MIDDLE EAST-SOUTH ASIA: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300070004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
Middle East-South Asia:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
r.._.rsa.._4a~i
NESA 84-10058
February 1984
Copy 4 2 4
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence 25X1
Middle East-South Asia:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
Confidential
NESA 84-/0058
February 1984
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Middle East-South Asia:
Population Problems and
Political Stability
Cnnfirlanfial
Key Judgments Rapid population growth, which will continue in the Middle East and
Irt/ormation available South Asia at least for the rest of the century, will impede economic
as o,/'1 February 1984 growth and contribute to social and political instability in countries vital to
was used in this report.
US interests such as Egypt and Pakistan:
? The growing ranks of politically volatile youth, frustrated by unmet
expectations for jobs, education, housing, and other services, will crowd
the already overburdened cities, where they will be ready recruits for
opposition political causes.
? Rapidly growing cities such as Cairo, Karachi, and Bombay, already
overcrowded by the influx of rural migrants, will increasingly strain
government resources and management.
? Expatriate workers in the oil-exporting states, including Palestinians, will
continue to be essential for economic development, at least for the rest of
the century. Tensions between the expatriates, who number about 6
million, and nationals in the host states will mount and could eventually
threaten political stability.
? The economies of key labor-sending countries such as Pakistan and
Egypt will be vulnerable to reductions in remittances from their overseas
workers in the Middle East if the economies of the oil-exporting countries
worsen.
? Continued presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Palestinian
refugees in the Middle East will threaten political stability by upsetting
ethnic balances, overtaxing the job market, and overburdening govern-
ment services.
? Changing ethnic and sectarian balances in countries such as Lebanon,
Israel, and Iraq, caused by disparate growth and immigration/emigra-
tion rates among the groups, will increasingly aggravate ethnic and
sectarian tensions if governments are not politically responsive to the
changes.
Countries friendly to the United States in the Middle East and South Asia
are likely to turn to Washington for greater financial and development
assistance to cope with these demographic pressures.
Confidential
NESA 84-10058
February 1984
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The recent wave of unrest in Tunisia and Morocco indicates that social ten-
sions based on demographic factors, as well as economic frustrations, can
flare up and spread quickly. Instability triggered by failure of national
governments to cope with population problems could invite intervention by
neighbors concerned for their own stability or meddling by troublemakers
such as Libya, Iran, or the Soviet Union.
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Middle East-South Asia:
Population Problems and
Political Stability ~~
We expect population dynamics, driven by continued
rapid growth, to be an increasingly important under-
lying determinant of political instability in the Middle
East and South Asia. Population growth rates, around
3 percent annually, typify most countries in the region
(see figure 7 at end of text). Such rapid growth will
double the region's population by shortly after the
turn of the century. According to UN estimates,
population growth in the Middle East and South Asia
will account for about one-third of the 1.4-billion
increase that will push the world's population total to
6.1 billion by the end of this century.
We believe that four elements of population dynamics
will complicate efforts by political leaders in the
Middle East and South Asia to consolidate popular
support and advance economic development:
? The numbers of youth requiring jobs and govern-
ment services will grow faster than most economies
can absorb them, resulting in mounting dissatisfac-
tion and political opposition.
? International migration triggered by political tur-
moil and rising unemployment will threaten the
capacity of host governments to limit the influence
of refugees and expatriates on their economic and
political stability. The labor-exporting countries'
growing reliance on worker remittances will in-
crease their vulnerability to economic fluctuations
in the oil-exporting countries.
? Differing population growth and migration rates
among sectarian and ethnic groups will aggravate
rivalries and force changes in government institu-
tions that broker political and economic power.
? Rapid urbanization will make effective manage-
ment of large cities increasingly difficult, siphon off
money needed for rural development, and challenge
the competence and authority of central govern-
ments.
Rapid Growth: The Crux of the Problem
We expect rapid growth to continue throughout the
Middle East and South Asia at least for the rest of the
century. According to UN estimates, all countries in
the region except Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan, and
Sri Lanka are growing faster than the 2.04 percent
LDC average (figure 1). By the year 2000 India's
population will approach the 1 billion mark, Pakistan
and Bangladesh will each approach 150 million, and
Egypt and Iran will each total about 65 million,
despite indications that population growth rates have
leveled off or declined slightly in each of these
countries (table 1).
Rapid population growth, particularly in already over-
populated countries such as Egypt; Bangladesh, and
Pakistan, in our view, will:
? Limit government options to meet popular demands.
? Retard economic development.
? Heighten the dissatisfaction of youth and minority
groups with the government.
? Increase the likelihood of internal disorder by
thwarting youth's aspirations.
We do not believe that family planning programs
alone will significantly slow the growth rates. Arab
and South Asian leaders see little political profit and,
in many cases, considerable political risk in advocat-
ing reductions in family size and endorsing family
planning programs. According to US Embassy re-
ports, even when leaders such as India's Gandhi,
Egypt's Mubarak, or Pakistan's Zia address the issue,
the gap is wide between their stated goals and the
ability of their governments to formulate and effec-
tively implement such programs.
Most social scientists believe that the strength of
traditional views regarding women's role in society
and the need for sons is a greater barrier to fertility
reduction and family planning implementation than
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Figure 1
Middle East/South Asia: Countries by Population Size
and Growth Rates, 1983 .
Afghanistan
?
Lebanon
Sri Lanka
?
Israel
Marrtan~a
Ban ladesh
Egypt C IQ
Morocco
Nepal QQ
Q
U~ibci~a
Sudan Q Iraq
Q Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Q
Q Jordan
Q South Yemen
QOman
Libya
Doubling
time in years
India
I I
Developed ~ Less developed
country average 6 country average ~
No[e: Red dots denote populations growing at or near
three percent annually.
are the teachings of Islam. Even Islamic scholars
acknowledge that no Islamic tenets directly prohibit
the use of modern contraception. Rather, we believe
that Muslim objections to family planning stem from
traditional family values and from the view that
family planning programs are a Western intrusion.
western Saharal V
J 1 ? I Oi
1 2 3 4 X56 7 8 9 1011
Average annual rate of population growth (percent)
-- ~ '~ Emi~tes
17.3 8.6 6.3 i
Youth Population To Swell Ranks
of Political Activists
With the likely exception of the oil-rich states, we
believe that governments are unlikely to meet the
economic and social expectations of their growing
youth populations. As a result, we expect that they
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Table 1
Middle East and South Asia:
Population Estimates, 1984 and 2000
will be increasingly vulnerable to youthful political
activism. According to US Census Bureau figures,
one-fourth to one-third of the populations of all
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries is in the
politically volatile 15 to 24 age group, a consequence
of high population growth rates during the 1950s and
1960s (figure 2). In Egypt, for example, 4.6 million
young men in this age bracket were ready for jobs or
advanced training in 1980. By 2000, despite the
anticipated downturn in Egypt's population growth
rate because of the trend toward higher age at
marriage and lower fertility, we know that ~7 million
young men will be in this age group because most of
them have already been born (figure 3). Many of the
youth in this group have at least a primary school
education, are politically aware, and have middl~-
class aspirations. Middle East scholars report that
educated youths are highly frustrated because their
salaries do not exceed the wages earned by skilled
laborers or foreigners. According to US Embassy
reports, even a college degree has diminishing value in
the overcrowded job markets of Egypt, India, Paki-
stan, Jordan, and other countries.
Frustrated and disappointed youths will be ready
recruits for opposition causes. We believe that Islamic
fundamentalism, which currently offers the principal
ideological haven for Muslim youth, will remain an
attractive alternative for those whose material and
modern-sector employment goals go unmet. In India
and Sri Lanka, we also expect opposition groups
stressing strengthened ethnic identity and religious
revivalism to attract young recruits as expectations
are dashed and belts tightened.
Refugees and Migrant Workers:
Millions on the Move
International migration, whether voluntary or invol-
untary, will touch political sensitivities in both send-
ing and receiving countries. According to our analysis
based on US Embassy reporting and national and
international data, roughly 12 million refugees or
migrant workers currently live in Middle Eastern or
South Asian countries other than their own. About
half of them are migrant workers employed in the oil-
exporting states of the Persian Gulf and Libya; the
other half are Palestinian or Afghan refugees
(see figure 8 at end of text).
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Figure 2
World Population Distribution by Age, 1980
I I I I I I I I
14 l2 l0 8 6 4 2 0
80+
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
I I I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Effects on the Host Governments
Migrant Workers. We believe that expatriate workers
will threaten long-term political stability in the oil-
rich states even as they remain essential to their
economic development. According to Embassy re-
ports, host governments worry that political activists
among the expatriates will commit terrorist acts or
stir opposition to their regimes. According to press
reports, host societies fear that large numbers of
expatriates will dilute traditional culture and cause
increases in crime and disease.
In order to limit the perceived political threat from
the expatriates, the labor-importing governments try
to isolate the foreign workers from the indigenous
population and encourage frequent rotations back
home. US Embassy officials report that, while the
host governments consider the assimilation of expatri-
ates unacceptable, growing numbers of foreigners-
including the Palestinians who have many years of
service in the Gulf states-would like to see their
children granted opportunities comparable to those of
the indigenous population.
We believe that expatriate workers themselves are
unlikely to destabilize host country regimes, but their
pervasive presence is increasingly likely to provoke
nationals, particularly those who are competing for
jobs in fields dominated by foreigners. In contrast to
most other countries in the region, demographic and
economic projections by the World Bank show that
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Figure 3
Egypt: Youth Growth Persists Despite Slowed
Growth Rate, 1976-2000
Males 15-24 years old
Million
the oil-exporting states will continue to have man-
power shortages and- will rely heavily on foreign
workers to realize their economic development plans.
Nationals in the oil-rich states, while too few in
numbers and unwilling or unable to do many of the
jobs held by expatriates, still object to their presence.
According to US Embassy reports, host governments
have appointed their own university graduates-even
those with inadequate training and experience-to
professional and managerial positions already held by
expatriates. In order to avoid even greater inefficien-
cy, many employers are retaining rather than replac-
ing their expatriate professionals even though this
may place two persons in one job.
ReJ'ugees. Politically, governments receiving refugee
populations will be drawn into the refugees' some-
times violent internecine conflicts as well as into their
Population growth
Percent
international disputes. Pakistan, as host to more than
2.5 million Afghan refugees, is experiencing height-
ened ethnic tensions in its North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and Baluchistan while it serves as a base for
insurgents fighting the Soviets and the Soviet-con-
trolled Afghan Government. Middle East govern-
ments admitting Palestinians have, without exception,
been pressed to some extent by the refugee communi-
ties to support Palestinian political goals.
On the economic side, refugees will continue to drain
host country financial coffers. Official Pakistani sta-
tistics show that Afghan refugees cost Islamabad
more than $250 million in scarce financial resources 25X1
over and above the $240 million in international aid it
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received for refugee assistance in 1983. Arab host
governments claim that they contribute $300-500
million to Palestinian organizations.
Effects on the Sending Governments
Migrant Workers. We believe that major labor-
exporting countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, and
Jordan will become increasingly vulnerable to reduc-
tions in the number of overseas jobs as a result of the
worldwide reduction of oil prices and the declines in
construction in the oil states-a development already
reported by US Embassy officials in the UAE, Bah-
rain, and Qatar. Official statistics confirm, moreover,
that the sending country economies have become, to
varying degrees, dependent on the $12 billion in
remittances from the emigrant workers.
According to US Embassy, World Bank, and press
reports, the sending countries continue to support
labor emigration because the advantages to the gov-
ernment, as well as to the migrants, continue to
outweigh the drawbacks:
? Remittances from overseas workers are equivalent
to or exceed export earnings for Pakistan, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Egypt.
? The migrants' earnings, which are three to 10 times
what they would be at home, raise notably the
standard of living of their families left behind.
Refugees. Countries such as Afghanistan that lose
large populations to refugee flows, including a major-
ity of the educated elite, will be impeded in their
efforts to revitalize the economy and to reestablish
services at the level that existed before the refugee
exodus.
population is a demographic minority (38 percent)
and growing at a slower annual rate than both the
oriental Jewish and Arab populations. More rapid
growth of the non-Jewish population (3.2 percent
annually or about twice the rate for the Jewish
population), if combined with the annexation of
territories with predominantly Arab populations,
could eventually put the non-Jewish population in
the majority and, in turn, threaten the idea of a
Jewish, democratic state.
? In Lebanon, according to US Census Bureau and
UN estimates, higher growth rates for Muslim
confessional groups (Sunnis at 3 percent and Shias
at 3.7 percent annually) than for Christians (1.7
percent) and an annual average emigration of an
estimated 65,000 Christians between 1975 and the
present have rendered the 40-year-old agreement
for the sectarian division of governmental power
increasingly unrepresentative (figure 4).
? In Iraq, Baghdad has on two occasions forcibly
moved politically troublesome populations to neu-
tralize political opposition. According to press re-
ports, some Sunni Kurds were moved out of the
northern mountains to Shia-dominated southern
Iraq after their defeat in 1975, and, according to an
academic study, more than 15,000 Shias of Iranian
ethnic origin were forced to leave Iraq for Iran after
the start of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Baghdad allowed
some Kurds to drift back to their mountain homes
during the late 1970s. We believe the deported
Shias are unwelcome in Iran, which views them as
yet another burdensome refugee group and as po-
tential Iraqi sympathizers. We expect the return of
this group of Shias to be a contentious issue in any
settlement of the Iran-Iraq war.
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Governments that are not sensitive to shifts in their
country's ethnic and sectarian composition caused by
changing demographics will risk outbreaks of commu-
nal violence and rising political opposition from politi-
cally underrepresented groups. Differential growth
and migration rates among key groups in countries
such as Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq change not only the
relative sizes of the groups but, more importantly,
their real or perceived political strength:
? In Israel, according to official Israeli data, the
politically dominant European-American Jewish
Immigration policies will reflect government concerns
with the ethnic and sectarian makeup of the popula-
tion. In our judgment, Gulf state governments turned
to Asian labor, for example, to reduce their reliance
on fellow Arabs whom they considered to be a greater
political risk. In some instances, governments will
have little choice but to accommodate the sudden
arrival or departure of large numbers of migrants and
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Figure 4
Lebanon: Estimated Distribution of Confessional Groups, 1979 and 1983
Shia
Sunni
Druze
Maronite ~ Orthodox
Other Catholic ?Other Christian
refugees. Pakistan, for example, has had to wrestle
with the heightened political tensions created by the
changes in its ethnic balance from both the influx of
Pushtun refugees from Afghanistan into the North-
West Frontier Province and the dominance of Pun-
jabis in overseas employment (figure 5). According to
Pakistani researchers, Punjabis win 70 percent of the
1.5 million overseas jobs bringing $2.25 billion into
Punjabi households-thereby reinforcing Sindhi per-
ceptions of their disadvantaged economic and political
status.
We believe that the cities will become increasingly
fertile grounds for political opposition to national
regimes. Unmet expectations for housing and jobs and
the competition between ethnic, religious, and educa-
tional groups are a volatile political mix subject to
manipulation by opposition elements. For example:
? In Tunis, violence in early January 1984-the cul-
mination of widespread rioting throughout the coun-
try-was brought on primarily by the poor and
unemployed who believe they have little stake in the
government or society. Their actions forced the
government to rescind price increases that had
sparked the riots, a move that-albeit expedient-
has damaged government authority, encouraged
ideological dissidents, and left the regime with even
more serious economic problems.
? In Morocco, rioting instigated primarily by students
broke out in northern cities in mid-January over
austerity measures involving food and fuel price
increases and hikes in school fees. As in Tunisia, the
government was compelled to set aside its austerity
program in order to restore calm. Islamic funda-
mentalist agitators and radicalized students no
doubt were encouraged by their contribution to
spreading and escalating the violence among restive
and disadvantaged workers in poorer urban areas.
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Figure 5
Pakistan: Population, Workers Overseas and Refugees
by Province, 1983
Punjabi ~ Sindhi
Pushtan ~Baluch
Percent Q 10
Percent Q 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Remittances
Total=3000 m
Percent
30
Million US $
Province
Refugees
Percent
Refugee Aid
Total=257 m
Percent
500
1,000
Punjab
Million US $
Province
0
Punjab Sind
' I
1,500
I
100
Sind NWFP Baluchistan
90 1Q0
100
2,000 2,500 3,000
I
150
100
I
200
100
250
Baluchistan
301 4 2-84
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c:onnaennad
? In Cairo, the recent urban unrest in Tunisia and
Morocco, as well as memories of local bread riots in
January 1977, make the government wary of price
hikes-whether for food, bus fares, or electricity-
and nervous about public service failures. Govern-
ment security forces were detailed to an older
section of the city in July 1982 when a broken sewer
main that flooded the neighborhood caused angry
public demonstrations.
sectarian hostilities.
? In Karachi, Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions, aggra-
vated by the frustrations of life in that overcrowded
and poorly managed city, erupted sporadically dur-
ing 1983 in antigovernment demonstrations, burn-
ing of property, stonings, and loss of life. Zia's
martial law government restored order to the strife-
torn neighborhoods, but we believe further disturb-
ances are in store as the government will be unable
to improve social and economic conditions or allay
and table 2).
We expect the rapid growth of cities in the Middle
East and South Asia over the past three decades will
continue at least through the rest of the century,
increasing the stress on government resources and
management. According to national data reported to
the United Nations, urban populations as a share of
total country populations have risen during this period
to a level of about 50 percent for the Middle East and
just under 25 percent for South Asia. According to
UN projections, nine of the world's 30 largest cities
will be in the Middle East and South Asia by the end
of the century. Bombay and Calcutta will have popu-
lations of over 16 million; Cairo and Madras, nearly
13 million; Karachi, Delhi, Tehran, and Baghdad,
over 11 million; and Dhaka, over 10.5 million (figure 6
investment to keep up with the growth.
In our judgment, the cities, where governmental
investment is higher, will continue to attract migrants
from the countryside. Investment in urban food subsi-
dies, piped water, and social services and the protec-
tion of urban wages accelerate rural-to-urban migra-
tion, which, in turn, necessitates even more urban
Urban-biased policies, especially subsidies on food
and utilities, have also created serious social and
economic problems for several Middle Eastern gov-
ernments. We believe that the recent rioting in Tuni-
sia, which started in the rural south and'spread
quickly to urban poor and unemployed, indicates the
tensions inherent in a dualistic society that favors the
urban well-to-do and middle class. In Morocco and
Egypt, subsidies on basic foods, fuel, and utilities have
been maintained while budget deficits mount; these
governments now face the difficult problem of keep-
ing alid on popular unrest while correcting pricing
structures in order to improve their balance-of-pay-
ments situation and to qualify for international fi-
nancing.
We do not believe that efforts by national govern-
ments to stem the tide of rural migrants to the cities
through urban controls or rural development ~+ill
succeed. In Egypt, for example, successive govern-
ments have only experimented with restrictive policies
to curb immigration from the countryside. Other
measures in other countries have had limited success
at best: raising rural incomes; investing in rural areas;
creating labor-intensive industries; investing in the
growth of smaller cities; and creating new towns such
as Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia and 10th of
Ramadan and 15 May in Egypt.
Although we expect those Middle Eastern and South
Asian governments concerned with rapid population
growth to continue their efforts to reduce growth rates
in order to reduce the drain on resources and dampen
political unrest, we do not expect dramatic results
from those efforts. In traditional societies suspicious
of central government and in places where populations
divide along ethnic or sectarian lines, the introduction
of family planning programs will cause political diffi-
culties. We expect governments in countries such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan to face par-
ticularly strong resistance to family planning pro-
grams from all sides: those in the majority ethnic or
sectarian group who fear that if they take the lead
they may lose political or economic power and those in
the minority who fear that their tenuous claims to
power may be further eroded.
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Figure 6
Middle East/South Asia: Share of World's 30 Largest Cities
Karachi
Baghdad
Dhaka
^i9so ^2000
^>9n
III
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote rank within [he
30 largest cities; (1) being the largest.
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We believe that governments of oil-exporting Persian refugee populations-Pakistan as a participant in
Gulf countries will be increasingly hard pressed to negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
maintain labor practices that require frequent rota- Afghanistan and Persian Gulf states as bankrollers of
tions and isolation of expatriates from the indigenous the Palestinian cause.
population because we expect the expatriates to push
for permanent residence or enhanced legal standing.
Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states will continue to
be parties to the political affairs of their respective
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Table 2
Middle East and South Asia: Population Estimates
for Capital Cities and Cities of 2 Million
or More Inhabitants, 1984 and 2000 a
Maldives: Male
NA
NA
Nepal: Kaihmandu
221
495
Pakistan: Islamabad
1,046
2,116
Karachi
5,945
11,574
Lahore
3,439
6,592
Sri Lanka: Colombo
660
1,021
North Africa
Algeria: Algiers
1,502
2,588
Egypt: Cairo
8,288
12,858
Libya: Tripoli
1,310
2,722
Mauritania: Nouakchott
379
1,118
Afghanistan: Kabul
773
1,270
Bangladesh: Dhaka
4,021
10,526
Bhutan: Thimphu
NA
NA
India: Delhi
6,344
11,496
Ahmedabad
2,839
5,113
Bangalore
2,546
4,509
Calcutta
9,853
16,410
Bombay
9,621
16,782
Hyderabad
2,899
5,218
Madras
6,594
12,675
e These estimates have been developed from survey and census
data. Because of migration associated with current and future
conflict, the population of cities like Kabul, Beirut, and Tehran
could vary widely from these figures.
Morocco: Rabat
1,136
2,283
Casablanca
2,505
4,499
Sudan: Khartoum
1,801
4,072
Tunisia: Tunis
1,133
1,734
Western Sahara: EI Aaiun
NA
NA
Middle East
Bahrain: Manama
131
213
Iran: Tehran
6,426
11,120
Iraq: Baghdad
6,269
11,037
Israel: Tel Aviv
1,359
1,763
Jordan: Amman
793
1,485
Kuwait: Kuwait City
442
826
Lebanon: Beirut
2,197
3,363
Oman: Muscat
66
191
Qatar: Doha
228
396
Saudi Arabia: Riyadh
1,284
2,513
Syria: Damascus
1,668
3,109
United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi
542
864
North Yemen: Sanaa
191
474
South Yemen: Aden
390
736
additional nationals for employment abroad
We expect governments in countries sending workers
to the oil-exporting states to continue policies to
maximize their share of that lucrative labor market
both as an outlet for domestic unemployment and as a
source of hard currency from remittances. According
to US Embassy and press reports, government minis-
tries of sending countries are streamlining exit for-
malities for those headed to jobs in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states and, in the case of South Asian
countries, establishing training programs to qualify
We do not believe that any Middle Eastern or South
Asian government will both formulate and implement
a comprehensive urban policy. At best, piecemeal
measures will address only some of the problems
caused by high rates of city -growth; at worst, meas-
ures taken will compound urban inefficiencies or
waste public funds. Egypt and India face critical
situations in the near term as the aging infrastruc-
tures of Cairo, Calcutta, and Bombay will be com-
pelled to serve additional millions of people within the
decade.
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Key Friends To Face Political Unrest
We believe that the buildup of demographic pressures
may combine with other destabilizing factors to cause
regime-threatening social and economic unrest in
countries vital to US interests in the region. Rapid
increases in the numbers of youth whose expectations
exceed those of their parents will expose the inability
of governments to satisfy their hopes for education,
training, jobs, and housing. We expect population
dynamics to work against efforts by the Pakistani and
Jordanian Governments to achieve national integra-
tion and economic prosperity:
? In Pakistan, Sindhi-Punjabi ethnic conflict and
Sunni-Shia rivalry guarantee grist for opposition
political interests. With unemployment of educated
young men concentrated in the cities persistently
running above 40 percent according to World Bank
researchers, we believe Zia will be unable to attract
the support of these disgruntled elites.
? In Jordan, we expect the regionwide economic
downturn and the net return of Jordanian workers
from jobs in the oil-exporting states will weaken the
economic prosperity on which Hussein depends for
internal political support. Rapid rates of natural
increase for Palestinians and the prospects for addi-
tional Palestinian immigration will, in our view,
complicate Hussein's efforts to balance East Bank
residents' interests against the increasing demands
of Palestinians.
We expect the activities of Afghan and Palestinian
refugees to strain host countries' economic and politi-
cal capacities to cope with them. We believe that
Pakistan has benefited economically from additional
US security, humanitarian, and development assist-
ance to cope with the Afghan refugees but risks
politically divisive internal unrest as the Afghans
lengthen their stay and compete with local people for
jobs and land. Moderate Arab governments that
admit Palestinians may be pressed to increase finan-
cial support to increasingly militant Palestinian orga-
nizations while simultaneously upgrading the legal
status of those resident Palestinians who would prefer
not to return to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, or the West
For the most part, international labor migration with-
in the Middle East and South Asia serves US interests
well. For example, Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan-
major labor exporters and important friends of the
United States-have used emigrant workers' remit-
tances to ease their way through potentially destabi-
lizing balance-of-payments difficulties during the late
1970s and early 1980s
If worker remittances continue to be a key element in
the economies of the labor-sending countries, how-
ever, their growing economic dependence on the Mid-
dle Eastern oil-exporting states may create political
difficulties for the United States. In order to protect
their economic interests, Asian labor-sending states
are likely to support publicly Arab positions on Mid-
dle East issues-occasionally at the expense of sup-
port for US positions.
Demographic changes over both the short and long
term are likely to aggravate ethnic and sectarian
rivalries that could force changes in the distribution of
political and economic power within and between key
friends of the United States.
Key Friends To Demand Increased Financial Support
The United States will be faced with increased de-
mands for financial assistance from its key friends in
the region. If, for example, a persistent soft oil market
causes a reduction in worker remittances from the oil-
exporting states, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and other
labor-sending states are likely to ask the United
States for financial support to cover their projected
foreign exchange deficits.
The United States probably will be called upon to
provide more financial aid for the cities and assistance
in urban policy formulation as Arab and South Asian
leaders are increasingly confronted by the economic
and political drawbacks of rapid urban growth. We
expect Egypt, Pakistan, and Morocco-countries that
already have major aid relationships with the United
States-to be high on the list of those countries
requesting additional urban aid. In many situations
the involvement of US assistance in urban areas will
Bank.
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become politicized. Although US aid to cities could
garner some good will, highly visible US urban aid
will increase the risk that Washington will be blamed
either for failing to solve immense urban problems or
for exerting too much influence over domestic poli-
cies.
The recent wave of urban unrest in North Africa
indicates that social tensions based on demographic
problems can erupt suddenly and spread quickly. Fear
of contagion could lead neighbors to intervene, and
demographic pressures that are allowed to build could
provide an easy target for external troublemakers to
exploit, complicating US efforts to maintain regional
stability in either case.
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Figure 7
Near East/South Asia Midyear 1983 Population
Lebanon
Jordan
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Egypt
Saudi
Arabia
`Kuwait
^ Bahrain
Qatar
Y.A.R. P?D.R.Y.
(N. Yemen) (S. Yemen)
Western
Sahara
Iran
Pakistan
India
Average annual growth rate
(in percent)
-0.5 to 1.9
2.0 to 2.9
3.0 to 3.9
4.0 to 10.7
Bangladesh
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CAIRO*
UWAIT
;uwait
I`~~ ,
Figure 8
Labor Migration to the Near East Oil-Producing States
s,ooa o00 -
t,5ao,aoo -
t,ooo.ooa -
500,000 -
250,000 -
100.000 -
10,000 -
Note: Migrations of less than
10,000 are not shown.
*RIYADH \
Saudi Arabia
P.D.R.Y.
(S. Yemen)
pOHA ~ DHABI
~~
MUSCAT
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Pakistan
*NEW DELHI
Stl
Lanka
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Confidenhal
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