KHAMENEI AND RAFSANJANI: RIVALS FOR POWER IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200110004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 3, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Khamenei and Rafsanjani:
Rivals for Power in Iran
Secret
NESA 83-10349
December 1983
Copy 3 0 8
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~? \ uirecrorare or
r\JJ Intelligence
Khamenei and Rafsanjani:
Rivals for Power in Iran
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from of the Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10349
December 1983
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Secret
Khamenei and Rafsanjani:
Rivals for Power in Iran) 25X1
Key Judgments The views of Iranian President Ali Khamenei and Majlis (Assembly)
Information available Speaker Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, two of the most powerful leaders in Iran,
as of 16 December 1983 strongly influence Iran's policies toward the war with Iraq, succession to
was used in this report.
Khomeini, the economy, and the United States. Khamenei and Rafsanjani
derive much of their authority from their close personal relationship with
Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, Khamenei, as President, controls much
of the government's administrative apparatus. Rafsanjani, as Speaker of
the Majlis, is in charge of the legislative arm of the government. 25X1
Not surprisingly, Khamenei and Rafsanjani are rivals for power. Neither is
of sufficient clerical rank to directly succeed Khomeini, but each wants to
be influential behind the scenes. Rafsanjani seems to favor Ayatollah
Montazeri, a more senior cleric who is currently the front-runner to
succeed Khomeini. Reportedly Rafsanjani hopes to manipulate Montazeri,
who is widely viewed in Iran as weak. President Khamenei, on the other
hand, favors rule by a three- or five-man council of senior clerics.
Khamenei reportedly hopes that such a council would dilute Montazeri's
power and limit Rafsanjani's ability to manipulate policy.
The personal conflict between the two men is aggravated by institutional
rivalry. Since early 1982 the office of the Presidency has been strengthened
by Khamenei, enabling him to begin consolidating his authority within the
regime. At the same time, the Maflis under Rafsanjani's leadership has
become an influential lawmaking body, and Rafsanjani has emerged as the
most influential personality in Iran after Ayatollah Khomeini. The two
have criticized each other publicly, and Ayatollah Khomeini has been
forced to intervene to limit their rivalry. He permits neither to achieve a
decisive advantage over the other.
In contrast to their differences over the succession, the positions of
Khamenei and Rafsanjani on other issues such as the war, the economy,
and foreign policy are similar. They both favor centralization of the
economy and have recently moderated their private positions on Iran's war
policy. They are both hostile toward the United States. They probably
favor a tolerant attitude toward the Soviets and closer cooperation with
Moscow on economic and military matters as long as there is no strategic
military understanding or massive presence of Soviet experts in Iran. Both
support the "export of the revolution" by means of propaganda and
subversion, although Khamenei is slightly less radical than Rafsanjani on
this issue.
Secret
NESA 83-10349
December 1983
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The rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani has important implications
for the future of Iran and, as a result, for US policy in the Persian Gulf.
We believe it is likely that the clerics, Rafsanjani, and Khamenei will work
out a mutually acceptable division of power after Khomeini's death, at
least in the short term, and that Iran's policies will remain much the same
as under the Ayatollah. A smooth succession is likely because no cleric will
defy Khomeini's written will soon after his death and all the clerics know
that an intense succession struggle could destroy their hold on power. A re-
gime influenced by Rafsanjani and Khamenei could moderate its foreign
policy stance slightly as the two men become more confident in their ability
to retain power and in their ability to work together. Eventually their
hostility toward the United States could lessen if they found it expedient,
but neither man is strong enough to alter unilaterally Iran's relations with
the United States. Relations with the USSR will probably depend on
factors beyond the control of either man such as Soviet support for Iraq
and for Iranian dissidents and Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
In the less likely event that the two men do not work out a mutually
satisfactory sharing of power, Iran is likely to experience serious political
turmoil. While the Ayatollah is alive, he can keep their rivalry in check.
Once he passes from the scene, however, their rivalry could threaten the co-
hesiveness of the clerical regime. Both men have longstanding ties to the
Revolutionary Guard, and both recently have begun to court elements in
the armed forces. If they and other leading clerics cannot reach a power-
sharing compromise, Iran could plummet into civil war and chaos,
threatening oil exports and providing the Soviets with an excuse to
intervene.
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Khamenei and Rafsanjani:
Rivals for Power in Iran F
President Ali Khamenei and Majlis (Assembly)
Speaker Ali Akbar Rafsanjani are two of the most
important people in Iran's clerical regime. Their views
on the succession, foreign policy, the war with Iraq,
and the economy have a significant impact on the
course of the Islamic Republic. Their influence will
increase after Ayatollah Khomeini dies or retires,
although we do not believe that either will succeed
him. Both are middle-level clerics, one step below
ayatollah and too junior to succeed Khomeini directly.
At present we believe senior cleric Hussein Ali Mon-
tazeri is the most likely successor to Khomeini.
There are senior clerics and revolutionary organiza-
tions outside the government whose authority and
influence at times exceed that of Rafsanjani and
Khamenei. Since early 1982, however, President
Khamenei has had some success in establishing gov-
ernment control over revolutionary organizations. Co-
ordination has improved within the government,
enhancing Khamenei's position as President. At the
same time, however,
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani
as emerge as the most influential person in the
regime after Khomeini, even though under Iran's
constitution, President Khamenei is the highest au-
thority in the country after the Ayatollah. We believe
this situation has increased personal conflicts between
Khamenei and Rafsanjani, whose relationship is
already aggravated by institutional rivalries.
Power Bases
Rqfsanjani. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, we believe, is an
ambitious and opportunistic politician who derives
much of his authority from his close personal relation-
ship with Ayatollah Khomeini. He benefits from real
or at least popularly perceived family relationships
with Khomeini.
uncertain whether Rafsanjani actually has family ties
to Khomeini, but he almost certainly plays on these
and similar reports of a close link to Khomeini to
increase his popular appeal. He is constantly working
to increase his power base so that he can continue to 25X1
be influential after Khomeini dies. 25X1
Rafsanjani's record of anti-Shah activity and his
imprisonment by the Shah give him excellent revolu- 25X1
tionary credentials. Rafsanjani was arrested in the
early 1970s for cooperating with the Mujahedin-e- 25X1
Khalq While in prison
he had contact.with some currently influential Irani- 25X1
ans, including President Khamenei,
During the
revolution, as a leader of a pro-Khomeini student
group, he was involved in organizing demonstrations
and distributing the Ayatollah's messages inside Iran,
Rafsanjani's role as one of the leaders of Tehran's
Friday prayers and his position as spokesman for
Iran's Supreme Defense Council give him important
forums to influence policy and public opinion.' During
the past 21 months Rafsanjani has led Friday prayers
48 times, far more than any other Iranian leader.
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oratorical abilities and his perceived lack of affiliation
view current events.
' Friday prayers are a primary tool in Iran for establishing direct
contact between the ruling fundamentalist clerics and the people.
At Friday prayer services throughout Iran, clerics deliver sermons
that are coordinated by authorities in Qom. They provide a political
and religious context in which the people are instructed on how to
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with extremist factions make him very popular with in the political climate. As spokesman for the Su-
the masses. His sermons show the full use he makes of preme Defense Council, he enunciates major changes
his abilities in addressing the thousands of Iranians in Iranian strategy in the war with Iraq and Iran's
who gather each Friday for prayers at Tehran Univer-
sity. He speaks extensively on economic and foreign
policy issues. His speeches tend to emphasize positions
he believes will please the crowd and reflect changes
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policy toward mediation efforts. Moreover, the Irani-
an media highlight his Friday prayer sermons and his
statements as spokesman for the Supreme Defense
Council, giving him wide exposure and spreading his
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views throughout Iran.
Rafsanjani has made the Majlis, a rubberstamp as-
sembly under the Shah, an influential lawmaking
body and another forum in which he can influence
events. Analysis of Majlis proceedings indicates that
as Speaker he controls the direction of debate and has
final review of legislation.
members who have expressed their
opposition by absenting themselves from proceedings
have found their seats filled by replacements chosen
in hastily called local elections. His duties in the
Majlis also give him access to important leaders from
all regions of Iran.
Rafsanjani helped found the Islamic Republic Party,
the only legal party in Iran, and is a member of its
Administrative and Central Committees. Lack of
press coverage of his party activities suggests he is not
active in party functions, but his membership gives
him further access to additional power centers. By
controlling party funds he has considerable say in who
receives significant party sitions
Rafsanjani has longstanding ties with the Revolution-
ary Guard, the regime's main internal security force.
He was involved in training and weapons procurement
for the Guard in 1979, shortly after the revolution,
Rafsanjani
supported the establishment of a Guard Ministry in
late 1982. The present Minister of the Revolutionary
Guard, Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, is a close friend of
Rafsanjani's~
His cousin is the director of the evo u-
Khamenei. Khamenei's revolutionary credentials are
similar to Rafsanjani's. He, too, is close to Khomeini,
having studied under the Ayatollah during the 1960s
in Iraq, He
also has a history tory of anti-Shah activity. He was
arrested in the early 1970s for aiding the anti-Shah
Fedayeen. He participated in propaganda activities
among theological students in Mashhad and was
influential in forming the ideological position of the
Islamic Republic Party, according to press reports. I
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Sources of Influence for Rafsanjani
and Khamenei
Assembly speaker
Rafsanjani
o Direct source
o Indirect source
Velayat-e faqih
(Supreme Religious Leader)
Ayatollah Khomeini
Supreme Defense Council
Islamic Republican Party =
Revolutionary Guard -
Cabinet
Intelligence
Much of Khamenei's authority derives from his posi-
tion as chief executive, which gives him overall control
of the government's administrative apparatus. As
President he is responsible for carrying out constitu-
tional laws and for organizing the relationship be-
tween the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of government. He also can veto bills and nominate
the Prime Minister.
Khamenei's previous positions as under secretary in
the Ministry of Defense and head of the Revolution-
ary Guard enabled him to establish close relations
with both organizations
Although Ayatollah Khomeini, as commander
in chief of the armed forces, controls the Iranian
Army, he is unconcerned with detail, and overall
control of the Army is exercised by President
Khamenei was reelected secretary general of the
Islamic Republic Party in May 1983 and won a seat
on its Central Committee but, according to Iranian
press reports, came in second to Rafsanjani in the
voting. Khamenei controls the Islamic Republic Party
newspaper, Islamic Republic, which he has used to
attack his enemies and advance both the regime's
policies and himself.
IKhamenei is a mem-
ber of a small group of Turkic-speaking Iranian
leaders who come from Tabriz and who control the
Islamic Republic Party.
Prime Minister Musavi-Khamenei, judiciary head
Musavi-Ardabili, Foreign Minister Velayati, and
revolutionary prosecutor Musavi-Tabrizi are also
members of the group.
Khamenei also has an important forum to influence
policy as Tehran's Friday prayer leader.' That he
succeeded Ayatollah Montazeri' as Friday prayer
'Ayatollah Montazeri holds some of Ayatollah Khomeini's author-
ity over the judiciary and Revolutionary Guard but holds no official
Khamenei some political advantage over Rafsanjani.
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leader indicates he was seen by Khomeini as a clerical
comer and that he probably has a better academic
record than Rafsanjani
He consistently attracts
much larger audiences than Rafsanjani does when
giving the Friday sermon
An assassination attempt in 1981, which
' Because of injuries Khamenei sustained during an assassination
attempt, he usually leads Friday prayers only on religious and
revolutionary holidays, which may explain the larger audiences.[
damaged his vocal cords, has reduced his public
speaking engagements but gained him the title from
Khomeini of Living Martyr in a nation obsessed with
martyrdom.
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Competition
We believe that the rivalry between the two men that
has developed since the revolution is mainly over
power rather than ideology. The competition is mag-
nified by a rivalry between the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government. Khamenei, at times, has
publicly accused the Majlis of hurting government
policy because of its slowness in passing bills. Rafsan-
jani has publicly complained that some of the bills
presented to the Majlis are poorly conceived.
Their competition is also manifested in their attempts
to control various security forces. Both leaders believe
that control of the security services will be the crucial
factor in determining influence after Khomeini dies,
Khamenei is trying to
consolidate control over all the Revolutionary Guard
components, which currently divide their loyalties
among the leading clerics. In July 1983 Khamenei
had Revolutionary Guard Minister Rafiq-Dust, who
is supported by Rafsanjani, fired because he dismissed
Khamenei-supported Guard Commander Rezai,C
The dispute was taken to
Ayatollah Khomeini, who "resolved" the problem by
reinstating both officials.
Khamenei and Rafsanjani are also maneuvering to
expand their influence and attract followers within
the Iranian Air Force
Khamenei has pushed for
increased benefits for the officer corps, while Rafsan-
jani has emphasized benefits for enlisted men and
noncommissioned officers. Former Air Force chief
Col. Hasan Monipur, reportedly a supporter of Kha-
menei, resigned last November probably because of ill
health. In the ensuing reshuffle of Air Force com-
manders, Col. Heydar Safari, reportedly a supporter
of Rafsanjani, was promoted to Deputy Air Force
Commander,
both men realize that Kho-
meini does not countenance public squabbling be-
tween key Iranian officials and are extremely careful
not to incur Khomeini's ire in this regard. F
their
respective militias have actually fought each other
after receiving conflicting orders from the two lead-
ers.
Succession Issue. We believe the power struggle
between Khamenei and Rafsanjani is centered on the
question of who should succeed Ayatollah Khomeini
and the form of the regime after he dies. Neither
Rafsanjani nor Khamenei is of sufficient clerical rank
to succeed Khomeini directly, but both want to be
influential behind the scenes,
In seeking political advantage they
take tactical positions on the succession issue that
often contradict their previous stands. Ayatollah
Montazeri has been presumed by Iranians to be
Khomeini's choice as heir. Khamenei and Rafsanjani,
while supporting the concept of a clerical monopoly on
political leadership, have been described
as both supporting and opposing Montazeri as
heir. Public statements by both men suggest that
Rafsanjani supports Montazeri, while Khamenei
favors a three- to five-man council of senior clerics
which could possibly be dominated by ayatollahs,
such as Meshkini and Musavi-Ardabili, from Azar-
bayjan, Khamenei's ancestral province. We believe
Rafsanjani supports Montazeri largely because he
believes Montazeri has Ayatollah Khomeini's back-
ing. Rafsanjani also hopes to be able to manipulate
the situation if Montazeri becomes leader.
Actions in January 1983 by the Council of Experts,
which is to choose a successor to Khomeini, suggest
that a compromise over the succession may have been
reached. The Council elected Ayatollah Meshkini,
whose views on the succession are similar to Kha-
menei's, as chairman. Rafsanjani, however, was elect-
ed as one of two deputy chairmen. In addition, we
believe Khomeini's will calls for a single successor
who should call on the Council of Experts for guid-
ance.
These two moves have established the basis for a
power-sharing arrangement. If Montazeri succeeds
Ayatollah Khomeini,
Rafsanjani will be able to manipulate the
situation in Tehran to check Khamenei's influence
while Montazeri is isolated in Qom. We believe
Khamenei, by virtue of his support for Meshkini and
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The course of the Islamic Republic depends to a large
extent on how the clerics manage the succession to
Khomeini. We believe Khomeini's will ensures a
smooth succession, at least in the short term, because
no cleric will be able to defy Khomeini's written
orders immediately following his death. The possibil-
ity of a smooth succession is also increased by the
establishment of the Council of Experts and by the
clerics' knowledge that their control of the govern-
ment would be threatened by an intensive succession
struggle. Political opportunism and the theological
and historical precedents that define clerical ideology
encourage compromise among the clerics.
In December 1982 the clerical regime elected an
83-man Assembly of Experts whose job it is to choose
Khomeini's successor(s). Under the Constitution, the
Assembly may select either one cleric or a council of
three or five clerics. The necessary machinery is thus
in place. Montazeri has been maneuvered into posi-
tions of responsibility delegated by Khomeini that are
designed to make him seem the obvious heir. But
Khomeini has also delegated similar responsibilities
to Meshkini.
Without Khomeini's overarching authority, there is a
chance that the clerics' disputes could become uncon-
tainable. No other cleric in Iran has Khomeini's
stature of unopposed authority, and Shiism has a
tradition of violent clashes between rival clerical
groups while one dominant faction is being replaced
by another. We believe such clashes could trigger
wider violence that would threaten the stability of the
Islamic Republic. Many clerics retain close ties to
his position as President, will retain enough power,
however, to balance Rafsanjani. We believe part of
the deal may involve elevating both Rafsanjani and
Khamenei to the rank of ayatollah when Khomeini
dies. Both are having religious studies written in their
name that must be accepted by the senior ayatollahs
before the two contenders can assume that rank. F_
factions in the Revolutionary Guard and to indi-
viduals in the regular Army. The organizations cur-
rently act as constraints on each other, and the
professional military seems less inclined than the
Guard to political involvement. If splits in clerical
ranks precipitated a breakdown in regime authority,
ambitious leaders in both the Guard and the Army
would probably attempt to align themselves with
their various clerical associates in a bid for power,
increasing the possibilities for a descent into anarchy.
We believe the grand ayatollahs may enter the suc-
cession process to modify the regime's ideology in
favor of curbing clerical involvement in running the
government. They have stayed in the background for
the most part since 1979, but recently grand Ayatol-
lah Shirazi, ayatollahs in Mashhad and Esfahan,
and possibly even grand Ayatollah Khoi have spon-
sored demonstrations against the government in Ira-
nian cities, according to the Iranian media. We
believe such activities, if sustained, would challenge
the activist clerics and would be especially threaten-
ing after Khomeini's death.
We do not believe the Soviets would become involved
in a succession process unless there was a total
breakdown in authority. While some leading clerics
may have ties with the Soviets, there is no evidence
that any would attempt to or could use Soviet power
tofurther their ambitions. A Soviet connection would
be the kiss of death to any cleric. His opponents
would use it as a major rallying point to remove him
from power.
Positions on Other Major Issues
The positions that Rafsanjani and Khamenei take on
other issues, such as the war with Iraq, foreign policy,
and the economy, appear similar if not identical.
Their views do not always accord with their radical
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Iraq invades, September 1980
Question of war and peace is up
to Khomeini, September 1980
Overthrow of Saddam is Iraqi
people's responsibility, October
1980
Iraqi offensive stalemates and
Iraq asks Turkey to mediate,
November 1980-January 1981
Negotiations for cease-fire out
of question as long as Iraq re-
mains in Iran, January 1981
Tehran agrees to receive Islamic
Conference, UN, and non-
aligned mediation plans
No negotiation with Saddam
under any circumstance. Ag-
gressor should be tried and pun-
ished, March 1981
Iran makes major gains, July
1981-June 1982. Khomeini
makes prowar statements
Peace conditions: (1) tribunal to
identify aggressors; (2) payment
of reparation, October 1981
1975 Algiers Accord valid and
should be implemented, Octo-
ber 1981
If enemy remains in Iran can-
not stop ourselves from pene-
trating Iraq. Reserve the right
to go anywhere, December
1981
Conditions for peace: (1) with-
drawal of Iraqi troops; (2) trial
and punishment of Iraq; (3) re-
storing Iran its upsurped rights,
January 1982
Most important thing is Sad-
dam and Ba'th be punished.
Will gain rights by force. Could
infiltrate Iraqi territory if
wished. If peace terms not ac-
cepted we have right to take
Baghdad but do not aim at en-
tering Iraq, April 1982
No cease-fire that does not con-
demn and punish aggressor.
Progress toward peace almost
impossible. Conditions for
peace: (1) unconditional with-
drawal; (2) punishment of and
admission that Iraq is aggres-
sor; (3) accept 1975 Algiers Ac-
cord, March 1981
So long as Iraqi troops in Iran,
accepting peace and compro-
mise will bring misery to Iran,
November 1981
Question of war damage and
punishing aggressor will not
prevent ending war once Iraqi
troops withdraw, December
1981
Peace viable only when not en-
couraging or rewarding aggres-
sion, January 1982
No designs on Iraqi territory.
Identification and punishment
of aggressor must be done by
world's wise men and peace lov-
ers, April 1982
Peace conditions now include
repatriation of Iraqi exiles, May
1982
Not concerned with money or
war damage but if Ba'th re-
mains even without Saddam, he
will press for reparations. Im-
possible that we will stay at
border. The way to Jerusalem is
through Karbala, June 1982
Iran attempts invasion, high ca-
sualties, July 1982
Invasion to stop shelling of cit-
ies, to get reparations, to open
road to Jerusalem. Iran needs
no mediation since conditions
remain the same, July 1982.
Invasion fails, August-October
1982
Reparations can be paid in in-
stallments, August 1982
We want to achieve our rights
in a way which will not make
millions of Iraqis homeless,
September 1982
Iranian units cross border, No-
vember 1982-January 1983
Mediation delegations should
not come unless they have
something new to say, Decem-
ber 1982
Iranian offensive, February
1983
Last decisive operation
launched. Period of grace
granted by Iran was construed
as weakness. Offensive will not
stop until Gate of War is
sealed. War has entered new
stage. Saddam not our main
enemy, the United States is. If
we stay on our border we can
still defeat Iraq, February 1983
Iran wants Saddam tried and
$150 billion in reparations.
Peace conditions now include
repatriation of Iraqi exiles. Will
remain in state of war until
reparations guaranteed, May
1982
Request that UAE use all its
efforts to stop war. Islamic con-
ference mission had no new
points. Cease-fire only when
conditions met, October 1982
We respect mediation efforts
being taken to achieve our
rights. We will go as far as it
takes to silence enemy artillery,
September 1982
Rejects Islamic Conference
Peace proposal, November
1982
We will not abandon conditions
for peace. Withdrawal of Iraqi
forces no longer main condition.
Main condition is Saddam be
punished. We cannot pay any
attention to Saddam or his pro-
posals, February 1983
Iranian people will never kneel
down to Iraqi-imposed war,
January 1983
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Public Positions on the War (continued)
Offensive fails, March-May
1983
Operations limited to avoid ca-
sualties; we are trying to refrain
from bloodshed. We have gone
as far as we had planned to,
March 1983
Martyrdom should be avoided
.... not the chief objective of
the war, May 1983
Khomeini makes prowar state-
ments, May-July 1983
Final solution is liberation of As long as demands not met we
the people of Iraq. We will in- will continue war. We should
tensify our resistance, June make Ramadan more blessed
1983 by increasing readiness to crush
enemy, June 1983
orientation, reported group affiliation, or social class.
Khamenei sometimes appears more idealistic and
dogmatic, but when necessary, pragmatism prevails.
Rafsanjani's positions appear to shift according to the
political climate.
War. Both men appear to be in general agreement on
Iran's strategy in its war with Iraq. Throughout most
of the war Rafsanjani and Khamenei have publicly
spoken against a negotiated settlement and repeatedly
warned the Arab Gulf states not to aid Iraq. Kha-
menei said in October 1981 that the war should be
seen as a jihad (holy war), and in February 1982 he
said the war could end only with the defeat and
humiliation of Iraq's President Saddam Husayn. Raf-
sanjani, in May 1982 and in February 1983, said the
war would not end until Saddam's overthrow and,
ongly sup-
In the spring of 1983, both men publicly moderated
their positions, probably as a result of heavy casualties
and growing popular disaffection for the conflict.
Khamenei's statements indicated support for reduced
fighting and possibly a negotiated settlement. Rafsan-
jani also made statements that showed increased
statements on the subject might appear.
concern for casualties and support for a reduction in
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urged the Gulf states to continue their mediation
efforts however intransigent and extreme Iran's public
Their positions shift, however, based on what they
believe Khomeini wants, and he made clear in late
spring 1983 that a negotiated settlement was unac-
ceptable, As a result, 25X1
Khamenei's and Rafsanjani's most recent public
statements have shifted again to conform with Kho-
meini's hardline position.
Foreign Policy. Both Rafsanjani and Khamenei ap-
pear in general agreement on foreign policy issues,
such as exporting the revolution and relations with the
Third World, the West, and the Communist coun-
tries. Both charge that international organizations
like the United Nations and the Nonaligned Move-
ment are under superpower influence. Rafsanjani
appears more belligerent toward the Persian Gulf
states, but both,
supported Ali Akbar Velayati's
appointment as Foreign Minister and his policies of
increasing Third World ties and trade relations with
the West.
Hostility toward the United States is a consistent
theme in both men's speeches. They view the United
States as Iran's principal enemy and blame it for most
of Iran's problems. In January 1981 Rafsanjani ruled
out good relations with the United States after he
was attacked by his opponents for not including the
United States in a list of enemies. Khamenei often
engages in anti-American tirades, sometimes giving
the impression that the only problem in Iran worth his
attention as President is the struggle against America.
Khamenei can be pragmatic, however, and has
favored trade with the United States for needed
military supplies. In mid-1979, as an under secretary
in the Ministry of Defense, he favored purchasing
arms from the United States,
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Khamenei and Rafsanjani on Relations With the
United States
"Our archenemy is the
United States ... we
will never tolerate
that superpower ...
the one that is at the
top of our list of
enemies is the United
States. "
"We have no plan
whatsoever to cooper-
ate with or get near
the United States. I
hope our government
will remain on this
path ... forever. "
"America continues to
be our enemy, and ac-
cordingly we are
America's enemy ... I
believe that this will
continue for a long
time. "
Both Rafsanjani and Khamenei have been accused
of being
pro-Soviet. Khamenei reportedly has advocated strong
ties with the USSR. He was called the "head of a
group of pro-Soviet Azarbayjani Turkic speakers in
the government" in 1982 by the
Western press. Rafsanjani in January 1982 said,
"Unlike the West, the USSR does not create any
trouble for us." Both men have been called Tudeh
sympathizers and then Tudeh Secretary General
Kianuri requested their
help in arranging the release of arrested party mem-
bers in March 1982. Rafsanjani publicly supported
allowing Tudeh members and their supporters back in
the universities in March 1982. Khamenei, however,
is currently accused by exiled Tudeh members of
being a rightist and allied with anti-Tudeh elements.
We believe that neither leader has been co-opted by
the Soviets. Both have repeatedly condemned the
USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan and are funda-
mentally dedicated to Islam, which has little in
Soviet-Iranian relations are at their lowest level since
the Islamic revolution in 1979. Open polemics be-
tween the two countries have become standard fare.
The Khomeini regime has arrested leaders of the
Tudeh on charges of spying for the KGB, closed the
offices of a variety of Soviet organizations in Iran,
and harassed the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The
Kremlin has swung its support in the war to Iraq and
has become less concerned about Tehran's reaction to
Soviet operations against Afghan insurgents near the
Iranian border.
As long as Khomeini remains in power, Soviet influ-
ence in Iran will be minimal. Iran under Khomeini
has become more dependent on Soviet and East
European trade and transit routes, but this has not
led to significant Soviet political leverage. Khomei-
ni's reluctance to deal directly with the Soviets on a
major scale is shared by most leading clerics in Iran,
including Rafsanjani and Khamenei. After Khomeini
dies, policies could moderate slightly if the Line of
the Imam faction increases its power. Close relations
between Iran and the Soviet Union while the clerics
rule, however, are highly unlikely.
common with Communism. They probably favor a
tolerant attitude toward the Soviets and closer cooper-
ation with Moscow on economic and military matters
as long as there is no strategic military understanding
or massive presence of Soviet experts in Iran.
Export of the Revolution. Both men favor exporting
the Islamic Revolution by means of propaganda and
subversion. Analysis of their public statements sug-
gests that, like Ayatollah Khomeini, both men see the
world in terms of oppressor and oppressed and advo-
cate dissemination of the revolution's social message
to non-Muslim countries as well as aid to "liberation
movements."
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Khamenei and Rafsanjani on Export of the
Revolution
Khamenei Rafsanjani
`Iran shall convey the "The export of the
voice of revolution to revolution is some-
the peoples of the thing that we cannot
world in every possi- prevent. "
ble way. "
"The question of unity
(against imperialism
and Marxism) is not
confined to Africa and
the Islamic
countries. "
Khamenei appears willing to moderate his position on
this issue, however, according to his public state-
ments. He has said publicly that Iran is against using
sabotage to export the revolution and that Iran's
support for liberation movements is mostly spiritual.
Khamenei stated in April 1982 that Iran wanted close
relations with Turkey, Pakistan, and the Gulf states,
but he has also called on the Gulf Arabs to overthrow
their rulers and establish Islamic governments. He is
a particularly active advocate of close economic and
political ties with Turkey. He publicly rules out
relations only with the United States, Israel, Jordan,
France, and Egypt. He is also a strong advocate of
close Sunni/Shia relations, and while calling on
Muslim governments to follow Iran's example, he
emphasizes Iran's desire for correct relations with the
Gulf states.
Rafsanjani has been less outspoken on exporting the
revolution than Khamenei, probably because it is not
a major issue for him. His record on other issues,
however, leads us to believe that he also would
moderate his position if he found it expedient to do so.
Economy. Both leaders favor centralization of the
economy and stress that priority should be given to
solving the country's economic problems. They favor
Khamenei on Muslim Unity
"We are friendly with Muslim and non-Muslim
states as long as they do not attack us. "
"The Islamic nation (Iran) does not regard its destiny
as separate from the destiny of the world's Muslims."
"Purity and brotherhood link us to our Sunni
brothers. "
"There is no difference between Shia and Sunni. "
"Iran seeks friendship, understanding, cooperation,
and peaceful coexistence with all the Persian Gulf
states. "
land reform, centralized supervision of commerce,
and centralized planning. Neither appears to favor
sudden, radical changes, however, preferring to use
bureaucratic and constitutional processes for change.
They also are usually pragmatic on the issues of
development, favoring foreign technical advice when
necessary and when using it does not threaten eco-
nomic independence. Rafsanjani favors an amnesty
for exiled Iranian economic experts to encourage their
return. Both favor employing and training Iranian
technical experts even if they are not fervently Islam-
Rafsanjani's
wealth he
owns large pistachio plantations-and his ties to the
bazaar and large landowners have led many Iranian
and Western analysts to conclude he opposes central-
ization and land reform. When land reform legislation
was first introduced in the Majlis after the revolution,
his statements indicated he was against land reform.
and
he opposed nationalization of foreign trade in Decem-
ber 1982. His recent public statements, however,
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Rafsanjani on "a Socialist Economy"
"Islam does not approve of poverty and great
wealth. "
"When the Hidden Imam returns, people will receive
to the extent they need and will contribute to the
extent they are able. "
"The high cost and unjust distribution of goods ... is
the last hope of the counterrevolution."
"Ownership of property does
misuse it."
indicate he now supports land reform, centralization,
and adjustments of wealth. We believe he has
changed his public position to curry political favor
with the party, government, and clergy and to main-
tain broad popular support.
Khamenei's position on economics has been more
consistent. He considers economic progress a major
goal: "Our most major concern is currently the econ-
omy." Development must be balanced, however, and
not depend on oil revenues or foreign imports. He
strongly favors industrial and planning centralization
and redistribution of wealth, and he apparently coop-
erates with Rafsanjani, at least some of the time, on
this issue. In March 1982 he praised Majlis coopera-
tion in government economic programs and budget
planning.
Vulnerabilities
The power the two men wield has created enemies and
resulted in attempts to curb their influence. Rafsan-
jani has been repeatedly accused of being corrupt
In addition, some lower level clerics have
accuse - him of being power hungry and an opportun-
ist. Despite his generally excellent contacts with the
bazaar, his reputation among some bazaar merchants
has suffered because of his alleged misappropriation
of funds, his practice of usury, and bribe taking,
His absence from the
two Islamic Republic Party meetings that were
bombed in 1981 killing most of the regime's top
leaders caused speculation that he was behind the
bombings to eliminate opponents
We believe Rafsanjani temporarily lost influence over
the Tudeh/Soviet issue in April 1983. Rafsanjani,
who has probably supported normal relations with the
Soviets and the existence of the Tudeh Party, was
several days late in speaking in support of the crack-
down. His clerical qualifications were questioned by
the Council of Guardians during this time,
and both radical
and moderate groups openly criticized him. He made
significantly fewer public statements for several weeks
following the arrests. The critical period has passed,
however, and he has reemerged as a major player in
Iranian politics.
Khamenei also has not escaped criticism. He appar-
ently has been admonished by Khomeini for disputes
with other officials. He also has been accused of
corruption although not
so frequently as Rafsanjani. Khamenei is more aus-
tere and scholarly. He enjoys a significantly better
reputation than Rafsanjani with Iran's religious lead-
There is no identifiable group that opposes both men,
although the four senior ayatollahs aside from Kho-
meini-Ayatollahs Golpayegoni, Najafi, Shirazi, and
Shariat-Madari-remain opposed to direct rule by
clerics and therefore at least indirectly opposed to
Rafsanjani and Khamenei.
opposition to both men by the
Line of the Imam group and the Hojjatiyeh,b but their
positions on issues are at times the same as the views
of these groups.
6 The Hojjatiyeh faction favors strict Islamic law, use of Western
technology to help the economy, limited clerical intervention in
secular affairs, and export of the revolution. The Hojjatiyeh opposes
major economic reform and a single successor to Khomeini. The
Line of the Imam emphasizes the more revolutionary aspects of
Iran's revolution and favors good relations with the USSR, a
centralized economy, and a single clerical successor to Khomeini.
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Khomeini's Position
Khomeini appears to try to balance Rafsanjani and
Khamenei, permitting neither to achieve a decisive
advantage over the other. Ayatollah Khomeini told
Khamenei to cooperate with Rafsanjani in late 1982,
In November 1982
President Khamenei publicly praised the Majlis
speaker. While addressing the staff of the Majlis
public relations office, President Khamenei stated
that Rafsanjani was one of the "exceptional personal-
ities of the country, a master of theology and politics,
a keen revolutionary, and farsighted." He also stated
that Rafsanjani was second only to Khomeini. Also in
late 1982, while speaking to Islamic Republic Party
members in Isfahan, President Khamenei called Raf-
sanjani an important member of the party.
With Rafsanjani apparently in ascendancy by the end
of 1982, Khomeini began countering Rafsanjani's
power by building up Khamenei. Rafsanjani was hurt
on the Tudeh issue during the spring of 1983 and,
probably at Khomeini's insistence, declared publicly
in May 1983 that "a vote for him (Khamenei) is a vote
for the Imam, the clergy, the Majlis. . . ." Khomeini,
in January 1983, praised Khamenei, saying "you
should not think you can find anyone in all the
world ... like Khamenei ... who is committed to
Islam and who is trying to serve this nation whole-
heartedly."
Outlook
While Khomeini remains alive, his ability to balance
Rafsanjani and Khamenei will probably keep their
rivalry in check. The rivalry will continue, however, at
times boiling over and becoming public. Khomeini has
made numerous speeches warning the clerics that
personal rivalries and ambition are un-Islamic and
should cease.
Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's differences appear more
personal than ideological, and they will probably keep
changing their positions and alliances depending on
their perception of the political climate. Rafsanjani,
weakened slightly by the Tudeh crackdown, will be
careful not to be caught off guard again. Both leaders
will seek to manipulate different factional groups,
hoping their views will prevail.
Implications for the United States
The rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani has
important implications for the future of Iran and, as a
result, for US policy in the Persian Gulf. If the
succession deteriorates into open conflict, there is a
strong possibility that it could turn violent. Both men
have links with the security forces, which could tempt
them to resort to force if their interests are seriously
challenged. Other factions would become involved,
causing a general deterioration of the security situa-
tion in Iran. This could result in a chaotic situation
that could disrupt oil exports and encourage Soviet
intervention. Rafsan- 25X1
such a struggle.
jani's and Khamenei's influence with the Revolution-
ary Guard and military is about equal, and we believe
it is impossible to determine which leader would win
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If, as is more likely, the succession is smooth and
Rafsanjani and Khamenei retain their positions of 25X1
influence, the regime's policies will remain much the
same. Some moderation is possible as they become
more confident in the regime's and in their own ability
to survive. Neither leader is strong enough to be the
determining factor in Iran's policies, but hostility
toward the United States could lessen if they view it
in Iran's interest despite their current public position.
Relations with the USSR could also improve, but we
do not believe either leader would argue for close ties,
and a basically nonaligned policy will be maintained.
Both men would probably push for a mediated settle-
ment in the war with Iraq, which would considerably
lessen the chance of hostilities spreading to the mod-
erate oil-exporting states in the Persian Gulf. Kha-
menei and possibly Rafsanjani would argue for less
aggressive export of the revolution, but neither would
stop Iranian meddling completely.
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