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• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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ALA 83-10177
November' l 983
COPY 2 67
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Assessment
Kenya:
A Postelection
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Directorate of Secret
Kenya:
A Postelection
Assessment (v)
This paper was prepared by
a contribution by ALA. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 83-10177
November 1983
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Secret
Kenya:
A Postelection
Assessment
Key Judgments The reelection in August of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi to his
information available second five-year term, although far from providing him with a ringing
as of 18 November 1983 mandate, has firmed his control over the government, placing him in his
was used in this report.
strongest political position since an attempted coup in August 1982. The
elections gave Moi-a member of a minority ethnic group-the opportuni-
ty to prune his cabinet, provided him with a generally more supportive
parliament, and enabled him to continue distributing power more equitably
among Kenya's many tribes. But the low turnout of only 40 percent of the
electorate disappointed Moi, reflecting public apathy toward the elections
and the Moi administration rather than a hoped-for outpouring of
nationwide support. In addition, the unusually high election losses among
those Kikuyu incumbents associated with the Moi government expressed
the dissatisfaction of Kenya's largest and most influential tribe with the
Moi presidency.
Now that the election campaign is over, Moi must turn again to the serious
long-term challenges besetting Kenya:
? Tribal rivalries fostered by Moi's efforts to erode further the dominance
of the Kikuyu and consolidate power in the hands of his coalition of
minority tribes.
? An economy afflicted by inefficiency, corruption, high urban unemploy-
ment, and low prices for Kenya's primary exports, coffee and tea.
? The need to maintain the support of a military rent by the 1982 coup
attempt.
? The task of continuing to improve relations with distrustful neighbors
and to cultivate Western nations, whose support is essential to Kenya's
economic rejuvenation.
None of these problems appears to pose an immediate threat to the Moi re-
gime, but, if unresolved, they could precipitate over the next several years
regime-threatening internal crises.
To date, Moi's measured steps have precluded the leaderless Kikuyu from
coalescing against him. Since the 1982 coup attempt, he has lessened the
tribe's influence in military and economic planning and limited Kikuyu
access to positions of political power. Even his eventual success in driving
from office his rival, Constitutional Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo-a
prominent but controversial Kikuyu against whom Moi made veiled
charges of treason-failed to unite the Kikuyu tribe. Moi has initiated a
formal judicial inquiry into the Njonjo affair, however, that will keep the
politically volatile ethnic issue in the limelight.
Secret
ALA 83-10177
November 1983
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Moi, with Western prompting, has begun addressing Kenya's chronic
financial problems, although implementation of the new measures is
questionable because of a corrupt and cumbersome bureaucracy. More-
over, while attempting to adopt more efficient procedures for allocating
foreign exchange, he is reluctant on political grounds to impose substantial
budget cuts and other reforms urged by his international creditors. We do
not anticipate any significant improvement in the situation unless there is
an unexpected surge in international demand for Kenya's agricultural
exports. Moi also must come to grips at some point with reversing urban
migration that has led to a growing food deficit and a rapid rise in urban
unemployment. To do so, however, requires financial resources far in
excess of what Nairobi is likely to have available.
Moi appears to have dealt effectively with the immediate problem of
divided loyalties within the military. His purge and subordination of the
Air Force to the Army after the 1982 coup attempt have enhanced his
control. Moreover, he has strengthened the position of loyal, apolitical
officers within the Army and has made some improvements in pay and
benefits to raise morale. Personal rivalries within the military could
eventually engender factionalism, however, and Moi's moves to limit the
promotion of Kikuyu officers are likely to exacerbate tribally motivated
discontent.
Kenya's foreign relations concerns are primarily economic, despite its
nagging preoccupation with Somali irredentism and Ugandan instability.
In recent months, however, prospects have brightened for improved
relations and a restoration of normal trade ties with Uganda and Tanzania.
While maintaining good relations with Ethiopia, Moi has also attempted to
improve relations with Somalia-not without misgivings but primarily to
appear responsive to Western aid donors who have urged reconciliation.
Moi's sensitivity to external criticism and his implication that London was
involved in the Njonjo affair temporarily set back Kenya's vital relations
with the United Kingdom at midyear, but recent events, including the
royal visit in November, appear to have nudged relations back on track.
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OVLt tL
Kenya's heavy dependence on Western trade and aid has been the
cornerstone for its Western orientation. As long as Moi continues in office,
we believe Kenya will retain its basically pro-US policy and will look to
Washington for still greater aid in return for allowing continued military
access to Kenyan facilities. Soviet and Libyan efforts to gain a foothold in
the region persist, however, and clearly would be intensified in the unlikely
event that Kenya's internal stability deteriorated markedly. If, in such a
situation, Moi resorted to repression to retain power, his opponents would
seize on the visible US military presence as evidence of US support for the
regime to turn public indignation against Washington. On balance,
however, we doubt that even a radical successor government in Nairobi
an unlikely development, in our view-could afford the domestic political
and economic impact of a rupture with the West, although such a regime
would be likely to cancel the military access agreement to demonstrate a
more nonaligned foreign policy
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Secret
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
The 1983 Elections
1
Moi's Continuing Challenges
2
The Tribal Rivalries Issue
2
A Troubled Economy
4
Assuring Military Support
7
Foreign Relations
8
Soviet and Libyan Meddling
9
Prospects and Implications for the United States
10
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Figure 1
Ethnotinguistic Groups in Kenya
CUSHITIC 2.1
Somali 1.0
Galla 0.7
Rendille
Hawiyah
Boni
Luo
Kalenjin
Maasai
Turkana
Iteso
Samburu
Njemps
Kikuyu
20.9
Luhya
13.8
Kamba
11.3
Kisii
6.1
Meru
5.5
Mijikenda
4.8
Embu
11
Bantu
Taita
1.0
Kuria
0.6
Cushitic
Tharaka
0.6
Nilotic
Mbere
0.6
Pokomo
0.4
Complex mixture
Bajun
0.2
Swahili
0.1 MERU
Tribal name
Tavela
0.1
Percent of Total Population
(Preliminary Report, Census of 1979)
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Secret
Kenya:
A Postelection
Assessment
In August 1983 Daniel arap Moi was elected auto-
matically to a second five-year term as President of
Kenya when no opposing candidate registered to
contest his parliamentary seat. Subsequently, parlia-
mentary elections in September returned a Parlia-
ment generally more loyal to him than its predecessor,
which had been dominated by former President Jomo
Kenyatta's close supporters. We believe Moi will use
the election results to continue promoting the ascend-
ancy of a coalition of minor ethnic groups including
his own small Kalenjin tribe-at the expense of the
long-dominant Kikuyu. He will also use his increased
leverage to institute some necessary but unpopular
austerity measures demanded by the United States,
other Western donor countries, and the IMF, in the
expectation of receiving much-needed economic aid.
Overall, Moi appears to have emerged from the
elections in a strong position and for now faces little
effective opposition. Failure to deal successfully with
the complex ethnic and economic issues, however,
could rejuvenate his largely silent and divided
critics-including the Kikuyu and a small minority of
anti-Western leftists. This paper analyzes the critical
social, political, and economic issues facing President
Moi; assesses the prospects for the stability of his
regime; discusses the potential for Soviet and Libyan
meddling; and addresses the implications for Western,
particularly US, interests.
Moi's surprise call in May for national elections-
more than a year earlier than mandated by the
Constitution-came during a heated campaign
against his chief political rival, former Constitutional
Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo. Moi probably
viewed the elections as a means to reassert his author-
ity, which had come increasingly into question due to
President Daniel arap Moi, reelected in August
1983 to a second five-year term, is a skillful
grass-roots politician. Because he has learned to
operate masterful!? in the cutthroat atmosphere
of Kenyan tribal politics, he has remained in the
highest ranks of the party and government for
over 20 years. In August 1982 he weathered
Kenya's first coup attempt since independence: in
its wake he has moved to quell dissent and avert
further challenges to his leadership. A memher of
the minority Kalenjin ethnic group in the Rift
Valley Province, he draws his .support from the
country's non-Kikuyu tribes and the Army. He is
ests in Kenya. Divorced, he has seven children.
Moi, 58, is widely traveled and has visited the
United States several times. He is a former
schoolteacher who has substantial business inter-
According to the US Embassy, overall voter apathy
and the obvious reflection of Kikuyu discontent repre-
sented the most significant characteristics of Kenya's
1983 general elections. In sharp contrast to previous
balloting, only 40 percent of the electorate voted.
Non-Kikuyu voters reelected some two-thirds of the
his indecisive handling of the Njonjo affair.
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incumbent candidates and returned a higher propor-
tion of Kenyan ministers and assistant ministers to
office than in prior elections. The Kikuyu, however,
replaced nearly 60 percent of their incumbent repre-
sentatives to Parliament, with the poorest showing
among those closely associated with the Moi regime.
Of the 13 Kikuyu ministers and assistant ministers
standing for reelection, nine were defeated. According
to the US Embassy, such a turnover is unprecedented
and demonstrates the tribe's deep dissatisfaction with
Moi's presidency.
Voters-with the exception of the Kikuyu-appeared
to focus on parochial economic issues and factional
rivalries among local candidates. Moi, however, has
publicly interpreted the results as evidence of a
national mandate and concluded that most of his
countrymen are united behind him and his pro-
Western policies. He probably will look to the defeat
of many supporters of the aging leftist Oginga
Odinga, titular head of the Luo tribe-historically the
second most influential ethnic group-as a further
demonstration of support for his regime. According to
the US Embassy, however, Odinga appears to have
lost much of his influence among the Luo.
Building on the firm support of his coalition of
minority tribes, Moi named a government that is
smaller, ethnically more heterogeneous, and, accord-
ing to the US Embassy, more capable than the
previous one. We believe one of Moi's key criteria in
filling posts was loyalty. Elijah Mwangale, for ex-
ample, the former Minister of Tourism, was promoted
to Foreign Minister as a reward for being the first
publicly to denounce Njonjo; and Hussein Mohamed,
the younger brother of the new Air Force Commander
Gen. Haji Mohamed, became a minister of state in
the office of the President
Moi also attempted to placate Western donor nations,
which were pressing for a more streamlined govern-
ment. Although internal political considerations pre-
cluded deep cuts-only five cabinet members were
not reelected-Moi did reduce the number of minis-
tries from 27 to 21, ministers from 27 to 23, and
assistant ministers from 49 to 42. He consolidated the
Ministries of Finance and Planning and appointed an
apolitical pro-Western professional, George Saitoti, to
the new portfolio. According to the press, the appoint-
ment was greeted with approval in international
financial circles. He also named a capable pro-
Western team with considerable international experi-
ence-particularly permanent Secretary Bethuel
Kiplagat-to high positions in the Ministry of Foreign
Moi's new government mirrors more closely the ethnic
makeup of the country, giving the minority groups a
greater share of the power. Minister of State
Mohamed, for example, is the first ethnic Somali ever
appointed to such a senior position. Thus, Moi has
consolidated and diversified his government, but at
the expense of the Kikuyu, who had dominated the
political life of Kenya since independence 20 years
ago.
Moi's Continuing Challenges
The Tribal Rivalries Issue
We believe the elections and the appointment of the
new cabinet represent the latest step in Moi's efforts
to diminish Kikuyu influence.' The tribe constitutes
21 percent of Kenya's population of 18.6 million and
is the largest of its 42 ethnic groups. Historically, the
Kikuyu have exerted a disproportionate influence on
Kenyan politics due to their favored position under
the British colonial system and the influence of Jomo
Kenyatta-the nation's foundine father and the
patron of the tribe.
Moi has long felt threatened by the Kikuyu-a
fear sharpened by the tribe's well-deserved reputation
for playing political hardball and his perception of
Kikuyu involvement in the August 1982 coup at-
tempt. Through a series of piecemeal moves acceler-
ated since the attempted coup, he has gradually
eroded Kikuyu influence and removed them from key
political and economic positions. Moi's efforts against
the Kikuyu have been facilitated by heightened fac-
tionalism and lack of strong leadership within the
tribe since the death of Kenyatta.
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US Embassy reporting indicates that Moi went so far
as to orchestrate a campaign of virulent anti-Kikuyu
rhetoric in April, with many senior government
officials from other tribes accusing the Kikuyu of
disloyalty. In May the campaign gathered national
attention as Moi maneuvered against Constitutional
Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo-a powerful but
controversial Kikuyu, alleging that unnamed foreign
countries were grooming a "traitor" to take over the
presidency. Most informed Kenyans concluded that,
although Moi mentioned no names, his thinly veiled
remarks were aimed at Njonjo and expected him to
resign or be fired. Njonjo refused to step down,
however, and Moi initially backed away from direct
action against him. Instead, the President called for
national elections--on the day he had promised to
expose the "traitor"-in part, in our view, to deflect
attention from the heated and convoluted affair.F
Moi's vacillation---in particular, his failure to de-
nounce Njonjo by name-greatly disturbed and dis-
appointed many of his loyal followers, and Moi
apparently felt driven to press the attack to a conclu-
sion to demonstrate his power and to counter charges
of indecisiveness. According to the US Embassy, Moi
wanted to create the impression that Kenyan politi-
cians in general, rather than he in particular, were the
driving force in Njonjo's downfall. Specific accusa-
tions against Njonjo finally surfaced in parliament in
June; Moi then announced a judicial inquiry into
Njonjo's affairs, taking the step that finally drove
Njonjo to resign both his cabinet post and his seat in
parliament.
We believe Moi's position became stronger with the
ouster of Njonjo. Indeed, we agree with the US
Embassy assessment that Moi rules alone; with
Njonjo's departure, no other Kenyan politician can
even approach Moi's stature. The Kikuyu must now
look to Vice President Kibaki, a longtime rival of
Njonjo as the sole prominent government official able
to defend their tribal interests. In our view, the
unassertive Kibaki may feel uncomfortable in such a
role. According to the US Embassy, Moi sees Kibaki
as weak, vacillating, and less independent than
Njonjo-factors that clearly have made him appear a
far less dangerous political rival. (s)
Although the Kikuyu reflected their bitter discontent
with Moi and their ineffectual tribal political leaders
in the election, Moi chose not to placate Kikuyu
sentiment in naming his cabinet, continuing his policy
of limiting their access to positions of power in the
government. He reduced by half Kikuyu representa-
tion at the cabinet level, dropping them to 17 percent
from the 33 percent they held in 1979. Following the
1979 general elections, the Kikuyu retained nine
cabinet portfolios; today, they occupy only four rela-
tively unimportant ministries. In at least one
instance the appointment of Kenneth Matiba, an
experienced and respected businessman, as the Minis-
ter of Culture and Social Services - Moi obviously
placed a Kikuyu in a position well beneath his ability.
The new cabinet much more closely approximates the
tribal makeup of the country, satisfying Moi's stated
intent to establish a more equitable ethnic balance in
his government (see table 1). Kikuyu failure to reelect
their incumbents gave Moi the opportunity to cut
back on their numbers in positions of power. Thus, he
was able to use the Kikuyu vote as both a mandate
and a rationale to initiate the changes he desired.
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Over the longer term, however, we believe that Moi's 25X1
ethnic policies carry the potential for inspiring serious
challenges to his control. If Moi continues to structure
the government in closer accord with the country's
ethnic makeup, the long-preeminent Kikuyu will find
themselves political outsiders. Governing in their
stead, under Moi's aegis, would be his own Kalenjin
tribe, the Kamba, the Luhya, and other small ethnic
groups. In our view, if Moi further circumscribes
Kikuyu influence-for example, by limiting their
opportunity for government promotions or lucrative
contracts-he runs a grave risk. His actions would be
particularly dangerous if he so alienated the tribe that
it would be driven to overcome its longstanding
internal divisions and unite against him. We agree
with the US Embassy assessment that, the more Moi
threatens Kikuyu interests, the more he increases the
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 Table 1
Ethnic Composition of the Cabinet
chances that they will conspire to depose or assassi-
nate him. Kikuyu history is strewn with political
violence directed against their opponents, and, denied
recourse, they may resort to it once again.
decline in world prices for Kenya's agricultural ex-
ports-particularly coffee. The falloff in foreign ex-
change receipts has in the past three years prompted a
reduction in imports, but not before Kenya incurred
record current account deficits and a shaky interna-
tional credit rating. Hard currency holdings earlier
this year dipped to a six-year low of $155 million, less
than enough for one month of imports. The shortage
of hard currency has hit most heavily the country's
import-dependent manufacturing sector, and many
businesses have been forced to close down or sharply
curtail production. Consumer goods also are becoming
scarce, and shortages of gasoline and other fuels occur
- periodically.
Exacerbating the usual requirements for foreign ex-
change has been the need to import food. Agricultural
production has not kept pace with demand because of
recurring periods of drought and ill-advised govern-
ment pricing policies, which caused an increasing
number of peasants to revert to subsistence farming.
Moreover, government restrictions on local distribu-
tion of food crops limit the capability to move surplus
food to areas of greatest need.
Moi is relying on Western governments and commer-
cial banks to pull Kenya out of its economic slump,
but at the cost of a lengthy period of financial
austerity. The International Monetary Fund, as part
of a stabilization program, is pressing the Kenyan
Government to devise a realistic program to reduce
spending and to clamp down on rampant official
corruption. The IMF also is calling for a substantial
increase in local interest rates, a ceiling on domestic
bank loans, and a more efficient procedure for allocat-
ing scarce foreign exchange. Other Western donors
are pressing the government to reduce its involvement
in the economy-particularly in the distribution of
agricultural commodities-in favor of private inter-
ests. Moi is making some efforts to improve the flow
of essential imports by allowing automatic govern-
ment approval of all foreign exchange applications for
industrial raw materials, medicines, and agricultural
A Troubled Economy
The Current Situation. With the election and the
formation of a new cabinet behind him, Moi must
again turn to his serious economic problems.' Since
1978 economic growth has not kept pace with the
increase in Kenya's population, resulting in a steady
decline in per capita income and urban living stand-
ards (see figure 2). Inflation and urban unemployment
are at record levels of around 30 percent, and corrup-
tion is reaching epidemic proportions. These trends
are in sharp contrast with the economy's performance
during the Kenyatta years, when real growth aver-
aged nearly 7 percent annually and Kenya was touted
as a model of successful private enterprise in black
Africa
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Number of persons' A leading factor in this dramatic turnaround is the
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Figure 2
Kenya: Selected Economic Indicators
rrrccnt
R ,%d (d)l' (,n?mh
~~~~~ II~III
products. Previously, these imports were subject to
time-consuming bureaucratic procedures and corrup-
tion.
Prospects for 1984. We see no significant turnaround
in the economy over the next year or so. A key
element in this projection is the likelihood that the
world market for coffee and tea will continue to be
oversupplied. Nairobi's hard currency revenues also
will be hurt by the decline in reexports of refined
petroleum products the result of a shrinking volume
of imported crude and the government's decision to
divert an increasing share for local consumption. Even
foreign capital inflows will show a decline. Several
Western governments have indicated that they will
withhold funds if, as we believe, Moi tries to reduce
budgetary spending by suspending Nairobi's contribu-
tions to various projects funded by foreign aid. Cuts in
investment spending also will impact on demand for
commercial bank loans. Finally, the government has
shown no willingness to increase producer prices to
levels that will persuade farmers to boost substantially
local agricultural production-particularly food
crops.
The absence of a hefty infusion of hard currency poses
serious problems for Nairobi. We anticipate little
chance that Kenya will be able to relax, on a sus-
tained basis, existing import controls that have
crippled local industrial production and helped keep
inflation and unemployment at uncomfortable levels.
These restrictions also have hampered Nairobi's abili-
ty to attract foreign private investment and are
affecting the availability of luxury consumer goods
required by Kenya's tourist industry. In addition,
inadequate funds will increase Moi's reliance on
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Table 2
Kenya: Trade and Financial Indicators
Million US $
(except where noted)
-801
-1,390
-1,101
-688
-830
1,031
1,242
1,089
1,042
1,100
Imports, c.i.f.
1,284
1,879
1,832
2,632
2,190
1,730
1,930
Net services and transfers
-29
184
222
384
332
220
220
Current account
-118
-737
-579
-1,006
-769
-468
-610
Foreign exchange reserves
504
338
520
466
220
195
NA
External debt
920
1,400
external financial sources and make him more vulner-
able to pressure from his Western benefactors to
implement politically controversial economic reforms.
He is particularly anxious to avoid having to freeze
government wages or hiring and to reduce operations
of public corporations.
The removal of Charles Njonjo also may have reper-
cussions on Kenya's already fragile economy. Njonjo
was viewed by Kenya's Asian, white, and expatriate
communities as the man who represented their inter-
ests with the government. The Asians, in particular,
were badly shaken by Njonjo's fall, and Moi must
now reassure them in order to prevent capital flight,
disinvestment, and increased emigration by this entre-
preneurial class.
1985 and Beyond. Beyond the current financial crisis
are other problems over the next five years that could
severely test Kenya's political and economic systems.
Kenya's food production since the late 1970s has
failed to match the country's 4-percent population
growth rate, one of the world's highest. Regaining
self-sufficiency will be difficult unless additional mar-
ginal land is brought into production. Most of the
uncultivated areas, however, are highly susceptible to
drought and far removed from available sources of
irrigation. The increasing scarcity of farm land, more-
over, could inflame ethnic tensions as various tribal
groups encroach on each other's territory. Land short-
ages also will accelerate an already rapid rate of
urbanization-Kenya's urban population currently is
increasing at close to 10 percent annually-and
hamper government efforts to hold down urban unem-
ployment.
Even if land became available, Nairobi could not
count on significant increases in production without
major changes in agricultural policies. Government-
controlled producer prices must be raised substantial-
ly. Major improvements also are needed in the rural
road network and other farm support services, partic-
ularly the availability of agricultural credits for pur-
chasing machinery, fertilizers, and other essential
materials. The cost of these changes would almost
certainly absorb the bulk of anticipated future govern-
ment revenues from tourism and the export of coffee
and tea. Excessive emphasis on developing the coun-
tryside, however, would jeopardize efforts to expand
manufacturing, housing, and essential urban services.
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The alternative is to increase reliance on foreign
financial assistance, but this approach also carries its
own dilemmas for Moi. Of particular concern is trying
to satisfy demands by the IMF and Western govern-
ments for progress in reducing government spending
and corruption. Restraining government salaries will
become increasingly difficult as civil servants com-
plain about continued high prices and no compensat-
ing rise in income. On the contrary, Moi will come
under heavy public pressure to boost government
hirings as one way to reduce urban unemployment.
Moreover, Nairobi will have to be especially careful in
any program to cut expenditures. The military will be
watching closely to see what and where cuts are made
in defense spending so that the armed forces do not
suffer disproportionately from any austerity budgets.
Assuring Military Support
Depending heavily on his coalition of Kamba, Kalen-
jin, and other minority tribes, Moi recognizes that he
needs more than ever the firm support of the military.
Since August 1982 he has eliminated the most imme-
diate challenge to his regime-divided loyalties within
the armed forces. He has stabilized the military as the
cornerstone of his power base by moving aggressively
against the Air Force-the perpetrators of the coup
attempt. He jailed all Air Force personnel suspected
of supporting the coup and, in a move calculated to
show his appreciation for Army loyalty, subordinated
the Air Force to the Army under the command of the
former Deputy Commander of the Army, General
Mohamed. In addition, he replaced the commander of
the General Service Unit-an elite paramilitary force
formerly dominated by the Kikuyu-and downgraded
its responsibilities.
Moi strengthened the control of loyal officers, partic-
ularly the Chief of the General Staff Jackson
Mulinge-a Kamba tribesman whose dominant posi-
tion within the military remains uncontested.
despite their in-
creased influence, most senior military officers still
view themselves strictly as professional soldiers and do
not have political ambitions. Most of these officers
began military service under British rule with the
King's African Rifles, and their apolitical values are
fairly deeply ingrained.
Table 3
Kenyan Military Forces
Total
35,500
Army
13,000
Navy
650
Air Force
1,850
General Service Unit
2,000
Police a
18,000
that, if-as we anticipate-Kenya's internal situation
remains relatively stable, Mulinge will be able to keep
the military apolitical
Despite some grievances-most notably a shortage of
permanent housing and lingering discontent in the
new Air Force-Moi has generally boosted military
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9,000 servicemen-about half of Kenya's military
personnel-Aid not receive the raise that was granted
in October 1982. Recognizing the potential volatility
of the situation, Moi instructed military finance offi-
cials to give all the affected personnel backpay for the
past year. He also initiated some construction pro- 25X1
grams in response to complaints over housing and, as
a gesture of his personal good will, authorized the
early release of hundreds jailed as coup plotters.
According to the US Embassy, the military is content
to concentrate on these internal issues and on the 25X1
question of the eventual successor to 58-year-old 25X1
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In our view, the two chief contenders for Mulinge's
post are Army Commander John Sawe, a Kalenjin,
and Chief of Staff of the General Staff Joseph
Musomba, a Kamba.' In late August, Musomba was
promoted to major general. Lieutenant General Sawe
voted against the promotion, but Mulinge discarded
precedent, pulled rank in favor of his fellow Kamba,
and overruled Sawe's objection. Normally, a unani-
mous vote is necessary to promote a military officer to
lieutenant colonel and above. The promotion in-
creased the rivalry and animosity between Sawe and
Musomba and aroused the fear among other tribal
groups that senior Kamba officers are seeking to
increase their influence within the leadership. F_
Both leaders are loyal and competent, but Musomba
appears to be more aggressive and ambitious. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy, Musomba could spell trouble
for the President if he became chief of the General
Staff. If Kenya's political-economic situation deterio-
rated badly, the action-oriented Musomba might be
the more likely to consider military intervention.
Kikuyu officers also are a source of potential trouble
for Moi. Moi has
long been uneasy about heavy Kikuyu representation
in the military and has exhibited his prejudice by
promoting members of his Kalenjin tribe into senior
positions. The US Embassy believes that the largely
Kamba and Kalenjin senior ranks of the Army are
discriminating against middle-grade Kikuyu officers,
who constitute a plurality in grades of colonel and
below.
The August 1982 coup attempt demonstrated the
political volatility of the junior officers and enlisted
men. Moi and senior officers have kept close tabs on
this group in the postcoup environment and almost
certainly would quickly become aware of any wide-
scale plotting. Nonetheless, many of these younger
men, who entered the service after independence,
clearly are less imbued with the British apolitical
' Lieutenant General Mohamed, the Air Force Commander, is a
potential third candidate who has impressed Moi with his loyalty.
According to the US Embassy, however, he dislikes administrative
work and has no apparent ambition to compete for a higher post.
military tradition than their seniors and probably are
influenced by the successful coups led by low-ranking
military personnel in Ghana and Liberia. The lower
ranks also are more affected by Kenya's economic
problems and would be the most likely element in the
military to respond to another downturn in the econo-
my.
Foreign Relations
Tanzania and Uganda. Moi's suspicions of Tanzanian
and Ugandan complicity in the 1982 coup plot aggra-
vated relations already strained by the breakup of the
East African Community in 1977 and the problem of
distributing its assets.' Kenya's border with Tanzania
remained closed for six years after the EAC breakup,
and trade among the three nations has been at
relatively low levels.
Encouraging signs of a thaw have appeared, however,
in recent months. The exchange of numerous high-
level delegations and official statements by all three
presidents welcoming the warming trend have created
a momentum toward further improvement culminat-
ing in the recently announced agreement to settle the
assets dispute and reopen the Kenya-Tanzania border.
We believe these developments stem from a mutual
recognition of the need for regional cooperation to
cope with current economic difficulties. The political
demise of Njonjo-whose animus for Tanzanian Pres-
ident Nyerere and Ugandan President Obote, accord-
ing to the US Embassy, contributed to worsened
relations-should also further cooperation. Presently,
all three leaders are attempting to use Njonjo as a
scapegoat for past friction to facilitate their current
movement toward reconciliation. We agree with the
US Embassy assessment that Moi has made a major
commitment to rapprochement with Tanzania and
Uganda. Expectations of success are high and still
rising in Nairobi, and Moi would suffer a loss of
prestige both as a national and regional leader if
reconciliation fails. Indeed, if political and economic
problems within the three states persist, their leaders
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are likely to resort to the past practice of blaming
their problems on their neighbors, and old animosities
probably will resurface.
Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya is faced with a difficult
task in balancing relations with longtime enemies
Ethiopia and Somalia, particularly as Nairobi and
Mogadishu attempt to forge closer ties with the
United States. Ethiopia, although a Soviet client, has
a long history of peaceful relations with Kenya, while
many Kenyans believe that Somalia has irredentist
designs on Kenya's Northeast province, which is
inhabited by a large number of ethnic Somalis. The
Kenyan Government believes-probably correctly-
that Somali President Siad is trying to improve
relations with Moi as a tactic to gain more Western
aid and to reduce the threat of military cooperation
between Kenya and Ethiopia, partners in a longstand-
ing military pact directed against Somalia.
Still, Moi has tried to improve relations with Soma-
lia-mainly because he, too, wants greater aid from
the United States and other Western nations, which
have encouraged a reconciliation. Moi's recent ap-
pointment of Hussein Mohamed to the Ministry of
State in the office of the President has been welcomed
in Mogadishu, which views the first naming of an
ethnic Somali to ministerial rank in Kenya as a
positive signal
Britain. In the spring of 1983, Moi encouraged a
campaign of innuendo implicating London in the
Njonjo affair, thus jeopardizing relations with the
United Kingdom--Kenya's main source of economic
and military aid. According to the US Embassy, a
variety of reasons account for Moi's actions. They
include:
? The longstanding dependence of the official and
unofficial British communities on Njonjo as their
interlocutor with the Kenyan Government and a
tendency over the past few years to favor Njonjo
instead of strengthening relations with Moi and his
allies.
? A general lack of discretion among the British
community in discussing Moi's faults. The British in
general have a low opinion of Moi's political and
intellectual abilities.
? A longstanding Kenyan oversensitivity to any criti-
cism that emanates from the former colonial power.
The few critical remarks made by Britain's Liberal
Party leader to the press in April on Kenya's
handling of internal dissent, therefore, were blown
completely out of proportion and resulted in an
official Kenyan protest.
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? Nairobi's sensitivity to London as the primary base
of operations for the newly organized Kenyan exile
movements.
Despite the downturn earlier this year, the US Em-
bassy reports that relations are back on a more even
course. In our view, Queen Elizabeth's visit to Kenya
in November,
The Soviets believe that the removal of Njonjo has
provided an opportunity to increase their influence in
Kenya, despite Nairobi's strongly pro-Western stance.
Moscow in July negotiated a trade agreement--which
necessitated the assignment of the first Kenyan trade
attache to the Soviet Union-and offered a credit line
of up to $50 million.` The Soviets also replaced their
dour, ineffectual ambassador with a more dynamic,
appealing representative.
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' The details of the trade agreement were not formally released. 25X1
According to press reports, it involved Soviet purchases of 3,000
metric tons of sisal and 5,000 tons of tea, plus a probable expansion
of purchases of Kenyan fluorspar, coffee, pyrethrum, and other
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The Soviets have 54 personnel in Kenya, including
Embassy officials, a trade mission, and representa-
tives to the Nairobi-based UN Environmental Pro-
gram. Nairobi accepts limited Soviet aid, including
the stationing of several Soviet doctors in Kenyan
hospitals and the provision of scholarships to Kenyan
students for study in the USSR
Moi, however, remains wary of Soviet attempts to
On balance, we do not believe that Kenya's current
situation offers much opportunity for the Soviets and
Libyans to garner influence. In the unlikely event that
Kenya became seriously destabilized, however, we
believe both the Libyans and the Soviets would move
quickly to cultivate disaffected groups and exploit the
situation to their advantage. In our view, the Moi
government will continue its efforts to monitor and
thwart Soviet and Libyan machinations, but opportu-
nities for Moscow and Tripoli to expand contacts will
be enhanced if ethnic rivalries increase and economic
performance does not improve over the long run.
Prospects and Implications
for the United States
We believe Moi will be able to remain in power over
the next few years. No well-organized dissident move-
ment or opposition leader with a strong national
following has emerged. Moreover, Moi has shown a
talent for outmaneuvering potential opponents and for
playing off the country's ethnic groups against one
Kenya, for historical and practical reasons, has been
closely tied to the West since independence, and we
foresee no basic change in this orientation over the
next few years. As long as Moi continues in office, we
believe that Kenya will retain its basically pro-US
policy and will look to the United States for still
greater economic and military aid in return for allow-
ing continued US military access to Kenyan facilities.
The public image of the Kenyan-US military relation-
ship, however, is clearly related to Moi's political
position. With Moi appearing more firmly in control
than at any time since the coup attempt, public
criticism of the United States is muted-and, in fact,
was not an issue in the recent elections. If Moi's
situation weakened, however, and he felt compelled to
increase repressive measures, a visible US military
presence would run the risk of inciting anti-US
protests. In our view, Moi's leftist opponents-includ-
ing students, workers, and lower economic classes-
would be quick to associate the United States with
any internal repression by the government.
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US Interests in Kenya
Kenya is strategically located near the vital sea lanes
serving the Middle East oil-producing countries
through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Kenyan
air and naval facilities provide support to normal US
peacetime military operations, including maintenance
and logistic support for US forces in the region.
Kenya is one of two countries (Somalia is the other)
in East Africa where the United States has a formal
military access agreement.
The importance of Kenyan facilities has grown signif-
icantly with the increased US presence in the Indian
Ocean and the emphasis on contingency planning for
the Persian Gulf area. Kenya's existing infrastruc-
ture, its relative political stability, and its pro-
Western orientation have made it the most attractive
of the alternative locations for the deployment of the
US forces.
The military access agreement signed in 1980, for-
malizing Kenyan-US military cooperation, authorizes
US access to Kenyan air and naval facilities. In
addition, it provides for the rapid staging of US
forces into the area, sanctions joint military exer-
cises, and permits the United States to improve both
air and naval facilities to meet anticipated needs.
When improvements are completed, the port of
Mombasa will be able to accommodate all types of
US naval ships, including aircraft carriers. The air-
field at Mombasa will be capable of supporting US
air operations involving large US transport aircraft,
up to and including the C-141. A proposed US Navy
communications site, also at Mombasa, will provide
support for US air, naval, and ground forces operat-
ing throughout Africa, the Indian Ocean, and South-
west Asia.
Kenya's moderate policies, market-oriented economy,
and, by African standards, relatively open political
system have enabled it to play a stabilizing role in the
unsettled East African region. Thus far, however,
Nairobi has often appeared out of step with the
mainstream of African opinion, and Kenyas example
has not been widely emulated. Its ability to serve as a
model of success for other African countries, more-
over, is being undermined by increasing economic
difficulties and growing autocratic tendencies of the
regime.
Moi's problems have caused him to look to the
United States for substantial economic and security
aid. The 1982 coup attempt has made him particular-
ly anxious to gain new aid commitments as he tries to
strengthen his domestic position. He believes that
Kenya has been Washington's most stalwart ally in
Africa. Kenyan officials have emphasized to the US
Embassy that they have been subjected to consider-
able criticism from other African countries for sup- 25X1
porting US policies and have expressed concern that
US aid levels have not reflected appropriate recogni-
tion of Kenyan backing.
Moi views the United States as Kenya's principal
protector against possible Libyan or Soviet subver-
sion and regional instability. He believes his accept-
ance of the US military access agreement has given
Washington a special obligation to help Kenya. For
the most part, the access agreement has stirred little
controversy among the generally pro-US Kenyan pop-
ulation. To avoid damaging his relations with
African and other nonaligned countries, however,
Moi wants to minimize publicity about the arrange-
ment. He is prepared to consider proposals for furt her
use of Kenyan facilities by US forces under the
agreement, so long as they do not gain much interna-
tional attention.
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Figure 3
Kenya and Its Regional Neighbors
Iraq
Saudi
Arabia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authontatrce
British Indian
Ocean Territory
(U.K.)
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If internal instability became a serious problem and
Moi appeared incapable of maintaining order, the
Kenyan military probably would intervene. Although
the traditionally apolitical military has increased its
political influence under Moi, we believe it probably
would not want to maintain for long the burdens of
governing. More likely, it would look for someone who
would maintain order and respect the military's posi-
tion. Because of the leadership's pro-Western bent,
however, Kenya would be likely to remain on a pro-
free-market course supportive of the United States
even during an interim period of military rule.
For now, Moi's leftist opponents are in disarray. In
the unlikely event a radical government came to
power in Nairobi, however, US interests would suffer.
Such a regime almost certainly would cancel the
military access agreement with Washington to dem-
onstrate its move to the left on foreign policy issues. It
probably would criticize the US-Somali military ac-
cess agreement and would permit port calls by Soviet
naval ships. Concern over the practical problems of
maintaining the support of a populace with a basic
pro-Western orientation and of trying to revive
Kenya's faltering economy, however, probably would
preclude such a regime from rupturing relations with
the West and the United States, at least during the
early stages of its rule. Even such a regime would
recognize Nairobi's heavy dependence on Western
trade and aid for its economic survival and is aware of
Moscow's poor record in providing economic aid to its
African clients
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