THE REGIONS OF ZAIRE: A HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200040009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Regions of Zaire:
A Handbook
I
Secret
ALA 83-10186
December 1983
Copy [ 3 1
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Regions of Zaire:
A Handbook
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from the Office of Central Reference.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10186
December 1983
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The Regions of Zaire:
A Handbook
Introduction Since independence in 1960 Zaire's central government and the regions
Information available have struggled over who would reap the benefits of the country's mineral
as of 14 December 1983 wealth-particularly the copper and cobalt of Shaba and the diamonds of
was used in this report.
the Kasais. Although the struggle was violent and bloody from 1960 to
1965 and at times thereafter, it has been muted over most of the 18 years
that President Mobutu has been in power, largely because of his skill in,
manipulating regional antagonisms for the benefit of the central govern-
ment. There is, nevertheless, a persistent, underlying concern in the capital,
Kinshasa-and in the Western capitals that provide Zaire with the bulk of
its external support-that the departure of Mobutu someday will revive the
regional chaos of the early 1960s. 25X1
Mobutu's way of dealing with the regions has been designed essentially to
prevent them from threatening his grip on power. He frequently reshuffles
regional military commanders and governors to keep them from developing
independent power bases in the regions. He fosters regional and tribal
rivalries to undermine potential opposition. He has also tried to reduce the
influence of the regions by creating and developing "national" institutions.
By exploiting the resources of the regions for his own and Kinshasa's use
and by neglecting their development needs, Mobutu has generated wide-
spread disrespect for himself and the Equateurian elite that dominates his
government. The regions view Kinshasa as an economic sinkhole that
drains the country's vital foreign exchange earnings. Because of this
diversion of resources to Kinshasa, the infrastructure is in tatters. Even in
Shaba, the source of most of the country's wealth, calls by GECAMINES,
the mining parastatal corporation, for rehabilitation and renovation fall on
deaf ears in Kinshasa. 25X1
The central government's presence in the regions, tenuous at best since
independence, has deteriorated in recent years. Several of the regions are
so physically and psychologically isolated from Kinshasa that they are part
of the country in name only. Kivu and Haut-Zaire are so cut off from the
rest of the country by bad roads that they trade more with neighboring
countries than with other parts of Zaire. Deteriorating roads, shortages of
fuel, and limited contact among the outlying regions and between them and
Secret
ALA 83-10186
December 1983
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Kinshasa lessen the likelihood that a revolt would spread. These factors
complicate Kinshasa's ability to maintain authority in the regions but may
also help to prevent-the coalescence of a regional challenge to the regime.
The regions are divided in other ways. The peasant farming regions of
Bandundu and Equateur have little in common with industralized Shaba
and Bas-Zaire. Rigid ethnic identification has caused widespread inter-
tribal distrust, particularly between the Lundas and Lubas in Shaba and
the Kasais, the scene of bloody feuds in the past. Suspicion that the recent
formation of an illegal second political party is merely a front for Luba
leaders has lessened the movement's otherwise potentially broad appeal to
Zairians discontented with Mobutu.
A major factor holding Zaire together is the ingrained political caution of
the average Zairian. Many believe that Mobutu has prevented Zaire from
sinking back into the chaos of the 1960s. Although Zairians grumble about
Mobutu and his corruption, he is the leader they know and to whom they
have learned to adapt.
Mobutu almost certainly will not significantly change his divide-and-rule
policy toward the regions, but regional strains are likely to increase once
Mobutu departs. Under the most likely succession scenario, others from the
present ruling group would take over, and, like Mobutu, they would almost
certainly not scrap a regional approach that has enhanced their wealth,
power, and prestige as well as Mobutu's.
There is little current interest in secession in Shaba or any other region,.
and, even after Mobutu departs, a secession would be unlikely to succeed
because none of Zaire's tribes is large enough or can control enough
territory to create an economically viable independent state. At the same
time, because the cohesiveness of Zaire as a national entity is likely to re-
main tenuous at best, the central government will have to continue to
struggle to keep its grip on the regions.
Secret iv
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Historical Overview: The Struggle Between the Center and the Periphery in Zaire
1
The Belgian Inheritance
Regional Strains Under Mobutu
2
Mobutu's Approach to the Regions
3
Bandundu: The Country's Breadbasket
5
Equateur: Mobutu's Home Region
19
Haut-Zaire: Remote but Resilient
27
The Kasai Regions: Home of Diamond Mining and Dissidents
35
Kinshasa: Smallest Administrative Region, Capital, and Microcosm of Zaire
45
Kivu: Isolated, Deteriorating, Resentful
51
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The Regions of Zaire:
A Handbook F-1
Historical Overview: The Struggle Between
the Center and the Periphery in Zaire
The Belgian Inheritance
Colonial practice in the former Belgian Congo 2 fos-
tered and exacerbated regional and tribal antago-
nisms. The Belgians favored the tribes that were
quickest to adapt to Western customs at the expense
of those more tied to traditional ways. They gave
special status to the Batetela, Baluba, Zande, and
Bangala, whom they regarded as "martial races." The
colonial police recruited heavily from these tribes,
which gave them an advantage over their tribal
enemies. Intertribal resentments often erupted into
violence, especially between the Balubas and Lundas,
who historically had battled for control of the miner-
al-rich Katanga (now Shaba) and Kasai regions. F_
Belgian policy limited opportunities for cross-regional
contacts and perpetuated tribal jealousies among
neighboring groups and xenophobia toward more dis-
tant ones. Smaller tribes that were willing to ally
against the dominant tribes of their regions found that
poor communications prevented effective cooperation.
Congolese political parties in the 1950s were merely
extensions in a few major cities of the cultural
associations of large tribes such as the Kongo and the
Baluba. Belgium's hasty retreat from Africa left the
Congolese devoid of any experience in national poli-
tics.
Chaos After Independence
Independence in June 1960 sparked a scramble by
regional leaders to fill the political vacuum left by the
Belgians. A series of civilian governments failed to
2 "Congo" became "Zaire" in the early 1970s when President
Mobutu attempted to instill a sense of national pride by substitut-
ing "authentic" African place and proper names for their Europe-
an-imposed equivalents. Other name changes at the time included
"Shaba" for "Katanga" and "Mobutu Sese Seko" for "Joseph
Desiree Mobutu."
From 1908 unto a e gian governor general in Leopold-
ville (now Kinshasa) ruled Congo through Belgian administrators in
six provinces. There were no elections for whites or blacks until a
limited form of local government was introduced in 1957. At the
time of independen ad risen to a high position
in the civil service.
agree whether the country should have a unitary
system-favored by the smaller tribes-or a federal
one, which would have benefited the dominant tribes
in the more economically advanced, regions like
Katanga and Bas-Zaire. Key groups in Katanga
wanted to maintain regional autonomy so they could
get a share of the profits of the Belgian mining
conglomerate, Union Miniere.
Katanga's declaration of independence in July 1960
triggered five years of chaos. South Kasai (now the
southern part of Kasai Oriental) declared its
independence, the next month and allied itself with
Katanga. The Katangans, Kasaians, and their Belgian
expatriate allies called for Western help in combating
the left-leaning central government in Leopoldville 25X1
(now Kinshasa), and Belgian troops helped evict Con-
go's armed forces from Katanga. Katanga was able to
become economically independent of Congo for a time
by shifting its trade southward and by obtaining funds
from Belgian companies eager to continue their min-
ing operations.
The central government was unable to form a stable
coalition to deal with the country's problems. The
government became deadlocked when President
Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba each tried to dismiss the other. Army
Chief of Staff Mobutu announced in September 1960 25X1
that he was taking power for the next three months to
give the country some stability and to end Communist
meddling. He returned power to civilian control in
early 1961.
The United Nations sent 19,000 troops to assist the
new government in its campaign against the
Katangan secessionists. Unhappy with the domination
of the Katangan government by Lundas, Baluba
tribesmen rebelled in northern Katanga. This weak-
ened the secessionist cause, which folded formally in
25X1
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January 1963. To avoid punitive retaliation by the
Congolese Army, most Katangan gendarmes fled into
neighboring Angola
Fissures soon developed elsewhere in the country.
Civilian governments were unable to quell a peasant
insurrection in the Kwilu subregion of Bandundu in
1963-64 and a rebellion in Kivu, the Kasais, and
Katanga in 1964.' The government quashed these
movements in 1965 with the help of UN forces and
mercenaries. Mobutu seized power again-this time
permanently-in November 1965 after a power strug-
gle between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister
Moise Tshombe-who had led the Katangan seces-
sion-had again brought the governmental machinery
a large military presence in the region. Belgium,
France, and the United States airlifted supplies to
Zaire, and about 1,500 Moroccan troops buttressed
the ineffectual Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), easily
driving the FLNC back to Angola and Zambia.F
The unusually good civilian-military relations in
Shaba that immediately followed the ouster of the
rebels soon soured, in part because members of the
region's large Lunda minority suspected that Mobutu
blamed them for the invasion. A general breakdown
in war relief aggravated Shaban discontent with the
regime: medicines never arrived, workers found their
places of employment closed, and harvests were low
because the government's troops had stolen seeds for
Regional Strains Under Mobutu
The first two years of Mobutu's rule were plagued by
new outbreaks of violence caused by regional strains.
Mobutu called in European mercenaries to put down
a mutiny by a Katangan regiment in 1966, and in
1967 the Army quelled a second mutiny by
Katangans. Remnants of the Katangan gendarmes,
mostly Lunda tribesmen, fled to Angola and in 1968
formed the Front for the National Liberation of the
Congo (FLNC). The most serious threats to Mobutu's
rule came from the invasions of Shaba Region by
FLNC guerrillas in the late 1970s.
Shaba I. The first invasion of Shaba began on 8
March 1977, when approximately 2,000 FLNC guer-
rillas invaded from Angola and soon occupied all of
the major towns in southwestern Shaba. Their drive
stalled 50 kilometers from Kolwezi-the region's ma-
jor copper-mining town.
The grassroots uprising that the FLNC expected to
set off among their fellow Lunda tribesmen in Shaba
never materialized, and the FLNC failed to establish
'The Kwilu rebels preached a blend of Marxism and tribal
traditionalism like that advocated by Lumumba, who had been
murdered in 1961. They were unable to organize the peasants
effectively because of tribal cleavages, although the rebels' call for
independence for the region had wide support. 0
The rebel youths in Kivu, the Kasais, and Katanga called their
movement the Simba rebellion (after the Swahili word for lion) to
project an image of strength. They accused the government of
corruption and inefficiency and also sought revenge for Lumumba's
death. They were eventually defeated by 600 Belgian paratroopers
Shaba H. The second invasion of Shaba began on
12 May 1978 when the FLNC returned in force
through northwestern Zambia. The rebels occupied
Kolwezi for six days before being driven out by 700
French Legionnaires and the FAZ. Brussels sent a
1,200-man airborne rescue team, which received US
logistic support. A 2,400-man Intra-African Force
mainly from Morocco-but also including soldiers
from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Togo-later
replaced the Western troops.
Shaba II devastated the economy of the region. The
rebels killed approximately 100 Europeans and
hundreds of Zairians. GECAMINES estimated that
the damage to Kolwezi alone came to $57 million.
Budding Opposition in Recent Years. The regional
issue receded after the Shaba invasions, but in 1980
an incipient political opposition developed with a
strong regional base. In November of that year, a
group of 13 former members of parliament published
an open. letter to Mobutu that questioned the legality
of the constitutional ban on allowing more than one
political party and declared their intent to form a new
political party. Mobutu promptly had them arrested
and exiled to their home villages
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Almost all of these anti-Mobutu activists are either
from Shaba or the Kasais, the richest and traditional-
ly the leading regions in the struggle against the
central government, although at least one of their
most prominent supporters is from Kivu. After a year
in exile in their respective regions, the 13 were
freed-only to be rearrested in March 1982, one
month after announcing the formal creation of the
Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).
Although all 13 were sentenced to 15 years in jail,
they were again freed (11 are still in the country; two
have fled) under Mobutu's general amnesty in May
1983. Mobutu is closely monitoring their activities
because he still regards them as a threat to his regime.
He recently banished several of the group's leaders
again to their home villages.
Mobutu's Approach to the Regions
Despite the two invasions of Shaba, the struggle
between the center and the periphery has been largely
muted over most of the 18 years that Mobutu has
been in power. This is testimony in part to his success
in building up central authority in Kinshasa under a
system of highly personalized rule that combines the
African tradition of the paramount chief with West-
ern-style institutions. At least as important has been
Mobutu's skill in manipulating regional antagonisms
and otherwise working to keep the regions weak and
disorganized so as to preempt potential challenges
from the periphery
One method Mobutu used to diminish the influence of
the regions was to give greater authority to "national"
institutions. In 1967 he scrapped the multiparty politi-
cal system, which was mired in regional squabbles, in
favor of a single national party-the Popular Move-
ment for the Revolution (MPR). He centralized au-
thority over the armed forces in the same year by
imposing a formal chain of command.
Soon after coming to power, Mobutu also decreed
that a person chosen as governor of a region could not
be from that region.` This made it difficult for any
' He also consolidated the country's administrative units into eight
regions by clustering many small units together and redrawing
governor to build a local base of support because he
would almost always be distrusted as an outsider. For
the same reason, Mobutu has also generally followed
a similar practice in appointing outsiders as military
commanders in the various regions.
Mobutu's policy of frequent reshuffling of senior 25X1
military and civilian personnel-to keep potential
rivals off balance-is harmful to the regions. Regional
governors and military commanders with little pros-
pect of longevity have few incentives to institute
reforms or other new programs. On the contrary, the
prevailing attitude among persons in positions of
authority in Zaire is to try to rake off whatever they 25X1
can as quickly as possible; the government does little
to discourage this practice.
The relatively few senior bureaucrats who are sta-
tioned in the regions are viewed by the local popula-
tions as rapacious "foreigners" who levy taxes, take
what they can get, and offer nothing in return.
Officials at the village level usually are recruited
locally, but they have little influence or status because
they lack authority and are underequipped, under-
staffed, and underpaid, according to American
scholars.
Mobutu has filled the highest levels of the government
with fellow Ngbandi tribesmen from his home region
of Equateur who care little about the other regions-
or their own, once they have become entrenched in25X1
Kinshasa. Kinshasa's mismanagement of resources
and neglect of the development needs of the regions
have caused widespread disrespect for the government
and resentment against Mobutu and the Equateurian
elite.
Mobutu also fosters regional and ethnic rivalries to
undermine potential opposition. This tactic has been
successful because Zaire's military and civilian lead-
ers still think of themselves primarily in tribal or
regional terms 25X1
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The Home Regions of Zaire's Ruling Elite
Key positions ?Executive brancha ?Governors ?Military/securityb
Entitled positions if apportioned according to population
Equateur
Kasais
Haut-Zaire
Bas-Zaire
Shaba
Bandundu
Kivu
a includes all Executive Council ( cabinet) members and Presidential c Includes major ambassadorial, legislative, judicial and parastatal
Office Directors. positions.
b Includes incumbents in key general officer slots and directors of
intelligence agencies.
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Bandundu:
The Country's Breadbasket
The agriculturally important region of Bandundu has
been beset since independence by a depressed econo-
my, deteriorating roads, increasingly inadequate
medical and educational services, and a corrupt and
incompetent administration. Many Bandunduans
have reverted in recent years to subsistence farming.
The region has been in even further eclipse since the
cabinet shuffle in November 1982 in which a Bandun-
duan (N'Singa Udjuu) lost the prime-ministry to an
Equateurian (Kengo wa Dondo).
The inability or unwillingness of Bandundu politicians
in key national posts to represent local interests has
made Bandundu a hotbed of anti-Mobutu feeling that
erupted into serious violence in 1963-64 and 1978.
Although we believe economic prospects in. Bandundu
are as bleak as in any region of Zaire, memories of
past atrocities and a fatalistic public outlook work
against a return to violence any time soon.
The People and Their Quality of Life
Bandundu's 3.7 million people,' equivalent to 14
percent of Zaire's population, live in a landlocked area
roughly the size of Nevada. As elsewhere in Zaire
during the 1970s, harsh living conditions in the
region's cities led people to migrate back to the
countryside.
Religion and magic strongly influence daily life
throughout Bandundu's three subregions. Catholicism
and Protestantism thrive, as does Kimbanguism, an
indigenous combination of Christianity and tradition-
al African beliefs
There are five major tribes in Bandundu. The Bayaka
tribe in the Kwango subregion, and the Bayanzi,
Bambala, and Basuku tribes in the Kwilu subregion,
are descended from Bantu speakers who migrated to
'Population data for this paper come from the Department of
Planning, Zaire; the University of Kinshasa; and the US Depart-
the region from what are now Cameroon and Nigeria
about 2,000 years ago. The linguistically distinct
Kundu people populate the Mai-Ndombe subregion.
Despite Bandundu's relative proximity to Kinshasa
(130 kilometers away), the lack of public assistance is
evident in almost all areas. According to the US
Embassy in Kinshasa, funds earmarked for Bandundu
are siphoned off at every level by underpaid bureau-
crats, and managerial incompetence and corruption 25X1
are pervasive. Former Prime Minister N'Singa ar-
ranged for his home village of 40 people to receive
electricity ahead of cities of 50,000 or more, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. 25X1
Bandunduans suffer from many diseases and other
ailments. Tuberculosis, trypanosomiasis (sleeping 25X1
sickness), and malaria are common. Malnutrition
among women and children is increasing rapidly,
partly because of local customs forbidding pregnant
women to eat meat, fish, or eggs. Protein intake is
only about half of the minimum requirement stipulat-
ed by the World Health Organization; caloric intake
is about 85 percent of what is needed, according to the
Hospital facilities are far from adequate. The general
hospital in the region's capital, Bandundu City, lacks
the most basic equipment and sanitary conditions.
The hospital in Kikwit operates at double its planned
capacity. Several West German churches are building
a $1.6 million modern hospital northwest of Bulungu,
but transportation problems in the area will limit
access
25X1
25X1
The educational system is in shambles. All of Ban-
dundu City's primary, secondary, and technical
schools are understaffed and underequipped. The US
Embassy reports that Protestant and Catholic schools
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Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Bandundu Region
,!T,l
Area
of
Map
5 Lac
Mai-Ndombe
under 10
10-20
20-30
over 30
~?~ Region boundary
Region capital
-- Bandundu subregion
boundary
O Bandundu subregion
capital
Major road
Railroad
50
Kilometers
M. a Kutu
Kasongo-Lunda
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
5 O( Kahenba
KASAI-~
OCCIDEN
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are the most highly regarded, but even these suffer
from inadequate financing and supplies. Paychecks
for teachers often arrive late or not at all-many are
stolen by bureaucrats. Teachers went on strike briefly
last year to protest this situation.
Other basic services are lacking as well. Kikwit, the
region's economic hub, has no running water, round-
the-clock electricity, or Air Zaire service. The mail
arrives biweekly. The region's other towns have even
fewer services
Farming in the savanna area of Bandundu, which
supplies Kinshasa with over 60 percent of its domesti-
cally produced food, is badly neglected. The Chinese
and Belgians abandoned their efforts to develop sugar
plantations in the early 1970s,
largely because Zaire rarely repays its debts.
Private and public investment have nearly dried up
since then. Seven of Lever Brothers' 12 palm oil
plantations, which as recently as the mid-1970s em-
ployed thousands of workers, have closed. Food scar-
cities have forced Lever to divert part of its labor
force to the cultivation of food crops. Coffee and rice
plantations also report difficulties, according to the
US Embassy
Agriculture in Kwilu-which produces much of the
country's staples of manioc and corn-also is de-
pressed, but there is hope. The federal government
has embarked on a multimillion-dollar agricultural
project designed to stimulate commercial develop-
ment. West Germany, the International Development
Agency, various private companies, the Jesuit Order,
and local Roman Catholic dioceses are also financing
training, seed production, cattle breeding, and trans-
portation projects associated with the venture.
Bandunduans are buffeted, however, by declining
prices for agricultural output, especially manioc.
Many impoverished Bandunduans ignore govern-
ment-imposed pricing schemes and engage in smug-
gling and black-market practices.
The nonagricultural sectors are in worse straits. Inter-
national financial institutions report that the region's
deteriorating transportation networks severely hinder
industrial and agricultural development. The twice-
weekly Air Zaire flight is unreliable; basic goods are 25X1
trucked in from Kinshasa or sporadically barged up
the Kwilu River; fuel shortages have become acute.
Bandundu City has no functioning factories except a
brewery soon to open. 25X1
Rising consumer prices are a major public concern. 25X1
Those dependent on the cash economy are worse off
now than at independence. Real wages in Bandundu-
had dropped in 1978 to only 15 percent of their 1960
level. A typical month's wages today will buy a pair of
cotton trousers.0 25X1
Many unemployed workers have left the cash econo-
my altogether to pursue subsistence farming, which
now accounts for 75 percent of the region's economic
activity. Others have joined the swelling ranks of
jobseekersin Kinshasa
25X1
25X1
Bandundu has long been a wellspring of political
opposition to Kinshasa. In the 1920s the Kimbanguist
religious movement was a focus of resistance to 25X1
European and governmental authority. During the
early 1930s workers from the Bapende tribe went on
strike in Kwilu to protest economic hardships result-
ing from the worldwide depression.
Kwilu.was wracked in 1964 by a rural insurgency led
by Pierre Mulele, a member of the Mumbunda tribe.
Mulele, who preached a blend of Marxism and tribal
traditionalism, had joined left-leaning Patrice
Lumumba and Antoine Gizenga in opposing the
government of Joseph Kasavubu. Although Mulele 25X1
called for violent and far-reaching change, his peasant
guerrilla administration closely paralleled the rigid
hierarchy that characterized Belgian bureaucratic
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Economic Activity in Zaire's Bandundu Region
,5 Lac
Mai-Ndombe
KINSHASA
INSHASA
Bananas, manioc
Corn, peanuts, manioc
UI Beans, manioc
Oil palm
Coffee
Rice
National park
?- Region boundary
captial
Major road
T
I
11 f^ It
ldiofafirth
'r ' fifiT .ITS.
M'IT PT
+f " o
KASAI-~
OCCIDEN
T'T' 111 T T-11 Tl R
fi'T f I P 7% TT TKfi'T T
enie~
O
shwe
71
t' fi'"~? fi r I TT T 1 if
fi 7 % fiT i t
77
7r P
;f 'ri'"f I fi~~ TI*
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practice. He was unable to unify the peasants because
of tribal rivalries. The forces of the United Nations
and mercenaries helped Prime Minister Tshombe end
the rebellions in Bandundu and other regions in 1965,
but at a cost of thousands of casualties.
The Zairian Army attacked suspected anti-Mobutu
insurgents in 1978 in Bandundu in retaliation for the
murder of a government official by members of the
Mumbunda tribe. At least 350 people were killed in
the town of Idiofa. According to American historians
who interviewed local residents, several members of
Mulele's family were buried alive, and US Peace
Corps volunteers were forced to watch the public
hangings of 12 Kimbanguist church leaders suspected
of being involved in the murder
Bandunduans remain contemptuous of the political
leadership in Kinshasa, but the public blames
Mobutu's advisers primarily for their plight, accord-
ing to an officer from the US Embassy who recently
toured the region
Key Figures
Although Bandundu has long been heavily represent-
ed in Mobutu's cabinet, local residents bitterly com-
plain of a lack of national responsiveness to regional
needs. None of Bandundu's officials based in Kinsha-
sa has been admitted to the Equateur-dominated
"inner circle" of Mobutu's advisers
The most prominent figure in the Mai-Ndombe sub-
region is N'Singa, the executive secretary of the
country's sole legal political party. He spent much of
his time as Prime Minister meddling in the politics of
the subregion. He was instrumental in moving the
administrative capital in 1970 from densely populated
Kikwit-in the rebellious Kwilu area-to Bandundu
City, which lacks the infrastructure needed to support
the bureaucracy adequately. Although the move led to
major political and economic dislocations, it served
N'Singa's patronage needs by transferring jobs and
putting his home area on the map.
The most competent political figure from the sub-
region of Kwilu probably is Kamitatu Massamba, a
former Prime Minister and leader during the early
days of independence whom Mobutu brought back
into the cabinet after imprisoning him for plotting
against the government in 1966. Another Kwilu nota-
ble, former Education Minister Mungul Diaka, who
has returned from his self-imposed exile in Brussels,
retains a small local following. Wealthy businessma^
Takizala Luyana also maintains a wide network of 25X1
local political ties.
Kwango subregion has no political leaders of the
stature and influence of those from other parts of
Bandundu. Aside from the influx in 1976 of 10,000
Angolan refugees, who quickly integrated with their
Bayaka tribal cousins, Kwango has played no signifi-
cant role in the region's politics. 25X1
The Governor of Bandundu, Konde Vila Kikanda, is a
politically adept and experienced administrator from
Bas-Zaire. His effectiveness in securing tangible
public assistance from the central government is
limited, however, by his lack of a following in Ban- 25X1
dundu, corruption and neglect by his superiors in
Kinshasa, and poor communications.
The Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), the
country's sole political party, has little grassroots
support in Bandundu. The people of the region are
generally cynical about the political process.
Key Political Issues
We believe that memories of the violence of the 1960s
help to quell the still rebellious tendencies in Ban- 25X1
dundu, although a parliamentarian from Idiofa was
among the 13 whom Mobutu arrested last year for
trying to form a second political party. Public fear of
the security services and of informers for the ruling
party tends to limit antiregime activity to mere
grousing. Bandundu-based supporters of the Congo
Resurrection Action Movement, a tiny insurgent or-
ganization, are now inactive and, in our view, pose no
threat to the regime. 25X1
Charges by Angola that Zaire is allowing guerrillas of
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) to operate from bases in Bandundu
have strained bilateral relations. Although Zaire may
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Bo-boliko Lokonga Monse
Mihono
Former Prime Minister, Former Popu-
lar Movement of the Revolution
(MPR) Executive Secretary
Walia
Kamanda wa Kamanda
State Commissioner for Justice
Mupende
Kamitatu Massamba
Former State Commissioner for Agri-
culture, Rural Development, and Envi-
ronment
Mongongo Bayaka
Konde Vila Kikanda
Governor of Bandundu
Muyombe
Mandungu Bula Nyati
Governor of Shaba
Mosengele-Monunu
Brig. Gen. Mukobo
Mudende Popolo
Commander, Kamanyola Division
Musongo
Namwisi Ma Nkoy
State Commissioner for Finance and
Budget
Bayanzi Mumbala
N'gole Iliki
State Commissioner for Planning
Basakata
N'Singa Udjuu Ongwan
Kebi Untube
MPR Executive Secretary
Basakata
Takizala Luyana
Former regional governor
Bahungana
Yoka Mangono
Former Foreign Minister
Monunu
Strong international trade union ties;
honest
Former OAU Assistant Secretary
General; former Foreign Minister, UN
African nationalist; leftist; favors con-
tinued US economic and military aid;
unpopular with Mobutu's advisers and
Prime Minister Kengo
Cofounder of an independence move-
ment in 1959; popular in Kwilu;
pre-Mobutu Prime Minister; jailed by
Mobutu, 1966; pro-US; French ties;
Sorbonne Ph. D.; rival of Prime Minis-
ter Kengo
Experienced territorial administrator;
intelligent; politically adept; from Bas-
Zaire
Mobutu loyalist; studied in USSR; for-
mer Foreign Minister; Minister of In-
formation and Public Works; former
Governor of Kinshasa
Only major military officer from Ban-
dundu; has law degree from University
of Belgium
Strong technical leader; in cabinet for
regional balance; honest; apolitical;
former Governor of Equateur, former
Planning Minister
Former Finance Minister; reputedly a
good economist
Poor leader; pro-West; politically
favors his tribe; ambitious; economic
reformer; did not make policy as Prime
Minister
Kwilu's dominant politician; experi-
enced administrator; son of a village
chief
Close to N'Singa, but not Mobutu;
poor leader; lawyer; anti-Kengo; for-
mer Minister of Land Affairs
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Bandundu Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area. 295,658 square kilometers
Population: 1970-2,488,596, 1982-3,681,542
Life expectancy (years): 1956-37, 1975-44
Rural population (percent), 1975: 85
Principal city: Kikwit
Population: 1970-111,960, 1982-160,000
Principal tribes: Bayaka, Bayanzi, Bambala, Basuku, Kundu
Economics Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 14 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, coffee
Principal industries: none
Leading minerals: none
Administration Governor: Konde Vila Kikanda (from Bas-Zaire)
Administrative capital: Bandundu
Area: 222 square kilometers
Population: 1970-74,467, 1982-100,000
Mai Ndombe subregion
Area. 127,243 square kilometers
Population: 1970-429,465
Capital: Inongo
Administrative zones: Inongo, Mushie, Oshwe, Kutu, Kiri, Bolobo
Kwilu subregion
Area. 78,219 square kilometers
Population: 1970-1,370,454
Capital: Bulungu
Administrative zones: Bulungu, Bagata, Idiofa, Masi-Manimba, Gungu
Kwango subregion
Area. 89,974 square kilometers
Population: 1970-614,210
Capital: Kenge
Administrative zones: Kenge, Popokabaka, Kasongo-Lunda, Kahemba, Feshi
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sympathize with UNITA's goals, the government
denies any official support to Angolan guerrillas. We
have no evidence that Kinshasa has directly aided
UNITA in recent years. Logistic difficulties make
Army policing of the border area problematical,
however, and guerrillas may operate out of Bandundu
undetected
Prospects
Bandundu's economic slide will not end soon. Declin-
ing urban standards of living in Bandundu and neigh-
boring Kinshasa, brought about in part by budgetary
austerity and the devaluation of the zaire, will contin-
ue to encourage a return to subsistence farming and
further decrease contacts between the capital and the
countryside.
Bandunduans are unlikely, however, to confront the
government regarding their deteriorating economy or
any other strictly regional issue. Local intellectuals
who support the banned second political party have
little in common with Bandundu's peasant farmers.
Guerrilla movements have little appeal in the region.
The average Bandunduan is likely to remain political-
Secret 12
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Bas-Zaire:
Zaire's Outlet to the Sea
The corruption and poor administration characteristic Health problems abound. A survey conducted in 1981
of Mobutu's rule have hindered economic develop- by Tulane University found 20 percent of Bas-Zaire's
ment in Bas-Zaire. Although Mobutu favors the population suffering from acute malnutrition. The
region over some others in his allocation of develop- problem is increasing especially rapidly among
ment projects because of Bas-Zaire's importance as women and children. Although Bas-Zaire has the
the country's sole outlet to the sea, Kinshasa has not potential to become self-sufficient in food crops, farm25X1
been generous in its support. ers export food needed to feed the local population,
according to the US Embassy.
Malaria is prevalent throughout the region, and sleep-
ing sickness and blood flukes are common along the
Congo River and near the Angolan borders. Hospitals
Bas-Zaire is Zaire's smallest region, roughly the size
of Delaware. Most of its terrain, a plateau that gently
descends from a maximum elevation of 750 meters,
;onsists of brush or tree savanna. The western sub-
-egion of Bas-Fleuve has a few dense forests.F_~
There are approximately 1.8 million people in the
region-about 7 percent of the country's population-
and ethnic ties are stronger in Bas-Zaire than in any
other region, according to several scholars. Bakongos,
who proudly trace their ancestry back to a kingdom
that ruled the area for centuries, are the main ethnic
group. The Bayombes, the second most important
group, predominate in Bas-Fleuve. Most of Bas-
Zaire's tribes speak Kikongo or Lingala dialects. As
elsewhere in the country, French is spoken only by the
few that have a formal education.
Christianity-both Catholic and Protestant-thrives
alongside Kimbanguism, a Christianized form of ani-
mism. Clergymen exercise influence by organizing
youth groups, settling jurisdictional disputes, and
playing the role of advisers.
Despite Bas-Zaire's economic importance to Kinsha-
sa, the central government provides few public serv-
ices. According to US Embassy reports, the private
sector has taken up some of the slack. For example, a
local Belgian firm that produces palm oil has estab-
lished and maintains 1,300 kilometers of rural roads,
22 canteens, and several clinics and dispensaries
suffer from inadequate financing and supplies.
The educational system has fared no better than the
health services. Teachers in Bas-Zaire, as well as the
rest of the country, went on strike last year to protest
the diversion of their paychecks by bureaucrats.
Schools lack chalk, books, desks, and other basic
equipment.
Bas-Zaire's transportation network is relatively well
developed, largely because all of Zaire depends on the
region's port at Matadi for most of its imports. The
heavily traveled, dangerously narrow road from Ma-
tadi to Kinshasa is one of few in the country in
relatively good repair, according to the US defense
attache. Kinshasa plans to construct a railroad be-
tween Dilolo and Songololo and a paved road along
the Matadi-Boma-Banana route. Japanese plans to
finance and build a large suspension bridge across the 25X1
Congo River near Matadi may be jeopardized be-
cause of Mobutu's diversion of previous Japanese aid,
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Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Bas-Zaire Region
Madingou
Nzeto
Atlantic
14 Boundary representation is
I not necessarily authoritative.
Population per sq. kilometer
Li under 10
10-20
20-30
over 30
Kakongo Selected tribe
-?- Region boundary
O Region capital
Bas-Zaire subregion
--- boundary
0 Bas-Zaire subregion
capital
Major road
Railroad
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Economic Activity in Zaire's Bas-Zaire Region
Area
of
Map,
Lukuld
FI
i C
M ba n za-
Ngungy
asanqgufii
s ? Oil product pipeline
it Refinery
A Selected offshore oil well
Agriculture
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Inga-Shaba powerline
Bauxite reserve
Agriculture
Bananas, manioc
Corn, peanuts, manioc
Beans, manioc
Oil palm
-?- Region boundary
l Region capital
--- Bas-Zaire subregion
boundary
O Bas-Zaire subregion
capital
Major road
-?-~ Railroad
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Bas-Zaire, alone among Zaire's western regions, is a
source of minerals. Crude oil from an offshore well is
refined near Moanda on the coast and piped to
Kinshasa. A large bauxite reserve girdles the region
just west of Matadi
Energy output from the Inga hydroelectric power
plant in Bas-Zaire could aid development. The gov-
ernment is offering cheap electricity in an industrial
zone to attract foreign capital. A Swiss aluminum
consortium may benefit from the offer if it can raise
$640 million to outbid Japan for a smelter project.[-
Several agricultural development projects bolster
farming in Bas-Zaire. The region's scant rainfall-
lowest in the country-is supplemented by the second-
highest number of water supply projects in Zaire. A
project to revitalize the flagging sugar industry oper-
ates near Mbunza Ngungu.
agribusiness consortium recently sound-
ed out the World Bank on plans to promote farming
along the Congo River. The Soviets also have ex-
pressed interest in this project.
Bas-Zaire is plagued, however, by many of the prob-
lems that hinder agricultural development throughout
Zaire. In the early 1970s, the US Embassy estimated
that at least a third of the region's palm crop was
diverted by corrupt Army commanders to the black
market. Drought in 1978 devastated virtually every
crop.
Security Jitters
Last December, longstanding fears that guerrillas of
the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo
would invade Zaire from bases in Angola led the
Army to call a full alert in Bas-Zaire and Shaba.
Although this proved to be a false alarm, Bas-Zaire
would be vulnerable if the FLNC could muster its
forces.
The Army's litany of chronic difficulties in Bas-
Zaire-inadequate vehicle maintenance, fuel thefts,
untrained troops, poor morale, logistic shortcom-
ings-would make selective sabotage and interdiction
relatively low-cost options for the FLNC. In addition,
Gendarmerie and Army shakedown operations have
damaged civil-military relations. We agree with US
Embassy assessments that Kinshasa would be eco-
nomically crippled in a matter of hours by attacks on 25X1
Bas-Zaire's oil storage facilities, refinery, pipeline,
railway, and the Matadi-Kinshasa road.
Despite these considerations, we believe there is little
likelihood of an imminent invasion. The FLNC has
not demonstrated a serious interest in attacking Bas-
Zaire, and its main forces are clustered far to the 25X1
southeast in Zambia and Angola. They suffer from
many of the problems that plague Mobutu's forces-
low morale, factional divisions, shortages of key sup-
plies, and questionable leadershi 25X1
25X1
Furthermore, we have no evidence that the local 25X1
population supports the Shaban exiles. Bas-Zairians 25X1
do, of course, complain of inflation, corruption, and
overall economic neglect. Like their compatriots in
other regions, however, they seem willing to put up 25X1
with economic inequities rather than risk a return to
the chaos of the immediate postindependence years.
25X1
Refugees
The approximately 200,000 Angolan refugees in Bas-
Zaire strain already overburdened social service net-
works. The US Embassy notes that the United 25X1
Nations has helped most of the refugees to resettle
with members of their extended families. Some, how-
ever-particularly those associated with the Front for
the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-have
resorted to shaking down local residents for sanctuary
and supplies.
Local Politics
Bas-Zaire has a long history of political activism.
Protest movements in 1919-23 and 1933-38 included
religious-mystical currents that persist in Kimban-
guism. The Bakongo Alliance of the 1950s, led by 25X1
later Prime Minister Joseph Kasavubu, evolved from
a Kikongo cultural group into an influential political
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Bayona Bameya
State Commissioner for University and
Higher Education and Scientific
Research
Hunianga
Kiakwama Kia Kiziki
State Commissioner for State,
Investments
Unknown
Kisombe Kiaku Muisi
Senior Legislative Council member
Mundibu
Kitemeko Mambu Manze
Senior member of legislative
delegation
Mundibu
Konde Vila Kikanda
Governor of Bandundu
Muyombe
Makolo Jibikilayi
Governor of Bas-Zaire
Lulua
Mananga Dintoka Pholo
Former State Commissioner for Labor
and Social Security
Bakongo
Mavua Mudima
Chief of Staff, Navy
Mundibu
Brig. Gen. Molamba Pene
Lowa
Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie
Muyombe
Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi
Director, Office of the President
Bakongo
Brig. Gen. Sasa Muaka
Mavavambu
Chief, International Council for
Military Sports
Bakongo-Muyombe
Former General Commissioner for
Sports and Leisure
Bakongo
State Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation
Bakongo-Muyombe
Former First President of Supreme
Court; former law school dean
Former Minister of Finance, Govern-
ment Investments, and National Econ-
omy; former managing director of na-
tional 25X6
insurance parastatal; close to
Wealthy businessman; former Gover-
nor of Kinshasa difficult to
deal with
Wealthy businessman; rival of Ki-
sombe; from Cataractes, the subregion
that is predominant in the delegation
Experienced territorial administrator;
intelligent; politically adept
Former Governor of Bandundu; former
Minister of Public Works, Public
Health and Social Welfare; opportun-
ist; from the Kasais
Corrupt; former Justice and Energy
Minister
Probably pro-US
Former Commander of Kinshasa Mili-
tary District
Capable attorney; member of Mobu-
tu's inner circle of advisers; Seti's uni-
versity classmate; oversees GECA-
MINES for Mobutu; helps him resist
reforms; economic adviser
Pacified Shaba in 1978; former
Commander, Kamanyola Division;
competent; pro-US
Connected by marriage to ex-Justice
Minister Vunduawe, which made him
disliked by Kengo
Former Ambassador to the United Na-
tions; held several other ministerial
portfolios; close ties to Nimy; coffee
exporter; protocol conscious
movement. In 1980 Mobutu ordered 60 Bas-Zairians I all but three of Bas-Zaire's 32
arrested for illegally organizing an opposition political legislators oppose Mobutu, but we believe that they
party, and resentment against the regime has sim- ?, are in no position to challenge him effectively. F_
mered under the surface since then.
25X1
25X1
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Bas-Zaire Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area. 53,441 square kilometers
Population: 1970-1,504,361, 1976-1,741,080, 1982-1,860,499
Rural population (percent): 1975-68.7
Life expectancy (years): 1956-38; 1975-45.7
Principal city: Matadi
Population: 1976-162,396
Principal tribes: Bakongo, Bambata, Basundi, Bayombe, Kakongo, Muserongo
Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 12.6 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, sugar, rubber, coffee, cocoa, fish, forestry
Principal industries: hydroelectric power plant, petroleum refining, port
facility
Leading minerals: bauxite, offshore oil
Administration Governor: Makolo Jibikilayi (from the Kasais)
Administrative capital: Matadi
Area: 61 square kilometers
Population: 1970-110,436
Bas-Fleuve subregion
Area: 14,246 square kilometers
Population: 1970-522,053
Capital: Boma
Administrative zones: Tshela, Lukula, Seke Banza, Boma
Cataractes subregion
Area. 39,134 square kilometers
Population: 1970-871,872
Capital: Mbanza-Ngungu
Administrative zones: Luozi, Songololo, Mbanza-Ngungu, Kimvula, Kasan-
gulu, Madimba
The most prominent political figure from Bas-Zaire is
Nimy Mayidika, director of Mobutu's office. He is
the only non-Equateurian in Mobutu's "inner, circle,"
but he has done little-if anything-for Bas-Zaire.
Aside from his official duties as Mobutu's bureaucrat-
ic watchdog, his main job seems to be to add to
Mobutu's personal fortune by siphoning off revenues
from parastatal enterprises.
Discontent with Mobutu will continue in Bas-Zaire,
but we doubt that it will flare into violence, given the
incompetence of the FLNC and overall public apathy.
Although Bas-Zaire will continue to suffer from
Kinshasa's neglect, it probably will remain less ne-
glected than most of the other regions because of its
importance as the country's logistic hub.
25X1
25X1
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Equateur:
Mobutu's Home Region
President Mobutu and nearly all of his advisers come
from Equateur,' but the region has benefited little
because the Equateurians in Kinshasa are more inter-
ested in personal gain than in their home region. As a
result, Equateur's large peasant class is at least as
dissatisfied with the regime as people in the rest of the
country. Such discontent is unlikely to coalesce into
an anti-Mobutu movement, however, because of inter-
tribal mistrust and political apathy. We expect that
Equateur will remain poor, economically stagnant,
politically lethargic, and largely neglected by Kinsha-
sa.
Other Equateurian Bantu-speaking groups-the
Binza, Ngombe, Adula, and Budja-live in the forests
along the Zaire River. Mobutu grew up among these
people and maintains close ties to them.
Even during the colonial era-when it was known as
the Forgotten Corner-Equateur had fewer schools,
hospitals, and roads than the other regions. Since
1973 when nationalization forced out foreign busi-
nessmen, commercial activity has plummeted. The
handful of internationally funded development proj-
Tribal frictions are the key to understanding the
people of Equateur, as in much of the rest of Zaire.
According to US Embassy reporting, Equateurians
welcome Kinshasa's practice of naming outsiders to
local government positions because they find them
less objectionable than persons from rival tribes with-
in the region.
Tribal jealousies are accentuated by Mobutu's
tendency to rely heavily for support on his Ngbandi
tribe, a minority that other Equateurians resent as
pampered foreigners.' The group's penchant for cor-
ruption is ascribed by other Zairians to an age-old
tradition in which theft-of articles, animals, and
women-was a prerequisite for manhood.
The principal rivals of the Ngbandis are the Mongo,
the largest tribe (3 million) in Equateur and the
second largest in Zaire. Despite their numbers, the
political effectiveness of the Mongos has been limited
by their tendency to divide into small, autonomous
political units. Mobutu nevertheless keeps a wary eye
on the few Mongos he has permitted to rise to key
positions in the military
6 Equateur, so named because it lies on the Equator, is roughly the
size of California. It is sparsely populated, and its rate of population
growth is among the lowest in the country. Information on the
region is also relatively sparse.
' Equateurians pejoratively refer to Ngbandis as Sudanese, but
ects in Equateur are too riddled with corruption to be
effective. 25X1
Most of the region's agricultural activity consists of
subsistence farming, although some cotton, cocoa,
coffee, rubber, and palm oil are grown for the market.
The region apparently has no mineral wealth.
What few resources the regime has allocated to
Equateur have been squandered on unproductive
showcase projects such as the presidential retreat at
Gbadolite. Once a backwater village, Gbadolite has
been transformed into a bustling town with paved
streets, electric lights, running water, fashionable
boutiques, an international-class hotel, a marble and
stained-glass cathedral, a zoo, and an international
airport. 25X1 25X1
Gbadolite was built by Mobutu and his wealthy
Ngbandi friends largely for their own benefit. Many
of the region's few small industries are owned by
persons fronting for Mobutu.
Even Gbadolite is not without its economic problems,
however. The explosion of economic activity has led to
skyrocketing inflation, forcing local workers to leave
low-paying jobs in town in order to maintain sub-
sistence plots or to eke out a living growing cash crops.
25X1 25X1
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Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Equateur Region
P
Population per
sq. kilometer
J under 10
L 10-20
( 20-30
over 30
Doko Selected
tribe
I)
700745(A01444)12-83
// o
~?- Region boundary
~. Region capital
--- tquateur subregion
boundary
O tquateur subregion
capital
Major road
Railroad
0 too 200
Kilometers
en)tra
Zongo Bosobolo;
a
Makanza o f,--9 2 BB saan
n
i
Kungu
Bolomba
rquG ateur
Mbandaka B 51 o
Ruki
city
tt.ndaka l
BBd to-MObay
i. (Gbadolite) ongo r)-k,
(a\p M a \ t^"-o) -Rondo
Ebola
ena Businga N 9 b 8
Bambari
Afr ,can (Republic
D
Bongandanga
`T U R 1 `akuma
`
l M / Isangi
\\ n Djolu
(`fate; 9 O
Z- Lukolela
e, 1' ` ./ Kiri " L - -L" el
Mai-Ndombe Inongo
p
.L-; B A N
MonkotoO
MonigaILa
a
umb,
u a p a
Boende
hoapa (a~ L-?l._
is \
Gombe`
o HAUT-
KAS
Dekese ? Kole
Lodl 'a ~'
OORI`NT
K SAI- J
25CC1 ENTAL
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Agriculture in Zaire's Equateur Region
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boundary
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capital
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21 Secret
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Bananas,
manioc
Corn, peanuts,
manioc
Oil palm
F, Cotton
>') Coffee
Cocoa
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A US academic study published in 1979 points out
that one of the main impediments to economic devel-
opment in Equateur is the bureaucracy. Every level of
the hierarchy provides opportunities to rake off a
share of government revenue. As a result, according
to the study, public works projects are not funded,
workers are not paid, equipment cannot be purchased,
and nothing gets done.
Health problems abound in Equateur, as throughout
Zaire. A local Belgian doctor has claimed that 90
percent of the males have gonorrhea. The country's
highest levels of malaria, blood flukes, and sleeping
sickness have been reported in northwestern Equa-
teur. Kwashiorkor, a disease that stems from protein
deficiency, is endemic among children because of poor
nutrition; leprosy is prevalent; and tuberculosis is on
the rise.
The central government rarely furnishes hospitals in
Equateur with even minimal supplies. The few medi-
cines it does send to the region are usually diverted to
the black market.
The educational system is also in disarray. Catholic
and Protestant missions sponsor about the only reli-
able educational and health services. Less than half of
the children attend school. Some teachers have not
been paid in four years.
In 1980 local university students participated in a
national strike to protest inadequate educational facil-
ities and dismal living conditions. The government
arrested 95 leaders of the strike, accused them of
collusion with jailed parliamentary dissidents and
tortured them, The
government then forcibly conscripted many of these
students into military service and sent them to a camp
in remote Kotakoli, Equateur. The students were
recently freed, but the Kotakoli experience has dis-
suaded them and their colleagues from engaging in
further protests even though living conditions and
instructional facilities have deteriorated further since
the strike.
Equateurian Dominance in the Central Government
We know little about local politics in Equateur, but
Mobutu has given Equateurians-mostly Ngbandis-
key roles in Kinshasa. Equateurians head most of the
important ministries, the military and intelligence
services, the sole political party, the legislature, and
important private and parastatal business concerns. 25X1
Except for the Director of the Presidential Office, all
of Mobutu's most trusted "inner circle" hail from the
region.
Mobutu's inner circle is currently dominated by
Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo, who is a Ngbandi-
metis (part European), and a longtime supporter of the
President. Kengo is allied with Mobutu's national
security adviser, Seti Yale, another Ngbandi-metis.
Kengo's strongest opponent, another Ngbandi, former
Deputy Prime Minister Vunduawe to Pemako, has 25X1
lost out in the struggle for power. Vunduawe resigned
his cabinet post in January 1983, ostensibly to protest
the hamhandedness. of Kengo's campaign against
corruption. Although he was confined to house arrest
for several weeks, Vunduawe is now serving on
Mobutu's reelection committee.
25X1
25X1
Mobutu's system of favoring Equateurians is not
without drawbacks for himself as well as the country.
Non-Ngbandis resent the growing wealth of Mobutu's
cronies and chafe at being passed over for jobs and 25X1
promotions. Mobutu's reliance on self-serving, Equa-
teurian yes-men also isolates him from the poverty
and concerns of the people in the country as a whole.
perpetuate widespread apathy.
Equateur's prospects are bleak. Local leaders are
more likely to be co-opted by Kinshasa than to help
the impoverished peasants of the region. Although
Equateur will continue to provide leadership cadre for
Zaire so long as Mobutu remains in power, the region
itself will probably continue to lack political influence
or economic importance. The public's minimal expec- 25X1
tations of what the government can do will tend to
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Atenda Mongebe Ongwano
Former Administrator General,
National Research and Information
Center
Akula
Former chief of Mobutu's recently dis-
banded civilian intelligence service,
CNRI
Bemba Saolona
Chairman, Association of Zairian
Companies (ANEZA)
Ngbakametis
Member of the "inner circle"; business
front for Prime Minister Kengo wa
Dondo
Bokana W'Ondangela
State Commissioner for Public Works
and Territorial Development
Mongo
Mobutu loyalist; technocrat; former
Deputy Director of President's Office
Col. Bolozi Gbudu
Tanikpma
Chief, Military Intelligence
. Ngbandi
Corrupt; married to Mobutu's sister;
pro-Israel; a hardliner in the "inner
circle"
Bomboko Lokumba
Ambassador to the United Nations
Mongo
Wealthy businessman; former Deputy
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister,
Justice Minister, and Ambassador to
United States
Brig. Gen. Bosange
Pompese Bakole
Chief, Presidential Military Office
Mongo
Young; combat experienced; has
Mobutu's confidence; former Com-
mander of the Special Presidential
Brigade
Lt. Gen. Boteti Nkok'ea
Nkanga
Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
Mongo
Ties to Mobutu's "inner circle"; hon-
est; intelligent; cooperative with West-
ern officials; lacks formal military
training
Lt. Gen. Danga Ngbokoli
Commander, Third Military Region
Ngbandi
Pro-West; close to Mobutu; was born
in Mobutu's village
State Commissioner for Women's
Affairs and Social Affairs
Libinza Mongo
Director of Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) Women's Bureau;
member of MPR Central Committee;
lawyer; one of first Zairian women to
receive a European education
Maj. Gen. Eluki Monga
Chief of Staff, Army
Budja
Anunda
Engulu Baangampongo
Bakokele Lodanga
Member of Political Bureau of MPR
Central Committee
Mongo
Former Minister of Agriculture, Terri-
tories, Political Affairs, and Public
Works
Brig. Gen. Esale Yoka
Lokole
Former Commander, First Military
Region
Mongo
"Father figure" in the military; cur-
rently suspended while being investi-
gated for corruption
Inonga Lokongo L'Ome
Former State Commissioner for Trans-
port and Communications
Mongo
Mobutu loyalist; no independent politi-
cal following; lawyer; was in cabinet
for tribal balance until Kengo removed
him
Kengo wa Dondo
First State Commissioner (Prime
Minister)
Ngbandi-metis
(Polish father)
Leader of "inner circle"; close to
Mobutu and Seti; has been relatively
effective in implementing economic
austerity measures advocated by Inter-
national Monetary Fund
Kititwa Tumansi Benga
Ntundu
Governor of Equateur
Former head of several ministries;
Mobutu loyalist; experienced diplomat;
from Kivu
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ocaI VI
Prominent Personalities in Equateur (continued)
Vice Adm. Lomponda wa
Botende
Secretary of State for National
Defense and Territorial Security
Mongo Libinza
-Makolo Wa Mpombo
Director, National Documentation
Agency, the civilian intelligence
service created in November 1983
Masegabio Nzanzu Mabele
State Commissioner for Culture and
Arts
Ngombe
Mata-Nkumu Wa Bowango
Former State Commissioner for Social
Affairs
Makanza
Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko
Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za
Banga
President; State Commissioner for Na-
tional Defense and Veterans' Affairs;
President of the MPR, Zaire's sole
legal political party; Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces
Ngbandi
Ndolela Si Kikonde
Former State Commissioner for
Primary and Secondary Education
Ngbandi
Ndjoli Balanga
State Commissioner for Environment,
Preservation of Nature, and Tourism
Mongo
Former Administrator General,
National Intelligence Service
Mongo
Col. Nzimbi Ngbale
Commander, Special Presidential
Brigade
Ngbandi
Nzondomyo A Dokpe Lingo
President, Legislative Council
Ngbaka
Sakombi Ekope
Former Governor of Kinshasa
Akula
Sakombi Inongo
State Commissioner for Information,
Mobilization, Propaganda, and Politi-
cal Action
Akula
Sambwa Pida Nbangui
Governor, Bank of Zaire
Ngbandi
Chairman, National Security Council;
Special Presidential Adviser on
National Security
Ngbandi-metis
Vunduawe to Pemako
Former Deputy Prime Minister
Ngbandi
Gen. Yeka Mangbau
Commander, First Military Region
(Shaba)
Budja
0 shows tribal favoritism; 25X6
friendly toward US officials
Former Ambassador to France, securi-
ty services chief in 1980; wealthy busi-
nessman; pro-West
Former Secretary of State for Primary
and Secondary Education; former pro-
fessor of literature
Was respected by her staff for her
honesty-rare among cabinet mem-
bers; former Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications and of Commerce
Pro-West; reported to be worth from
$3 billion to $5 billion; declared him-
self president in 1965 when civilian
leaders reached an impasse
Nonaligned member of the "inner cir-
cle"; business front for Mobutu; relat-
ed to Mobutu
Friend of Mobutu and Vunduawe; has
doctorate in sociology
Appointed in March 1983 to same
position he held in 1970s; friend of
Mobutu
Moderate member of "inner circle";
pro-West; capable foreign policy
expert
Mobutu's nephew; his Israeli-trained
brigade, which serves as Mobutu's pal-
ace guard, is paid 35 percent more
than regular Army units to ensure
personal loyalty to Mobutu
Close to Mobutu; authoritarian; expe-
rienced legislator
Extremely pro-Mobutu; former Interi-
or Minister; old political hand
Former member of Mobutu's inner cir-
cle; has served in other ministerial and
party positions; was expelled from par-
ty for criticizing Mobutu; rebuttal to a
book by Nguza brought him back into
Close ties to Belgian bankers; respect-
ed economist; pro-US
Mobutu's principal adviser, confidant,
and a relative; anti-US
Pro-US; former leading moderate in
the "inner circle"; rival of Kengo and
Seti; cousin of Mobutu
Recently replaced General Esale as
Shaba Commander during anticorrup-
tion drive
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Equateur Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area: 402,154 square kilometers
Population: 1970-2,431,812, 1976-2,681,755, 1982-3,094,010
Life expectancy (years): 1956-40.2, 1975-47.8
Rural population (percent), 1975: 84.1
Principal city: Mbandaka
Population: 1975-139,739
Principal tribes: Mongo, Ngbandi, Budja, Ngbaka
Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 17.5 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, coffee, rubber, cocoa, cotton
Principal industries: brewery
Leading minerals: none
Administration Governor: Kititwa Tumansi Benga Ntundu (from Kivu)
Administrative capital: Mbandaka
Area: 460 square kilometers
Population: 1970-107,910
Equateur subregion
Area. 102,304 square kilometers
Population: 1970-340,823
Capital: Basankusu
Administrative zones: Basankusu, Bomongo, Bolomba, Ingende, Bikoro,
Makanza, Lukolela
Tshuapa subregion
Area: 132,957 square kilometers
Population: 1970-466,286
Capital: Boende
Administrative zones: Boende, Djolu, Befale, Bokungu, Monkoto, Ikela
Mongala subregion
Area: 101,508 square kilometers
Population: 1970-739,813
Capital: Lisala
Administrative zones: Lisala, Bumba, Mobayi, Businga, Bangandanga
North/South Ubangi subregions
Area: 64,925 square kilometers
Population: 1970-776,980
Capitals: Gemena, Gbadolite
Administrative zones: Gemena, Kungu, Libenge, Bosobolo, Budjala, Badolite
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Haut-Zaire:
Remote but Resilient
Haut-Zaire is isolated from Kinshasa because of
distance, poor transportation links, and the disinterest
of the central government. A burgeoning black
market in coffee, cotton, ivory, and gold has developed
with Uganda and Sudan-with whom Haut-Zaire has
closer economic and social ties than to the rest of
Zaire-demonstrating the resilience of the region's
otherwise flagging economy.
The People and Their Quality of Life
Haut-Zaire's roughly 4 million people, about 14 per-
cent of the country's population, live in a region
approximately the size of France. Principally Bantu,
Sudanic, Nilotic, and Pygmy, Haut-Zairians have
ethnically and culturally more in common with their
cousins in Sudan, Uganda, and the Central African
Republic than with other tribes in Zaire. Most Haut-
Zairians speak Swahili dialects; officials in Kinshasa
generally speak Lingala. This linguistic difference
accentuates the region's isolation.
Government services are negligible because of corrup-
tion, administrative incompetence, and, perhaps most
important, Kinshasa's disinterest in this remote
region. As in Shaba and most other regions of the
country, what few public services are available are the
result of self-help or the work of missionaries and
domestic and foreign corporations. Officials complain
of irregular pay, inadequate funds to support local
programs, and the laxity of the central government in
responding to their needs
Religion, magic, and rigid ethnic identification
strongly influence daily life. Catholicism and Protes-
tantism thrive largely because of missionary efforts to
improve living conditions, but witch doctors and sor-
cerers also abound.
Ugandan border. The region also has the country's
highest percentage of leprosy cases. An outbreak of
cholera in Kisangani was controlled only after flood-
ing of the Congo River swept away some of the
infected homes. Hospitals suffer from inadequate 25X1
financing and supplies
Haut-Zaire's educational system is plagued with the25X1
same difficulties found throughout the country, in-
cluding poorly trained teachers and a lack of basic
facilities-chalk, blackboards, desks, and books.
Qualified teachers are leaving the region in despair,
further reducing the level of instruction and student
performance. 25X1
Students at the University of Zaire at Kisangani have
expressed dissatisfaction with the deteriorating educa-
tional system and the Mobutu regime. They have not
engaged in overt political action, however, because
they fear security service informers and the loss of
their paltry government subsidies. Many brighter
students are leaving schools to seek jobs.
The land in Haut-Zaire is extremely fertile, but
Kinshasa's neglect of transportation links with the
region and low, government-set prices have led agri-
cultural producers to look to the flourishing black
market at Zaire's northeastern border with Sudan and
Uganda for their livelihoods. Haut-Zaire's legal
coffee economy has declined in part because the 25X1
Greek planters who own the largest plantations are
not interested in reinvesting their profits in the region.
As a result, they overwork their land and do not
diversify their crops. By contrast, small-scale Zairian 25X1
planters are always short of cash and credit and are
dependent upon foreign-owned operations for milling
services. Few of them are able to make a living in the
The region's problems are aggravated by periodic
influxes of refugees from Uganda carrying epidemic
diseases. The highest levels of malaria, trypanosomia-
sis, and schistosomiasis in Zaire are found near the
legal market.
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Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Haut-Zaire Region
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Secret
Economic Activity in Zaire's Haut-Zaire Region
24 26
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Illegal coffee trading has evolved into big business
over the past decade. Until the mid-1970s Haut-
Zairians smuggled their coffee through Uganda to
foreign markets. Because of insecurity within
Uganda, however, Ugandan and Zairian planters now
move their coffee through Haut-Zaire to the Sudan.
Kinshasa's efforts to intervene against black market-
ing and to recoup lost tax revenues have had limited
results. High-level government officials quietly have
joined the ranks of the smugglers, ensuring that the
roads to Sudan are kept in adequate repair and that
the government's efforts to crack down on smuggling
Coffee is not the only item of contraband moved out
of Haut-Zaire. Gold smuggling into Burundi by
pygmies and Wanande peasants has cut into the
profits of Kilo-Moto, a parastatal company that mines
80 percent of the country's gold. Senior military and
civilian officials-including one of President
Mobutu's sons-dominate illegal trafficking of ivory
with West African and Arab merchants, according to
The widespread smuggling has been a mixed blessing
for the region. On the one hand, the easy hard
currency profits have stimulated economic life, lead-
ing scores of expatriates to return to rebuild planta-
tions and start new commercial enterprises. On the
other hand, the influx of cash has had a number of
deleterious effects. Students have been lured to leave
school by get-rich-quick schemes. People generally
have become more cynical about their government as
they watch officials profit from illegal trade. Violence
has been another byproduct, as rival gangs fight for
control of the smuggling trade. Finally, smuggling is
costing the government millions of dollars in lost
foreign exchange earnings and uncollected taxes
Refugees
Thousands of refugees fled to Zaire from Uganda
following the overthrow of Idi Amin, and the low-level
insurgency there since then has maintained a continu-
ing flow. The number of Ugandan refugees in Haut-
Zaire as of January 1981 was 129,000, according to
the US Embassy; an additional 46,000 refugees regis-
tered with the UN that summer{
Ugandan military operations have often spilled across
the border. Uganda charges that Zaire harbors anti-
government rebels and demands that the refugees be
moved farther from the border. The lack of discipline
in both armies makes policing the border area diffi-
cult, and has strained bilateral relations.
Haut-Zaire's already large refugee population could
serve as a magnet for other Ugandan refugees who
live along the Rwanda-Uganda border. Yet another
influx would strain the government's already ineffec-
tive social services, however, and would deplete the
resources of tribal, business, and missionary groups
Discontent With Mobutu
As elsewhere in Zaire, the people of Haut-Zaire
generally dislike the central government because of its
inability and disinclination to respond to the region's
needs, according to the US Embassy
Residents characterize Kinshasa as at
best a hindrance to development and at worst the
source of its many problems. Haut-Zaire's chronic
underrepresentation in Mobutu's cabinet adds to local
feelings of powerlessness and alienation. Many believe
that Mobutu holds a grudge against the region.
Mobutu was greeted with sullen silence in 1979 when
he visited Kisangani, once the country's third most
important city
There have long been a number of talented Haut-
Zairian officers in the military, such as Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Singa Boyenge and former Minister of
Defense Babia Wili Malobia. Mobutu's tendency to
favor his fellow Equateurians in staffing senior com-
mand positions has created resentment among Haut-
Zairians in the military. Mobutu's policy of deliber-
ately fostering personal rivalries among military
leaders has led to the formation of cliques at the most
senior levels of command and increased discontent
among middle-level Haut-Zairian officers]
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Discontent in Haut-Zaire has not taken the form of
antiregime action, however, since the traumatic vio-
lence of 1964. spilled over into Haut-Zaire. Even
though Haut-Zairian officers resent Equateurian pre-
dominance, they appear to be loyal to Mobutu. F-1 25X1
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Prominent Personalities in Haut-Zaire
Lt. Gen. Babia Wili
Malobia Zongbi
Former Minister of Defense
Zande,Babua
Duga Kugbe-Toroa
Governor of Kasai-Oriental
Ngbandi
Etitimoto Ekangamengo
Second Parliamentary Secretary
Mosoko
Kasongo Mutuale
Ambassador to the United States
Mokusu
Maj. Gen. Kikunda Ombala
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Lokele
Mozagba Ngbuka Bomanga
State Commissioner for Territorial
Affairs
Ngbandi
Nendaka Bika
First Vice President of MPR Central
Committee
Babua
Gen. Singa Boyenge
Mosambay
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
Sukadi Bulayi Mudumbe
Governor of Haut-Zaire
Basonge
Zamundu Agenong-ha
Kasongo
Governor of Kasai-Occidental
Alur
Leader of Haut-Zaire officers who
oppose are nonetheless loyal to Mobutu; pro-
West; rival of Army Chief of Staff
Eluki
Member of Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) Central Committee;
former Minister of Territories; reput-
edly a tough politician, opportunist
Only woman in permanent bureau of
national legislature; lacks parliamenta-
ry experience
Competent and well informed; not a
power in his own right; former Minis-
ter of Civil Services and Posts, Tele-
phones, and Telegraphs
Member of MPR Political Bureau; for-
merly Mobutu's pilot, temporarily sus-
pended in 1983 for corruption
Babia's cousin; from Mobutu's tribe;
former Minister of Public Health,
Social Welfare, and Justice
Member of "Binza Group" that helped
Mobutu come to power; former Surete
chief, once arrested for subversion
Pro-West; leader of Haut-Zaire offi-
cers loyal to Mobutu; popular owing to
skill and courage shown in resisting
Shaba invasions; may retire soon; for25X6
mer Governor of Shaba
friend of Nendaka
Supported by Kabinda tribal leaders;
former Minister of Land Affairs
Pro-West; former Governor of Kasai-
Oriental and Bas-Zaire, where he was
unpopular and involved in scandals as-
sociated with US PL-480 aid; former
Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and
Telephones, Public Works, and Agri-
culture; served as deputy chief of intel-
ligence when Nendaka headed Surete
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Haut-Zaire Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area: 503,239 square kilometers
Population: 1970-3,356,419, 1976-3,551,465, 1982-4,049,623
Life expectancy (years): 1956-39.3, 1975-46.9
Rural population (percent), 1975: 82.4
Principal city: Kisangani
Population: 1975-291,888
Principal tribes: Zande, Babua, Lokele
Economics Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 18.6 percent
Principal crops: manioc, livestock, corn, rice, vegetables, potatoes, cotton; coffee,
cocoa, peanuts
Principal industries: smuggling of ivory, coffee, and gold
Leading minerals: gold, iron
Administration Governor: Sukadi Bulayi Mudumbe (from the Kasais)
Administrative capital: Kisangani
Area: 1,910 square kilometers
Population: 1970-229,596
Tshopo/Haut-Zaire subregion
Area: 197,657 square kilometers
Population: 1970-714,545
Capital: Wanie-Rukula
Administrative zones: Basoko, Banalia, Bafwasende, Opala, Yahuma, Isangi,
Ubundu
Bas-Uele subregion
Area: 148,331 square kilometers
Population: 1970-588,768
Capital: Buta
Administrative zones: Buta, Bondo, Aketi, Ango, Bambesa, Poko
Haut-Uele subregion
Area: 89,683 square kilometers
Population: 1970-795,619
Capital: Isiro
Administrative zones: Rungu, Niangara, Dungu, Wamba, Watsa, Faradje
Ituri subregion
Area: 65,658 square kilometers
Population: 1970-1,027,891
Capital: Bunia
Administrative zones: Irumu, Aru, Mahagi, Djigu, Mambasa
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The most prominent Haut-Zairian who might chal-
lenge Mobutu is Nendaka Bika, former security chief
and a member of the group who helped Mobutu come
to power. Nendaka has 25X1
been quietly consolidating his power base among
intellectuals, the military, and political allies in other
eastern regions under the cover of his extensive
commercial interests. Mobutu once arrested Nendaka
for subversion and continues to keep a close watch on 25X1
him
Prospects
Geographically and socially cut off from the rest of
the country, Haut-Zaire is not as dependent on
Kinshasa as Zaire's other regions largely because of
the resilience of its black-market economy. In our
view, the region's entrepreneurs will continue to flour-
ish outside the legal market structure. Although this
will mean a loss of both tax revenue and respect for
the central government, it assures Haut-Zaire a large 25X1
measure of autonomy.
33 Secret
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The Kasai Regions:
Home of Diamond Mining
and Dissidents
The two Kasai regions (East and West) of Zaire
historically have been a problem for any central
government-Belgian or African-that has attempt-
ed to impose its authority over them. After independ-
ence, bloody intertribal warfare and a secessionist
movement forced Kinshasa to amalgamate several
small provinces in the Kasai area into two regions-
Occidental (West) and Oriental (East). Although
ethnic frictions remain, most people in the Kasais are
united in the belief that President Mobutu does not
like, trust, or care about them. They comprise, there-
fore, fertile ground for political opposition
The Belgians used the relatively disciplined Baluba to
administer the Lulua Valley, the homeland of the
Luluas. 25X1
When the colonial government's control weakened as
independence approached in 1959-60, the Lulua rose
up against the Baluba. The resultant bloodletting
forced hundreds of thousands of Baluba to flee to
neighboring Shaba and Kasai-Oriental and led
Baluba chief Kalonji Ditunga in 1960 to form the
secessionist Mining State of South Kasai. The seces-
sion failed in 1962 when disillusioned Baluba forced
Kalonji to accept the authority of the central govern-
The Kasais are also the center of diamond mining in
Zaire-the non-Communist world's leading producer
of industrial diamonds. Kinshasa hopes that an agree-
ment arrived at in March 1983, which permits
DeBeers, the South African-based company that
controls the international diamond cartel, once again
to market most of Zaire's diamonds, will revive the
industry. Despite stepped-up government policing
measures, diamond smuggling will continue to drain
much of the country's output.
The People and Their Quality of Life
Tribal Rivalries
Tribal frictions have long been a central part of life in
the Kasais, whose approximately 4 million people
make up 14 percent of the country's population.
Jealousies among the five key tribes-the Baluba and
Batetela in Kasai-Oriental, the Lulua and Basalam-
pasu in Kasai-Occidental, and the Bakuba in both
regions-have fostered some of the worst violence in
the country's history. These troubles have forced
several administrative reorganizations and redrawings
of regional boundaries.
The Baluba have been relatively successful in business
and government because of their personal drive and
acceptance of modern ways. Their success was partic-
ularly evident when Zaire was under Belgian rule.
ment and join a new governing coalition.
The Batetela played a major role in the politics and
violence that split the country in its early years of
independence. The assassination in 1961 of Patrice
Lumumba, the country's first Prime Minister and a
Batetela, sparked widespread antiwhite violence by
his tribe. Many young Batetela joined the "Simba"
rebellion, which terrorized most of the Sankuru subre-
gion of Kasai-Oriental in 1964. (See the Historical 25X1
Overview.) Since then, many Batetela have moved to
Kinshasa and have been assimilated despite having to
overcome Kinshasan prejudice because of their com-
paratively higher level of education. 25X1
The cultures of all five of the Kasai tribes remain
rooted in their remote, jungle backgrounds. The
Baluba and Batetela practice polygyny, magic, and
.other ancestral customs. Most neighboring tribes be-
lieve that the Basalampasu, who dominate southern
Kasai-Occidental, still practice cannibalism. The
King of the Bakuba is currently campaigning to get
the males of his tribe to wear trousers
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Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Kasai Regions
BANDUNDU/
*Idiofa
212
EQUATE```
~Dekese /
KASAI(/-1
Kole'
Zaire
Area of Map
Angola
Population per
sq. kilometer
under 10
10-20
20-30
I over 30
Lulua Selected tribe
-?-Region boundary
O Region capital
- - - Kasai subregion
boundary
OO Kasai subregion
capital
Major road
---~-~- Railroad
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Gems
498
533
640
294
345
260
Industrial
11,323
10,681
10,603
8,440
9,890
7,240
Source: US Bureau of Mines. (Figures include estimates of smug-
gling and therefore may differ from official SOZACOM data.)
Standard of Living
Living conditions in the Kasais are comparable to
those in Zaire's other regions. Radios, newspapers,
fuel, electricity, potable water, medical facilities, and
industrial jobs are virtually nonexistent. The buildings
and streets in.the cities are in severe decay. Soil
erosion threatens to wipe out entire city blocks.
Prostitution, alcoholism, and armed banditry are ram-
pant
The government spends little on maintaining or devel-
oping public facilities. A shortage of schools forces
teachers to instruct children outdoors. Most rural
development projects are run by Catholic and Presby-
terian missionaries. Private enterprise provides some
social services in Kasai-Oriental, but not in Kasai-
Occidental.
Diamond Mining
Zaire's diamond production-which accounts for
about 5 percent of the country's export revenues-is
centered in the Kasais. Societe Miniere de Bakwanga
(MIBA), owned jointly by the Zairian Government
and Belgian businessmen, operates a 103,000-hectare
concession at Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai-Oriental. Large
numbers of individual, private miners work deposits at
Tshikapa in Kasai-Occidental.
MIBA accounts for 95 percent of the country's
diamond production, but only about 5 percent of
MIBA's output are gems. A higher percentage of
Tshikapa's diamonds are gems, but production from
Tshikapa totals only 350,000 to 400,000 carats a year.
MIBA's production has fallen from 15 million carats
in 1964 to only slightly more than 6 million carats in
1982 because of aging plant and equipment, shortages
of spare parts, and dwindling ore reserves. About 75
percent of MIBA's production is "boart," an industri-
al-grade powder. Another 20 percent is of "near gem"
quality and can be used for industry or in low-quality
jewelry.
Zaire's decision to leave the DeBeers diamond mar-
keting cartel in May 1981 imposed heavy costs on the
Kasai diamond mines. DeBeers created a surplus in
the world market for industrial diamonds, according
to press reports, which cut average prices for MIBA's
output by about one-fourth to little more than $2 a
carat by the end of 1981. Zaire's diamond revenues
fell from $68 million in 1980 to $45 million in 1981
because of the glut, a strike, and the inefficient and
corrupt practices of SOZACOM, the parastatal com-
pany which had taken over the marketing of Zaire's
diamonds. 25X1
Zaire took steps to reverse the slide in diamond
earnings in March 1983 by signing a new agreement
with DeBeers's British subsidiary, Britmond, to pur-
chase MIBA's future output. Britmond guaranteed a
25X1
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floor price of $8.55 per carat for MIBA's diamonds,
which Kinshasa hopes will be enough to enable MIBA
to renovate and expand its mining facilities. The
return to the DeBeers marketing system should re-
duce fraud, which was common when the industry
was under SOZACOM's control.
Zaire also has announced regulations that permit
private companies to open buying offices and to
compete with purchasers on the black market. Private
buying offices have been opened by British, Ameri-
can, Belgian, and Haitian businessmen as well as by
DeBeers and at least one business associate of Mo-
butu. They reportedly have funneled $25 million in
hard currency into legal banking channels during the
first few weeks of the new system's operation.
We doubt, nevertheless, that these marketing changes
will bring significant new benefits to the Kasai
regions. Although the new system may reduce smug-
gling and bring some additional employment opportu-
nities if MIBA expands, it may also encourage illegal
prospecting on MIBA's holdings. MIBA officials
claim that illegal prospectors diverted 6 million carats
per year to the black market between 1969 and 1977,
plundered the richest reserve lodes, rendered MIBA's
operations less efficient, and undercut MIBA's at-
tempts to increase sales when world demand was high.
Further illegal prospecting could lead to violence
involving the prospectors against MIBA'S police and
Zairian gendarmes. The new system may also tempt
members of the Zairian Armed Forces to shake down
the black-marketeers and to step up their own illegal
mining. Military officers worry that an influx of
traders and miners could also cover infiltration of
insurgents into the area
Agriculture
Although a meat and grain exporting area under
Belgian rule, the Kasais have not recovered from a
postindependence slump in production and now im-
port corn from Zimbabwe and South Africa. In an
effort to reverse the agricultural decline, the govern-
ment sponsored a large maize project in Kasai-
Oriental in 1980, which increased production from
23,000 metric tons in 1980 to 32,250 metric tons in
1982
Confiscatory taxation policies, unrealistically low gov-
ernment-set prices, inefficient harvesting methods,
and a deteriorating transportation system have in-
duced many farmers to turn to illegal but more 25X1
lucrative diamond mining and smuggling. Moreover,
the impoverished Lulua farmers in Kasai-Occidental
often are forced to sell their entire crop, including
their own food stocks, to diamond-rich Baluba mer-
chants to pay off debts. This contributes to high rural
malnutrition and tribal tensions. The Lulua farmers
fear further economic dependence on the Balubas
and, according to the US Embassy, refuse to accept
electricity from Kasai-Oriental.
Mobutu's autocratic style of rule has only aggravated
Kasaian discontent. His government has slighted the
Kasaian regions in filling university, government, and
military slots, thus adding to both Baluba and Lulua
resentment of Kinshasa.
In 1981 several Kasaians in the National Assembly
joined other national legislators in forming the Union
for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), an orga-
nization that aroused Mobutu's ire. Eight Kasaians
were among the 13 key UDPS leaders who were jailed
for over a year for forming this illegal political party.
Mobutu's national security adviser, Seti Yale, and
Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo are using a new
Baluba political organization, the Revolutionary
Committee for Coordination and Action (CRCA), to
influence Kasai-Oriental politics and to monitor the
activities of the recently released UDPS leaders. The
CRCA members are young opportunists who do not
represent significant local interests, but Mobutu
might use them as functionaries because their politi-
cal weakness would make them pliable tools
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Prominent Personalities in the Kasai Regions
Kande Buloba Kasumpata
State Commissioner for Labor and
Social Security
Unknown
Former State Commissioner for Infor-
mation, Culture, and Arts
Luba
First Vice President of Legislative
Council
Batetela
Government Minerals Marketing
Company (SOZACOM)
Former State Commissioner for Scien-
tific Research
Luba
Makinda Watawata
Former State Commissioner for Pri-
mary and Secondary Education
Mushelele
Makolo Jibikilayi
Governor of Bas-Zaire
Gen. Malu Malu Dianda
Commander, Kitona Base
Mwamba Ndumba State Commissioner for Transport and Luba
Communication
Former Minister of Territories, Com-
merce, and Finance; reputedly a tough
politician; opportunist; from Haut-
Zaire
Former secretary general of the youth
wing of the Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR); former legislator
from Kasai-Occidental; also has ties in
Kasai-Oriental
Former President of the Court of
Appeals
Malopwe (emperor) of Baluba tribe;
led secessionist movement in 1960-62;
recently criticized for vote fraud in
Kasai-Oriental
Professor at the University of Kin-
shasa; former judicial adviser in the
Office of the President
Pro-US; friend of Mobutu; former
journalist; former member of Mo-
butu's inner circle
Served in political, labor, diplomatic,
and parastatal positions; helped by po-
litical connections of his wife, a Ba-
luba; viewed by colleagues as a concili-
ator and patient negotiator
Shrewd political operator; former chief
of Zairian Control Office
Lawyer from Kasai-Occidental; former
magistrate; MPR Central Committee
Former Governor of Bandundu; former
Minister of Public Works, Public
Health, and Social Affairs; opportunist
Only important military commander
from Kasais; was Chief of Staff of
OAU peacekeeping force in Chad
Popular Kasai-Occidental politician;
good administrator; fired as Governor
of Bas-Zaire in recent anticorruption
campaign
Former Secretary of State for Agricul-
ture; President of Tabazaire, a tobacco
firm; apolitical; pro-US
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Prominent Personalities in the Kasai Regions (continued)
Ngalula Mpandanjila Leader of Union for Democracy and
Social Progress (UDPS)
Sukadi Bulayi Mudumbe Governor of Haut-Zaire
Zamumdu Agenong'ha Governor of Kasai-Occidental
Kasongo
Pro-US; authored 51-page UDPS let-
ter criticizing Mobutu; cofounded
National Congolese Movement, a pre-
Mobutu political party; served as Gov-
ernor of South Kasai
Supported by Kabinda tribal leaders;
former Minister of Land Affairs
One of the first Zairians to earn M.D.
after independence; has extensive ex-
perience in health administration in
Shaba, Kasai-Oriental, and Haut-
Zaire; political ally of Prime Minister
Kengo
Most outspoken critic of Mobutu with-
in Zaire before being jailed in 1982 for
trying to form a second political party;
had served in cabinet and ambassado-
rial positions for Mobutu; pro-US
Pro-West; former Governor of Kasai-
Oriental and Bas-Zaire, where he was
involved in scandals involving PL-480
funds; held several ministerial posts;
was deputy chief of intelligence under
Nendaka Bika, a political rival of
Mobutu; from Haut-Zaire
25X1
Tribal frictions between Baluba and Batetela legisla-
tors have limited the effectiveness of the parliamenta-
ry delegation from Kasai-Oriental. The delegation
also has been weakened by the expulsion of the UDPS
dissidents and has not been able to replace them with
politicians of equal caliber.
Kasaian dissatisfaction with the Mobutu regime could
once again lead to open rebellion, according to Kasai-
Oriental Governor Zamundu Agenong. Economic
stagnation and election-rigging last year against sup-
porters of the UDPS have increased discontent
Seti advocates a get-tough policy for the Kasais, but
the Zairian Armed Forces are unprepared to imple-
ment it. military
units in the Kasais suffer from the same transporta-
tion, communications, equipment, and discipline prob-
lems that plague most military units elsewhere.
The armed forces can expect little help from the local
population in combating dissidence or insurgency.
Civil-military relations are poor because of extortion
of the population by military personnel and the
belief-which we have been unable to confirm-of
the local population that soldiers massacred hundreds
of students and miners in the region in 1979 and 1980.
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Kasai-Occidental Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area: 156,967 square kilometers; approximately the size of Georgia
Population: a 1976-1,918,115, 1982-2,226,482
Life expectancy (years): 1956-30.4, 1975-39.9
Rural population (percent), 1975: 74.4
Principal city: Kananga
Population: 1975-316,770
Principal tribes: Lulua, Bena-Luluwa, Bakuba, Babindji, Tshokwe, Basalampasu
Economics Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 6.4 percent
Principal crops: cotton, peanuts, manioc, coffee, palm oil, timber
Principal industries: brewery
Leading minerals: diamonds
Administration Governor: Zamundu Agenong'ha Kasongo (from Haut-Zaire)
Administrative capital: Kananga
Area. 378 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-18
Kasai subregion
Area: 95,631 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-34
Capital: Luebo
Administrative zones: Luebo, Mweka, Tshikapa, Ilebo, Dekese
Lulua subregion
Area. 60,938 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-48
Capital: Tshimbulu
Administrative zones: Demba, Dimbelenge, Dibaya, Luiza, Kazumba
e Zairian demographers believe that the government overestimated the population of the Kasais in the
1970 census.
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Kasai-Oriental Factsheet
Vital Statistics Area: 168,216 square kilometers; approximately the size of Tunisia or the state of
Washington
Population: a 1976-1,556,178, 1982-1,822,659
Life expectancy (years): 1956-39.2, 1975-46.9
Rural population (percent), 1975: 69.5
Principal city: Mbuji-Mayi
Population: 1975-283,219
Principal tribes: Baluba, Basonge, Bena-Kanioka, Batetela, Bakuba, Milembwe,
Luntu
Economics Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 5.5 percent
Principal crops: coffee, cotton, rice, corn, manioc, livestock
Principal industries: agricultural processing plants
Leading minerals: diamonds
Administration Governor: Duga Kugbe-Toroa (from Haut-Zaire)
Administrative capital: Mbuji-Mayi
Area: 64 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-14
Kabinda subregion
Area: 63,821 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-60
Capital: Kabinda
Administrative zones: Kabinda, Lubao, Tshilenge, Kamiji, Gandjika, Mwene-
Ditu
Sankuru subregion
Area: 104,331 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970-26
Capital: Lusambo
Administrative zones: Lusambo, Lodja, Lomeia, Kole, Katako-Kombe,
Lubefu
Zairian demographers believe that the government overestimated the population of the Kasais in the
1970 census.
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The people of four whole villages in Kasai-Occidental
resettled in Angola in 1980 to escape harassment by
the military, according to the US Embassy.
Kinshasa's unwillingness or inability to devote more
resources to the development of the Kasais will con-
tinue to hinder economic development. Although the
resumption of the diamond marketing agreement with
DeBeers probably will increase revenues, in our view
little of this money will be returned to either region.
Even a major expansion of MIBA's operations, how-
ever, cannot begin to dent the high unemployment
rates in the Kasais because MIBA does not need
many more workers. The social ills that attend high
unemployment-crime, migration, malnourishment,
and social unrest-will continue unabated.
Political alienation in the Kasais makes the local
populations sympathetic to nascent anti-Mobutu
movements. Although memories of past chaos will
make Kasaians wary of resuming armed rebellion,
support for political dissent almost certainly will
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Kinshasa:
Smallest Administrative
Region, Capital, and
Microcosm of Zaire
Kinshasa, the'capital and smallest administrative
region of Zaire, is the center of commerce and
manufacturing in the country and the home of the
country's wealthy elite. The average Kinshasan is no
better off, however, than his destitute country cousins.
Most Kinshasans face the same problems as city-
dwellers in the rest of the Third World-crime,
unemployment, abysmal social services, and over-
crowding.
The gap between the rich and the poor in Kinshasa is
reflected in the contrast between the Ville and the
Cite. The Ville, a narrow strip of land along the river,
is made up of the luxury villas and apartments of the
country's political and business elite. The Cite, which
covers 202 of Kinshasa Region's 9,965 square kilome-
ters, is a sprawling slum in which most of the people
of Kinshasa live. Ramshackle stores line the road
from N'Djili Airport in the suburbs to the Cite, and
seemingly endless rows of shacks crowd the dusty, dirt
paths that cross it. The sides of the road are cluttered
with people, some hustling cigarettes, magazines, or
trinkets, others pulling rickshaw-like carts or begging.
Most of the approximately 3 million people who live
in Kinshasa, roughly 10 percent of Zaire's population,
are migrants or the children of migrants from Zaire's
outlying regions, according to several academic stud-
ies. The rich and affluent generally have some connec-
tion with President Mobutu's regime. The 75 percent
of Kinshasans who are poor, defined as those who
devote at least 70 percent of their income to food, lack
the means for decent housing, medical care, or educa-
tion. Most of them left farming to try to find work in
the city.
Most new jobs in~ Zaire are found in manufacturing
plants in Kinshasa, according to business surveys.
Major employers produce cigarettes, beer, textiles,
wood products, footwear, chemicals, and semifinished
metal products.
Poor transportation to the interior has resulted in
underutilized facilities and increased unemployment.
Zaire's single, government-run union, however, is
more interested in higher wages for those alread
working than in expanding the number of jobs
Those who obtain employment find that inflation
erodes their incomes. After a currency devaluation in
1981, inflation averaged 14 percent per month for 25X1
several months. From 1976 through 1982, the cost-of-
living index increased 22-fold for low- and middle-
income workers. Many Kinshasans make ends meet
through petty trading, second jobs, borrowing from
relatives, and various kinds of illegal or corrupt deals.
25X1
Kinshasa gets almost all of its food from outlying
regions of Zaire and from foreign sources: the part of
Kinshasa Region outside the Ville and the Cite
produces less than 1 percent of Zaire's agricultural
output. In late 1981 many Kinshasans went hungry
because Zaire's shortage of foreign exchange prevent-
to shortages. With UNESCO assistance some Cite
dwellers have marginally alleviated the problem by
ed the purchase of fuel for trucks to transport food.
Breakdowns in the flour mill at Matadi also have led
farming tiny plots of land
In addition, France is funding truck-farming and fish-
culture projects in the region's small food-producing 25X1
Kinshasans usually satisfy local petroleum require-
ments by diverting stocks originally allocated by the 25X1
government for other regions. Waiting lines at gas
stations frequently spring up unexpectedly, however,
and kerosene needed for cooking is often scarce.
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Population Distribution and Economic Activity in Zaire's Kinshasa Region
eoundaryrepresenrardn is
nor necassarny aerhonraiive
Area Zaire
of
Map
Y Angola
KINSHASA
Kasangulu
BAS-ZAIRE
Inkisi-Kisantu