LIBYAN MILITARY AID: TRYING TO BUY INFLUENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300030006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
"Pap-secree-
February 1984
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Libyan Military Aid:
Trying To Buy Influence
An Intelligence Assessment
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Libyan Military Aid:
Trying To Buy Influence
An Intelligence Assessment
Operations.
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA RQ-1009R!'
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Libyan Military Aid:
Trying To Buy Influence
Key Judgments Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has amassed a large inventory of Soviet-
Information available supplied arms far in excess of Libya's needs. Qadhafi has used these arms
as 4f 6 January 1984 to try to buy influence with a wide variet of Third World governments
was used in this report. y
and insurgent groups. Since the mid-1970s Libya has supplied over
$1 billion in arms and trained several thousand foreign dissidents and
soldiers in camps inside Libya. Despite this ambitious scope, of all the
measures Qadhafi has used to advance his influence-subversion, terror-
ism, and economic and military aid-arms transfers have been the most
tangible means, yet perhaps the least effective. Few recipients have become
dependable allies, and, while many continue to accept aid, often it is
because they lack other suppliers. Most clients do not adhere to Qadhafi's
policies simply because they have received arms.
In the early 1970s, Qadhafi handed out cash grants largely to Palestinian
and other radical Arab groups and governments. This reflected the Libyan
leader's fierce ambition to eliminate the state of Israel and to win
adherents to his revolutionary ideas. From 1975 onward, direct arms
transfers began to replace financial aid as Qadhafi sought more control
over recipients' behavior. When he failed to develop a major role for Libya
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qadhafi expanded his meddling to Sub-
Saharan Africa, where weak, politically unstable nations seemed more
susceptible to Libyan influence.
The shift to Africa also proved largely a failure, and Libya has developed
relatively close ties only with such radical states as Benin and Ethiopia.
Qadhafi has attempted to use arms transfers to create a dependency on
Libya among some recipient states and in other instances to support
surrogates like rebel groups in Chad. Most insurgent groups obtain arms
and training from Libya because they cannot find other sources of supply
or cannot pay for arms and training. Few have shown a genuine ideological
affinity for Qadhafi's views.
The scope of Libyan activity has recently expanded into Latin America.
Qadhafi has become convinced that the United States is his biggest threat,
and he sees arms shipments to Latin America as a way to strike at the
United States in its own backyard. He will continue attempts to send such
aid despite the embarrassing seizure by Brazil of four aircraft carrying
arms to Nicaragua in April 1983. The success of further efforts to send
arms by air depends on Libya's obtaining overflight rights now denied it in
West Africa.
iii Top Secret
NESA 84-100280
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Top Secret
Tripoli generally has failed to establish lasting political influence through
its military aid policies. Libya often is its own worst enemy because logistic
problems, poorly qualified diplomatic and military personnel, and a lack of
coherent policy direction leave both Libyan diplomats abroad and foreign
clients confused and angry. Qadhafi's mercurial actions have included
parsimonious fulfillment of promises of assistance; cutting off aid when
groups fail to obey his directives; and alienating foreign trainees by
heavyhanded revolutionary doctrine and general arrogance at the expense
of practical instruction.
We believe Libya will continue its arms transfer policies despite these
problems, particularly those aimed at undermining US influence. His view
of military aid as a symbol of power feeds Qadhafi's self-image as a major
international leader. The greatest potential danger is that Qadhafi eventu-
ally may give away more sophisticated weapons systems that would
enhance the military capabilities of the recipient. To date, Tripoli has been
strikingly reluctant to transfer such major weapons as fighter aircraft,
armored vehicles, and top-of-the-line missile systems and tanks. Although
Qadhafi wants to present his country as having the best and the most
potent arsenal, Libya's overall attitude is parsimonious, with promises far
outweighing deliveries. Qadhafi probably believes a certain leverage comes
through simply having such an impressive weapons inventory.
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Libyan Military Aid:
Trying To Buy Influence
Qadbafi's Objectives
Since coming to power, Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi has used Libya's oil wealth to amass an
arsenal far beyond his country's needs. Angered and
disillusioned by the outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war and the diplomatic efforts following it, he dedi-
cated himself to the elimination of Israel, the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state, and the revitalization
of Muslim and Arab power. In pursuit of this policy,
Qadhafi turned to the Soviet Union as the only power
both willing and able to sell Tripoli the lame guanti-
ties of arms Qadhafi wanted.
Libya's peripheral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict
and its alienation from Egypt, its natural ally in the
struggle with Israel, soon eroded the notion that
Libya's formidable arms inventory would stoke an-
other Arab-Israeli war. We believe, however, that the
international attention and disproportionate influence
Qadhafi gained by having such an arsenal encouraged
him to exploit that influence through arms transfers
to groups such as the Palestinian guerrillas who were
continuing the fight against Israel and to other groups
and governments who either shared Qadhafi's radical
views or simply needed arms and financing from any
Qadhafi's frustration over his inability to strike Israel
directly has resulted in his increasingly directing his
anger toward the United States. Following the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, Qadhafi became convinced that the
United States was responsible for Israel's continued
existence and military success. Qadhafi's public state-
ments make clear that he blamed the United States
for Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab struggle, and
he began to see US peace efforts as an attempt to
divide and weaken the Arab world. Much of Qadha-
fi's activity since the signing of the Camp David
accords in 1979 has been directed toward undermin-
ing moderate, pro-Western Arab regimes or encour-
aging radicals whose activities are inimical to US
interests, especially in Africa. Military aid to Latin
America is the most recent example of Libyan med-
dling specifically designed to strike at US interests.[
Military aid as an instrument of influence has distinct
advantages from Qadhafi's perspective. As a symbol
of power it feeds Qadhafi's image of himself as a
major international leader. Libya's large arsenal-
even undistributed and poorly maintained-conveys
power by its very existence. Qadhafi has used arms
transfers to create a dependency on Libya among
some recipient states and in other instances to support
surrogates like rebel groups in Chad.
Qadhafi's other tactics to acquire influence have
ranged from attempts at statesmanship to bribery,
from economic aid to state-supported terrorism and
subversion. These divergent approaches coupled with
Qadhafl's unpredictable behavior make him a danger-
ous adversary. Economic aid for development projects
to recognized governments, as well as funds to guerilla
groups, are of approximately the same magnitude as
arms transfers-about $1 billion since 1974. Money is
more easily distributed than arms, making this an
attractive option for Libya. The problem is that little
control can be exerted over a group or government
once the funds are in its hands, and we believe this is
one reason why arms transfers and military training
have come to figure more prominently in Libya's
foreign aid policy.Z
Qadhafi also has tried to woo the same governments
he wishes to overthrow, a technique that US Embassy
reporting indicates is perhaps more unsettling than
any other to foreign governments. Tunisian, Suda-
nese, and Moroccan officials all viewed Qadhafi's
efforts at reconciliation in the summer of 1983 with
~ See appendix, "Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents."
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Libyan Training Sites for Foreign Dissidents
.~,
mac,,
Tunisia
apprehension, since all three countries have thwarted and US su ort to Khartoum,
Libyan-sponsored coup attempts in the past three
years. The attempt to overthrow Sudanese President
Nimeiri in February 1983 was blocked by Egyptian
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We estimate Libyan military spending has remained
constant since 1980 at about $3 billion per year. We
believe most of this is for domestic expenditures and
Although the Soviet Union has not directly supported
Libya's more extreme adventures, it has made them
possible by supplying massive quantities of arms to
Libya. The value of Libya's arms contracts with the
Soviet Union-the first major arms deal in 1974 was
worth $2.3 billion-exceeds that of any other Soviet
client state. We calculate that Libya's arms deliveries
from the Soviet Union currently total more than $8
billion. Despite different ideologies and mutual suspi-
cion, the relationship is mutually convenient. In addi-
tion to its efforts to subvert US interests around the
globe, Tripoli until recently provided Moscow with a
source of much-needed hard currency. A sharp de-
cline in oil revenues in 1982 resulted in Libya pressing
Moscow to accept oil in part payment of its weannnc
Despite their common objectives of wanting to under-
mine Western influence, Tri oli and Mosc w '
each o
oug i ya an t e oviet Union
announced agreement "in principle" on a friendship
too dependent on the Soviets, and we believe this fear
might prevent Qadhafi from agreeing to Soviet de-
mands for expanded military access as art of a
friendship treaty.
s own _ s behavior that he is reluctant to become
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Much of Libya's Soviet-supplied weapons inventory
remains in storage, and only a relatively small propor-
tion has been delivered to Libyan clients. Two-thirds
of Libya's tanks and armored vehicles have never
been assigned to operational units 25X1
Libya has given away only ] 0 percent 25X1
o t e more than 2,000 tanks in its inventory, the
largest in North Africa. Arms transferred are often
earlier models such as the BM-11 multiple rocket
launcher or the ZU-23 antiaircraft gun, instead of the
more recent BM-21 or ZSU-23/4 self-propelled gun
in Qadhafi's arsenal. Transfers of sophisticated weap-
ons have been rare. Possible Soviet restrictions on
such weapons transfers may be a factor,
Syria and the Polisario Front have re-
ceived SA-6 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles; the
SA-7 shoulder-fired missile is the usual item.
Libya has sent Iran, Ethiopia, and the Polisario Front
T-54/T-55 tanks, but Libya has never delivered the
T-62 or its newest T-72 Soviet-built tank to any
client. Few of the tank transfers appear to have
treaty in March 1983, it is yet to be signed.
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ver the years, Qadhafi has
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Libyan SA-6 surface-to-air
/nlSSlle tranSpOrter-vrvr[nr-
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launcher (TELJ
appreciably improved the armored capabilities of the
recipients. Only the Polisario Front guerrillas appear
to have used T-55 tanks in battle against the Moroc-
cans, according to satellite photography. The 100
tanks received by Ethiopia in January 1983 remained
at the port of Aseb for over six months before some
were seen at an armor training school. We believe
Iran probably has attempted to use its tanks in the
war against Ira because of i
armor
Constraints on Libyan Military Assistance
In its arms transfer policies, Libya often is its own
worst enemy. Logistic constraints, diplomatic inept-
ness, and a lack of direction from home often leave
Libyan diplomats abroad and foreign clients confused
and angry. Qadhafi has made generous promises that
are not matched by deliveries and has sent weapons
systems that arrive in poor working order or without
component parts. Clients have reported that Libyans
display evidence of poor discipline and training, which
disillusions recipients about the value of what they are
getting, and many Libyan instructors lack the neces-
sary language qualifications. Finally, Qadhafi often
demands more extreme olicies than re ' are
willing to undertake.
Libya's ineptitude alienates many arms recipients.
We believe Qadhafi's decision in 1979 to replace
Libyan embassies abroad with "Peoples' Bureaus"-a
move that swept out what little diplomatic talent
remained-seriously weakened Libya's ability to car-
ry out international diplomacy. Qadhafi has com-
plained that reporting from his Peoples' Bureaus was
inaccurate and uninformed, and in February 1982 he
ordered new officials installed with some di lomatic
and language training,
ttempts to improve Tripoli's arms
transfer performance also led to the creation in March
1983 of a military affairs department under Oadhaf;'c
direct control.
the office was esta is ed to expand assistance to
governments and groups in Africa and Latin America
opposed to the United States and Israel.
Central policy guidance from Tripoli is lacking to
such an extent that often Libyan representatives
overseas and officials back home are com letel
touch with each other
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Table 2
Typical Military Aid Items
From Libyan Inventory a
Armor
T-54/T-55 tanks
Cascavel armored fighting vehicle
Possibly BRDM-2 armored fighting vehicle and/or BMP, BTR-60
armored personnel carrier
Artillery
130-mm M-46 Geld gun
122-mm D-30 howitzer
Mortars, various calibers
122-mm BM-11 and BM-21 multiple rocket launcher
107-mm recoilless rifle
Air defense
23 ZU-23 antiaircraft gun
37-mm M-1939 antiaircraft gun
57-mm 5-60 antiaircraft gun
SA-7 Grail missile
Antiarmor
AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile
RPG-7 antitank gun
SPG-9 antitank gun
Small arms
Mines
Grenades
Machineguns rifles pistols
a Meant to show items Libya usually supplies; not all mclus~ve.
;nrlnrrr;natinn rather than on practical instruction.
Beninese officers prefer French to
Libyan mt ttary training, while Tunisian and Suda-
nese dissidents have complained about the emphasis
at Libyan training camps on discipline and ideological
Over the years, Qadhafi's approach to military assist-
ance gradually has become more selective, although
promises still outweigh deliveries to many groups.
Libyan aid in the early 1970s consisted largely of cash
erants to Palestinian groups,
Arms deliveries eventually
replaced direct financta atd after Qadhafi became
angry about what he considered was misuse of funds
and the recipients' failure to adhere to Libya's view-
Qadhafi continues to provt e
weapons in the hope that he will gain more control
and to ensure that guerrilla leaders will fi ht rather
than use the funds to line their pockets.
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Tripoli's problems in supplying military equipment
efficiently and its sloppy training methods also dimin-
ish the value of its relationships with client states. For
example, the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) was
annoyed when it received armored equipment in such
poor mechanical condition that Libyan instructors in
Bangui could not repair it, accordin? to the US
Embassy in Bangui. In 1982
four T-55 tanks intended for delivery to
the C.A.R. reached Pointe Noire, Congo, then re-
turned to Tripoli-probably because the Libyans
could find no means to transport them farther.C
Patterns of Arms Distribution
Libyan military aid falls into three categories: aid to
governments, aid to dissident groups, and military
training-conventional and guerrilla- mostly inside
Libya. Libya has transferred arms to about 20 gov-
ernments and dissident groups in the last two years,
roughly the same number as during 1979-81.? The
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Libyan T-SS tanks have been
transferred to Iran and Ethio-
Sagger AT-3 antitank missile
on BRDM-2 armored t htin
vehicle
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Table 3
Recipients of Libyan Arms, 1981-83 a
North Africa-Horn of Africa
Ethiopia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Benin
Central African Republic
Ghana
Lesotho
Mozambique
Upper Volta
Middle East/Persian Gulf
Iran
South Yemen
Syria
Argentina
Grenada
Nicaragua
Somali National Movement
Somali Democratic Salvation
Front b
Eastern Sudan Group
Sudanese Socialist Popular Front
Polisario Front (Western Sahara)
Chadian dissidents
Ugandan Freedom Movement
Ugandan National Rescue Front
National Resistance Movement
(Uganda)
National Resistance Army
(Uganda)
United Popular Front (Uganda) n
Front for the National Liberation
of the Congo (FLNC)
Union of Iraqi Democrats
Kurdistan Patriotic Union
Lebanese
Arab Socialist Union
Mirabitun
Progressive Socialist Party
(Druze)
Palestinians
DFLP
PFLP
PFLP-GC
Popular Struggle Front
National Democratic Front
(North Yemen)
Farabundo Marti (FMLN) (E1
Salvador)
e Groups previously supplied arms but not noted since January 1981
are not included.
b Consolidation of previous groups.
Ex-Katangan gendarmes.
pattern of distribution indicates that Qadhafi still is
working to establish influence within the Muslim
sphere and that he is concentrating on weak, relatively
needy countries-primarily in Africa-where his
chances of success are greater. This emphasis on
Africa as the most susceptible sphere for asserting
Libyan influence is likely to continue, in our judg-
ment.
Political events and economic shortfalls since late
1981 have contributed to a narrowing of Libyan
activity. Qadhafi's desire to gain the chairmanship of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1982
caused him to reduce sharply his troublemaking in
Africa, while his financial problems led to a more
cautious posture on military aid and disbursements.
Scaled-down activity included the withdrawal of
Libyan troops from Chad in November 1981 and a
short-lived deal with Morocco to stop supporting the
Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara.
arms shipments to insurgents
in Somalia and Uganda apparently ended in late
1982.
Qadhafi did not completely stop his meddling, how-
ever, especially after two abortive efforts in 1982 to
convene the OAU summit meeting in Tripoli, and the
loss of the chairmanship removed the need for Qadha-
fi to stay on his best behavior. Tripoli's large arms
stockpile allows Qadhafi to direct arms transfers to
areas where he deems it most important. With the
second invasion of Chad in 1983, we saw an upsurge
in Libyan activity.
Africa
Qadhafi has found fertile ground for promoting
Libyan influence among the politically unstable and
economically weak regimes of Sub-Saharan Africa,
particularly West Africa. The prospect for success is
bolstered by Libya's historic ties to several countries
in the region and the presence of large Muslim groups
in many of them. Fostering Muslim claims to political
dominance is a cornerstone of Qadhafi's revolutionary
mandate, which he claims to have inherited from
Nasir. Qadhafi's personal interest in Africa and the
degree of Libyan involvement there have tended to
shift with the fluctuations in Qadhafl's ambitions in
the Middle East-his area of primary concern. Since
Libya's alienation from Egypt in the mid-1970s and
more recently his isolation from even the more radical
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Arab camp, we have seen Qadhafi's attentions in-
creasingly focus on Africa, interrupted only periodi-
cally by such events as the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon. His primary targets have been Chad and
Sudan, where he has for some time sought to install
regimes responsive to Tripoli's interests an[l eventual-
ly politically unite them with Libya.
Qadhafi's interest in Chad stems from Libya's histor-
ic claim to sovereignty over the northern Aozou Strip.
The Libyan monarchy began to aid dissident Muslim
tribesmen in the late 1960s against the southern non-
Muslim blacks who had dominated Chad since it
gained independence from France in 1960. Qadhafi,
proclaiming himself heir to Libya's 19th century
religious predominance over much of northern Chad,
occupied the Aozou Strip in 1973. The issue has
bedeviled Libyan-Chadian relations ever since.
The current conflict in Chad marks the second time
Libya has committed large numbers of troops to
Chad's episodic civil war. In 1980-81 Libya provided
materiel and logistic support to then President Gou-
kouni, eventually dispatching a 7,000-man contingent
to help in the struggle against rebel troops led by
former Defense Minister Habre. Following the Liby-
an withdrawal in late 1981 and the ouster of Gou-
kouni by Habre in June 1982, Qadhafi again armed
and provided logistic backing to Goukouni's forces in
their attempt to regain control of the country.
aim in both cases has been to protect its claim to the
Aozou Strip and to install a regime in N'Djamena
responsive to its interests.
The amounts of arms given to pro-Libyan forces in
Chad during the periods of direct intervention and in
the years leading up to them are impossible to deter-
mine with any precision, given the shifting fortunes of
Qadhafi's clients and the difficulty in distinguishing
materiel that has remained in Libyan hands and that
passed on to the Chadians.
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lthough the cost of 25X1
such major items as tanks makes aid to Iran and
Ethiopia more costly for Libya than aid given to 25X1
Chad, nowhere else have the Libyans mounted an
operation of such magnitude. 25X1
Although Libya has not won aclear-cut success in 25X1
Chad, its hold on the northern third of the country is
secure, and we believe it is unlikely to withdraw 25X1
without establishment of a friendly government in
N'Djamena that will honor Tripoli's territorial claims
and recognize its influence. We believe Qadhafi's 25X1
determination coupled with Chad's vulnerability to
Libyan meddling assures that Libya will continue to
support an active military training and assistance "~~ ~ '
effort on behalf of one or another of Chad's political
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Elsewhere in Africa, Libya has had few successes.
Libya's recently bungled relationship with the C.A.R.
demonstrates the pitfalls Tripoli creates for itself
when it tries to use arms transfers as an instrument of
influence.
to train Central Africans in tactics for aLibyan-
supplied armored unit. President Kolingba told the
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US Ambassador in Bangui that he was suspicious of
Libya's motives from the first, and relations between
the two countries deteriorated markedly when Kol-
ingba refused to join Qadhafi in denouncing the
Chadian regime during the Central African leader's
visit to Tripoli in April 1983. One month later Bangui
announced the "completion" of the Libyan training
mission.
The setback in the C.A.R. was partly offset by the
coup in Upper Yolta in September 1983 that brought
to power a young pro-Libyan Army officer, Captain
power, he immediately claimed to have halted an
"unsolicited" Libyan airlift that was mounted follow-
ing his coup, according to press accounts. Despite this
attempt to ease the fears of his moderate neighbors,
Sankara has publicly praised Qadhafi's revolution and
supported his position in Chad.
Libyan arms are sti arriving at
uaga ougou, possibly overland through Ghana
Rawlings' refusal to grant basing rights to
Libya, the latest in an escalating set of Libyan
requests, led Qadhafi to cut off much-needed oil to
Ghana in the second half of 1983, according to the
US Embassy in Accra. If Ghana cannot obtain af-
fordable oil elsewhere, relations will warm somewhat,
but with caution on Ghana's side and growing annoy-
ance on Libya's.
Qadhafi's ties to Benin are among his closest in
Africa. Only Benin has allowed its territory to be used
as a transit point for ferrvine dissidents into Chad,
Recruits from such
est rican nations as igeria, Niger, Senegal, and
Mauritania have been flown from Cotonou to Libya
for paramilitary training and ideological indoctrina-
tion, and we believe many of these may later be
infiltrated into their home countries to foment trouble
against their governments. Tripoli promised some
military equipment to Benin in May 1983-including
an early warning radar that US defense attache
sources saw at the Cotonou airport in early June-
marking the first direct shipment from Libya in some
in icate Qadhafl's continuing interest in Benin as a
staging point from which to pursue his goal of displac-
ing Western influence in western and Sahelian
Africa.
Libya has generally good relations with Ethiopia,
with which Tripoli joined in a three-way defense pact
in 1981 that also included South Yemen. Tripoli also
provided considerable assistance to Somali dissidents
through 1982. Over half of the more than $700
million in aid to Addis Ababa-apart from resupply-
ing foreign dissident camps inside Ethiopia-has been
economic, however, The
military component of the Tripartite Pact, formed as
a shield against the US rapid deployment force, has
failed to materialize partly because Libya has been
reluctant to make good its promises to equip a
trinational force and to finance construction of the
necessary military facilities, beyond $150 million
possibly used for military purposes that was loaned in
late 1981. The only tangible military aid Ethiopia has
received under the Tripartite Pact appears to have
been the delivery of 100 T-55 tanks in January 1983,
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Libya's principal activity in the Horn of Africa during
this period consisted of an extensive airlift to Somali
dissidents that ended in late 1982.
Several insurgent groups in Uganda also have suffered
from Libya dropping its earlier aid, and even that aid
had been very limited. We judge that Qadhafi became
more selective about his military assistance and may
have realized that-as in Somalia-the insurgents
were makin little headwa .
In the Maghreb, Libya's principal arms transfer
activity has been the supply of Polisario Front guerril-
las. Libya and Algeria have been the major patrons of
the Polisario since its evolution into a fighting force in
the mid-1970s. Since 1980 the Polisario Front has
received SA-6 missiles, tanks, and armored vehicles
from Libya. The relationship with the Polisario is a
prime example of Libya's failure to translate signifi-
cant arms aid into durable political influence. The
Front's dealings with Libya have been so plagued by
Qadhafi's inconsistent policies that few among its
leadership are pro-Libyan. As a result, we believe the
Polisario views Libya with considerable skepticism
and disdain.
On at least two occasions-most recently in July 25X1
1983-we believe Qadhafi interrupted the flow of 25X1
supplies in order to broker temporary and tactical
rapprochements with Morocco. In the latest instance,
the US Embassy reported that Qadhafi apparently
agreed to halt his assistance to the Polisario in
exchange for Morocco refraining from interference in
Libya's adventures in Chad. Shortly before Qadhafi's
first visit to Morocco in July 1983, he announced 25X1
publicly that he was no longer concerned with the
struggle to wrest control of Western Sahara from 25X1
Morocco. Although we cannot confirm that Tripoli
has cut off supplies or that the interruption will be
prolonged, the incident further erodes Qadhafi's repu-
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The smaller states of the Maghreb fear Qadhafi, who
sponsored the Gafsa raid into Tunisia in 1980 and 25X1
organized a coup plot in Mauritania that was uncov-
ered in December 1982.
The Middle East
Qadhafi's ambitions to play a major role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict have been largely confined to support 25X1
ing Syria and pro-Syrian Palestinians. Qadhafi
warmly welcomed the recent rebellion against Yasir 25X1
Arafat by hardline Palestinians and ave the rebels
financial aid and ossibl arm .
Tripoli announced that the 600 Libyan troops in
Lebanon-sent before the 1982 Israeli invasion to
support Syria and the Palestinians in the Bekaa
Valley-were at Druze and Syrian disposal
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small arms,
some artillery pieces, and some ammunition were
delivered to Junblatt's forces.
This renewed activity on behalf of Syria and radical
Palestinians is in keeping with Libya's past activities.
In the early 1970s Libya was the principal financial
supporter of the PLO, but Qadhafi broke with Arafat
as the latter gradually became more moderate. When
Qadhafi insisted on continued militancy against Isra-
el, he began to give arms-rather than money-and
directed the flow to the more radical groups, particu-
larly Ahmad Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).
Libya sent an
SA-9 battery into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in May
1981, and Libyan technicians and soldiers arrived
over the next year. The Libyan forces in n n
initially were under PFLP-GC command
Qadhafi viewed the expulsion of
the Palestinians from Beirut in autumn 1982 as a
blow to Arab prestige and exhorted them to commit
suicide rather than be driven out by the Israelis.C
he temporarily stopped assistance to all
Palestinian groups in disgust when they began to pull
out of Lebanon. Qadhafi probably views the anti-
Arafat rebellion as a chance to eliminate moderate
influence within the PLO, and he is likely to continue
arming those who are willing to fight the Israelis and
oppose US interests.
Since 1981 Libya has been Iran's second-largest
source of military hardware. The two nations have
signed nearly $350 million worth in arms contracts.
The Iranian regime accepted Libya's offer to supply
arms and to negotiate with third parties on Iran's
behalf after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, largely
because of its pressing needs and political isolation.
Libya has been a difficult partner, however, providing
only older model equipment and forcing Iran to
transport all of its purchases.
we believe
Libya's ability to supply arms will ensure a continuing
military relationship between the two regimes. Libya
offers Tehran access to arms and East European
suppliers
Latin America
Libya has made only limited progress in expanding its
influence in Latin America, but the prospect of
handouts is attractive to leftist governments and
groups. Tripoli has begun the familiar cycle of offer-
ing unlimited arms to a variety of groups, with
probably the same mixed results. The distance be-
tween Libya and Latin America is perhaps the great-
est constraint on potential relationships. We calculate
that Libya's larger cargo aircraft cannot transfer a
substantial quantity of weapons without landing and
refueling rights. Libya's few oceangoing vessels could
transport the promised equipment, but we believe
Tripoli may be unwilling to dedicate its cargo ships to
a project that could involve a confrontation with US
naval forces.
We know of no reason why Libya has not used its
merchant fleet to ship arms to Nicaragua, but Libyan
behavior traditionally has been cautious on this issue.
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Libya's cultivation of Latin American leftists has
increased substantially in the last two years and is
inspired primarily by Qadhafi's desire to cause trou-
ble for the United States in its own backyard, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting from the region. Libya's
most significant effort in the re ion has been in
Nicaragua. US defense attache
reporting in icate ripoli's assistance to Nicaragua in
1982 was sizable, from the standpoint of Nicaragua's
limited air inventory. Libya's aid consisted primarily
of at least two helicopters, four Italian light strike
aircraft, and a small Libyan air training team. While
Libya's periodic assistance has been a boon to the
Sandinista government, Cuba and the Soviet Union
deliver the bulk of military equipment to Managua.
In February 1983
the two nations signe a mi nary agreement t at
included further deliveries of helicopters, light strike
aircraft, and other weapons such as SA-7 surface-to-
air missiles and radars. We believe delivery of all the
promised equipment would augment Nicaragua's mil-
itary capabilities, but there would be no fundamental
change in the balance of power in the region. Libya's
L-39 jet trainers, if combat equipped, would signifi-
cantly improve the effectiveness of Managua's coun-
terinsurgency campaign, and the overall aid could
help Nicaragua in a confrontation with Honduras.
Qadhafi's attempts to send this equipment were sty-
mied in April 1983 by Brazil's seizure of four Libyan
transport aircraft en route to Managua. The incident
only provoked Qadhafi's ire and renewed his determi-
nation to stand up to the United States
it out landing rights in a West African nation-
Mauritania, Cape Verde, or Morocco-Qadhafi even-
tually may use his few oceangoing vessels to transport
arms. These vessels r outside the Medi-
terranean.
Some arms went to Argentina during the Falklands
war, but no durable relationship appears to have
resulted. Qadha- 25X1
fi's willingness to supply arms to the conservative 25X1
regime in Argentina stemmed from his antipathy to
the British, whom he holds directl res onsible for the
creation of Israel.
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We believe the expense and general lack of success in
buying influence that Libya has had with its arms
transfer program are not likely to deter Qadhafi. He
operates under very few domestic constraints, and 25X1
even though his adventuresome policies are not popu-25X1
lar, there are few who would openly challenge him.
instances, to our knowledge, of Qadhafi moderating
this aspect of his foreign policy out of concern for
domestic considerations.
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Qadhafi is generally impervious to international dis-
approval, with important exceptions, such as when he
persistently sought the OAU chairmanship in 1982.
The condemnation of the Libyan arms lift to Nicara-
gua judging from Qadhafi's statements and subse- 25X1
quent actions-appears only to have reinforced his
determination to find a way to deliver weapons to his
clients. Although French and US efforts to block
further Libyan penetration of Chad had an intimidat-
ing effect on Libyan battlefield operations, Qadhafi
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has continued to arm rebel forces and probably
considers the current stalemate as only a temporary
setback. We believe Qadhafi's cavalier attitude to-
ward Libya's interests and those of the international
community is an outgrowth of his belief that:
? He, along with other revolutionary forces, can
change a neocolonialist world only by force.
? He is engaged in a mortal struggle with the United
States, which initiated a campaign against him and
can be deterred only by resolute Libyan action.
? He is not acting irresponsibly, as his detractors
charge, but is simply adopting the tactics of other
great powers that are trying to shape the world
order.
We think it unlikely that recent efforts by Algerian
President Bendjedid to forge greater cooperation
among North African countries will have a moderat-
ing effect on Libyan policies in that region. There
probably would be measurable changes only in West-
ern Sahara and in Libyan recruitment of dissident
North Africans for paramilitary training.
There is little chance that Libya's military aid pro-
gram will become more polished in the near term. The
lack of sophistication among Libyan diplomats, the
poor coordination between the aid program and Qa-
dhafi's political objectives, and constraints stemming
from Libya's transport and servicing capabilities are
likely to persist indefinitely. Despite the creation in
the spring of 1983 of a new office under Qadhafi's
direct control designed to coordinate arms transfers,
analysis of continuing military assistance has shown
virtually no change in the way Libya conducts arms
transactions. Although Libyan activities have contrib-
uted to instability, particularly in West Africa, and
encourage disruptive elements in a host of countries,
we believe it is unlikely that Tripoli will develop close
allies or wield significant, durable influence over any
of its clients in the near term
Implications for the United States
We believe Libya's policy of arms transfers specifical-
ly aimed at undermining US influence will continue.
Activity directed at pro-Western regimes or bolstering
anti-US governments allows Libya to claim it is at the
forefront of the struggle against Israel and the United
States. Moreover, particularly since the Gulf of Sidra
incident, Qadhafi has sought security for Libya
against what he believes are increasingly overt at-
tempts by the United States to unseat him. He is
likely to be more generous with assistance to countries
such as Syria that he believes can provide him with
some added measure of protection.
The greatest potential danger, in our view, is that
Qadhafi-perhaps out of frustration with his fail-
ures-may become more willing in time to give away
larger, more sophisticated weapon systems. He has
been strikingly parsimonious in transferring such ma-
jor weapon systems as aircraft, helicopters, and ar-
mored vehicles, probably largely because in his mind
the offer is as good as its fulfillment. Only Iran,
Ethiopia, and the Polisario Front have received tanks,
and-with the exception of Syria-only light strike
aircraft have been transferred in recent years. Should
Qadhafi begin to transfer more modern tanks, fighter
aircraft, or significant numbers of sophisticated air
defense and field artillery weapons, such deliveries
could enhance the military capabilities of the recipi-
ent state or group.
Qadhafi could continue his present scattershot ap-
proach of giving limited amounts of aid to a variety of
groups and having relatively little influence, or he
could select only a few key recipients. Tripoli then
could concentrate on building ties and improving the
military capabilities-through larger weapons flow
and training-of the chosen recipients. Such a fo-
cused program could considerably augment the cli-
ent's inventory-altering the military balance in a
region if its neighbors were more poorly armed-but a
pronounced increase in military capability is unlikely
to occur if the client is dependent solely on Libyan
training and maintenance.
Qadhafi's threats against moderate regimes like
Sudan, Chad, and Tunisia will ensure that these
nations will continue to look to the United States and
other Western nations for military and economic
support and protection. Western aid to Chad during
the fighting in 1983 was a key factor enabling
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Habre's regime to survive the Libyan military on-
slaught. Tunisia has used US assistance to fashion a
limited military deterrent against Libya, according to
US Embassy and defense attache reports, while Su-
dan's vulnerability to Libyan subversion is an impor-
tant component of its relationship with Egypt and the
United States. Other regimes-such as the C.A.R.
and Ghana-are becoming more wary of involvement
with Libya's Qadhafi and may seek closer ties with
the West.
Libya's arms transfer policy, if kept apace, ensures
continued close Libyan-Soviet ties and the prolifera-
tion of Soviet-made weaponry in Africa and the
Middle East. This policy requires a steady stream of
Soviet arms flowing to Libya, increasing Qadhafi's
dependence on the Soviet Union and raising the
possibility that the Soviet Union eventually may
become involved in decisions regarding arms trans-
Finally, Qadhafi's troublemaking and influence
peddling is of concern to government leaders through-
out the region who fear that Qadhafi's activities invite
superpower intervention. We believe this is a primary
factor in the policies of such states as Algeria and
Saudi Arabia when they attempt to influence Qadha-
fl's unpredictable behavior. Some leaders, such as
Morocco's King Hassan, believe that Qadhafi is an
"Arab" problem and that dealing with him directly is
preferable to ignoring him. Many states prefer to get
along with Qadhafi-even occasionally accommodat-
ing him-rather than risk the involvement of outside
powers, which, in their view, will drive Qadhafi
further into the Soviet embrace.
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Appendix
Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents
Tripoli has trained several thousand foreigners in
commando and small-unit tactics at some 10 installa-
tions inside Libya since the mid-1970s. Some facilities
are dedicated exclusively to training dissidents, while
others are regular military installations. There has
been limited training of regular government forces in
their own countries. Qadhafi clearly believes that
providing military training enhances Libya's reputa-
tion with revolutionary groups while helping to intimi-
date or destabilize countries opposed to his goals. We
believe that such trainin will contin e
remains in power.
Since 1981-probably the peak year of Qadhafi's
subversive efforts-Libyan training of foreign nation-
als has declined somewhat. We believe this is largely
because of the less radical posture the Libyan leader
adopted in 1982 to ease his regional isolation. Recent
training has involved principally North and Sub-
Saharan African dissidents, particularly Sudanese
and Chadian rebels.
Training Inside Libya
The activity observed at these camps varies with the
state of relations between Libya and its adversaries.
For example, a training camp near Al Kufrah in
southeast Libya, used to train Sudanese dissidents,
has been periodically opened and closed, depending on
the level of tension between Tripoli and Khartoum.
Increased activity at the Sebha East facility was noted
n late 1982, which probably
was linked to the training of Chadian dissidents who
took the offensive against the Habre eovernment in
June 1983.
peared to be deteriorating from disuse.
hand combat pit, and an SA-7 firing position ap-
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g p ac ivi y. snot e25X1'X1
facility in June 1983, an obstacle course, ahand-to-
There is al-so evidence that the facilities are not well
maintained durin eriods of l
t' 't A
h -
courses in small-unit tactics.
Libyan training of subversives appears to consist 25X1
mostly of instruction in the use of light weaponry and
In November 1983, Sudanese
issi ents fighting in Chad were sent back to Libya,
where we believe they may undergo further training 25X1
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for operations against Sudan.
Tuareg tribesmen rom Mali receive
training on the AK-47 assault rifle and other Soviet-
made small arms in 1981 at a camp south of Tripoli.
Libyan instructors have been present to continue
dissident training. We believe that since mid-1982
most of the Libyan training of Sudanese dissidents in
Ethiopia has occurred at a large military facility at
Dire Dawa, after forward bases near the Sudanese
border were closed or scaled down because of security
problems. Activity near the border increased in 1983,
however, as the situation in Sudan's southern region
deteriorated. Libyan second-in-command Jallud visit-
ed Ethiopia in November 1983, and
Support for Governments:
Involvement With Regular Armed Forces
We believe that Libya's military training programs
were originally designed for Palestinians and other
Arabs involved in operations against Israel. But as
Qadhafi's ambitions as a revolutionary leader grew
and the more moderate elements of the PLO increas-
ingly minimized the importance of terrorism as a tool,
the Libyans began to offer training to radical groups
and subversives in many parts of the world.
African dissident and subversive groups have emerged
in the 1980s as favorite candidates for Libyan train-
ing. Although Qadhafi appears willing to offer train-
ing to anti-imperialist forces worldwide, Libya clearly
has logistic advantages in Africa, where trainees can
few Latin American dissidents have been trained in
Libya, and transportation problems and the expense
probably are hindrances.
Activity near the Sudanese border has increased in
the last few months as the situation in Sudan's
southern region has deteriorated, and
Libyan support for anti-Nimeiri forces has
accelerated. The Libyans have transferred many Su-
danese dissidents from training areas in Libya to
bases in Ethiopia,
Libya has trained a few re ular ersonnel from
Nicaragua and Iran, but
most such trainees are African.
Before relations soured in late 1983, the Libyans were
active in training the armed forces of the Rawlings
regime in Ghana.
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Table 4
Libyan Military Training, 1981-83
Ethiopia
Unknown
Somali Democratic Salvation Front
Libya
Sudanese dissidents
Ethiopia; Libya
Polisario guerrillas
Libya
Tunisian dissidents
Libya
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central African Republic
Km 22 Camp, CAR
Benin
Cotonou, Benin; Lib
Ghana
Ghana; Libya
Chadian dissidents
Southern Libya
SWAPO (South Africa)
Libya
Malian dissidents
Libya
Nigerian dissidents
Libya
FLNC (Zaire)
Unknown
Farabundo Marti (EI Salvador) Managua; Nicaragua
Chilean Socialist Party Libya
The Libyans have also provided training to their
"anti-imperialist" allies in Iran and NicaraQUa.
In Nicaragua, accord-
about 20 Nicaraguans were undergoing unspecified
military training in Libya as of late spring 1983,
Libyan Training: Problems and Prospects
Libya has expended considerable effort in its training
ing to the US defense attache in Managua, the programs for foreign nationals, but we believe that the
Libyans had a 10-man aviation training team that results have been disappointing from Qadhafi's point
provided instruction for SF-260 light attack aircraft
and MI-2 helicopters in early 1983. Additionally,
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of view. Part of the difficulty has arisen because of the
generally low quality of the trainees involved and the
factionalism that has undermined the effectiveness of
many of the groups supported by Libya, particularly
in Chad and Sudan. The Libyans, however, have
produced many of the difficulties associated with their
training of foreign nationals by alienating the recipi-
ents with poor instruction, heavy ideological empha-
sis, and general arrogance. Many trainees reportedly
are forced into camps against their will and do not
necessarily remain allied with Libya after their
release.
The quality of Libyan training has often disappointed
the Groups and governments that have been recipients.
Despite these difficulties and irritants, we believe that
Qadhafi will continue to offer military training to a
wide variety of regimes and groups as long as their
political orientation and goals are at least somewhat
compatible with Qadhafl's. Training activity may
fluctuate with the political climate, but Qadhafi
clearly sees it as enhancing Libya's influence and
prestige throughout the world. The fear caused by
rumors of Libyan-trained dissidents probably also is a
factor in Qadhafi's calculations, although-as with
arms transfers-the reputation outweighs the reality.
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from Managua indicates that the Libyan team there
had done little to enhance Nicaraguan maintenance
capabilities for their aircraft. In our judgment, this
reflects Libyan inefficiency in their own maintenance
procedures.
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sians, Sudanese, and other trainee ten disaf-
fected by Libyan methods of recruitment, discipline,
and ideological instruction.
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ave entered Libya seeking employment opportunities
have been dragooned into dissident training camps.
Trainees sometimes are subject to strict discipline;
when some mem-
bers o a u anese group m i ya wanted to stop
training, the Libyans exerted severe physical and
psychological pressure on them to continue and exe-
cuted two trainees when they refused. Some groups
are concerned about the substantial amount of
Qadhafi's ideology that is included in Libyan training
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