IRAQ: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS DETER RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200040003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 Intelligence
r -1.7
Iraq: Social and
Political Factors Deter
Religious Revival
A Research Paper
NESA 83-10310
November 1983
Copy 3 18
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Religious Revival
Iraq: Social and
Political Factors Deter
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Ana ysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 83-10310
November 1983
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Iraq: Social and
Political Factors Deter
Religious Revival
Key Judgments We believe that Iraq exhibits many of the signs of stress-inducing cultural
Information available disarray-economic downturn, rapid cultural change, and an unresolved
as of I November 1983 war-that have led to religious revivalist movements in other parts of the
was used in this report.
Muslim world. Several factors, however, principally the lack of charismatic
fundamentalist leadership and the division of the country's population into
different religious communities (roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and
Shias) will work against the development of a strong fundamentalist
religious movement in Iraq in the foreseeable future.
President Saddam Husayn's policies will continue to deter the rise of a
prophetic religious leader who could guide a regime-threatening funda-
mentalist movement:
? He appeases potential fundamentalist opposition, particularly the Shias,
by pouring money into the development of their neighborhoods, cities,
and religious shrines.
? He ruthlessly suppresses those individuals or groups whom he considers a
threat to his regime.
? He advances his cult of personality to maximize his appeal to all Iraqis.
Many, particularly the poor, ascribe to Saddam the charisma that is
commonly associated with religious prophets.
? He alters Ba'thist policies to appeal to the full range of Iraqi society-
Shias as well as Sunnis, Kurds as well as Arabs.
? He challenges Khomeini's Islamic rhetoric in order to blunt the attrac-
tion of Iran's radical policies among Iraq's Shias.
If the outlook for the war and the economy fails to improve, political and
cultural disarray is likely to increase, which will, in turn, translate into
more Islamic activity, especially among the disadvantaged Shias. Increased
fundamentalist fervor in the society would force Saddam, or a successor, to
modify government policies to appease fundamentalist critics. A greater
fundamentalist influence in the government would result in Washington
increasingly interacting with a government less sympathetic to Western
policies.
Secret
Secret
NESA 83-10310
November 1983
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Iraq: Social and
Political Factors Deter
Religious Revival
Iraq shows many of the signs of cultural disintegra-
tion-a stalemated war, economic decline, the pres-
ence of large numbers of foreigners, rapid cultural
change, and a repressive government-that have ac-
companied the birth of fundamentalist religious move-
ments in the Middle East and elsewhere. A closer
look-coupled with behavioral science theories that
explain religious revivals-suggests, however, that key
factors are lacking for a full-scale religious revolution
to take place. Chief among the missing elements are a
religiously and ethnically homogeneous population
and a prophetic religious leader who could rally
support against the secular rule of President Saddam
Husayn and his Ba'thist regime. The first of these will
not change appreciably; the second factor-the miss-
ing prophet-is, we believe, a key to the future of
fundamentalism in Iraq.
The Rise of Fundamentalism:
The Behavioral Science Theory
The First Step: Cultural Disintegration.
Following Khomeini's rise to power in Iran, behavior-
al scientists as well as intelligence analysts have
focused on identifying the key factors giving rise to
fundamentalist religious movements in the Middle
East and elsewhere. They theorize that cultural disin-
tegration frequently leads to psychological stress and
aberrant behavior in groups as well as in individuals
because the group's cultural models of how the world
should work-believed to be immutable truth-no
longer relate to changing political, social, or economic
circumstances. They further believe that outbreaks of
religious fundamentalism are almost always charac-
teristic of threatened or disintegrating societies. In the
Muslim world, for example:
? Many Egyptians who were surprised by Egypt's
crushing defeat by Israel in 1967 rationalized the
loss through religious reasoning by blaming the
defeat on Egypt's abandonment of traditional Is-
lamic values rather than on the failure of military
planning or implementation.
? Pakistan's longstanding inability to establish a na-
tional identity for its ethnically diverse population
set the stage for President Zia's efforts to unify the
country through "Islamization."
? Tunisia's small but growing fundamentalist move-
ment arose from the political and economic ferment
in the late 1960s.
? Morocco's incipient fundamentalist movement is
being nurtured by a depressed economy, high urban
unemployment, and rising expectations among the
growing youthful population
The Second Step: Arrival of the Prophet
According to behavioral science theory, the rise of a
prophetic religious leader is the second step in the
formation of a religious fundamentalist movement.
An environment of cultural disarray provides the
necessary setting for an individual, claiming to have
received divine revelation, to assert that he can right
the wrongs of society, channel its anger, offer hope to
its people, and lead them to a better future. Such a
prophet exhibits certain traits:
? He believes that he has been sent on a divinely
inspired mission (and is considered to be divine by
his followers).
? In Iran, large-scale migration to Tehran, which was
a byproduct of increased oil revenues and the Shah's
industrial development and land reform policies, con-
tributed to cultural instability and provided a willing
audience for Khomeini's Islamic revolutionary
rhetoric.
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Figure 1
Rise of Religious Fundamentalism
Events leading to cultural
disarray
-Iran-Iraq war -
-Economic decline
-Rapid cultural change
Deterrents to rise of pro-
phetic leadership and uni-
fied Islamic revival
-Directs reactions - Religious revival
to stress
-Offers hope to alleviate
stress
sectarian and ethnic differences
-Saddam's policies of appeasement and terror
Saddam's cult of personality
-Ba'thist ideology an alternative to fundamentalism
-Backlash of Iranian revolution
? He believes his value system is under attack, often
by a conspiracy of outsiders.
? He has no doubt in the absolute authenticity or
superiority of his values.
? He is intolerant of all other beliefs.
? He can mirror the anxieties of society, articulate its
wishes, and communicate his mission to a willing
audience.
Historically, most individuals who claim to be proph-
ets fail to rally wide support. Behavioral scientists
believe they fail because:
? Their teachings do not fit existing cultural patterns.
? They make claims, such as the imminent death of
enemies, that lack credibility.
? They aim their message at a narrow segment of
society.
? Their revelation contradicts the established religious
organization or previous sacred revelations.
We believe that Iraq shows some of the signs of
political, social, and economic disarray that have led
to fundamentalist eruptions in other Muslim coun-
tries, but it lacks others-including a religiously
homogeneous population and the presence of a charis-
matic religious leader-that would provide the impe-
tus for a religious-based revolution. Key characteris-
tics that favor more fundamentalist activity in Iraq
are:
? It is embroiled in a long, stalemated war.
? Iraqis are feeling the hardships of the war-sapped
economy.
? It has undergone rapid cultural change because of
rapid urbanization, the influx of foreigners, and
government policies.
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Stalemated War With Iran
As the war drags on, we believe that mounting
frustration among Iraqis increases the likelihood that
they will be receptive to a prophetic individual who
questions the righteousness of the war and President
Saddam Husayn's regime, which has become closely
linked with it. According to CIA estimates, by mid-
1983 the war had resulted in an estimated 50,000 to
60,000 Iraqi soldiers killed, at least 200,000 wounded,
and as many as 50,000 taken captive by Iran. In a
nation with a total population of about 14 million, the
war has personally affected nearly everyone through
the loss of a friend or relative.
Thus far neither Saddam nor Iraq's secularism is
being directly blamed for the war casualties. Even
though faithful Iraqi families probably are comforted
by their belief that their sons have died as martyrs
and are placated by the regime's liberal compensation
for their loss, we believe that these mystical and
monetary compensations will not work indefinitely
and that continued casualties eventually could height-
en the appeal of religious revivalist rhetoric.
Economic Decline
According to press and US Interest Section reporting,
Iraq has been forced to adopt economic austerity
measures to cope with the revenue shortfalls caused
by the rapid decline in Iraq's oil revenues from $25
billion in 1980 to $9.5 billion in 1982 and a concomi-
tant downturn in the entire economy:
? Raising income taxes.
? Cutting back economic development programs.
? Canceling almost all new contracts not related to
defense or petroleum programs.
? Postponing work on several construction projects
that were under way.
? Restricting sales of consumer goods at state retail
stores.
? Slowing the sale of luxury imported goods.
Escalating inflation, now approaching 40 percent, is
causing a shortage of consumer goods, according to
press and US Interest Section reporting. Although
staples and other essential items are in stock, fresh
fruits, vegetables, and other perishables are expensive.
Gasoline is in short supply, lines at service stations are
long, and spare parts for many vehicles are unavail-
able.
If the war continues to sap the economy, we believe
that some dissatisfied Iraqis could follow the pattern
of Egypt's Muslim militants who asserted that eco-
nomic stagnation was linked to a betrayal of Islamic
traditions. Saddam, with mixed success, according to
press reporting, has tried to exploit hardship to pro-
mote patriotic zeal through programs such as the
collection of gold jewelry from Iraqi women to help
fund the war effort.
Rapid Cultural Change
We believe that the rapid cultural change caused by
urbanization, the increased presence of foreigners, 25X1
and by Ba'thist secular policies has the potential for
creating significant social and psychological stress
which, in turn, could set the stage for a prophetic call
for a new order that would revive the perceived
stability of the past.
Urbanization. We believe that in Iraq, as in many
other parts of the Middle East, rapid urbanization
creates great stress in traditional society. In other
Middle Eastern cities, Cairo and Tehran, for example, 25X1
sociological studies of jailed Muslim extremists indi-
cate that recent migrants from the rural areas, partic-
ularly the youth, have been the group most susceptible
to Islamic revivalist rhetoric and the focus of discon-
tent and dissension.
Baghdad, which has received large-scale migrations
from the countryside since the late 1960s, has devel-
oped the same problems-crowding, poor housing,
lack of services-that, according to our analysis, have
contributed to the support for Islamic fundamentalist
movements in other Middle Eastern cities. Baghdad's
population, which, according to our estimates based
on Iraqi census data, now stands at about 3.4 million,
has nearly doubled since the Ba'thists seized power in
1968. Iraqi scholars believe that the city's growth was
spurred by the Ba'thists' industrialization program
and the faltering of their land reform and rural
development programs.
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Presence of Foreigners. We believe that Iraq's long
period of foreign domination (under the Persians,
Ottomans, and finally the British), coupled with its
heavy reliance on foreigners to manage and staff its
oil industry and development programs, contributes to
the weakness of Iraqi national identity. Many Iraqis
still identify themselves in tribal or village terms. An
identity dilemma, according to many social scientists,
has been a major contributor to the rise of fundamen-
talist activity. This is particularly notable in Pakistan,
where President Zia is striving to use Islamic identity
to overcome ethnic and sectarian differences.
Even if the war with Iran continues and oil production
remains depressed, we expect a continued presence of
large numbers of foreign workers. The war has boost-
ed the need for foreign workers in order to free Iraqi
men for military service. Based on our analysis of
migrant workers in the Middle East, the number of
foreign workers in Iraq has escalated from about
65,000 in 1975 to approximately 1.3 million in 1983.
Approximately 1.2 million Egyptians are employed as
skilled technicians, bankers, teachers, unskilled
laborers, and farmers. Among the other 100,000
foreigners, Indians and Pakistanis supply much of the
engineering and construction skills, and Chinese and
Filipinos do much of the heavy labor. The US Interest
Section in Baghdad estimates that about 10,000
Europeans serve as project supervisors, service engi-
neers, and other management and technical person-
nel
Ba'thist Policies. We believe that changes in some
cultural traditions, which tend to induce psychological
stress resulting in religious fundamentalism, are part
of the goals of the Ba'thist regime:
? Although cultural change was already under way
when the Ba'thists came to power in 1968, their
social policies have speeded the shift from the
extended to the nuclear family as the primary social
unit. An Iraqi scholar says that the extended family,
which perpetuated tribal rather than national iden-
tity, is losing its importance in socialization, health
care, and as the primary economic unit.
? The policies of the Ba'thist government, as well as
the impact of the war, have elevated the position of
women in Iraqi society. The Western press reports
that the government encourages Iraqi women to
work in factories, banks, and government offices.
Some have even graduated from the Air Force
Academy as fighter pilots. Although we have no
evidence that Iraqis resent these changes, funda-
mentalists in other Muslim countries, particularly
Pakistan, have demanded that women return to a
more subordinate status.
Women's rights were recognized in 1979 when the
government liberalized laws on divorce. Contrary to
Islamic tradition, men must now go to court to
obtain a divorce, and women, for the first time, have
the right to seek divorce from their husbands.
In addition to contributing to the destabilization of
cultural change, we believe that the secularist policies
of Saddam's Ba'thist government open a channel for
Islamic revivalists to attribute any or all national
problems-economic downturn, military setbacks, so-
cial crises-to the regime's infidelity to basic Islamic
values. As in Iran, Egypt, and now Algeria, secular-
ism, characterized by the exclusion of Islamic princi-
ples from government decisions, in our opinion, opens
Saddam's regime to the charge that it lacks Islamic
legitimacy.
Factors Against an Islamic Revival
Despite the evidence of social disarray in Iraq that
could pave the way for a fundamentalist-instigated
revolution, we believe that other factors-including
Iraq's religious and ethnic diversity and the govern-
ment's repression of all opposition-will, at least for
the near term, preclude the coalescence of Iraqis
around a prophetic religious leader who could threat-
en Saddam's regime. Furthermore, we see no indica-
tion in press reporting or in US Interest Section
analysis that Iraqis have exhibited the psychological
reactions to the social and economic problems that
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have given rise to fundamentalist religious movements
elsewhere. Nothing like the massive psychological
depression that occurred in Egypt following the war of
1967 has taken place. Unlike Nasser, who attributed
Egypt's defeat in the war with Israel to failure to
adhere to Islamic beliefs, no Iraqi political or religious
leader has announced that Iraq's troubles stem from
their failure to toe the conservative Islamic line.
Sectarian and Ethnic Differences
We believe that Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divisions
(55 percent Shia and 43 percent Sunni Muslim; 70
percent Arab and 18 percent Kurd) substantially
decrease the likelihood that a powerful religious lead-
er could rally a following from a majority of the
population.
We believe that the roughly equal Sunni-Shia split, in
particular, precludes the prospects for an Iranian-
style religious revolution. We believe it more likely
that any large-scale religious fundamentalist move-
ment would be concentrated among the Shias, who,
despite their greater numbers, have long been disad-
vantaged politically and remain at the bottom of the
social and economic ladder. Although the US Interest
Section reports that Saddam has tried to improve the
Shias' lot economically and bring them into the
mainstream, they remain geographically segregated
and politically and economically subordinate to the
Sunnis. The Interest Section reports that many have
migrated to Baghdad, where they now comprise more
than one-third of the population. More than 1 million
have crowded into poor areas such as al-Thawra
township, where the residents lacked basic urban
services until Saddam initiated a redevelopment pro-
gram in the late 1970s.
Despite proselytizing among Shias by Iran and the
Shia opposition to the Saddam regime, Shia opposi-
tion has thus far been splintered into several factions
that, according to the US Interest Section, have
shown no signs of unification:
? Dawa Party. Founded in 1965, Dawa is the largest
and most influencial Shia opposition group. The
bulk of its support comes from Iran and exiles in
Jordan, the Gulf, and Europe.
? Fatima Party. Fatima cooperates with the Dawa
Party but is very militant in its lans for a religious
government in Iraq. This group, 25X1
has penetrated 25X1
other religious movements.
? Islamic Movement in Iraq. A very small group that
probably receives funds from Iran, Libya, and Syr- 25X1
ia. 25X1
We believe that the possibility of a widespread Islam-
ic revival among the Sunnis is lessened by their
overall political and economic preeminence as well as
by their division between Arabs and Kurds. The Arab
Sunnis benefited the most from the increase in living
standards before the war and are, in our opinion, more 25X1
likely to be insulated from the stresses of economic
decline and rapid cultural change than either the
Shias or the Kurds. The Arab Sunnis dominate both
the government and the leadership of the Ba'th Party,
while the Kurds, who have long sought self-rule for
the mountainous region that they occupy in northern
Iraq and the contiguous areas of Iran and Turkey,
have traditionally opposed the government in Bagh-
dad on nationalistic rather than on religious grounds.
According to our estimates, there are approximately
15,000 Iraqi Kurds organized in several dissident
groups backed by Syria and Iran. We believe that the
animosity between the Kurds and Arabs in Iraq,
heightened by Kurdish dissidence since the war be-
gan, is so great that a prophetic religious leader in one
group would probably not be accepted by the other.
Saddam's Policies: Appeasement and Terror
In our opinion, Saddam has blunted the appeal of 25X1
Islamic revivalist rhetoric as social and economic
conditions have worsened by making effective use of a
mixed policy, described by other Arabs as "appease-
ment and terror." According to US Interest Section
reporting from Baghdad, Saddam's policy of appease-
ment is based on his genuine desire to improve social
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and economic conditions in order to forge a stronger
Iraq from the mosaic of ethnic and religious groups.
Examples of his efforts include:
? Subsidizing basic foodstuffs.
? Building low-cost housing and subsidizing housing
for military families and survivors of the war.
? Providing inexpensive medical care.
? Emphasizing education and literacy at all levels.
? Providing greater security from persecution for reli-
gious minorities than under previous regimes.
In an effort to gain the loyalties of the Shias and
Kurds, we believe Saddam has channeled government
spending and favors to them. For example, according
to press accounts, he has spent millions on shrines,
mosques, pilgrimages, and other religious affairs for
the Shias. He has declared the birthday of Ali bin
Abu Talib, believed by the Shias to be the rightful
successor to the Prophet Muhammad, a national
holiday. He has paid frequent visits to the Shia holy
cities of An Najaf and Karbala and toured Shia areas
promising new services and further reforms. In a
speech in An Najaf he called for a "revival of
heavenly values" and reasserted his family's claim of
descent from the Prophet. His redevelopment pro-
gram of new sewers, power, lighting, and housing for
al-Thawra, a principal center of Shia unrest and
notorious as one of the worst slums in the Middle
East, is, according to US Interest Section reporting,
beginning to transform it into a model district. It has
been renamed Saddam City. The Kurds also have
benefited from Saddam's largess through experiments
with autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan and by a law that
has exempted Kurds from military service.
In our judgment, the likelihood of the rise of a
charismatic religious leader and a militant fundamen-
talist movement is further reduced because Saddam-
through the Mukhabarat (security force), estimated
by the US Interest Section to number 40,000-
effectively suppresses all groups or individuals who try
to flex any political muscle. As a measure of the
massive government crackdowns on political dissi-
a crash program has begun to expand the
capacity of the country's central political criminal
prison near Baghdad.
the prison housed 16,000 civil-
ians charged or awaiting trial for political offenses as
well as 12,000 military detainees charged with draft
evasion or desertion
Saddam has cracked down hard on the Shia
opposition:
He ordered the execution of five members of the
Dawa Party in 1974 and eight more in 1977,
according to US Interest Section reporting.
? In June 1979, according to reporting of the Interest
Section, he ordered numerous executions including
that of the popular and widely respected Shia cleric
Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadir, who was ac-
cused of leading an antiregime demonstration dur-
ing Muharram, the celebration commemorating the
seventh-century martyrdom of Imam Husayn.
? In early 1983,1 the
Mukhabarat executed approximately 50 Shia civil-
ians and 28 Sunni military officers for alleged
opposition activities. The 50 civilians were suspected
of being members of the Dawa Party.
executed six and imprisoned 56 members of the
family of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of the
antiregime Shia fundamentalist movement based in
Tehran. the government's
reason for a persecution is to end Iranian interfer-
ence in Iraqi Shia affairs.
Despite the regime's repression of the Shia opposition,
officials in late February 1983. The two officials were
killed by machinegun fire while they attended a
ceremony marking the o enin of an urban project in
al-Thawra. Saddam had been
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scheduled to attend the ceremony but that he can-
celed his appearance at the last moment. Dawa
members said that the assassinated officials were
advisers to Saddam and were sent to the ceremony in
place of the President
Cult of Personality
We believe that Saddam's cult of personality, which
has a number of prophet-like features, lessens the
possibility that a strong charismatic religious leader
will arise in Iraq. Numerous sources report that:
? He holds exaggerated views of his own capabilities.
? He is totally committed to his views.
? He deals ruthlessly with opponents or people who
offer him poor advice
In our view, Saddam has promoted a personality cult
unrivaled in the Middle East outside Iran. His por-
traits, in a variety of poses-soldier, father figure with
a small child, politician, or peasant-appear in every
shop and office; his leading officials wear gold badges
bearing his likeness; his picture is on the dial of the
gold watches carried by army officers; his speeches fill
the newspapers; and buildings and towns have been
named or renamed after him. Saddam visits hospitals,
markets, and other public places where he listens
attentively to individual complaints and requests. F_
Ba'thist Ideology: An Alternative to Fundamentalism
Despite its secular tone, we believe that Ba'thist
ideology is strong and well developed enough to offer
stiff competition to the religious ideals of an Islamic
revivalist movement. According to academic analysis,
Ba'thist ideology has experienced a number of shifts
under Saddam:
? In the late 1970s the Ba'thists broadened use of the
term "Arab" from meaning only those who consider
themselves Arab in language, feeling, and heritage
to include all those descended from peoples living in
ancient Mesopotamia. We believe that this move to
link Arab, Kurd, and other minorities under the
banner of Iraqi nationhood was an unsuccessful
attempt to replace ethnic and religious factions with
Arab nationalism.
Although we do not believe that he has enough appeal
to unite the country's religious and ethnic groups
against the secularist government, we believe that
exiled Shia leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, son
of the late Ayatollah Muhsim al-Hakim, comes the
closest to filling the bill of a prospective charismatic
fundamentalist leader.
Islam-although keeping it subservient to Arab
nationalism. According to Saddam's press releases,
Ba'thists consider Islam an important, but not domi-
nant, part of the Arab heritage. Moreover, Ba'thist
25X6
goals of Arab unity, socialism, and modernization 25X1
are precisely the same ideals embodied by the
Prophet Muhammad.
Backlash of the Iranian Revolution
We believe that Iraqis have rallied around Saddam's
regime in response to the war, the excesses and
policies of the Iranian Islamic regime, and the tradi-
tional enmity between Arabs and Persians. In our
opinion, few of Iraq's Shias consider Khomeini as a
prophet speaking for them. Iraqis, according to press
reporting, appear more willing to endure economic
hardship than to conform to Khomeini's brand of
Islamic fundamentalism, thus lessening the prospects
that Iraqis will follow the Iranian revolutionary
model.
? Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Ba'thists have
attempted to preempt religious criticism of their
secular philosophy by placing more emphasis on
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Cornerstones of Ba'thist
Ideology
Unity
The eventual political union of all Arab states.
Freedom
Freedom from foreign control and influence. Freedom
of the individual to participate in the social and
political life of the nation, with limits set by the state.
Socialism
Government ownership of all large-scale industry,
international trade, and financial institutions, and
some retail trade, although it allows some private
enterprise.
Arab Renaissance
Commitment to the material and spiritual revitaliza-
tion of the Arab people along modern, progressive,
secular lines.
will arise.
We believe, however, that the course of the war could
significantly alter the prospects for the rise of militant
fundamentalism. Should a continued stalemate in the
war or increased losses for Iraq aggravate economic
conditions, or should the war end on terms unfavor-
able to Baghdad, we believe that an increasingly
receptive audience for fundamentalist rhetoric would
force the present regime or any successor to alter
policies to appease its fundamentalist critics. Little
change in the war or in economic conditions decreases
the likelihood that major fundamentalist opposition
We believe that conditions within Iraqi society that
are conducive to a religion-based revolution bear
watching (see table). Particular attention should be
paid to the possible emergence of a prophetic leader-
which we believe is the key to the successful evolution
of a religious movement-from either the Sunni or
Shia religious establishments or opposition groups. If
such a leader emerges, however, we would expect his
constituency to be confined to either the Sunni or Shia
communities and would not expect a groundswell of
support to develop as it did for Khomeini in Iran.
Saddam, through Baghdad radio and press releases,
has tried to undermine Khomeini's potential appeal to
Iraq's Shias. He has asserted that Khomeini is espous-
ing a mistaken interpretation of Islam and has ex-
pressed hope that "Iran, on Khomeini's death, will
resume the correct religious course." Saddam later
inferred that only those who spoke Arabic-the lan-
guage of the Koran-could adequately interpret and
practice Islam.
Outlook
Despite the presence in Iraq of several economic,
political, and social conditions that have set the stage
for the rise of militant fundamentalist activity else-
where in the Muslim world, we believe that Iraq's
sectarian and ethnic differences and Saddam's effec-
tive suppression of all opposition limit prospects that a
regime-threatening fundamentalist force will develop.
We believe that, even if Saddam were replaced by a
successor less skilled at controlling his opposition,
increased fundamentalist activity would be prevented
Implications for the United States
Since we believe, barring an assassination and a
takeover by its secular opponents, that Saddam and
the Ba'thist regime will not fall victim to its Islamic
fundamentalist opposition, we expect Iraq to maintain
its diplomatic and economic links with the United
States. If the war should end favorably for Iraq, we
would expect little change in the religious policies of
the Ba'thist regime and, in turn, perhaps a slight
improvement in US-Iraq relations. US Interest Sec-
tion observers believe that Saddam will reestablish
full diplomatic relations with the United States once
the war is over. If the war should end unfavorably for
Iraq, however, we expect that a stronger fundamental-
ist voice-an outgrowth of the conviction that the
defeat was due to the regime's lack of religious
fervor-would force the regime to develop a foreign
policy even less friendly to Western secularist coun-
tries]
from coalescing into a countrywide movement by
Iraq's sectarian and ethnic fragmentation.
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Common Preconditions for Islamic Resurgence
War with Iran, which began in 1980, has been stalemated for
more than three years with no signs of speedy resolution. War
has drained economy, hurt morale of population, and potentially
increased receptivity to a fundamentalist movement.
Economic decline X Cost of war, damage to oil facilities, and declining oil prices
have seriously impaired Iraq's economy. Oil exports are at one-
fifth prewar levels, inflation is high, consumer goods are in short
supply, and agricultural productivity is low.
Rapid urbanization X The urban percentage of Iraq's population increased from 36
percent in 1947 to 77 percent in 1980. Baghdad has grown from
slightly more than 2 million in 1965 to approximately 3.4
million today. Its overcrowded slums, particularly in predomi-
nantly Shia areas, are potential breeding grounds for opposi-
tion-including fundamentalist-activity.
Presence of large numbers of X About 1.3 million foreigners currently in country include more
foreigners than a million Egyptians. Foreign presence in key managerial,
professional, and teaching positions creates resentment and
contributes to xenophobia among Iraqis.
Rapid cultural change X Government policies have contributed to rapid cultural change
already generated by urbanization and presence of large foreign
communities-deemphasis of the extended family as primary
social unit, emphasis on national rather than tribal loyalties,
and liberalization of women's roles.
Secular government X Despite Saddam's efforts to equate goals of secular Ba'thist
government with those of Islam, the government is still per-
ceived by most fundamentalist elements as running counter to
their interests.
Prophetic leader X We know of no charismatic religious leaders, Sunni or Shia,
who could rally significant followings. Saddam has tried to
prevent development of constituencies around religious leaders
by building his own personality cult.
Homogeneous population X Iraq's population is 55 percent Shia, 25 percent Sunni Arab, 18
percent Sunni Kurd. Diverse population, including the roughly
equal religious division, works against emergence of a prophetic
religious leader or a movement that would appeal to all sectors
of society, Shia as well as Sunni.
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