CUBA: CASTRO'S PROPAGANDA APPARATUS AND FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200050008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Foreign Policy
Cuba:
Castro's Propaganda Apparatus
Seems
ALA 83-10187
December 1983
Copy 2 9 0
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba:
Castro's Propaganda Apparatus
and Foreign Policy
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 83-10187
December 1983
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Cuba:
Castro's Propaganda Apparatus
and Foreign Policy
Key Judgments Cuban President Fidel Castro has long considered propaganda to be one of
Information available the most potent weapons in his foreign policy arsenal. His use of the few
as oft November 1983 propaganda assets available to him-personal interviews with journalists,
was used in this report
radiobroadcasts, and special publicity-seeking operations-during his guer-
rilla war against Batista contributed in a major way to his victory and was
a preview of the methods he would use so successfully after coming to
power.
Immediately after assuming power, he set about creating a propaganda
empire that today is perhaps the most effective in the hemisphere and has
connections worldwide. The empire is directed by a clique made up of
Castro and his old guerrilla comrades; this ensures a permanent antipathy
toward the United States.
This network consists of a global news agency, international broadcasting
facilities, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, front groups, "friend-
ship" institutes, sports and cultural activities, and a wide variety of
miscellaneous organizations.
Cuba's news service has 36 offices around the world, transmits stories in
four languages, and publishes a variety of magazines and news periodicals
that are disseminated to readers in numerous Western and Third World
nations. Cuba's broadcast facilities include eight transmitters on the
island-ranging up to 100 kilowatts-and two transmitters in the USSR.
Shortwave broadcasting alone exceeds 400 hours weekly in eight languages
to Europe, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban Institute for
Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP) is designed to organize in foreign
countries associations that are responsive to direction from Havana. There
are now 113 such associations throughout the world.
The Castro regime constructed a $25 million Palace of Conventions in
Havana to host international gatherings designed to focus world opinion on
specific issues or to promote Cuban prestige. In addition, Cuban cultural
institutions such as the Casa de las Americas have effectively mobilized
Latin American intellectuals-many of them prestigious-in support of
the Cuban revolution. Cuba's publishing houses have turned out some
17,000 titles and over 500 million copies of books and pamphlets, a
significant amount being propaganda. Cuban books are now distributed in
more than 60 countries.
Castro's propaganda successes are impressive. Despite economic ruin in his
country, he has been able to project such a favorable image of Cuba that
Third World leaders see it as a model for other developing countries.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10187
December 1983
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Despite relentless meddling abroad, he has been able to convince many
influential individuals that he is willing to abide by correct standards of in-
ternational behavior.
It is clear from Cuban Government statements that propaganda will
continue to be a major priority and will expand in certain key areas.
Although economic constraints will hamper this effort, we are likely to see
new investments made to:
? Improve the availability of Cuban books and magazines abroad.
? Open new bureaus of Cuba's international news agency and increase the
number of subscribers for that news agency's services:
? Help allies develop their own propaganda outlets for both domestic and
international audiences.
? Train foreign journalists to make the most of their skills and opportuni-
ties in non-Marxist countries.
? Establish and promote ostensibly independent news-gathering and pro-
fessional organizations of leftists to provide competition for-and reduce
the influence of-Western news agencies, journalists, and radio stations.
In our view, the bitterly anti-US bias of Castro's propaganda apparatus
will not change because it mirrors his own deep-seated antipathy toward
the United States. He may, from time to time, have the apparatus temper
its invective, but such a muting so far has always proved to be temporary.
He expects the propaganda machine to counter US political moves on a
day-to-day basis. In addition, he intends to use it to produce abroad,
permanent body of literature that, through its scholarship, eloquence, and
sheer volume, will influence current and future generations of Latin
Americans. Castro probably expects this growing body of literature to
cause problems for the United States long after he himself is out of the
picture.
Castro's propaganda mills have sometimes made mistakes. Radio Havana's
reporting on Peru's Maoist Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group, for exam-
ple, has angered the Peruvian Government, and Cuban interpretations of
Belize's history have caused local criticism of Havana's anti-US and
antireligious bias. Despite these occasional lapses, however, the Cuban
propaganda machine, enjoying close association with its Soviet counter-
part, ample funding, and competent personnel, will remain an important
negative factor working against US interests worldwide.
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Historical Perspective: In the Sierra Maestra 1
The Structure for Media Management 3
Miscellaneous Propaganda Organs 21
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Cuba:
Castro's Propaganda Apparatus
and Foreign Policy
Historical Perspective: In the Sierra Maestra
Instinct for Publicity. Fidel Castro's instinct for the
value of international propaganda served him spectac-
ularly as early as February 1957, two months after his
infiltration of eastern Cuba by sea. His group of 82
insurgents had been reduced through combat and
desertions to a hardcore of only 18, and government
control of the media left most Cubans with the
impression that the insurgency had failed and that
Castro was dead. To overcome the censorship barrier
and embarrass the Batista administration, Castro sent
a messenger to Havana to invite a foreign journalist to
meet with him in the Sierra Maestra mountains of
eastern Cuba. The journalist picked for the task was
Herbert Matthews of The New York Times.
In three articles resulting from his brief encounter
with Castro, Matthews gave an almost heroic impres-
sion of the Cuban revolutionary, describing him as
"the flaming symbol of the opposition to the regime,"
and boldly predicted that "from the looks of things,
General Batista cannot possibly hope to suppress the
Castro revolt"-a judgment made at a time when the
insurgent band consisted only of 18 poorly armed,
half-starved men on the run.
A political bombshell, the Times articles, with their
photographic evidence of the historic meeting, gave
the lie to Batista's insistence that Castro was dead,
overstated the strength of the insurgent band (thanks
to Castro's deliberate efforts to deceive Matthews),
and gave the insurgents vital international exposure.
Castro's comrade-in-arms, Che Guevara, recalled two
years later: "At that time, the presence of a foreign
journalist, preferably an American, was more impor-
tant to us than a military victory." Within a month of
' This paper-based largely on open sources-is an in-depth exami-
nation of Castro's propaganda apparatus, but it is not all inclusive.
A number of the apparatus's lesser elements have been omitted for
sake of brevity, and no mention has been made of Havana's
extensive use of foreign aid to enhance the Castro regime's image.
The major branches of the propaganda mill, however, are discussed
in sufficient detail to give the reader an adequate appreciation of
the size and sophistication of one of Havana's most important
the Matthews interview, the band of 18 had grown to
about 80. For his support, Matthews was later deco-
rated by Castro.
The intermediaries who had arranged the Matthews
trip later set up a similar propaganda exercise with
the Columbia Broadcasting System. The resulting
television documentary, which included a dramatic
interview with Castro atop the highest mountain peak
in Cuba, further enhanced the rebels' romantic image.
Radio Rebelde. The second phase of Castro's propa-
ganda war against Batista opened a year later on
Cuba's independence day when a rebel radio located
at Che Guevara's headquarters in the Sierra Maestra
began nightly broadcasts on shortwave. The use of
shortwave, which meant it could not be heard in
eastern Cuba itself, suggests it was intended as much
for listeners abroad as for those on the island. Castro's
first speech on Radio Rebelde suggests the same; he
opened by appealing "to public opinion in Cuba and
to the free peoples of Latin America," and criticized
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democratic governments, leaders, and parties'of the 25X1
region for their tolerance of the Batista dictatorship.
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A popular Venezuelan station began taping the rebel
broadcasts and replaying them on mediumwave-
clearly audible in eastern Cuba at night-which was,
according to the insurgent radio's engineer, a source
of great satisfaction in the rebel camp. Another
important Venezuelan broadcaster later did the same
on both mediumwave and shortwave and eventually
stations in Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, and even
Argentina were involved in the retransmissions.
By late 1958 Radio Rebelde's nightly broadcasts
could be heard throughout the Caribbean Basin and
were clearly audible in Washington. Thus, Radio
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Rebelde, powered by less than 150 watts, became a
major factor in putting Batista on the defensive'
internationally and in creating a heroic portrait of
Castro.
Castro's Press Club. Radio Rebelde was only part of
Castro's campaign. Journalists from a number of
countries were invited to repeat the Matthews experi-
ence. One of Buenos Aires's most influential radio
stations sent Jorge Ricardo Masetti to the Sierra
Maestra in April 1958. His "instant" book about his
trip, Those Who Fight and Those Who Weep, intro-
duced Castro to Argentina. Masetti was so captivated
that he later returned to Cuba to organize Castro's
international press agency and in 1963, using the alias
Comandante Segundo, died trying to launch a guerril-
Masetti was preceded into the Sierra Maestra by
reporter Enrique Meneses, whose reporting on this
trip appeared in articles in Paris Match. The French
magazine's greatest international competitor, Look
magazine, had already published an interview with
Castro in which Fidel-with an eye for his US
audience-pledged to hold "a truly honest election"
and disclaimed any intention of nationalizing foreign
investments.
During this same period in early 1958, Castro hosted
a Uruguayan journalist and another New York Times
reporter. Foreign journalists were visiting with such
frequency that a sign reading "Press Club," in En-
glish and Spanish, was placed on the rude hut where
the foreign visitors were received at insurgent head-
quarters, and Che Guevara jokingly referred to it as
"the most exclusive press club in the world."
Headline Grabbers. In addition to entertaining inter-
national journalists during early 1958, the insurgents
carried out special paramilitary operations designed
both to attract the press and to heap scorn on Batista's
security forces. The insurgents' urban apparatus, for
example, kidnaped world-famous Argentine race car
driver Juan Manuel Fangio from a Havana hotel in
broad daylight. Fangio-in Cuba for the Gran Premio
contest-was released unharmed after the race had
started, but gained points for his captors by comment-
ing favorably on the treatment he had received. F_
A second kidnaping, carried out in late June 1958,
involved a busload of about 30 US sailors and ma-
rines, who were held until mid-July. The aims were to
pressure Batista to halt indiscriminate air bombings
of villages in guerrilla territory, to prod the United
States into making demands on Batista to rescue its
personnel that he could not fulfill and thus to discredit
him, and to alert the US public to the savagery with
which the Batista forces were pursuing the civil war.
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la war in his homeland.
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Argentine journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti, seen here (center) with
Castro's guerrilla forces in the Sierra Maestra in 1958, later
became the first director of Castro's news agency Prensa Latina.
Through his broadcasts, his careful cultivation of
foreign journalists, and his propaganda-oriented para-
military operations, Castro succeeded in internation-
alizing the conflict. Besides arousing broad interna-
tional sympathy, his efforts yielded tangible benefits.
His propaganda campaign almost certainly played an
important part in the US decision in March 1958 to
suspend arms shipments to Cuba. It also elicited
important support in arms and money from abroad.
The Structure for Media Management
Castro's Personal Control. Once in power, Castro
began organizing what is today an international me-
dia empire unmatched in Latin America. As in other
Communist countries, this empire is tightly controlled
by the Cuban Communist Party's Political Bureau,
the regime's highest policymaking body. This network
consists of such organizations as radio stations, a news
agency with offices around the globe, newspapers, .
magazines, publishing houses, front groups, "friend-
ship" institutes, professional associations, as well as
ad hoc devices, including international meetings,
sham tribunals, cultural displays, speaking tours, and
literary contests-all of which are dedicated to pro-
moting the Cuban line and denigrating the United
States. Some operate overtly as acknowledged organs
of the Cuban Government while others are fronts
ostensibly free of Cuban influence. The efforts of this
vast party-controlled apparatus are carefully synchro-
nized with and supplemented by the personal efforts
of Castro and other top Cuban officials, who use their
prerogatives of office and their considerable powers of
persuasion to sway foreign figures of influence and
exploit the non-Cuban media.
Topping this media monolith is Castro himself. His
concern for propaganda nuances is so great that,
he sometimes visits the
editorial off-ices of the party's daily newspaper,
Granma, late at night to review the next day's edition
or direct the exact placement of a story.
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sees Castro's propaganda empire.
headquarters of Cuba's international news agency,
Prensa Latina, to make a statement that he wants
disseminated abroad as a response to quick-breakin
ly demonstrated a keen personal interest in how news
is presented, always trying to gain the maximum
political benefit from it. Granma director Jorge
Enrique Mendoza-who got his start in propaganda
as an announcer on Castro's clandestine Radio Re-
belde-is authorized to contact Castro at any time of
the day or night to resolve journalistic problems,
Castro's chief political officer, Antonio Perez
Herrero, a Political Bureau alternate member who
functions as party secretary for ideology, oversees
day-to-day operations of the media empire, ensuring.
that it accurately reflects Castro's thinking. A guerril-
la veteran, he rose quickly in Raul Castro's Armed
Forces Ministry after the revolution to become a vice
minister and chief political officer for the entire
military establishment.
Orlando Fundora Lopez, former director of Ra-
dio Havana, has been chief of the Central Com-
mittee's Revolutionary Orientation Department
The Revolutionary Orientation Department. Perez
Herrero exerts control over the media empire through
the Revolutionary Orientation Department, an office 25X1
of the party's Central Committee charged with estab-
lishing ideological guidelines and ensuring that they
are followed. The department's chief, Orlando
Fundora Lopez, has served in this position since
September 1967 and is directly subordinate to Perez
Herrero. According to press reports, it is not unusual
for either or both to accompany Castro on trips
abroad to ensure that his tight control of the media is
not loosened by distance.
Fundora's department includes Granma, which, in
addition to its daily schedule for domestic consump-
tion, publishes three weekly editions-in Spanish,
English, and French-for distribution abroad. The
department's Radio, TV, and Documentary Film
Section controls domestic broadcasting as well as
Radio Havana shortwave and La Voz de Cuba me-
diumwave for external audiences. Its Press Section
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The Revolutionary Orientation Department (DOR)
all Cuban propaganda is directed and controlled by
the DOR. The DOR is responsible for formulating
annual "theme plans "for the Cuban media. Addi-
tional plans are made up on an ad hoc basis,
When unforeseen international events occur for which
no Cuban policy exists, the DOR awaits the official
Soviet reaction in TASS and then follows TASS's
lead. Should Prensa Latina ever take a stance that is
later contradicted by TASS, the Cuban news agency
has standing instructions to reverse itself and fall in
presumably to meet changing conditions.
In past years, "theme plans" have consistently in-
cluded the following.
? Emphasis on the values of socialism, traditionally
a first priority theme.
? Denigration of US foreign policy. The amount of
stress placed on this theme fluctuates depending on
the state of Cuban-US relations.
? Glorification of the institution.of "Poder Popular,"
Cuba's system of local, provincial, and national
governmental administration.
? Stress on alleged religious freedom in Cuba.
? Praise for Soviet efforts to maintain world peace.
line with TASS.
The heads of news agencies of Communist countries
meet in Moscow or another Communist capital at
least once a year to discuss common policy and
problems, and to be brought up to date on new
communications equipment and techniques. Similar
meetings are held by the various Communist Party
ideology secretaries and other party functionaries to
coordinate their policies.
? Defense of Soviet policies at all levels.
supervises the international news agency, Prensa La-
tina, and its domestic counterpart, Agencia Informa-
tive Nacional. It also has history, publications, and
publicity sections as well as several others that have
not yet been identified.
gathered more than 500 foreign journalists and news
photographers, mostly from Latin America, in Ha-
vana to try to overcome the bad press that resulted
from a wave of executions immediately following his
victory over Batista. The high point of Operation
Truth occurred on 22 January when Castro met with
The Components of the Apparatus
Prensa Latina. Perhaps the most effective-and, from
the US viewpoint, most dangerous-Cuban propagan-
da weapon is Prensa Latina, which not only dissemi-
nates a daily stream of propaganda hostile to the
United States, but also serves as a cover for intelli-
gence collection and operations; on occasion it fills a
diplomatic function by using branch offices as de
facto embassies.
According to the authors of a Cuban history of the
agency, the idea for Prensa Latina was born at the
time of Operation Truth in mid-January 1959 when
Castro, complaining of a conspiracy against him and
his revolution by the international news agencies,
the assembled army of newspersons.
In condemning the Western wire services, he lament-
ed that "we don't have (our own) international wire
services. You Latin American journalists have no
other choice but to accept what the (US and Europe-
an) wire services tell you. The Latin American press
ought to have the means that would permit it to know
the truth and not be victim to the lie." He urged the
journalists to become involved: "Do you journalists
want to help the oppressed? Well, you have a formi-
dable weapon in your hand: continental public opin-
ion. Use it and you will see how you can help to
liberate people and save many lives."
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On hand for Castro's spectacular press conference they had returned to Cuba from Buenos Aires in early
were Carlos Maria Gutierrez and Jorge Ricardo January 1959 and had helped Castro prepare for
Masetti, two pro-Castro journalists whose radical Operation Truth. Following Castro's plea, they pre-
bona fides had been established during their visit to pared the groundwork for what six months later was
Che Guevara's "press club" in the Sierra Maestra in to become Prensa Latina.
1958. Responding to a personal invitation from Che,
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In April 1959 Mexican. industrialist Guillermo Castro
Ulloa arrived in Havana to conclude the preparations
for the agency, later becoming its first president. On
9 June, it was formally inaugurated, and on 16
June-with Masetti as its director general-Prensa
Latina began its first transmissions to subscribers
abroad.
By the end of the year, Prensa Latina had, in addition
to its service in Spanish for Latin America, a trans-
mission in English for Egypt's Middle East News
Agency and Yugoslavia's Tanyug news agency. Its
Spanish transmissions were also directed to Czecho-
slovakia for CTK and to Poland for PAP. A year after
its creation, Prensa Latina had branch offices in
Washington, New York, London, Paris, Geneva, and
Prague, as well as in all countries of Latin America
except Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicara-
gua. By the end of 1972, it boasted of two national
and 12 international radio circuits and an average
daily transmission total of 2,500 news dispatches. In
1975 it began a Quechua Indian language news
service for Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
Today, Prensa Latina transmits in four languages-
Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French-on short-
wave to all parts of the world-its news in Spanish is
on the air 18 hours a day-and provides additional
transmissions in undetermined languages on satellite
facilities. It has 36 branch offices in major cities of
the world from Tokyo and Luanda to Moscow and
Buenos Aires. (See figure 1 at back of book.) It boasts
a special services department that offers a variety of
journalistic support materials, including: photograph-
ic packages of events or personalities; compilations of
basic data for background presentations; recorded
interviews with leading political, cultural, and sports
figures; political or economic commentaries on a
single country or an entire region by experienced
observers; and feature articles on virtually any subject
that a newspaper or magazine would be interested in
publishing. These made-to-order services can be pro-
vided in Spanish, French, or English.
Prensa Latina also publishes its own magazines and
news periodicals. Its monthly 64-page Prisma
Latinoamericano, with a format designed to compete
with Time, has a Spanish edition sold in Spain and
nine countries of Latin America, and a Portuguese
edition for Portugal, Brazil, and five African coun-
tries. Prisma's news items and illustrations invariably
have an anti-US slant intended to condition its read-
ers to view the United States as the source of all the
world's ills. Its half- and full-page advertisements for
products of major Spanish and Portuguese manufac-
turers lend it respectability. Begun in May 1975
(Portuguese edition in 1981), Prisma is staffed by
some of Prensa Latina's most professional and effec-
tive writers. An English-language version of Prisma
first appeared in September 1982. Printed in Prague
through agreement with CTK, it is avowedly aiming
for distribution in the United States, Canada, Great
Britain, Japan, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria, South Yemen, Tanzania, Nigeria,
Libya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
A companion to Prisma is Cuba Internacional, a
large-format, 72-page monthly in Spanish that relies
on illustrations and feature articles, many of which
are devoted to presenting an optimistic picture of life
in Cuba or lauding the exploits of Cuban aid missions
abroad and Cuban sports teams in international com-
petition. Like Prisma, it is consistently anti-United
States. The April 1983 issue, for example, carried a
six-page article entitled "Strategy of Terror," which
purports to be the confession of an Argentine intelli-
gence officer who allegedly took part in a US-
sponsored plot to subvert Nicaragua. Cuba Interna-
cional is distributed in Spain, Portugal, Angola, and
nine countries of Latih America. It also has a Rus-
sian-language edition for. the USSR.
In addition, Prensa Latina publishes PEL, or Panora-
ma Economico Latinoamericano, a 16-page, fort-
nightly publication in Spanish that provides articles
on "the principal international economic problems ...
with special attention to themes related to Asia,
Africa, and Latin America." The Prensa Latina office
in Prague, Czechoslovakia, publishes Latin American
Roundup (Sintesis Latinoamericana), a twice-weekly
wrap-up of events in Latin America in both an
English and a Spanish edition. Also in English and
Spanish editions is Direct From Cuba, a fortnightly,
30-page Prensa Latina product that aims "to place at
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the reach of progressive publications all over the globe
the most important, permanent, and current informa-
tion from our network of correspondents in Cuba,
Latin America, and other parts of the world." Prensa
Latina and the Soviet Novosti news agency office in
Havana jointly publish Integration Economica Socia-
lista, a monthly, 12-page collection of articles on the
economic activities of the countries of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA); it is basically
a public relations vehicle for CEMA.
Prensa Latina facilities are not used exclusively for
journalistic purposes. When Havana closed its embas-
sy in Caracas in 1980 and withdrew its diplomatic
personnel from Venezuela, for example, the Prensa
Latina office there assumed diplomatic functions.
figure 2 at back of book.)
International Broadcasting. Before Castro came to
power, Cuba had no international shortwave broad-
casting service. Today the Castro regime has Radio
Havana, an official government entity that, according
to regular observations, broadcasts over 400 hours per
week on shortwave in eight languages to the countries
of Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Ameri-
cas. From a single low-powered transmitter inaugu-
rated in 1961, Radio Havana has grown into one of
the leaders of the Third World in the field of interna-
tional broadcasting. It now has at least eight transmit-
ters in Cuba ranging up to 100 kilowatts in power,
and also uses two transmitters in the USSR. (The use
of Radio Moscow's transmitters to beam Cuban
broadcasts to Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa
complements Soviet use of two Cuban shortwave
transmitters for Radio Moscow transmissions to Latin
America.) No other government in Latin America has
a comparable international broadcasting service. (See
Radio Marti.
Radio Havana's service on shortwave is supplemented
by La Voz de Cuba, on mediumwave, which broad-
casts approximately 38 hours per week for Spanish-
speaking listeners in the United States and in the
countries bordering the Caribbean. A parallel service
in English-The Voice of Cuba-and retransmissions
of Radio Moscow's English service for North America
were broadcast by some of Cuba's strongest medium-
wave transmitters, including at least one of 150
kilowatts, until late 1981 when both were taken off
the air; their removal, in our judgment, was intended
to deny Washington the opportunity to use retaliation
as grounds for justifying the initiation of US broad-
casts to Cuba on mediumwave over the proposed
The Castro regime has a long history of involvement
in subversive broadcasting efforts. Castro's victory
over Batista was less than a month old before Cuban
commercial broadcasting stations began beaming pro-
grams abroad calling openly for revolution in Haiti,
the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. As Castro's
sponsorship of guerrilla warfare in other countries
grew in 1959 to 1963, clandestine insurgent radio
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stations proliferated. Their links to Cuba were virtual-
ly impossible to prove, but circumstantial evidence
frequently indicated Cuban involvement. For exam-
ple, one short-lived clandestine shortwave station-
Radio Rebelde de Nicaragua-carried little else but
slanted news provided by Prensa Latina.
On other occasions, Cuban complicity was obvious. In
one such incident, for example, one of Radio
Havana's shortwave transmitters was temporarily
taken out of service, and on its frequency there
appeared a "clandestine" radio that displayed techni-
cal characteristics we believe were unique to the
Radio Havana transmitter. The station's pretense that
it was broadcasting from the Dominican Republic was
belied by its inability to provide timely news of fast-
breaking events taking place there. When the radio
ceased its transmissions, Radio Havana resumed its
broadcasts on the same frequency.
More recently, Cuba has been linked to broadcasters
in Costa Rica and, until recently, Grenada; as well as
to clandestine radios associated with Salvadoran in-
surgents. Radio Noticias del Continente, a shortwave
radio.that broadcast openly from San Jose until closed
by the Costa Rican Government in early 1981, regu-
larly attacked the Governments of Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador-at the time,
all standard targets of Cuban propaganda. On the air
for over a year, Radio Noticias was eventually found
to be a propaganda outlet of the Montoneros, an
Noticias' closure evoked a bitter attack from Radio
Havana, which suggests that the Castro regime had
placed a high value on its operation.
the Cuban association with Radio Free Grenada was
open. Cuban communications technicians arrived in
Grenada in May 1979, only two months after
Maurice Bishop seized power, and, according to press
reports, in June 1980 the two countries arranged for
Cuban assistance in the repair and upgrading of
Radio Free.Grenada. Cuba provided a 75-kilowatt
mediumwave transmitter-more powerful by 50 per-
cent. than the strongest commercial mediumwave
broadcasting station in the United States-and
Cuban technicians installed it along with a 400-foot
transmitting tower and ancillary equipment. Havana
provided scholarships for training Grenadian students
who were to maintain and operate the new equipment,
which was inaugurated on 13 March 1982, the third
anniversary of Bishop's takeover.
Presumably to support Radio Free Grenada's news-
casts, Havana inaugurated Prensa Latina press trans-
missions in English to the eastern Caribbean.
According to a press release from the .Cuban Embassy
in St. Georges, the Cuban Radio-Television Institute
also provided Radio Free Grenada with programing in
the fields of culture, sports, the sciences, and music.
Grenadian Information Ministry representatives suc-
ceeded in getting journalists in other Caribbean coun-
tries to publish articles supplied by Radio Free
Grenada-a clear indication, in our judgment, that
the station's broadcasts were expected to have an
impact abroad. The extent of Cuban support for
Radio Free Grenada suggested a high degree of
confidence in Havana that the station would function
as a Cuban propaganda surrogate in the eastern
Caribbean.
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Havana apparently had hoped to make its influence in
Suriname permanent. Cuba funded a small team of
Surinamers sent to the island last year to study
journalism. We believe the students received instruc-
tion on ways to politicize the media.
Following the events in Grenada in October, however,
Bouterse recalled all Surinamers studying in Cuba
and expelled all Cubans-except for a small diplo-
matic team-from Suriname. Havana subsequently
withdrew all its personnel, and this presumably termi-
nated Cuba's direct role in Suriname's media. Never-
theless, the Suriname experience fits the pattern of
Cuban behavior in working quickly to try to exploit
propaganda resources in other countries whenever
political conditions permit.
Cuba's interest in clandestine broadcasting stations is
currently evident in its collaboration with the Salva-
doran insurgents. According to an analysis by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which regu-
larly monitors Havana and the insurgent radios,
"Havana regularly provides a forum for the rebels'
three clandestine radio stations by replaying the
radios' political commentaries, military communi-
ques, and news bulletins." Cuban foreknowledge of
these radios' operations over the past two years has
been proved on three occasions: the Cuban media
gave advance publicity for the guerrillas' Radio
Venceremos before it began broadcasting in January
1981, for Radio Farabundo Marti before it came on
the air in January 1982, and for Radio Guazapa
before it started broadcasts on 21 February 1983.
Last February, Radio Havana admitted openly that
Radio Venceremos maintains a representative in
Havana.
In light of the high value the Castro regime has
always placed on insurgent broadcasting and consid-
ering the material support it has provided the Salva-
doran rebels for years, it seems safe to assume that
Cuba's guerrilla warfare training schools have been
used to teach Salvadorans to operate and maintain
clandestine radios and that Cuban party schools have
provided instruction on the techniques of propaganda.
Central Committee member Rene Rodriguez
Cruz heads the worldwide apparatus of the Cu-
ICAP. The Cuban Institute for Friendship Among
Peoples (ICAP) was established on 30 December 1960
in the midst of a major Cuban campaign to mobilize
popular sentiment in Latin America and Europe
against the anticipated counterrevolutionary invasion
from the United States. The new organization, ac-
cording to the law creating it, was founded "to
stimulate and facilitate the visit to Cuba of the
representatives of the popular and progressive sectors
of all the countries of the world that show interest in
learning first hand the economic and social changes
and the works carried out by the Cuban revolution"
and to assist the groups-such as the United States'
own Fair Play for Cuba Committee-that had been
formed in other countries to publicly demonstrate
support for the Castro regime.
One of ICAP's first tasks was to organize foreigners
in Cuba into associations based on country of origin,
such as the Union of Peruvians in Cuba, the Cuban-
Spanish Friendship Society, the Cuban-Venezuelan
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Institute of Revolutionary Solidarity, the Cuban-
Brazilian Friendship Committee, and the Association
of Guatemalans Residing in Cuba. This provided
Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens
who might prove useful in intelligence collection
efforts and operations in their homelands, and served
as a structure for mobilizing foreign nationals in
demonstrations against the policies of their own gov-
ernments. Every Latin American diplomatic mission
in Havana knew it could face an ICAP-sponsored
parade of its own nationals marching and shouting
outside the embassy walls if frictions developed with
Cuba's revolutionary government.
Subsequently, ICAP, establishing contacts with intel-
lectuals abroad, arranged for them to form local
"friendship" associations responsive to directives from
Havana. Colombian author Leon de Greif, for
example, organized the Colombian-Cuban Friendship
Association in Bogota and was its first president,
while Culture Ministry official Robin Ravales
"Dobru," touted as the "national poet of Suriname,"
heads the Suriname-Cuba Friendship Association in
Paramaribo.
There are now 113 such associations throughout the
world, according to ICAP President Rene Rodriguez
Cruz. In a statement last year, he described them as
being made up of writers, artists, journalists, civil
rights workers, student and labor leaders, politicians
of various ideological stripes, men and women in the
religious life, and others. They "are those who are
charged with refuting in their respective countries the
distorted version that North American imperialism
presents of our social work and our internationalist
assistance to other peoples."
Rodriguez Cruz boasted that through these associa-
tions "we are related to the broadest social, political,
cultural, and mass sectors in every part of the globe."
ICAP's goal, he said, is "to establish a mechanism of
communications between the various social strata of a
given country, a mechanism that is quick and flexible,
without formality or protocol." ICAP, then, is highly
opportunistic, eagerly welcoming propaganda support
from all sources, even those that might be ideological-
ly incompatible.
In his interview, Rodriguez Cruz admitted openly that
ICAP-sponsored friendship associations carry out
their propaganda activities according to prearranged
work plans coordinated with Havana and depend on
Havana for material support. He stressed the "fluid
and systematic interchange" that Cuban officials had
with the leadership of these associations. He also
confirmed Havana's links with-and catalytic role
in-the West European peace movement by saying
that: "we have directed the (friendship) associations
abroad to ... establish broad links with the whole
movement that is promoting actions in defense of
peace. And we can say, without fear of error, that
many of them are carrying out precisely those instruc-
tions." He bragged that "when a great peace move-
ment began in West Germany, the first banner that
waved, carried by the demonstrators, had the initials
of ICAP printed on it." Cuba thus acknowledges that
in effect the 113 friendship associations abroad are
directed from Havana and act on its instructions.F_
In addition to aligning themselves with broadly based
political organizations such as the peace and anti-
nuclear-weapons movements, the friendship associa-
tions distribute Cuban-supplied propaganda, publish
their own pro-Cuban literature, serve as unofficial
spokesmen for the government in Havana, defend
Cuban policy in the local press, and carry out marches
and other demonstrations to focus local attention on
issues that Havana wants to exploit. Even when these
activities involve-very few people and have no measur-
able impact locally, they are duly reported throughout
the hemisphere by Radio Havana, Prensa Latina, and
Cuban newspapers and magazines, and thus promote
an exaggerated impression of substantial popular sen-
timent in favor of Cuban policy and against US
interests.
Bringing foreign groups to Cuba for propaganda
exploitation is another part of ICAP's job. The Nordic
Brigade made up mostly of young Scandanavians, the
Venceremos Brigade from the United States, the
Antonio Maceo Brigade of young Cuban exiles-most
of whom live in the United States-and the Jose
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Marti Brigade of West Europeans all make regular
pilgrimages to Cuba to engage in "constructive
work"-usually symbolic cane cutting or manual
labor in the field of construction-and be rewarded
with a guided tour of the island. The groups from the
United States are usually portrayed by the Cuban
media as typical of the idealistic youth who have
rejected the anti-Castro political judgments of Wash-
ington; in reality, according to accounts by some of
these young visitors, Cuban authorities are wary of
the drug problem these people sometimes bring with
them to Cuba and considerable effort is made to
isolate the members of the brigades to keep them from
"contaminating" the Cuban population.
The Casa de las Americas. Judged from their own
writings and statements, Latin America's intellectu-
als-including many who had been persecuted by
dictatorial regimes in their own countries-took vicar-
ious satisfaction from Batista's downfall and consti-
tuted a continentwide supply of literary and artistic
talent waiting to be tapped on the revolution's behalf.
To help harness the considerable propaganda poten-
tial of this influential segment of Latin American
society, Castro founded the Casa de las Americas in
April 1959, less than four months after he assumed
power. The Casa quickly established itself as an
influential literary institution. For its first 12 years, it
sponsored annual Latin American theater festivals
and in 1965 began publishing a theatrical journal
called Conjunto. In September 1959 it organized the
"Festival Comprension Cuba" for Latin American
writers and used the occasion to publish five books.
That same month, it established its own Jose Antonio
Echeverria Library, which specializes in Latin Ameri-
can studies, and held a series of conferences on the
"American Policy of the Revolution" attended by
prominent cultural and political figures.
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In 1960 the Casa organized what we believe has
become one of its most important political vehicles;
the annual literary contest that awards monetary
prizes to Latin American poets, writers, and play-
wrights in various categories of literature. The "testi-
mony" category for autobiographical writings, for
example, has been particularly useful for calling
public attention to memoirs of those in the region
willing to relate the experiences of urban or rural
guerrilla fighters. The 1970 prize, for example, went
to Argentine journalist Maria Esther Gilio for her
book The Tupamaro Guerrillas. Prize-winning works
are often published by the Casa, giving added prestige
and exposure to the author. In the mid-1970s, when
the Castro regime began paying greater heed to the
former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Casa
added to the annual competition a special category for
authors from the English-speaking Caribbean territo-
ries and still later included a French-language catego-
ry for authors from Martinique, Guadeloupe, and
In June-July 1960, the Casa began publishing its
literary journal, Casa de las Americas, which serves
as a vehicle for shorter works by the region's poets
and writers. Published six times a year, it also has a
book review section that publicizes books with the
appropriate political slant and, conversely, provides a
platform for challenging those not favored. A lengthy
news column alerts the reader to coming cultural
events and details those that have already taken place;
as with the magazine in general, political content-an
anti-US bias-appears to be a major criterion for
selection of material appearing in the column.
In addition to publishing the works of some of the
winners of the annual competition, Casa publishes
book-length material by authors whose literary efforts
are deemed worthy of broad exposure. Perhaps the
most famous example was Regis Debray's Revolution
Within the Revolution?-published in 1967 just in
time for the failure of the guerrilla operation it was
meant to complement-Guevara's Bolivian disaster.
Other Casa books, such as Gerard Pierre Charles'
Haiti: The Uninterrupted Crisis, are designed to
establish the historical justification for a rebellion
that destroys all political, economic, and social institu-
tions in a country and replaces them with "socialist"
institutions.
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French Guiana.
Until her suicide in 1980, the president of the Casa
was Haydee Santamaria, a self-effacing heroine of
the Cuban revolution who always maintained that she
herself was not an intellectual. If her cultural bona
fides were wanting, her credentials as a revolutionary
were impeccable. She was a member of Castro's rebel
force that attacked the Moncada army barracks on 26
July 1953-a futile assault that left both her brother
and her fiance dead of torture and herself a prison-
er-and later worked in the underground in support
of Castro's guerrilla war. Her daring revolutionary
experiences and her tragic personal losses made her a
particularly appealing, dramatic figure for the re-
gion's intellectuals, many of whom could relate to her
sufferings.
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During her tenure as its president, the Casa served the
Castro regime effectively by marshaling supportive
cultural activity and helping create acceptance of
Cuban revolutionary ideology. In our estimation, it
made a major contribution to the formation of a
sizable body of literature that helped to reshape
popular conceptions of armed struggle, dramatize it,
and make it respectable. Revolution became synony-
mous with idealism, and intellectuals, caught up
emotionally, left their normal pursuits to take up
guns.
Author-journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti, for exam-
ple, left Cuba to die in Argentina in 1963 at the head
of a guerrilla band; Peruvian poet Javier Heraud and
a group of young Peruvian intellectuals, according to
Havana's own admission, left Cuba to die in their
homeland in 1963 while trying to rendezvous with a
guerrilla group; French intellectual Regis Debray,
now an official. of the Mitterrand government, scouted
Bolivia for Che Guevara and later was caught and
jailed; Guatemalan poet Otto Rene Castillo, accord-
ing to an account published by the Casa, died in 1967
while serving as a propaganda officer for the Guate-
malan Rebel Armed Forces guerrilla group; noted
Salvadoran poet-author Roque Dalton, who had a
long and warm association with the Casa, died in
1975 in internecine fighting within his rebel move-
ment; Nicaraguan priest-poet Ernesto Cardenal, an-
other friend of the Casa, became an active member of
the Sandinista National Liberation Front and was
given a cabinet post after the ouster of Somoza; and
many others over the years who had links to the Casa
contributed in some form to the fulfillment of the
Cuban armed struggle doctrine. Many more have
willingly aided Cuba in less dramatic but perhaps
more useful pursuits; the staffs of the Casa, Prensa
Latina, and Radio Havana, in particular, have profit-
ed in this fashion.
Never quite confident of her role as a cultural person-
ality, Haydee Santamaria, according to accounts by
knowledgeable observers, left much of the Casa's day-
to-day business to others whose personal prestige
helped it develop into one of the most influential
cultural organizations in Latin America. Noted Cu-
ban leftist intellectuals who staffed it or linked their
reputations to it were joined by foreign intellectuals
such as Argentine Marxist philosopher Ezekial
Martinez Estrada and Guatemala's Manuel Galich.
The latter, a leader of the Guatemalan Communist
Party who was Foreign Minister during the Arbenz
government, was appointed Assistant Director of the
Casa and also headed the Casa's Theater Depart-
ment. Noted Uruguayan leftist author Mario
Benedetti became director of the Casa's Center for
Literary Research when it was created in 1967 and
later gave way temporarily to Colombian writer Oscar
Collazos. Others who helped the Casa earn a highly
respected literary reputation include such notables as
Mexico's Carlos Fuentes, Peru's Mario Vargas Llosa,
Argentina's Julio Cortazar, and many others whose
fame extends beyond their country's borders.
One observer, who in 1977 wrote a sympathetic study
of the Casa and interviewed several of its top figures,
noted that the Casa's history "is the chronicle of the
efforts by Cuban and Latin American vanguard
intellectuals to ally, unite, and integrate intellectual
support for Cuba and the Latin American revolu-
tion," and credited the Casa's magazine with serving
as a forum for Latin American writers and as a
mobilization center for the region's more militant
intellectuals. This description of the Casa's mission
remains true today.
The Performing Arts. It appears that any element of
the performing arts in Cuba is considered an appro-
priate vehicle for disseminating propaganda-an os-
tensibly innocent messenger that, through its polished
performances, conveys a favorable impression about
the Cuban social system. The Cuban National Ballet,
captained by prima ballerina Alicia Alonso, is the
flagship of this segment of the propaganda machinery,
and has performed in many parts of the world from
Hanoi and Moscow to the Kennedy Center in Wash-
ington.
Alonso, who is about 60 years old and almost blind, is
the ballet's director and principal choreographer. She
earned international acclaim in the 1950s and 1960s,
and she has shaped the National Ballet into a respect-
ed representative of the Castro regime. Her state-
ments and actions over the past 24 years indicate
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clearly that she is deeply. committed to Castro's
revolution, and she continues to lend her personal
prestige to it.
Other performing groups that are sent abroad to
enhance Cuban prestige include the National Folklor-
ic Ensemble, the National Symphony Orchestra, and,
more frequently, smaller teams of actors, singers, and
musicians such as the Cubana de Acerb theater
group, which appeared recently in New York, Cuer-
navaca, Morelia, and Mexico City; the Moncada
musical group, back from Portugal where it presented
a selection of Cuban, Nicaraguan, Chilean, and An-
golan revolutionary songs; the Camaguey Ballet Com-
pany, which toured Spain for a month late last year;
the Aragon Orchestra; the Irakere jazz rock band; the
Papines popular music quartet; the Nueva Trova
musical group; and others. We believe their mission is
to help erase the image of the Castro regime as a
promoter of subversion and revolution, and convince
their audiences that Cuba merits closer bilateral ties.
It appears that anti-US themes are usually worked
into performances only where the audience is likely to
be receptive and where they are not likely to interfere
with the primary goal of a favorable impression of
Cuba.
Athletes and Sports Teams. Cuban sports teams and
athletes are also sent abroad as goodwill emissaries
and as evidence of the superiority of the Cuban
system. Because of the stress Havana places on the
politics of international competition, there is great
pressure on Cuban participants to win, especially
when matched against US athletes. A loss to a US
amateur baseball team, for example, is a source of
great embarrassment. The Castro regime invests
heavily in its athletic programs, and its huge represen-
tations at the Central American and Caribbean
Games, a regional competition held every four years,
dwarf the delegations from neighboring countries.
The acquisition of masses of medals is given high
priority because the Cubans realize that the country
that dominates such athletic extravaganzas usually
the "outside world;" earn international respect for
Cuba, pave the way for increased contacts, and help
to overcome the Castro regime's isolation. They also
help to destroy the myth that the Colossus of the
North is invincible, an iconoclastic twist that has
great appeal in many sectors of Latin America and
Europe.
Losers, on the other hand, are politically untenable.
Even though Cuban athletes won 173 gold, 17 silver,
and 40 bronze medals during the Central American
and Caribbean Games in Cuba in August 1982, there
was high-level disappointment in Havana because the
baseball team won none. As a result, the regime
canceled plans to send the team to the world amateur
baseball championship competition in South Korea
the following month. Fielding no team at all was
considered better than fielding one that would be
likely to lose and thus stain Cuba's reputation.
The Cinema. While athletes and performing artists
help to create a general impression that Cuba's
system promotes artistic expression and athletic excel=
lence, the cinema industry is much more directly
propagandist. Cuban films pointedly address political
themes, and film festivals as a matter of course base
the awarding of prizes on political content. A third-
rate film that endorses violent revolution or dispar-
ages the United States is certain to find favor over a
first-rate production that is apolitical.
At the Fourth International Festival of the New Latin
American Film, held in Havana last December, poli-
tics and ideology played the dominant role as usual.
First prize for a documentary film, according to the
Cuban media, was awarded to "Cartas de Morazan"
(Letters From Morazan), a war movie prepared by the
Radio Venceremos propagandists of the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front, the Salvadoran insurgent
group. A similar award in the animated cartoon
category was given to "Cronicas del Caribe" (Chroni-
cles of the Caribbean), a film jointly produced in
Mexico and Puerto Rico that allegedly exposed the
economic penetration of "Yankee imperialism" in the
gets the broadest press coverage.
Because international-class athletes such as boxer
Teofilo Stevenson and runner Alberto Juantorena can
capture headlines in the US press by defeating US
competitors, they are looked upon as important na-
tional assets by the Castro regime. Like their counter-
parts in the performing arts, they establish links with
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Caribbean. A US-produced film, "Americas in Tran-
sition," also got a first prize for "analyzing US
meddling" in Latin America in the 20th century. First
prize for fiction went to "Tiempo de Revancha" (Time
for Revenge), a film that attacked big mining consor-
tiums in Argentina as exploiters of the working class.
This annual festival, first held in December 1979, is a
production of the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic
Art and Industry (ICAIC) of the Ministry of Culture.
Its anti-US mission is clear; ICAIC has stated public-
ly that the festival's purpose is, in its own verbose
description, "to promote the regular meeting of Latin
American film stars who with their work enrich the
artistic culture of our countries, contributing to the
redemption and affirmation of our identity and the
defense of national values and common characteristics
of our peoples in the face of imperialist cultural
domination and deforming penetration."
Films produced in Cuba provide much the same diet
of politically slanted material designed to justify
armed struggle, glorify violent revolution, provide
ideological indoctrination, bolster Cuba's internation-
al standing, and undermine US influence. The film
entitled "No," for example, is a documentary de-
nouncing alleged US plans to manufacture the neu-
tron bomb; "And the Night Became a Rainbow," by
top Cuban filmmaker Santiago Alvarez, covered the
visit of Fidel Castro to Ethiopia in 1978; "Fifty-Five
Brothers" is a full-length film about the return to
Cuba from the United States of a group of young
Cuban exiles; "Pablo," portrays in heroic terms the
exploits of one of Cuba's first Communists in the
1920s and 1930s; "The Survivors" describes how the
bourgeoisie disappears as a class in revolutionary
society.
We believe the distribution, of Cuban films is probably
limited, although they are shown in European and
some US theaters, as well as in Latin America, and
some have even received awards at such noted forums
as the Cannes Film Festival. In addition, Cuban films
on occasion are shown privately by various Cuban
diplomatic missions or Friendship Institutes for select-
ed audiences. Nevertheless, in our opinion, they do not
have to reach a mass audience to provide a notewor-
thy return on Havana's investment. We believe the
Castro regime is satisfied that the films receive
significant exposure among foreign intellectuals,
many of whom can influence public opinion either 25X1
through the media or through their own writings or
other cultural activities.
International Meetings, Conferences, and Sympo-
siums. Havana often hosts international gatherings of
various kinds to focus world opinion on specific issues
or to promote Cuban prestige. To accommodate such
events, the Castro regime in the late 1970s built a
Palace of Conventions in a Havana suburb at a cost of
over 23 million pesos, according to the Cuban media.
These meetings, manipulated to generate propaganda
and create a favorable image of Cuba, range from
small affairs-for example, a modest regional confer-
ence of professionals in a narrow field-to major
conclaves such as the Sixth Nonaligned Movement 25X1
Summit in 1979, the 11th World Festival of Youth
and Students in 1978, the Havana Cultural Congress
of 1968, and the Tricontinental Conference of 1966.
Some, like the Tricontinental and the subsequent
conference of the Latin American Peoples Solidarity
Organization-which were held to set the stage for
Che Guevara's guerrilla war in the Bolivian Andes in
1967-have very specific goals; others, such as those
Havana cosponsors with the United Nations, the
Nonaligned Movement, or other international agen-
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and developing common anti-US themes that range
from the vituperative to the subliminal;
In meetings where Cuba does not control the invita-
tions, such as those of international organizations,
Havana adapts by abusing its position as host to
neutralize potentially uncooperative delegations. One
troublesome delegation to the Nonaligned Movement
Summit in 1979, for example, was assigned housing so
remote from the Palace as to hamper seriously its
liaison with other delegations, according to diplomats
in Havana at that time.
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Castro's efforts to project an image of respectability led him to
assume the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement in 1979.
Because to the Cubans these meetings have political
rationale, cost apparently is a secondary consider-
ation. In 1979, for example, Cuba sent one of its
passenger-cargo ships, the XX Aniversario, to St.
Vincent, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, Montserrat, Gre-
nada, and Guyana to bring 211 artists, performers,
and intellectuals to Cuba for the Third Caribbean
.Festival of the Creative Arts (CARIFESTA 79),
according to press reports. The Cuban national airline
also made charter flights to Venezuela, The Bahamas,
Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico on similar
missions. In all, 29 countries and island political
entities, by Havana's count, participated in
CARIFESTA 79, and over a quarter of a million
people attended its 724 performances in Havana
alone. The Cuban press claims it had over 500
journalists, photographers, and technicians covering
the festivities.
Until the Cubans sponsored the event, CARIFESTA
had been an apolitical cultural affair, sponsored every
three years by various Caribbean governments. Ha-
vana, however, used it to organize a "Symposium on
Caribbean Cultural Identity" and issue a declaration
denouncing various facets of imperialism. Although
some 2,100 artists, performers, and intellectuals took
part in CARIFESTA 79, only 21-four Cubans and
17 visitors-actively participated in the symposium,
and all appear to have been carefully picked to ensure
the anti-US bias of the declaration.
Another meeting to enlist the support of intellectuals
on behalf of Cuban policy was the "Meeting of
Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of the Peoples of
`Our America,"' held in Havana from 4 through 7
September 1981 under the sponsorship of the Casa de
las Americas. According to Havana's own description
of the event, some 300 delegates from Latin America,
the Caribbean, the United States, and Europe "de-
nounced the deforming cultural penetration-of
which the great American fatherland is a victim-by
the imperialist government of the United States,
which is the creator, manipulator, and financier of
various sophisticated means of interference that re-
duce and aim to destroy the sovereignty of the
majority of our countries."
Havana used the meeting to organize the "Standing
Committee of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of the
Peoples of `Our America,"' a front group that, in our
opinion, was founded to perpetuate the impression
that the region's leading thinkers are solidly united
against the United States. The group is chaired by the
president of Cuba's Casa de las Americas and meets
periodically to issue denunciations of US policy.
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From 7 to 17 August 1978,
Havana sponsored the Third
Latin American Seminar of
Journalists as a platform for
issuing new denunciations of
Fidel Castro "jawbones" with
Cuban exile leaders from Mi-
Jawboning. Officials of the Castro regime make
effective use of the personal attention they grant to
visiting individuals and small, specialized groups of
people-industrialists, legislators, media luminaries,
religious leaders, academicians, government or party
officials-whose rank or position makes them useful,
to Cuban interests. This special attention, in our
estimation, is often designed to complement propa-
ganda compaigns and generate favorable press cover-
age.
Castro, for example, has on many occasions met with
US and other foreign personages to explain Cuban
policies with apparent sincerity and reasonableness
that he expects will influence his visitors' views. He is
a consummate actor who, especially when dealing
with visitors on an individual basis, can put on a
remarkably convincing display of candor and idealism
that rarely fails to make a deep impression on his
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Jawboning: Castro's Personal Touch
Former President of Colombia Alfonso Lopez Mi-
chelsen, according to press reports, spent 10 days in
Cuba in January 1983 on a trip arranged by Colom-
bia's Nobel Prize-winning author Gabriel Garcia
Marquez. During his visit, Lopez Michelsen and his
wife and son went on, a two-day cruise around the
island with President Castro followed by a tour of the
interior that Castro himself had planned for them.
Subsequently, in an interview for a Bogota newspa-
per, Lopez Michelsen gave a favorable impression of
Cuba, made light of Cuban links to Colombian
guerrillas and drug traffickers, and indicated he was
flattered by receiving treatment that formally was
reserved for incumbent chiefs of state. Upon his
return to Colombia, he met with President Belasario
Betancur to discuss the trip.
guests. With favored visitors who may be particularly
useful to him, he engages in special activities such as
hunting or spearfishing intended to create a sense of
familiarity that he hopes will pay dividends. On
several occasions, Castro has done special favors-
releasing specific prisoners from Cuban jails, for
example-to establish good will with influential peo-
ple.
Such visits with Castro and other high-ranking Cuban
officials frequently yield good press coverage. Several
of the 17 Costa Rican legislators who spent a week in
Cuba in mid-January this year-a visit highlighted by
an interview with Castro-made comments favorable
to Cuba upon their return home, and thereby gave
Radio Havana ammunition for its broadcasts promot-
ing the Cuban position on Central America and on the
resumption of normal relations between Havana and
San Jose. The visit and the favorable media attention
it precipitated put the Monge administration on the
defensive and cast Castro in the role of a responsible
chief of state reluctant to offend his neighbors. A
Spanish news agency, for example, reported that, in
discussing frictions between Costa Rica and Nicara-
gua with the legislators, Castro "asked to be excused
from interceding with the Sandinista government" on
Costa Rica's behalf because "he cannot interfere in
the domestic affairs of other countries."
The Castro regime has been using this intimate type
of person-to-person propaganda freely in its efforts to
generate pressure on Washington regarding Central
America. At the same time that a Cuban campaign
for negotiations on El Salvador was getting under
way, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a mem-
ber of the party's ruling Political Bureau and Castro's
chief foreign policy adviser, headed a team of foreign
policy officials who played host to a group of US
academicians and journalists in April 1982 to create
an impression that Cuba was willing to contribute to
and abide by a negotiated political solution in Central
America. Havana had, in our opinion, no intention of
abandoning the insurgents in El Salvador, but recog-
nized the need to mobilize world opinion and channel
it in such a way to prevent a perceived drift of the
United States toward intervention not only in El
Salvador but in Nicaragua and, perhaps, Cuba as
well. Subsequently, articles by the visiting journalists
appeared in a number of US newspapers reflecting the
Cubans' propaganda line. One such article, by two
respected academicians, argued strongly for accepting
a Cuban call for a Havana-Washington dialogue.
More recently, Havana has been trying to improve
formal relations with Colombia. Castro invited former
President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, head of Colom-
bia's Liberal Party, to Cuba and spent several days
vacationing with him in mid-January. In giving the
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ex-President his personal attention, judging from sub-
sequent Colombian press accounts, Castro assured
himself of access to influential figures in Colombian
politics.
Castro's desire to maintain excellent relations with
the government of Socialist Prime Minister Olof
Palme in Sweden, according to diplomats in Havana,
is one of the reasons why the Cuban President has
developed such a warm personal relationship with the
Swedish Ambassador in Havana, Anders Sandstrom.
Not long after they first met in 1980, Castro's yacht
came upon Sandstrom as he was scuba diving in
waters south of Cuba and the Swedish envoy was
invited aboard. Castro and Sandstrom went diving
together and afterwards spent 17 hours together
discussing a variety of subjects. They subsequently
went scuba diving and spearfishing on several occa-
sions; Sandstrom is now the envy of the Havana
diplomatic community as one of the few ambassadors
who has direct access to Castro.
Miscellaneous Propaganda Organs. The Castro re-
gime has a variety of other propaganda agencies and
vehicles. One is the Executive Secretariat of the
African, Asian, and Latin America Peoples Solidarity
Organization (AALAPSO), founded at the Triconti-
nental Conference in early 1966. Although it purports
to be an independent international organization, its
staffing and activities over the years leave no doubt
that the Secretariat is actually an agency of the
Cuban Government used as an outlet for propaganda
aimed at strengthening Cuba's links to revolutionary
movements abroad and perpetuating the Che Guevara
guerrilla cult.
Every other month, AALAPSO publishes for world-
wide distribution a book-length magazine-with edi-
tions in English, French, and Spanish-containing
articles by representatives of the Palestine Liberation
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Organization, the South-West Africa People's Orga-
nization, the African National Congress, the Frente
Polisario, and other revolutionary organizations and
Communist parties. The AALAPSO is headquartered
in Havana and is headed by Cuban Communist Party
Central Committee member Melba Hernandez, a
heroine of the Cuban revolution. In addition to the
magazine, the AALAPSO sponsors "solidarity" meet-
ings in Cuban factories and ministries, issues state-
ments to the press, sends representatives to interna-
tional meetings of an anti-US nature, and entertains
foreign radicals when they visit Havana. It also prints
and distributes colorful posters that glorify armed
struggle and attack the United States.
A similar propaganda agency is the Continental Or-
ganization of Latin American Students (OCLAE).
OCLAE operates out of Havana and publishes a
monthly magazine with articles supporting revolution
and discrediting the United States. Much of
OCLAE's propaganda focuses on promoting
independence for Puerto Rico. Like AALAPSO,
OCLAE had its origin in the Cuban effort in the mid-
1960s to organize international support for the Gue-
vara operation in Bolivia. With the death of Guevara
and the failure of his expedition in 1967, however,
both agencies lost their international character and
became little more than Cuban propaganda mills,
which is their current status.
On 31 March 1959, within three months of assuming
power, Castro established the Imprenta Nacional de
Cuba, a publishing house created to spearhead the
new government's propaganda efforts in the field of
literature. The organization, according to the Cuban
media, has since grown into a major industry consist-
ing of a number of large publishing houses that have
turned out some 17,000 titles and over 500 million
copies of various kinds of books and pamphlets over
the past 24 years. The giants of the industry are the
Juan Marinello Polygraphic Combine in Guantana-
mo, which opened with equipment from East Germa-
ny in 1977, and a similar plant in Palma Soriano,
which began operations in early 1983. The former has
a capacity to produce 20 million books per year while
the latter has a capacity for 30 million. These expand-
ed capabilities now so exceed Cuban needs that
Havana is soliciting printing business from abroad.
While much of the output of these plants consists of
textbooks, technical manuals, and other materials for
domestic consumption, a significant amount is propa-
ganda, much of it intended for consumption abroad;
by Havana's own claim, Cuban books are now distrib-
uted in more than 60 countries. Some are the tradi-
tional works by Marx, Lenin, and other ideologues,
and some are by such typically anti-US Latin Ameri-
can writers as Argentina's Gregorio Selser, Uruguay's
Eduardo Galeano, and Guatemala's Guillermo Tor-
iello and Manuel Galich.
Cuban books are distributed through direct sales from
the Cuban Book Institute in Havana; cultural agree-
ments with other governments, universities, or cultur-
al institutions; printing arrangements with foreign
publishers; and in various other ways. In late 1982
and early 1983, for example, the ICAP arranged for
its Venezuelan-Cuban Friendship Institute to hold
Cuban book exhibitions in Caracas, Maracaibo, and
San Cristobal. Some 600 titles were available and,
according to the Cuban press, the exhibits were
attended by well over 120,000 visitors.
The Castro regime also uses other organizations and
publications to carry its propaganda message. Some
are ostensibly independent but, judging from their
activities and political bias, are under Havana's strong
influence if not outright covert control. The Latin
America Federation of Journalists (FELAP), for ex-
ample, was formed as a result of vigorous Cuban
lobbying with leftist journalists of the region to
counter the influence of the independent Interameri-
can Press Association. FELAP, which has close links
to such Soviet front groups as the Prague-based
International Organization of Journalists and the
World Peace Council, is used by Havana to focus
international attention on abuses of freedom of the
press by rightist governments of the hemisphere as
well as to attack the United States.
Another front group is the Managua-based Anti-
Imperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA).
Founded on 23 September 1981 as.the Anti-Imperial-
ist Tribunal of Central America and the Caribbean
(TACC), the organization did not have overt links to
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In 1976, according to press reports, the head of
Cuba's professional organization for newsmen, Er-
nesto Vera, announced the founding by the Cuban
Journalists Union (UPEC) of a journalists' "improve-
ment school" that would accept newsmen from all of
Latin America. By 1982 candidates from Africa were
also being accepted, and in mid-1983 a group of 11
Angolans who had been attending a yearlong course
graduated and returned home. Their course, accord-
ing to a Luanda newspaper, "emphasized political
training and journalistic techniques.... The prob-
lems entailed in the realm of the ideological struggle
between decadent capitalism and ascending socialism
in this important field were also examined. "
The Cuban Communist Party's Nico Lopez National
Cadre School also has a variety of courses including
two entitled "Political Training for Journalists" and
"Political Training for Propagandists." The July
1981 graduating class, according to the Cuban press,
included 69 foJ'eign graduates from 17 countries of
Africa and Latin America. Press reports also indicate
that one of the measures Havana took to gain
influence in Grenada and Suriname after the two
countries' respective "revolutions" was to bring teams
of local journalists to Cuba for training. The courses
were offered either at the UPEC school or the party's
Nico Lopez school.
Cuba until mid-1982 when a local chapter was estab-
lished in Havana. Havana's influence, however, is
clear. TANA's president is Guatemalan Guillermo
Toriello, who has had close ties to the Castro regime
for more than two decades, and its executive secretary
is Venezuelan Freddy Balzan, who for years worked
in Cuba's Prensa Latina office in Caracas. TANA
publishes the monthly magazine Soberania devoted to
"denouncing imperalism and its crimes" and "identi-
fying the agents of the CIA" in the region. The
magazine's editorial board includes Phillip Agee, a
US citizen noted for his efforts to expose CIA employ-
ees, as well as several Cubans and a claque of leftist
writers and cultural figures.
Havana has close ties to-and reportedly helps to
finance-the Mexico City-based monthly Cuadernos
del Tercer Mundo, a stridently anti-US magazine
that. never deviates from the Cuban policy line. Its
English-language edition was short lived, but it con-
tinues to publish in Spanish (printed in Mexico City
and Lima) and Portuguese (printed in Lisbon and Rio
de Janeiro) with distribution in Europe, Africa, and
Latin America.
Havana has long had close contact with leftist Mexi-
can journalist Mario Menendez Rodriguez and
Menendez's magazine Por
rators."
Esto. Although the magazine claims to be an
independent weekly, its links to Havana are readily
apparent from its generous Cuban advertising and its
list of Cuban-associated staff personnel and "collabo-
We believe that Havana views Costa Rica as another
important propaganda center. Besides supporting the
Montoneros radio station eventually closed down by
the government, Havana apparently played a key role
in the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO), a leftist organization based in San Jose.
Conclusions
Fidel Castro's skillful use of the few propaganda
assets available to him during his guerrilla war
against Batista, in our opinion, contributed in a major
way to his victory and was an augury of the methods
he would use so successfully after coming to power.
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It is clear from the statments of Antonio Perez
Herrero and other top spokesmen for the Castro
regime that a major effort will continue to be made to
expand the propaganda apparatus in certain key
areas. Although economic reality will hamper this
effort, important investments are likely to be made to:
? Improve the availability of Cuban books and maga-
zines abroad.
? Open new Prensa Latina bureaus and increase the
number of subscribers to Prensa Latina services.
? Help allies develop their own propaganda outlets for
both domestic and international audiences.
? Train foreign journalists so as to utilize their skills
and opportunities on behalf of Cuba in non-Marxist
countries.
? Establish and promote ostensibly independent news
gathering and professional organizations of leftists
to provide competition for-and reduce the influ-
ence of-Western news agencies, radio stations, and
journalists.
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Havana probably has placed high priority, for exam-
ple, on helping Nicaragua organize an international
shortwave broadcasting service and on promoting
such groups as Salpress-the news agency of the
Salvadoran insurgents-and similar organizations
formed to publicize the activities of insurgents and
serve as propaganda vehicles for leftist exiles. Sal-
press, according to Havana Radio, was formed in
Mexico City in December 1980, just before the start
of the January 1981 insurgent offensive, and now
boasts branch offices in six other countries, five
correspondents serving with guerrilla groups in El
Salvador, and membership in the Nonaligned Move-
ment's news agency organization. It presumably has
already received considerable Cuban assistance and
guidance.
In addition, we expect Cuba will try to use its
membership in the Latin American Features News
Agency (ALASEI)-formed just this year-to ensure
that the agency's output has a radical left, anti-US
slant. ALASEI, which is based in Mexico City, is a
joint effort by 12 countries of the region to form a
news agency, which many of them feel will focus
greater attention on the area than have US and
European agencies. According to Prensa Latina's
ranking commentator, ALASEI "will enable the
region to confront with its own mechanisms the
systematic deformation and disinformation of Latin
American reality that exists today," a clear signal
that Havana expects ALASEI to counter, if not
displace, UPI, AP, AFP, Reuter, and other Western
agencies in Latin America.
Some of Havana's future ventures in propaganda are
certain to be joint efforts with other Communist
countries, which will ease some of the economic
burden on Havana. This is in keeping with a resolu-
tion approved at the last Party congress stating that
"In view of the breadth and complexity of the ideolog-
ical struggle, it is ever more important to coordinate
our information activities with those of the Commu-
nist parties of the other sister socialist republics." The
Cubans will look to the International Organization of
Journalists and other Soviet front groups for support
and may succeed in getting some Latin American
governments to contribute to agencies and publica-
tions that have an anti-US bias.
Castro may have the propaganda apparatus temper its
invective toward the United States from time to time
for tactical reasons-this sometimes happens while he
assesses the intentions toward Cuba of incoming
administrations in Washington-but such a muting
has always proved to be temporary. He invariably
finds an excuse to revert to normal animosity.
Castro depends on Prensa Latina, Radio Havana,
ICAP, and the various newspapers and news maga-
zines of his propaganda machine to counter US
political moves on a day-to-day basis. It is clear,
however, that he is also intent on using other elements
of the machine-the Casa de las Americas and his
other publishing houses, for example-to create a
broad, permanent body of literature that, through its
scholarship, eloquence, and sheer volume, will influ-
ence current and future generations of Latin Ameri-
cans and peoples of the Caribbean. The aim of this
long-term propaganda effort is to establish a record of
an irremediably flawed United States. Castro proba-
bly expects this growing body of literature to cause
problems for the United States long after he himself is
out of the political picture.
Castro's propaganda empire, however, does make
mistakes. Radio Havana's slanted coverage of the
Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group, for example, has
created frictions between Cuba and Peru. Two slanted
Cuban books published this year have provoked anti-
Cuban reaction in some circles in Belize over Ha-
vana's blatant attempt to propagandize the population
and muster anti-US and antireligious sentiment there.
One ostensibly independent foreign magazine that
enjoys Cuban funding incurred Havana's wrath when
it carelessly published some material from a Salvador-
an guerrilla leader that reflected poorly on Cuba's
revolutionary commitment. Influential visitors attend-
ing international meetings in Havana-for example,
some chiefs of state at the Nonaligned Movement's
Summit in 1979-have been alienated by the Castro
regime's heavyhanded efforts to use them as window
dressing for Cuba's pro-Soviet foreign policy activi-
ties.
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The huge investment Castro has made in his empire
of radio stations, news agencies, publishing houses,
and other publicity vehicles attests to the high regard
he has for propaganda as a political weapon. We
believe it also explains his great concern over the
prospects for US broadcasts to Cuba. He understands
clearly that propaganda is a two-edged sword.
The Cuban propaganda machine, enjoying close asso-
ciation with its Soviet counterpart, ample funding,
and competent personnel, will remain an important
negative factor working against US interests through-
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Figure 2
Cuba's Daily Broadcasting Effort
700665 (545038) 12-83
RADIO HAVANA
(shortwave)
LA VOZ DE CUBA
(mediumwave)
Latin America and_....:.::
the Caribbean
Spanish:! ! ! 5hrs. 45 mm.:
Total
The Americas
English
French
Guarani 1 hr.
Haitian Creole 2 hrs.
Portuguese 2 hrs.
Quechua 1 hr. 50 min.
Spanish 17 hrs. 50 min.
8 hrs. 50 min.
30 min.
34 hrs.
Canada
United States
Yana
r
nd Tobago
~e 'm~ ~ ~ ~ fan eaa a d amuda
~a5 et ~ / SLL ci - ..a
n .;Nlc 6 Granada
Venezuela:. Gyf
ncb Guano
Colombia F
, ~ IFn 1
J
Ecu dor % `~
Peru Brazil 7
8oltma
i1ii
.__iiiii
P
ara
4'/Suay
Argentina
r/
ceIand
Arabic 2 hrs.
English 1 hr.
French 3 hrs. 40 min.
Portuguese 1 hr.
Spanish 6 hrs. 15 min.
Total
Africa and the
Mediterranean
13 hrs. 55 mn.
29
Secret
English
French
Tdtal
Europe
1 hr, 30.min.
2 hrs. 10 min.
3 hrs. 40 mm.
The.Unltod.Stmes Government has not recognized.
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Secret
orocco
v-' W
\ France
Algeria
B in
Ivory na Nigeria
:oast ~
Can~ei
Togo ~
yams ~-. t~
nd 7nniipe ~, t
Gabon
EquatoralGmnaa
Angola
Romania
Zaire
e yp5,~~7~y Sy
Leb Iraq
1sraeft Iran
~`~lor an
Egypt
Ethiopia
Mozabigue
Seyth
C.A.R. -Central African Republic
F.R.G. - Federal Republic of Germany
G.D.R. -German Democratic Republic
P.D.R.Y.-People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
U.A.E. -United Arab Emirates
Y.A.R. -Yemen Arab Republic
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Secret
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