BRAZIL S PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: THE CIVILIANS RETURN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
U&) Intelligence
Brazil's Presidential Succession:
The Civilians Return
-mot
ALA 84-10033
March 1984
356
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Brazil's Presidential Succession:
The Civilians Return
This paper was prepared by ffice
of African and Latin American Ana ysis, with
contributions b Office of Central
Reference. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 84-10033
March 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
Brazil's Presidential Succession:
The Civilians Return
Key Judgments The uncertainty surrounding the indirect presidential elections scheduled
Information available for next January has thrown open the succession to an array of candidates
as of 13 March 1984 and has made the military, despite sentiment for a return to the barracks,
was used in this report.
more of a player in the electoral process. Both President Figueiredo's
shortcomings and the political liberalization now under way are creating a
free-for-all political atmosphere. 25X1
Despite the uncertainty, we believe the indirect system-which provides for
the selection of the president by a 686-member electoral college-will
survive for one more election, if only by default. Overwhelming public
sentiment for direct balloting is likely to be offset by military opposition,
lack of political consensus, and the reluctance of the government's
Democratic Social Party (PDS) to give up its majority in the electoral
college
We judge that the armed forces, despite some uneasiness, remain loyal to
Figueiredo and are unlikely to remove him or to upset a victory by any of
the leading candidates. We believe the strongest contenders are:
? Congressman Paulo Maluf, whose tireless campaigning and backroom
maneuvering have won support among government party electors despite
Figueiredo's intense personal dislike for him.
? Vice President Aureliano Chaves, who impressed the military and other
interest groups as Acting President last year and who is reaching out to
opposition moderates.
? Interior Minister Mario Andreazza, who is Figueiredo's choice for the
nomination but lacks support in the military and the opposition.
? Opposition party leader Governor Tancredo Neves, whose centrist policies
give him the broadest institutional backing of any opposition figure and
make him potentially acceptable to Figueiredo and the military.
In our opinion, the military will remain the arbiter of Brazilian politics. If
the administration's eroding authority makes it appear unable to resist the
popular campaign for direct elections (we estimate those chances at
perhaps 1 in 5), then the likelihood of military action would be great. We
would expect the armed forces to:
? Arrange for an interim presidency of perhaps two years preparatory to an
open contest.
? Disqualify ideologically unacceptable civilian candidates like populist
Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro. 25X1
Secret
ALA 84-10033
March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
Opposition and government politicians alike probably would acquiesce to
either move, reasoning, as we do, that otherwise the risk of outright
intervention would be too high. If the armed forces did not move quickly
enough to forestall direct elections or disqualify Brizola and the latter
somehow were elected, we judge the odds to be better than even that the
military would-abort the transition process entirely.
No matter which civilian succeeds Figueiredo, the political environment
will be different. The assertiveness of Congress and other groups, along
with the dismantling of the regime's extraordinary powers, will leave the
new president ill equipped to balance competing forces and maintain
coherent policies. Any successor will find Brazil's domestic and external
economic problems particularly troublesome. Both the government party
and the major opposition party, forged under an authoritarian system, are
badly divided and likely to split and re-form in new coalitions within the
first year or so of the civilian regime
We judge that all of the leading candidates are moderates unlikely to
diverge sharply from current policies on key US-Brazilian issues and that
the transition to civilian rule represents a positive step for US interests in
promoting democracy in South America. Nevertheless, the systemic
political changes now under way will make the Brazilian Government less
predictable than at any time since the early 1960s. Because Congress, the
political parties, the business community, and public opinion in general will
assume greater importance, the new president will have to take a tougher
line on issues such as negotiations with the IMF and foreign creditors.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Key Judgments
The Regime Loses Control
An Unruly Government Party
Opposition Parties Weigh In
The Military's Stake
6
Secondary Actors
7
Changing the Rules?
8
Implications for the United States
10
Leading Candidates
13.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
Brazil's Presidential Succession:
The Civilians Return)
There is a sense of moment in -Brazil as the country
approaches the presidential elections scheduled for
January 1985. For the first time in 20 years, the
selection of the next president is no longer the exclu-
sive prerogative of the incumbent or the military high
command. Rather, it will be determined by the inter-
action of several forces within the relatively open
political system that has evolved since the late 1970s.
President Joao Baptista de Figueiredo has lost control
over the choice of his successor due to his administra-
tion's mishandling of the economy and to the process
of abertura o enin ), that is, political liberalization.
This paper examines the dynamics of the presidential
selection process; the role of the political parties, the
armed forces, and other players; the options left to the
regime to regain some control over the succession; the
likely outcome; and alternative scenarios. In addition,
it assesses some of the implications of the succession
for Brazil's political landscape and for the United
States
After seizing power in 1964, the high command
carefully but firmly manipulated Brazilian politics.
Until recently, successive military regimes ensured
the dominance of the government party, the subservi-
ence of Congress, the disenfranchisement of the left,
censorship of the mass media, and the emasculation of
the labor movement. Essential to and reflective of the
armed forces' control has been the imposition of a
series of generals in the presidency.
Over the past year, however, the military's ability to
choose and install the next president has been eroded
severely. We believe this loss of power, exercised
traditionally through the chief executive, represents in
part an acceleration of abertura, the gradual loosen-
ing of authoritarian measures in preparation for a
return to civilian rule. Initiated by President Ernesto
Geisel (1974-79), abertura was embraced by his suc-
cessor, Figueiredo, who, by all accounts, has remained
steadfast in his commitment to see the process 25X1
through. most of the
military favored slowly relinquishing power to the
civilians, and hardline opponents of liberalization
gradually were purged from the officer corps. Since
1979, the Figueiredo administration has:
? Lifted censorship.
? Weakened its own extraordinary powers by revising
the national security law.
? Partially reined in the intelligence services, which
previously had a free hand in countering leftists and
other opponents of the regime. 25X1
? Granted amnesty to most individuals who had their
political rights taken away in the 1960s.
? Held open congressional, state, and municipal elec- 25X1
tions in November 1982, in which the government
party suffered substantial losses.
According to the original timetable, abertura's final
step, a return to direct presidential elections, was to
occur in 1990. In the interim, the military planned to
retain strong-although deliberately diminished-
control by ensuring that the government's Democratic
Social Party (PDS) would dominate the electoral
college and rubberstamp an in-house choice of the
next president in 1985. This strategy began to unravel
last year, however, because the administration's pres-
tige plummeted precisely at the time its authoritarian
means of control were being dismantled. This has left
the administration less able to enforce party discipline
and control PDS or electoral college delegates or use
political muscle to turn back opposition initiatives for
systemic change.
In our view, serious economic problems have hastened
the abertura process and undermined government
control. Now in the fourth year of a deep recession,
Brazil is suffering negative economic growth, high
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
Ve zuela
Peru
South
Pacific
Ocean
Boa
Vista
Roraima
Rio Ne9'
Bolivia
Parag
Amapa
~Macapd?
Mato Grosso
do Sul
Campo?
Grande
Boundary represamaeon is
not necessarily aumoritatiee
Maranhao bTeresina ^
Site
Luis
Fortaleza
5
ti.
Piaui L, Paraib~ 080
P
essoa
/ Pernambuco ~?`~?
f'1 r??~ Recife
(DMaceid
A
l
1
Minas
Belo ) -San tro
?Horizon~ Santo
~Vitdria
Rio e
Janeiro
South
Atlantic
Ocean
?
,
acjn"
J Aracaju
k-S r'9ipe
Internal administrative
boundary
o Internal administrative
capital
0 250 500 Kilometers
0 250 500 Miles
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
unemployment, and falling per capita income. More-
over, the regime's efforts to ride out the economic
slump by stepping up foreign borrowing led to an
acute financial crisis. The necessity of seeking a
rescue package from the International Monetary
Fund in late 1982 and again last year was a bitter pill
for a country that gloried in the "Brazilian miracle"
of 1968-74, when annual growth rates averaged 10
percent.
We believe the widely held perception of President
Figueiredo's lackluster leadership also has eroded the
regime's power. During the first half of 1983, the
Brazilian press continuously reflected popular concern
over his physical and mental health. Doubts about his
ability to govern
were not erased by his improved performance follow-
ing recuperation from heart bypass surgery in mid-
exclusively on a group of close advisers to make and
implement policies, without consulting Congress or
even the leaders of his own party. Although his
championship of abertura initially made him the most
popular of the country's military presidents, a public
opinion poll last September gave Figueiredo the low-
est rating ever recorded for a chief executive in Brazil.
An Unruly Government Party
The growing assertiveness and independence of the
government's own party reflects the President's loss of
control. Many PDS Congressmen, aware that their
political futures increasingly depend less on their
relationship to Figueiredo than on their responsiveness
to public concerns, are demanding a voice in policy-
making and refusing to defer to Figueiredo in the
choice of the party's presidential candidate. After 25X1
changing the rules in mid-1982 to guarantee the
government party's dominance of the electoral col-
lege, Figueiredo now finds he cannot control the first
step in the process-the PDS nomination. Instead of
waiting for the President to anoint his successor, as
tradition has dictated, three PDS aspirants have
thrown their hats in the ring.
The insurgent candidacy of Congressman Paulo Ma 25X1
luf is the most difficult for Figueiredo to swallow. For
the past two years, Maluf has been positioning himself
for a run at the presidency, building a network of
friends and allies through personal contacts and the 25X1
Figueiredo detests the Congressman, ap- 25X1
parently less for his reputation for corruption than for
personal disloyalty. In 1978, Maluf outmaneuvered 25X1
Brasilia's candidate to win the governorship of Sao 25X1
Paulo, and his refusal to allow the President to choose
the party standard bearer violates Figueiredo's deeply25X1
held sense of hierarchy and fealty.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
The electoral college, scheduled to convene in open
session on 15 January 1985, comprises 686 votes-
479 federal deputies, 69 senators, and six delegates
from each of the 23 states.
Only the official candidates of registered political
parties may receive votes, and they must be chosen in
party convention by 5 September 1984.
If no candidate receives at least 344 votes on either of
the first two ballots, the election can be decided on
the third ballot by a simple majority of those present.
The following tabulation shows the electoral college
votes, by parties:
Democratic Social Party (PDS) 358
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) 276
Democratic Workers' Party (PDT) 30
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) 14
Workers' Party (PT) 8
To be eligible, heads of state enterprises must resign
six months-and cabinet officers and state governors,
five months prior to the election. The vice president
would lose his eligibility if he served as acting
president at any time during the six months before
the election.
1985.
Vice President Aureliano Chaves also has formally
announced his candidacy for the PDS nomination.
His stint as Acting President last year while Figuei-
redo recovered from heart surgery won him praise
from both military and civilian sectors but. also the
President's resentment
As a moderate, Chaves is
acceptable to most groups, in our opinion, and there-
fore is a logical compromise if the party convention
deadlocks.
The third candidate is Figueiredo's favorite, Interior
Minister Mario Andreazza. Although at year's end
the President publicly abdicated responsibility for
"coordinating" the PDS nomination
According to
the US Consulate in Salvador, the recent commitment
to Andreazza of some 70 state delegates to the party
convention resulted from Figueiredo's intercession
with the Governor of Bahia. One of Andreazza's
principal assets is his control over the substantial
financial resources of the Interior Ministry, which
allows him, according to US Embassy reporting, to
cultivate party officials at the local level
In our view, elements outside the government clique
have an opportunity to affect the succession for the
first time in two decades. During the past 18 months,
the opposition has demonstrated increasing strength
and independence. In the elections of November 1982,
the opposition parties won a narrow majority in the
Chamber of Deputies as well as 10 of the 23 governor-
ships, including those of the most populous and
wealthy states. They have used their congressional
platform to blast government policies and, along with
dissident PDS elements, have won a role in decision-
making for the legislature, most notably in wresting
concessions from the administration on a key wage-
restraint law last November.
The PMDB
We agree with US Embassy and press accounts that
as the largest opposition party-its congressional
strength is nearly equal to that of the PDS-the
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party sees its best
chance in a return to direct elections. The PMDB has
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
been sponsoring mass demonstrations in Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, and other cities calling for direct
balloting. The party has introduced in Congress a
constitutional amendment substituting direct elections
for the current system.
Failing this, however, the PMDB's sizable moderate
wing appears willing to strike a deal for joint action
with government party delegates to the electoral
college who might be unenthusiastic about Maluf or
Andreazza. Gover-
nor Tancredo Neves of Minas Gerais, leader of the
PMDB moderates, has often been mentioned publicly
and privately as a possible consensus candidate ac-
ceptable to Figueiredo and much of the PDS leader-
ship. The US Embassy reports that Neves, who is
interested in running, intends to seek electoral college
votes from the PDS if the movement for direct
balloting fails
The Others
Although small in size, several other parties are trying
to take advantage of the government's loss of control
and position themselves to play a role in the succes-
sion. The Democratic Workers' Party (PDT) has 25X1
particular significance for the succession issue be- 25X1
cause it is the personal vehicle of populist Governor
Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro, who,
has strong presidential ambitions25X1
Lacking a grassroots organization outside that state25X1
and Rio Grande do Sul, and with only 30 electoral
college delegates, Brizola's strategy has been to press
for direct elections because some public opinion polls
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
October was negotiating a joint strategy with PMDB
leaders for pressing the government to allow direct
balloting and for his becoming the candidate of a
unified opposition bloc.
Other parties do not figure prominently, in large part
because of their small size and limited influence:
? The Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) has only a handful
of votes in the electoral college but could welcome
an offer to form an electoral alliance with the PDS
in exchange for ministerial portfolios.
? The Workers' Party (PT), a leftist group centered on
the industrial areas of Sao Paulo, has even fewer
electoral college votes, and we judge it will have
only marginal weight unless the race is very close.
? The two Communist parties and other groups on the
far left are small-totaling 10,000-15,000 members
nationally-and outlawed by the regime.
Even though, after 20 years in power, the military is
voluntarily relinquishing its status as the dominant
political player, it shows no inclination to withdraw
from politics entirely. We judge the armed forces, in
keeping with long-established practice, would be
quick'to defend their corporate interests and to put
down perceived threats to national security. Ultimate-
ly, in our opinion, the military will remain the final
arbiter of Brazilian politics, notwithstanding the new
emphasis on becoming a more effective fighting force.
In this light, the armed forces believe they have a
stake in the presidential succession and intend' to
define the parameters of the process. Despite Army
Minister Pires's public statements that the military
would not be involved in selecting the next president,
it already has asserted its influence.
Figueiredo ceased promoting direct elections
We believe that the active-duty military is loyal to
Figueiredo-despite some uneasiness over his inept
leadership and mishandling of the economy-and is
presently committed to a return to the barracks. The
President has removed most hardliners from key
posts, and all members of the high command owe
their positions to him.
the military leadership wants to concen-
trate on modernizing the armed forces in the wake of
the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands in
1982. Several recent academic studies also conclude
that the armed forces are eager to allow a civilian
regime to grapple with the country's tough economic
problems
We believe the upper echelons of the officer corps
share common views on the limits of abertura and the
military's proper role in politics. Army Minister Wal-
ter Pires appears to be the spokesman for the armed
forces and works closely with the other service chiefs.
We have no indication of any challenge to the military
leadership, and the only penalties meted out to offi-
cers over the past year have been for relatively minor
breaches of discipline. Thus, in the event of a political
crisis, the officer corps probably would be able to act
with a high degree of consensus-historically a pre-
requisite for military pressure or intervention in
Brazil.
last-November after his military advisers told him the
armed forces considered such a change unacceptable.
he service chiefs reiterated
this point in February, prompting Figueiredo to sum-
mon the contenders for the PDS nomination in an
unsuccessful attempt to restore party unity and head
off the movement for direct elections.
In addition to this behind-the-scenes activity, the
armed forces have publicly reminded the country that
they are not indifferent to the succession issue. In late
February, following personal criticisms of Figueiredo
by speakers at direct election rallies, the service chiefs
warned they would tolerate neither public disorder
nor insults to the President or the armed forces. In the
same statement, the military leaders affirmed their
intention to defend the Constitution-a veiled asser-
tion, we believe, of their opposition to the proposed
amendment establishing direct elections.
Many officers I are
concerned that choosing the next president by popular
vote would constitute a plebiscite on military rule and
discredit the institution. In addition, according to
the US defense
attache, they fear the election of a "radical" like
Governor Brizola, whom they see as a symbol of the
leftist policies that provoked their intervention in
1964.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
secret
25X1
25X1
The prosecution of top officers by the new civilian
administration of Raul Alfonsin in Argentina also has
unsettled many in the Brazilian armed forces.
high-level officers
of abide similar actions
against those involved in antisubversive efforts in
US defense attache reporting indicates that middle-
grade Army officers believe Golbery and former 25X1
President Geisel, who recently endorsed Chaves, will
join forces to try to guarantee an outcome to their
liking.
While we believe other players, such as business
groups, public opinion, the media, labor, and the
Catholic Church, have contributed to the acceleration
of abertura, they probably will have little direct voice
in the succession:
The armed forces, however, appear willing to accept
any candidate chosen by indirect balloting
(press
and US defense attache reporting, indicate that Vice
President Chaves is the choice of most officers, al-
though he could be hurt by a recent rumor cam-
paign-probably initiated by another candidate-
equating him with Argentine President Alfonsin.
Although the active-duty military is restricting its role
to that of a somewhat biased referee, a few high-
ranking retired officers appear to be seeking a more
direct say in the process. Gen. Golbery do Couto e
Silva, top presidential adviser both in the Geisel
administration and, until his resignation in 1981, in
the current administration as well, has publicly criti-
cized Figueiredo's leadership and is working to ensure
that the President does not impose his successor.
Golbery last
September was backing Maluf, possibly as a way to
block Andreazza and secure for himself a role in
choosing a compromise PDS candidate. As the mili-
tary's premier geopolitical theorist, Golbery probably
retains substantial influence within the armed forces.
? Business leaders, thoroughly alienated by govern-
ment policies, talked in mid-1983 of pooling their 25X1
efforts to influence the selection of the next presi-25X1
? The government so far has been able to ignore
overwhelming sentiment-indicated by opinion
and mass demonstrations-in favor of direct
elections.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
polls
25X1
25X1
? The media have fanned public concern by exposing 25X1
official corruption, criticizing the government, and
promoting direct elections, but Brasilia has succeed- 25X1
ed to some extent in muting their attacks by cutting
state enterprises' advertising expenditures.
? The union movement is in disarray because workers
generally are more concerned with survival than
challenging the status quo, according to press and
US Embassy reporting.
? We see no indications that the church, notwith-
standing its local activism and its role as social
conscience, is trying to influence the presidential 25X1
succession
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
Persistent public and private speculation about
changes in the electoral rules has added to the
uncertainty surrounding the succession. Although
proposals have arisen from several quarters, the presi-
dential palace has been the principal player, due to
Figueiredo's interest in stopping Maluf and regaining
some influence over the choice of his successor)
Last year, the President seems to have viewed direct
elections as a possible way to thwart Maluf, whose
popular support is untested. In October and Novem-
ber, Figueiredo publicly raised the possibility of
changing to direct balloting, but, as mentioned earli-
er, at year's end he reversed himself in the face of
opposition from the armed forces and the PDS leader-
ship. In the meantime, the opposition parties and the
media have fueled public sentiment for direct elec-
tions, and our analysis of the press indicates the issue
recently has superceded the IMF-mandated austerity
program as Brazil's number-one political question. By
early February,
the groundswell for a change in the electoral proce-
dures might become uncontrollable, although such a
move would still require a constitutional amendment
needing the approval of two-thirds of Congress.
the regime also has consid-
ered the alternative of a consensus candidate-that is,
one acceptable both to Figueiredo's loyalists in the
PDS and to the opposition PMDB's moderate wing-
.to run against Maluf in the electoral college
the gathering
momentum for direct elections has sparked renewed
interest in such a plan on the part of Figueiredo's.
power of the next president by limiting his role to
ceremonial head of state and thereby making his
acceptability less important.
the US Embassy, report
that the President's advisers also have considered
instituting an interim presidency. This would be ac-
complished either through an extension of Figueire-
do's term or, more likely, the selection of a "national
unity" stand-in to be followed by direct elections
within two or three years. According to the US
Embassy, Governor Brizola was promoting a similar
plan last year in the hope of making a bid for the
presidency by popular vote in 1987. An interim
arrangement probably would be possible only with a
consensus candidate, because Figueired
will not consent to extending
his term. Like a switch to direct elections or a
parliamentary system, this option also requires chang-
ing the Constitution. Its proponents seem to be hold-
ing the interim presidential option in reserve, in case
the present system gives signs of leading to a distaste-
ful outcome
In our judgment, the next president most likely will be
chosen according to the existing formula-indirect
elections in January 1985. Opposition from the mili-
tary, as well as from many within the PDS who do not
want to give up the party's advantage, probably will
be adequate to block a constitutional amendment
allowing direct balloting. Moreover, the President's
public withdrawal from the succession process and the
government's weakened authority probably all but
rule out an attempt to impose a candidate through a
flagrant manipulation of the electoral procedures,
such as expanding the size of the electoral college and
stacking it with administration supporters.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
the US Embassy have
reported discussions within the administration about
switching to a parliamentary system. The main ad-
vantage of such a change would be to weaken the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
We believe that Figueiredo, at least in the short term,
will continue bolstering Andreazza's candidacy from
behind the scenes. The President also is likely to use
the intelligence services, despite their lack of success
so far, in an effort to discredit Maluf. Figueiredo's
obstinacy, the momentum these efforts have already
gathered, and the President's lingering desire to play
kingmaker like his predecessors argue this course.
We judge, however, that Maluf retains at least even
odds to win the presidency. The Congressman from
Sao Paulo has built a strong lead for the PDS
nomination through early and tireless campaigning;
he is not opposed by the military and appears to have
the support of some retired but influential officers. As
the PDS candidate, he would enjoy a clear-cut advan-
tage in the electoral college, and his enemies will be
hard pressed to put together a bloc powerful enough
to frustrate him. Maluf has all the advantages and
disadvantages of a front-runner. He probably will
have to cement a coalition strong enough for a first
ballot victory at the PDS convention or risk desertion
by his opportunistic backers.
Chaves could gain the presidency either as the PDS
nominee or as a consensus candidate in the electoral
college, but we judge the odds at 2 to 1 against him.
He would be the most likely benefactor if Maluf's
support evaporates at the convention. The Vice Presi-
dent already has a core of support within the party,
and his potential ability to win opposition votes in the
electoral college-based on his willingness to reach
out to various sectors during his tenure as Acting
President-would enhance his appeal within the PDS
as a compromise candidate. If Maluf walks away with
the party's nomination, Chaves still would have an
outside chance in the electoral college under the
banner of a "stop Maluf ' coalition.
Andreazza, we believe, faces odds of 3 to 1. He has no
route to the presidency other than the PDS nomina-
tion, and, despite recent endorsements by several
important party leaders, he seems unlikely to overtake
Maluf's early lead. Both Maluf and Chaves would
probably have to stumble or miscalculate to give
Andreazza the PDS nomination. In addition, An-
dreazza, just as much as Maluf, would be vulnerable
to a "stop" campaign in the electoral college
We estimate the odds against Neves at 5 to 1, largely
because negotiating an agreement on a consensus
candidacy would be difficult. The many components
of the fragmented parties have different equities to
protect. Moreover, a variety of reporting suggests 25X1
Neves will be wary of a quixotic adventure; he is
unlikely to place himself at the front of an anti-Maluf
effort unless reasonably confident of victory.
We agree with conventional wisdom holding that the
armed forces are unlikely to halt the transition to 25X1
civilian rule. Rather, we believe they will allow the
selection process to unfold unless their interests are
directly threatened.
25X1
all of the leading candidates are acceptable to the
armed forces, which-barring a change to direct
elections and the prospect of an unacceptable victor
such as Brizola, or a rapid and widespread breakdown
in public order-intend to honor their promise to
return to the barracks. 25X1
We project, however, that no matter which civilian 25X1
wins the election Brazil's political environment will be
decisively altered. Congress, the political parties, and
the business community will have larger voices in
decisionmaking, and public opinion will assume great-
er importance. We see the chief executive, lacking the
extraordinary powers of the military regimes, as less 25X1
By the same token, the new president will be hard
pressed to balance competing interests and maintain
coherent policies. Popular expectations after the long
and gradual opening of the political system will be
difficult to satisfy, especially with the limited re- 25X1
sources available under Brazil's current economic
circumstances. Ad hoc decisionmaking is likely to be
the order of the day, with frequent shifts in direction
.as the administration navigates difficult waters.F_~
The political parties, regardless of the election out25X1
come, probably will undergo restructuring over the
medium term. Created to serve limited purposes
under the military regime, they are ill suited for a
democratic system and have become increasingly
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
divided as the old authoritarian order has been dis-
mantled. The factions of the different parties proba-
bly will re-form in new combinations based on com-
mon principles, loyalty to specific leaders, or
short-term political strategies
Although we rate the odds at only I in 5 that the next
election will be direct, the Figueiredo administration's
diminished authority leaves it vulnerable to growing
public demands for, and congressional efforts to ef-
fect, such a change. Should the movement for direct
elections appear irresistible, Brasilia probably would
step up its efforts to negotiate the choice of a consen-
sus candidate. This approach, based on an appeal for
national unity, would offer the opportunity both to
block Maluf and deflect the rising clamor for direct
balloting. In such a scenario, we believe Figueiredo
probably would look to the PMDB moderates and his
sometime PTB allies for support. At the very least, he
probably would ask the Superior Electoral Tribunal to
rule that the principle of party loyalty-originally
enacted to facilitate the passage of legislation in
Congress-does not apply to the electoral college.
Such a ruling would allow anti-Maluf forces to con-
tinue trying to put together a deal up to the last
moment
If the administration appears unable to head off direct
elections, the armed forces probably would become
more directly involved. We believe the military's
preferred course of action, in this case, would be to
arrange an interim presidency under an acceptable
civilian or, less likely,.a military officer. The rationale
would be to restore some measure of stability before
holding presidential elections, perhaps within two
years. If the military believed it could not blunt the
momentum for direct elections or that difficulties in.
postponing them for so long were too great, we judge
the high command almost certainly would insist on
manipulating the rules to disqualify popular civilian
candidates like Brizola, whose political views are
unacceptable. Most politicians probably would go
along with either option, believing, as we do, that
otherwise the military would abort the transition
process. The desire to keep abertura on track thus will
constrain the assertiveness of most government party
and opposition leaders.
A second scenario likely to draw the armed forces
more directly into the political process is predicated
on a rapid and widespread breakdown in public order.
This could stem either from economic complaints, or
from the campaign for direct elections turning violent,
or from a combination of the two: The military
response probably would be measured and sequential.
First, local units would be called out to put down riots,
strikes, or violent demonstrations. If this action
proved inadequate, the high command probably would
cite the disturbances as justification for an interim
presidency.
In our opinion, the armed forces ultimately would be
willing to intervene directly if necessary to protect
their institutional interests. For example, the election
of Brizola or another individual too closely identified
with the left, the threat by any government to prose-
cute officers for corruption or human rights abuses, or
a more serious breakdown in public order probably
would be enough to overcome the military's reluc-
tance to reassume direct rule.
Until the election early next year, heightened political
activity and the uncertainty surrounding its outcome
may, make it difficult for Brasilia to resolve certain
bilateral and international issues. The electoral cam-
paign is likely to highlight Brazil's financial plight
and probably will increase the pressures for moderat-
ing the government's austerity program and for de-
manding more lenient terms from the IMF and
foreign creditors. In addition, disputes within the
bureaucracy over sensitive issues-arms sales to Iran,
for example-probably will not be settled definitively
as Figueiredo's term draws to a close, hindering US
efforts to find a responsive and influential audience
for some policy initiatives. Moreover, any perceptions
that US officials or media favor a particular candi-
date will be interpreted harshly by the Brazilians as
meddling in their internal affairs and might under-
mine that candidate's prospects.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
Secret
Over the longer term, an orderly transition to civilian
rule would further US interests in the region. It would
be a significant step, even if accomplished through
indirect elections, toward creating a more broadly
based government responsive to a range of interest
groups in Brazilian society.
In our opinion, US commercial interests probably
would be most comfortable initially with Maluf, who
has a strong probusiness background.
he has offered the Foreign
Ministry in his administration to former Planning
Minister Roberto Campos. This choice reinforces
Maluf's pro-free-enterprise attitudes and also sug-
gests that Brazil might edge toward closer economic
relations with Japan and the industrial West.
The unpredictability of the new political environment
will, of course, entail risks for the United States..
Although all of the leading presidential candidates are
moderates who probably intend to maintain correct
bilateral relations, according to US Embassy report-
ing, the winner will need to demonstrate his inde-
pendence from Washington in certain areas and may
adopt policies at variance with US interests. More-
over, in the new political environment the next presi-
dent, unlike the isolated Figueiredo, will not be able to
ignore the demands of interest groups and the public
in general. Such pressures are likely to push Figueire-
do's successor toward, for example, a harder line in
negotiations with the IMF and foreign creditors.
A resumption of military rule, which would become
more likely if the new administration were chronically
ineffective or ventured into populist politics, would
complicate bilateral relations and set back US policy
aimed at encouraging democratization in South
America.
A reversal of abertura would frustrate public aspira-
tions for civilian government and almost certainly
would entail some measure of repression. Very few
elements outside the armed forces would support a
coup, and the extreme left might again use urban
terrorism to pressure the government.
In addition, the return of the Brazilian military to
power might adversely affect the regional trend to-
ward civilian rule. It would dishearten opposition
groups in Chile and Paraguay and probably would
embolden elements in the Uruguayan armed forces to
delay their return to the barracks. Such a Brazilian
example might also foster greater resistance in Argen-
tina to President Alfonsin's efforts to establish civilian
control over the discredited military there
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
Appendix
Leading Candidates
Paulo Maluf, 52
Congressman
An effective campaign based on largesse and personal contacts over the
past two years has made Maluf the favorite for the PDS presidential
nomination, despite President Figueiredo's strong opposition. Criticized for
corruption and blatant opportunism, the Congressman nonetheless is 25X1
acceptable to the military, Stopping
his bid for the presidency may require changes in the electoral procedures
or an agreement between opposition leaders and anti-Maluf elements in the
PDS to back a consensus candidate.
Aureliano Chaves, 55
Vice President
Widespread favorable reaction to Chaves's performance as Acting Presi-
dent last year brightened his prospects considerably. He is acceptable to
most groups and, according to press reports, is the favorite of the armed
forces. Although he could emerge as a PDS compromise candidate if
Maluf fails to sweep the party convention next September, his best chance
appears to be as the standard bearer of a "national unity" ticket of PDS
loyalists and opposition party elements.
Mario Andreazza, 65
Interior Minister
Andreazza's principal assets are the financial resources of his ministry,
which aid his courting of state and local party leaders, and Figueiredo's
support. These, however, probably will not be enough to win him the PDS
nomination. is reputation for corrup-
tion has generated substantial opposition to him within the armed forces.
Even if Chaves bows out, Andreazza, a retired Army colonel, will not
easily overtake Maluf.
13 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Secret
Tancredo Neves, 73
Governor of Minas Gerais
Leader of the ascendant PMDB moderates, Neves probably would be
acceptable to the military. His only shot at the presidency, in view of the
PDS majority in the electoral college, would be as a consensus candidate.
He probably will be reluctant to resign the governorship with two and a
half years left in his term, however, unless he believes victory is certain.
Moreover, his age will increase the odds against him.
25X1
Long Shot
Jose Costa Cavalcanti, 66
President of Electrobras and Itaipu Binational Commission
A successful veteran administrator and retired Army general, Costa
Cavalcanti is close to Figueiredo and, we believe, acceptable to the
military. He lacks strong support among civilian politicians, however, and
has no bloc of committed PDS delegates. Virtually his only hope is that a
stalemated party convention will turn to him as a compromise candidate.
Leonel Brizola, 62
Governor of Rio de Janeiro
A charismatic populist and founder of the PDT, Brizola overcame the
administration's determined opposition to win the Rio governorship in
November 1982. Public opinion polls show him to be the most popular
politician nationwide, even though his ineffective state administration has
cost him much of the middle class support that carried him to victory in
Rio. With no chance under current electoral rules, Brizola is pressing for
direct elections, but the military distrusts him and probably would not
tolerate his assuming the presidency.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5
Sec.
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200170004-5