications received over the past five years. Academic monographs
and foreign and US press reports provided additional details and often
useful analysis. Population statistics were estimated as of July 1983 by the
Center for International Research, US Bureau of the Census. In many
countries, we estimated the Muslim populations based on the best available
data because their governments have not enumerated their populations by
sect or released statistics on them.) 25X1
iii Secret
NESA 84-10092
April 1984
 South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic 31
of Yemen)
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Unity, Diversity, and Turmoil
in the Islamic Mosaic
The latest Islamic revival, begun in the early 1970s,
reached its apogee with the revolution in Iran in 1979
and now affects the lives of close to 1 billion people
and more than 60 governments worldwide. Although
Islam increasingly thrives as a set of social and
religious values transcending national boundaries, its
political content has often meant domestic pressure on
the government establishment and tensions between
Islam has developed a confrontational dimension that
has both invigorated its reassertion and alarmed
Western policymakers. In many countries with signif-
icant Muslim populations, disillusionment with alien,
secular ideologies such as democracy, Communism,
and socialism is widespread. Military setbacks in the
Arab heartland states have added to a sentiment of
failure, despite the fact that colonial domination is
over.F I
Fundamentalist Goals
Fundamentalist Islam is, according to academics, an
offshoot of the overall phenomenon of religious revival
and has increasingly taken on both militant and
radical forms. Based on our analysis of fundamental-
ist organizations in 71 countries with sizable Muslim
populations, we see common philosophical goals
among them:
? Constitutional Reform. All groups press for a return
to preeminence of the Shariah (Islamic legal system)
rather than civil codes for the rule of the state.
? Search for Social and Economic Justice. Funda-
mentalists want society restructured to protect the
underprivileged and to institutionalize an equitable
distribution of the fruits of labor.
? Reform of Leadership. The "just ruler" who serves
his populace before himself is a consistent theme in
fundamentalist belief.
dietary prohibitions of Islam, the immodest dress of
females, and the mingling of the sexes in school and
commerce.) 25X1
Despite these common goals and attempts to inter-
nationalize the scope of fundamentalism through
associations, havens in exile, and external funding of
small radical cells, international links between fun-
damentalist groups are hampered by mutual intoler-
ance and domestic issuesF I 25X1
A Third World Phenomenon
Although Muslims exist under democracies, monar-
chies, sultanates, and socialist and Communist 25X1
states-virtually every form of government-we see
the revival principally as a developing country phe-
nomenon. It is born out of the anxieties and frustra-
tions of the disproportionately youthful Third World
countries striving to demonstrate their autonomy from
the postcolonial influences of the developed world. We
believe that the revival was partly fueled by the oil-
rich Muslim heartland countries in the mid-1970s,
but it also exists indigenously without external assist-
ance and will continue even if the world petroleum
market declines or collapses. 25X1
Our analysis shows that all governments in the Mus-
lim world, whatever their political ideology, are vul-
nerable to the destabilizing criticism made by domes-
tic opposition or by imported Islamic activists. Many
of these governments are debt ridden and lack the
resources for independent economic development.
They must seek funds from radical Muslim states yet
cultivate the financial largess of both superpowers.
Internally, they must provide their youthful popula-
tion with employment and their masses with social
welfare programsF_____1 25X1
? Purity Within Society. All fundamentalist groups
condemn the lax morals of contemporary society,
the breakdown of family unity, deviation from the
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Within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun) is the most prominent funda-
mentalist Islamic organization. Founded in 1928 by
Shaykh Hassan al-Banna, it became an important
political group in Egypt in the 1940s. After World
War II it spread to other Arab states, both through
returning Arab students who had studied in Egypt
and through Egyptian exiles who sought haven in
other states, especially in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the Gulf states. Many Egyptian Brothers
remain as teachers of Arabic in neighboring nations,
conveying their philosophy along with their academic
During its sometimes tempestuous history, the Broth-
erhood has adapted to the exigencies of regime .
suspicions by active cooperation with governments or,
at the other extreme, byfghting underground as
terrorist groups, infiltrating armies, co-opting student
organizations, and publishing propaganda. This flexi-
bility of tactics and the clandestine nature of its
methods have perhaps given the Brotherhood a more
sinister reputation than it deserves. Only in the
Syrian "branch" is the Brotherhood a declared revo-
lutionary force determined to overthrow the secular
regime. In other countries such as Egypt, Sudan, and
Jordan, the governments have used the Brotherhood
to counter threats from leftists and Arab nationalists.
such non-Arab countries as West Germany, United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Malaysia are linked in
any way. It may only be the name that is a common
feature.
A common set of objectives, as opposed to true
fraternal links, underlies Brotherhood pronounce-
ments in all countries:
? Substitution of the Shariah for Western legal
systems.
? An economy based on Koranic principles, including
the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax
codes by the traditional zakat (alms tax) to help the
poor. 25X1
? The relegation of women to the home tofufiill their
divinely ordered function of bearing and raising
We expect the Brotherhood's ideology to remain
attractive, especially among disadvantaged youth in
developing countries, as an Islamic fundamentalist
counterpoint to the perceived threat of Westerniza-
tion. The presence of a secret society will create
tensions between the Brotherhood and the host gov-
ernments, particularly in secular states that are
deeply suspicious of the aims of a potentially destabi-
We have little evidence that the innumerable groups
of religious revivalists calling themselves the Muslim
Brotherhood that exist not only in Arab states but in
Reaffirmation and Purification
We believe the Islamic revival has been principally a
reaffirming and purifying force sweeping nominally
Muslim societies rather than a proselytizing force
attempting to convert nonbelievers as it was in past
centuries. The lax practice and distortion of orthodox
Islam has been moderated as both governments and
the opposition have used Islamic terminology and
symbols to introduce reforms in society. This attitudi-
nal change has spurred an unprecedented intellectual
revival in Islamic centers, international dialogues and
disputations, and a plethora of publications and study
groups. The profound communications and transpor-
tation explosion of the late 20th century has sparked
almost instantaneous awareness of the powerful mes-
sage of Islam by millions of villagers on the ubiquitous
 Islam has undergone numerous splits, rivalries, and
conflicts over the interpretation of the Koran and
Muhammad's messages on social and religious be-
havior among believers. The major division is be-
tween the two branches, Sunni and Shia. Numerous
subsects or schools of interpretation are included in
Sunni
More than 80 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis.
They are followers of the Sunnah, the way of the
Prophet, and recognize the first four caliphs (succes-
sors to Muhammad) as temporal leaders of Islam.
Within two centuries after the death of Muhammad,
however, no central authority interpreted Islamic
religious law. Instead, four schools of interpretation
evolved, based on the individuals who first espoused a
doctrinal version of the hadiths, the "six books" of
traditions under the Prophet. These schools (Hanbali,
Hanafi, ShafIi, and Maliki) are considered equally
valid, and a Sunni Muslim may follow any one of
Although Sunni Muslims have religious scholars and
clerics, they place greater stress on community con-
sensus than on the pronouncements of religious el-
ders. The religious establishments in Sunni states
have rarely posed a political threat to the regime, as
they accept a secular leader's right to rule the state.
They have often legitimized authoritarian rule by
their support and, at the same time, moderated the
leader's secular policies.
Shia
Shia Islam is based on the belief that the legitimate
leadership of the Islamic community rests exclusively
The purification element of Islamic activism has
omitted, almost without exception, any condemnation
of the concurrent technological revolution within the
Third World. Instead, it exists alongside knowledge
and control of advanced scientific techniques, agricul-
tural and industrial modernization, and, more omi-
nously, nuclear knowledge and sophisticated military
among the descendants of Muhammad's son-in-law
Ali, who was the fourth infallible imam. Over time
the line of succession came into dispute, with Shia
Islam dividing and subdividing into innumerable
sects, usually over interpretation of when a new
infallible imam would appear to bestow true knowl-
edge upon mankind. 25X1 25X1
Shias accept the doctrine of the indivisibility of
religious and political decision making in a literal
sense. This makes it easy for Shia adherents to
accept authoritative figures who interpret all laws-
civil and religious-in the spirit of an imam in the
Political Repercussions of the Split
The Sunni-Shia split has, throughout the history of
Islam, been one of its most divisive and, at times,
most bloody characteristics. In the 19th century this
split produced "reformist " or 'fundamentalist"
movements. In the last decade, Shias-who are a
minority except in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and North 25X1
Yemen-have fared poorly politically against the
more flexible Sunni majority. But, with Iran's revo-
lution, its proselytizing convictions, and the funds to
support its missionizing, new sectarian tensions have
come to other Muslim communities. To the Sunni or
secular leadership in countries such as Lebanon,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Kuwait, Shias
have been perceived as a politically destabilizing
threat that must be dealt with-sometimes delicate-
ly, sometimes with political repression.
applications. Some of the most militant fundamental-
ists have impressive Western educations in technical
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Sufism is a variant on orthodox Islam with broad
appeal, particularly in Africa. Sufi elements also
appear in the Soviet Union and in South and South-
east Asia. Sufism is not a "sect" as such but rather
an Islamic order with followers banded together,
usually under one historic teacher who often becomes
The SO tradition, which began several centuries
after Muhammad's death, is characterized by two
components: personal spiritual growth and union with
Allah through mystical ecstasy. It is condemned by
orthodox Islam and fundamentalism, which both
stress more rigid adherence to the Koran and the
Sufi religious orders in North Africa evolved into
numerous groups who believed that religious power
came from saints, tombs, and the descendants of
original teachers. In the rest of Africa, Surfraterni-
ties have stressed special rituals and charms and
have given cohesion and social order, especially in
rural areas. They have often represented particular
ethnic interests and, in some cases, commercial ties.
Qadiriya and TiJaniya are the two most popular Sufi
orders in Africa:
? Qadiriya. Abd al-Qadir al Jilani was a Persian
mystic and miracle worker who died in 1166 in
Baghdad after attracting hundreds of disciples and
followers. His conservative teachings came to be 25X1
laced with Sur mysticism and ecstasy producing
ceremonies through the centuries.
? Tijaniya. The TiJaniya Brotherhood sprang up in
the 19th century partly as a rival to the powerful
Qadiriyahs. Founded by a Moroccan cleric, Ahmad
al-Tifani (1737-1815), it spread through Islamic
Africa spearheaded through territorial conquests
by specific Sufi leaders. After waning, it reemerged
in the 20th century. It now is probably the largest
brotherhood in Africa with many largely autono-
mous branches ranging from western Upper Volta to
- 25X1
Politically, the Sul orders have had little influence
on the predominantly secular leadership of African
states. Sufism, however, has proved to be a resilient
restraining factor against the proselytizing of either 25X1
Saudi Wa'hhabis, radical Libyans, or fundamentalist
Iranians, all of whom regard Sufism as a heretical
form of Islam. rI 25X1
The Threat to Stability
Our analysis of fundamentalist groups worldwide
indicates that many of them, frustrated by their
inability to participate in their own domestic political
process, have turned to militancy and terrorism to
unseat unpopular secular leaders or "impure" Muslim
leaders. The ideologically motivated battle of the
fundamentalists against indigenous leaders who have
associated themselves too closely with Western secu-
larism is often bloody and dangerous-as irrational or
destructive as the assassination of Egypt's Sadat or
the terrorist bombing of peacekeeping forces in Bei-
Although fundamentalist groups can cause national
crises overnight with terrorist acts, they usually lose
more than they gain as the government undertakes
repressive measures against them.) 25X1
We have observed that governments' political re-
sponses over the past few years have followed patterns
Co-optation
Governments have set up varying forms of "establish-
ment Islam" in which they:
? Emphasize personal acts of piety and public reli-
gious observances by government leaders.
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? Engage in widespread building of mosques and
Islamic educational institutions.
? Establish Ministries of Religion, Islamic Affairs, or
similar structures in which religious figures can be
co-opted into the government establishment.
? Nationalize the clerics by making them civil
servants.
? Sponsor Islamic cultural events such as Koran
reading contests.
? Mandate more stringent observance of the Islamic
social code such as banning gambling, alcohol, and
nightclubs.
? Send religious leaders on representational trips to
In our view, these steps have short-range usefulness in
legitimizing the political leader and his regime but
have done little to dampen fundamentalist zeal. Co-
optation may have radicalized many Muslim youths .
who resent what they perceive as the government's
Repression
The alternative government response has been repres-
sion, which includes:
? Banning of radical literature, censorship of publica-
tions, and seizure of imported Islamic literature.
? Disbanding student organizations and banning
group meetings.
? Trying, jailing, and even executing fundamentalist
opposition.
? Targeting fundamentalist groups for security sur-
veillance and infiltration; setting up networks of
informers, agents, and provocateurs.
Publicly equating fundamentalism with fanaticism
Ruthless suppression has had its successes, most
noticeably in the Communist states. Other secular
states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Indonesia, have also
found that repression keeps opposition manageable.
We believe, however, that suppression of the funda-
mentalist opposition may eventually backfire, as it did
against Sadat in Egypt. Increasing numbers of funda-
mentalists may form extremist groups in exile, gain
financial assistance from Libya or Iran, and increase
their terrorist acts against secular or even moderate
The Future: Fundamentalism Limited
as a Political Force
We expect the Islamic revival to continue to exert
pressure on the leaders of Muslim countries but not to
create revolutionary changes either within the state or
in the relations between countries. Governments,
which can exploit Islam for political expediency,
economic enhancement, and genuine social change,
probably will continue a course of pragmatic accom-
modation with it. No government ignores its political-
ly divisive implications. Although we believe that 25X1
violent acts by Muslim extremists will continue to
plague the states of the Muslim world over the near
term, we do not expect the forces of fundamentalism
to unite in the unique conditions that produced the
Islamic Republic of Iran.O 25X1
Although the Iranian revolution unquestionably
strengthened the Islamic revival, we believe that the
inherent divisiveness and multisectarian and mutually
intolerant character of the Muslim world, including 25X1
the presence of ethnic, tribal, and national rivalries,
will work against a unified movement that could
coalesce against US interests. We know of no charis-
matic leader who transcends national lines. Although
we expect Iran and Libya to continue their efforts to
export a more militant brand of Islam and Saudi
Arabian coffers to spill out millions to support friend-
ly, conservative states, we believe their influence will
continue to be limited, especially where the two
superpowers are largely inimical to their aims
Our analysis shows that Islamic resurgence has often
generated anti-Western attitudes and policies and a
suspicion of Western intentions. The fundamentalists
are hostile to the United States on several counts:
? It is a predominantly Christian country with a
constitutionally mandated separation between
church and state.
? Its materialism and immorality (as perceived by the
fundamentalists) are offensive.
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? It is a benefactor to the power elite of regimes
throughout the Muslim world. For Islamic militants
opposing their own rulers, the United States shares
the role of villain.
? The fundamentalists see the United States as favor-
ing Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
? Fundamentalists blame the United States for failing
to propose an equitable solution to the Palestinian
Most militant fundamentalist groups display a xeno-
phobic fear that the West, specifically the United
States, will translate what the groups see as disdain
for Islam into active interference and confrontation.
This perception has impaired US initiatives for peace
in the Middle East and has bred an intransigence and
intolerance among the fundamentalists that we be-
lieve is a legacy of years of Islamic animosity to the
Christian world's predominance in world affairs.
"Neither East nor West" is a recurrent and popular
theme in current Islamic ideology, but the fundamen-
talists usually find the Soviet Union's message more
appealing than that of the United States because of its
stronger support for revolutionary change against
entrenched regimes. The Soviet invasion of Afghani-
We believe that the Islamic factor will be a potential-
ly destabilizing force for many Muslim nations with
which the United States has strategic relations and
that it will require increased sensitivity on the part of
US policy to contain subversion by fundamentalists.
Although we do not believe that extremist religious
groups will be able to seize control of governments
anywhere in the Islamic world in the near term, they
are capable-as evidenced by the assassination of
Sadat-of taking violent action against close US
An attempt by the government of a Muslim country
to diminish Islam's normally important role in govern-
ment decisionmaking could obscure important indica-
tors of a serious challenge to the government. For
example, the stilled voice of the clerics under the Shah
in Iran contributed to a US misassessment of the
Shah's staying power. On the other hand, an overreac-
tion to our problems with predicting the Iranian
revolution might lead us to misperceive a threat to US
interests resulting from Islamic resurgence. In most
cases, governments probably will continue to co-opt
 OTrinidad and Tobago
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Senegal
w~nea-
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Guinea
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Uganda Kenya
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Kuwait
Gatar
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Saudi
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Areas scaled according to Muslim population
Muslim Country Muslims as a
population equivalent percentage of
---------- I . 14.000.000 Afnanistan total population
.. 1,250000 Sri Lanka
... 250,000 Guinea Bissau
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Iran
 The Middle. East:
Crisis at the Epicenter
The Islamic revival has had its greatest impact in the
Middle East, the birthplace of Islam. In its radical
fundamentalist forms, it provides a divinely inspired
Islamic answer to the social dislocations of modern-
ization. In states where religious expression is inextri-
cably associated with political action, moreover, Is-
lamic radicalism and militancy are paths for social
change. Petroleum wealth has added to the equa-
tion-as both the engine of rapid modernization and
In foreign relations, Islam provides the cement bind-
ing disparate societies together in their rhetorical, if
not actual, conflict with the Jewish state of Israel in
their midst. Common Islamic bonds intensify the
Middle Eastern fixation on the Palestinian dilemma.
Despite these bonds, Islamic unity is perennially
wracked by the region's theological variations of
fundamentalist belief, variations that have led from
Two nations in the Middle East can claim to be
genuinely fundamentalist. Saudi Arabia, a tribal
kingdom ruled by the Saud family, which united with
the religious hierarchy a century ago, contains the
holiest shrines of Islam, proclaims the Shariah as its
legal system, and, using its oil wealth, has attempted
to influence other Muslim nations with its version of
fundamentalist principles. The second, Iran, is not
Arab but underwent a revolution in 1979, which is
considered by all experts to be by far the most serious
Islamic movement of the 20th century. The successful
Shia assumption of political power, wrested by the
masses from an entrenched autocrat and powerful
military, has evolved into a theocracy that continues
to attempt to influence and destabilize neighboring
Muslim states{
The religious policies of most other regimes in the
region range from orthodox to modernist, seeking
policies by which the leadership can retain political
power yet accommodate, co-opt, and even coerce the
common religion. Jordan and Egypt have set out
ambitious modernization plans, heavily dependent on
Saudi and US financial aid, while the rulers empha-
size their Islamic credentials and fully support "estab-
lishment" Islam. The lesser Gulf monarchies, starting
from the basis of highly traditional and underdevel-
oped societies, are heavily dependent on foreigners for
technological advancement, which makes them vul-
nerable to militant Islam and its rejection of the West.
Within the last few years, these rulers have tried to
balance Westernization with traditional values by
stricter enforcement of Islam's social and ethical
codes and increased linkages with other Muslim
states. North Yemen has proclaimed itself an Islamic
Arab socialist republic but has had only marginal
success at mixing modernization with traditional
The Arab secular regimes, which have never recog-
nized Islam as a basis for government-the Ba'thist
socialists of Syria and Iraq, the embattled regime of
divided and war-torn Lebanon, and Marxist South 25X1
Yemen-all face in varying degrees the threat of
politicized Islam undermining their unpopular
Ideological failures and a crisis of legitimacy continue
to provide fertile ground for Islamic militancy
throughout the region. Shaped by the postcolonial
demarcations of foreign powers, without genuine wars
of independence to hone true nationalism, most Mid-
dle Eastern countries are searching for an identity to
match their cultural roots. Most reformist political
trends-Islamic socialism, Arab nationalism, Marx-
ism-have failed to bring about lasting peace and
stability. To increasing numbers of youth (more than
half of the populations of almost all countries are
under 20), Islamic ideals are appealing. Radical revo-
lutionary criticism of the country's leadership and its
hypocrisy, corruption, failure to spread the wealth,
and inability to bring about social justice is increas-
ing. Since political channels of expression are few in
states that are either monarchical, authoritarian, or
feudal, opposition isincreasin ly expressed in reli-
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0
LUR
Sunni Muslim majority
Shia Muslim majority
Shia Muslim concentration
Significant Muslim minority
Selected ethnic group
0 200 Kilometers
I' I
0 200 Mile.
I
25X1
Young activists who see deep-rooted Islamic values
being challenged or abandoned by their rulers are
gaining militant converts, stressing opposition to de-
velopments such as the broader role of women in their
changing societies. Their militancy also has taken the
form of sectarian or tribal strife, concealing with the
mantle of Islamic purification more ancient differ-
Not surprisingly, the Iranian revolution sent waves of
alarm through the leadership of neighboring states. It
had widespread appeal among the Muslim masses of
the Middle East, Sunni as well as Shia, for several
reasons:
? It demonstrated that the masses can overturn a
powerful regime, removing its legitimacy by sus-
tained struggle.
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Country
Total
Population
Percent Principal Sect
Muslims (Percent)
Bahrain
393,000
100
Shia-65
Sunni-35
Cyprus
653,000
18
Sunni
Egypt
45, 800,000
93
Sunni-93
Shia-less
than I
Sufism
Sunni-6
Sufism
Iraq
14,500,000
95
Shia-55
Sunni-40
Israel
4,000,000 a
11
Sunni
Jordan
2,600,000
92
Sunni
Kuwait
1,700,000
99
Sunni-69
Shia-30
Lebanon
2,600,000
74
Shia-40
Sunni-27
Druze--7
Oman
978,000
100
Ibadhi-75
Sunni-25
Shia-less
than I
Qatar
267,000
100
Sunni
(Wa'hhabi)-89
Shia-1 I
Saudi Arabia
10,400,000
100
Sunni
(Wa'hhabi)-95
Shia-5
Government Status of Foreign Prognosis
Fundamentalism Involvement
Among Muslims
Shaykhdom Growing, Iran Sectarian
especially among unrest
Shins
Republic Minimal None known Greek-
divided into Turkish
Greek and Turk enmity
political
entities
Authoritarian Strong mass Saudi Arabia Islam prime
republic appeal, many source of
groups dissension
theocracy philosophy; fundamental-
state supported ist fervor
Socialist, Increasing Iran, Syria, Repression,
one party Libya sectarian
strife
Parliamentary Signs of revival None known Islamic popu-
democracy lation may
become more
assertive,
troublesome
Constitutional Weak, some Saudi Arabia - Probably
monarchy government stable
support
Shaykhdom Increasing; some Iran Probably
government stable; terror-
sponsored ism a threat
Parliamentary Religious Syria, Iran, Partition
democracy revival not a Saudi Arabia between Mus-
major factor in lims and
civil war Christians
possible
Absolute Latent Saudi Arabia, Probably
shaykhdom South Yemen stable
Shaykhdom No evidence Saudi Arabia, Stability
Iran
Islamic . Government Iran Probably
monarchy sponsored stable
Alawite-11 socialist rising among tensions,
Druze-3 Sunnis repression
Shia-1.5
 Table 1
Middle East (continued)
Country
Total
Population
Percent Principal Sect
Muslims (Percent)
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Prognosis
Turkey
49,200,000
99
Sunni-79
Alevi-20
Sufism
Military rule
Growth in
religious interest
Iran
Sectarian ten-
sions persist
United Arab
Emirates
1,400,000
100
Sunni-95
Shia-5
Federation of
shaykhdoms
No evidence
None known
Probably
stable
Yemen, North
5,700,000
100
Zaydi Shia-52
Sunni-48
Military rule
Growing, many
small groups
Iran, Saudi
Arabia,
Egypt,
Syria, PLO
Chronic
instability
Marxist
No evidence
No evidence
Probably
stable
? It was a Third World victory in which both super-
powers were powerless to stop its momentum.
? Regardless of its subsequent tarnish theologically, it
was an Islamic victory after decades of defeat in the
region at the hands of other ideologies.
Consequently, most Arab nations have rated "funda-
mentalists" and "Shias" as first-priority internal se-
curity threats. Arab calls for militant unity against
Israel and solutions for Palestine remain popular, but
the catalytic effect of the Iranian revolution has
injected a new appeal that is potentially destabilizin
to the regimes of the Middle East in the long run.
Bahrain
PopulationlEtbnic Composition: 393,000. 313,000
native Arabs; 80,000 foreigners, primarily Indians
Religious Composition: Approximately 65 percent
Shia and 35 percent Sunni Muslim. About 20 percent
Government: Ruled as a traditional Arab emirate by
the Sunni Muslim Khalifa family since the late 18th
century, then became constitutional monarchy with
independence in 1971. The current Amir, Isa bin
Sulman Al-Khalifa, has ruled since 1961 in consulta-
tion with family members and a Council of Ministers,
many of whom are Khalifas. Bahrain had a National
Assembly from 1973 until 1975, when it was dissolved
Religious Policies of Government: Islamic state with
the reputation among the more conservative Gulf
states for laxity in applying Shariah (religious law)
and for toleration of decadence (permitting discos,
mixing of the sexes, and sale of alcohol). The govern-
ment permits Christian sects to maintain places of 25X1
worship but frowns on proselytizing. Since a coup .
attempt in 1981, Bahrain has accelerated its policy of
removing Shias from sensitive positions in govern-
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The government maintains separate
Sunni and Shia religious courts as well as secular
ones; Islamic Affairs Ministry has separate Sunni and
Shia departments. Although the ruling family is
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Egypt: President Sadat's defi-
ant assassins on trialF-
Saudi Arabia: Rapid modern-
ization in a tribal shaykhdom
6
DMA3 i I-QUI)MB
25X1
- ----------------
Sunni, the Amir contributes to religious organizations Sunni and Shia fundamentalist societies and public
and consults with religious leaders of both sects. Both displays of devotion to Islamic practices are increas-
Sunnis and Shias hold government positions, includ- ing. Some evidence that a corresponding growth in
ing Cabinet posts clandestine, antiregime, religious-based factions exists
LLI J G' i ~~i~ii/~ - 0
I
Status of Fundamentalism: Support for fundamental-
ist causes is growing within the Shia community and
to a lesser extent among the Sunnis; membership in
 ban-Iraq war: A conflagration threatening the region and beyond
? Islamic Call (Da wah) Party (ICP): The clandestine
ICP, apparently an offshoot of the Iraqi Da'wah
? Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB): Bahraini regime.
Based in Iran, the clandestine IFLB was responsible
for the coup attempt in December 1981. The IFLB Foreign Involvement: Iran supports Shia dissident
seeks the overthrow of the Khalifas and the estab- groups, the IFLB, and the ICP; little known of exact
lishment of an Iranian-type Islamic republic in amount of financial support
Bahrain.
? The Islamic Enlightenment Society: An overt Shia
religious club centered in the Shia villages of north-
west Bahrain, it is the largest fundamentalist group;
it is headed by Shaykh `Isa Ahmad Qasim. It
probably is a front for the clandestine Islamic Call
(Da'wah) Party (ICP).
Recent Developments:
? 16 December 1981: Attempted coup against ruling
Khalifa family.
 nized in the Gulf, are likely to repeat their attempt to
remove the Khalifas. The government's seemingly
tolerant policies will do little to win it Shia approval
or assuage the deep-seated tensions between the Sunni
and Shia communities. Gestures of conciliation to
Shia moderates and threats of punishment to religious
militants will not remove the sources of sectarian
unrest. Shias will continue to resent the dominant
Sunni minority and to use religious organizations-
whether legitimate or clandestine-as vehicles for
Status of Fundamentalism: Islamic resurgence ap-
pears minimal, only as a social accompaniment to
tion Council on security and intelligence matters=Fundamentalist Organizations: None reportedly ac-
tive, although Cyprus has long served as a haven for
? 20 December 1981: Bahrain signed a bilateral
security pact with Saudi Arabia immediately after
the coup attempt was uncovered and has encour-
aged broader cooperation within the Gulf Coopera-
Cyprus
Population/Ethnic Composition: 653,000. 78 percent
Greek; 18 percent Turk; 4 percent Armenian, Maro-
Religious Composition: 18 percent Sunni Muslim
(118,000); 78 percent Greek Orthodox; 4 percent
Maronite, Armenian, Apostolic, other. Muslims are
exclusively Turks, concentrated in the northern 37
Government: Republic, but divided into two separate
ethnic-based political entities. Greeks control the only
internationally recognized government in the south.
Turks established a federated state in 1975 and in
November 1983 proclaimed an independent "Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus." Turkey is the only
country that has recognized the new Turkish Cypriot
Religious Policies of Government. Both communities
are officially secular and tolerant of all religious
Government: Mufti of Cyprus has no political func-
tion, serves only as official expounder of Islamic law.
Recent Developments:
? January 1984: Turkish Cypriot "government" un-
successfully sought recognition by Muslim states at
the Casablanca meeting of the Islamic Conference
Organization.0 25X1
Prognosis: Greek and Turkish enmity will continue, 25X1
with Islam playing a role only as an identifying
Egypt
Population/Ethnic Composition: 45.8 million. 90 per-
cent 25X1
eastern Hamitic; about 10 percent Greek, Ital-
Religious Composition: 93 percent Muslim (42.6
million); 7 percent Christian Copt and other. Muslims
are 93 percent Sunni, less than 1 percent Shia. Strong
25X1
Government: Monarchy indirectly ruled by Great
Britain until toppled by military coup led by Maj.
Gen. Muhammad Naguib in 1952. He was replaced
as President in 1954 by Col. Gamal Abd al-Nasir.
Nasir espoused Arab socialism and Egyptian nation-
alism with Soviet support. After defeat by Israel in
1967, Nasir's leftist policies were somewhat discredit-
ed. 25X1
His Vice President, Anwar Sadat, became Presi-
dent when Nasir died in 1970. Sadat was assassinated
by Muslim extremists in October 1981 and was 25X1
succeeded by his Vice President, Hosni Mubarak.
Republican government under a strong executive with
elected legislature dominated by government party,
an independent judiciary, and regular legislative and
presidential elections0 25X1
25X1
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Religious Policies of Government: Secular govern-
ment. President Nasir subordinated the role of the
ulema, reduced their power and wealth by making
them civil servants, secularized religious courts, and
banned the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. The
military defeat by Israel in 1967 resulted in a popular
revival of religion among Egyptians. In 1970 Sadat
took political advantage of this trend by supporting
Islamic fundamentalists to counter leftist influence in
government and among youth. The government con-
tinued its sponsorship of official forms of Islam,
extensive mosque building, and co-opting the religious
hierarchy until September 1981 when Sadat sharply
reduced his tolerance for fundamentalism and ordered
massive arrests of extremist leaders. Mubarak has
continued official ban of Islamic radicals but main-
tains a truce with the Muslim Brotherhood. He has
also moved to install moderates in religious institu-
tions and to improve strained relations with other
Muslim states caused by the peace treaty with Israel.
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Egypt is the intellectual center of Islam.
A wide spectrum of Islamic thought exists, and, as a
result, numerous groups have proliferated. The offi-
cial Muslim establishment is employed directly or
dominated by the state and has no separate power
base. The Grand Shaykh of Al Azhar, a presidential
appointee, oversees Al Azhar University, the center of
Islamic intellectual activity. The Ministry for Reli-
gious Trusts controls the purse strings for both Mus-
lim and Coptic welfare activities. The Grand Mufti,
another presidential appointee, is theoretically highest
authority on Islamic law but performs largely ceremo-
nial role. Both are highly esteemed moderates. The
relatively moderate fundamentalist Muslim Brother-
Status of Fundamentalism: Religious revival has gone
on in Egypt sporadically in the 20th century. Latest
revival opposed Sadat's liberal social and economic
policies and has strong antiregime flavor that appears
destined to affect any government's future social and
economic policies. Islamic fundamentalism finds par-
ticular appeal among educated youth, both urban and
rural, and is even common in the lower levels of
Fundamentalist Organizations: There are two major
moderate organizations and a large number of ex-
tremist offshoots that have gone underground:
? Muslim Brotherhood (MB): Egypt's earliest Islamic
fundamentalist organization, has evolved from early
radicalism of 1930s into a moderate organization
dedicated to development of an Islamic state. Mem-
bership is estimated at 500,000; organization ap-
pears tight and disciplined; name of nominal leader
is Umar Talmasana. MB is banned but unofficially
tolerated because it poses no threat to government.
? Jama'iyat al-Shari'ah (Legal Society): A smaller,
moderate offshoot from Muslim Brotherhood which
Extremist Groups: They range from small groups of
less than 100 to groups up t6 5,000 strong. All 25X1
advocate violent overthrow of the government. Mem-
bership is drawn mostly from young professionals and
students. Activities range from pamphleteering to
violent confrontations with Coptic Christian minority.
The following is a partial list of known groups:
? Al-Taktir Wa al-Hijrah (Repentance and Holy
Flight).
? Al-Jihad (Holy Struggle).
? Al-Jihad al-Jadid (The New Holy Struggle): The
name of an umbrella organization of radicals who
assassinated President Sadat. Most members arrest-
ed, some executed.
? Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party)
with its youth wing, Shabab Muhammad (Youth of
Muhammad), is part of a multistate network found-
ed in 1948 and dedicated to establishing a caliphate
in Islamic countries. Clandestine, underground
group whose leadership in Egypt was arrested.
? Jama'at ahl-Bayt (People of the House).
? Jama'at Quwwat al-Quran (Forces of the Koran).
? New Islam.
? Hizb Allah (God's Party).
? Tanzim al-Qutbiyun (Supporters of Sayyid Qutb).
? Al-Tala'ia al-Islamiya (The Islamic Vanguard).
? Group for the Promotion of Virtue.
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Foreign Involvement: The government suspects exter-
nal funding and encouragement of fundamentalist
and radical societies. Saudi Arabia is believed to have
been the original banker of Muslim Brotherhood
activities, and both Iran and Libya are rumored to
have funneled money to militant antiregime groups.
Thus far, we have no proof of anything more than
Recent Developments:
? 1977: Two extremist groups, Al-Takfir Wa al-
Hijrah and Al-Jihad, kidnaped and assassinated the
Minister for Religious Trusts; government, in major
crackdown, captured and executed leadership of the
two groups.
? 1979: Fundamentalist students staged strikes in
reaction to government passage of liberalized
women's rights law and signing of peace treaty with
Israel; President Sadat abolished fundamentalist-
dominated student unions.
? November 1979: Islamic societies staged massive
prayer service in Cairo.
? September 1981: Sadat attacked Muslim Brother-
hood and jailed hundreds of extremists and other
dissidents.
? 6 October 1981: Sadat assassinated by AI-Jihad al-
Jadid followers who called for general uprising
Prognosis: Islam will continue to be a dominant
source of dissension, and the Islamic right will remain
the most politically explosive force opposing the gov-
ernment, particularly if Mubarak fails to effectively
address basic social and economic concerns.F__~
Iran
Population/Ethnic Composition: 42.5 million. 63 per-
cent Persians; 18_ percent Turkic (Azarbayjanis, Turk-
mens, Qashqais); 3 percent Arab; 16 percent other
(Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Baluch, Gilanis, Mazandor-
anis, Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews).
Religious Composition of Population: 97 percent
Islam (41.6 million) of which 91 percent is Shia and 6
percent is Sunni (mostly in southwest, southeast, and
northwest areas among the Turkomans, Arabs, Ba-
luch, and some Kurds). Sufi orders are still active.
Government: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who
had ruled with one interruption since 1941, was
overthrown in bloody revolution, and Islamic Repub-
lic was established in 1979 under leadership of Aya-
tollah Khomeini. The 270-member Islamic Consulta-
tive Assembly (Majlis) has legislative powers, with
Council of Guardians reviewing all legislation for
fidelity to the principles of Islam. Judicial authorities
are religious jurists.) 25X1
Religious Policies of Government. The constitution
provides that Shia Islam is the official religion. Other
Islamic denominations "enjoy complete respect," and
the recognized minority religions (Christianity, Juda-
ism, and Zoroastrianism) are "free within the limits of
the law to perform their religious rites." There ap-
pears, however, to be persecution and discrimination
of some religious groups. The government has moved
forcefully against the Bahai faith, which is not offi-
cially recognized. The government enforces Islamic
tenets by a number of official and "revolutionary"
organizations, including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary
Guard), which is also a defensive force that outnum-
bers the regular army. Many smaller groups such as
Hezbollahi and Komitehs function domestically to
restrict women's activities, indoctrinate youth, and
prevent any signs of Western orientation in dress and
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The government is run by clerics who are
divided along theological, political, geographic, gener-
ational, and educational lines. Those politically active
clerics who support Ayatollah Khomeini's regime are
divided roughly into three groups: the Line-of-the-
Imam (Khat-elman) and Hojatieh factions and oppor-
tunists like Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, who are
not firmly affiliated with either group. Other senior
ayatollahs oppose the Khomeini regime in varying
degrees, but they have been outmaneuvered by
Khomeini's supporters. The Islamic Republic Party
seems to dominate the government but does not fully
 control the executive and legislature. On the neigh-
borhood and village level, the political power of the
local "Komiteh" (made up of mosque clergy and
Status Of Fundamentalism: The revolution is the most
conspicuous example of fundamentalist fervor trans-
lated into the overturn of a secular state. A genuinely
popular movement when it triumphed, its Shia char-
acter continues to have strong emotional and symbolic
appeal among the lower classes who are its power
base, buttressed by fundamentalist clerics and the
Fundamentalist Organizations: The government and
its political arm, the Islamic Republic Party, are
fundamentalist. Other organizations include:
Hojatieh Society: Society for the propagation of
Islam, anti-Bahai, formed in 1950s. Currently, a
faction favoring strict Islamic law, use of Western
technology to help the economy, limited clerical
intervention in secular affairs, and export of the
revolution.
? Line-of-the-Imam: Faction that emphasizes the
more revolutionary aspects of Iran's revolution and
favors good relations with the USSR, centralized
economy, and a single clerical successor to
Khomeini.
? Qom Theological Circle: Influential clerics in Iran's
theological capital who maintain links to clerics
throughout the country.
Foreign Involvement: Foreign involvement in Iran by
non-Shia Muslims is nonexistent. Instead, Iran is an
exporter of its version of Islam and has attempted, for
example, to subvert the leadership in Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. The government spon-
sors proselytizing missions to Africa and South and
Southeast Asia, with little success thus far. It is
currently implicated in backing radical Shia terrorists
in Lebanon, a chief target for export of the Iranian
Recent Developments:
? 1980: Khomeini created the Basij, a militia force of
20 million youths led by the Revolutionary Guard
25X1
? Late 1982: The Tudeh (Communist) Party, only
non-Islamic political group, banned with mass ar-
rests and executions of members.
? December 1982: Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized
that Iran is "no longer in a revolutionary situation"
and that the regime should concentrate on guaran-
teeing civil liberties because the opposition has been
curbed. Committees to implement this decree and
some reforms apparently taking place.
? July-August 1983: Rival conservative clerics spon-
sored antiregime demonstrations in cities of Esfahan
and Mashhad, attacking government's radical social
and economic policies 25X1
Prognosis: No successful challenge to the regime is
likely while Ayatollah Khomeini lives. Fundamental-
ist fervor is not likely to significantly weaken, even
after Khomeini's death, and any new government will
Iraq
Population/Ethnic Composition: 14.5 million. 70.9
percent Arabs; 18.3 percent Kurds; 2.4 percent
Religious Composition of Population: 95 percent
Muslim (13.8 million), 5 percent Christians and oth-
ers. 55 percent Shia, 40 percent Sunni. In general, the
Shias predominate in eastern and southern provinces,
the Sunnis in western and northern provinces. Iraq is
a major center of Shia Islam because it is site of its 25X1
holiest shrines in Najaf and KarbalaF I 25X1
Government: Monarchy overthrown in 1958 by mili-
tary coup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim. Ba'th Party
(Arab Socialist) overturned Qasim in February 1963,
losing power by end of 1963. Ba'th Party regained
power in coup of 1968, then series of countercoups
until Ba'thist Saddam Husayn's ascension in 1979.
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Authoritarian, secular, but Sunni-dominated govern-
ment, with Saddam's Tikriti clan associates preemi-
Religious Policies of Government. Since the Ba'th
Party returned to power in 1968, it has struggled to
consolidate power in a country plagued by Sunni-Shia
factionalism. The party charter establishes Islam as a
state religion. All minority religions are tolerated. The
government proclaims a policy of nondiscrimination
toward the Shias, who nonetheless are underrepre-
sented in the upper ranks of the military and govern-
ment. Shias lag well behind Sunnis economically and
socially despite recent government efforts to improve
The Ba'thist regime has adopted a carrot-and-stick
approach to the Shia problem. It has curried the
support of Shia religious leaders, expanded economic
and educational opportunities in Shia areas, and
recruited Shias into the Ba'th Party. At the same
time, it has ruthlessly suppressed all overt manifesta-
tions of Shia discontent, has executed some Shia
leaders, and continues to supervise all Shia clergy and
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The Ba'th Party is predominantly Sunni,
partly because Sunni-dominated security services
dealt more harshly with Shias, who controlled the
party in the 1950s. As a result of subsequent party
dominance by Sunnis, many Shias view the Ba'thists
as merely the latest in the long line of Sunni oppres-
There are numerous interlocking and shifting Shia
opposition groups. Although minor anti-Ba'thist dem-
onstrations have occurred sporadically for years in
Shia areas of Iraq, such demonstrations increased
after Ayatollah Khomeini gained power in Iran. Shia
dissident activities have increased since early 1982
but remain episodic and more an irritant than a
Status of Fundamentalism. Fundamentalist opposi-
tion to Ba'th secular regime centers in Shia groups,
but there is evidence that Islamic backlash is occur-
ring among some Sunnis as well. Economic depriva-
tion, prolonged warfare, and rapid cultural change are
all factors for Islamic resurgence. Nearby Iranian
revolution has, however, held limited appeal to
faction-ridden fundamentalists who lack a charismat- 25X1
25X1
Fundamentalist Organizations: Innumerable small
groups of antiregime dissidents use fundamentalist
rhetoric to galvanize struggle against Saddam's rule.
They are badly splintered, reflecting tribal and re-
gional power bases; leadership is shifting with fre-
quent organizational renaming; the government inter-
nal security apparatus ruthlessly breaks up
clandestine groups. The umbrella organization is
Da'wah (Call) Party with its action arm the Muja- 25X1
hedin, which has headquarters in Tehran and London
and close ties to Khomeini's regime. Most groups exist
only on paper. Da'wah itself is split by its two leaders,
who are brothers. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim is
based in Tehran and holds the fundamentalist view
that Iraq should become an Islamic state. Mahdi al-
Hakim is based in London and is inclined toward
creating a secular government heavily imbued with
Foreign Involvement: Iraq's dissidents vie for support
from Iran, Syria, and Libya, all of which provide
limited financial aid and training to groups. Iran and
Syria aid competing factions in Iraq and continue to
Recent Developments:
? June 1979: Saddam ordered execution of Sayyed
Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, most widely respected
Shia cleric, for demonstrating during Muharram.
? September 1980: Iraq invaded Iran in war continu-
ing to present, with Saddam appealing to conserva-
tive Arab states for assistance against Khomeini's
counterattack and call for an Islamic state in Iraq.
? Fall 1982: While in Iran, exiled Shias proclaimed
interim government under leadership of Muham-
mad Baqr al-Hakim, leading Shia dissident.
? Spring 1983: Saddam in speech at Najaf called for
"revival of heavenly values" and reasserts his fam-
ily's claim of descent from the Prophet.
? May 1983: Saddam executed six members of al-
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Prognosis: Fundamentalist opposition to regime re-
mains badly splintered, despite the regime's economic
disarray and political unpopularity. Should Iraq lose
its war with Iran, fundamentalist militancy would
play a role in a future state-probably for destabiliza-
tion, when it would compete with Kurds seeking
Israel
Population/Ethnic Composition: 4 million in Israel
proper. 85 percent Jews; 15 percent Arabs. In occu-
pied West Bank and Gaza territories, population is
estimated to be about 1.29 million, 96 percent Arab.
Religious Composition: In Israel proper, 85 percent
Jewish, 11 percent (475,000) Muslim; 4 percent Chris-
tian and other. More than 95 percent Muslim in
Government: Secular republic founded in 1948 as a
homeland for Jews. Parliamentary democracy with no
constitution, but strong unicameral legislature and
multiparty system. Elections are held every four
years. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who had
ruled since 1977, resigned in September 1983 and was
Religious Policies of Government. Although estab-
lished as a homeland for Jews, official policy is
tolerance of all creeds. Unofficially, Muslims are
discriminated against and forbidden to serve in the
armed forces. They were largely ignored until take-
over of West Bank in 1967 significantly increased the
Muslim population. For the last decade government
has paid greater attention to Muslims (built mosques,
helped pilgrims on hajj) in attempt to create bulwark
against rising Arab nationalism. Government places
heavy emphasis on surveillance of possible extremist
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment. to
Government: Arabs, who are predominantly Muslims,
have suffered land expropriation, economic discrimi-
nation, and social and political isolation. No Islamic
party is represented in parliament, which has only a
few token Arab representatives. Arabs have political
influence only in towns such as Nazareth, which is
largely Arab. As second-class citizens, Arabs have
Status of Fundamentalism: The last few years have
seen reinvigoration and renewal of Islam among
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Muslim Brotherhood: Formally established in 1980.
Little known of extent of membership although it is
believed to be confined generally to Arab-populated
25X1
25X1
25X1
Recent Developments:
? 1979: Fundamentalist movement started among 25X1
Arabs at Hebrew University, beginning with study
groups and radical speeches.
? 11 December 1980: Prime Minister Begin banned
an Israel Arab Congress to be held at Nazareth.
? February 1981: Government arrested 60 militant
youths of the Muslim Brotherhood.
? 19 March 1983: Militant Israelis tried to break into
Temple Mount and occupy Al Aqsa mosque, both
sacred to Islam. Police discovered bomb cache
destined for Arab schools.
Prognosis: Government is increasingly alarmed by
possibility of clash between extremists from both 25X1
Jewish and Arab Muslim population. Incidents of civil
disorder are likely to increase during next few years as
fundamentalist Islam and PLO causes become inter-
twined{
Jordan
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.6 million. 98 per-
cent Arab. More than half of the population is of
Palestinian origin; most of the rest are of Bedouin
origin.
Government: Constitutional monarchy since state was
founded in 1950 as a successor to the former Emirate
of Transjordan, controlled by Great Britain. First
king, Abdallah, was assassinated in 1951. After brief
rule by his son Talal, grandson Hussein assumed the
I
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 throne in 1952. Hussein rules as absolute monarch
with advice of an elected House of Representatives
and an appointed Senate. He abolished political par-
Religious Policies of Government. Religious minor-
ities are tolerated under constitution. Otherwise Jor-
dan is a de facto Islamic state. Hussein's claimed
direct descent from Prophet Muhammad legitimizes
his political and religious rule. Government supports
and thoroughly co-opts conservative Islam through
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Holy Places, and Reli-
gious Trusts and subsidizes clergy. At the same time,
the government has attempted to co-opt the funda-
mentalist movement by recognizing relatively moder-
ate Muslim Brotherhood and allowing Brotherhood
exiles from other Arab countries to live in Jordan. The
government also uses highly effective internal security
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: No politically independent Muslim hier-
archy exists; all clerics are part of the state's system
institutionalized through the Ministry of Islamic Af-
fairs. Religious bureaucracy even extends into the
ranks of the military to reinforce piety and loyalty to
the King. High-ranking officials in Muslim Brother-
hood may play a consultative role in the government's
domestic and foreign policy. Fundamentalists hold
several seats in Jordan's lower house of Parliament.
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist revival,
which got a boost from the Iranian revolution, does
not appear to threaten the regime. The government
encourages limited fundamentalist activity to com-
pensate for lack of other allowable political activity as
well as to legitimize Hussein's rule)
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Muslim Brotherhood (MB): A legal, nonrevolution-
ary organization with about 3,000 members, mostly
from universities and trade unions, that seeks even-
tual Islamic state. Leader is lawyer Abd al-Rahman
Khalifa. The MB recruits actively among educated;
middle-class youth. It does not pose a threat to
government and is allowed only so long as it con-
fines its activities to addressing religious, not politi-
cal, issues.
? Islamic Liberation Party (ILP): Espouses violence to
establish an Islamic state and overthrow of neigh-
boring moderate Arab governments. Banned since
1952, underground membership is now about 200. 25X1
Ten members were arrested in 1977 for infiltrating
the Army, plotting to assassinate King Hussein.
Reportedly has cells in other Arab nations. Head is
Abd al-Hafiz Sha'rawi. Closely watched by Jorda-
nian security.
? Da'wah: A nonpolitical, proselytizing group of re-
formists led by Muhammad Mustafa al-Rapati.
Foreign Involvement: Saudis are the major benefactor
as they try to preserve moderate monarchy. The
government is suspicious of Iranian financial assis-
tance; the MB harbors radicals from other Arab
countries, particularly Syria. The government sus- 25X1
pects that some small radical splinter groups have left
the MB because it is too moderate. One prominent
radical cleric, Shaykh Tamimi, who is reportedly a
Recent Developments:
? Early 1981: The government suspected that some
MB members had established paramilitary training
camps in remote areas.
? September 1982: A small number of ILP members
in the Army were arrested.
? 1983: ILP members, Shaykh Tamimi and his son, 25X1
arrested several times for making inflammatory
Prognosis: Although Hussein pursues a careful policy
that blends conservative Islamic legitimacy with evo-
lutionary modernization, if corruption among the elite
increases and income gap widens, militant Islam 25X1
could possibly become more influential and threaten
Kuwait
Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.7 million. Ku-
waitis comprise less than 40 percent of the population;
foreign population includes 300,000 Palestinians as
well as a large number of Iraqis, Iranians, Syrians,
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Religious Composition: 99 percent Muslim (1.6 mil-
lion), mostly Sunnis; Shias comprise 30 percent of the
? The Social Cultural Society: The Shia equivalent of
the Social Reform Society, an overt club with no
apparent signs of antiregime political activity.
In addition, two clandestine organizations exist:
? The Sala tyyin.? A clandestine, ultraconservative
Sunni faction that may be connected to the group
that took over the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.
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Government: A shaykhdom ruled by the Sabah family.
since the mid-18th century; Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-
Jabir Al Sabah has reigned since 1977. Kuwait has a
constitution and an elected 50-man National Assem-
Religious Policies of Government: A conservative
Islamic state with Shariah as a source, but not the
only source, of legislation. Like all the Gulf states,
Kuwait has a Ministry of Awqaf (religious endow-
ment) and Islamic Affairs. The government has intro-
duced Islamic commercial banking and recently ap-
plied more restrictive religious laws. Women have
comparatively greater freedom than in more tradi-
tional Gulf states. Non-Muslims may worship in
private, but proselytizing by non-Muslims is forbid-
den.F_ I
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Ruling family is sympathetic with reli-
gious conservatives; Amir consults religious establish-
ment on policies of concern to it.
Status of Fundamentalism: Islam in Kuwait has a
powerful emotional appeal that cuts across ethnic and
class lines. Since the mid-1970s, signs of Islamic
revival have included stricter religious observances,
greater use of Islamic attire by women and wearing of
beards by men, inclusion of religious courses at the
university, and increased interest in religious "clubs."
The Khomeini revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq
war have provided Kuwait's Shias with a morale boost
but not an incentive for revolution. Rather, some
Fundamentalist Organizations: While political par-
ties are banned, the government allows social and
cultural clubs that must be apolitical:
? The Social Reform Society: A popular, overt Sunni
fundamentalist organization which publishes the
magazine Al-Muftama
Foreign Involvement: The Iranian Embassy tries to
influence the Social Cultural Society, the Iranian
Recent Developments:
? 1981: Four Shias (three of whom were considered
Khomeini supporters) won seats in the National
Assembly, as did five Sunni fundamentalists.
? 12 December 1983: Shia terrorists, majority
Iranian-trained Iraqis, bombed US and French Em-
bassies and Kuwaiti Government buildings. The
government arrested and tried 21 youths, sentencing
Prognosis: Rising Islamic fundamentalism and Shia
unrest probably can be handled adequately by securi-
ty forces. Isolated acts of terrorism, particularly by
expatriates, will continue to be a major threat to the
Lebanon
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.6 million. 93 per-
Religious Composition Lebanon's ethnic homogene-
ity does not extend to its religious beliefs. According
to best estimates, 74 percent (1.7 million) of the
population is Muslim; 7 percent is Druze (an occult
offshoot of Islam); 27 percent Christian (Greek Ortho-
dox, Roman Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, and Ar-
menian). Muslims are divided between Shias (40
percent) and Sunnis (27 percent). Within the last
decade, Shias, who had been the most backward,
rural, and dispossessed of the religious groups, have
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Christian
Mixed Druze and
Christian
Population shifts caused by the June 1982
Israeli invasion are not depicted.
o to rcimmeters
o i
0 10 Mlles
 Government: Gained independence from France in
1945. The government was formed as a coalition of
religious groups. Civil war in 1975-77, followed by
occupation, first by Syrian then by Israeli troops. The
government's army disintegrated as religious militias
sprang up to continue fighting. Bashir Gemayel was
elected President in 1982, but he was assassinated
before taking office. Current President, Amin
Gemayel, is a brother of Bashir. The Cabinet repre-
Religious Policies of Government. Initial policy of
"confessionalism" and a National Covenant kept
Christian-Muslim balance, with Christian control of
government and religious freedom guaranteed. Al-
though Muslim population now outnumbers Chris-
tians, it still occupies a secondary political position.
The militancy between religions has increased since
the civil war broke out and has turned into arming of
separate religious militias, which the government has
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims have always had an official role
in government-albeit secondary to Christians-but
disunity among Muslims has hampered attempts to
strengthen political influence. Moderate Shia Mus-
lims of the 1970s lost popular support to radicals who
wished to gain political power for the dispossessed and
underrepresented Shias~
Status of Fundamentalism: Although civil wars have
encouraged a sense of religious revival among both
Muslims and Christians, fundamentalism does not
play a dominant role in Islamic militancy today; it is
more a case of both moderate and conservative ver-
sions of Islam being militantly radicalized over the
issue of political influence in the nation's future. fl
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Amal (Hope): Led by Nabih Barri, who has largest
secular following in Shia community; a moderate
group that favors the central government but de-
mands more power for Shias; based in Beirut
suburbs.
? Islamic Amal: Led by Husayn Musawi, this is a
terrorist-prone breakaway group from Amal; Irani-
an backed; aims for conversion of Lebanon into an
Islamic state linked to Tehran; based in the Bekaa
Valley.
? Husayn Suicide Commandos: A subgroup of Islam-
ic Amal led by cousin of Husayn; based in Bekaa
Valley; probably about 200 men.
Hizb Allah (Party of God): Terrorist prone; Iranian
backed; based in Bekaa Valley.
? Union of Muslim Students: Led by radical Sayyed
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah; terrorist prone; has
operational and ideological links with Islamic Amal;
Foreign Involvement: Since 1978 Iran has been giving
covert aid to Amal. Iran views Lebanon as its chief
candidate for export of its revolution. Using Syria as 25X1
staging area, Iran continues to supply thousands of
Iranian Revolutionary Guards to train Lebanese Shi-
as in religious ideology and terror tactics 25X1
Recent Developments:
? June 1982: Israel invaded southern Lebanon.
? September 1982: Recently elected President, Maro-
nite 25X1
Bashir Gemayel, assassinated.
? April 1983: US Embassy bombed, 70 killed; various
radical Muslim groups claim credit.
? September 1983: Serious factional fighting between
Druze and Christian groups followed Israeli with-
drawal to Awali River.
October 1983: American and French peacekeeping
contingents of Multinational Force bombed, with
over 250 casualties. Groups calling themselves "Is-
lamic Jihad Organization," "Free Islamic Revolu-
tionary Movement," "Dawn Movement of the Arab
Nations," and "Sabra and Shatila Organization"
 Prognosis: Outlook remains grim for any form of
national reconciliation, especially with extent of exter-
nal influence appealing to radicalized elements of
both Muslim and Christian faiths. Lebanon remains
vulnerable to civil war and potential for partition. A
minority of radical fundamentalists will pursue their
goals of an Islamic state, causing turmoil among the
majority of Muslims who only want reform of the
confessional system.
Oman
PopulationlEthnic Composition: 978,000. 750,000
native Arabs; about 200,000 foreigners, mostly Indian
Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent Mus-
lim. 75 percent are Ibadhis, a sect that broke with
mainstream Islam before the Sunni-Shia split oc-
curred; most of remainder are Sunni; less than I
Government: An absolute monarchy ruled by Sultan
Qaboos bin Said Al Bu Said since the overthrow in
1970 of his father in a British-assisted coup. Qaboos
has appointed an advisory council and permits tribal
and town councils but has not allowed a constitution,
Religious Policies of Government: Ibadhi Islam is
relatively tolerant and moderate. The government is
conservative in its religious policies and does not
interfere with religious beliefs or the influence of the
religious establishment on local society. The Sultan's
predecessors once claimed religious title of Imam, but
he does not press claims to religious authority. Minis-
try of Justice and Islamic Affairs reinforces official
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Ibadhi Council of Qadis (religious
judges) advises the Sultan on Islamic affairs and
passes on the conformity of individual decrees with
Islamic law. Qaboos is careful not to disturb the
religious-state compact or encourage sectarian rival-
Status of Fundamentalism: There is no evidence of
active, antiregime religious-based opposition move-
ments, although the government historically has had
to contend with religious rebellion encouraged by
claimants to the role of Ibadhi Imam. (The current
Fundamentalist Organizations: No significant funda-
mentalist organizations are known to exist in Oman.
The exiled Ibadhi Imam has many loyalists in the
interior, but prospects for the revival of an Imam-led
rebellion such as occurred in the 1950s appear remote. 25X1
Foreign Involvement: Leftist Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman, based in South Yemen, has had
little appeal for Omanis and no success in recruiting
them. Occasional evidence of pro-Khomeini propa-
Recent Developments: Oman is a member of the. Gulf
Cooperation Council, has signed a security pact with
Saudi Arabia, and has a military-economic accord 25X1
with the United States-none of which have religious
overtones or have raised religious objections in Oman.
25X1
Prognosis: Religion could once again become the
vehicle for discontent if economic and professional
expectations of new middle class, and returning stu-
dents in particular, are not met; if resentment of
foreign workers grows (and it will, particularly in the
military); if awareness of corruption becomes more
widespread; and if oil revenues fall and pace of
Qatar
PopulationlEthnic Composition: 267,000. 20 percent
native Arabs; 34 percent South Asians, 25 percent
Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. Approx-
imately 89 percent Sunni Wa'hhabis, I I percent Shia,
Government: Traditional Arab shaykhdom ruled by
Thani family since 19th century. Current Amir Kha=
lifa bin Hamad Al Thani has been in power since
1972. There is a provisional constitution but no
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political parties and no elective body. Decisionmaking
is based on family consensus and consultation with
leading families and Council of Ministers, majority of
Religious Policies of Government. Conservative Is-
lamic state. Shariah is source of legislation. Non-
Muslims may hold religious ceremonies in private but
are not permitted to proselytize or establish perma-
nent places of worship. Ruling family has reputation
for personal laxness in observing Islamic practices.
Government is making conscious effort to reduce
potential threat to regime from fundamentalist crit-
ics-it has restricted gambling, the sale of alcohol,
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Government makes decisions in consul-
tation with religious hierarchy and with an eye to
Saudi Arabian policies. (The ruling families of Qatar
and Saudi Arabia share common tribal and religious
backgrounds.) Jasfari Islamic Canonical Council
serves as adviser to the government and interpreter of
religious law. Qatar has secular as well as religious
Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of active
Islamic resurgence in society which is already
conservative
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Muslim Brotherhood: A small chapter that appar-
ently restricts its activities to fundraising; no sign of
Foreign Involvement: The security forces closely mon-
itor the Iranian Shia community for signs of antire-
gime activities. A member of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, Qatar signed a security pact with Saudi
Arabia following coup attempt by Shias in Bahrain in
Prognosis: Fundamentalist threat is not significant.
Government will support more rigid application of
Islamic law but will also continue its development
plans. Greatest threat of unrest may come from
expatriate Shias if number of foreign workers is cut
back. They will be deported if implicated in suspicious
Saudi Arabia
Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 10.4
million. Of the native population 90 percent Arab; 10
percent Afro-Arab mixture. Non-Saudi workers num-
Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. 95 per-
cent are Sunnis of the puritanical Wa'hhabi sect; 5
percent Shia. Over 300,000 Shias live in the Eastern
Province, where they make up approximately 70
percent of the population
Government: An Islamic monarchy since 1932 when
`Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud (also known as Ibn Saud)
united Bedouin tribes and joined forces with the
prominent ulema of the Al Shaykh family, whose
progenitor established the orthodox sect of Wa'hhabi
Islam. Upon `Abd al-'Aziz's death in 1953, his son
King Sa'ud ruled until 1964 when he was deposed by
the royal family in favor of another son Faysal. King
Faysal was assassinated in 1975. He was replaced by
the next son, Khalid who died in 1982. King Fahd,
another son, now reigns. There is no legislative body
Religious Policies of Government: Saudi Arabia is
the birth place of Islam and contains the two holiest
cities of Islam. Officially, there is no separation of
church and state. The King serves as both sectarian
and religious head; Shariah serves as framework for
law, and religious notables dominate the judiciary.
Koranic doctrine is sometimes liberally interpreted in
the interests of rapid modernization. Government co-
opts and cooperates with the religious hierarchy but,
through extensive security apparatus, monitors
mosques and schools for evidence of antiregime activi-
ty. Government has numerous religious cabinet-level
components and a powerful Ministry of Pilgrimage
Affairs and Religious Trusts. Religious police con-
trolled by the Interior Ministry rigorously enforce
puritanical social code. The government established
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The Saudi royal family derives much of
its political legitimacy from the support of the reli-
gious community. The regime does notalways accept
the views of religious leaders on social issues, but it
routinely confers with them and usually seeks to
We perceive no signs o
organize antiregime activity among Saudi youths
that could threaten the regime in the near term. A
creeping Islamic revivalism among Saudi university
students, however, is being encouraged by imported
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known
Foreign Involvement: Iranians continue to try to
subvert Shins in Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia is, on
the other hand, heavily involved in other countries as
the original exporter of Islam (in a conservative
version) to the less developed world. It is the founder
of the Muslim World League, the Islamic Conference,
and the World Association of Muslim Youth. The
government uses its wealth to encourage and some-
times press other Islamic states to institute more
conservative social and political measures and to
promote solidarity against leftist movements and
Israel. It provides sanctuary to Muslim Brotherhood
members exiled from other Middle Eastern countries.
Recent Developments:
? November 1979: Attack on the Great Mosque in
Mecca, the holiest Islamic shrine, by antiregime,
radical fundamentalist youth. Government forces
recaptured the Mosque after two weeks of fighting
and executed 30 militants, both Saudis and
foreigners.
? November 1979, February 1980: Violent demon-
strations by Shias in Eastern Province. Saudi Na-
tional Guard put down unrest, killed at least 60.
? The fall of 1982 through the winter of 1983:
Government crackdown on suspected Shia dissi-
dents in Eastern Province; at least 300 Shias ar-
rested.F______-] 25X1
ty-especially younger, more militant clerics-will
continue to criticize the regime privately for what
they regard as hypocritical inconsistencies between
Islamic ideals and the self-indulgent lifestyles of
25X1
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Isolated antiregime incidents by Sunni fundamental-
ists or Shia dissidents are possible and would be
difficult to anticipate. The regime would act forceful-
ly to quash religious-oriented unrest. It is unlikely
that isolated incidents would trigger any widespread 25X1
antiregime activity that would jeopardize the royal
family's hold on power. 25X1
Syria
Population/Ethnic Composition: 9.7 million. More.
- than 90 percent Arab; rest is divided between Kurd-
Religious Composition: Approximately 90 percent
Muslim (8.8 million); 9 percent Christian of different
sects; 1 percent Jewish. Muslims are predominantly
Sunni, but three subsects or minorities play a signifi-
cant role in the country's intragroup conflicts:
Alawites, 11 percent of population and a majority in
the Latakia region of the northwest; Druze, 3 percent,
and a majority along the Jordan border; Ismaili Shia,
Government: Ba'th Party came to power as military-
dominated Renaissance Socialist Party in 1963 and
has ruled ever since without opposition parties. Presi-
dent Hafiz al-Assad emerged with a moderate Islamic
program in 1970 but has remained an authoritarian
leader who has placed his fellow Alawites throughout
S
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Religious Policies of Government: Although a social-
ist, secular state, government has backed down when
ulema have resisted total secularization. It has co-
opted many religious leaders but cracks down harshly
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government. Religious leaders continue to press Is-
lamic demands and to resist secularization, although
they avoid outright opposition. Many wealthy Mus-
lims from pre-Ba'th days actively support under-
ground fundamentalists against regime.
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism is used
by the numerically dominant urban Sunnis as a
vehicle to undermine rule by what they consider to be
a small, rural heretical minority of Alawitesl
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Muslim Brotherhood (MB): Spread from Egypt in
1940s; fought for independence against French;
then fought against secularism and Westernization;
outlawed during Syrian union with Egypt, 1958-61;
reappeared in late 1970s to early 1980 in more
militant role; it stepped up opposition tactics and
tried to assassinate Assad; it was again forced
underground in 1980. MB is the principal source of
antiregime activity. Many MB members went into
exile to neighboring Arab states and Europe. Mem-
bership is concentrated among Sunni students and
merchants.
? Combat Vanguard of the Mujahedin: A radical
offshoot of the MB. It wants an Islamic republic
based on private property and a multiparty system.
Several other underground organizations exist, but
little is known of them:
? Muhammad's Brigades (Kata'ib Muhammad)
? Muhammad's Youth (Shabab Muhammad)
? Islamic Liberation Party: Started in Jordan. More
Prognosis: Islamic opposition, which is weak and
divided, is unlikely to topple the Ba'thist regime. The 25X1
most likely near-term scenario is an indefinite stale-
mate and paralysis of the political system 25X1
Turkey
Population/Ethnic Composition: 49.2 million. 85 per-
cent Turkish; 12 percent Kurdish; 3 percent other
25X1
Religious Composition: 99 percent (48.7 million)
Muslim; less than 1 percent Christian. Muslims are
predominantly Sunni, but about 20 percent are
Alevis, a sect syncretically composed of Shias, Sufis,
and shamans located in eastern and central Turkey.
Government: Republic founded in 1923 after the
collapse of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Mustafa
Kemal (Ataturk), the first President, turned country
into Western, secular, one-party state. He died in
1938. Civilian and military governments have alter-
nated since then. The current military regime took
over the government in 1980. President Gen. Kenan
Evren held legislative elections in November 1983,
signaling another return to "civilian" rule.F_
Religious Policies tf Government: Ataturk radically
altered the role of Islam in Turkey by converting a
Muslim society into a secular state. He smashed the
Shariah courts; abolished the Sufi brotherhoods, the
caliphate, and Muslim schools; and replaced Arabic
with Turkish and Muslim dress with Western garb.
After World War II, the government allowed Islam to
reenter politics in a limited fashion. Until 1980
successive governments allowed a steady relaxation of
Recent Developments:
? Spring 1980: Islamic opposition staged major offen-
sive in the north. Regime response was swift and
brutal; hundreds were killed, and the rebellion
collapsed. Government introduced new laws to make
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable
by death.
? February 1982: Attempted armed insurrection in
the northern city of Harrah by Muslim Brotherhood 25X1
and sympathizers brought severe repression: thou-
sands were killed; parts of the city were destroyed;
25X1
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 some secularist measures, while co-opting the ulema;
subsidizing mosques and Islamic schools; and trying
to put Islam under state control. The military govern-
ment has once again relegated religion to private life.
New civilian government is moving cautiously toward
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious institutions are controlled by
the government. The Islamic fundamentalist National
Salvation Party (NSP) was banned after the military
takeover of 1980 because of its disruptive influence in
the many coalition governments in the late 1970s.
Sufi brotherhoods still flourish as a social force but
Status of Fundamentalism: The growth in religious
interest and practice during the last decade, including
a return to the Sufi brotherhoods, has generally not
escalated into fundamentalism. A healthy mutual
respect remains between the state and the religious
Fundamentalist Organizations: Dozens of small ter-
rorist groups exist, most based on minor sectarian or
regional differences, and many without names.
? Suleymanci: The largest known fundamentalist
sect. It follows the teachings of Suleyman Hilmi
Tunahan (1888-1959) and is now led by Kemal
Kacar, his son-in-law. It advocates an Islamic state
and return to Shariah law and the caliphate. The
Suleymancis openly teach Koranic classes, propa-
gate banned extremist philosophy; operate small
illegal colleges; have links with the banned Justice
Party; have infiltrated the military; and operate
openly among Turkish migrant workers in Western
Foreign Involvement: The Turkish Government has
been worried about the impact of the Iranian revolu-
tion and has arrested and prosecuted allegedly
Recent Developments:
? July 1980: Sunni-Alevi clashes in Corum resulted in
deaths.
? September 1982: Draft constitution made religious
training compulsory for Muslims in public schools;
referred to Allah in text; and subjected Ataturk's
secularism to public debate.
? September 1982: Arrest of Sufi and NSP leaders for
fomenting dissension. 25X1
? March 1983: Government arrested and tried 33
suspected members of Iranian-backed Shia group.
Prognosis: Islam will continue to be a major social
and political force. Sectarian hostility may reappear
in the future, forcing the government to reinstitute
strong security measuresF__~ 25X1
United Arab Emirates
Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 1.4
million. About 21 percent native Arabs; 79 percent
foreign residents, mainly workers (including 250,000
Indians, 300,000 Pakistanis 50,000 Iranians, and
50,000 Palestinians). 25X1
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Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent of the
native population is Muslim, with Sunnis comprising
95 percent and Shias 5 percent, concentrated mostly
in the northern emirates; 30 percent of the total
population (mostly Asian workers) is non-Muslim.
Government: A federation of seven small shaykhdoms
formed in 1971 following the British withdrawal from
the Gulf. Abu Dhabi's ruler, Shaykh Zayid, has been
President since 1971; Dubai's ruler, Shaykh Rashid,
has been Vice President and Prime Minister since
1979. The federal government has a provisional con-
stitution, a Supreme Council composed of the rulers
of the seven shaykhdoms, and an a
member National ional Assembly. 25X1
Religious Policies of Government. A conservative
Islamic state governed by Islamic law. The govern-
25X1
ment is less doctrinaire in applying religious principles
to secular practices and does not impose Islamic
practices and prohibitions on non-Muslim foreigners.
There is no overt discrimination against the Shia
minority. Christians are permitted to worship but not
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The ruling families make decisions based
on family consensus and in consultation with leading
Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of active
Islamic resurgence in an already conservative society.
Foreign Involvement: Because of once lax immigra-
tion procedures and the large number of expatriates
working in the shaykhdoms, the UAE is an uninten-
tional haven for Arabs and others who espouse radical
political and religious ideas. No evidence exists that
religious groups are seeking to impose their practices
on the UAE, although the government is increasingly
concerned about the activities of Shia religious lead-
ers (mostly Iranian in origin) in the northern emirates
and is also suspicious of some of the wealthy Iranian
Recent Developments: Although there are calls to
expand religious education and enforce strict separa-
tion of the sexes, there has been no ground swell of
sentiment for the government to crack down on
"permissive practices."
Prognosis: Islamic fundamentalism is unlikely to be a
significant influence for change in the UAE. Natives
may become frustrated by aspects of modernization,
and they may dislike the moral and social values that
accompany it, but they mistrust even more the alter-
natives to their way of life-secular leftist politics or
North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic)
Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 5.7
million. 90 percent Arab; 10 percent Afro-Arab mix-
ture. ,
Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. 48 per-
cent Sunnis of Shafli school in the south and west
coastal areas; 52 percent Zaydi, a variant of Shia,
which is doctrinally close to Sunni, in the north.
Highly conservative, traditional, and rural Islam; high
Government: A military republican group overthrew
the feudal Imamate in 1962 and espoused an Arab
socialist state. Civil .war between the tribal-royalists
and the military-republicans continued for eight
years. A compromise was struck in 1970, with a
constitution providing for Yemen to be "Arab and
Muslim." The military took full control in 1974-75,
but two presidents were assassinated in 1977 and
1978. Current President, Col. All Abdallah Salih, has
ruled since 1978. North Yemen still remains deeply
tribal with marginal central government control over
Religious Policies Of Government: Constitutionally,
North Yemen is an Islamic Arab nation, with Shariah
the source of all laws and Islamic scholars given high
administrative posts. Government attempts to com-
bine conservative Islam with socialist form of develop-
ment. Education remains Islamic. Government uses
co-optation, surveillance, harassment, and arrests to
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Fundamentalists have high-ranking
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism as a
quasi-political manifestation is growing in a state
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Fundamentalist Organizations: Fundamentalist orga-
nizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and
numerous other externally supported radical groups,
are flourishing. They are considered a sufficient
threat that President Salih postponed legislative elec-
tions until 1984. Groups are not coordinated or united
Muslim Brotherhood (MB): Has widespread sup-
port, both in the universities and among rural
tribesmen, and has infiltrated government posts. 25X1
MB is anti-Communist, anti-West, and critical of
government policies that are too secular. It won half
the elected seats in a quasi-legislative body charged
with writing a new constitution.
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links include:
? Al-Talfr Wa al-Hifrah (Repentance and Holy
Flight): An extremist spinoff of the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brotherhood.
? Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party):
An extremist group with Palestinian and Syrian
support.
? Yemeni Wa'hhabis: Saudi-backed small paramili-
tary organization.
? Al Jabhah a! Islamiyyah (Islamic Front): A govern-
ment-supported paramilitary group recruited from
Shia tribesmen to help fight South Yemeni insur-
Foreign Involvement: Government believes the Mus-
lim Brotherhood to be backed by Saudi Arabia, which
wants to use it to constrain President Salih's flirta-
tions with Moscow. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and
the Palestinians also support other -fundamentalist
organizations as indicated above. Little is known of
the extent of Iranian influence, but government wor-
ries that several northern tribes are being influenced
by militant Iranians
Recent Developments:
? September 1981: Presidents of South Yemen and
North Yemen agreed to a cease-fire and to discuss
unification of two Yemens with Islam as state
religion. The cease-fire broke down shortly
thereafter.
? October 1982: Demonstrations by pro-Iranian
youths.
? Early 1983: President Salih postponed elections for
legislature until 1984, because of concern over
Prognosis: The government may have to make in-
creasing adjustments to Islamic sentiments in order to
South Yemen (People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen)
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.1 million. 75 per-
cent Arab; 25 percent non-Arab mixture of Negroid
and South Asian
Religious Composition: Almost 100 percent Muslim
or former Muslim. Sunnis predominate, are of the
Shafii school, historically subservient to Shiite Zaydi
Imams of North Yemen. 25X1
Government: The only Marxist government in the
Middle East. British protectorate ended in 1967,
leaving leftwing National Liberation Front in power
to battle the remaining royalists. The current ruling
elite is still the same group of revolutionaries. The
government has been torn by coups between pro-
Soviet, pro-Chinese, and more moderate leaders but
has remained a Marxist state on the Soviet model.
Current President is Ali Nasir Muhammad al- 25X1
Hasani, who deposed a pro-Soviet rival in April 1980.
Religious Policies of Government: The government
still recognizes Islam as the state religion, and the
Constitution guarantees religious freedom, but it has
worked since independence to remove Islam political-
ly, culturally, and socially from Yemeni life. Official-
ly, the government is trying to unite Islam and
socialism but is replacing Islamic schools with state 25X1
education. The government recently gave religious
leaders civil service salaries as a move to ensure their
loyalty. 25X1
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Although officially there is no religious
establishment, Islam is still the social and cultural
Status of Fundamentalism: Some evidence Islam is
losing strength among the urban elite. The govern-
ment retains close surveillance over religious activi-
Fundamentalist Organizations: Muslim Brotherhood
may exist deep underground, as there have been
numerous arrests of alleged Brothers
25X1
25X1
Foreign Involvement: The government supports Arab
radical movements and takes in exiles, among which
there may be some fundamentalists 25X1
2
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Recent Developments:
? September 1981: Presidents of South Yemen and
North Yemen agreed to a cease-fire and to discuss
unification of two Yemens with Islam as state
religion. The cease-fire broke down shortly
thereafter.
September 1982: Two youths found giving antire-
gime sermons in Aden mosque were arrested and
executed.
Prognosis: The South Yemeni radical secular regime
has made only slight accommodation to Islam and will
continue to restrict fundamentalist activity. Because
of disastrous economic plight, the government has
begun to reach accommodations with more conserva-
tive Arab states to get aid and may introduce addi-
.1
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islamic establishment fully controlled by
government; mosques almost all under state supervi-
25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: Increased piety is evident,
especially among Arabized youth. Fundamentalist
youth becoming critical of regime for economic, mor-
al, and ideological failures; activism has increasingly
turned into violent confrontations either with less
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Maghreb:
The Arab Edge of Africa
Until a few years ago, Islam was a moderate unifying
force along the northern tier of Africa, where regimes
range in ideology from the traditional Islamic Repub-
lic of Mauritania to Libya's "Islamic Socialism" to
avowedly secular Tunisia. Since then, fundamentalist
Islam has taken root, especially among the urbanized
middle-class youth, and is causing increasing security
problems for three of the five sovereign Maghreb
states-Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The other
two, Libya and Mauritania, are ruled by military
dictators, both ardent Muslims whose control over
their populations effectively cows any political opposi-
The growth in fundamentalism has gone hand in hand
with Arabization of the region. The minority Berbers
in Algeria and Morocco, and in Mauritania the
Blacks, have been forced to shed some of their
traditional beliefs and values to conform with the
Arab leaders' unification policies. These policies of
Arabization are now unraveling at various rates, as
the opponents attack the regimes for their failure to
provide the promised economic and social justice that
was to be a concomitant of modernization. Under the
banner of Islam, dissidence is even spreading to the
ranks of junior military officers, and Maghreb leaders
have been forced to undertake unprecedented surveil-
Religious Composition: 99 percent (20.5 million) Sun-
ni Muslim, majority of conservative Maliki school.
Small group in M'zab area follow the puritanical
Kharidjite sect. Islamicized since 7th century. Sufi
Islam extremely popular in rural areas with more
Government: Successful revolution for independence
from France ended in 1962. Experimental socialist
government under first president, Ben Bella. Boume-
dienne, who overthrew Ben Bella in 1965, ruled leftist
military-dominated regime until his death in Decem-
ber 1978. The military chose next president, Col.
Chadli Bendjedid, who was first elected to office in
February 1979. One-party socialist state, moving 25X1
from left to centrist, nonaligned
Religious Policies of Government. Islam is state
religion, although other faiths are officially tolerated.
Ministry of Religious Affairs supports and controls all
mosques, religious schools, and imams. Government
program of Arabization has indirectly heightened
Islamic character of society since 1970 and perhaps
increased fundamentalist tendencies. Government has
responded quickly to fundamentalist threat, which it
perceives as significantly unsettling, by emphasizing
its commitment to Islam in visible projects and con-
tinuing in a more Islamic direction while using repres-
sive measures to limit religious activities. Muslim
In Libya, Qadhafi has used Islam as justification for
his support of opposition groups in other countries.
While he has not succeeded in exporting his aberrant
brand of Islam beyond Libya's borders, his meddle-
some activities have destabilized the immediate region
and even set off revolutionary alarms far beyond the
African continent
Algeria
Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.7 million. Arab-
Berber mixture predominates, with Kabyles the larg-
est Berber group; European minority of about 75,000.
25X1
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}*Nouakchott
Fundamentalist Organizations: Movement yet re-
mains small, only few groups known:
? AI-Qiyam (The Upright): Originally inspired by
Muslim Brotherhood but banned in 1968 by govern-
ment afraid it had become too popular among the
establishment.
A1-Da'wah: Believed to be reincarnation of Al-
Qiyam. Receives support from sister organization in
Saudi Arabia. Often surfaces under different
names, including Front Islamique and the Mouve-
ment Islamique en Algerie. 0
from Saudi Arabia and Egypt
Foreign Involvement: The government fears that Lib-
ya and/or Iran may be supporting radical organiza-
tions. Long history of support for establishment Islam
? Muslim majority
MOOR Selected ethnic
group
Kabyle Berber tribe
0 200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Recent Developments:
? Late 1979-Early 1980: Student strikes and demon-
strations against government policies and conflict
between French-speaking and Arab-speaking stu-
dents; Muslim Brotherhood role suspected by
authorities.
? Early 1980: Demonstrations in three eastern cities;
youths attacked hotels, bars, prostitutes.
? May 1981: More confrontations at universities be-
tween fundamentalists and others.
? October 1981: Rioting fundamentalists seized
mosque in oasis town, held it for three days until
police regained control.
? November 1982: Clashes at University of Algiers;
one student killed, followed by widespread arrests in
December, including members of the official reli-
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 I .
Country
Total
Population
Percent
Muslims
Principal
Sect
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Prognosis
Algeria
20,700,000
99
Sunni
Sufism
Socialist;
military;
authoritarian
Rising threat,
confrontation
with government
Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Iran,
Egypt
Increased
fundamental-
ist agitation
Islamic
socialism;
authoritarian
Latent
None known
Conservatives
could over-
throw
Qadhafi
Mauritania
1,600,000
100
Sunni
Sufism
Islamic
republic;
authoritarian
Weak but growing
None known
Religious-
based ten-
sions may
increase
Morocco
22,900,000
99
Sunni
Sufism
Conservative
monarchy
Growing, especially Libya
among students
Fairly stable
Tunisia
7,000,000
98
Sunni
'Republic;
Growing, still non-
None known
Increased
Sufism
authoritarian
violent
fundamental-
ist agitation
Western
87,000
100
Sunni
Sovereignty
Conservative
None known
Increased
Sahara
Sufism
dispute
religious values
fundamental-
unresolved
pervasive
ist activity
Prognosis: Domestic issues such as Arabization are
undercutting the government's traditional efforts to
co-opt fundamentalist causes. Religious confronta-
tions will continue, with government forced to use
increasingly repressive tactics and devise methods to
Libya
Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.5 million. 97 per-
cent Arab/Berber mixture, divided into three main
tribal groups. Remainder are Greeks, Turks, Egyp-
Religious Composition: 97 percent (3.4 million) Mus-
lim; remainder mixture of Christian and other. Most
Muslims are Sunnis, with strong Sufi influence in
Religious Policies of Government: Government under
Qadhafi is Islamic socialism mixed with populism,
with all institutions theoretically ruled by "peoples'
committees." Libya was first country to bring entire
body of jurisprudence under the Shariah. Entire social
and political system and much of economic structure
is based, in theory, on Qadhafi's interpretation of
Islam. Regime restrains other versions of Islamic
25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Authority of religious establishment was
thoroughly dismantled by Qadhafi, and most leaders
went into exile. Religious leaders who remain are
Government: Independence from Italy by UN decision
in 1951. Idris was first king. Colonel Qadhafi and
other military officers overthrew Idris in 1969 and
 Status of Fundamentalism: Only unsubstantiated evi-
dence suggests that some mosques criticize the "her-
esy" of Qadhafi policies and that some students
charge that Qadhafi has misinterpreted Islamic prin-
Fundamentalist Organizations::
? Muslim Brotherhood: Fragmentary evidence indi-
cates that it may have some cells in Libya.
? Al-Ta/dir Wa al-Hijrah (Repentance and Holy.
Flight): From Egypt.
? Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islam! (Islamic Liberation Party):
Fanatical groups, may have several hundred adher-
ents each, chiefly in universities and secondary
Foreign Involvement: No external funding has been
given to Libyan Islamic institutions. On the contrary,
Qadhafi attempts to spread his version of the Islamic
revolution by financial aid and promises to train
"fighters" to overturn regimes. Qadhafi has tried, and
failed, to promote pan-Islamic unity by declaring
union (at different times) with Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia,
Algeria, Chad, and Syria. He has also actively prose-
lytized in Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and the rest
Recent Developments:
? January 1982: Arrest of fundamentalists accused of
plotting against regime; most were from Al Fatah
Prognosis: Qadhafi is vulnerable to assassination or
overthrow as his "Islamic revolution" has deeply
alienated many conservative Libyans. Should he be
replaced, most probably by someone from the mili-
tary, Libya could once again undergo a radical re-
structuring of its institutions. Islam is certain to
remain an integral part of government and politics.
Mauritania
Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.6 million. 30 per-
cent Moor (Arab-Berber); 30 percent Black; 40 per-
cent mixed Moor-Black. North predominantly no-
madic Moors, south predominantly Black
Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent Sunni
Muslim, ranging from fundamentalist to orthodox to
nominal, replete with saints and mystic pre-Islamic
beliefs. Qadiriya and Tijaniya Sufi brotherhoods ex-
Government: Islamic Republic established at time of
independence from France in 1960. First president,
Moktar Ould Daddah, was overthrown in bloodless
coup led by Col. Ould Salek in July 1978. Junta
replaced Salek with Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould
-Haidalla.in 1980. Haidalla briefly established civilian
cabinet but reverted to rule by military council in
1981, promising eventual party participation and "re-
Religious Policies of Government: Concept of Islamic
Republic reinforced since independence but with a
distinctly Mauritanian flavor. Other religions are
tolerated if practiced by non-Mauritanians. The gov-
ernment has replaced French civil law with Shariah
25X1 I
25X1
25X1
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I
Morocco: Warriors waving the
Koran go on "Green March" to
and has created a Ministry of Justice and Islamic
Affairs. President Haidalla is a devout Muslim. The
government sponsors a Mauritanian Islamic Cultural
Association to support imams, educate youth spiri-
tually. Mauritania is a member of the Islamic Confer-
ence and Arab League. The government introduced
measures to counteract fundamentalists:
? Emphasis on Shariah, including public flogging,
amputation.
? Ban on alcohol.
? Introduction of Islamic workweek
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islamic leaders and teachers have little
political influence but encourage government reasser-
tions of Islamic principles and criticize secular gov-
ernment policies or encouragement of Western mod-
Status of Fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is a
weak but growing force. Radicals do not exert suffi-
cient pressure on government, chiefly for lack of
Fundamentalist Organizations: Muslim Brotherhood
has penetrated Mauritania, chiefly via Senegalese
agitate for stricter application of Shariah.
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of current foreign
support for radical fundamentalist activity although
Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have all provided small
Recent Developments:
? June 1982: Authorities raided a Bahai sect head-
quarters, arrested Mauritanian members, and ex-
pelled most foreign members. 25X1
? 25 December 1982: Government decreed that na-
tion will abide by Islamic workweek.F___~ 25X1
Prognosis: As backward Mauritania struggles to over-
come a paucity of human and technological resources,
both racial and religious tensions will increase, per-
haps between new fundamentalists and more tradi-
tional Muslims. 25X1
25X1
Morocco
Population/Ethnic Composition: 22.9 million. 99 per-
cent Arab-Berber mixture. 25X1
Religious Composition: Almost 99 percent (22.7 mil-
lion) Muslim; 1.1 percent Christian; 0.2 percent Jew-
ish. Muslims are Sunnis of the Maliki school. Ortho-
dox Islam at official and educated elite level; folk 25X1
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Islam dominates in rural areas, with variety of saint
cults and Sufi brotherhoods that incorporate animism
Government: Constitutional monarchy with King Has-
san II, who has ruled since 1961, asserting paramount
executive powers. King allows multiparty system.
Chamber of Representatives dominated by King's
own National Assembly of Independents. Conserva-
tive, pro-West regime
Religious Policies of Government. King rules as
spiritual leader by virtue of claim of direct descent
from Prophet Muhammad, thus combining political
rule with spiritual legitimacy. Ministry of Islamic
Affairs controls religious education, sponsors Friday
sermons, builds mosques. Government is tolerant of
Sufi brotherhoods, saint cults, religious minorities as
long as they avoid criticism of the government. Fun-
damentalists who distribute antiregime material have
been arrested. The government is making strenuous
efforts to co-opt Islamic revival by encouraging reviv-
al of Sufi brotherhoods to counteract imported funda-
mentalism, increasing piety of the King, and introduc-
ing other measures in schools, military, press, and
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious establishment, institutional-
ized in 1961 as League of Moroccan Ulema, is
promonarchy. Co-opted to ensure legitimization and
Status of' Fundamentalism: Perhaps 5 percent of
students are militant fundamentalists, with limited
number of fundamentalists in the armed forces as well
as other segments of society.
Fundamentalist Organizations: Small groups have
proliferated in urban areas among youth, with esti-
mates of about 70 to 80 organizations with combined
membership of 45,000. Only several thousand in
groups that espouse violence as means to "purify"
Islamic character of Morocco:
Islamic Youth Movement: Largest youth group.
Founded in 1972 with covert government support. Co-
optation backfired in 1975 when radical members
assassinated a prominent socialist leader. Movement
now operates clandestinely, and government-disowned
leader Abd al-Karim Moti is in exile.
Other known small groups are Mujahidin Movement
and Islamic Revolutionary Committee.
25X1
Muslim Brotherhood: Active only in the north. Has
links with European chapters. Recruits among elite.
Seeks to gain power through nonviolent conversion of
Foreign Involvement: Iranian Islamic revolution has
had profound effect on Moroccan youth, although we
have no evidence of active Iranian proselytizing.
Recent Developments:
? Mid-1980: Government raided a fundamentalist
sect headquarters and arrested 85; one policeman
was killed.
? January 1982: Demonstration in Tangier by 800
over issue of government interference with Friday
prayer leader.
? January 1982: Government sanctioned creation of
"Popular Islamic Renaissance," another attempt to
Prognosis: Regime remains strong, opposition in dis-
array, but economic downturn is causing more out-
bursts of social grievances and alienation of some
elite. Among the opposition, fundamentalists have
potential for disrupting regime through appeal to
25X1
25X1
Tunisia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 7 million. 98 per- 25X1
cent Arab, less than 1 percent each European and
Religious Composition: 98 percent (6.9 million) Mus-
lim, of whom about 92 percent are Sunni from Maliki
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Religious Policies of Government: Constitutionally,
Islam is a state religion, and the Chief of State must
be Muslim. Most Westernized and secularized of the
North African states. Judicial system is secular.
Religious schools are absorbed within public educa-
tion system; religion is compulsory subject but taught
as civics course. Mosques are subsidized by govern-
ment. Official tolerance toward non-Islamic religious
Government: Chief of State is Habib Bourguiba, 80,
who came to power after successful revolution in 1956
and is President for Life. Government officially a
republic, characterized as secular and modernist;
dominated by strong executive and official ruling
party which in last election received 95 percent of
Bourguiba has adopted policies to counter rising
fundamentalism and to let other social forces compete
with it:
? He released all the labor union members who had
been imprisoned after the bloody 1978 riots and
allowed the national labor union to reestablish its
independence and autonomy by electing a new
leadership to replace puppet group appointed by the
government in 1978.
? He revived the banned Tunisian Communist Party,
a small pro-Soviet intellectual group, to make it the,
officially sanctioned opposition for the late 1981
elections.
? He may have been responsible for fraud allegations
against fundamentalist leader Ghodbani and rumors
that he had accepted funds from Libya in order to
discredit him.
? He arrested all of the Islamic fundamentalist lead-
ership in the summer of 1981 and had long prison
terms assigned to them.
ances{
? He has adopted more Islamic coloration to the
extent that he has made occasional mosque appear-
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious establishment is not tied into
political structure. Religious societies are abundant,
based on both Islamic and pre-Islamic folk beliefs and
led by holy men, who have never posed political threat
or opposition to regime.F____1 25X1 25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: Started in the 1970s with
officially sponsored societies. By the 1980s fundamen-
talism was gaining popularity, chiefly among urban
students and intellectuals. Most fundamentalists still
moderate and represent minimal threat to the regime,
although membership in radical organizations and
number of sympathizers is growing, chiefly in Tunis.
Fundamentalist movement is still nonviolent, al-
though there have been sporadic clashes with leftists
at universities. Fundamentalism finds appeal in soci- 25X1
ety where generation gap is the chief problem; it is
opposed to lack of political liberalization and Bourgui-
ba's seeming refusal to make any concessions. Indica-
tions that fundamentalist leanings may be increasing
Fundamentalist Organizations: Dominant organiza-
tion, with at least two radical offshoots, is the Mouve-
ment de Tendance Islamique (MTI, the "Brethren")
with roughly 200 hardcore members and at least
10,000 sympathizers at the University of Tunis.=
25X1
Foreign. Involvement: No known external ties, finan-
cial support, or evidence of outside manipulation of
MTI in other fundamentalist organizations, although
the regime has claimed support from Libya to discred-
it MTI's appeal. 25X1
Recent Developments:
? Summer 1981: Government arrested, imprisoned,
and put on trial89 MTI members, including top
leadership, as fears mounted that it would become
opposition party.
? Summer 1981-present: More radical, clandestine
fundamentalist groups, with sharp splits between
pro- and anti-Khomeini factions, have appeared
since crackdown against MTI.
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? April 1982: Fundamentalist youth groups held
pitched campus battles with leftist students, result-
ing in injuries and arrests.
? 1983: Continued crackdown and arrests of funda-
Prognosis: Of all North African countries, Tunisia is
most likely to experience religious agitation in the
next few years. Bourguiba's rigidity in dealing with
fundamentalists may eventually backfire in creating
more clandestine, possibly terrorist, groups that might
attract outside support. Bourguiba may soften his
punishment of Islamic fundamentalists, but society
will increasingly be divided between secular modern-
ism.and Islamic tradition. Current radical activism
may fade if youth join the middle-class, moderate
majority and if regime provides an orderly transition
Western Sahara
Population/Ethnic Composition: 87,000. 100 percent
Government: Legal status of territory and question of
sovereignty unresolved. Major population centers con-
trolled by Morocco since Spanish withdrawal in 1976.
Religious Policies of Government: Same as those for
Morocco. King Hassan rules as spiritual and secular
leader. The Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs
controls religious education, sponsors Friday sermons,
and maintains mosques. The government is tolerant of
Sufi brotherhoods and other variations in orthodox
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious establishment is, for all practi-
cal purposes, an integral part of the Moroccan Gov-
Status of Fundamentalism: Conservative religious
values are pervasive. A few fundamentalists have been
arrested for antiregime activity among the Moroccan
Foreign Involvement: Polisario Front insurgents,
backed by Algeria, contest Morocco's claim to the
Prognosis: Potential for increased fundamentalist ac-
tivity as the downturn of the Moroccan economy
25X1
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Islam in South Asia:
Faith Without Fervor
South Asia, with nearly 300 million Muslims, about
three times as many as in the entire Arab heartland,
has witnessed a perceptible upswing in revival of
personal piety, some governmental tolerance and even
encouragement of Islamic ritual observances, but no
significant role for Islamic fundamentalism outside of
President Zia's "Islamization" experiment in Paki-
stan. Several reasons are behind this lack of Islamic
militancy:
of oil wealth has precluded modernization on the
scale of most other Islamic countries. The issue of
Islamic traditionalism versus Westernized moderni-
ty and its attendant debasement of Islamic values
has not evolved. 25X1
Not only has fundamentalism failed to become a
major political force in most of South Asia, in many
respects it has been more divisive than unifying.
? Politically and geographically, the region is domi-
nated by India, the second most populous nation in
the world and overwhelmingly Hindu. In most states
of the subcontinent, secularism and nationalism
take precedence over religious beliefs among the
people. Islamic fundamentalism has been unable to
inspire resistance to forms of political control-
whether military or civilian-which continue to
restrain and sometimes restrict oppositionist
movement.
? Culturally, Islam was superimposed by Muslim
conquerors on ancient beliefs among populations
whose cultural identities remain tied to ethnic and
tribal loyalties predating the arrival of Islam in the
eighth century. The resulting religious and cultural
diversity has worked against a cohesive Islamic
fundamentalist movement. Linguistically, the sub-
continent is a mosaic of non-Arabic languages that
have accentuated the ethnic differences. The sense
of umma, a larger Islamic community transcending
national boundaries and united by the shared use of
the Arabic language, is missing. Pakistan's breakup
in 1971 demonstrated this weakness in South Asia.
? Economically, South Asia's poverty is not conducive
to fundamentalist activity. Overall, per capita in-
come is only 2 percent of Saudi Arabia's, 6 percent
of the average for the entire Arab heartland. Large-
ly illiterate peasant farmers eking out a meager
subsistence have little time-or inclination-for re-
ligious agitation. The lack of wealth may, at least
according to some academic theories, limit the
funds to spawn Islamic activism. Moreover, the lack
? In Pakistan no consensus exists as to what an
"Islamic state" should be. This problem, which has
dogged the nation since its birth, helped cause a civil
war and eventual dismemberment of the country
and still hinders efforts to attain national integra-
tion. Zia's "Islamization" program, intended to
convert Pakistan into a purer version of an "Islamic
state," has even contributed to destabilizing sectari-
an strife between Sunnis and Shias and may be a
contributing factor to the disturbances in Sind
Province.
? In Afghanistan, Islam has been so integral a part of
society that, until the Communist coup in 1978 and
the Soviet invasion in 1979, the country had not
been touched by the politicization of Islam. After
the Soviet invasion, resistance groups rallied under
an Islamic banner, although even Islam has been
unable to unite the disparate and mutually hostile
tribes. None of the champions of Islamic unity
(Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran) have openly mobi-
lized support for the resistance fighters.
? In India recurrent communal strife, including Hin-
du-Muslim confrontations, threaten to undo Prime
Minister Gandhi's skillful and sustained political
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GIJ Muslim majority
600 Significant Muslim minority
TAJ/K Selected ethnic group
--- Selected first-order boundary
0 400 Kilometers
0 400 Miles
25X1'
 I
Country
Total
Population
Percent Principal Sect
Muslims (Percent)
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Afghanistan
14,200,000
99
Sunni-87
Shia-12
Sufism
Communist
Strong among
opposition
Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Egypt,
Pakistan
Bangladesh
96,500,000
85
Sunni
Shia-less
than I
Sufism
Martial law
Quiescent
Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Libya
India
731,000,000
12
Sunni-11
Shia-I
Sufism
Parliamentary
democracy
Quiescent
None known
Pakistan 94,000,000 97 Sunni-80
Shia-16
Ahmadi-less
than I
Sufism
Prognosis
Continued
insurgency
Reasonably
stable
Communal
conflicts
endemic
sanctioned ethnic and
sectarian
conflicts
Sri Lanka 15,600,000 8 Sunni Parliamentary None as yet None known Communal
Shia-less than I democracy tensions
Afghanistan
Population/Ethnic Composition: 14.2 million. 50 per-
cent Pashtun; 25 percent Tajik; 9 percent Uzbek; 9
percent Hazara. Tribal identification remains ex-
tremely strong, more important than national identi-
Religious Composition: 99 percent Muslim (14 mil-
lion) 87 percent Sunni of Hanafi school; 12 percent
Shia; mainly from Hazara tribe. Islam is laced with
pre-Islamic tribal beliefs and practices and influence
Government: Afghan monarchy ended in 1973 with
military coup led by Gen. Daud Khan, a reformer.
Daud was unseated in 1978 in bloody coup by pro-
Soviet Afghan Army forces, bringing Nur Moham-
mad Taraki to power. Taraki overthrown by rival
Communist faction leader Hafizullah Amin in August
1979. Soviet Union invaded in December 1979, killed
Amin, and installed Babrak Kamal as puppet presi-
dent. The government currently faces insurrection
been de facto state religion. When reformers came to
power in 1973, religious activities were curtailed and
powerful landowning clergy were persecuted. Under
Amin, persecution escalated to mass arrests and
executions, even of rural Muslim clergy. Babrak's
regime has tried to undercut resistance fighters'
claims that the government is anti-Islamic by co-.
opting remaining religious establishment, restoring.
Islamic colors to national flag, publicizing Babrak's
25X1 25X1
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islam is used as a political symbol by
both the resistance and the government in the con-
tinuing power struggle. Most of the influential Mus-
lim clergy are dead or in exile. Government makes
extensive use of remaining mullahs, co-opts them by
0
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1 Secret
Afghanistan: Muslim resis-
tance fighters make Soviet oc-
Status of Fundamentalism. An Islamic underground
has existed since the early 1970s in political shadings
ranging from ultraconservative neomonarchists to
radical fundamentalists. Much of conservative, na-
tionalistic Islam now calls itself "fundamentalist"
opposition, using Islam as a rallying cry against the
Fundamentalist Organizations: Many of the hun-
dreds of resistance groups are fundamentalist. The
leading fundamentalist groups are:
Group
Leader
Ethnic
Composition
Area of
Strength
Hizbe Islami
(Gulbuddin)
Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar
Pashtun
Eastern
Afghanistan
Hizbe Islami
(Khalis)
Younus Khalis
Pashtun
Nangarhar
Province
Jamiat-i-tslami
Burhanuddin
Tajik
Northeast
(Islamic League) Rabbani
Afghanistan
Foreign Involvement: Pakistan provides substantial
assistance and haven to refugee and exile resistance
groups. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt also provide
limited financial assistance to selected resistance
? December 1979: USSR invaded, killing President
Amin and replacing him with pro-Soviet Babrak
Kamal. Throughout period from invasion to present,
warfare has continued between insurgents and
government.
? Spring 1980: Babrak government restored use of
green Islamic colors in the national flag.
? Summer 1981: Babrak announced a revised land
reform program designed to accommodate Muslim
establishment's traditional landholding patterns.
Prognosis: Islam will dictate the language but not the
content of the conflict between the Soviet-controlled
Babrak regime and the resistance. The fratricidal
discord among the resistance groups may decrease
over time, but, even if the Soviet occupiers should
decide to withdraw from Afghanistan, fundamental-
ists, moderates, and secular rivals would continue to
25X1 I
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 Bangladesh
Population/Ethnic Composition: 96.5 million. Al-
most all Bengalis; fewer than 1 million tribals live
Religious Composition: 85 percent Muslim (82 mil-
lion), 14 percent Hindu; 1 percent Buddhist; about
200,000 Christians. Muslims are predominantly Sun-
ni, with extensive Sufi practices of saint worship and
pirs (priests) interwoven.
Government: Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, cre-
ated after splitting from Pakistan in 1971. Military
and civilian regimes, separated by bloody transitions,
have alternated since then. Present head of state,
General Ershad, has declared country will return to
civilian rule and has called for general elections in
Religious Policies of Government. Established as a
secular state when it split from Pakistan. The govern-
ment uses secular law in criminal and civil matters,
religious laws of Islam and other faiths in personal
matters. Since 1977 constitutional changes have insti-
tuted new Islamic provisions. Martial law government
has reasserted Islamic identity, but on muted level. It
uses conservative Islamic symbols to placate popula-
tion but avoids support for Islamic political parties.
Although poor, it has spent money on mosque build-
ing, educating imams, and small zakat fund. Ershad
has emphasized his Islamic credentials, first head of
government to make the hajj. Many cabinet-level 25X1
officials are practicing Muslims and have pressed him
to introduce more conservative Islamic practices. He
made Friday the official holiday in 1982, established
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Islamic Advisory
Council in the spring of 1983. Aligned with Saudi-led
"moderate" group of Muslim countries. 25X1
Relation of /slam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious leaders, both Sufi pirs and
Sunni imams, remain important part of nation's
25X1
cultural identity, but they have little influence politi-
cally although many government leaders consult pirs
for spiritual advice. The religious establishment tends
to stay out of politics although under civilian rule they 25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: In 1979 elections alliance
of fundamentalists won 10 percent of popular vote and
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Fundamentalist Organizations: Several Islamic polit-
ical parties still exist informally under martial law:
? Islamic Democratic League: More orthodox, con-
servative, Sunni.
? Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Society-JI): Far right
politically; now semisecret society. Claims 700 ac-
tive members, 100,000 "associates"; wants Islamic
state, admires Iranian theocracy. Antimodern with
Other nonparty groups include:
? Islami Chatra Shibir (Islamic Youth): Small core of
dedicated Koran readers, mostly youths from rural
lower-middle class, pro-Iranian sentiments, linked
with JI party.
? Jamaat-i-Tabligh (Proclamation Society): Organi-
zation stressing purity of Islamic devotions, nonpo-
Foreign Involvement: Saudi involvement in social,
economic, and educational programs-a university,
technology training center, mosques. The government
Recent Events: -
? 14 January 1983: Ershad made emotional speech
saying nation should be heading toward an Islamic
state and that Arabic must be taught in elementary
schools.
? February 1983: Student clashes in Dhaka between
secular and Muslim students. Numerous arrests,
300 injured, situation degenerated into rioting and
Prognosis: Although. fundamentalist activity remains
quiescent, fundamentalists could try to mobilize
strong support over a wide spectrum of society as a
symbol of opposition to authoritarian, military domi-
nation. Any such attempt would clash with the over-
whelming sentiments of Bengali mass culture, always
India
Population/Ethnic Composition: 731 million. 72 per-
cent Indo-Aryan; 25 percent Dravidian; 3 percent
Religious Composition: Most middle-class and elite
Muslims left India for new state of Pakistan in 1947,
leaving behind a large uneducated, poor, rural Mus-
lim minority. 12 percent of population is now Muslim
(88 million); 84 percent Hindu; 2 percent Christian;
2 percent Sikh. Muslims predominantly Sunni of
Hanafi school,.with approximately 10 percent of
Muslims Shia. Sufism important in rural areas. Mus-
lims are scattered geographically, stratified by class,
divided linguistically. Only in Kashmir state are they
a majority of population; in states of Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, and Kerala they com-
Government: Federal republic since independence
from Great Britain in 1947. Parliamentary democra-
cy, under prime minister with multiparty system,
although Congress Party dominates. Indira Gandhi,
daughter of first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
became Prime Minister in 1966. She imposed a
controversial "state of emergency" in 1975. Gandhi
was ousted in 1977 election by coalition Janata Party.
She was reelected in 1980 and is current Prime
Religious Policies Of Government: Constitutionally
secular, with religious freedom guaranteed. Govern-
ment gives Muslims representation, offices, and pro-
tects Islamic family laws but has not granted repre-
sentation in proportion to actual percentage of the
population. Government effectively co-opts and re-
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: A number of conservative Muslim orga-
nizations exist, usually co-opted by and supportive of
government. Traditionally, Muslim voters have sup-
ported the dominant Congress Party for protection
and have failed to institute a nationwide Muslim
political organization, in part for fear of Hindu
backlash. Muslims are geographically, culturally, lin-
guistically, socially, and economically diverse. Clergy
are weak and divided among Sunni, Shia, and Sufi..
After excesses of emergency rule in 1975-77, which
Muslims believed was discriminatory, Muslim voters
shifted to Janata Party and helped to defeat Gandhi.
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India: A Muslim minority
seeks economic and political
protection
Recent Muslim defections from Gandhi's Congress
Party have been on grounds that it has not provided
enough economic help or security in Hindu-Muslim
clashes. Some Muslim radicals have aligned with
Status of'Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: No
significant move toward an Islamic revival or in-
creased fundamentalism. Indian Muslims are only
marginally affected by outside events, more con-
cerned with retaining minority rights and avoiding
APPY BIRTHDAY cFiii afl6 S
A 7RAT MOHAMMAD UNDER AUSPICE
ULQUORAN MADRAS! QtMAtlb
Fundamentalist Organizations: Jamaat-i-Islami, is
divided into two branches-Jamaat-i-Islami-e-Kash-
mir and Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Hind for the rest of India.
The Kashmir branch has a youth wing, Jamaat-i-
Tulaba. It has about 3,000 members, concentrates on
educational and literary work, and upholds religious
orthodoxy. It was banned during the 1975-77 emer-
gency, then later reinstated. It has little influence on
either political or religious attitudes of Indian Mus-
Foreign Involvement: New Delhi is suspicious of
external funding of Muslim organizations, fearing
links with Pakistan and Iran, and closely observes and
restricts activities of suspected radical groups. Saudi
Arabia has made small contributions to Islamic orga-
nizations for mosque building, but we have no evi-
dence that the Saudis or any other Muslim state have
contributed funds for political purposes 25X1
Recent Developments: 25X1
? August 1980: Autonomous agitation in Kashmir
instigated by Jamaat-i-Islami Hind.
? August 1980: Hindu-Muslim violence, starting in
densely populated Moradabad, Uttar Pradish,
reached 20 urban areas, hundreds killed. 25X1
? 1981-early 1982: Mass conversions of thousands of
Harijans (Untouchables) to Islam in Tamil Nadu
created governmental nervousness and caused a
Hindu revival movement to spring up.
? Mid-to-end 1982: Numerous Muslim-Hindu riots
throughout northern India became major problem
for government forces.
? February 1983: Election in Assam instigated riots
and mass killings of Muslims as well as other groups
(Assamese, Bengalis) in most serious outburst of
religious violence since independence. 25X1
 able, but possibility exists that Muslims may eventu- developments
ally unite over an issue such as governmental aban-
donment of secular policy and equal treatment of Prognosis: As Maldives modernizes, there may be
minorities. Any strong and coordinated Muslim out- some backlash by the conservative clergy or by youths
burst would almost certainly provoke a strong-and trained abroad, but the government is likely to pursue
bloody-Hindu backlash.) a measured modernization to avoid conservative
Population/Ethnic Composition: 168,000. Mixture of Pakistan
Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab, black. F__1 Population/Ethnic Composition: 94 million. 56 per-
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1965. Sultanate was replaced by republic in 1968.
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom received 98 percent of vote
in 1978 election and remains as President with near
Religious Policies of Government: Although govern-
ment has avoided declaring Maldives an Islamic
Republic, Islam is state religion, and all Maldivians
must be Muslim for citizenship purposes. Legal sys-
tem is based almost entirely on Shariah; Islamic
customs such as fasting during Ramadan are en-
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Conservatism of religious establishment
is reflected in government policies; as yet, it has not
objected to government efforts to modernize and
Status of Fundamentalism: Conservative religious
values are pervasive; little sign of further fundamen-
talist revival. Some youths have campaigned unsuc-
Foreign Involvement: The government cooperates
with other Muslim states, chiefly with Egypt, for
higher education of its officials, but remains leery of
radical Islamic states such as Libya. The government,
however, recently set up the Institute of Islamic
cent Punjabi; 23 percent Sindhi; 15 percent Pashtun;
6 percent BaluclF~
lim; 3 percent other, mainly Christian. Muslims are
predominantly Sunnis of Hanafi school, but other
Sunni sects also represented. Ahmadis, less than
1 percent, are a heretical sect, mainly urban intellec-
tuals whom government considers non-Muslims. Shi-
as, mostly tribal groups in the north and many urban
tradesmen, comprise 15 to 25 percent of population.
Strong elements of Sufi saint worship in rural areas,
Government: Pakistan, with western and eastern sec-
tions, was founded in 1947 as Islamic Republic when
it was partitioned from India as a homeland for the
subcontinent's Muslims. Founder Mohammed Ali
Jinnah died in 1948, and his successor Liaquat Ali
Khan was assassinated in 1951. Series of ineffectual
prime ministers until Gen. Ayub Khan came to power
in military coup in 1958 and instituted martial law.
Ayub Khan, a modernist, ruled until 1969 when
demonstrations forced him to transfer authority to
Gen. Yahya Khan. The government fell after civil war
and separation of East Pakistan in 1971. New govern-
ment was led by socialist Z. A. Bhutto. Bhutto was
removed in 1977 by military coup led by Gen. Zia-ul-
Haq, who executed Bhutto and currently rules under
Religious Policies of Government: Alternated
throughout history between search for identity as
Islamic state and greater separation of religion from
political life under Khan and Bhutto. Currently,
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Pakistan President Zia presses
ahead with Islamization poll-
President Zia is restructuring Pakistan to conform to
his version of an Islamic state. He also uses Islam to
legitimitize military rule and to justify banning all
political party activity.-Governmentally decreed Is-
lamization includes: return of hudud (stoning, flog-
ging, amputation) punishment; Islamic prohibitions
such as ban on alcohol, night clubs, Western dress by
government workers, gambling; Shariah form of legal
system; revision of textbooks; compulsory zakat tax;
Islamic banking system; and curtailment of women's
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Zia's appointed legislative body, the
Federal Advisory Council, is dominated by religious
figures but has no authority. The Islamic Ideology
Council (IIC), comprised of fundamentalists, recom-
mends measures (often revolutionary and radical) to
steer the country toward a more Islamic course, but
its recommendations are not binding on Zia. Jamaat-
i-Islami (JI), a semiautonomous political force with
deeply fundamentalist values, has links to the govern-
ment, influences labor affairs, student activity, and
refugee affairs and is used as an informal link with
other Islamic states. Mainline Muslim clergy, al-
though deeply divided by doctrinal factions, have
vorable to fundamentalists took control of government
in 1977; religious revival is a government-sponsored
Fundamentalist Organizations: Jamaat-i-Islami, a 25X1
former fundamentalist political party founded in the
1930s by Maulana Abdul Maudoodi, dominates the
fundamentalist scene. It is now headed by Mian
Tufail Mohammad, a distant relative of President
Zia. It has a membership of several thousand, but
active sympathizers and supporters may number I
million. It appeals to middle- and lower-class mer-
chants, civil servants, students, and mullahs. Its youth
wing, Islami Jamaat Tulaba (IJT), provided the
shock troops to begin the agitation that toppled
Bhutto and remain militant radicals who have great
influence on college campus organizations. Nonpoliti-
cal fundamentalist organizations also abound, most
important of which include:
? Ahl-e-Hadis (People of the Traditions): Most puri-
tanical of Islamic sects; it has had members on both
the Islamic Ideology Council and the Federal Advi-
sory Council.
 ? Nadvis (The Association): It seeks moderate course
and reconciliation between the puritanical Ahl-e-
Hadis and the regular Hanafi orthodoxy.
? Tehrik-i-Nifaz-Jaffaria (Movement for the Promul-
gation of Shiism): A Shia Muslim organization that
Foreign Involvement: Jamaat-i-Islami, in addition to
serving as an informal link between the government
and other Muslim states, maintains longstanding ties
with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The JI, according
to the US Embassy, receives financial support from
Recent Developments:
? April 1979: President Zia executed former Prime
Minister Bhutto over protests from many Arab and
Muslim leaders.
? July 1980: Thousands of Shins demonstrated in
Islamabad against imposition of zakat tax; Zia
relented and exempted them from payment.
? June 1982 and December 1982: Shia-Sunni clashes
in Kurram Tribal Agency; dozens killed.
? February-April 1983: Sunni-Shia riots in Karachi
resulted in deaths, injuries, and extensive property
damage.
? August-September 1983: Two months of ethnic
violence in Sind Province; agitation against martial
Prognosis: Zia's vision of Islamization is not matched
by the realities of his society, which still suffers an
identity crisis, troubled by regional rivalries and
increasing sectarian conflict. Zia is beset by opposi-
tion from the radical fundamentalists who believe he
has compromised too much in Islamic terms, and by
the remnants of the Westernized elite and the socialist
left who see his Islamization as nothing but an excuse
for military rule. Unless he can bring real economic
benefits to the lower and middle classes and avoid
damaging external conflict, class cleavages and sepa-
ratism could undo his attempts to restructure Paki-
SriLanka
Population/Ethnic Composition: 15.6 million. 74 per-
cent Sinhalese; 18 percent Tamil; 7 percent "Moors"
Religious Composition: 69 percent Buddhist; 15 per-
cent Hindu; 8 percent Christian; 8 percent Muslim
(1.3 million), predominantly Sunni, handful of Shias
Government: Independent since 1948. Parliamentary
democracy. President Junius R. Jayewardene, in of-
fice since 1977, heads United National Party (con-
servative, free trade, moderately pro-West, non-
aligned). Numerous small opposition parties but none
Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant
of all religions, including IslamO
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims either of merchant class in
urban areas or poor East Coast Moors. Muslims are
generally religiously unobtrusive. They have attained
prominence politically through appointment of two
Muslims as cabinet ministers (Foreign Affairs and
Transport) and through parliamentary representa-
tives. Religious establishment is thoroughly co-opted.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: The Islamic revival has
had little impact, reflecting both minority status of
Muslims in Sri Lanka and insularity of the country.
Muslims share Buddhists' concern about the effects of
modernization on society, but their concern has not 25X1
taken a detectable fundamentalist turn, even among
youth groups.F_____1
Fundamentalist Organizations: None,'but two radical
political groups draw upon members from lower-
middle-class Tamil-speaking Muslims: JVP (Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna), a radical leftwing militant
group prominent in early 1970s and now in decline,
and quasiterrorist cluster of Tamil separatist groups
Foreign Involvement: Iran has made overtures to
establish links with Sri Lankan Muslims but has
received no encouragement from government or Mus-
lims. No other evidence of external support of Mus-
 I Secret
Recent Developments: Periodic communal violence
between Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority has
often spilled over into anti-Muslim sentiments:
? July 1982: At western seacoast town of Galle, a
dispute between Muslim landlord and Sinhalese
tenant escalated into two days of rioting, arson, and
death and injuries. The government quickly imposed
a state of emergency and press censorship.
? July 1983: Worst Sinhalese-Tamil violence in 35
years evolved from Tamil terrorist attacks. During
Colombo riots, Tamil-speaking Muslims' property
destroyed; west coast Muslims threatened to align
Prognosis: The Islamic fundamentalist cause is not
likely to attract significant support from Sri Lankan
Muslims, and religious-based communal differences
will continue to be overshadowed by Sinhalese-Tamil
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Southeast Asia and Islam:
A Secondary Force
Islam, practiced in Southeast Asia by either a major-
ity or an entrenched minority in all countries, cannot
compete with nationalism as the preeminent political
force. Independence from Western colonial powers
created a series of states propelled by a sense of
national identity. The majority established secular
forms of government that provided for religious ex-
pression but excluded the clerical establishment from
About 200 million Muslims live in the region. The
range of Islamic fervor ranges from sporadic armed
resistance to the central government (in southern
Thailand, the southern Philippines, northern Sumatra
in Indonesia, and border areas in Burma) to newly
independent Brunei, which, until January 1984, had
been one of the world's few remaining sultanates.
Despite this overall religious enthusiasm, Malaysia is
the only state where fundamentalism has influenced
the government to modify its domestic policies to
accommodate Islamic sensitivities and to actively
Throughout the region, resurgence of personal piety
has been widespread among Muslims since the Irani-
an revolution-and the injection of Middle Eastern
petrodollars-and is found in all social groups, partic-
ularly among the young. As a social phenomenon, the
revival is growing among those states with Muslim
majorities (Indonesia and Malaysia). Even in two key
states where the Muslims are a troublesome minority
(Thailand and the Philippines), the government has
had to adopt a series of cosmetic measures to demon-
strate its tolerance of the minority's religious beliefs.
Islam also is a key destabilizing force among the
ethnic groups of Southeast Asia, where communal
disturbances often have roots in tensions between
Muslims and non-Muslims, usually the Chinese mi-
nority. Tensions between Malaysia and both the
Philippines and Thailand continue over alleged Ma-
laysian assistance to Muslim insurgent groups. In
newly independent Brunei, a quiet exodus of the
Chinese professional class is going on in anticipation
that. anti-Chinese feelings may erupt into confronta-
tion or, at a minimum, increased discrimination
against non-Muslims. Burma's new minority laws, on
the other hand, discriminate against Muslims and
Governments of the region have so far suppressed the
resistance of Muslim secessionist groups-Thailand's 25X1
new policy of "Peace in the South," Marcos's manipu-
lation of a badly fragmented Moro (Muslim) secession
movement, and Soeharto's virtual elimination of Mus-
lim rebels seeking greater autonomy in northern
Sumatra. Few of the rebellions have gained signifi-
cant assistance from the international Muslim com-
munity except for rhetorical support in Islamic Con-
ference gatherings. Regional internal security forces
have cooperated to cut off funds, arms shipments, and
rebel leader movements, although they cannot stem
the flow of some youths going abroad for trainin in
the radical Middle Eastern states. 25X1
With the exception of Malaysia, all states in the
region are pursuing secular policies designed to ensure
rapid economic development. The models range from
an outright love feast with Western capitalism in
Singapore, to authoritarian mixed economies in Indo-
nesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, to Burma's inept
and uneven march to socialism, and to the Communist
Political Islam
The two Muslim majority states have dealt with
politicized Islam in diametrically different fashions.
Indonesia, numerically the world's largest Muslim 25X1
state, has been depoliticized under the 19-year rule of
ex-General Soeharto in the name of stability and
economic development. In three successive national
elections, Muslim parties have received close to 30
percent of the vote, yet Soeharto has not allowed
meaningful political participation by them. Instead,
he has co-opted the Muslim establishment, built
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Muslim majority
Significant Muslim minority
CRAM Selected ethnic group
-- - Selected state boundary
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200 400 Miles
mosques, subsidized private Muslim education, and
issued carefully orchestrated warnings about "fanati-
-cism" endangering ethnic relations in a heterogeneous
society. The result has been overall obedience but
festering resentment, especially among the educated
In Malaysia, where the politically preeminent Malays
barely outnumber the Chinese, the largely ethnic
issue of Malayanization of government is inextricably
linked with Islam. When Mahathir bin Mohamad
became Prime Minister in 1981, he embarked on a
program of institutionalizing Islam throughout society
which has created a curious coexistence of personal,
social Islamic revival, government-sponsored ortho-
doxy, and the constant threat of communal break-
down. To quiet fundamentalist demands of a strident
minority party of rural Malays, he co-opted into a
government post the most popular leader of a Muslim
youth group with mass appeal. The result has been a
split between the old-guard orthodox Muslims and the
frustrated fundamentalists.
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Fundamentalism
.
Involvement
Among Muslims
Brunei
209,000
60
Sunni
Sultanate
Independence in
January 1984
Already orthodox;
no evidence
Limited
Burma
35,500,000
7
Sunni
small Shia
community
One party;
authoritarian
Limited activity
Limited
Indonesia
166,000,000
90
Sunni
Shia-less
than I
Sufism
Military-run;
multiparty
Many small
underground
groups
Iran, Libya,
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
15,000,000
50
Sunni
Shia-less
than l
Sufism
Parliamentary
democracy
Increasing with
widening appeal
Libya, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, PLO
Philippines
54,300,000
4
Sunni
Authoritarian
Weak
Saudi Arabia,
Libya,Iran,
Syria, Malaysia
Singapore
2,500,000
l5
Sunni .
One-party.
democracy
Thailand
50,700,000
4
Sunni
Military
dominated;
constitutional
monarchy
Weak
Libya, PLO
The Chams are remnants of an ancient Indochinese
Hindu kingdom that had converted to Islam in the
14th century, only to be displaced by the Vietnamese
in the 15th century. They.have somehow survived in
Kampuchea and Vietnam through most of the 20th
century, but just barely. In Kampuchea they were
prime targets of the Communist Khmer Rouge as
part of a campaign to wipe out religion. Journalists
estimate that several hundred thousand may have
been eliminated mercilessly. The Vietnamese, after
their invasion of Kampuchea, used the Chams for
propaganda by restoring religious freedom, rebuild-
ing mosques, placing Chams in government jobs and
Some chance
of postinde-
pendence
instability
Islam only a
political
irritant
Stability with
co-optation or
repression
Islam con-
tinuing potent
political force
Low-levelin-
surgency will
continue;
instability
Irritant of
Muslim sepa-
ratists; stable
high-ranking positions in the occupying army, and by
using Chams as international spokesmen for their
"beneficent " rule of minority groups. 25X1
After the Communist takeover of South Vietnam in
1975, however, approximately 100,000 Chams who
live scattered throughout the Mekong Delta have had
their religious and ethnic identity slowly eliminated
through a vigorous assimilation policy. Imports of
Korans are banned; the hajj is forbidden; mosques
have been converted to community centers. Chain
refugees from both countries have been largely ig-
nored by international Muslim organizations
25X1
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Indonesia: President Soeharto
successfully constructs a secu-
lar state in a Muslim society
Malaysia: Islam reinforces
Malay identity in a multiracial
Brunei Government: Independence attained from Great Brit-
Population/Ethnic Composition: 209,000. 65 percent ain on 1 January 1984. Constitutional hereditary
Malay; 24 percent Chinese; I 1 percent European, sultanate. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who acceded to
Indian, Arab, and Dyak.F__1 the throne in 1967, rules with appointed councils. No
(125,000); 32 percent Buddhist or animist; 8 percent only) banned since 1965.
Christian. Muslims are the most orthodox in South-
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Philippines: Southern Muslims
want autonomy, but get only
minor political representation
Religious Policies of Government: Islam is the state
religion. Legal system is based on Islamic law. Gov-
ernment strictly enforces Islamic prohibitions with
"religious police" who patrol for infractions. Govern-
ment advances Islamic cause through policies such as
sponsoring more Islamic programing on radio. Two
previous Islamic political parties have been banned.
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The ulema are thoroughly co-opted by
the government and have ceremonial importance only.
Their views are respected by the government, but they
have little input.)
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known=
Foreign Involvement: Country is wealthy enough so
that external influence of Saudi Arabia, Libya, or
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments. 25X1
Prognosis: The return of 2,000 students after full
independence may exert influence either for more
modernization or for more tightening of Islamic pro-
hibitions. Distinct possibility of instability with Islam
a contributing factor 25X1
Burma 25X1
Population/Ethnic Composition: 35.5 million. 72 per-
cent Burman; remainder consists of various ethnic
minorities (Karen, Kachin, Shan, Chin, Chinese, and
Bengali Indians). F____-] 25X1 25X1
Religious Composition: 85 percent Buddhist; over 7 25X1
percent Muslim (2.5 million); rest are Christian or
animist. Most Muslims are Sunni; about one-fourth
are Rohingya of Arakan Province bordering on Ban-
gladesh; rest are scattered, with small Shia communi-
ty in Rangoon. 25X1
25X1
25X1
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Government: Independent since 1948. First President
U Nu overthrown in 1962 coup, which brought
General Ne Win to power. Unicameral legislature.
One official party (Burma Socialist Program Party).
Ne Win retired in 1981 but retained effective control
of country as chairman of BSPP. Current President is
U San Yu. Government is socialist, neutral in exter-
nal political
Religious Policies of Government. Buddhism was
state religion under U Nu; Ne Win has championed
secular state, with strict separation of church and
state. Government restricts outside Muslim influence,
bans all preaching by visiting clergy, bans imports of
Islamic literature, and tries to isolate and contain
Muslim minority. Strict government policies stop
short of outright harassment, but, through National-
ity Act of 1982, the government has made most
Muslims a second-class minority. In 1978 government
crackdown on illegal Bengali Muslim immigrants
spilled over to Bengali settlers in Arakan; 200,000
fled to Bangladesh. Under international pressure,
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Six officially recognized "Establishment
Islam" groups represent Muslims in relations with the
government; basically nonpolitical, including a Shia
Status of Fundamentalism: Small resurgence in reli-
gious observance reported in press during 1980-81.
For the Rohingyas, the issue is Islamic autonomy,
whereas other Muslims are agitating for restoration of
civil rights and freedom of religion; some have joined
other ethnic insurgencies for common goal of unseat-
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? United Islamic Organization Burma (UIOB): A
resistance group formed to protect ethnic minority
rights. Its military guerrilla arm is known as Mus-
lim Liberation Front (MLF), reportedly about 200
armed men; may have some Thai support.
? Muslim Action Group: Leader is Maung Maung
Tar; of Iranian descent, runs a small, pro-Iranian
group about which little is known.
? Rohingya Patriotic Front of Arakan: Muslim mili-
tants wanting to establish separate Islamic state;
their military wing, the Rohingya Liberation Army
Foreign Involvement: Iran has established a small
Shia Islamic Center in Rangoon. UIOB also has some
limited financial support from World Muslim League
and Organization of Islamic Conference (Saudi Ara-
bia), perhaps also from Iran
Recent Developments:
? 1980: Government allowed Muslims to make hajj
for first time since 1962.
? April 1981: 1,500 Burmese Muslims fled to Malay-
sia after new citizenship law denied their civil
rights.
? October 1982: Nationality Law passed against
minorities.
? August 1983: Anti-Muslim incidents broke out in
numerous small towns, 250 arrested. Muslim orga-
nizations protested, threatened to cancel religious 25X1
festival, but government moved in to protect wor-
shipers at mosque. 25X1
Prognosis: Fundamentalism among Muslim minority
is unlikely to become more than a political irritant to
the government but has added to traditional separatist
Indonesia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 166 million. Major-
ity of Malay stock with numerous subdivisions, most
important being Javanese (45 percent); 3 percent
Chinese; less than 1 percent Indian and Arab.
25X1
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 Religious Composition: Numerically the largest
Muslim country worldwide. More than 90 percent
Muslim (149 million); 5 percent Christian; 3 percent
Buddhist/Hindu. Muslims are Sunni, but many Sufi
beliefs; Muslims on Java practice syncretic blend of
pre-Islamic Hindu/Buddhist and animistic beliefs;
orthodox Islam (perhaps 20 percent) practiced more
rigorously on islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and in
Government: Independence from Netherlands in 1949.
Brief parliamentary democratic period, followed by
Sukarno's authoritarian leftist rule. Attempted Com-
munist coup in 1965 provoked military reaction;
General Soeharto assumed political control and has
ruled since 1966 with periodic elections reaffirming
his mandate until 1988. Soeharto's regime is a mili-
tary/technocratic alliance, moderate, pro-West, and
anti-Communist.
Religious Policies of Government: Secular state with
Islam as the dominant religion. Official tolerance of
all religions, but no proselytizing allowed, and the
government promotes nonsectarian state ideology.
Status of Fundamentalism: Since mid-1970s, there
has been a strong social and cultural renaissance of
Islam and a vigorous upswing in Islamic observance,
particularly among the elite, rising middle class, and
youth. Extremist fundamentalist groups have flour-
ished, some as cults, others as underground radical
Fundamentalist Organizations: Numerous groups
have emerged, then been suppressed by the govern-
ment, which tends to lump them together as Daru[
Islam. Most prominent current groups:
? Islam Jema'ah (Society of Islam): Reformist, non-
political sect, numbering about 50,000 mostly urban
youth at height; formed in early 1970s, banned
twice, most recently in 1979; now underground. 25X1
? Kommando Jihad (War Command): Umbrella term
for group of militant fundamentalists operating
underground. Responsible for terrorist acts, some
assassinations, plots against Soeharto and other
Cabinet members.
Ministry of Religion encourages establishment of ? Istagomah. West Javanese zealots believed to be
Islam, monitors any signs of fundamentalism or dis- linked with the Kommando Jihad. Led by lotion
sent. The government supports many Islamic organi- ben Zein, executed for series of terrorist assassina-
zations, Koran-reading contests, and mosque building. tions and bombings. Leadership was mostly killed or
Externally, the government supports moderate Islam- arrested after hijacking attempt was thwarted by
is positions and is active in Islamic organizations. government in 1981.
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government:
? Traditionally, small minority of religious leaders
and Muslim politicians have lobbied for Islamic
state and failed.
? Several regional Islamic rebellions in mid-1950s
called Darul Islam are represented now by one
small armed guerrilla group in north Sumatra.
? Four Muslim parties were integrated forcefully into
one Unity Development Party (PPP) in 1973; it
usually wins about 28 percent of election votes;
leadership is co-opted by government.
? Religious hierarchy is neither organized nor united;
no religious figure or PPP Muslim has widespread'
appeal with masses or influence in central
government.
? Council of Ulemas (MUI) set up by government in
1975; co-opted but occasionally takes issue with
? Warman group: Small group of terrorist bandits
calling themselves "Sons of Darul Islam" operating
underground in Sumatra and Java. Warman was
killed in manhunt in 1982.
? NII (Islamic State of Indonesia): Reportedly found-
ed in 1976 by former Darul Islam members and
sympathizers. The leadership was arrested in 1981
cases{
Foreign Involvement: None of the fundamentalist
groups are known to have extensive outside links.
Government is suspicious of Iranian delegations and
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Recent Developments:
? 1977-78: Series of bombings, church, and nightclub
attacks by Kommandd Jihad in Sumatra and Java.
? March 1978: Islamic youth group stormed Parlia-
ment building and set off bombs at session to install
Soeharto.
? Mid-1979: Government exposed Warman terrorist
plot to kill Soeharto at National Grand Mosque.
? March 1981: Airplane hijacking by Istaqomah end-
ed in Thailand with storming by Indonesian com-
mandos; all hijackers were killed; leader Imron ben
Zein was seized in Java as "mastermind."
? March 1982: Election rally in Jakarta, broken up by
Prognosis: Muslim groups, although factionalized and
unorganized, are main focus of political opposition to
regime. They may polarize into more radical opposi-
tion groups to create communal violence in which
Islam plays a role. Present secular regime will not
compromise and may become more repressive of
Malaysia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 15 million, divided
between Peninsular Malaysia and the states of Sara-
wak and Sabah on the island of Borneo. 50 percent
Malay; 35 percent Chinese; 10 percent Indian; 5
Religious Composition: On Peninsular Malaysia,
Malays are Muslim, nearly all Chinese are Buddhists,
Indians are Hindu. Sarawak: 24 percent Muslim; 36
percent animist; 24 percent Buddhist and Confucian;
16 percent Christian. Sabah: 38 percent Muslim; 17
percent Christian; 45 percent animist. Nearly all
Muslims (7.5 million) are Sunni. Small Shia pocket in
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1957. Malaya joined with Borneo states to form
Malaysia in 1963. Constitutional parliamentary de-
mocracy, secular rule, pro-West, conservative. The
government rules through 11-party coalition dominat-
ed by predominantly Muslim Malay UMNO with
regular elections and two opposition parties. Most
recent election, in 1982, reelected Mahathir bin Mo-
Religious Policies of Government: Islam is the state
religion, but the Constitution guarantees freedom of
religion. The government. promotes moderate, official
Islamic "orthodoxy," emphasizing Muslim compata-
bility with development. The government, through the
Islamic Affairs Council and National Council of
Religious Affairs promotes policy of dakwah (propa-
gation) which indirectly assures Malay political domi-
nance. Dakwah, which has stressed reform within
.Islamic groups and conversion of non-Malay citizens,
has appealed not only to urban, middle-class, well-
educated youth and Malay elite, but to poor rural
Malays as way to compete against perceived Chinese 25X1
economic dominance. The government co-opted An-
war Ibrahim, popular leader of ABIM (Muslim Youth
Movement of Malaysia), who has joined. the govern-
ment party (UMNO) and has been made Minister of
Culture, Youth, and Sports. The government has
advanced more fundamentalist society by:
? Increasing sponsorship of mosque building, Islamic
education subsidies, Koran reading contests, hajj
sponsorships.
? Helped found Islamic Conference.
laysian Muslim Convert Association) activities in
conversion of non-Muslims (Chinese, Dyaks); also
massively subsidized by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.
? Drawing up new "morals" law that adopts many,
cosmetic Islamic features.
? Agreeing to transmit Saudi network of Islamic
broadcasts to all of Southeast Asia.
? Announcing that it will establish an International
Islamic University, the first in Southeast Asia.
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islamic Malay (ruling elite) community
has disproportionately heavy influence on state poli-
cies. Sultans of each state within the Federation act as
ceremonial guardians of Islam. Conservative religious
officials at village level emphasize moderate ortho-
doxy. PERKIM, major Islamic welfare organization,
 Status of Fundamentalism: Islamic identity was ac-
tively asserted, starting in early 1970s, through:
? Increased government support of orthodox Islamic
policies.
? Spread of radicalism under dakwah policy. Funda-
mentalism strongest in rural areas but also exists
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia). Malay Islamic
chauvinist party in northern Peninsular Malaysia.
Iran-backed extremist wing calls for Islamic state
and, by implication, expulsion of Chinese. PAS
currently in disarray, factionalized.
? ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia).
Founded in 1971. Largest fundamentalist organiza-
tion with 40,000 members. Membership concentrat-
ed among elite youth, although it has mass base and
support. It had extensive connections with Islamic
groups in Middle East until government barred such
ties in 1981.
? Darul Arqam (House of Arqam-Companion of
Muhammad): Founded in early 1970s. Small group
of Arabist extremists who sponsor religious retreats
and communes. Nonpolitical, but anti-Western.
Claims 50,000 members.
? Jamaat-i-Tabligh (Proclamation Society): Original-
ly formed of Muslim Indian members but extended
to include Malays. Proselytizes among rural popula-
tion, antimaterialist, anti-Western. No apparent
political leanings, although some radicals may be
involved in isolated violence.
Other small extremist groups may exist in small cells:
? API (Islamic Unity Force).
? P.A.S.: Another radical underground group, not the
same as PAS.
? Islamic Revolutionary Party: Mainly Malay stu-
Foreign Involvement: Maintains closest links to Mid-
dle East states of any country in Southeast Asia.
Saudi Arabia broadcasts Islamic programs from base
in Kuala Lumpur. Libyan Embassy aids Islamic
Center in capital. PLO representative in Kuala Lum-
pur is only one in Southeast Asia. Iran sends missions
annually. 25X1
Recent Developments:
? 1978: Muslim youths desecrated Hindu temples in
Kerling. 25X1
? October 1980: Muslim fanatics attacked police sta-
tion at Batu Pahat, 24 killed. Triggered government
drive against "deviants."
? 1981: Thousands of Thai Muslim refugees fled to
Malaysia. Thais charged Malaysia with training
Thai Muslim insurgents.
? Fall 1982: Government announced formation of
Southeast Asia's first "Islamic Bank."
? January 1983: Muslim terrorists shot at Soviet
Embassy, claiming to be "International Muslim
Brotherhood."I 25X1
Prognosis: Revivalist spirit will continue, but, with its
large Chinese minority, Malaysia will never have
thoroughly Islamic society. The government, in order
to keep constant threat of Malay-Chinese communal
violence in bounds, must control fundamentalist asser-
tiveness it ironically helped sponsor.
25X1
Philippines
Population/Ethnic Composition: 54.3 million. 95 per-
cent Malay, 1.5 percent Chinese, 3.5 percent other.
Religious Composition: 93 percent Christian, pre-
dominantly Catholic; 4 percent Sunni Muslim (2.2
million); 3 percent Buddhist or animist. Muslims
divided into four tribal groups known collectively as
Moros, most located in southern islands, where they
make up 33 percent of population. Some scattered
throughout cities.0 25X1
Government: Independent from United States since
1946. Originally a democratic republic, with series of
elected presidents. Current President Ferdinand M25X1
cos has ruled since he was first elected in 1965.
Marcos imposed martial law in 1972; revised Consti-
tution for more parliamentary form of government in
0
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I
1973. Again revised in 1981 when martial law was
lifted. Regime is authoritarian with some constitu-
Foreign Involvement: MNLF received overt and co-
vert aid from both Libya and Saudi Arabia for years.
with Malaysia as conduit. Islamic Conference granted
MNLF observer status. Iran and Syria have provided
limited financial and material support
Religious Policies of Government: Secular state, with
Christianity as dominant religion. Freedom of reli-
gious expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The
government has been struggling with Muslim separat-
ism and civil war among the southern Moros since
independence. Government efforts to resettle Chris-
tians in Muslim areas since late 1940s caused commu-
nal hostilities and banditry. Armed rebellion among
Muslims began when martial law was imposed in
1972. The government granted token form of autono-
my to Muslim regions and has tried to co-opt and to
offer amnesty for rebel leaders. Minister of Muslim
Affairs monitors developments in the Moro provinces.
Internationally, the government has moved closer to
Arab positions because of oil dependency and Philip-
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim elite in south remains subordi-
nate to Christian ruling class. Some are co-opted, but
limited Muslim autonomy restricts political influence.
Muslim masses at bottom of national economic lad-
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism is not a
feature of the antigovernment rebellion, although, in
quest for external support, Moro National Liberation
Front leaders have subscribed to concept of Islamic
revival. Fundamentalism has been used to unite a
disparate group of nominal Muslims and to use
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): Separat-
ist organization that uses Islamic traditions in quest
for a Muslim autonomous region. It was formed in
the 1960s from numerous armed bandit gangs.
Armed strength currently estimated by the govern-
ment at 12,000 to 17,000 but largely inactive.
Movement is on the decline because of combat
losses and loss of the international support that it
had in the mid-1970s. Exile leader Nur Misuari
claims to head movement, although his claim is
contested by other rebels, some of whom are more
willing to negotiate with Marcos for limited
autonomy.
Recent Developments:
? January 1979: Marcos held elections as way to
fulfill 1976 agreement to grant more autonomy to
Muslim regions. MNLF boycotted elections.
? January 1981: Army embarked on short-lived plan
to relocate 30,000 Muslims in south.
? February 1981: MNLF faction ambushed and
killed 124 Philippine Constabulary troops. The
Army killed 2,000 MNLF members and arrested
4,000 in retaliation.
? January 1982: Air Force planes strafed Japanese
vessel suspected of transmitting $10 million worth
of arms from Libya to MNLF.
25X1
? March 1982: Marcos made highly publicized trip to
Saudi Arabia to improve ties to Middle East
25X1
Prognosis: Government is dealing with insurgency
that will never go away entirely unless autonomy and
economic parity with rest of country are achieved.
MNLF strength and influence probably will continue
at a low level. Less likely, but possible, would be a
tactical alliance with Communist resistance forces
Singapore
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.5 million. 77 per-
cent Chinese; 15 percent Malay; 6 percent Indian and
Religious Composition: Most Chinese are Buddhists;
15 percent (375,000) Malay Muslims; a few Chris-
Government: Republic and constitutional democracy.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has served and been
reelected since independence from Great Britain in
1959. People's Action Party is only one represented in
unicameral legislature 0
 Religious Policies of Government: Official and unof-
ficial religious tolerance in secular state. The govern-
ment shows some deference to Islamic sensitivities-
has Shariah court for family laws; maintains separate
registry for Muslim marriages; funds Muslim welfare
societies; and sponsors mosques at public housing
sites. The government also watches through security
agency for signs of religious dissent or discord, is
extremely sensitive to Muslim restiveness or imported
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islam is an ethnic issue, totally identified
with the Malay minority. Malays, who comprise
nearly all of the Muslim community, are at the
bottom of the social-economic ladder, and the reli-
gious establishment has no political significance or
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known to exist.
Leadership of Malay and Indian extremist group
called Singapore People's Liberation Organization
(SPLO), which may have had some Islamic ideology,
Recent Developments:
? 1979: Ten people arrested, tried as "Muslim
fanatics."
? January 1982: Four people arrested for distributing
pro-Muslim, antigovernment leaflets from Singa-
pore People's Liberation Organization at a Muslim
holiday rallyF___1
Prognosis: No near-term threat of Muslim extrem-
ism, even though there is some dissatisfaction among
Malays with the social engineering one by Chinese-
Thailand
Population/Ethnic Composition: 50.7 million. 75 per-
cent Thai; 14 percent Chinese; 11 percent minority
tribes and Malays{
Religious Composition: 95 percent Buddhist; 4 per-
cent (2 million) Muslim; less than 1 percent Christian.
Nearly all Muslims are located in southernmost prov-
inces bordering Malaysia, although a few live in
Bangkok. Muslim population forms 80 percent of
population in the southern provinces, which were once
part of a separate Pattani empire that spanned territo-
Government: Constitutional monarchy with parlia- 25X1
mentary system of government, numerous political
parties. Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda has been Prime
Minister since 1980. The armed forces are, unofficial-
ly, final arbiters in political decisions. F___-] 25X1
Religious Policies of Government. Freedom of reli-
gion is guaranteed constitutionally. The King acts as
defender of all faiths, although he is a practicing 25X1
Buddhist. Muslims had been a neglected, unassimilat-
ed minority. The government has recently made de-
termined effort to eliminate causes for disaffection. It25X1
has built mosques and an Islamic Center in Bangkok;
established special educational quotas, Muslim wel-
fare societies, and Shariah representatives in courts; 25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to 25X1
Government: Armed Muslim rebellion movement in
the south is small and fragmented. Groups espouse
either total independence or union with Malaysia.
Muslims have never organized a political party. Mus-
lims in other parts of the country coexist well with
Status of Fundamentalism: No significant fundamen-
talist activity since rebellion by Thai Muslims in late
1940s, although more Muslim students are studying
in the Middle East. 25X1 25X1
Fundamentalist Organizations: Not strictly funda-
mentalist, but largest separatist and dissident organi-
zations are: 25X1
? PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization):
Founded in 1968, based in Malaysia with about 13
distinct gangs operating in Thailand.
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? BNPP (Pattani National Liberation Front): Found-
ed in 1947 to lobby for independent Islamic state.
May now be merged with PULO.
? BRN (National Revolutionary Front): Founded in
1960s. More secular than other groups, perhaps
with links to Thai Communist Party.
? Paperi (Islamic Young People's Organization):
Youth group, perhaps a dummy set up by Commu-
nists to attract Muslims.
Jamaat-i-Tabligh (Proclamation Society): Evangeli-
cal group originally from India, gathering adherents
from other Southeast Asian states; nonpolitical but
strong support among peasants in southern
Thailand.
? Party Angkatan Revolusi Tentara Islam Pattani:
Subfaction of BRN with membership of 30 to 40
No group numbers more than 1,000. Some are armed
terrorists and bandits with little political support.
Estimated 10 to 20 percent of Muslim population
sympathizes with their radical aims. The groups often
receive asylum in Malaysia, where they may have
links with fundamentalist Islamic Party of Malaysia
Foreign Involvement: Libya, which built large Islamic
Center in Bangkok, is suspected of aiding and training
separatists. Some rebels getting military training in
Recent Developments:
? 1980: Alleged Muslim threats to assassinate the
King and Queen never materialized; the government
set up special police force to operate against bandit-
ry; rash of unattributed bomb attacks in Bangkok.
About 2,000 Thai Muslims fled to Malaysia during
counterinsurgent operations.
? Late 1981: The government launched "Peace in the
South" campaign, appointed popular Gen. Han
-1
25X1 I
Prognosis: Government cannot fully assimilate Mus-
lims into Thai society-but shows signs of removing
support for the separatists by attentive administration
and attempts to reach bilateral agreement with Ma-
laysia not to harbor separatists. Separatists in turn are
too hopelessly divided to unite against government
and may fade away or remain localized threat.
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Mostly Moderate Islam
In Africa 27 countries outside the Arab-dominated
northern tier contain approximately 120 million Mus-
lims, ranging up to 100 percent in Somalia. The
remaining Sub-Saharan African nations outside our
survey contain only negligible Muslim populations,
usually non-African immigrants.
The forms of African Islam are almost as wide
ranging as the percentages. Devotees of mystic Sufism
intertwined with pre-Islamic animism prevail in the
region, while, at the other extreme, a vocal minority
of Muslims in Nigeria are strongly influenced by
militant fundamentalism. Although the political voice
of Islam is generally weak and fundamentalists are a
tiny minority of all Muslims in the region, a limited
Islamic revival is under way in several states.F_~
Arab support is paying off in an increase in Islamic
social consciousness and activism. Practically all of
the states of the region are sending increasing num-
bers of Muslims on hajj as well as to Middle Eastern
universities and religious schools. The impact of re-
turning students on their societies has yet to be
reliably measured but may add to the tensions as a
new generation assumes political leadership. We be-
lieve they may compete with the Christian-educated
majority who have received religious and technical
In the future, Muslim zealots, supported and financed
by Libya, conservative Saudi Arabia, or Iran, could
emerge to change the formula for rule by already
weak governments with fragile political institutions:
? The ranks of older, Western-oriented African
statesmen are thinning, and their ability to steer a
moderate political course backed by personalized
authoritarian rule is coming to a close. Military
regimes led by ideologically naive officers often take
their place, with subsequent instability.
? Economic crisis bedevils almost all of Africa, bring-
ing with it generational, tribal, sectarian, and ur-
ban-rural tensions that could fracture along Islamic 25X1
versus non-Islamic lines if money from the wealthy
25X1
The predominantly Muslim states adjacent to the
northern tier face the greatest threat from Libyan.
ambitions. Religious as well as militant fundamental-
ist influence has thus far been checked as a political
force, although in Chad and Sudan, Libyan military
intervention or support on behalf of rebels continues
to aggravate chronic tensions between Muslims and
25X1 25X1
In West Africa rising fundamentalism among youn-
ger Muslims in northern Nigeria threatens to intensi-
fy existing regional and north-south tensions and
contributes to national instability. The rise in funda-
mentalist fervor in Nigeria, in turn, threatens to
slowly seep through to other countries of the region-
particularly to Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, and
Mali-with an appeal that will survive with or with-
out Libyan support. The Libyan influence has been
particularly strong in Benin, which has been used as a
transit point for Libyan-supported dissident groups
from other West African states as well as a venue for
"Islamic brotherhood conferences" designed to spread 25X1
In East Africa, where Islam is practiced by only a
minority of the populations of all states except in the
Comoros Islands, fundamentalist activity has not been
a major element in the political equation. Islam there
is principally associated with the Asian minority
populations, usually the economically envied middle
class. In Tanzania an ethnic-religious division be-
tween the Muslim islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and
 EM Significant Muslim minority
SUSU Selected ethnic group
0 500 Kilometers
0 I 500 Mile,
the mostly non-Muslim mainland contributes to con-
stant tensions. The rise in Islamic consciousness adds
to the desire of the islands for more autonomy.
In the Horn countries, the pragmatic variety of Islam
practiced by large Muslim populations exists along-
side the chronic political instability of the region-
antagonistic ethnic groups, border wars, and internal
rebellions. Islam remains only a bystander to the main
Benin
Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.8 million. 99 per-
cent African. Yoruba, Fort, Bariba, Adja major tribal
groups{
Religious Composition: Approximately 12 percent
(455,000) Muslim, predominantly Sunni, or nonortho-
dox; 8 percent Christian; 80 percent animist. Muslims 25X1
are represented in three major tribal groups concen-
Government: One-party Marxist military regime. Col.
Mathieu Kerekou has served as President and De-
25X1
Religious Policies of Government: Official tolerance
for all religions despite Marxist character of state.
Government does not permit politicized Islamic activ-
ity. 25X1
 Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin
3,800,000
12
Sunni
Sufism
Marxist;
military
Not yet evident
Nigeria,
Libya,
Saudi Arabia
Comoros
Islands
442,000
97
Sunni
Islamic
republic;
authoritarian
Not yet evident
Libya, Gulf
states
Djibouti
316,000
92
Sunni
Sufism
One party;
parliamentary
Small fundamen-
talist minority
Libya
Ethiopia
31,300,000
40
Sunni
Sufism
Marxist;
military
Insignificant
None
Gambia, The
700,000
90
Sufism
Republic
Insignificant
Libya
Ghana
13,400,000
12
Sunni
Sufism
Military;
leftist
None known
None
Libya
Guinea-
Bissau
827,000
30
Sufism
One party;
leftist
Increasing
conversions
Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Libya
Sufism
Wa'hhabis
authoritarian
Kenya
18,600,000
7
Sunni
Shia minority
One party;
civilian
Nonexistent
Iran, Libya,
Saudi Arabia,
Malawi
6,600,000
12
Sunni
Sufism
Rightist one-
man regime
Nonexistent
Limited
Sufism
Wa'hhabis
socialist
Libya, Egypt,
Nigeria
Mozambique
13,000,000
11
Sunni
Military;
people's
republic
None
None
Niger
6,100,000
85
Sunni
Sufism
Pro-West;
military
Not yet evident
Nigeria,
Libya,
Nigeria
85,200,000
47
Sunni
Sufism
Wa'hhabis
Pro-West;
military
Strongest in
Africa
Libya, Iran,
Saudi Arabia
Instability
Repression
Ethnic
conflict
Secessionist
movements
Probably
stable
Instability
sion insta-
bility
Uneasy
stability
sion insta-
bility
Fragile
stability
Possible posh
succession
stability
Insurgency,
instability
Libyan tar-
get-
Instability
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Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa (Continues)
Country
Total
Population
Percent
Muslims
Principal Sect
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Prognosis
Senegal
6,300,000
82
Sunni
Sufism
Shia minority
Pro-West;
civilian
Fairly significant
Libya, Iran
Continued
stability
Sierra Leone
3,700,000
25
Sunni
Sufism
Shia minority
One party;
pro-West;
civilian
Growing
Libya, Iran
Postsucces-
sion insta-
bility
Somalia
6,200,000
100
Sunni
Sufism
Military;
socialist
Many exile
groups
Libya, South Ye-
men, Iran,
Ethiopia
Postsucces-
sion insta-
bility
South Africa
27,000,000
1
Sunni
Shia minority
Parliamenta-
ry for whites
Increasing
among Coloreds
Saudi Arabia,
Iran
Stability,
rising
ethnic
dissidence
Sudan
20,600,000
73
Sunni
Sufism
Pro-West;
military
Increasing on
campuses; many
exile groups
Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Libya
Instability;
potential civil
war
Tanzania
20,500,000
35
Sunni
Sufism
Wa'hhabis
Small Shia
minority
One-party
republic
Limited
Libya, Iran
Potential
Christian-
Muslim
conflict '
Uganda
13,800,000
10
Sunni
Sufism
Civilian, one
party
Upper Volta
6,600,000
20
Sunni
Sufism
Pro-West;
military
Revival among
youth
Libya
Uneasy
stability
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims, long dominant in commercial
life, hold some key cabinet and military positions such
as Foreign Minister and Army chief. Religious estab-
lishment is in disarray and too docile to criticize
Status of Fundamentalism: Although Islam is gaining
converts, fundamentalist ideas have yet to penetrate
or affect Muslim population
Fundamentalist Organizations: League for the Elimi-
nation of Heresy (Jama'atul Izalatul Bidi'a): Clandes-
tine militant group based in Nigeria, has about 25
members among Hausa community in capital of Porto
Novo. Leader is Ghana-born Mohammed El Aqul
Said, now imprisoned in Nigeria, a reformist who
preaches against the secular governments of West
Foreign Involvement: Benin accepts significant Liby-
an financial contributions for mosque construction
and other religious uses and serves as a transit stop for
Libyan-recruited West Africans flown to Libya for 25X1
political indoctrination and paramilitary training.
Saudis have given limited aid via mosques and imams.
25X1 25X1
Prognosis: Continued instability due to internal prob-
lems-economic, regional, and ethnic-as much if not
more than external pressures. Internal Muslim factor
will not play significant role
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Cameroon
Population/Ethnic Composition: 9.3 million. 99 per-
cent African divided among approximately 200 tribes.
Religious Composition: About 16 percent (1.5 mil-
lion) Muslim, mainly in northern provinces; 50 per-
cent animist; 34 percent Christian, in southern prov-
Government: Unitary republic under one-party presi-
dential regime. President Ahmadou Ahidjo, a north-
ern Muslim, ruled from 1960 until November 1982
when he resigned in favor of then Prime Minister Paul
Biya, a southern Christian. Presidential elections are
scheduled for 1985. Biya has continued Ahidjo's
Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant
of all religions, government balances ethnic and reli-
gious groups by awarding positions in civil service and
commerce. Islamic Cultural Association, a conserva-
tive voluntary association of elites, was founded by
government to monitor activities of the Islamic com-
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: While some northern Muslims continue
to be represented in Biya's government, he has gradu-
ally removed others closely associated with the Ahidjo
regime. Press reports suggest that northern Muslims
are growing apprehensive about their future role in
the government and the current pace of change.
Foreign Involvement: Government is suspicious of
Libyan overtures and closely watches Libyan influ-
Recent Developments:
Prognosis: President Biya must watch carefully for
signs of ethnic, regional, or religious tensions in the
wake of the failed northern mutiny. Continuing eco-
nomic successes will help moderate Muslims resist
fundamentalist appeals.0 25X1
25X1
Chad
Population/Ethnic Composition: 5 million. 80 per-
cent African, 20 percent ArabF____] 25X1
Religious Composition: 45 percent (2.2 million) Sunni
Muslim; 45 percent animist; 10 percent Christian.
Muslims are fairly orthodox; northern Toubou groups
follow the Sanusi school established in Libya in 19th
century. Other Muslim tribes, influenced by West
Africa, are followers of Sufi brotherhoods, predomi-
nantly Tijaniya.~ . 25X1 25X1
Government: Civil war and series of coups and coun-
tercoups between feuding (mainly Muslim) factions
since independence from France in 1960. Constitution
suspended in 1975 and never reinstated. Legal system
is combination of French civil law and Chadian 25X1
customary law. The latest upheaval was in 1982 when
Col. Hissein Habre, who had served as Defense
Minister, deposed pro-Libyan President Goukouni
Weddeye. Both Goukouni and Habre are Muslim,
Religious Policies of Government: Since assuming
leadership in 1982, President Habre has tried to
reduce tensions between southern Christians and
northern Muslims. He has not been able to overcome
deep-rooted ethnic and religious rivalries that plague
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim rebelliousness against earlier
Christian domination has disintegrated into internal
feuding, putting Islam into the background. Islamic
leadership now has little voice in the government
policy in a divided country. Imam Moussa is widely
revered as clerical leader among Muslims, but he has
? 1979: Muslim-inspired incident in north against
village authorities
? 1984: Mutiny attempt by disaffected northerners in
25X1
25X1
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Foreign Involvement: Libyan involvement in Chad in
recent years originally manipulated Islam as a symbol
of resistance. Libyans armed Muslim dissidents in the
early 1970s, invaded in 1980 to prevent President
Goukouni's overthrow, and continued military support
for Goukouni's rebel forces in 1983. Libyan aims are
to install a friendly regime in N'Djamena, using Chad
as a springboard for regional subversion
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments
Prognosis: Chad faces continuous destabilization
from external threats of Libya, grievous economic
conditions, and lack of national unity. Islam, itself
divided, distantly follows factional warfare as an
Comoros Islands
Population/Ethnic Composition: 442,000. Mixture of
Arabs, Malays, and blacks
Government: Independent from France since 1975.
First President, Ahmed Abdallah, was overthrown by
radical Ali Soilih a month after he took office. Soilih's
brutal and anti-Muslim regime was, in turn, over-
thrown by Abdallah returning from three-year exile
in France. Abdallah established "Islamic Republic"
in 1978, engineered six-year term as President and a
rubberstamp parliament. Political parties banned in
Religious Policies of Government: Officially, toler-
ance for all religions. In actuality, Abdallah rules in
the name of Islam, with Islamic law in courts, brutal
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Religious establishment has close ties
with conservative regime. Grand Mufti, although not
officially in government, rules on governmental deci-
sions. Ministry of Muslim Affairs advises and sup-
Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of funda-
mentalist opposition in country already deeply con-
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known outside 25X1
of officially sponsored Islamic societies and associa-
Foreign Involvement: Libya has attempted to obtain
diplomatic presence, while at same time maintaining
contact with small Comoran opposition group based in
Tanzania. Comoros also receive small amount of aid
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments0 25X1 25X1
Prognosis: Abdallah's repressive regime will continue
use of conservative Islam to reinforce rule. Antire-
Djibouti 25X1
Population/Ethnic Composition: 316,000. Divided
between two mutually hostile ethnic groups, the Afars
and the Issas (ethnic Somalis).F____-]
25X1
25X1
Religious Composition: 92 percent (291,000) Sunni
Muslim; 8 percent Christian. Majority of Muslims
Government: One-party parliamentary republic under
President Hassan Gouled, who has ruled since inde-
pendence from France in 1977. Since 1981 the Peo-
ples Progress Assembly is the only legal political
Religious Policies of Government: Islam is official
religion, but the government is officially tolerant of
other religions as long as they do not proselytize.
Government observes Islamic day of rest. A combina-
tion of Shariah and French civil law is used in courts.
Ministry of Justice is combined with Islamic Affairs.
25X1
25X1
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Government: Religious establishment has no signifi-
cant political influence even though it is represented
Status of Fundamentalism: For society as a whole, no
evidence of fundamentalist zeal. Within the Army, a
small group of nationalist/fundamentalist zealots is
led by Capt. Zakaria Ibrahim, who has presidential
ambitions. They are closely monitored by security
personnel and pose little threat to the regime)
Foreign Involvement: Fundamentalist roup in Army
may receive support from Libya
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments
Prognosis: If Gouled is ousted, he might possibly be
replaced by military officers who would move to
reduce French and other Western influence. Islam
probably would not be a major factor unless Libya
could exploit the situatio
Ethiopia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 31.3 million. Oromo
(Galla); Amhara, and Tigrai tribes predominate and
compete with each other. Somalis comprise 6 percent
Religious Composition: 40 percent (12.5 million)
Muslim; 35 percent Christian, 25 percent animist.
Somalis are 100 percent Muslim. Some urban Mus-
lims are orthodox, but majority are Sunnis with Sufi
allegiances to two main brotherhoods, Qadiriya and
Government: Monarchy under Emperor Haile Selas-
sie, a Christian, until overthrown in 1974 by army
coup. Executive power now in hands of military
council, run by Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam. No
Religious Policies of Government: Under monarchy,
Ethiopian Coptic orthodoxy was established state
religion. In 1975 church was disestablished and patri-
arch replaced. Revolutionary regime is secular. All. 25X1
religions officially tolerated and considered equal
although minor persecution and harassment of funda-
mentalist Protestant groups.) 25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Under Christian-dominated government,
Muslims suffered discrimination. Since the revolu- 25X1
tion, Muslim establishment has slightly more freedom
but no political power and remains too disunited to
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist activity
believed to be insignificant. 25X1
25X1
25X1
Recent Developments. No significant fundamentalist
developments.F___1 25X1 25X1
Prognosis: Islamic agitation is not a likely develop-
ment since the government prides itself on its treat-
ment of Muslims. In addition, it would be almost
impossible for Muslims to unite in opposition since the
various ethnic groups' deep distrust of each other
transcends their common religious beliefs.I 25X1
25X1
Religious Composition: 90 percent (630,000) Muslim;
10 percent animist or Christian. Muslims are mem- 25X1
bers of Sufi brotherhoods; majority practice Tijaniya,
but Qadiriya and Muridiya also represented; all are
0
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Government: Republic, independent from Great Brit-
ain since 1965. Formed confederation with Senegal in
1982. President Jawara has been successively reelect-
ed since 1965; briefly overturned in coup by young
officers in 1981 but reinstated by Senegalese military
Religious Policies of Government: Secular. Tolerant
of Sufi activity. President Jawara converted from
Christianity to Islam in 1973. The government sup-
ports Muslim Association in an effort to monitor and
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Sufi brotherhoods work with the govern-
Status of Fundamentalism: Increase in Muslim mem-
bership, but mainly as revival of conservative values.
Perhaps some clandestine support for the exiled Sene-
galese radical Niasse's proposal for a combined Sene-
gal-Gambia Islamic state, but not politically signifi-
Government: After independence in 1957, President
Kwame Nkrumah evolved from multiparty parlia-
mentarianism to one-man rule with radical socialism
as theme. Nkrumah overthrown in 1966 with latest
change in government a coup in 1981 by Flight
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings after ineffective two-year
experiment with civilian rule. Rawlings, a Christian,
heads the seven-man "Provisional National Defense
Council," with leftist ideology. 0 25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Little known about political influence of
Muslim establishment or its position in military-
dominated governmentF____1
25X1
.I
25X1
25X1
Recent Developments. No known fundamentalist de-
_____
Foreign Involvement: Libya was suspected of implica-
velopments
F
1
25X1
tion in 1981 coup
but since that time there has been
,
25X1
Prognosis: Possible friction between Tijaniya Broth-
erhood dominance in Gambia and increasing influ-
ence of rival Muridiya Brotherhood in Senegal could
Ghana
Population/Ethnic Composition: 13.4 million. 99 per-
cent African. Ashanti, Fante, and Ewe are major
tribes.)
Religious Composition: 12 percent (1.6 million) Mus-
lim, concentrated in pockets in thinly populated north
and in southern cities; 45 percent animist; 43 percent
Christian. Muslims are Sunnis, but majority are
practitioners of folk Islam mixed with pre-Islamic
Guinea 25X1
Population/Ethnic Composition: 5.4 million. 99 per-
cent African, with three major tribes-Fulani,
lim; 35 percent animist. Muslims are of the Sufi
Brotherhood Qadiriya; practice nonorthodox, folk Is-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
One-man, one-party regime until 1984 under Ahmed
Sekou Toure, who initially attempted a leftwing,
revolutionary socialist society with strong links to
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I
1.
USSR. In search of greater economic assistance,
Toure turned to more pragmatic, Western orientation.
Religious Policies QfGovernment: Islam is state
religion. Ministry of Islamic Affairs and an official
Islamic Council support and monitor Islamic develop-
ments. Toure took active part in international Islamic
Relation oJIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim establishment has no political
role. Brotherhoods active in 1950s were suppressed.
Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist activity
forbidden by highly authoritarian regime; probably
Foreign Involvement: Toure used contacts with both
Libya and Saudi Arabia purely for economic aid;
after becoming disenchanted with Libyan meddling,
he turned toward more conservative Arabs, inaugu-
rated world's fourth-largest mosque with Saudi aid.
Prognosis: More open influence of Islam may emerge
now that Toure regime has passed, but more likely
development is breakdown of Army factions and
fights between moderates and leftists in both military
Guinea-Bissau
PopulationlEthnic Composition: 827,000. 99 percent
African; most of rest mulatto. 30 distinct tribal
groups.0 25X1
Religious Composition: 30 percent (248,000) Muslim;
66 percent animist; 4 percent Christian. Most Mus-
lims practice unorthodox Sufi rites, incorporating
animistic rituals and centering around priests or
Government: Independent from Portugal since 1974.
Constitutional government by Muslim-Christian mu-
latto minority overthrown by coup led by present 25X1
President, Gen. Joao Bernardo Vieira in 1979. He
now leads one-party leftist regimeF____1 25X1
Religious Policies of Government. Official tolerance
of all religions. Islamization of animistic tribal groups
continues without any religious persecution by gov- 25X1
Relation oJIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims serve in many high-ranking
positions in government but do not press religious
25X1
25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: No fundamentalist activi-
ty evident, just increasing Islamization of animist 25X1
Foreign Involvement: In the late 1970s the govern-
ment received aid from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Kuwait for national mosque: At one time it considered
making Arabic official language. In later years it has
Recent Developments: No known fundamentalist de-
velopments.0 25X1 25X1
Prognosis: Continued uneasy stability, but Islam does
not appear to be a factor in political future
25X1
Ivory Coast
Population/Ethnic Composition: 8.9 million. 99 per.25X1
cent African, about 60 tribal groups.)
Religious Composition: 25 percent (2.2 million) Sunni
Muslim; 65 percent animist, 10 percent Christian.
Muslims are mostly northerners from Dioula (Man-
dingo) tribe. Now also found in urban centers with
increased migration by non-Ivorians. All practice folk
Islam, nonorthodox, with exception of some urban
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Government: Independent from France since 1960,
with benevolent authoritarian rule by President Felix
Houphouet-Boigny since then. One-party, unicameral
legislature. No established constitutional succession.
Pro-West stronly anti-Communist, and anti-Libyan.
Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant
of all religions. Suspicious of Muslim minority only in
context of fear of Libyan influence spilling over from
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim Cultural Center, a conservative
voluntary association of elite with political ties, coop-
erates with the government. Muslim elite are in top
Status of Fundamentalism: Increase in numbers of
conversions to Islam and limited fundamentalist activ-
Fundamentalist Organizations: Few Muslim sects
with limited following. Some Wa'hhabi groups in
cities are critical of folk Islam and very anti-Western.
Foreign Involvement: Libya training small number of
Ivorian dissidents but has limited influence in official-
ly hostile environment. Iranians have made represen-
Recent Developments:
? 1981: President Houphouet-Boigny became more
suspicious of Muslim potential for opposition, put
suspected activists under surveillance.F__~
Prognosis: President Houphouet-Boigny's death could
throw country into period of uncertainty that might
result in instability, some agitation by poorer ele-
ments, including foreign Muslim minority who have
come from Sahel seekin jobs in major Ivory Coast
cities.
Kenya
Population/Ethnic Composition: 18.6 million. 97 per-
cent black (major tribes are Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic,
and Hamitic); 2 percent Asian; 1 percent European,
Religious Composition: 7 percent Muslim (1.3 mil-
lion); 56 percent Christian; 36 percent animist; I
percent Hindu. Approximately half of the coastal
inhabitants-blacks, Asians, and Arabs-are Sunni
Muslims of the Hanafi school; a few coastal blacks
are Shias. About 40 percent of the Asians are Mus-
lims, mostly from Pakistan or Indian provinces of
Gujerat or Punjab. A minority are Shias, mostly in
into three sects:
? Khoja Ismailis are from Aga Khan group, number
about 4,000, and are nonorthodox modernists.
? Bhora (6,000) are nonorthodox.
? Ithna-Ashari (4,000) are orthodox Shias.
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1963. First President, African nationalist Jomo Ken-
yatta, banned opposition parties in 1969 and ruled as
one-party leader until his death in 1978. Current
President, Daniel T. arap Moi, has ruled since then.
Religious Policies of Government: Secular state with
strong Christian influence because of colonial heri-
tage. Officially tolerant of all religions but forbids
"destabilizing sects," a measure intended to discour- 25X1
age tribalism. Islamic fundamentalist groups, howev-
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to 25X1
Government: Muslims are politically weak and have
little voice in government policy. Country's only polit-
ical party has no Islamic cadre or caucus; no Muslims
hold ministerial rank, although some hold second-
echelon cabinet positions; Supreme Council of Ke-
nyan Muslims prestigious but influences the govern- 25X1
ment only on religious, not on political or secular
issues; only Parliament, which has a disproportionate-
ly high Muslim representation of 15 percent because
unicameral system gives high representation to heavi-
ly Muslim northeastern provinces, gives Muslims any
political influence. 0 25X1 25X1
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Fundamentalist Organizations: Only unsubstantiated
evidence that Muslim Brotherhood may have at-
tempted to establish a chapter.
Foreign Involvement: Although Libya, Iran; Saudi
Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states have all attempt-
ed to increase their influence among Kenya's Mus-
lims, they have made little headway. Iranian clergy
have preached among Swahili Shias in Mombasa but
with little effect. Most visible foreign involvement has
been from the Aga Khan, who has supported the
Khoja Ismailis as well as the Government of Kenya,
with whom he has traditionally had warm relations.
He has funded hospitals and schools for non-Muslims
as well as Muslims and has extensive business inter-
ests in hotels, newspapers, restaurants, and forward-
Recent Developments:
? Late 1980: North Frontier District Liberation Front
attacked government installations, trying to wrest
the Muslim Somali district from Kenya.
? August 1982: Coup attempt against President'Moi
degenerated into looting and destruction of Asian
Prognosis: It is remotely possible that traditional
Kenyan religious harmony could be upset by econom-
ic deterioration. Islam would not be a factor. Separat-
ist sentiments in the north, which is Muslim, could be
Liberia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.1 million. 97 per-
cent indigenous black; rest Americo-Liberians whose
ancestors arrived in 19th century and became the
Religious Composition: 15 percent (314,000) moder-
ate Sunni Muslim; 75 percent animists; 10 percent
Government: Military coup of April 1980 suspended
previous constitutional democracy, assassinated Presi-
dent Tolbert, transferred political power from Amer-
ico-Liberian elite to indigenous tribal groups, install-
ing Gen. Samuel Kanyon Doe as head of state. Doe, a
Christian, installed martial law and People's Redemp-
tion Council, suspended political parties and legisla-
ture, but has promised return to civilian rule in 1985.
Religious Policies of Government: Secular govern-
ment under military rule has no particular religious
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim elite are politically passive and
unimportant. One Muslim businessman, Mohamet
Sylla, has been influential with palace. Liberian Na-
tional Muslim Council (LNMC) is apolitical, con-
servative, Saudi-supported group that sponsors
Status of Fundamentalism: No known significant
fundamentalist activity 25X1
Fundamentalist Organizations: Out of a handful of
groups, only one, the Islamic Call Society, is receiving
some funds from Libya, but has little political signifi_
Foreign Involvement: Libya has widespread economic
projects in Liberia and has tried to influence political
and military aspirants to power. Funding for mosques
and religious projects provided by Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.0 25X1 25X1
Recent Developments:
? 1980: Libya made political overtures when Tolbert
was toppled. 25X1
? Mid-1981: Liberia closed Libyan mission when
suspicions arose of coup plotting against Doe
25X1
Prognosis: Deteriorating economy is eroding public
support for Doe's reforms, but, should regime be
threatened, it would not have discernible Muslim
ingredient; more likely threat from military dissatis-
Malawi
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.6 million. 99 per-
Religious Composition: 12 percent (793,000) Sunni
Muslim; small Christian minority; rest are animists.
Muslims incorporate pre-Islamic animism with folk
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Government: Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda has ruled
since independence from Great Britain in 1964 and is
President for Life. Strong rightwing one-man regime
with unicameral legislature, judiciary, and form of
Religious Policies of Government: Secular govern-
ment is intolerant of any religious activity that sug-
gests criticism of the state. Government leadership is
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islam generally has not touched the elite,
although one of the contenders for eventual succession
to President Banda is a Muslim.)
Status of Fundamentalism: No fundamentalist activi-
ty known to exist and, if it did, it would be quickly
Foreign Involvement: Some scanty evidence that Lib-
yans are courting the political opposition. F_
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments.
Prognosis: When Banda dies, government leaders will
seek to ensure a peaceful transition and exclude
radical Islam from influencing the docile population.
Mali
Population/Ethnic Composition: 7.4 million. 99 per-
cent black;1 percent Arab (Lebanese and North
African). Many tribes, with Mande the most promi-
Religious Composition: 90 percent (6.7 million) Mus-
lim; 9 percent animist; 1 percent Christian. Majority
of Muslims are of the Tijaniya Brotherhood and
follow mystic Sufi practices liberally mixed with
traditional animism. Small minority among Arab elite
Government: Independent from France since 1960.
Military overthrew civilian government in 1968, in-
stalled Gen. Moussa Traore, a Muslim, as president.
Traore established a "civilian regime" in 1979, social-
ist-oriented, with shared military-civilian powers. One
political party allowed-the Democratic Union of
cially tolerant of all religions, but religious activities
considered fundamentalist are banned. Government
banned Wa'hhabi group in 1979, but they remain
politically active and influential through connections
in the party. Government has established Malian
Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam to
control Muslim community and to mediate disputes
25X1
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between Sufi brotherhoods and Wa'hhabi fundamen-
talists.)) 25X1 25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Brotherhoods have little political clout
but widespread social prestige. Wa'hhabi group has
informally put pressure on the government for reform-
25X125X1
Status of Fundamentalism: Limited increase in piety
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Followers ofIssa Dembele: Preach Malian nation-
alist and socialist doctrines mixed with Islamic
reform. Leader travels widely abroad to gain sup-
port from regime's exiled opponents.
? Grouping of Democrats: Led by Medina Soum-
bounou, exiled in Libya; promotes an Islamic Coast
Union of Togo, Benin, Mali.
? League for the Elimination of Heresy: Libyan-
backed, based in Nigeria, has branch in Mali but
not known if it has any popular strength
Foreign Involvement: Mali, as "poor Islamic cousin,"
has extensive relations with Arab countries. Wa'hhabi
group includes many wealthy businessmen of Arab
blood with extensive ties throughout Arab world.
Many elite youth educated in Riyadh and Cairo.
Missionary activity and conservative Saudi influence
reflected in "Islamic Reform Movement," an organi-
zation of businessmen active in education and social
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Recent Developments:
? 11 May 1983: Government banned sale of alcohol,
except in international hotels, and banned bars and
brothels. In July ban partly lifted, exempting some
23 bars. F I
Prognosis: Possibility of coup attempts by younger
officers, perhaps with backing from Libya, but little
indication that Islam would play a major role.
Wa'hhabi group will press reforms that could lead to
clashes with Sufi brotherhoods.0
Mauritius
Population/Ethnic Composition: 1 million. 68 per-
cent Indian; 27 percent Creole; 3 percent Chinese; 2
percent Franco-Mauritian minority elite.
Religious Composition: 17 percent (170,000) Muslim;
51 percent Hindu; 30 percent Catholic Christian
(blacks, Creoles, and whites). Muslims are predomi-
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1968. Pro-Western Labor Party coalition lost in elec-
tions to left-leaning Mauritian Militant Movement
(MMM) under Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth in
mid-1982. MMM split led to new elections in August
1983 with Jugnauth leading a Hindu-dominated co-
alition, including the Labor Party, to victory over the
MMM. Jugnauth has become more pro-West to gain
Religious Policies of Government. Secular state with
official tolerance for all religions.
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: One small Muslim party, Muslim Action
Committee, backed the coalition running government
from 1982 to 1983 and was helpful in getting Arab
funds for development and for spreading Islamic
culture{
Foreign Involvement: Libyan funds and influence
have been flowing to the leftist opposition and were
helpful in earlier election victory for the MMM. C
Recent Developments:
? June 1982: MMM won election as alliance of
majority of Muslim population and leftist Creoles
and Hindus.
? August 1983: Faction of the MMM that represent-
ed Muslims lost election against Hindu-dominated
alliance. 0 25X1
Prognosis: Communal strife between Muslims and
Hindus remains a danger to the stability of the regime
Population/Ethnic Composition: 13 million. 99 per-
cent black African, but mulattos and whites figure in
government leadership. Bantus and Yaos are chief
Religious Composition: 11 percent (1.4 million) nomi-
nal Sunni Muslim of Shafli school; 67 percent ani-
mist; 22 percent Christian.
Government: People's republic since independence
from Portugal in 1975, with Samora Machel, a
Christian, as President. Ten-man Politburo and 23-
man Council of Ministers. Black nationalists make up
core of government, but man hardline Marxists are
particularly influential 25X1
Religious Policies of Government: The government
largely ignores Muslim minority, although officially
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims have no significant representa-
25X1
Status of Fundamentalism: No known fundamentalist
activity0 25X1
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Status of Fundamentalism: Some fundamentalist fer-
vor among young Muslims who are also attracted to
radicalism and would accept Libyan support.
Fundamentalist Organizations: Unknown
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Fundamentalist Organizations: None at presen
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of external funding
for formation of fundamentalist groups.
Prognosis: Mitchell's 1982 socialist experiment has
failed completely in economic field. He has been
making overtures to Western Europe for assistance
but still relies on Communist countries for arms.
Niger
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.1 million. 75 per-
cent black; rest is mixture of Berbers, Arabs, and
Europeans.F----~
Religious Composition: 85 percent (5.2 million) Mus-
lim (includes Berbers, Arabs, and most blacks); most
of remainder is animist; small Christian population.
Four major tribal groups:
? Hausa: Sunnis of Maliki school; urban dwellers
belong to Sufi Tijaniya brotherhood.
? Djerma: Conservative Sunnis.
? Fulani: Conservative Sunnis.
? Tuareg: Sunni overlay combined with pre-Islamic
beliefs and Sufism.
Government: Moderate, pro-Western military regime,
ruled since 1974 by Maj. Gen. Seyni Kountche, a
Muslim Djerma tribesman, with a military council.
Religious Policies of Government. Secular, but the
government and President Kountche have emphasized
Muslim credentials to enhance national unity and to
get Arab aid. First West African country to act as
host to Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. The
government supports Islamic Association, biggest and
only recognized conservative Muslim voluntary asso-
ciation, backed by Saudi Arabian funding.
Relation of Islam Religious Establishment to
Government. Islamic groups have never played an
important political role. Neither Qadiriya Brother-
hood in urban areas nor Tijaniya Brotherhood among
Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence that funda-
mentalism on the rise, but upsurge of fundamentalism
among Hausa tribe in Nigeria could spill over
Fundamentalist Organizations: Libyan-financed
League for the Elimination of Heresy, based in
Nigeria, planned to establish branch in Niger.
Foreign Involvement: Libya, considering Niger one of
its prime targets, has provided gifts such as national
mosque, but Niger remains extremely wary of Qadha-
ti's designs because Libya simultaneously has armed
dissident Tuaregs, promoted unsuccessful coup in
1976, and advanced territorial claims against govern-
ment. Saudis generously support Muslim establish-
Recent Development:
? May 1982: Acted as host to Islamic Foreign Minis-
ters Conference.
Prognosis: Although regime is shaky because of eco-
nomic problems, more threat of overthrow by tribal or
Nigeria
Population/Ethnic Composition: 85.2 million. 99 per-
cent black, principal tribal groups
I,--- are Hausa/Fulani,
t .. .-
Religious Composition: 47 percent Sunni Muslim
(40.1 million; largest Muslim Population in West
Africa); 34 percent Christian; 19 percent animists. In
northern Nigeria, over 90 percent Muslim. Although
predominantly Sunni, Sufi brotherhoods of Qadiriya
and Tijaniya exert strong influence in some areas.
Small Wa'hhabi minority in south.
Government: President Shagari, a Fulani Muslim,
elected with the restoration of civilian rule in 1979,
ushered in moderate government with bicameral leg-
islature and multiparty elections. Shagari reelected in
1983 but ousted in military coup at end of year by
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Religious Policies of Government: Nigerian govern-
ments traditionally have been secular and tolerant of
all creeds. The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, a
quasi-government agency, coordinates Muslim af-
fairs. The government also uses Islamic conservative
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim elite basically conservative and
supports government, fearing both Communism and
Status of Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: Most
intensive fundamentalist activity among all West
African states. Northern campuses and urban unem-
ployed youths are focus for fundamentalist activity,
with followers lobbying for more orthodox application
of Islamic values while stopping short of calling for an
Fundamentalist Organizations: Many, but most im-
portant are:
Society for the Victory of Islam (Jama'atul Nasril
Islam): Founded in the 1960s by Alhaji Abubakar
Gumi, a Hausa, who is the principal spiritual leader
of Nigerian fundamentalism. Multiethnic member-
ship includes civil servants and traditional elites.
Undertakes welfare activities and liaison with Mus-
lim community for the Federal Government.
? The Islamic Trust: Founded by Abubakar Gumi;
includes members of corrupt Kaduna group repre-
senting commercial and political elites of the north.
Since 1979 it has been the principal channel for
disbursing Saudi funds in Nigeria. The Trust lead-
ers still have voice in current government.
League for the Elimination of Heresy (Jama'atul
Izlatul Bidi'a): Largest fundamentalist group in
Nigeria, numbering perhaps several thousand. Its
youthful membership is prone to violence. It was
originally based among Muslims in central Middle
Belt states and is now spreading to Hausa communi-
ties in other West African countries. Some Libyan
funding. Hostile to traditional brotherhoods.
? Muslim Student Association: Most radical funda-
mentalist group in Nigeria. Multiethnic member-
ship; strongest on two principal northern university
campuses. Strongly opposed to the West, traditional
brotherhoods, and Christianity. Seeking ties with
other Islamic groups, particularly the League for
the Elimination of Heresy. 25X1
? Yan Izalla: Followers of the late Maitatsine Marwa,
a Cameroonian cleric in Kano city. Membership
estimated at 10,000 or more before riots in Decem-
ber 1980 in Kano that took thousands of lives, 25X1
including Marwa's. Established branches in north-
ern Nigeria that continue to be active. Militantly
antigovernment.
? Anwaru Islam, the Ansaudeen, and the Ahmadiya:
Yoruba Muslim groups formed during colonial peri-
od. Play an important role in western. region's policy
of universal education. The Ahmadiya, the largest
of the groups, is a source of interethnic friction and
has been barred from the pilgrimage to Mecca by
Saudi and northern Nigerian Muslims due to doc-
Foreign Involvement: Saudi Arabia has been chief
sponsor of fundamentalist groups, chiefly to counter
Libyan influence. Nigeria is also a target for Iranian
influence. Iran sends delegations, trains students, and
is suspected of being involved with dissidents in riots
Recent Developments:
? 1979: Communal violence erupted in university
towns between Muslim and Christian students.
? 1980: Religious riots in Kano took several thousand
lives; government suspected Libyan involvement and
expelled Libyan diplomats and temporarily suspend-
ed relations with Tripoli.
? April 1982: League for Elimination of Heresy and a
Nigerian Muslim student society took over mosque
in Bauchi, clashed with police.
? October 1982: Three days of riots in Kaduna,
northern Muslim town.
? March 1984: Followers of the late Maitatsine
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Prognosis: Significant potential for Muslim-inspired
unrest and anti-West actions. Fundamentalist groups
Senegal
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.3 million. 99 per-
cent black; 1 percent European. Wolof, Peul, Mandin-
go, and Serer are principal tribal groups
Religious Composition: 82 percent (5.2 million) nomi-
nally Sunni Muslim; 5 percent Christian; 13 percent
animist. Sufi Muslims are most highly organized in
West Africa, chiefly cluster around Tijaniya and
Muridiya brotherhoods, with devotion to local saints
and teachers. Some Shias, mainly Lebanese traders,
in capital.)
Government: Democratic republic independent from
France since 1960. Unicameral assembly, multiparty
system, dominated by moderate Socialist Party. No
Muslim party exists. President Abdou Diouf, a Mus-
lim, succeeded President Senghor, a Christian, in
early 1981. Diouf continues moderate, pro-West con-
stitutionalism
Religious Policies of Government. Secular govern-
ment is officially tolerant of all religions, especially
accommodating of brotherhoods and their leaders.
Government also backs the Union for Islamic Pro-
gress, a conservative voluntary association with pow-
erful political ties. President Diouf has emphasized his
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Islamic Brotherhoods vie for political
influence and economic privileges from government.
Tijaniya orthodox group includes many top govern-
ment officials, including President Diouf. Muridiya
Brotherhood-the largest brotherhood-its chief ri-
val, has some influence in the military and controls
Status of Fundamentalism: Fairly significant. Some
Muslim leaders are turning from conservatism to a
more reformist and even radical position.[
Fundamentalist Organizations: None have yet suc-
cessfully broken away from the traditional Tijaniya
and Muridiya Brotherhoods. Reform movement led
by Ibrahim Niasse dissipated with his death in 1977.
His son Abroad Niasse tried to establish Libyan-
backed political party on "Islamic Revolution" plat-
form in 1979. Party was banned, and Niasse moves in
and out of exile
Foreign Involvement: Libyan influence in both major
brotherhoods, usually as a radical wing, but Libyans
have failed to make significant inroads in these mass-
based groups. Attempts by Iran to influence and
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propagandize Shias in capital city of Dakar have
alarmed the government and caused the ouster of
Iranian Embassy employees]
Prognosis: Continued political stability unless Diouf
attempts to restrict the Muridiya Brotherhood's eco-
Sierra Leone
Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.7 million. 99 per-
Religious Composition: 25 percent (925,000) Sunni
Muslim; 70 percent animists; 5 percent Christian.
Muslims' beliefs nominal, mixed with animist and
Government: One-party presidential regime, ruled by
Dr. Siaka Stevens since 1968. Stevens, a Christian
who is in his mid-eighties, periodically reshuffles
cabinets. Politics in Sierra Leone center on rivalry
between two main tribes: the predominantly non-
Muslim Mende in the south and the partly Islamized
northern Temne. Stevens's ruling party has a large
following among the Temne and other northern tribes,
Religious Policies of Government: Secular govern-
ment is religiously tolerant. Government recently
joined the Islamic Conference.
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: No direct political role for Islam, but
many senior government officials are Muslim. Series
of associations and congresses provide religious educa-
Status of Fundamentalism: Young people are begin-
ning to be attracted to revivalist Islam and to confront
old conservative imams
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of Libyan influ-
ence among fundamentalists. Government does, how-
ever, seek oil and aid from both Libya and Iran to
avoid financial crisis, and Sierra Leone is a target
Recent Developments: 25X1
? August 1983: Freetown held Iranian-financed Is-
lamic Conference, highly contentious with Iranians
attacking Sunnis and Saudis. '25X1 25X1
Prognosis: Islam is not yet a factor in chronic instabil-
ity but could be seized upon by disaffected youth in
both university and military, especially if external aid
is forthcoming from Nigeria or Libya through Islamic 25X1
Somalia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.2 million. 85 per-
cent Hamitic, divided among six major tribes; 14
percent black; scattering of Arabs and Europeans.
Religious Composition of Population: 100 percent
Sunni Muslim, following Shafli school. Earliest con-
verts to Islam in Africa. Most are Sufi followers,
belong to Qadiriya and Salifiya brotherhoods.
nated by President Mohamed Siad Barre, who has
ruled since 1969.E 25X1
Religious Policies of Government: Religion is recog- 25X1
nized as part of social fabric. Several well-known
Muslim leaders have been appointed to high-level civil
service jobs in an, effort to co-opt Muslim leadership;
government has Ministry of Justice and Religious
Affairs. Regime now stresses Islamic credentials in
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Influence of Islamic leaders restricted to
tribal groups. They have almost no national appeal.
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Status of Fundamentalism: Internally, fundamental-
ism has had little influence; externally, it is used by
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Somali Democratic Salvation Front (once known as
Somali Salvation Front): About 3,000 armed dissi-
dents who use religious and Marxist doctrines in
effort to overturn Siad. Financial and military
support from Ethiopia, Libya (chief donor), and
South Yemen for border attacks and terrorism.
? Somali National Movement (SNM): Isaak tribal
dissidents supported by Ethiopia number several
hundred; strongly anti-Marxist, conservative Mus-
lims who reportedly enjoy some support in Somali
Foreign Involvement: Foreign support confined mostly
to aid for Somali Democratic Salvation Front and
SNM from Libya. Saudis contribute minor sums for
religious aid to mosques and Muslim social organiza-
Prognosis: Siad is vulnerable to a coup because of
deep tribal animosities, growing unrest in the Army,
and the constant external pressure on him by Libyan-
and Ethiopian-supported dissidents. Islam does not
play a role in these problems
South Africa
Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 27
million. 16 percent white; 9 percent Colored; 3 per-
Religious Composition of the Population: Approxi-
mately 20 percent of the Indian population (180,000)
and 10 percent of the Colored population (200,000)
are Muslim; a few thousand Africans are Muslim.
The majority of the Indian Muslim community is
Sunni; the composition of the Colored Muslim com-
munity is 40 percent Sunni, and 40 percent Shia. The
majority of the white, Colored, and African are
South Africa A tiny Mommunit becomes more vocal in
the antiapartheid issue Muslim
Government: For whites, there is a modified parlia-
mentary democratic system. Coloreds and Indians
will receive some political rights in 1984. Africans
have political rights only in their tribal "homelands."
Religious Policies of Government; Freedom of reli-
gion is guaranteed by law. The ruling National Party
maintains that it conforms to a policy of "Christian
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Leaders of the Islamic communities tra-
ditionally have been hostile to the government's policy
of apartheid. The Muslim Judicial Council, an inde-
pendent and conservative body of prestigious clerics,
cooperates with the government while cautiously
pressing for reforms beneficial to Coloreds and Afri-
cans{
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Status of Fundamentalism: Following the Iranian
revolution, Shia fundamentalism gained greater sup-
port in the Colored community, especially among
university and secondary school students. Pro-Kho-
meini rallies were held at the Universities of Cape
Town and Western Cape in February 1980. The
Muslim News took an increasingly pro-Khomeini and
anti-US stance on political issues, as well as a strong
Foreign Involvement: The Saudi Government has
provided Muslim congregations with funds for the
building of mosques and the education of clergymen.
Since 1980, radical Muslim students, clergymen, and
Recent Developments:
? 1980-81: Muslim Colored students played an active
role in secondary school boycotts. Several Muslim
student leaders were detained for 30 to 90 days.
? 1983-84: Muslim students took a strong stance
against government reforms that gave political
rights to Coloreds and Indians but not to Africans.
Prognosis: Radical Shia students and intellectuals
will continue to oppose the government's reform ini-
tiatives and to seek converts in the African communi-
ty. Pro-Khomeini radicals may become a catalytic
force in African communities. The South African
Government will continue to arrest dissident commu-
nity leaders and to harass radical religious organiza-
Sudan
Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.6 million. 39 per-
cent Arab; 52 percent black; 6 percent Beja; 2 percent
foreigners; 1 percent other. Arabs are concentrated in
the north, blacks in the south; animosity between the
Religious Composition: 73 percent (15 million) Sunni
Muslim, mainly in Arab north but with pockets in the
south; 23 percent animist; 4 percent Christian, all in
Government: Independent from Anglo-Egyptian rule
since 1956. Parliamentary rule overthrown by revolu-
tion in 1969 led by current President Marshal Gaafar
Mohamed Nimeiri. Nimeiri's regime has resisted
three coup attempts and grown more moderate and
anti-Communist through the years. Strong presiden25X1
tial rule. Only one legal political party, the Sudan
Religious Policies of Government: Constitution of25X1
1973 states that both Islam and Christianity are
religions of Sudan; it implicitly recognizes Islam as
the majority religion but not the state religion. Ni-
meiri's policy has been to try to co-opt or neutralize
major Islamic organizations, to be personally devo2,
and to stress Islamic credentials with Arab states,
particularly conservative ones. His most recent reli-
giously controversial move has been to decree Islamic
law in Sudan.l 25X1
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The Muslim Brotherhood has participat-
ed in government since 1979, and its leader, Hasan al-
Turabi, is a special adviser to Nimeiri for foreign 25X1
 affairs. Many other MB figures serve in government.
MB members also occupy significant number of seats
Status of Fundamentalism: Press reports indicate
increased religiosity on university campuses; MBs
have controlled the Khartoum University student
Fundamentalist Organizations: Ansar, Khatmiyyah,
and Muslim Brotherhood formed temporary coalition
in 1970s to overthrow Nimeiri but split apart:
? Ansar: Sect claims membership of one-fifth of
population. Umma Party-its political wing-was
banned in 1969. Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, jailed and
exiled several times since 1969, returned from self-
imposed exile in September 1982. Sadiq and several
top aides were arrested in September 1983 after he
made statements critical of the government.
? Khatmiyyah: Sufists led by Muhammad Uthman
al-Mirghani; has rural roots and links to Egypt.
? Muslim Brotherhood: Membership estimated to be
at least 100,000. Led by Hasan al-Turabi; elitist,
urban based. MB espouses a gradualist approach to
Islamization and has been principal advocate for
Foreign Involvement: Saudis have actively bankrolled
the government, while Libya's Qadhafi has sworn to
overthrow Nimeiri's regime. Libya has unsuccessfully
tried to unite the northern Sudanese dissidents with
southern non-Arab, non-Muslim secessionists. The
Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood move-
ments are not involved with Qadhafi, may get some
Saudi financial assistance. Saudi Arabia and Libya
have both focused on Sudan for political rather than
Recent Developments:
? July 1979: Muslim Brotherhood held international
conference in Khartoum, sponsored by Saudi
Arabia.
? August 1979: "Price riot" over high cost of food,
reportedly Communist led, strengthened influence
of Muslim right in Khartoum.
April 1981: Nimeiri held International Da'wah
conference to strengthen his Muslim credentials.
Conference highlighted by disunity and acrimonious
debate.
September 1983: Nimeiri imposed Islamic law in
Prognosis: A senior military officer probably would
assume office if Nimeiri falters, and the conservative
Muslim groups such as Ansar and Muslim Brother-
hood might remain important political actors no
matter who succeeds Nimeiri. Neither the govern-
ment nor fundamentalist groups will succeed in im-
Tanzania
Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.5 million. 99 per-
cent black; remainder European, Arab, Asian
Religious Composition: Overall 35 percent (7.2 mil-
lion) Muslim. Largest concentration of Muslims in
central/East Africa. Mainland is 30 percent Muslim;
40 percent animist; 30 percent Christian. Zanzibar is
almost 100 percent Muslim. Majority of Muslims are
Sunni of Hanafi school; Wa'hhabi on Zanzibar are
largely confined to Asian population. About 12,000
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1961. Tanganyika united with Zanzibar in 1964.
Tanganyika dominant political partner, Zanzibar
semiautonomous and economically stronger. President
Julius Nyerere has headed single-party republic since
1962. Nonaligned, moderate, socialist. Zanzibar's
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi also serves as Vice
President of Tanzania. Good relations with all Arab
Religious Policies of Government. Officially secular,
tolerant. All religions are allowed to proselytize
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to 25X1 25X1
Government: All Muslim groups represented in the
Muslim Council, a quasi-government and nonpolitical
umbrella group. Many Muslims prominent in govern-
ment; totally Muslim Zanzibar overrepresented nu-
 Status of Fundamentalism: Increased piety in Zanzi-
bar probably more related to increase of secessionist
Fundamentalist Organizations: Sketchy evidence
that some radical movements on mainland, if in
power, would go back to pure Islamic tenets, but these
groups are not yet significant
Foreign Involvement: Some Libyan support for poten-
tial opposition and dissidents, intended more to oust
Nyerere (Nyerere ousted Libya's friend in Uganda,
Idi Amin) than to spread fundamentalist Islam. Some
Iranian propagandizing among Shias in capital=
Prognosis: Continuing instability due to hostility be-
tween Christians and Muslims, between mainland and
Zanzibar-Pemba, with the latter using Islamic heri-
Uganda
Population/Ethnic Composition: 13.8 million. 99 per-
cent black; 1 percent divided among Arabs, Asians,
and Europeans. Numerous tribal groups, none with
Religious Composition Up to 10 percent (1.4 million)
Muslim; 60 percent nominal Christian; 30 percent
animis(______~
Government: Independent from Great Britain since
1962. President Milton Obote, a Christian, eventually
took over after coup against dictator Idi Amin, a
Muslim, in 1979; staged election for National Assem-
bly in 1980; and still runs "provisional" government
with promise to restore unicameral assembly and
independent judiciary{
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Status Of Fundamentalism: No evidence of any reviv-
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known at
presentF___1 25X1
Foreign Involvement: Libya's Qadhafi has attempted
without success to unite the three insurgent groups 25X1
that want to oust regime. F___1 '25X1
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist
developments.F---] 25X1
Prognosis: Tribalism in the Army and guerrilla activi25X1
ty continue to plague the Obote regime, but Islam is
not a major factor in political instability because
25X1 25X1
Upper Volta
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.6 million. 99 per-
cent black with about 40 percent of population from
Mossi tribe.0 25X1 25X1
Religious Composition: 20 percent (1.3 million) Sunni
Muslim; 75 percent animist; 5 percent Christian.
Muslims are followers of Sufi mystics, divided among
Qadiriya and Tijaniya Brotherhoods. 25X1
Government: Independent from France since 1960. 25X1
Succession of military coups, with latest in August
1983. The government led by pro-Libyan Thomas
Sankara, a Christian, and ruled by a military council.
25X1 25X1
Religious Policies of Government: Government has
officially banned all Muslim or any other "political"
activity that would endanger the state. Decree of the
current regime makes no mention of religious freedom
or religious faith. 25X1
 Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslim elite is politically influential, but
indirectly, for fear of being labeled "political." Mus-
lim tribal leaders influence large numbers under their
leadership. The Tijaniya Brotherhood is concurrently
part of the "Muslim Community of Upper Volta,"
which cares for religious and social needs and is
apolitical.
Status of Fundamentalism: Some genuine revivalist
feeling among the young, who have expressed admira-
tion for Iranian revolution. Young fundamentalist
extremists called Wa'hhabiya actively recruit among
the urban poor and could clash with older conserva-
Foreign Involvement: Extensive Libyan activity,
building "Islamic Cultural Centers," and military
Fundamentalist Organizations:
? Wa'hhabiya: Fundamentalist extremist group; num-
bers about 30,000 to 80,000, mostly youth; cam-
paigns among urban poor. Extent of Libyan support
Prognosis: Islam is unlikely to be a significant factor
in the near future among Upper Volta's economic and
political problems.~~
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Islam in the Communist States:
A Policy of Accommodation
Orthodox Communist doctrine theoretically clashes
head-on with an organized religion such as Islam.
Despite the incompatibility, however; pockets of Mus-
lims (overt and clandestine) persist in many Commu-
nist states. Muslims or direct descendants of Muslims
total about 80 million throughout the Communist
world. They range from about 3 percent of China's
population to approximately 70 percent of Albania's.
Most Communist governments have adopted an ac-
commodative policy toward their Muslim minorities
after years of experimenting with both assimilative
and sometimes brutally repressive policies. Most of
them allow Muslims to continue the social practices of
ritual Islam, perhaps because they cannot entirely
stamp out those practices and would risk radicalized
resistance if they did. Both the USSR and China have
co-opted the Muslim establishment and avoid direct
interference in Islamic practices. Albania remains the
major exception to an accommodative approach as it
continues its unique status as a totally atheistic state
that represses all religious practice.)
With the exception of Albania, Communist states
supervise their Muslim minorities by installing official
Islamic hierarchies that have limited political power
and by restricting the number of mosques, Muslim
schools, and religious teachers so that, so far as
possible, the Muslim populace is sheltered from the
theological revival elsewhere in the Muslim world.fl
Relations with other Muslim (principally Arab) states
and fears of internal dissent or civil unrest have been
major factors in this accommodation. Both China and
the Soviet Union seek influence and trade among the
oil-rich Arab states and try to outdo each other in
professing tolerance now that their own revolutions
are reaching middle age. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
the governments continue to manipulate their reli-
gious establishments to gain credibility among the
Muslim states and to stimulate more trade and aid.fl
The major risk that these accommodative practices
might incur is that the Muslim minorities may one
day agitate for more autonomy. So far, there are only
a few faint clues that a clandestine religious revival is
spreading among the Muslim minorities of the Com-
munist countries, and this "revival" is probably more
a reaction by ethnic minorities to preserve their
identities against unsympathetic rulers than a legiti?25X1
Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.8 million. 96 per=
cent Albanian; 4 percent other (Greeks, Gypsies,
Vlachs, and Bulgarians). 0 25X1
Religious Composition: 70 percent former Muslims (2
million) or descendants of Muslims; 30 percent former
Christians or descendants of Christians. Most Mus-
lims are Sunnis of Hanafi school, but some are
Bektashis, a liberal sect. F__~ 25X1
Government: Communist regime since 1944. Head of.
party, since 1941, is Enver Hoxha. Chief of State, 25X1
Religious Policies of Government: Albania is the
ultimate example of total repression against any
religious practice. It claims to be the world's first
atheist state. Most Muslim and Christian religious
leaders were killed after the Communist takeover.
Continuous antireligious measures were capped in
1967, when the government closed down all religious
institutions. The 1976 Constitution recognizes no
Relation of /slam/Religious Establishment to
Government: None known, but any religious leaders
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 Muslim majority
Significant Muslim
minority
Republic boundary
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
0
rez
Turkmen
S.S.R.
0 Muslim majority
? Significant Muslim
minority
0 100 Kilometers
l .
0 toomrIes
Uzbek
S.S.R.
rp~ Kirghiz
Tajik S.S.R.
? Significant Muslim
minority
AOL
0 500KIIom.I... / U -
I a nwto4~on_
ol--~"s3o Mil... .v. O
Kazakh
S.S.R.
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Table 6
Communist States
Country
Total
Population
Percent
Muslims
Principal
Sect
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Albania
2,800,000
70
Sunni
Communist
No evidence
No evidence
Bulgaria
8,900,000
13
Sunni
Communist
No evidence
No evidence
China
1,000,000,000
Less than 3
Sunni
Communist
Weak
Saudi Arabia
USSR
272,000,000
18
Sunni
Sufism
small Shia
community
Communist
Weak
Limited
Communist
Limited revival
Iran, Libya
Foreign Involvement: None known.
Prognosis: The government's repressive religious poli-
cies will continue to be successful. We have far too
little access to know if any religious observances
persist clandestinely. We doubt that the external
influences of Iran, Libya, or Saudi Arabia can touch
Bulgaria
Population/Ethnic Composition: 8.9 million. 85 per-
cent Bulgarian; 8.5 percent Turk; others include
Armenians; Gypsies, Russians, and Macedonians.
Religious Composition: 13 percent (1.2 million) Sunni
Muslim of Hanafi school; 85 percent Bulgarian Or-
thodox Christian; 2 percent other. Muslims include
Turks and Pomaks who live in isolated border areas.
Government: Communist state in 1946 replaced mon-
archy, became People's Republic with Georgi Dimi-
trov as the first party leader. President rules with
Council of State; Cabinet ruled by Premier, but real
power is in the party, which has been headed by Todor
Zhivkov since 1954. Zhivkov also has position of
Religious Policies of Government: Government offi-
cially promotes atheism, insists on separation of
church and state. The Communist government initial-
ly pursued a harsh assimilation policy toward all
minorities, including the Muslim Turks, who are
regarded with disdain. In the 1950s the government
granted the minorities more freedom under a cultural
autonomy policy. It reversed this policy in the 1970s
and renewed harassment and persecution. Currently,
the government tends to ignore the Muslims as an
unassimilated minority, although it uses Muslim
Turks as pawns in bilateral relations with Turkey.
Although constitutionally protected, the Muslims re-
main passive and isolated, fearful of government
harassment. Mosques are almost deserted, visited
mostly by old people; youth increasingly are ignorant
of religious rites; distinctive dress is rarely worn
Prognosis
Repressive stability
Repressive stability
Likely conflict be-
tween government
and Muslims
Subdued Muslim
minority may assert
itself
Increasing ethnic
and religious
tensions
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The religious establishment has been co-
opted; the Grand Mufti of Turkish Muslims is in exile
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of imported revival
or influence from Muslim countries.)
Recent Developments:
? Fall 1982: Assassination of Turkish attache in
Bulgaria sparked a rumor of agitation by Turkish
Prognosis: The Islamic minority is quiet, but the
possibility of conflict remains due to inequitable
treatment of Muslims, declining standard of living in
Muslim areas, and chance of international spotlight
on Bulgaria's repression of its Muslim minority
China
Population/Ethnic Composition: I billion. 94 percent
Han Chinese; 6 percent minorities, including 11 Mus-
Religious Composition: Less than 3 percent (27 mil-
lion) Muslim; rest of population is officially nonreli-
gious, but with residual overlay of Confucianism,
Government: After revolution in 1949, China became
a Communist People's Republic under Chairman
Mao Zedong. From 1965 to 1968, the Cultural
Revolution radicalized the entire social, legal, and
political system, bringing to an end already limited
religious freedom. With Mao's death in 1976, the
government reverted to control by the more moderate
Religious Policies of Government: Although China is
a secular, Communist state, official policy since 1980
has been to reintroduce liberalization toward minor-
ities and to grant greater religious freedom. Govern-
ment recognizes the special Islamic "identity" of
several minorities and exempts them from stringent
birth control policies; has rebuilt mosques destroyed
during the Cultural Revolution; allowed Chinese to go
on hajj and to distribute the Koran. The government
revived the Chinese Islamic Association, founded in
1952, and actively co-opts the Islamic leadership
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Under liberalization, older Muslim lead-
ers have been given token political positions. As long
as religious establishment does not confront or criti-
cize the government, it can publicly practice Islamic
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Status ofFundamentalism/Religious Revival: Mus-
lims are the best organized religious group in China
with a history of rebellions and resistance to the
central government. Any serious signs of fundamen-
talism today, however, would be squelched by authori-
Recent Developments:
? 1980: Third Plenum of Communist Party set up a
new policy of official toleration of religious
practices.
? 1980-8 1: Series of violent incidents between Hans
and Uygurs, a prominent Muslim minority group
from western ChinaO
Prognosis: Conflict on local level between Han-domi-
nated government and Muslim minority groups is
inevitable, and government policy of active co-opta-
tion of Islamic leaders may backfire eventually, al-
though not in the near future
USSR
Population/Ethnic Composition: 272 million. 72 per-
cent Slavic; 28 percent divided among some 170
Religious Composition: Muslim population is esti-
mated at about 50 million, making it the fifth-largest
group of Muslims in the world. Almost all Muslims
live in six southern Soviet socialist republics. 90
percent are Sunnis of the Hanafi school; a few Shias
live in Azerbaydzhan. A large number of Sufi Broth-
erhoods operate clandestinely. The rest of the popula-
tion is atheist with small Russian Orthodox, other
Government: Communist state since revolution in
1917. Head of Communist Party is Konstantin Cher-
nenko, seventh leader since the revolution. One-party,
secular state with civil law. 0
25X1 25X1
Religious Policies of Government: Official policy 25X1
stresses compatibility of Communism and Islam and
freedom of religion, although the government propa-
gandizes heavily against all religious beliefs. Histori-
cally, the government has persecuted Muslims, but
the present policy is one of containment rather than
assimilation. Fewer than 500 mosques remain, only
1,000 religious teachers, and two small Islamic
schools. In the 1920s the government set up official
Islamic establishment containing four Muftiats,
whose co-opted leadership controls Muslims internally 25X1
and provides supervised external relations with Mus-
lim countries. The government allows selected Mus-
lims to go on hap and sponsors Islamic conferences to
emphasize its religious tolerance. FI 25X1
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Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The Islamic religious establishment is
completely co-opted and guided by the government.
Status of Fundamentalism: Most Soviet Muslims are
not aware of Islamic resurgence on the outside world.
Too little is known about the growing underground
Islam to judge whether it has a fundamentalist out-
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known to exist,
although there is some evidence that a clandestine
Islamic organization publishes illegal pamphlets and
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of any external aid
being funneled into tightly monitored country, al-
though Saudi-based World Muslim League in 1982
signed agreement to build an Islamic University in the
Recent Developments:
? March 1980: Riots in Alma Ata, capital of Kazakh
SSR, when Muslims refused to let dead Muslim
soldiers be buried in military cemetery.
? April 1980: Assassination of Sultan Ibrahimov of
Kirghiz SSR by "Muslim nationalists."
? November 1982: Three days of violence in Muslim-
dominated North Severo-Osetinkaya in the Cauca-
sus, included ransacking Communist Party
headquarters.
? November 1982: Authorities broke up a large-scale
Prognosis: In the short run, we have no evidence of
imminent separatist threat among Muslims, only
mounting pressure for greater cultural autonomy. The
authorities probably will continue policy of promoting
carefully controlled official Islam, while monitoring
Sufi brotherhoods and other illegal Islamic activities.
Because the Muslims and other minority populations
are growing at a more rapid rate than the Russians,
by 1990 Russians will be a minority in their own
country. Muslims, now a subdued minority, may
become more assertive in demanding respect for their
Yugoslavia
Population/Ethnic Composition: 22.8 million. 36 per-
cent Serbs; 20 percent Croats; rest divided between
Slovenes, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians,
Religious Composition: 12 percent (2.7 million) Sunni
Muslim (Albanians, Slavs, Turks); 41 percent Serbian
Orthodox; 32 percent Roman Catholic; 15 percent
other. Yugoslavia has largest established Muslim
community in Europe. In the Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Muslim nationals represent 40 percent
Government: Communist government in form of so-
cialist federal republic since 1945. Only President,
Josip Broz Tito, held office until his death in 1980;
country now has collective presidency. Elections for
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Religious Policies of Government. Permits religious
practice. 1945 Constitution asserts separation of
church and state, guarantees freedom of worship as
long as it does not impinge on state policies. In the
1960s, however, the government harassed and re-
pressed Muslims, finally giving recognition in census
to category of "Muslim" nationality. In the 1970s the
government began to liberalize its religious policies
and to support Muslims, primarily to demonstrate
nonaligned credentials and to get favor of Middle
Eastern countries. With foreign financial help (Libya,
Egypt), it built new mosques, financed education of
youth overseas in Muslim countries, and in 1979 also
built a Muslim theological college in Sarajevo. Islam-
ic schools are allowed, within very strict limits, to
supplement secular education. By Communist stand-
ards, the Muslim press is allowed a fairly unrestricted
publishing policy. Recently, however, the government
has actively campaigned against Muslims becoming
politically assertive, reflecting deep-seated fears of
militant Islam, and has tried and jailed Muslim
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: The Muslim establishment generally
stays out of politics, although some clerics are increas-
ingly outspoken in support of Muslim rights. The
mufti at the unofficial Muslim capital, Sarajevo, has
been thoroughly co-opted by the regime. Muslims are
Status of Fundamentalism: The government encour-
aged a limited Muslim cultural revival in the 1970s.
The revival has taken the form of a renewed Muslim
consciousness and reawakening of Muslim "national-
ism." In Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Muslims out-
number both Serbs and Croats, the revival is particu-
larly strong. (Nevertheless, Muslim nationalism
appears stronger than fundamentalism.)
Foreign Involvement: Muslims were influenced in the
1970s by the Iranian revolution and have had increas-
ing influence from Libya and Iran. During the trials
in August 1983 of Muslim nationalists in Sarajevo,
Iran was cited as an instigator of antigovernment
Recent Developments:
? 1981: The national census showed the number of
Muslims far larger than in 1971.
? April 1983: 13 Bosnian Muslims returning from
Iran were arrested; authorities confiscated pan-
Islamic and anti-Yugoslav literature. The subse-
quent trial in August resulted in sentences ranging
from six months to 15 years.F 25X1
Prognosis: Renewed Muslim assertiveness, particular-
ly if some Muslims are responsive to Iranian encour-
agement to establish a separate state, is likely to meet
more direct resistance from federal authorities. There
is also increasing ethnic and regional tension between
Muslims and Serbs and Croats, based on competing
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Islam in the Western Hemisphere:
Backwater Bastion
Islam has never played a significant role on the
political scene in the tiny nations that make up the
Caribbean and line the northern tier of Latin Ameri-
ca. Most of the few hundred thousand Muslims in the
region are descendants of poor East Indian and
Javanese plantation workers, although a few are
descended from Lebanese and other Arab entrepre-
neurs. The Muslims have been content to practice an
often syncretic folk Islam that might be barely recog-
nizable in the Middle East and to survive as a
tolerated minority among Christian and animist ma-
The last few years have seen the first glimmerings of a
connection between the Middle East and the region as
the small island and coastal countries have sought
economic aid to stave off bankruptcy. They have had
no takers among the moderate Arab countries. Only
Libya has seized upon the opportunities to further its
own goals. It has sought to establish "Islamic Cultural
Centers" throughout the region in an effort to attract
radical youth and establish a base from which to
mount anti-American campaigns. The results of these
Guyana
Population/Ethnic Composition: 833,000. 51 percent
East Indian; 43 percent Negro (Creole); 6 percent
other=
Religious Composition: 9 percent (75,000) Sunni
Muslim; 57 percent Christian; 34 percent Hindu.
Most Muslims are descendants of East Indians im-
Government: Independence from Great Britain in
1966 after stormy years of competing factions be-
tween Cheddi Jagan (Indian) and Forbes Burnham
(Negro) split an earlier coalition. Burnham became
Prime Minister of a socialist autocratic regime. He
declared a new constitution in 1980 and named
himself Executive President.
0 Muslim majority
E Significant Muslim
minority
0 100 Kilometers
0 100 Mlles
Oouedarr represemmlon a
not nteeantrilv.mnoate'
25X1
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims are generally poor and hold no 25X1
political offices. Islam serves as basis for group identi-
ty among the East Indian majority. 25X1
Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. Two
Islamic organizations are primarily social, with some
Libyan backing; have sent representatives to Islamic
conferences.0 25X1
Foreign Involvement: Burnham has tried to attract
'd f moderate and radical Arab states Libya
rom
a~
25X1
which considers Guyana a strategic base for its
activities in the Caribbean, has supported an Islamic
Recent Developments.
? September 1982: Demonstration by East Indians in
Georgetown against Zionism, massacre in Beirut.
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Table 7
Western Hemisphere
Country
Total
Population
Percent
Muslims
Principal
Sect
Government
Status of
Fundamentalism
Foreign
Involvement
Among Muslims
Prognosis
Socialist
autocratic
No evidence
Libya
Racial
disharmony
Military leftist
No evidence
Libya
Uneasy
stability
Trinidad
and Tobago
1,100,000
6
Sunni
small Shia
community
Parliamentary
democracy
No evidence
Libya
No Islamic
role in unrest
Prognosis: Burnham has brought country to bank-
ruptcy, disarray, and has done nothing to dampen
intense racial disharmony that could eventually be
expressed along religious lines. His attempts to woo
radical Arab states have not been very successful, and
only Libya seems to consider the relationship one of
Suriname
Population/Ethnic Composition: 363,000. 37 percent
East Indian; 31 percent Creole; 16 percent Javanese;
10 percent Negro; others include Chinese, Amerin-
Religious Composition: 20 percent (73,000) Muslim;
27 percent Hindu; 23 percent Catholic; 16 percent
Moravian; 14 percent other. Muslims are mostly
descendants of Javanese and East Indian immigrants,
Government: Independence obtained from Nether-
lands in 1975, although the country has been internal-
ly self-governing since 1950. Various coalition govern-
ments ruled constitutionally until February 1980,
when noncommissioned officers staged a brief, almost
bloodless, coup. Amid promises to return to civilian
rule, Lt. Col. Daysi Bouterse fended off a countercoup
in May 1980; by August he declared a state of
emergency, abolishing the Constitution and Cabinet.
He now rules under a National Military Council. The
government has become increasingly leftist, although
Relation ofIslam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Before Bouterse's takeover, Islam was
represented as part of the multiparty system. No
major figure in the current government is a Muslim,
although Muslim leaders joined with others in an
interfaith attempt to persuade Bouterse to return to
Foreign Involvement: With Libyan financial assist-
ance, the government has allowed an Islamic Teach-
ing Center to be established in Paramaribo. Bouterse
declined Qadhafi's request for a secure airstrip in
Suriname in the spring of 1983, and the extent of
Libyan financial aid is now in question. (s)
Recent Develo ments: No significant fundamentalist
develop
Prognosis: While Bouterse remains in power, Islam
will have a political role only as long as he believes he
must stimulate and support Islamic causes to get
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Trinidad and Tobago
Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.1 million; 43 per-
cent Negro (Creole), 40 percent East Indian; 17
percent other, divided among mulattoes, whites, Chi-
nese, and Arabs.
Religious Composition: About 6 percent (69,000)
Muslim, mostly East Indians and Arabs; 58 percent
Christian, divided between Catholic and Protestant;
23 percent Hindu; 13 percent other. Muslims are
almost all nominal Sunnis, although some Shias exist
among the Arab merchants.
Government: Independence from Great Britain in
1962. First Prime Minister, Eric Williams, ruled until
his death in 1981, with peaceful transition to present
Prime Minister, George Chambers. The government
is a parliamentary democracy dominated by People's
National Movement with small multiparty opposition.
Pro-West but officially nonaligned.
Religious Policies of Government. A secular but
predominantly Christian society in which religious
tolerance is official and practiced. Muslims are al-
lowed separate schools, religious holiday observances.
Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to
Government: Muslims are generally a low-status mi-
nority, although a few Muslims in the urban commer-
cial class have joined the dominant party and have
prominent positions in government. Ishaat-i-Islami
and Ahmadiya are ultraconservative Muslim social
Foreign Involvement: Opposition parties have gone to
Libya for funds with limited success; some Libyan
influence in building an Islamic Training Center in
Recent Developments:
? 1981: 28th Islamic Conference held in Port-of-
Spain.
? September 1982: Ahmadiya formally protested the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.F____1 25X1
Prognosis: Islam, which is practiced mostly by low- 25X1
h
e
status East Indians, has not been a factor in t
political evolution of the country. Economic difficul-
ties may cause some future unrest and dissatisfaction,
but Islamic issues are not likely to play a role.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Muslim Terms
ayatollah Persian for "reflection of God"; used in masji
Iran to denote Shia religious leaders
elevated to high status by community
hadith Sayings or deeds of the Prophet which,
together with the Koran, provide the
foundation of theology and law.
hajj The annual pilgrimage to Mecca, al-
ways in the last month of the Muslim
calendar; required at least once in the
lifetime of every Muslim as one of the
five pillars of Islam; after completion of
the hajj, a Muslim is entitled to the
prefix hajji for his name.
A mosque, place where Muslims wor-
ship in groups.
A specialist in Islamic law who, by his
reputation, is appointed by government
or designated by the Muslim communi-
ty to rule on points of law.
Muharram The first month of the Islamic year. In
Shia tradition the 10th of Muharram
commemorates the martyrdom of Ali.
mujahidin Fighters in a jihad or religious battle;
often used in fundamentalist organiza-
tional titles.
ikhwan Literally, "brotherhood"; often used to
denote a fundamentalist Muslim Muslim
organization.
imam A leader of prayer in the Muslim com-
munity; among Shias, the term con-
notes considerable religious authority.
Islam Submission to the will of God; used to
connote the nation of believers and
their faith.
jihad Literally, "holy war"; used to designate
either a war against unbelievers or a
personal struggle to overcome one's im-
perfections; used often in the names of
fundamentalist groups.
Koran (Often spelled Qur'an.) The book of
"recitations" of the word of God as
revealed to Muhammad.
madrasah Seminary or academy for Muslim
. scholars.
(Sometimes spelled Moslem.) An adher-
ent of Islam; a person who submits to
the will of God.
The ninth month of the Islamic year,
when Muslims are usually required to
observe several forms of abstinence.
Shariah Also spelled Shari'a; the Islamic legal
code set down in the seventh century
and derived from the Koran and hadith.
It codifies the relationship between
families, rulers and ruled, economic
transactions, and the treatment of crim-
inal behavior.
shaykh (Sometimes spelled sheikh.) Literally,
"a venerable old gentleman," used with
both religious and nonreligious conno-
tation as the leader of a tribe, family, or
organization.
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Shia The branch of Islam that developed
from the conviction that Ali was the
rightful successor as caliph to the
Prophet Muhammad.
sunnah The accepted practices and beliefs of
the Muslim community.
Sunni The branch of Islam that is most widely
observed among Muslims.
tariqah (Plural is tariqat.) Sufi brotherhood or
religious order.
ulema (Sometimes spelled ulama.) Collective
body of Muslim scholars; closest equiv-
alent to a "clergy."
Wa'hhabis (Sometimes spelled Wahabi.) The Saudi
Arabian form of Islamic belief and
practice.
waqf (Plural is awqaf.) An endowment. or
trust of land or other property that
produces income for charitable
purposes.
A tithe or tax that goes to the poor; one
of the five pillars of Islam.
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