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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000100060002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Afghanistan: The Cease-Fire and
the Future of the Insurgency
in the Panjsher Valley
Secret
NESA 83-10211
September 1983
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uirectorate of Secret
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Afghanistan: The Cease-Fire and
the Future of the Insurgency
in the Panjsher Valley
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by~Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of Soviet
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 83-10211
September 1983
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Afghanistan: The Cease-Fire and
the Future of the Insur enc
in the Panjsher Valley
Key Judgments The insurgent stronghold in the Panjsher Valley-strategically located
Information available near Kabul and major Soviet supply lines-continues to be a significant
as of 15 August 1983 military threat and potential political embarrassment to Soviet forces and
was used in this report.
the Communist regime in Afghanistan. The leadership-under Ahmad
Shah Masood-and organization of the resistance in the Panjsher have
become the model of a militarily effective insurgency. Despite the de facto
cease-fire in the Panjsher Valley between the insurgents and the Soviets,
the valley remains an important symbol of the viability of the Afghan
resistance movement.
The Soviets have launched six major operations against the insurgents in
the Panjsher since the invasion. We believe the cumulative effect of Soviet
and Afghan Government military pressure led local insurgent leaders to
accept the Soviet offer of a cease-fire in January 1983. The insurgents'
inability to protect civilians had contributed to a 60-percent decline in the
valley's population and a weakening in support for the insurgents.
The military and political position of the Panjsheri insurgents and the
resistance movement overall have not, in our view, been undermined so far
by the cease-fire in the valley. The Panjsheris have benefited from the
agreement, and they probably will attempt to maintain the cease-fire in the
valley into the fall of 1983 and agree to similar truces in the future:
? The insurgents have infiltrated equipment and weapons into the valley,
stockpiled food, and tried to protect civilians and raise their morale.
Masood's forces also attacked a rival insurgent band that threatened the
Panjsheris' supply lines.
? We judge that the Panjsher Valley insurgents could establish new
strongholds throughout northern Afghanistan in one to two years,
especially if they secured additional foreign material support.
Our analysis suggests that the Soviets hoped the cease-fire would encour-
age other insurgent groups to reach similar agreements. They also believed
that over the short term the truce would reduce insurgent attacks near
Kabul, allow the Soviets to redeploy troops from the valley for operations
in other areas, and encourage Masood to attack rival bands, weakening all
local insurgent groups:
? So far no other major insurgent groups have agreed to truces with the So-
viets. The Panjsher cease-fire has not divided the resistance movement
further nor been condemned by most insurgent groups inside or outside
Afghanistan.
Secret
NESA 83-10211
September 1983
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? We believe Soviet and Afghan Government forces have not gained any
significant military advantages from the truce; insurgents in other areas
have defeated government forces withdrawn from the valley.
We judge that Moscow will tolerate limited attacks by Panjsher insurgents
outside the valley in hopes of preserving and extending the cease-fire. In
our view, however, the Soviets will be impelled eventually to resume major
operations against Masood's forces in response to the continuing buildup of
his military capability and the likelihood that his troops will launch
extensive attacks outside the Panjsher:
? The insurgents probably would survive new Soviet and Afghan attacks on
the Panjsher even though Soviet and government forces, by undertaking
a major offensive, could reoccupy the main valley.
? In the less likely event that the Panjsher organization was destroyed
militarily, effective guerrilla resistance would continue in Afghanistan,
although the insurgent movement's morale would decline temporarily.
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Afghanistan: The Cease-Fire and
the Future of the Insurgency
in the Panjsher Valley F
The strategic location of the Panjsher Valley near
Kabul and the growing effectiveness of the insurgents
there have made the valley increasingly important for
the Soviets, the Afghan Government, and the insur-
gents.
between early 1980 and late 1982 Panjsher-based
guerrillas repeatedly attacked the Soviet fuel pipeline
and convoys on the Termez to Kabul road, reducing
vital supplies to major Afghan and Soviet garrisons
and airfields near the capital.
he Panjsher is a major m i ration route for
supplies from Pakistan to northern Afghanistan. By
mid-1982 the survival and growth of the Panjsher
insurgent organization had become a major political
and military embarrassment for the Babrak regime
and a symbol of resistance that raised the morale of
Afghans opposed to the Communist government.F_
International press coverage has given the Panjsher
and the leader of the resistance in the valley, Ahmad
Shah Masood, an inordinate amount of attention
compared to other insurgent bases and leaders in the
country that have been equally effective but less well
publicized.
one guerrilla leader has established an insurgent
organization with hundreds of men in Balkh Province.
Reports from the US Embassy in Kabul indicate that
guerrillas operating from strongholds have periodical-
ly isolated the cities of Herat and Qandahar, causing
Soviet and Afghan forces to launch major counter-
attacks. Repeated insurgent attacks from the Pagh-
man area, 15 kilometers west of Kabul, have de-
stroyed convoys and damaged facilities near the
capital. The press attention given to the Panjsher,
however, combined with its strategic location and the
effectiveness of the insurgency there, have given
impetus to Soviet efforts to destroy or co-opt the
resistance in the valley.
cumulative effect contributed to Masood's willingness
to accept a cease-fire in January 1983.
Soviet and Afghan offensives . 25X1
could not eliminate Masood's guerrilla bands, primar-
ily because the large-scale sweep operations were
insufficiently aggressive and lacked the speed, mobil-
ity, and surprise necessary for successful counterin-
surgency operations. 25X1
eve estimate that between
early 1980 and December 1982 Soviet and Afghan
forces suffered between 1,000 and 2,500 killed and
wounded-mostly Afghan-and the insurgents suf-
fered somewhat lower losses in combat in the valley
(see table).
In addition to their military efforts against the insur-
gents, Soviet and Afghan forces have attempted to
bribe or coerce civilians in the Panjsher to reduce
their support to the insurgents.
Soviet and Afghan troops deliberately destroyed some
crops and farms during past attacks.
after the offensive in May 1982,
Afghan officials tried unsuccessfully to pacify areas of
the valley by distributing food and goods to civilians.
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Insurgent Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths. The success of the resistance in the
Panjsher Valley has resulted from organizing all
insurgents in the area into military units under a
single command and using them in coordinated offen-
sive and defensive operations 25X1
Masood was able to weld together 25X1
many formerly disorganized insurgent bands largely
because of his willingness-unusual for an Afghan
leader-to set aside ethnic, religious, political, and
tribal differences to fight Soviet and Afghan regime
forces. 25X1
Since early 1980 Soviet and Afghan forces have
launched six major ground offensives and many air
attacks into the Panjsher Valley. These attacks failed
to destroy the resistance, although we believe their
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The Six Campaigns in the Panjsher Valley
Soviet and Insurgent Forcesa
Afghan Forces a
Mid-April 1980 1,000 to 2,000 A few hundred men
men
Late August to early
September 1980
2,000 men
Late October to
2,000 to 3,000
early November
men
1980
Late August to early
5,000 to 8,000
September 1981
men
Less than 1,000 men
Approximately 1,000
men
1,000 to 2,000 men
Mid-May to mid- 14,000 men 1,000 to 2,000 Panj-
June 1982 sheri insurgents.
1,000 to 2,000 insur-
gents from nearby
areas.
Late August to mid- 5,000 to 8,000 Approximately 2,000
September 1982 men men.
Secret 2
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Ahmad Shah Masood
Insurgent Commander in the Panjsher
Ahmad Shah Masood has become the best known
field commander in the Afghan resistance and has
built what many believe to be the most successful
insurgent band in Afghanistan. Masood's successes
have boosted insurgent morale throughout the coun-
try and have gained him considerable international
press coverage, with one article stating that he was
emerging as a national folk hero.
Masood has studied the works of Mao Zedong and
Che Guevara and has a good understanding of guer-
rilla tactics. Masood
understands the need for training, including physical
conditioning, development of tactical skills, and
'political indoctrination" in current affairs and the
nature of Communism. Although he professes alle-
giance to the Jamiat-i-Islami organization, one of the
six major insurgent groups, he apparently uses this
tie primarily to procure weapons.
An ethnic Tajik born in the Panjsher Valley in 1953,
Masood was an engineering student at Kabul Univer-
sity in 1973 when the King was overthrown. Masood
later fled to Pakistan, where he joined other Afghan
dissidents in opposing the Daoud regime and its
Communist successors. Along with other Panjsheri
students, he returned to the valley after the Soviet
intervention in 1979 and won the support of the local
population and insurgents from the fundamentalist
Hizbi Islami organization.
We believe the effective use of guerrilla warfare for defending the Panjsher
tactics-avoiding direct combat with superior enemy
firepower and manpower-has helped the insurgents
survive massive attacks in the valley and raid targets
outside the Panjsher.
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Masood
s forces include some 2,000.full-time
guerrillas organized into at least five "mobile groups"
that fight generally outside the valley and about 5,000
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part-time fighters who have the main responsibility
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Acquiring more light infantry weapons has helped the
Panjsher resistance to increase significantly the num-
ber of aimed insurgents and to expand operations,
The guerrillas are
armed with a variety of rifles, automatic weapons,
antitank rockets, mines, and a growing number of
heavy machineguns, mortars, and recoilless rifles.
growing numbers of
12.7- and 14.5-mm heavy machineguns helped the
insurgents improve their air defenses in 1982. We
believe the Panjsheri insurgents destroyed or damaged
between 20 and 30 helicopters in attacks inside and
outside the Panjsher between early 1980 and early
1983.
Training in weapons and tactics has helped increase
the effectiveness and number of insurgent attacks.
result of the war since late 1979 and that between
30,000 and 40,000 civilians and insurgents of the
90,000 prewar population remain in the main valley.
Negotiations and the Cease-Fire
The military situation that developed in the Panjsher
following the Soviet and Afghan occupation of the
main valley in 1982 and the insurgents' ability to
avoid destruction in the mountains and side valleys
led to talks and a cease-fire with the insurgents in
January 1983. the
Soviets initiated negotiations in December 1982, seek-
ing an agreement that would halt insurgent attacks in
the Panjsher and apparently also in the northern
provinces and along the main road from Termez to
Kabul. Although Masood said he rejected this plan
and the insurgents claim no agreement was signed, a
cease-fire subsequently has been observed by both
sides in the Panjsher. As a result of the cease-fire,
Soviet and Afghan forces withdrew from most of the
valley in late April 1983
Weaknesses. The Panjsheri insurgents appear to have
realized only recently the need to plan for a long-term
struggle and to protect and win the loyalty of their
the insurgents' greatest error
was their failure to stockpile adequate food for the
winter, especially after several enemy attacks on the
Panjsher in 1982.
insurgents did little to protect civilians from
air attacks or prepare them psychologically for a long
war.
Failure to protect civilians has contributed to a signif-
icant decline in the valley's population and, with high
noncombatant casualties, has lowered civilian support
civilians were becom-
ing depressed, were not as friendly toward the insur-
gents, and were increasingly reluctant to give them
material support.
60 percent of the population has fled the main v
as a result of enemy attacks.
between 1980 and early 1983, air attacks killed 3,000
civilians and destroyed 6,800 homes. We estimate
that 5,000 to 10,000 civilians have died as a direct
Masood's Motives. We believe the Panjsheris accept-
ed a cease-fire because of continuing Soviet and
Afghan military pressure, supply problems, and hard-
ships suffered by unprepared civilians. By late 1982.
guerrilla leaders may have recognized that their
forces could not militarily dislodge the strong Afghan
and Soviet garrisons in the valley. Moreover, continu-
ing Soviet and Afghan air and ground attacks made it
difficult to rebuild and resupply guerrilla units that
had suffered losses in 1982. We believe the insurgents
recognized that without efforts to improve conditions
among the valley population, civilians might begin to
withhold support for the resistance. The leadership
probably judged that improvements could best be
achieved during a cease-fire
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Insurgent Antiaircrqft Weapons
Insurgent with shoulder fired
SA-7 surface-to-air missile.
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Since January 1983, the insurgents have used the
truce to improve their military position in and outside
the Panjsher. Masood has increased his influence in
the northeast, which was already growing before the
Crops have been replanted, and efforts are
being made to stockpile food. More effective propa-
ganda efforts have been organized, and Masood, using
the concept of a "holy war" to maintain popular
support, has warned civilians the war will be a long
one with many hardships and sacrifices
Masood's insurgents seized con-
trol of the strategic Andarab Valley from Hizbi
Islami forces who had used the area to block caravans
from reaching the Panjsher.
Soviet Motives. We believe that the Soviets entered
into the cease-fire with the guerrillas to reduce insur-
gent activity around the Panjsher, particularly near
Kabul, and over the long . to weaken and divide
the resistance movement. he
Soviets believed that a cease-fire with the famous and
respected Panjsher insurgents would encourage other
guerrilla groups in the country to reach similar agree-
ments. They probably hoped that they could use such
cease-fires to stimulate fighting among guerrilla
bands throughout Afghanistan, reversing the trend of
cooperation between bands that has led to increased
insurgent military effectiveness
the Soviets may even have hoped
that they could eventually entice Masood into collabo-
ratin with them and perhaps join a coalition govern-
ment
Our analysis indicates, however, that Soviet attempts
to use the Panjsher cease-fire to weaken and divide
the resistance movement have not been effective so
far. We know of no cease-fires between the Soviets
and other major insurgent groups.
overall level of insurgent infighting had declined
significantly in 1983 compared to a similar period in
1982. Although some fundamentalist groups have
been critical of the Panjsher cease-fire,
most insurgent groups and lead-
ers have not criticized Masood's agreement with the
Soviets.
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Masood's "Strategic Triangle"
U Masood's "Strategic Triangle"
cJ Soviet division
Soviet regiment
Selected province boundary
Nazar-e
Sharif
\nanaaaar
China
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We judge that the cease-fire has not yet resulted in a
significant strengthening of the Soviet military posi-
tion insurgent attacks in
Kabul, including mortar attacks on the airport, Radio
Afghanistan buildings, and Soviet military headquar-
ters, increased during the summer of 1983.
an elite, Soviet-
trained Afghan brigade withdrawn from the Panjsher
suffered what the Afghan Ministry of Defense called
the worst defeat of the war during fighting in May
1983 in Paktia Province. Another Afghan unit that
was redeployed from the Panjsher apparently failed to
help stem increasing insurgent activity in Herat Prov-
ince
Prospects and Implications
We believe that Masood will seek to extend the cease-
fire as long as possible within the valley.
the cease-fire will
allow the Panjsheris to continue to build up their
forces, infiltrate more weapons and supplies, and take
measures to protect civilians. Using the valley as a
sanctuary allows Masood to continue attacks else-
where and maintain efforts to expand his influence
among other insurgents.
We believe Masood currently lacks the ability as well
as the desire to enforce a cease-fire in areas outside
the Panjsher.
he has not tried to extend the cease-fire outside the
valley. Even if he attempted such an effort, other
groups not party to the agreement would continue
attacks, although the overall level of combat in the
northeast probably would decline. In our view, even
groups allied with Masood outside the Panjsher prob-
ably would eventually renew attacks on Soviet and
Afghan targets.
International press coverage has drawn world atten-
tion to the war in the Panjsher Valley, and a lengthy
truce in the area could eventually reduce foreign
support for the resistance movement. We believe the
Soviets would cite the truce to foreign critics as
evidence that the insurgents had accepted a Commu-
nist government.
Defections and Bribes
In addition to their military efforts to destroy the
resistance, the Soviets and the Afghan Government
have made extensive efforts to buy the loyalty of
tribes and encourage insurgent groups to defect to the
government.
Afghan officials report-
edly have offered money and weapons in return for
the insurgents' promise to stop attacks.
Kabul has also sought to buy the
loyalty of tribes and then use them to block insurgen
supply routes or guard government facilities in re-
mote areas.
Efforts to bribe or induce insurgent defections, how-
ever, apparently have had only limited success so far.
many guerrilla bands have followed the tra i-
tional Afghan response to such efforts-accepting
government positions, money, and arms only to rejoin
the resistance later on. Government efforts to gain the
loyalty of tribes have been undermined by the tradi-
tional rural Afghan distrust of any central authority
and, since the revolution and invasion', hostility to-
ward the anti-Islamic Communist regime kept in
power by a foreign army.
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Given these possible gains, we believe Moscow in the
short term will tolerate limited attacks by Panjsher
insurgents outside the valley. In our view, however,
the Soviets will be impelled eventually to resume
major operations against Masood's forces in response
to the continuing buildup of his military capability
and the likelihood that his forces will launch extensive
attacks beyond the Panjsher. A massive Soviet and
Afghan attack similar to the one in May 1982 would
result in occupation of the main valley floor and
blocking some supply routes, according to our analy-
sis, but the insurgent organization in the Panjsher
The guerrillas will be able to continue effective
military operations, in our view, because of resupply
efforts during the cease-fire. The Soviets are aware of
the resupply but have been unable to significantly
reduce infiltration into the valley)
Because of these preparations, we believe the insur-
gents are not only likely to survive, but that there is a
good possibility that Masood's organization will con-
tinue to expand and eventually become the predomi-
nant insurgent group in northeastern Afghanistan.
We judge that the development of additional insur-
gent strongholds under Masood's command in the
northeast would pose a significantly increased danger
to Soviet and Afghan forces by threatening to cut
supply lines and temporarily isolate Soviet and
Afghan Government units.
continuing
ethnic, religious, and political differences among the
hundreds of insurgent bands make it unlikely that any
insurgent commander will emerge as a national leader
in the foreseeable future.
Building and operating a large number of effective
strongholds would depend greatly on increasing out-
side material support to the Panjsher insurgent orga-
nization. Increased supplies of ammunition, heavy
machineguns, mortars, and mines would help the
insurgents train and arm the men in the bases that
would be used to cut key Soviet supply lines-
especially the Termez to Kabul road and the Soviet
fuel pipeline-for long periods
The Panjsher insurgents will face some dangers and
problems in attempting to consolidate control even in
northeastern Afghanistan, in our judgment. Some
major insurgent bands would become hostile toward
the Panjsher group's expanding hegemony, resulting
large-scale battles, resulting in heavy insurgent losses.
could become overconfident, cease guerrilla warfare,
and attempt to confront major Soviet offensives in
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in more clashes between insurgent bands. The Soviets
and Afghans could exploit any animosity by providing
some groups with military aid to attack the Panjsher
insurgents. With the increase in manpower and con-
trol over a wider area, Masood and his subordinates 25X1
Consolidation of military control under a single group
in the northeast would also raise the risk that a future
cease-fire agreement between one insurgent group
and the Soviets could seriously weaken the resistance
movement. With command over most insurgent
forces, Masood would be in a strong position to
enforce a truce that could halt almost all resistance
military pressure against Soviet and Afghan Govern-
ment forces in the most important area of the country.
Such a truce could convince insurgent supporters
inside ands outside Afghanistan that all resistance was
likely to end in a short time.
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