POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200120004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
Intelligence
Political Dynamics
of Algeria
NESA 83-10350
December 1983
Copy 3 4 b
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
of Algeria
Political Dynamics
This paper was prepared b
y
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Asian Analysis-.
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The paper was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
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Secret
NESA 83-10350
December 1983
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Political D namics
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of Algeriar 25X1
Key Judgments The prospects for political stability in Algeria are good. President Chadli
Information available Bendjedid has grown in political stature and authority since his election in
as of 23 December 1983 1979:
was used in this report.
? He has maintained the confidence of the armed forces, which put him in
power.
? He has ousted prominent opponents and reined in the leftist ideologues of
the National Liberation Front (FLN), the sole legal political party.
? Bendjedid's style and attention to improving the lot of the average
Algerian have struck a sympathetic chord among Algerians.
The armed forces are the decisive center of power in Algeria and the only
group we believe can effect a sudden change in regime. An informal
coalition of military officers and civilian bureaucrats constitutes the
privileged elite, sharing pragmatic and nationalist values. This group now
dominates the FLN and has been instrumental in redirecting policy along
more moderate lines. In our view, Bendjedid and the Army will continue to
dominate the party, and Bendjedid will be elected next year to a second
term as President.
While retaining the nation's support for socialism, Bendjedid has aban-
doned the rigid doctrines of his predecessors:
? Light industry, housing, and agriculture-areas directly affecting the
average Algerian-are receiving greater emphasis than heavy industry.
? Bendjedid is allowing greater freedom to the private sector to increase
economic efficiency.
? Algerian foreign policy is less confrontational, aiming at regional stabil-
ity and cooperation.
Loyal and efficient security services monitor dissidents, who for the near
future will play a minor role in Algerian politics:
? The opposition lacks resources and effective leadership and is
fragmented.
? Bendjedid, with Army backing, purged prominent leftists from the FLN,
and members of the Communist Socialist Vanguard Party have been
barred from leadership positions.
? The regime vigorously suppresses dissident Muslim fundamentalists-
potentially the most dangerous opposition-while actively promoting its
Islamic legitimacy.
Secret
NESA 83-10350
December 1983
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Certain issues are potentially divisive of Algerian society and government,
but we expect the Bendjedid regime to manage them effectively. The
Western Sahara conflict and the Arabization campaign will generate
occasional tension for some time. A prolonged revenue squeeze may compel
Bendjedid to undertake further domestic belt tightening and thus risk
public discontent. Longer term problems, such as chronic unemployment
and a burgeoning, youthful population, will trouble Algerian development
efforts for years.
We believe that over the next few years the pragmatic, moderate orienta-
tion of the Bendjedid government will continue to improve the opportuni-
ties for cooperation between Algeria and the West and for better US-
Algerian ties. In areas of trade and economic development, Algeria will
seek US and Western technology, goods, and expertise. Algiers is also
gradually reducing its reliance on the Soviet Union for military equipment
by expanding its diversification efforts, although its longstanding supply
relationship will predominate and endure for the near future. Algeria will
look to the West for more of its military hardware and training in the com-
ing years.
Algerian and US interests in stability in the Maghreb, in the Middle East,
and in Africa are generally compatible but not wholly congruent. Strains
will persist over important specific issues such as US-Moroccan military
cooperation and how best to deter Libyan activities in Africa. Genuine
philosophical differences on international economic matters will also
continue to disturb US-Algerian relations.
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Political Dynamics
of Algeria
Algeria's prospects for political stability and develop-
ment appear bright as the country passes its 20th year
as an independent state. The disputes that occurred
during the Ben Bella and Boumediene presidencies
have been largely resolved, and a new sense of
national unity and purpose has emerged under Presi-
dent Chadli Bendjedid. The orderly transition from
Boumediene to Bendjedid has demonstrated to Algeri-
ans that their country's political institutions are oper-
ating smoothly.
The death in December 1978 of President Houari
Boumediene-a rigid leftist-gave the Algerian lead-
ership the opportunity to reconsider the direction of
the country's domestic and foreign policies. The emer-
gence of Bendjedid-with his less ideological ap-
proach-reflects a maturing of the revolutionary re-
gime that is working to put some distance between its
current goals and the struggle for independence some
two decades ago. Bendjedid has made clear in his
actions and his public statements that his policies are
geared more toward fulfilling contemporary Algerian
expectations and solving Algeria's immediate econom-
ic and social problems than trying to apply socialist
precepts that have been found wanting. Although
Bendjedid and his closest advisers believe in socialism,
they are not dogmatic in applying its ideology. We
view the current regime as one that pursues what
works and is more tolerant of regimes with a conserv-
ative structure and orientation.
The Presidency: Authoritative yet Collegial
We believe President Bendjedid has grown in political
stature and authority during his five-year term. Es-
sentially self-educated, Bendjedid was a member of
the tightly knit group that led Algeria's war for
independence from France. The 54-year-old former
Army colonel appears comfortable in the presidency.
According to US officials, he demonstrates an in-
creasingly sophisticated understanding of issues and
greater confidence in making decisions. In our judg-
ment, he has rejected his predecessor's rigid ideologi-
cal approach and has begun to direct Algeria toward a
more moderate position on domestic and international
issues.
Bendjedid's quiet demeanor belies a toughness and
political cunning that he has used to establish his
authority over the country. We believe Bendjedid has
adroitly overcome the stigma of being a "compro-
mise" candidate, a term used by many Algeria watch-
ers when he was elected president in 1979. Within a
year after Boumediene's death, it was apparent that
he had won the allegiance of more than just those
military officers who placed him in power.
In consolidating his power, Bendjedid has used his
formidable presidential powers patiently and discreet-
ly to weed out many of the radical holdovers from the
Boumediene era.' He has shuffled his cabinet three
' All important powers are concentrated in the office of the
president. He is head of state and government, Secretary General of
Algeria's sole political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN),
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and President of the
Supreme Court and High Security Council. Bendjedid, like his
predecessors, retains the Defense portfolio. National presidential
elections are held every five years. In accordance with the National
Charter and the Constitution, the President alone determines the
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oc~Ica
Algeria
Berber-speaking area
Standard-gauge railroad
Narrow-gauge railroad
Road
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(ITALY)
Sicily
FTALY)
LIBYA
North Gibraltar
(U KJ Mostaganem
A tlantic
Ora .
Ocean
WESTERN
SAHARA
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times to reward loyalists and reduce the power of
potential adversaries and hardcore leftists. Key partic-
ipants in the previous regime, such as Merbah Kasdi,
currently Minister of Heavy Industry, and Mohamed
Salah Yahiaoui, former FLN party coordinator, have
been eased into nonpolitical ministry and party posi-
tions. The accidental death of Foreign Minister Ben
Yahia in an air crash in April 1982 removed the last
influential adviser with a strong leftist orientation. He
was replaced by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a more
moderate and reliable ally. Others, like former For-
eign Minister Bouteflika and Maj. Rashid Zeghar,
former security adviser to Boumediene, have been
snared by Bendjedid's anticorruption campaign. Al-
though we believe the campaign is a political instru-
ment of the regime, the charges in most cases appear
valid. Bendjedid has chosen not to make a public
but also because the military is the only source of
power that could effectively challenge a presidential
initiative.
The Military and Security Forces-Political
Kingmakers
The professional military establishment in Algeria
includes the Army, Air Force, Navy, and gendarmer-
ie, collectively known as the People's National Army
(ANP). In our assessment, the ANP under Bendjedid
continues to exert pervasive control of Algerian poli-
spectacle of the campaign's victims, using house
arrest rather than harsh imprisonment as punishment.
Bendjedid favors a collegial style of leadership and
seldom exercises the full prerogatives of his office
without consultation. Embassy reporting indicates
that most major decisions are made in concert with
trusted loyalists whose influence depends on their
personal relationship with Bendjedid or their demon-
strated expertise. Membership in the country's sole
political party-the National Liberation Front
(FLN)-is not a prerequisite for influence. Moreover,
according to Embassy reporting, participation in the
inner circle varies depending on the issue at hand.
This system of decisionmaking assures consultation
among a variety of political sectors-the military,
party, and technocratic elites-and prevents individ-
uals from rivaling the President's influence.' Accord-
ing to Embassy reporting, only the Secretary General
of the Presidency, Col. Larbi Belkheir, enjoys regular
access to Bendjedid. He is considered to be the second
most important figure in the country, according to
Embassy sources.
Although Bendjedid routinely covers his political
flanks through wide consultations, we believe he seeks
first and foremost the approval of the military. He
does so partly because that is his home constituency
tics that it has held since independence.
The basis of the ANP's political clout is its monopoly
of organized force, its status in Algerian society
gained during the early postindependence years, and
the control it has had of key party and government
positions over the years. The officer corps has over-
come various ethnic and regional differences to o er-
ate as a united block in Algerian politics
~
that the military -
is the most cohesive, disciplined organization in Alge- 25X1
ria. Most officers are loyal to the ANP as an institu-
tion and, according to Embassy reporting, see them-
selves as the guardians of the nation.
The ANP exercises its influence through the key
positions military officers hold in the government and
the FLN. According to Embassy reporting, the three
men considered the most powerful in the Algerian
Government-President Bendjedid, Secretary Gener-
al of the Presidency Larbi Belkheir, and Ministry of
Defense Secretary General Mustapha Benloucif-are
all professional military officers. In addition, military
officers hold eight of the 30 cabinet portfolios.F
Under Bendjedid the ANP promotes its viewpoint
primarily through its control of the FLN.
Bendjedid confers
with the ANP leadership before FLN Central Com-
mittee meetings and before important policy initia-
tives, such as his summit meeting with Morocco's
King Hassan in 1983. By meeting regularly with
senior officers, Bendjedid can maintain the support of
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the ANP, coordinate political strategy with the offi-
cers, and incorporate Armed Forces wishes into gov-
ernment policy.
The military block within the FLN is supported by
civilians from the civil service and state enterprises,
according to Embassy reporting. Led by Bendjedid
since 1979, this coalition of officers and technocrats
has progressively consolidated its grip on party organs
and has endorsed Bendjedid's efforts to subordinate
the powers of the party cadre to those in the coalition.
At the local level, regional military commanders wield
considerable authority by virtue of their responsibility
for public order. Embassy reporting notes that the
regional commanders usually defer in local decision-
making on nonmilitary and nonsecurity matters to the
governors and communal assemblies, choosing for
themselves a watchdog role over local government.F
officers.' Berbers have traditionally been underrepre-
sented in the officer corps, and-as in broader social
and development issues-have lobbied for representa-
tion and status commensurate with their position as
the country's largest minority. (Berbers constitute 20
percent of Algeria's predominantly Arab population.)
On the other hand, Berbers-especially from the
Kabyle region-have over the years come to dominate
the important Military Security (SM) service in the
ANP, creating some concern among their Arab coun-
ter arts
Bendjedid neutralized the problem
by appointing to the cabinet the Kabyle SM chief Col.
Merbah Kasdi, replacing him with an Arab. For good
measure, Bendjedid retired a number of Kabyle offi-
cers and transferred the important SM security and
intelligence functions to Larbi Belkheir in the office
Bendjedid appears to have a comfortable working
relationship with his fellow officers and, in our view, is
likely to retain their confidence as long as he contin-
ues to protect their special status, equip them well,
and pursue his current foreign and domestic policies.
Rumors occasionally circulate-conjured by the Mo-
roccans, we suspect-that cliques of officers have
turned on Bendjedid or chosen to ignore his directives,
particularly on controversial issues, such as Algerian
support for the Polisario. We have no information to
support these rumors, nor have there been domestic
military disturbances that would lend them credence.
There are, however, longstanding rivalries and resent-
ments in the officer corps based on regional and
ethnic affiliations that have been troublesome for
Bendjedid and, in extreme circumstances, could com-
plicate his domination of decisionmaking. In the
broader political arena, however, the military closes
In our judgment, a more pervasive and potentially
troublesome friction exists between Berber and Arab
of the presidency.
According to Embassy reporting, these frictions con-
tinue to dissuade Bendjedid from appointing an
Armed Forces chief of staff for fear of upsetting the
equilibrium of the ANP. To a large extent, however,
these. problems are internal issues and have not
inhibited the ANP from acting as a cohesive force on
broader national issues. Moreover, grumbling about
regional and ethnic favoritism has not dampened
ANP approval of Bendjedid's policies and perfor-
mance, according to Embassy reporting.
The Bureaucracy-Junior Members of the
Ruling Elite
The Algerian bureaucracy generally has supported
the ANP's control of the government. We believe both
groups desire greater pragmatism and less ideology'in
' Berbers are the indigenous people of North Africa, most of whom
submitted to Arab domination during the Arab conquests in the
seventh and eighth centuries. Although the Berbers converted to
Islam and thus share many of the social and political traditions of
the Arabs, they have retained the Berber language and maintain a
strong sense of their ethnic identity. The Kabyles of the Kabyle
Mountains east of Algiers are the largest of the Berber groups in
Algeria. Second are the Chaouias of the Aures range south of
Constantine; the M'zabites of the northern part of the Sahara
Region and the Tuareg of the southern Ahaggar Mountains are
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the Algerian Government. Thus, in the FLN party
congresses and Central Committee, the bureaucrats
cooperate with the military.
Unlike the Armed Forces, the bureaucracy-includ-
ing key civil servants and managers of state enter-
prises-does not have an inherently powerful political
base and could not on its own dictate the course of
Algerian policy. Rather, these specialists are influen-
tial because of their expertise. We believe, for exam-
ple, that Foreign Minister Ibrahimi is quite important
in determining foreign policy, yet he possesses no
personal power base and owes his position to Bendje-
did. Should leading bureaucrats diverge significantly
from the course favored by Bendjedid or the military,
it is unlikely they would retain their positions.
Although the ANP will remain the paramount power
in Algeria, we expect the bureaucracy's influence to
grow as Bendjedid implements a gradual devolution of
decisionmaking to local governors and managers of
state enterprises. Under the slogan "the right man for
the right job," Bendjedid has placed more competent
managers in positions formerly occupied by party
hacks. Bendjedid's emphasis on results over ideologi-
cal purity should allow managers to improve produc-
tion and administration so long as they adhere to the
broadly defined ideals of national independence and
socialism.
Berbers are represented in the bureaucracy in propor-
tions greater than in the general population, according
to the US Embassy, but we do not believe this affects
the political outlook of the technocrats. We believe
the bureaucracy is less cohesive than the Armed
Forces. As in the ANP, bureaucratic discontent tends
to focus on the slow pace rather than the direction of
Bendjedid's reforms. The bureaucracy's interest in
less dogmatic policies and its middle class character
suggest it will continue to support Bendjedid as long
as he promotes greater liberalization in government
and less austerity in Algerian society.
The National Liberation Front-Instrument
of the Government
The power and strength of the FLN today derive
almost exclusively from the military officers who hold
positions in the party. The functionaries who adminis-
ter the FLN have become steadily less powerful since
independence and under Bendjedid have had their
influence severely curtailed by a major party reorga-
nization in 1980. In the reorganization Bendjedid 25X1
transferred power to the secretary general-a position
he holds-and removed many leftist ideologues from
positions of influence in the party. As a result, the
FLN now serves mainly as a consultative forum for
Bendjedid and his military officers and a symbol of
the regime's legitimacy.
Once the most important body in the FLN, the
Political Bureau has lost its preeminence to the
Central Committee under the secretary general, ac-
cording to Embassy reporting. In his first two years in
office, Bendjedid, with the backing of the ANP-
bureaucracy coalition, stripped the Political Bureau of 25X1
its policymaking function, reduced its membership
from 17 to 10, and ousted opponents, such as party
coordinator Yahiaoui and former Foreign Minister
Bouteflika. The Political Bureau is now under the
direct authority of Bendjedid and has become largely
a conduit for decisions taken in the government or
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Since 1979 the FLN Central Committee has become
the locus of power in the FLN-again by virtue of the
military officers who staff it.
a coalition of moderate military officers and 25X1
civilian chnocrats dominates the 200-member com-
mittee, which usually meets only twice a year. Ac-
cording to the list of the Central Committee member-
ship provided by the Embassy in Algiers in 1981, 42
percent had military backgrounds.
In December 1983 the Fifth FLN Party Congress
reelected Bendjedid as its secretary general. He be-
comes the sole candidate for president in national
elections in January. We believe that Bendjedid and
the Army will continue to dominate the party and that
Bendjedid will be elected to a second term as presi-
dent. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that the
FLN preparatory commission charged with organiz-
ing the Congress is led by six men personally loyal to
Bendjedid, three of whom are colonels. As long as
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Bendjedid retains ANP support, we do not expect the
FLN to reemerge as an independent political institu-
tion. Although it may continue to express a more
dogmatic outlook in its official pronouncements, the
party will have little influence on Algerian policy.F-
The Regime and the Public
In our view, Algerians for the most part support the
current regime and probably would give Bendjedid
generally high marks for his performance. In contrast
to his predecessor, Bendjedid projects a personable
and lively image and appears comfortable in his
public role. The President frequently travels outside
the capital to enhance his popularity, but he has
avoided the personality cult characteristic of previous
Algerian regimes, according to US officials. The
President's photograph, for example, is not widely
displayed around the country.
Bendjedid has had to win over a public that, in our
opinion, all too often views the regime's primary goal
to be self-aggrandizement. Many Algerians believe
that corruption-practically a way of life in Algeria
today-has gone too far. Although we view Bendje-
did's anticorruption campaigns as mostly attempts to
eliminate rivals, several have been popular with the
public, but have done little to stem corruption and
graft. An aggressive anticorruption program would
probably be one of the most dangerous initiatives
Bendjedid could undertake
Bendjedid has made foreign policy changes that have
probably helped rebuild national pride. Bendjedid's
efforts to steer Algeria back into the Arab main-
stream and to strengthen its ties with the West,
especially with the United States, in our view, have
enhanced his image as an Arab statesman. Similarly,
his government's role in negotiating the release of US
hostages from Iran, acceptance of many Palestinians
after the PLO exodus from Beirut last year, and its
efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war have improved
Algeria's reputation internationally. Public reaction
to Bendjedid's initiatives toward improving relations
with its Maghreb neighbors, particularly Morocco,
has been favorable in part because it has opened the
borders to much-needed Moroccan agricultural prod-
A good indicator of the regime's growing confidence
in its public support is the reduced presence of police
and security forces throughout the country. In addi-
tion, Embassy reporting indicates that the human
rights record of the Bendjedid regime is better than
that of previous regimes, although political and civil
liberties remain restricted. This more relaxed atmo-
sphere suggests that the government and the people
are not at odds, nor, in our judgment, are there serious
tensions below the surface.
The Opposition
Bendjedid has sidelined his more prominent opponents
with a minimum of political disruption and public
attention. Leading leftists, such as former President
Ben Bella and Col. Tahar Z'biri-former Chief of
Staff under Boumediene-have been discredited by
the current regime but have' been treated mildly
compared with the harsh tactics used in earlier re-
gimes. Some have been forced into permanent exile,
fallen victim to charges of corruption, or been quietly
retired from public life, according to Embassy report-
ing. In our opinion, Bendjedid probably believes that
these forms of political punishment are more accept-
able to the Algerian public and essentially render
these once-powerful individuals irrelevant to Algeria's
rapidly changing society.
We believe disaffection among students, workers, and
Islamic fundamentalists is of far greater concern to
the regime than the lingering problems posed by
political has-beens, but here too Bendjedid has had
considerable success using accommodation when pos-
sible but delineating a clear limit to government
tolerance of criticism.
Fundamentalists. In our view, Islamic fundamental-
ists present the greatest problem for the regime. The
government has had some success during the past 20
years in monitoring and dampening the appeal of
religious conservatives. The Iranian revolution, how-
ever, heightened religious consciousness throughout
the Islamic world and has spurred a religious revival
in Algeria that has seriously concerned senior offi-
cials,
ucts.
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fundamentalist groups are small, fluid, and poorly
organized, Embassy sources report that they have
infiltrated university campuses and labor organiza-
tions, occasionally inciting violence between these
groups and security forces. After a series of violent,
fundamentalist-inspired demonstrations last year, the
government arrested about 50 activists, detaining
some highly respected members of the religious estab-
lishment and publicly warning against further funda-
mentalist activities.
We believe the regime will use force in those instances
when militants threaten public order. In our view, the
regime is not inclined to change the country's basical-
ly secular outlook, and few of its leaders are strict in
their personal Islamic practice. Nevertheless, they are
taking measures to ensure that their Islamic creden-
tials-a cornerstone of their right to govern-are not
seriously challenged. The regime maintains tight con-
trol over the national religious apparatus, which it
uses to strengthen its image and to monitor religious
expression in Algeria. In addition, the regime's public
rhetoric often incorporates Islamic themes.
Political Parties. Although political parties other
than the FLN are illegal in Algeria, a few manage to
operate clandestinely. The Communist party, called
the Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS), established in
1966, has an estimated 1,500 members, who operate
mainly through the General Union of Algerian Work-
ers and the National Union of Algerian Youth. Its
activities-confined to a very limited distribution of
pamphlets-probably have been tolerated largely be-
cause in 1971 PAGS recognized the FLN as the sole
legitimate party and has since then given it tacit
support.
The Party of.the Socialist Revolution, formed in 1962
and claiming to be a party of the democratic left, has
few members and little influence. Its primary purpose
is opposition to the Boumediene holdovers, whose
numbers have been rapidly diminishing. According to
Embassy reporting, it has been active only in the
capital and among emigre groups in Paris. Its best
known leader, Mohamed Boudiaf, one of the original
leaders of the revolution, is in exile in Morocco
according to Embassy reporting.
In addition, former President Ben Bella has gathered
a coterie of followers since his release from house
arrest in 1980. Primarily composed of former cronies
and operating mainly from France, where Ben Bella
lives, this group is generally older and espouses an
Islamic antiregime line, according to Embassy report-
ing. we believe 25X1
the current regime is paying c oser attention to Ben
Bella's connections with Libya and his recent endorse-
ment of Islamic fundamentalism. Although press and 25X1
Embassy reporting point to occasional contacts be-
tween Ben Bella and Qadhafi or fundamentalist
groups in Algeria, the regime is probably mostly
concerned that the 64-year-old Ben Bella does not
become an instrument for the unification of the
various dissident groups in Algeria.
Berbers. The Kabyle Region, which is predominantly
Berber, has historically been a center of opposition to
the central government. Kabyle Berbers played an
important role in the Algerian revolution, and a
number of them served in the liberation army. Shortly
after independence, Hoceine Ait Ahmed-who is in 25X1
exile-led an insurrection in the region against Ben
Bella and in 1967 staged an unsuccessful coup against
Boumediene. According to press reports, the major
urban and industrial hub of Kabyle country, Tizi
Ouzou, continues to be a center of unrest and antigov-
ernment demonstrations.
Berber unrest arises mostly out of what is perceived to
be the government's neglect and discrimination and
not from desires for regional autonomy. According to
Embassy reporting, Berbers believe they have not
received their fair share of government development
funds over the years. Even though Berbers are found
in almost every level of the Algerian bureaucracy,
they resent holding relatively few high-level positions
in the Armed Forces.
Organized Berber political interests have been repre-
sented by the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) since
1963 when Ait Ahmed founded the party. In 1981 it
was resuscitated during a heated confrontation be-
tween the government and the Berbers. Illegal and
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operating clandestinely or outside the country, the
FFS has had varying success in mobilizing Berber
support and is most active when Berber interests are
directly challenged, according to Embassy reporting.
The FFS appears to have significant support among
Berber youth and among emigres in France, who are
mostly Berber. It calls for greater economic and
political liberalization, use of French and Berber in
addition to Arabic (Berbers jealously guard their
language, preferring to learn French rather than
Arabic), cultural diversity, and a multiparty system.
Embassy reporting suggests that it may also be allied
or synonymous with the Berber Liberation Front,
which is based in Paris and allegedly receives finan-
cial support from the Libyans.
Bendjedid, like his predecessors, has tried to accom-
modate some Berber demands,' and the government is
generally tolerant of their public criticism. In general,
Berbers favor Bendjedid's move away from the hard-
line policies of the previous regime. Berber activists
have told US Embassy officials in Algiers that they
are pleased with government efforts to increase invest-
ment in the region, but group political consciousness is
at an alltime high so that lapses of government
attention become major issues. In our judgment, the
Berbers' desire to get a bigger piece of the Algerian
pie will remain a potential flashpoint in Algerian
society for some time.
Divisive Issues
Despite Bendjedid's political strength, several issues
could crack the current government policy consensus
or increase popular criticism of the government. F_
Economic Reorientation. Beginning in the early
1970s, Algeria worked to diversify and industrialize
its economy through large investments in heavy indus-
try financed with oil revenues. By 1979 the Algerian
leadership-faced with a rapidly escalating foreign
debt and only marginal progress in industrialization-
altered its development strategy. There has been a
noticeable change in investment policy, but it is too
' Bendjedid has appointed five Berbers to his cabinet-Minister of
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Selim Saadi, Minister of Educa-
tion and Basic Instruction Mohamed Cherif Kherroubi, Minister of
Heavy Industry Merbah Kasdi, Minister of Interior M'hamed Hadj
Yala, and Minister of Labor Mouloud Oumeziane-and Mohamed
Said Mazouzi, former Governor of Tizi Ouzou, as chairman of the
early to measure the long-term effects of this new
strategy on productivity.
Since 1979 Bendjedid has moved to reverse
Boumediene's emphasis on heavy industry by promot-
ing labor-intensive light industry and commerce.
Bendjedid has successfully begun to decentralize
many large state-owned cooperations, such as the
country's energy company, SONATRACH, give
greater emphasis to developing the infrastructure and
social services, and encourage private-sector activity.
This strategy generated considerable controversy in
the early years of the Bendjedid regime. Following the
removal from the FLN of prominent leftists and
opponents of Bendjedid, the debate diminished.
Nevertheless, economic performance is a key issue for
Algeria, and the success of the Bendjedid government
in part depends on the continuation of a good
economic record.
The real test of the regime will be how well it
manages Algeria's hydrocarbon industry under the
current difficult market conditions. We believe the
results have been good up to now. The performance in
this area will probably determine popular attitudes
toward Bendjedid's economic management, and any
serious misstep is likely to revive old arguments over
socialism.
In our view, both the ANP and the bureaucracy are
strongly behind the current economic course. Indeed,
some Army
officers are impatient with Bendjedid's deliberate
pace in opening up the economy. The ideological left,
mostly technocrats in the FLN, is the only outspoken
foe of Bendjedid's policy. They condemn the opening
to limited private enterprise as exploitative and inimi-
cal to their concept of social justice. In 1979 the FLN
party organ Revolution Africaine conceded the pri-
vate sector's greater efficiency but criticized it for
promoting exploitative enterprises and for fostering
"neocolonial dependency."
The government is well placed to quash political
opposition to its economic policy. We believe the ANP
and technocrats have a firm grip on the FLN Central
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Figure 2
Algeria: Investment Spending, by Sector:
A Shift in Emphasis
Hydrocarbons
I? Social
? Agriculture
Other
1970-73
1974-77
1980-84 Plan
US $7.5 billion
US $26.8 billion
US $104.3 billion
10.7
Committee. Legislation prohibiting Communists from
holding office in the mass organizations eliminated
the most militant leftists from the leadership of the
national labor union, and the rank-and-file members
are mostly apolitical. Possible opposition from the
student population will be blunted if Bendjedid's
strategy increases job opportunities. Finally, the gov-
ernment, true to its socialist principles, is sensitive to
demands for social justice. Bendjedid stresses that
Algeria's private businesses must remain "nonexploit-
ative," and he will keep tight control over its actions.
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Figure 3
Algeria: Dependence on Petroleum, 1982
? Construction and manufacturing
Services
Petroleum
Other
Managing the oil and gas industries that will largely
finance development in other areas will be even more.
challenging. In our view, any sharp drop in hydrocar-
bon revenues would seriously hinder the regime's
economic objectives. Moreover, it is unclear whether
the average Algerian-particularly more politicized
elements such as students and workers-would make
a distinction as to the causes of continued economic
hardships or a decline in the general standard of
living. Bendjedid's policies and particularly his efforts
to attract greater investment from the West would
probably be saddled with some blame, justified or not.
Western Sahara. Since 1975 Algeria has provided
diplomatic and military support to the Polisario Front,
which contests Morocco's annexation of Western
Sahara. Under Boumediene support for Polisario
demands for complete independence from Morocco
was consistent with Algeria's self-appointed role as a
leader of the Third World. Bendjedid's continued
support for the Polisario complicates his more moder-
ate foreign policy goals and desire for economic
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cooperation with Morocco. The Sahara war hinders
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement and thus remains
a stumblingblock to the "greater Maghreb" concept
that Bendjedid has been promoting since early 1983.
The Western Sahara issue has polarized recent OAU
summits, a development Algerians fear may lead to
increased superpower involvement in Africa.
On the other hand, Algeria's commitment to the
Polisario continues for reasons greater than ideologi-
cal commitment. Maintaining some control over the
guerrillas ensures that Libya and other potential
supporters, like the Soviet Union and Cuba, will not
support goals contrary to Algerian policy. Moreover,
we do not believe that Algeria is prepared to see
Morocco-its chief regional rival-enhance its size,
resources, and prestige by incorporating the Sahara.
Although we believe that Bendjedid would welcome a
political settlement of the conflict, he cannot ignore
those factions in Algerian political life that advocate
continued support for the Polisario. We believe the
Algerian Government over the years has been aware
of and sometimes involved in the Polisario's military
activities. This dual policy of seeking a political
solution while continuing military support suggests
that there is an internal debate in Algiers over its
Western Sahara policy.
The Algerian military would oppose any attempt by
Bendjedid to cut ties with the Polisario.
that support for the
Polisario is strong at all levels of the officer corps.
Embassy reporting over the years suggests that the
ANP officer corps has been less flexible than
Bendjedid on a possible political solution to the
dispute. Although we believe the officers accept a
negotiated solution to the war, they would resist a
settlement that did not recognize some form of Saha-
ran autonomy.
We do not expect the Western Sahara issue to create
a dangerous rift in the Algerian Government.
Bendjedid's cautious, consensual style of governing
ensures that he will not adopt a policy that alienates
the ANP leadershi .
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the Algerian Government to continue to assist the
Polisario, even at the expense of improved relations
with Morocco. Furthermore, should fighting escalate
in the Sahara on Morocco's part, particularly if it 25X1
threatens Polisario survival, we believe Bendjedid
would adopt a more strident policy to retain ANP
backing.
Arabization. The replacement of French with Arabic
as the national language grew out of FLN efforts
during the war of independence to unite Algerians
around a separate national identity, emphasizing
Islamic and Arab cultural traditions. As in colonial
times, however, French-style education is the prereq-
uisite for success in Algeria, and French is the 25X1
language of the political elite. Algerian-produced
French language newspapers have a larger circulation
in Algeria than do Arabic ones.
Although the government is publicly committed to the
Arabization of government, business, and education,
Bendjedid's actions suggest he gives priority to
improving government services and relieving the aus-
terity of Algerian life. These goals conflict in some
instances with rapid Arabization, which would signifi-
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racy and state corporations. In our view, the bureauc-
racy would be especially resistant to the elimination of
French.
The Arabization program is regarded differently by
the various components of Algerian society. Embassy
sources report that:
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? Leftists in the government view Arabization as a
means of breaking with the colonial past.
? Berbers see Arabization as undermining their dis- 25X1
tinct culture and language and degrading their
status.
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? Students, who are divided into pro- and anti-Arabi-
zation factions, depending on whether they have
received a French or Arabic education, closely link
Arabization to their employment prospects in the
tight Algerian marketplace.
? The general public, while not opposed to the pro-
gram, is much more concerned about housing, em-
ployment, and availability of consumer goods. F_
Recognizing the potential divisiveness of the program,
Bendjedid has tried to walk a fine line. Since 1981,
Berber has been taught at the larger Algerian univer-
sities, and this has significantly reduced Berber dis-
content over this issue. Because leftists are not suffi-
ciently strong to challenge the regime in the FLN or
in any other forum, Bendjedid has largely ignored
their demand that he push the Arabization program.
There has been no obvious or easy way, however, to
deal with the disaffection among students and youn-
ger workers who back the Arabization program.
Consequently, Arabization as a political issue is likely
to continue to feed tension.
Outlook
Bendjedid's regime seems secure for the near term.
His appointees are in key posts in the government, the
FLN, and the military, and his reelection at the party
congress in December 1983 was not contested. Al-
though some groups in Algerian society are disap-
pointed that neither the revolution nor Bendjedid's
economic policies have lived up to expectations, Bend-
jedid is more popular than either of his predecessors.
Moreover, Bendjedid's obvious sensitivity to military
concerns diminishes the possibility for serious friction
between him and this decisive element in the Algerian
power structure.
In our judgment, opposition to the regime will remain
fragmented and ineffectual for some time. Lacking
resources and popular leaders, the few existing dissi-
dent organizations will play only a marginal role in
Algerian politics. We cannot rule out, however, the
possibility of rogue elements, particularly in the mili-
tary or the FLN, attempting a coup or assassination.
If Bendjedid died suddenly, moderate military officers
would probably again carry decisive weight in the
succession and would select someone from the same
mold. Even if a new president assumed office in the
next several years, he would probably not significantly
alter Bendjedid's programs. A new leader would
probably adopt as his own the goals of a more open,
but still socialist society.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, the good prospects for continued
political stability in Algeria will help US-Algerian
relations. Barring a serious policy failure-for exam-
ple, an economic crisis or serious Polisario defeats-
we believe Bendjedid's secure grip on the government,
coupled with the political predominance of the Army,
ensures that Algerian policy will continue to be
pragmatic. We expect Bendjedid to pursue better
relations with the United States cautiously and delib-
erately.
Economic and commercial ties between the United
States and Algeria are likely to show greater and
more rapid improvement than political and military
relations. Algiers has some experience in dealing with
American business, particularly the petroleum indus-
try, and commercial relations with the United States
have provoked little controversy. We believe the
Bendjedid regime will seek contracts that further the
government's ability to achieve the goals of its new
economic outlook. Labor-intensive projects and a real
transfer of technology and skills will be of particular
value to Algiers. The pace and scope of US-Algerian
trade faces constraints, however, because of Algeria's
diminishing oil revenues and Bendjedid's aversion to
economic dependence on any one country. Since the
United States holds only a small share of the Algerian
market, we believe Algeria's quest for diverse eco-
nomic partners enhances the prospects for increased
trade with the United States.
Broader changes in Algeria's foreign policy have
created a confluence of interest with the United
States that allows for more lasting cooperation. As the
Bendjedid regime has become more secure in its
position, Algeria's foreign policy has been based
increasingly on traditional considerations of national
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Bendjedid meets with Pope
John Paul II during West Eu-
ropean visit in November 1983
as part of his efforts to encour-
interest rather than on the abstractions of revolution-
ary dogma. We expect Algiers in the coming years to
emphasize stability and regional cooperation over
ideological confrontation:
? In the Middle East, Algeria promotes Arab unity
and seeks to avoid debilitating and divisive confron-
tations in the region. The extent to which Bendjedid
can integrate Algeria into the Arab mainstream will
determine directly the extent of Algerian support
for Washington's Middle East policy.
? Strengthening the OAU and limiting superpower
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa are important
objectives of Bendjedid's African policy. On issues
like Chad, for example, Algiers will be critical of
US involvement but will seek political solutions
within the OAU to preclude the need for super-
power intervention.
? In North Africa, Bendjedid is pursuing greater
Maghreb unity, including the continuation of cor-
rect relations with Libya. Algiers, however, will
remain distrustful of close US-Moroccan military
ties and is not likely to endorse Washington's meth-
ods of dealing with Libya. We believe Algeria
prefers a closer consultative relationship with
Qadhafi as a means of containing him.
? Genuine philosophical differences-such as over the
international economic order, Western Sahara, and
North-South problems-will continue to precipitate
public criticism of US policy. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that these differences will not impede improved
bilateral ties with Washington in the long run.
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Algerian-US relations will move most slowly in the
sphere of military cooperation. Dependent on the
Soviet Union for the bulk of its military equipment
and technical training, Algeria is reluctant to endan-
ger its relationship with Moscow. Much of Algeria's
advanced equipment is relatively new, and Algiers
will continue to deal closely with Moscow to keep its
inventory operational. This dependence, in our view, is
likely to restrain criticism of Moscow and thus perpet-
uate whatever impression there is that Algeria is
Moscow's client. The confinement of this relationship
and the availability of superior Western military
technology, however, provide impetus to Bendjedid's
cautious efforts to diversify Algeria's military suppli-
ers. Algiers may turn to the United States for less
controversial military equipment, but we believe
Bendjedid will rely on Western Europe for any major
Western weapon systems he wishes to purchase.
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