ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200050005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
in Algeria
Islamic Resurgence
A Research Paper
- t4
NESA 83-10316
November 1983
Copy 3 3 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Islamic Resurgence
in Algeria
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Office of Near Eastern and
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South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
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Comments and queries ar
directed to the Chief, Ara
e welcome and may be
b-Israeli Division, MESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10316
November 1983
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Islamic Resurgence
in Algeria 25X1
Key Judgments The rise of religious conservatism has caused the Algerian Government to
Information available adjust its religious and social policies and is a problem for the regime, but
as of 17 November 1983 we believe that Algeria's Islamic fundamentalists do not immediately
was used in this report.
threaten the government because they have no leaders who could organize
and direct serious opposition. Furthermore, the fundamentalists are out of
step with other opposition groups, which prevents them from uniting into a
single regime-threatening force.
We believe that the fundamentalist movement in Algeria stems primarily
from the frustrations caused by rapid industrialization, the failure of
socialism to solve economic problems, and the tensions created by compet-
ing Arab and French influence throughout Algerian society. The current
revival has also been fueled by a uniquely Algerian phenomenon of a large
segment of society seeking to reduce state control of religious practices.
Discontent caused by these currents has been given sharper focus by the
revolution in Iran and fundamentalist activity elsewhere in the Middle
East.
In our estimation, militant fundamentalists have had difficulty infiltrating
the military-the real backbone of the regime. They have their greatest
appeal among Algerian youth and students in their late teens and early
twenties, many of whom see the movement as an opportunity to articulate
their nonreligious demands. As many as 5,000 of Algeria's 70,000
university students have been involved in fundamentalist-related activities,
including clashes with police and antifundamentalist student. groups.
Despite the trend in Algeria toward religious conservatism, most Algerians
do not appear attracted to militant Islam. They have enjoyed the consum-
erism accompanying French influence and are not attracted to the ascetic
lifestyle advocated by the fundamentalists.
Members of the regime do not appear to be particularly strict in their
religious observance, but they are taking measures to ensure that their
Islamic credentials-a cornerstone of their political legitimacy-are not
seriously challenged. The regime has control of the national religious
apparatus, which it uses to strengthen its image and to monitor religious
expression in Algeria.
Secret
NESA 83-10316
November 1983
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The Algerian Government will probably continue a hardline policy,
resorting to force only when militants threaten public order. Earlier this
year it departed drastically from its policy of tolerance by using harsh
measures to dismantle what was perceived to be a budding fundamentalist
threat. The regime has not had to adjust any of its major domestic
economic development programs or foreign policy initiatives, nor is it likely
to be seriously intimidated by militants.
Efforts to improve relations with the United States are not likely to be af-
fected by the regime's attempts to cope with fundamentalists. Moreover,
Algerian officials would almost certainly provide rapid and complete
protection to US interests in Algeria, should they become targets of Islamic
zealotry
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Islamic Resurgence
in Algeria
The Historical Setting
In Algeria, as in many Muslim countries, Islam in its
most traditional form is showing renewed vigor.
the French colonial rulers
generally took a hostile stance toward Islam in Alge-
ria and restricted Islamic education, converted
mosques into churches, and sought to replace the
values and culture of Islam with those of France.
Reaction to this approach resulted in part in the
identification of orthodox Islam with the movement
for an independent Algeria. During the war with the
French (1954-62), adherence to Islam became a sym-
bol of national pride and social cohesion as much as a
personal affirmation of faith. The nationalist move-
ment began with this impulse, and the restoration of
Islam to its former place in society was an oft-stated
goal of the revolution.
We believe that since the war of independence, how-
ever, the Algerian Government has sought to weave
together the principles of Islam and the secular
socialist state, with the latter taking a clear priority.
political leaders have
used Islam as a rallying point for national loyalties
and a justification for modernization, while both
Western-educated intellectuals and Islamic scholars
have been encouraged to reconcile traditional Islamic
values with the development of a modern society. In
effect, the government has
tried to co-opt the powerful influence of Islam to
promote a fundamentally secular way of life, and the
regime has taken almost total control of the country's
religious institutions. Modernization is given prece-
dence over tradition, and the formal mechanisms of
religion-the ulema, religious books and pamphlets,
most mosques, and mosque-based social associa-
tions-have been turned into instruments of the state.
Algeria's historic development and distance from the
Arab heartland have allowed different Islamic prac-
tices to evolve:
? Algerian Muslims, like most North Africans, ad-
here to the Malaki school of Sunni Islamic law, one
of four and the first of the schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. Muslims from Egypt through Iran
follow the Hanafi school, and most Saudi Arabians
follow the puritanical variant of Sunni Islam known
as Wahabbism.
? Many Algerians follow the teachings of Islamic
mystics known as marabouts and erected shrines in
their honor. Both practices are scorned by orthodox
Muslims in the Arabian peninsula.
? Dietary prohibitions are not strictly followed, and
alcoholic beverages are openly consumed.
? Algerian Sunnis also differ from the Shias who
predominate in Iran because they tend to view the
time of Muhammad as the ideal society. On the
other hand, Shias, with their messianic tradition,
tend to believe that the "Golden Age"' lies in the
future and, in our opinion, are more likely than
Sunnis to accept a prophetic leadership advocating
revolutionary change.
regime. A less controlled religious establishment al-
most certainly would complicate, if not directly
threaten, the government's pursuit of a modern, pro-
gressive society.
Algerian leaders, in our opinion, have felt compelled
to exercise tight control because "restoration" of
Islam remains a cornerstone of their political legiti-
macy. Furthermore, questioning of their Islamic cre-
dentials would be viewed as a direct challenge to the
Despite government efforts to promote secularism in
daily life, we believe the trend in Algerian society is
toward greater interest in and practice of religion.
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The US Embassy in Algiers reports that over the past
several years attendance at mosques has increased,
more women are wearing traditional Islamic dress,
and observance of Muslim holidays has become more
widespread. The construction of independent mosques
by private citizens is also increasing rapidly.
The current revival parallels the heightened piety
throughout the Islamic world but also represents a
uniquely Algerian phenomenon of a large segment of
society wanting to move away from state control of
religious practice. We believe that the rise of funda-
mentalism over the past several years is part of a
struggle between popular Islam, that is, a religion of
the people, and official Islam, used by the state to
justify and obtain consensus for secular policies. In
our opinion, political strategy and religious tactics,
government rhetoric and Muslim vocabulary-until
now consistently intertwined in Algerian society-are
becoming differentiated. Popular Islam is being used
by fundamentalists to put pressure on official Islam.
President Bendjedid tolerated the resurgence until
Islamic fundamentalists began resorting to violence
last year to attract popular attention. Early this year
the President,
ordered security officials to dismantle what
he believed was a budding fundamentalist movement
that perhaps had even permeated the state religious
apparatus. According to Embassy reporting, the gov-
ernment's crackdown resulted in the arrest of about
50 activists, members of the official religious estab-
lishment, including the Minister of Religious Affairs,
and Algeria's most venerable religious figure, 85-
year-old Ahmed Shanoun.
Seeds of a Revival
Some 20 years after independence, Algerians general-
ly appear to be tempering their enthusiasm for revolu-
tion, socialism, and some of the Western values
associated with them. As the nation matures, a small
but vocal number of Algerians are seeking an indige-
nous ideology to supersede the alien secular socialism
that has failed to deliver its promises. In our opinion,
the tenets of traditional Islam are, in the eyes of many
Algerians, a more enduring, direct connection with
their own cultural heritage and with the rest of the
Arab and Muslim world and a more appealing guide
for living than the socialist ideology that has dominat-
In tandem with this search for a more relevant,
promising ideology, scholars believe that specific pres-
sures resulting from modernization have spawned a
militant piety among a growing number of Algerians
who advocate a radical change in social and political
life. In our view, this more militant fundamentalism
has been nurtured by a dichotomy between the rapid
industrialization program pushed by the government
and by the policy of Arabization, which has sharply
focused the extent to which Algeria remains a society
dominated by the French language and French mores
and values. The Islamic revival, following the pattern
of other religious resurgences, feeds on these stresses
with which normal routines-secular or sacred-
cannot cope. It is fueled by popular interest in the
religious aspects of Iran's revolution and by the
presence in Algeria of Egyptian teachers with a
fundamentalist bent.
Industrialization. We believe that rapid industrial-
ization, which was proposed as the only economic
course that could lead to economic independence, has
pressed the country into a Western secular mold but
has failed to deliver promised economic and social
benefits. The development of heavy industry-steel-
works, foundries, chemical factories, and refineries-
is bringing about the transformation of Algeria from a
traditional society to a Western-oriented technologi-
cal state. Scholarly journals and government statistics
show, however, that the drive for industrialization has
led to maldistribution of investment between industry
and other sectors, shortages of consumer goods, and
inflation problems. Moreover, the level of technology
insisted upon has often been beyond the capability of
the local labor force, fostering dependence on foreign
technicians and reliance on Europe as an outlet for
1 million Algerian workers-about one-third of the
active male population-who cannot find jobs at
home.
Embassy reporting suggests that industrialization and
its concomitant Westernized lifestyle have caused
tension between the emerging working class and the
traditional bazaar workers. As a result of rising wages
and shorter working hours, the Westernized industrial
ed society since.
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sector has more leisure time and higher consumption
than the bazaar sector. The reporting also shows that,
as more women are working and more girls are going
to school, the new working class is beginning to
question traditional male and female roles in society.
To the conservative Algerian bazaar merchants, the
new industrial lifestyle looks unacceptably progressive
and dangerous. the
bazaaris see the technocrats, politicians, and industri-
al workers as all adhering to the sane secular West-
ern views about culture, leisure, consumerism, and
money. The bazaar class is more comfortable with an
austere lifestyle where males and females are segre-
gated, industry is small scale, and there is a clear
separation between work and leisure-patterns they
consider sanctioned by tradition and the Quran.
Arabization. The policy of Arabization, which the
Government of Algeria has endorsed since 1975 to
build a national, anticolonial identity, has tended, in
our view, to deepen the fissure between the Western-
ized industrial and the traditional rural and bazaar
sectors of society. Arabization is exposing Algerian
students to their Arabic heritage, which makes the
students even more aware of the gulf between Islamic
traditions and the secular nature of contemporary
Algeria. The use of Arabic in university instruction is
largely confined to the humanities and social sciences,
whereas French is the language of instruction for
science and engineering. As a result, Arabic-educated
students find fewer and less lucrative job opportuni-
ties than those trained in French.
Islamic Fundamentalists
Conservative religious elements regularly have
pressed the government for the imposition of stricter
Islamic observance,
entering the political arena.
their most reknowned association, al-Qiyam,
was banned in 1968 in part because the regime-
choosing to focus on Islamic education, economic
development, and agrarian reform-believed that al-
Qiyam had gone too far in its attempt to seize the role
of guardian of pure Islam and government ethics from
the regime in power.
Islamic fundamentalists remained relatively quiet un-
til 1975, when they joined the nationwide public
debate of the National Charter, the drafting of which
was the first step in the preparation of a new constitu-
tion that was promulgated in 1976. Arabization and
adherence to Islam became central principles of the 25X1
charter, and since then the fundamentalists have
openly pressed for Arabization and demanded that 25X1
the state maintain Islamic values. By invoking the
National Charter and the Constitution,0 25X1
the fundamentalists have felt justified 25X1
in criticizing the government on other issues that they
claim have religious implications, such as the Family
Code and laws governing personal status.
Although specific fundamentalist groups like al-
Qiyam and the Muslim Brotherhood have been out-
lawed by the government, we believe that these groups 25X1
have successfully infiltrated Algerian society over the
years. the Muslim 25X1
Brotherhood penetrated Algerian society during the
early 1960s with the help of the Egyptian Govern-
ment, Muslim Brotherhood chapters elsewhere, and
private citizens. Al-Qiyam identified itself with the
Brotherhood and became firmly established at the
University of Algiers. it 25X1
continues to operate clandestinely under the name al-
Dawah and receives financial and political support
from a sister organization in Saudi Arabia. Offshoots
of this group, including the Front Islamique, the
Mouvement Islamique en Algerie, and the Takfir wa
al-Hijrah, have periodically been identified by the
Algerian Government. We do not know, however, if
these are separate movements or merely factions of al- 25X1
Dawah. 25X1
Algerian authorities are
concerned most with Libyan aid,
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They believe-with only marginal evidence- 20A]
that support from Libya is part of Qadhafi's effort to
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destabilize the region.
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the government is particularly wary that Qadhafi may
be encouraging fundamentalist activities through for-
mer Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella, who main-
tains close ties with Libya.
We believe that the militant movement has its broad-
est appeal among Algerian students and urban youth
in their late teens or early twenties. The movement
provides them a context within which their demands
for control of university life and employment pros-
pects can be expressed. Embassy and press reporting
indicates that as many as 5,000 students have been
involved in fundamentalist-related demonstrations at
the University of Algiers and its branch campus,
which has a student population of about 70,000.
Students from lower middle- and working-class back-
grounds-who do not have access to the French
education necessary to compete for the best jobs-in
particular probably believe that a more Arab Muslim
society would offer them better employment opportu-
nities and would reduce competition with their
French-educated counterparts.
By all accounts, the fundamentalist movement in
Algeria is not so pervasive as that found in Tunisia
and Egypt, for example. Even in the university, where
its numbers are greatest, it appears to be fluid and
poorly organized-its sympathizers uniting for a spe-
cific purpose and disbanding quickly thereafter. Ac-
cording to Embassy reporting, religious activists are
subject to intense police scrutiny and surveillance.
Despite government efforts to control violence be-
tween militants and authorities, clashes have been on
the rise since 1979. Demonstrations mostly on univer-
sity campuses around Algiers that have resulted in
arrests and several killings of both students and police
have been reported in the press. These incidents have
generally stemmed from student resistance to funda-
mentalist activities on campus rather than from vio-
lence against the regime. The most serious demonstra-
tions in May 1981 and December 1982 convinced the
regime that Algeria faced the same potential prob-
lems regarding Islamic extremists as other Arab
countries.
According to Embassy reporting, many university
students and faculty have been angered by fundamen-
talist harassment and activities that they believe
attract harsh security measures that interfere with
their daily routine and limit normal access to the
university mosque. For example, in November 1982
the press reported that fundamentalists at the Ben
Aknoun campus in Algiers confronted an opposition
group that had gathered to counter fundamentalist
efforts to control elections for student representation
on a university committee. One student died and 10
were injured after security forces arrived on the scene.
Several days later students and faculty boycotted
classes in protest against the death of the student and
the general lack of security against fundamentalists.
In our estimation, the military-the real backbone of
the regime-has not been seriously penetrated by
fundamentalists. According to the US defense attache
in Algiers, officers are screened rigorously to the point
that even fundamentalist leanings among family
members are grounds to relegate an officer to reserve
commission status. Army officers are probably the
most privileged sector of Algerian society, and, in our
view, they would be unsympathetic toward a move-
ment that threatened their status.
Among advocates of a return to stricter adherence to
religious values are those with conservative religious
views who primarily seek a restoration of Islam in
daily life and militant fundamentalists who call for a
radical change in the social and political structure of
the country. Although both groups want many of the
same changes, such as the prohibition of alcohol and
the right to pray during work hours, their goals and
their approach to effecting change differ-conserva-
tives seek personal piety and the militants want
structural changes in society. We believe that conserv-
ative activists prefer. working with the government-
controlled religious apparatus and are appeased by
the accommodations they have extracted from the
government, whereas the militant fundamentalists are
willing to take a belligerent course.
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President BendJedid and high-
level party members attend the
Friday prayer at the Grand
Material published by the militant fundamentalists
shows that they have no unique doctrine but advocate
a variety of ideas:
? An Islamic society akin to the Libyan model.
? The meshing of Islam and socialism, citing Iran as
an example.
? The formation of an Islamic government.
? The purification of society by eliminating coeduca-
tion in primary schools and instructing girls 12 or
older separately.
? Prohibiting alcoholic beverages.
? Total rejection of Western values.
State Monopoly of Religious Institutions
In our view, the current regime, including Bendjedid,
is not inclined to change its basically secular outlook,
and few of its leaders strictly follow Islamic practices
themselves. US officials who deal regularly with high-
level Algerian officials report that alcohol is readily
available at official functions and at officers' clubs,
and many Algerians still look to Europe, especially
Paris, for the latest trends. In general, most officials
prefer to speak French even among themselves, par-
ticularly when discussing professional matters. When
Bendjedid first became President, he had difficulty
giving a speech in Arabic but through study now
appears comfortable in both languages. In looking for
Some members of the cabinet have good Islamic
credentials, according to Embassy reports, and we
believe they may advocate a more religious stance
during policy discussions. For example, the Minister
of Religious Affairs has traditionally been chosen
because of his close ties with the Islamic and political
establishments:
? Earlier this year Minister of Religious Affairs
Abderrahmane Chibane was temporarily detained
as part of the government's crackdown on funda-
mentalists. We suspect that his close identification
with certain conservative religious issues and his
apparent hesitation in dealing forcefully with ex-
tremists made Bendjedid question his loyalty.
? Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed. Taleb Ibrahimi,
whose stepfather was a religious leader, retains
strong ties to the Islamic religious community. He
does not appear to have a fundamentalist
orientation.
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little detailed information.
According to the Constitution and decrees promulgat-
ed in 1980, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is
responsible for the administration of religious institu-
tions, the extension of Quranic education, the develop-
ment of Islamic studies, and the explanation and
dissemination of "socialist principles embedded in
social justice-one of the essential elements of Islam."
In addition, the Ministry is responsible for supervising
the education of the mosques' personnel. Algerian
Government data suggest that there are about 5,000
public mosques with an equal number of people in
charge and a few private mosques for which there is
in Algeria is the Islamic Superior Council,
The most politically important religious organization
Presided over by the Minister of
? Minister of Justice Boualem Baki maintains con-
tacts with Islamic traditionalists.
? Minister of Culture Abdelmajid Meziane, a respect-
ed scholar and former head of the University of
Algiers, was educated at the Institute of Higher
Islamic Studies in Rabat.
On balance, however, we believe that these cabinet
members would not publicly challenge Bendjedid's
policies or vigorously lobby for more conservative
religious practices.
Except for some private mosques, the entire religious
apparatus has been in the hands of the state since
independence; most imams and leaders of the reli-
gious organizations and schools are appointed by the
government. Each regime since independence has
used the apparatus to strengthen its Islamic creden-
tials and control religious expression. The state reli-
gious establishment, in our view, has tended to sup-
port the regime's policies over the years.
jedid's policies.
Religious Affairs, this government-appointed body is
charged with the official interpretation of Islamic
doctrine. Its political strength is derived from the
government's need to interpret Islam to justify Bend-
The state uses various instruments to disseminate
official guidelines on doctrinal matters involving reli-
gion. In addition to the 715 Islamic social groups
(Jam'iyya Islamiyya) under the aegis of the Ministry
of Religious Affairs,
the most effective forums are the Seminars on Islamic
Thought and certain government-controlled periodi-
cals. The government uses the Seminar on Islamic
Thought, an annual gathering of theologians, philoso-
phers, and politicians, to promote its own interpreta-
tion of Islam. AI-Asala and AI-Risala (mainly for
children)--the only Islamic reviews permitted in Al-
geria-spread the official view regarding theology
and law, particularly as they relate to current prob-
lems and events. The Ministries of Culture, Informa-
tion, Justice, and Higher Education and Scientific
Research are also involved in formulating and dissem-
inating the government's line on Islam through radio
programing, television, book publications, films, and
cultural events.
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A mosque near Ghardaia in the
M'zab region of the northern
central Sahara. One of the
smallest Berber population cen-
ters, the M'zab is known for the
Kharidiite refugees, a small,
reclusive Islamic sect, who in
the 10th century fled the
Shiism imposed by the Fatimid
dynasty to establish a theocrat-
ic kingdom. The absence of
structural or ornamental en-
hancements of the mosques is a
reflection of M'zabite society
Government Reaction
Embass sources indicate that the
Algerian Government takes seriously the need to
respond to some demands of religious conservatives.
The state has tried to demonstrate its orthodoxy and
has given proof of its respect for Muslim tradition in a
number of ways. The official day of rest was changed
to Friday in 1976 to correspond with tradition. The
Family Code is under review again to comply more
with demands from conservative activists and the
militant fundamentalists. Bendjedid's recent anticor-
ruption campaign, although largely designed to check
his rivals, has been packaged to apply Quranic princi-
ples to government personnel. The government also
recently declared its intention to strengthen religious
education by promising to open about 160 Quranic
schools by 1986.
the government be-
lieves that the poor quality of state imams (prayer
leaders) is a major factor in the spread of private
Islam and the diminution of its control over religious
ideas. Government officials publicly admitted in Jan-
uary 1981 that three-fifths of the state imams were
not qualified to comment on the Quran and Sunna
(deeds and statements of the Prophet). As a remedy
the government is making various attempts to up-
grade the education of its imams in the hope they will
regain control of religion. For example, a central
postgraduate institute and new Islamic institutes for
each province have been created. Thus, students will
no longer have to go abroad to get a diploma, nor will
they be so easily exposed to "reform" ideas.
Bendjedid is taking other measures to diffuse the
potential appeal of fundamentalism by:
? Deemphasizing the contributions of former Presi-
dent Boumediene and elevating revolutionary heroes
whose religious credentials are more acceptable to
the fundamentalists.
? Constructing new state mosques.
? Stressing publicly the attention to Islam given by his
own administration.
Furthermore, a campaign is under way to generate
support among the intellectual elite for the govern-
ment's orthodoxy and method for dealing with Islamic
extremists. Arabic-speaking intellectuals who have
generally taken a backseat to their French-speaking
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counterparts are being promoted as Algeria's new
cultural leadership. Hoping to appear more open-
minded, the Bendjedid regime
has permitted well-known Islamic theorists and schol-
ars to publish books that deviate slightly from the
further diminish their position in society. The funda-
mentalist movement's threat to the regime is further
reduced by an effective security network that closely
monitors the militants.
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Another tactic of the regime has been to be surpris-
ingly open in promoting its policy toward fundamen-
talists and extremists, particularly regarding the use
of force. Government leaders have repeatedly warned
that Islamic extremists should not mistake patience
and tolerance for weakness, implying that the regime
will use whatever means necessary to deal with funda-
mentalist activity. The state-controlled newspaper,
EI-Moudjahid, has given widespread and generally
accurate coverage of the violent demonstrations and
the subsequent arrests that took place late last year.
We believe the government probably hopes that, by
making a public example of those involved in religious
activities against the regime, they will discredit the
extremists and discourage the appeal of fundamental-
Since the crackdown last year, we have not seen any
fundamentalist-related disturbances. In our view,
Bendjedid's hardline policy has diffused the move-
ment at least on the surface and for the short term.
We believe that, as in other Arab countries, the
underlying causes of fundamentalism in Algeria have
not been sufficiently resolved by the regime to have
eradicated the problem.
Outlook
Although Islamic fundamentalists will probably gain
appeal among Algeria's students and urban youth-
who have identified more closely with fundamentalist
demands in the past-we believe that they are not a
serious threat to the regime at this time. The funda-
mentalist movement suffers from a lack of leadership,
without which it has no clear strategy for political
action. Furthermore, the fundamentalists appear to be
at odds with Algeria's other opposition groups. They
are the ideological archenemy of the clandestine
Communist Party, and they are perceived by the
Berbers-already politically and socially alienated
from the Arab majority-as a movement that would
In our view, the lack of sympathy with fundamentalist
ideals by a majority of Algerians is the greatest
deterrent to the spread of the movement. We believe
Algerians, in general, are more attracted by consum-
erism than by the ascetic lifestyle espoused by the
fundamentalists. Moreover, most Algerians support
Bendjedid's regime and are confident of its ability to
govern Algeria. Algerians may gravitate toward more
conservative religious practices, but this seems to be
more a reflection of personal preference than a desire
to seriously alter the country's political and social
order.
In our opinion, however, as long as the Bendjedid
government remains unresponsive to the root causes
of social tensions-and most specifically the disloca-
tions resulting from the industrialization and Arabi-
zation programs-there will be criticism and occa-
sional violence by Islamic extremists.
Implications for the United States
We believe that the surge of Muslim activism in
Algeria will not interfere with the current trend
toward improved US-Algerian relations.' The issue of
Islamic fundamentalism, in our opinion, has not
reached the level-of heated national debate and
certainly has not become a factor in shaping Algeria's
foreign policy. The government has felt secure enough
in its policy toward fundamentalism to take on such
major changes in foreign policy as improving ties with
the United States. Algeria's efforts as a broker be-
tween the United States and Iran to end the hostage
crisis indicate, in our analysis, that the government
feels confident about its own Islamic credentials.
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Washington, however, will be dealing with a govern-
ment that wishes for a variety of reasons-including
its concern over Islamic resurgence-not to appear to
be a client or supplicant of the West or a superpower.
Although the recent visit by the US Vice President to
Algeria was given high visibility, Algiers will contin-
ue, as it did during the visit, to characterize its
broadening relationship with the United States as an
outgrowth of its responsibilities as a leader of the
nonaligned movement.
Events like the Iranian revolution and Sadat's assassi-
nation at the hands of fundamentalists no doubt have
brought home to the Algerian Government the dan-
gers of unchecked, rampant Islamic activism. As a
result, we expect the Algerians to be more sympathet-
ic to moderate Arab concerns and to pursue policies
compatible with US concerns regarding the spread of
fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world.
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