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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100050003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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11,1f1-F,"f Directorate of
Intelligence
Zaire:
A Look at a
Post-Mobutu Regime
Sloar.st
ALA 83-10144X
September 1983
copy 2 3 4
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Directorate of Secret
~` Int
lli
e
gence
Zaire:
A Look at a
Post-Mobutu Regime
This paper was prepared in the Office of African
and Latin American Analysis
contributions byF
ALA, and
Office of Central Reference. It
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALAF_
Secret
ALA 83-10144X
September 1983
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Zaire:
A Look at a
Post-Mobutu Regime
Key Judgments We believe that potential challengers to Zaire's President Mobutu are too
Information available weak and divided to bring down his regime within the next two years.
as of 17 August 1983 Nonetheless, the risk of major instability in this large, pro-Western,
was used in this report.
mineral-rich nation if its strongman President were suddenly to be removed
has led us to consider the probable features of a post-Mobutu regime.
An examination of the type of government that is likely to succeed Mobutu 25X1
necessarily involves considerable speculation. Mobutu has prevented the
emergence of institutions or leaders that would facilitate a clear-cut,
readily identifiable succession. The actual process may be complex,
disorderly, and prolonged.
If Mobutu's departure from the political scene were to occur within the
next two years, we believe it would be the result of his sudden and
unexpected death by assassination, accident, or natural causes. We believe
that in such circumstances a coalition regime would emerge that would
include civilian politicians from inside and outside the present government
as well as military officers. Civilians and military men from Mobutu's
home region of Equateur would, in our view, hold a disproportionate share
of the key positions, just as they do under Mobutu.
In the light of what we know about the people likely to play central roles in
such a government, we would expect the major outlines of Mobutu's pro-
Western foreign policy to remain intact. Most educated Zairians are said
to distrust Marxist ideology and the Soviet Union. Even more important,
they recognize that only the West can provide the aid Zaire needs and ab-
sorb the bulk of the country's mineral exports. Nonetheless, a post-Mobutu
government might in time seek to distance itself somewhat from the West,
primarily because it would be likely to include some people who are now
unhappy over the West's close relations with Mobutu. The new regime
might also be less willing than Mobutu has been to take bold initiatives
supportive of Western interests elsewhere in Africa, such as his recent
military intervention in Chad.
On domestic issues, we would expect an Equateurian-dominated civilian-
military regime to continue to govern through a single political party,
employing a combination of coercive force and co-optation, as Mobutu has.
We would anticipate limited movement on Western-proposed economic
reforms, a continued high level of corruption, and tightly controlled
elections at some point.
Secret
ALA 83-10144X"
September 1983
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In our view, there are several other types of regimes that could conceivably
follow Mobutu, although we do not believe that factors conducive to their
emergence will obtain over the next two years:
? A new strongman, handpicked by Mobutu, might assume power if
Mobutu left office under circumstances that gave him enough leadtime
to groom a successor. We would expect him to select a pro-Western
Equateurian.
? An ethnically broad-based coalition rather than an Equateurian-domi-
nated one could be established if non-Equateurian military personnel
managed to seize power in the post-Mobutu period. We believe that such
a regime would be pro-Western, and that it would move toward a
somewhat more democratic political system than would an Equateurian-
controlled government.
? A radically oriented regime might result from a power grab by hitherto
unidentified junior military personnel. Although we believe such an
outcome is unlikely, there has long been resentment among lower ranking
personnel over low pay and inadequate supplies. Moreover, extensive
contact by foreigners with junior officers and enlisted men is prohibited,
and leftist sentiment could thus exist without our knowledge.
A resurgence of intertribal warfare and regional secession movements-
reminiscent of the first few years after Zaire's independence in 1960-is a
strong possibility under almost any regime in the post-Mobutu period.
Various ethnic-regional groups may well look upon Mobutu's departure as
an opportunity to settle old scores. At the same time, we believe most
Zairians want to avoid a recurrence of the anarchy and bloodshed of the
early 1960s. We also believe there is a greater sense of national identity to-
day than there was then.
In view of these countervailing factors, the ability of a post-Mobutu regime
to minimize violence and instability may depend on the extent to which it is
seen by the populace as firm and decisive, representative of the main tribal
and regional groups and genuinely attempting to address economic prob-
lems. Possibly the most important factor in deterring both potential
challengers and widespread unrest would be the degree to which Western
countries demonstrated their economic, political, and military backing for
a successor regime.
Secret iv
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Key Judgments iii
Introduction
Characteristics of a Likely Successor Regime
Makeup 1
Civilian-Military Coalition 3
Major Role for Equateurians 3
Policy Orientation 4
Domestic Issues 4
Foreign Policy 5
Alternative Possibilities 6
Another Strongman 6
A Broad-Based Government 6
A Leftist Regime 7
Prospects for Stability 8
Centrifugal Forces 8
Signposts 8
Implications for the United States 9
Prospective Participants in a Successor Regime I I
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Pointe-
Neirer
Mb
Ba V"-
Bandundu
BANDUNDU
Kikwit
! insha ~a
K!N3 A
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tadi Ngun
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South
Atlantic
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Zaire
-- - Region boundary
Major tribal group
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Bondo
Lisala Bumba
EQUATEUR \
andaka
HAUT-ZAIRE
Kisangani
KASAI
Mombasa'
Beni
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2 ORIENTALS _
KASAI _T
UCi;IDFNT AL
Kanange?
Mbuji-Mayi
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SHABA
Kamina? L: 1,.., 11/
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Likasi
Lubumbashi
n .
Lake
Bangweulu
6
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Zaire:
A Look at a
Post-Mobutu Regime
President Mobutu Sese Seko seems to us firmly in
control of Zaire at present. Potential challengers
appear too weak and divided to bring down his regime
in the near term. The few insurgent groups that exist
(see biographic information in the appendix) are frag-
mented and lack external support. Nevertheless,
Zaire's importance as a large, pro-Western, mineral-
rich, centrally located African nation-and the poten-
tial for major instability if its strongman President
were unexpectedly removed-have led us to address
the question of what a post-Mobutu regime might
look like.
This speculative paper is intended to serve as a
resource for US Government policymakers in the
event of a sudden change of government in Kinshasa.
The paper does not attempt to predict precisely how
or when Mobutu's role will end or exactly how the
succession will unfold; the actual process may be
highly complex, disorderly, and prolonged. Rather,
the paper outlines what we believe are likely to be
salient characteristics of the regime that ultimately
emerges after Mobutu, particularly if he were to leave
office within the next couple of years. The paper also
discusses, in the biographic appendix, people within
and outside the present government who could emerge
as important participants in such a regime.
In addition to examining what we see as the most
likely outcome of the succession process, the paper
sketches out some alternatives. It also addresses the
question of how the different scenarios would affect
US interests.
The Characteristics of a Likely Successor Regime
The type of regime that follows Mobutu will depend
in part on the manner in which he leaves office. If his
departure were to occur during the next few years, we
believe it would probably be the result of his sudden
and unexpected death, by accident, natural causes
Field Marshal Mobutu Sese
Seko, Zaire's strongman Presi-
one or more individuals. It is far from certain, in our
judgment, that Zaire's constitutional provisions for
succession would be applied. Even if these procedures
were followed, the constitutional successor would
probably serve as a figurehead, with others dominat-
ing the regime.
Makeup
We would expect a period of intense backroom bar-
gaining among leading military and civilian figures
following Mobutu's unexpected departure. We believe
the leadership of the regime that ultimately emerged
would include civilian politicians from inside and
outside the present government as well as military
officers. We also believe that civilians and military
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The Years Before Mobutu: A Time of Turmoil
During the first five years after Zaire became inde-
pendent from Belgium in 1960, a series of weak
central governments was beset by army mutinies,
widespread fighting among ethnic groups, secession
movements in several regions, and a proliferation of
largely ethnic-based political parties. United Nations
troops helped suppress the secession attempts by
1963, but new rebellions broke out in much of the
country the following year.
The new uprisings were put down with the help of
white mercenaries brought in by Prime Minister (and
former Shaba Region secessionist leader) Moise
Tshombe. By late 1965, however, political leaders in
Kinshasa had become deadlocked and unable to form
an effective government, which led Gen. Joseph
Mobutu, the head of the army, to seize power and
install himself as President.
Mobutu's Early Years: Political Calm, Economic
Progress
During Mobutu's first years in office, popular revul-
sion at the anarchy and bloodshed of the early 1960s,
combined with a widely shared belief among Zairians
that there was at last a firm, decisive hand at the
helm in Kinshasa, helped usher in a period of tran-
quillity. Several years of relative economic prosperi-
ty, primarily a result of high international prices for
Zaire's copper and cobalt exports, contributed to the
more stable political climate. GDP grew by an aver-
age of 5.5 percent per year during the period 1966-71.
By the early 1970s Zaire had a stable and convertible
currency, negligible debt, and ample foreign exchange
reserves.
Downturn in the 1970s
Starting in 1973-74, a series of economic setbacks
sent Zaire on a downward spin from which it has yet
to recover. World prices of copper plummeted, while
the cost of key imports-especially oil-rose sharply.
Mobutu exacerbated the situation with a series of ill-
advised economic decisions. He nationalized many
enterprises, placing them under the control of largely
inexperienced and corrupt political cronies. He also
launched a series of grandiose and costly develop-
ment projects.a
Zaire's problems were compounded when the Front
for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the
group that had led the secession movement in Shaba
Region in the early 1960s, invaded the mineral-rich
region in 1977 and again in 1978, operating from
bases in Angola and Zambia. Mobutu had to turn to
foreign military forces provided primarily by Mo-
rocco in 1977 and by France and Belgium in 1978-
to turn back the invaders. The two episodes revealed
serious weaknesses in the Zairian armed forces
and-even more important, in our view punctured
Mobutu's aura of invincibility.
The Current Situation
Although Mobutu has recently taken some steps to
improve economic management and reduce excessive
government spending, the economy has not yet come
out of the doldrums. US Embassy officials have
noted that, as economic conditions have worsened in
recent years, Mobutu has become increasingly preoc-
cupied with ensuring the regime's security and his
personal safety. He has turned to Israel-a pariah in
the eyes of most African states-to train and equip
some key military units. He has increasingly relied-
particularly in security matters-on a small circle of
key officials, most of whom hail from his home
region of Equateur and many of whom are members
of his own tribe, the Ngbandi.
Working in Mobutu's favor, in our view, are long-
standing rivalries among his opponents, their lack of
substantial outside support, their inability to orga-
nize within Zaire, Mobutu's adroitness at co-optation
and repression, and the Zairian public's apparent
preoccupation with economic survival rather than
political change. Mobutu also has been careful to
maintain personal control over the armed forces,
by putting Equa-
teurians in senior command positions, by encouraging
rivalries among military leaders, and by maintaining
an extensive network of informers.
a The nationalizations were part of a campaign of "Zairianization" launched
by Mobutu. Citizens were required to exchange their Christian given names
for indigenous ones, and the country was renamed "Zaire" in place of its
Belgian-bequeathed name, Republic of the Congo. Other place names were
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Zaire's Constitution does not contain extensive provi-
sions for presidential succession. As amended in
1982, the Constitution states that if the president
leaves office his functions are assumed by the Central
Committee of the (ruling and only) party, the Popular
Movement of the Revolution. The oldest member of
the Central Committee serves as head of state.
Although US Embassy ~ sources describe the
Zairian armed forces as riddled with corruption,
incompetence, and severe logistic weaknesses 2 the
military's advantages in weaponry, training, and orga-
nization probably assure a major role for its leaders in
a post-Mobutu government. At the same time, mili-
tary men could not run the country on their own, in
our judgment. They lack the necessary expertise and
would almost certainly have to bring in civilians to
The 124-member Central Committee, the party's
highest organ, is comprised of leading government
officials and senior politicians from throughout
Zaire. Under Mobutu the Committee has had little
decisionmaking power. It often acts as a sounding
board for proposals Mobutu is considering on domes-
tic and foreign policy issues.
The oldest Central Committee member at present is
Derikoye Tita Avungara, 76. Derikoye, a former
legislator and government official, currently heads
the Central Committee's Commission on Discipline.
He is not a strong personality and is unlikely to be a
major power broker in the post-Mobutu period. An
Azande tribesman from Haut Zaire Region, Derikoye
is friendly toward the West, according to US Embas-
sy officials.
U the constitutional succession process is invoked,
the Central Committee, in view of its size and
diversity, is likely to be ineffective as a governing
body, in our judgment. Nevertheless, Derikoye, func-
tioning as a temporary figurehead, could provide a
facade of legitimacy while more powerful figures try
to reach agreement on a successor regime.
men from Mobutu's home region of Equateur would
hold a disproportionate share of the key positions, as
they do in the present regime.'
Civilian-Military Coalition. Neither civilian nor
military leaders will be in a position to exclude each
other from a post-Mobutu regime, in our judgment.
run most ministries and other key agencies
In the biographic appendix, we discuss those military
officers, as well as civilian personalities inside and
outside the present regime, from among whom we
expect the main participants in a post-Mobutu coali-
tion to emerge. We believe civilian figures from this
group will control the day-to-day management of the
government-as they did after Mobutu assumed pow-
er-because of their relative advantages in education
and experience
We do not rule out the possibility that a military
"man on horseback" might emerge following Mobu-
tu's departure, but at present we do not see any
candidates for such a role.
Major Role for Equateurians. Prominent people from
Equateur Region are likely to continue holding most
of the key civilian and military posts as long as
Mobutu is in power. Thus they are likely to be in a po-
sition to exercise strong influence over the transition.
Despite tribal and clan differences and personal rival-
ries among leading Equateurians, we believe that if
Mobutu died suddenly they would work together to
protect their interests. They would also be anxious to
prevent the retaliation against Equateurians that
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could occur if another group took control. We doubt 25X1
that any one Equateurian would rapidly emerge as a
strongman if Mobutu departed without having
groomed someone for this role
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Executive branch
Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga
Kengo Wa Dondo
Seti Yale
Military and security services
Nkema Liloo
Col. Bolozi Gbudu Tanikpma
Vice Adm. Lomponda Wa Botende
Lt. Gen. Boteti Nkok'ea Nkanga
Brig. Gen. Bosange Pompese Bakole
Maj. Gen. Eluki Monga Anunda
Col. Nzimbi Ngbale
Gen. Yeka Mangbau
Lt. Gen. Danga Ngbokoli
Brig. Gen. Somao Mbele
Col. Mahele Bokungu
Other
Bomboko Lokumba
Sambwa Pida
Nzondomyo A Dokpe Lingo
Bemba Saolonaa
Moleka Libokea
Despite their innocuous titles, these men are among the wealthiest
and most influential businessmen in Zaire.
President; State Commissioner (Minister) for National Defense and
Veterans Affairs; President of the Popular Movement of the Revolu-
tion (MPR), Zaire's sole political party; Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces
Special Presidential Adviser on National Security
Administrator General, National Intelligence Service (external intelli-
gence service)
Administrator General, National Center for Research and Investiga-
tions (domestic intelligence service)
Chief, Military Intelligence
Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security
Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
Chief, Presidential Military Office
Chief of Staff, Army
Commander, Special Presidential Brigade
Commander, First Military Region (Shaba Region)
Commander, Third Military Region
Commander, Ist Armored Brigade
Deputy Commander, 31st Brigade (based in Kinshasa)
Ambassador to Belgium
Governor, Bank of Zaire
President, Legislative Council
Chairman, Association of Zairian Companies
Vice President, Zairian Chamber of Commerce
We would not expect Equateurians completely to
monopolize important posts in a post-Mobutu regime.
We believe leading Equateurians recognize that any
attempt to exclude other groups entirely from posi-
tions of influence would probably lead to major civil
unrest. We expect, therefore, that some of the promi-
nent non-Equateurians discussed in the biographic
appendix would be placed in sensitive security posts or
in most of the other key advisory positions.
Policy Orientation
Domestic Issues. Considering what we know about
the people likely to play central roles in a post-
Mobutu government, we expect policy continuity in
domestic matters. We believe that an Equateurian-
dominated regime would govern through a combina-
tion of coercive force and co-optation, as Mobutu has.
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Figure 2
Regional Affiliations of Zaire's
Ruling Elite
Equatcur 17) -25.9
Kivu (1 )-3.7
11a1_1t-/airs H) - 3.7
Kasai, (2)-7.4
Bas-/airc (4)- 14.8
Shaha (6(-22.2
Bandundu (6)-22.2
Equatcur I I )-57.9
Kivu (I) 5-3
Kasais ( I I 5.3
Iluut-/wire (3)-I5.8
Bus-Zaire (3) -15.8
I quatcur (4)-28.6
Shaha (I I- '. 1
Kivu (I)-7.1
Bundundu (1)-71
Bas/airc
Kas ik (3)-21-4
l lout-/wire (3 )- 21.4
I quatcur (22) 31.9
Kivu (4)-5.8
Shah,, (8)- 1 1.6
Bandundu (8)- 11.6
Kasais (9)-13.O
Ilaut-/wire (9) - 13.0
Bus-/,lire (9)-13.0
Moreover, we would expect the new regime to contin-
ue Mobutu's practice of ensuring that opportunities
for financial enrichment remain available to a broad
segment of the educated urban elite. Thus, we would
expect the government to sanction a high degree of
corruption, just as Mobutu has done.
We believe it unlikely that a regime in which Equa-
teurians played a central role would move toward
participatory democracy and hold genuine elections
because of their general unpopularity. Some sort of
tightly controlled single-party elections would proba-
bly be held at some point in an effort to strengthen the
regime's credentials in the West
On economic questions, we would expect such a
regime to continue Mobutu's general practice of
undertaking just enough of the reform actions de-
manded by Western and multilateral aid donors to
ensure continued foreign support. We do not believe
such a regime would be willing to attempt the kinds of
large-scale austerity actions and overhaul of economic
management practices that would facilitate economic
recovery but would be likely to alienate many mem-
bers of the elite.'
Foreign Policy. We believe the regime most likely to
follow Mobutu will retain his pro-Western orienta-
tion. According to US Embassy reporting, the vast
majority of educated Zairians are favorably disposed
toward the West and particularly toward the United
States, in part because they recognize that only the
West can provide the aid Zaire needs and absorb the
bulk of Zairian mineral exports.
Moreover, according to US officials in Kinshasa,
educated Zairians have had relatively little exposure
to Communist ideology, are generally distrustful of
the Soviet Union, and view the activities of the Soviets
and their allies in neighboring African countries as a
threat to Zaire. Even anti-Mobutu Zairian academics
for the most part reject Marxism, according to Em-
bassy reports
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Contributing to these attitudes, according to Embassy
officers, are a predilection for free enterprise among
Zairians and the pervasive influence of the Catholic
Church. About 60 percent of Zaire's population is
Christian, predominantly Catholic.
Nonetheless, we believe a post-Mobutu regime may in
time seek to distance itself somewhat from the West.
The regime may include some Equateurians and
others who resent either past Western pressures for
economic reform or the West's staunch support for
Mobutu over the years. Moreover, a new regime, in
our judgment, may well be less willing than Mobutu
to be viewed by Zaire's African neighbors as one of
the continent's most pro-Western governments
Such a limited loosening of ties with the West could
take several forms. The Mobutu regime has usually
supported US positions in international forums; a
successor government might vote somewhat more
frequently in support of nonaligned positions. A new
regime may become more active in support of the
Frontline States ? on southern African issues such as
Namibia, and somewhat less willing than Mobutu has
been to support US initiatives on these questions. It
might be less inclined to take bold initiatives support-
ive of Western interests elsewhere in Africa, such as
Mobutu's recent military intervention in Chad. It may
also try harder than Mobutu has to improve Zaire's
often uneasy bilateral relations with neighboring
countries, some of which are Marxist-oriented.
Another Strongman
It is possible, in our view, that Mobutu, rather than
departing the scene suddenly as the result of assassi-
nation, accident, or natural causes, could leave office
in a manner that gave him some leadtime, which he
could use to help shape the succession before stepping
down. We see little indication that he will depart in
this way within the next couple of years, although in
the longer run we find such a set of circumstances to
be highly plausible.
The Frontline States group is informally chaired by Tanzania
and includes most of the countries of southern Africa: Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
For example, if economic conditions were to worsen
sharply, with no sign of effective remedial measures
by the government or efforts by Western countries to
bail Zaire out, Mobutu might simply lose his zest for
ruling and decide to quit. He might retire to Western
Europe, where he has accumulated considerable
wealth
We believe that in such circumstances Mobutu would
groom a politician from Equateur Region to succeed
him as Zaire's leader, who would be capable of
sustaining the system of one-man rule that Mobutu
probably views as the most effective way to govern
Zaire. In our judgment, he would not trust a non-
Equateurian to refrain from condemning the Mobutu
regime and from taking reprisals of some kind against
the Equateurians who now dominate the government.
Among the Equateurian candidates that we believe
Mobutu might consider in selecting a new strongman
are a pro-Western former foreign minister, Bomboko
Lokumba, and Mobutu's strong-willed Prime Minis-
ter, Kengo Wa Dondo. Because Kengo is a mulatto,
he would probably have to play the role of strongman
from behind the scenes, or from the position of prime
minister, with a black Zairian acting as a figurehead
president.
A Broad-Based Government
It is also possible, though still not likely in our view,
that a more broadly based regime rather than an
Equateurian-dominated one will emerge after Mo-
butu. For this to occur, we believe non-Equateurian
military officers would have to seize power and
remove most of the leading Equateurians from posi-
tions of power. We do not see any non-Equateurians
as being in a position to do this within the next two
years.
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Bomboko Lokumba, Ambassa-
dor to Belgium, potential suc-
If a regime not dominated by Equateurians nonethe-
less did come to power, we believe it would have
several features of importance to US interests:
? We would expect such a regime to be pro-Western
because most of the civilian and military figures
likely to be included are known to be friendly to the
West. Nonetheless, we would not be surprised to see
some limited distancing of Kinshasa's policies from
Washington's, for the same reasons-as stated ear-
lier-an Equateurian-dominated regime might fol-
low such a course.
? We believe such a regime would be characterized by
a substantial degree of balance among various eth-
nic-regional groups; we see no one non-Equateurian
group as being able totally to dominate the others.
We also believe that such a regime would go further
than an Equateurian-dominated one in inviting
some of the country's political dissidents to join the
government.
? We would not expect multiparty democracy to
emerge under such a regime because we believe
most educated Zairians would fear a resurgence of
the political infighting, violence, and governmental
paralysis that prevailed during the multiparty era in
the early 1960s. In view of what we know about
potential participants in a broad-based regime, we
believe it might opt for a more limited form of
democracy. It might, for example, allow genuinely
competitive legislative elections, in which rival con-
testants would run under the banner of a single
official party without the careful screening and
frequent purging of candidates by the party leader-
ship that has taken place under Mobutu.
? The displacement of the notoriously corrupt Equa-
teurian elite would, in our view, result in some
reduction of high-level graft. In view of Zaire's long
tradition of and broad opportunities for such activi-
ty, we have no illusions that anything approaching a
corruption-free regime would emerge. The mere
promise of reform on the part of a new regime,
however, might result in additional financial help
from the country's Western creditors, who have
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up his government.
A Leftist Regime
Also unlikely, but conceivable in our view, is a power
grab by junior military officers or enlisted men-a
possibility obtaining in almost any country in Africa.
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been considerable resentment among lower ranking
personnel over low pay, chronic shortages of food and
other supplies, Mobutu's tribal-regional favoritism,
and the corruption that has enriched many senior
officers.
Although junior officers or enlisted men involved in
such a move might be radically oriented, it is also
possible that they would be nonideological. Zairian
military personnel have had very little exposure to
Communist or other radical influences, and we are
not aware of any leftwing sentiment within the armed
forces. Nonetheless, US Embassy officials and other
US personnel have only limited access to junior
military people, and leftist sentiment could exist
without our knowledge.
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A radically leftist regime in Zaire probably would be
inherently unstable. We believe it would face chal-
lenges from other elements in the military and would
lack broad support among the general populace or,
more important, among the educated civilian elite.
Even if a leftist regime did succeed in consolidating its
authority and establishing close ties with Communist
countries, we believe Zaire would not totally sever its
links with Western countries. Zaire has no realistic
alternative to the West as the market for most of its
mineral exports. Nor do we believe the regime would
repudiate Zaire's foreign debt, since doing so would
presumably close off any hope of further Western aid
and investment.
Centrifugal Forces
A resurgence of intertribal warfare and regional
secession movements will be a real possibility under
almost any regime in the post-Mobutu period, in our
judgment. Strong ethnic and social tensions exist
beneath the surface calm that prevails today in Zaire,
according to US Embassy officers. Indeed, Mobutu is
said to encourage such tensions as a way of preventing
groups from forming alliances and becoming strong
enough to challenge him:
? In urban areas, the increasing enrichment of the
Equateurian elite and its dominant position within
the government have created strong resentment
among other groups,
? In rural areas as well, tribal loyalties seem strong
throughout the country and there appears to be
considerable latent enmity among the various ethnic
groups
In our judgment, various ethnic-regional groups may
well look upon Mobutu's departure as an opportunity
to settle old scores. Perhaps the most formidable
challenge would come in Shaba Region, where the
Angola- and Zambia-based insurgents who invaded
Shaba in the late 1970s might well be emboldened to
Zairians.
Mobutu for years has emphasized the notion that he
alone deserves credit for the peace that has generally
prevailed in Zaire since the mid-1960s, and that when
he departs the old animosities will flare anew. We
believe that this view is widely accepted among
and authority to assure a smooth transition.
Adding to the threat to stability and national unity
after Mobutu's departure will be the near-total lack of
institutions that could help ensure a smooth succes-
sion. US Embassy officers note that instead of foster-
ing the building of institutions, Mobutu has created a
cult of personality whereby the state is closely identi-
fied with his person. His frequent restructuring of key
party and government organs also has worked against
the development of institutions with enough power
Despite these threats to stability, we cannot be certain
that Zaire will slip into chaos after Mobutu departs.
we believe most
Zairians wish to avoid a recurrence of the country-
wide anarchy that prevailed in the early 1960s. We
also believe there is a greater sense of national
identity among Zairians today than existed in the pre-
Mobutu period. In addition, under Mobutu the Zair-
ian military and security services have gained a
reputation for dealing ruthlessly with internal dissi-
dence, and this would help deter any challenges to a
successor regime that retained the loyalty of the
armed forces, police, and intelligence services. On
balance, we believe that an Equateurian-led successor
regime would be able to avoid a widespread break-
down of order, but we are less certain that a non-
Equateurian government could do so.
Signposts
Any successor regime's ability to minimize violence
and instability may depend to a great extent on the
following factors:
? The extent to which the new regime gives the
impression of strength and authority. At present,
we do not see any other individual figure who could
match Mobutu in this regard. We do not rule out
try again.
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the possibility that a resolute leader might emerge
from obscurity, or that some hitherto uninspiring
figure might prove to have hidden reserves of tenac-
ity and decisiveness.
? The extent to which the country's main ethnic and
regional interests are represented in the regime.
Inclusion of leaders of various groups would not only
help pacify these groups, in our judgment, but also
would make it easier for the regime to control their
members. For these reasons we believe representa-
tives of the Shaban rebels and/or of smaller dissi-
dent groups might well be among those invited to
join a post-Mobutu regime. (Paradoxically, the more
broadly based the regime, the more difficulty it will
have in projecting an imagc of decisiveness and
strength, in our judgment.)
? The extent to which the regime gives the appearance
of coming to grips with economic problems. We
believe any successor regime that seemed to be
making a serious effort to combat mismanagement,
corruption, endemic shortages, and inflation would
win a significant degree of public support, at least
initially. A new government's ability to bring about
any sustained economic progress will depend in
large measure, however, on international prices for
Zaire's mineral exports, as well as on the regime's
ability to convince international donors that it de-
serves generous economic aid.
? Attitudes of.foreign powers toward the regime.
According to the US Embassy, a widely held view
among Zairians that the United States, Belgium,
and even the Socialist government in France strong-
ly support Mobutu-and a widespread belief that
one or more of these countries would intervene
militarily in his behalf if necessary-have helped to
discourage moves against the regime by discontent-
ed groups. If Western countries move to demon-
strate strong economic, political, and military back-
ing for the regime that succeeds Mobutu, we believe
that would-be challengers among disgruntled ele-
ments of the society might well be deterred from
mounting an armed bid for power.
Thus the odds are good, in our view, that the regime
that emerges after Mobutu-regardless of how he
departs and how the succession process unfolds-will
be friendly to the West and anxious for Western aid
and investment. During the crucial early phases, we
believe a post-Mobutu government will seek strong
support from the United States in particular. As it
becomes more secure, however, it may seek to dis-
tance itself somewhat from the West, perhaps toward
a more nonaligned position.
A successor regime might attempt to reduce corrup-
tion and mismanagement in government if only in the
hope of winning the approval of Western creditors. At
the same time, however, a successor regime may lack
Mobutu's ability to keep the lid on ethnic and regional
unrest. Major turmoil in Zaire could paralyze the
country's mineral industries at least temporarily,
thereby driving up international cobalt and copper
prices.
Prolonged unrest would probably break down along
ethnic and regional lines and would increase the
possibility for secession attempts or outside meddling.
An armed challenge from Shaban dissidents based in
Marxist-ruled Angola, for example, could lead to a
confrontation between the Soviet- and Cuban-sup-
ported regime in Luanda and a new Zairian govern-
ment which would probably request US or French
military assistance.
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Appendix
Prospective Participants in a
Successor Regime 5
It is difficult to predict precisely which civilian and
military leaders will be included in the regime that
follows Mobutu; this will depend partly on whether
Mobutu helps shape the succession. Below we exam-
ine a number of key individuals who, we believe, may
play important roles after his departure.
Civilians Within the Mobutu Regime
Civilian politicians within the present government
could figure importantly in a post-Mobutu regime.
Some of these people have periodically been moved in
and out of the regime by Mobutu, who maintains the
support of members of the Zairian elite by allowing
them to hold office long enough to enrich themselves
but not long enough to amass sufficient independent
power to pose a threat to the President. The politi-
cians we discuss below are by and large competent
and experienced men, and some of them are adroit
politicians with significant followings in their home
regions. Most of them appear to be pro-Western in
outlook.
Ken go Wa Dondo, First State Commissioner (Prime
Minister). We believe the qualities of shrewdness and
toughness that Prime Minister Kengo has exhibited
throughout his career make him a candidate for a
major role in a post-Mobutu regime.
After Mobutu appointed him in late 1982, Kengo,
now 48, moved rapidly to strengthen the cabinet and
cement alliances with other influential politicians in
the regime. With Mobutu's approval, he launched a
dramatic anticorruption campaign in December.
Some 150 civil servants were investigated, and many
were arrested or fled the country before the campaign
began to taper off in mid-1983. Kengo deftly exploit-
ed the corruption issue to remove old political rivals
such as Vunduawe to Pemako, an Equateurian who
had served as Deputy Prime Minister.
' Except where otherwise indicated, the information in this appen-
dix is based on reporting from US Embassy officials in Kinshasa.
As Zaire's Attorney General and President of the
Judicial Council from 1978 to 1980, Kengo came
under criticism both at home and abroad for trying to
put Zaire's judicial and legal systems completely
under the control of the executive branch and for
transferring, demoting, or retiring many judges and
magistrates. The adverse publicity apparently moved
Mobutu to send Kengo to Belgium as Ambassador.
Although Kengo, a mulatto (his mother was an
Ngbandi tribeswoman, his father Polish) from Equa-
teur Region, has made many enemies over the years,
he has retained links with powerful figures, particu-
larly presidential security adviser Seti Yale. Such
men might well support Kengo as a major figure in a
successor regime. Kengo's repressive style, however,
would probably alienate many ethnic groups and
politicians if he were installed as president. Kengo
seems generally sympathetic to the West and has
commented a number of times to US officials on the
importance of close US-Zaire relations
Seti Yale, Special Presidential Adviser on National
Security. Seti, 40, is one of the two men closest to
Mobutu. (The other is Nimy Mayidika, director of the
President's office.) A mulatto (Ngbandi mother, Por-
tuguese father) from Equateur, Seti has risen rapidly
as a career security official. Prior to his appointment
as Special Presidential Adviser in 1979, he served as
head of the civilian security agency. Unlike some
other senior officials, Seti has shown no desire to
succeed Mobutu. Seti has no following of his own and
seems to prefer playing a powerful role behind the
scenes.
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Seti has been a trusted adviser to the President on a
wide range of political and security matters as well as
foreign affairs. The leader of a "hardline" faction of
presidential advisers, he has counseled Mobutu to deal
harshly with dissidents and to remove a number of
officials who advocate political and economic reform
Seti seems to resent what he regards as interference
by the United States and other Western countries in
Zairian internal affairs. He has often been uncoopera-
Because he is entrenched so close to the presidency,
Seti may be in position to play a highly influential role
in a post-Mobutu government. We believe he might
prefer to remain an eminence grise rather than hold a
top cabinet post in such a regime. In any case, Seti
would probably try to influence such a government
toward authoritarian domestic policies and greater
independence in relations with the West.
Bomboko Lokumba, Ambassador to Belgium. Bom-
boko, 55, has demonstrated an array of skills that
mark him as a probable leading player in a post-
Mobutu government. A three-time Foreign Minister
(1960-63, 1965-69, and 1981) and Ambassador to the
United States in 1969-70, Bomboko has been one of
Zaire's most able diplomats. His affable and sophisti-
cated negotiating style and grasp of international
affairs have won him high marks from Western
officials. US Embassy officials in Kinshasa character-
ize Bomboko as a friend of the West who has
generally tried to influence events and policies in
Zaire in a direction favorable to US interests.
Bomboko served as both Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister from February to October 1981. He
put together a group of competent cabinet officials
who sought to challenge the influence of some of
Mobutu's cronies and to improve economic policies
and management practices. As he had done in the
past with Bomboko, Mobutu removed him from his
position because he was exercising too much responsi-
bility and strength
periods he was out of office.
Bomboko is a native of Equateur. He has profited
financially under Mobutu's tenure, both while serving
in the government and as a businessman during the
Nendaka Bika, First Vice President of the Central
Committee, Popular Movement of the Revolution.
Nendaka has long been one of the most influential
men in Zaire. He has a sizable following in eastern
Zaire, particularly in his home region of Haut-Zaire.
During the early 1960s, Nendaka served as Chief of
National Security and then as Minister of Interior.
He was a key supporter of Mobutu's rise to power in
1965. Subsequently, however, Mobutu moved to
weaken him through a series of demotions, culminat-
ing in his brief imprisonment on treason charges in
1971.
Mobutu subsequently rusticated Nendaka to Haut-
Zaire Region, where Nendaka worked to expand his
network of business interests and regional supporters.
He was elected from Haut-Zaire to the Political
Bureau of Zaire's official political party in 1977.
INendaka is reputed to be an ally of
Zaire's top Army officer, Armed Forces Chief of
Staff General Singa, a fellow Haut-Zairian)
We believe Nendaka will seek to play a strong
Paut-Zairian interests, however, will probably be
viewed as a threat by other regional groups particu-
larly the Equateurians, traditional rivals of the Haut-
Zairians.
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Nendaka, an energetic entrepreneur and admirer of
free enterprise, has expressed considerable respect for
the US economic system and seems to be friendly to
the West.
Kamitatu Massamba, State Commissioner (Minister)
for Agriculture/Rural Development and Conserva-
tion/Tourism. A colorful and influential figure in
Zairian politics since independence in 1960,
Kamitatu, 52, was for many years an opponent of the
Mobutu regime. After serving in several senior posi-
tions in postindependence governments, he fell from
favor when Mobutu came to power in 1965. The
following year he was sentenced to a five-year prison
term for alleged involvement in an abortive coup, but
he was pardoned and released by the President in
1968.
Subsequently, Kamitatu antagonized the regime
again by attempting to marshal a political following in
his native region of Bandundu. He fled to Paris in
1970. During seven years in exile there, he organized
a Zairian dissident group with ties to the French
socialists and wrote a book harshly critical of Mobutu.
In 1977, however, Kamitatu reconciled with Mobutu,
returned to Zaire, and was named to the cabinet as
Minister of Conservation, Nature, and Tourism. He
obtained the more important Agriculture portfolio the
following year. Since then he has managed to survive
several sweeping cabinet changes as a result of his
political shrewdness and professional competence. A
forceful personality, he has been one of the govern-
ment's more outspoken advocates for economic re-
form. Although he professes a socialist orientation, he
seems more inclined toward pragmatism than ideolo-
gy and has encouraged much-needed private invest-
ment in the agricultural sector.
As recently as 1981, Kamitatu intimated to US
officials that he would like to take Mobutu's place.
Despite his strengths, we do not think he would be
accepted by the many Equateurians who are in a
position to influence the succession.
Should he hold a major position in a post-Mobutu
regime, Kamitatu would probably operate through the
existing, well-established system of patronage and
ethnic favoritism while also attempting to introduce a
few reforms. Kamitatu has stated that he views the
United States with mixed feelings, and we believe he
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Mandungu Bula, Regional Commissioner (Governor),
Shaba Region. Bula's political adroitness and profes-
sional talents could propel him to prominence in
almost any type of regime that follows Mobutu. He
was a Marxist revolutionary in exile-mostly in the
USSR and East Germany-for the first decade of
Zaire's independence. He attended the Institute for
International Relations in Moscow, became involved
in a number of international leftist causes, and served
as Moscow representative for a Zairian Communist
movement led by Antoine Gizenga. He returned to 25X1
Zaire in 1971 and less than three years later was
appointed personal adviser to the President.
In 1975 Bula was named Foreign Minister as part of 25X1
an effort to improve Mobutu's nonaligned credentials.
He subsequently served in several cabinet positions
and as Mayor of Kinshasa. In the latter post, he
proved to be an industrious, competent manager, 25X1
particularly in intelligence and security matters. As
Governor of the economically vital and politically
sensitive Shaba Region since 1980, Bula, a native of
Bandundu Region, has generally been regarded as a
skillful performer in the government's most important
post outside Kinshasa
After entering the government in the mid-1970s, Bula
was instrumental in persuading Mobutu to establish
relations with China and North Korea. During his
tenure as Foreign Minister, he presided over-and
was partly responsible for-a sharp decline in US-
Zairian relations, which included the expulsion of the
US Ambassador in 1975. At that time, the US 25X1
Embassy in Kinshasa reported that he was suspicious
of the United States and that he had warned Mobutu
that Washington would ultimately abandon him. In
recent years, Bula, now 48, has been more cooperative
with US officials, but we do not believe he has wholly
abandoned his Marxist views.
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Bula no doubt is sensitive to the Western orientation
of most educated Zairians, and we believe he would
attempt to succeed Mobutu as president only if he had
the support of an outside power such as the Soviet
Union or Cuba. Bula is more likely, in our view, to
seek an influential advisory role in a post-Mobutu
government in the hope of steering Zaire away from
its traditional Western friends
Moderates Within Zaire Who Have Become
Estranged From the Regime
As part of his method of governing, Mobutu frequent-
ly rotates in and out of government figures who gain
too much prominence or who prove too critical of the
President's policies. While some of these politicians
react to being banished to the political sidelines by
joining the dissident ranks, most are content to quietly
pursue private business interests until they are politi-
cally rehabilitated by Mobutu. Below we discuss two
such personalities, currently out of office, who could
eventually play prominent roles in a post-Mobutu
government
Ileo Songa, former President of the Socio-Cultural
Commission, Central Committee, Popular Movement
of the Revolution. Ileo is a rare political figure in
Zaire because he is an influential Equateurian who is
highly respected among other regional groups. Popu-
larly referred to as "Papa," the 62-year-old Ileo is one
of the country's surviving founding fathers. He was
removed from the Central Committee in 1981 for
openly criticizing the President. In our view, his
popularity, experience, and political stature make him
a potential candidate for inclusion in almost any type
of government that succeeds Mobutu
A journalist in the preindependence period, Ileo
helped found the National Congolese Movement, a
party that attempted to unite the country's various
ethnic, regional, and political groups. During the early
1960s, he served twice as Prime Minister and later
headed the commission that drafted the country's first
constitution. He was elected to the legislature in the
mid-1970s. As that body's President in 1980, he
presided over sensitive legislative hearings that sought
to expose high-level corruption in government. Em-
bassy reporting has consistently portrayed Ileo as
solidly pro-West.
Bo-Boliko Lokonga, former Executive Secretary,
Popular Movement of the Revolution. A veteran labor
and political leader, Bo-Boliko is respected by virtual-
ly all elements of society, including the military,
politicians, and intellectuals. A native of Bandundu,
he appears to have avoided intense ethnic and regional
competition and enjoys a reputation as a fairminded,
competent, and industrious technocrat. As Prime
Minister during 1979-80, he tried to control public-
sector finances and was eventually removed for acting
too independently, according to US Embassy officials.
He was subsequently given the figurehead job as head
of the sole political party and was finally purged from
government in 1981. In view of his popularity and
experience, Bo-Boliko could be invited to play an
important role in a post-Mobutu government.
From 1961 to 1967 Bo-Boliko was president of Zaire's
largest labor union. He later served as secretary
general of the National Union of Workers of the
Congo, an umbrella group created to unify the labor
movement. In 1970 he was elected president of the
Legislative Council where he gained widespread pop-
ularity among its members for allowing them to vent
grievances against other government institutions, in-
cluding the presidency. Bo-Boliko is pro-West but has
generally been cautious about appearing to be overly
friendly with US Embassy officials. In 1963 he visited
the United States under the US-Government-spon-
sored International Visitors Program
Opposition Group Within Zaire
The Union for Democracy and Social Progress
(UDPS) has been the only significant opposition group
operating inside the country in recent years. It was
formed in 1981 by 13 former members of the Zairian
parliament who hoped to press Mobutu into allowing
an officially sanctioned opposition party. Although
the 13 were sentenced in 1982 to long prison terms for
their activities, Mobutu released them in June 1983 as
part of a general amnesty for political prisoners and
exiled dissidents. Since then they have rejected Mobu-
tu's offers of government posts and have continued to
advocate formation of an opposition party.
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While many of the 13 are members of one tribe-the
Baluba, based largely in southern Zaire-they appear
to enjoy considerable popular sympathy because they
are the only group in recent years that has worked
openly within the country to try to build a broadly
based opposition party. Given the group's apparent
popular appeal, we believe that some of its leaders
could well be invited to participate in a post-Mobutu
government.
Below we discuss the three top leaders of the UDPS-
all potential candidates for inclusion in such a govern-
ment. The three are Balubas who began working
closely together in the 1970s when, as members of
parliament, they were leading advocates of democrat-
ic reform. We believe that all three would prefer a
multiparty system for Zaire and the retention of close
ties to the West.
Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba. The most outspoken critic
of Mobutu in Zaire, Tshisekedi is the de facto leader
of the UDPS and would probably be the group's
principal representative if it were included in a future
government. His willingness to remain in Zaire to
work toward reform, along with his vociferous criti-
cism of the regime, seem to have won him consider-
able popular sympathy.
During the 1960s, Tshisekedi was one of Mobutu's
closest advisers. He served as Minister of Interior in
Mobutu's first cabinet, as a member of the Political
Bureau of Zaire's sole political party, as the party's
first national secretary, and finally as Minister of
Planning. In 1969 he was sent to Morocco as Ambas-
sador after the Balubas fell out with Mobutu.
Tshisekedi has long been an advocate of democratic
reform and a critic of ethnicity and corruption in the
government. The first Zairian to earn a doctorate in
law from its national university (1961), he also helped
draft the country's constitution.
The 50-year-old Tshisekedi, in our view, would proba-
bly be an aggressive, competent figure in a post-
Mobutu regime. We believe he is generally well-
disposed toward the West, particularly the United
States. He has argued strongly, however, that the
United States should help foster democracy in Zaire,
and he has often complained to US officials that
Washington is impeding Zaire's political and econom-
ic development through its support for Mobutu. As a
result, he might advocate a cautious app-oach toward
relations with the US in a post-Mobutu cra.F_
Ngalula Mpandanjila. Ngalula has been the main
political strategist of the UDPS. He conceived of and
wrote the group's principal political document, a
51-page open letter sent to Mobutu in 1981. Ngalula,
55, appears less aggressive than Tshisekedi, but he
nonetheless has been a prime mover in the UDPS and
might well press from behind the scenes for political
and economic reforms if the group were to be included
in a future government.
Ngalula has been an active politician since the late
1950s when, as a journalist, he cofounded the Nation-
al Congolese Movement, an organization that worked
for independence and later became a political party.
He served as Governor of South Kasai Region in the
mid-1960s. At that time the US Embassy described
Ngalula as one of the country's most impressive
politicians-an intelligent man with leadership and
oratorial skills. Ngalula was a prominent member of
the Zairian parliament from 1965 to 1980, but he has
never served in a top post in the central government.
He has advocated strong ties with the West and
especially with the United States.
Makanda Mpinga. Although he has been a leading
activist in the UDPS movement, Makanda seems to
lack the political stature and breadth of experience
that Tshisekedi and Ngalula possess, and we believe
he would probably be given a lesser cabinet post if the
UDPS were included in a future government
Makanda, now 53, was an advocate of democratic
reforms as a member of parliament during the late
1970s and would almost certainly press for such
changes as a member of a new future regime. In a
letter to the US Embassy in Kinshasa in 1982,
Makanda-who had visited the United States in 1980
under the International Visitors Program-asked for
US support for the UDPS and cited the United States
as "the model and political and economic ideal which
inspires us.'I
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Brussels-Based Dissidents
Brussels has long been a haven for exiled Zairian
dissidents because of the historical ties between the
two countries, Belgium's liberal political asylum laws,
and the sympathetic attitude of one of the Belgian
political parties-the Flemish Socialist (SP)-toward
anti-Mobutu dissidents.
The US Embassy in Brussels estimated last year that
there were over 50 Zairian opposition groups in
Belgium, but most were small, poorly organized, and
apparently lacking in any popular following in Zaire.
Even the few groups that are relatively organized and
active tend to be less respected by the Zairian public
than are dissidents who have remained within the
country. Moreover, although the Brussels-based dissi-
dent groups have occasionally formed loose alliances
with one another, they generally seem to compete
among themselves for public attention. Finally, these
dissidents were further weakened when several of the
more prominent members of the exile community
returned to Zaire in June 1983 under Mobutu's
political amnesty
Nonetheless, a very few of the leading dissidents in
Brussels appear to have reputations abroad or ties
within Zaire that could result in their inclusion in a
post-Mobutu government. Two such leaders are dis-
cussed below.
Nguza Karl-i-Bond-Leader, Congolese Front for
the Restoration of Democracy (FCD). A former Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister under Mobutu, Nguza
Karl-i-Bond is the most prominent of the Brussels-
based dissidents. During his years in the government
he was highly regarded by Zaire's Western and
multilateral benefactors as well as its African neigh-
bors. Largely because of his favorable international
reputation, he was chosen to serve as the titular head
and spokesman of the FCD, a loose coalition of
Brussels-based dissidents formed in October 1982. A
post-Mobutu government wishing to obtain interna-
tional and regional credibility might well invite
Nguza to assume an important post.
Between 1972 and 1981, Nguza served as Foreign
Minister on three occasions and finally as Prime
Minister. In August 1977 Mobutu, claiming Nguza
had suppressed intelligence concerning the rebel inva-
sion of Shaba Region in March of that year, had the
Foreign Minister jailed on charges of treason. Nguza
reportedly was mistreated in prison and was under a
death sentence for a time, but was pardoned by
Mobutu in July 1978 and reappointed Foreign Minis-
ter the following year. He served as Prime Minister
from August 1980 until 1981, when he fled to Brus-
sels and obtained political asylum.
As Foreign Minister, Nguza was the architect of a
"good neighbor" policy that eased strained relations
with Zaire's neighbors and won Nguza the admiration
of a number of African leaders. As Prime Minister he
earned the respect of Western governments for his
cooperative attitude toward them, his advocacy of
sound fiscal policies, and his skills as an international
negotiator.
Nguza, 44, is a native of Shaba Region and a member
of the Lunda tribe, the predominant ethnic group in
Shaba. Partly because of his long affiliation with the
Mobutu regime, he lacks a strong political base of his
own within Zaire. Moreover, as Prime Minister he
was not a forceful cabinet leader, and in our judgment
he probably would not be a strong figure in a post-
Mobutu government.
Nguza appears to have remained favorably disposed
toward the West. In 1981 he publicly described the
United States as "that admirable democracy which
we would like to use as a model." He speaks fluent
English and has visited the United States on several
occasions-most recently in September 1981 when he
criticized the Mobutu regime in testimony before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Dikonda Wa Lumanyisha-Foreign Representative,
Union for Democracy and Social Progress. As a
leading intellectual and outspoken critic of the Mo-
butu regime, Dikonda seems to be respected by
dissidents both within and outside Zaire. A former
professor of sociology at Zaire's National University,
Dikonda was imprisoned and tortured in 1981 after
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critizing Mobutu on Belgian television. Released from
prison in January 1982, he became a leading support-
er of the movement for a second political party. He
fled to Brussels in mid-1982 and now acts as the main
Embassy I Like the FLNC, it lacks
material and financial resources. The PRP has tried
on several occasions to develop links with the FLNC,
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spokesman there for the UDPS.
Dikonda, like many of the other activists of the
UDPS, is a member of the Baluba tribe. In view of his
good reputation among Zairian dissidents and his
active role in the movement to establish a second
party, we believe he could be included in a post-
Mobutu government, particularly if the UDPS plays a
prominent part in such a regime.
In Brussels, Dikonda, who is about 50, has tried to
bridge differences among anti-Mobutu dissidents of
divergent ideological and political orientations, and he
might try to play a similar role in a future govern-
ment. He has affirmed, however, that his first loyalty
lies with the UDPS. He is currently working to build
international support for the group, particularly
among West German and French socialists
Representatives of Insurgent Groups
Three insurgent groups have been active in recent
years. The Front for the National Liberation of the
Congo (FLNC), comprised of dissidents from mineral-
rich Shaba Region, operates from bases in neighbor-
ing Angola and Zambia. The FLNC, which was
unsuccessful in two attempts in the late 1970s to seize
control of Shaba, suffers from factional divisions,
severe material and financial shortages, and morale
problems.
the group-which has
several thousand members-has continued to infil-
trate men into Shaba to seek new recruits and to
cache weapons and supplies there in the hope of
eventually launching military or guerrilla operations
The second most important group, the Popular Revo-
lutionary Party (PRP), is the only insurgent organiza-
tion that has operated more or less continuously inside
Zaire in recent years. The PRP, comprised of 200 to
300 men, has been based along Lake Tanganyika in
eastern Zaire since 1967, according to reports from
The group
tried to gain international attention in 1975 by kid-
naping several American students on the Tanzanian
side of Lake Tanganyika and holding them for two
months.
A third insurgent group, the National Congolese
Movement/Lumumba (MNC/L), traces its roots to
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movement. It operated as a political party in the early
1960s. After years of obscurity the MNC/L resur-
faced in the late 1970s as a rebel group. The group
enjoys some support in Zaire's eastern regions but has
remained too small, loosely organized, and poorly
funded to mount guerrilla operations.
Monga Numbi-Commander in Chief, Front for the
National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC). In our 25X1
judgment, the FLNC's most likely representative in a
post-Mobutu government, should the group be includ-
ed in such a regime, is Gen. Monga Numbi, its
principal leader.
Monga, formerly an obscure FLNC colonel, was
elected by Front leaders as Commander in Chief and
Minister of Defense in March 1981. The 42-year-old
Monga oversees all aspects of FLNC activity, includ-
ing recruitment, training, infiltration, and efforts to
obtain Soviet assistance. Although the FLNC suffers
from factional differences-mainly between those 25X1
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soon and those who advocate a delay until the FLNC
is better prepared-Monga appears to command the
allegiance of most members.
Laurent Kabila-Founder and President, Popular 25X1
Revolutionary Party (PRP). Kabila has been a dedi- 25X1
cated guerrilla leader since 1963. He was active in
several revolutionary movements in eastern Zaire
before forming his own group in 1967. Under Kabila's
leadership the PRP grew into a well-organized and
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disciplined rebel movement. In the past few years,
however, the group has become inactive because of
Kabila's inability to obtain significant outside assist-
ance. Kabila, 44, travels periodically to Belgium from
Tanzania and Burundi in search of aid
Kabila received material assistance from China dur-
ing the 1960s, but Beijing terminated its aid in the
early 1970s and was denounced by the PRP leader.
Kabila subsequently obtained modest amounts of aid
from Tanzania and Burundi, and he still seems to
enjoy freedom of movement in those countries.
In late 1982 Kabila joined a loose coalition of pro-
Western dissidents based in Brussels-a further sign
that he may have moderated his stance. Kabila's ties
with Brussels-based dissidents and his experience as
an insurgent leader lead us to believe that he could be
included in a post-Mobutu regime, although we doubt
he would be given a major role
Francois Lumumba-Secretary General, National
Congolese Movement/Lumumba. The MNC/L chose
Francois Lumumba as its leader in 1981 largely
because he is the eldest son of the late Patrice
Lumumba, the organization's first president and the
country's first Prime Minister after independence.
After his father was assassinated in 1961, Francois,
then 10 years old, lived for a number of years in the
palace of Egypt's then President Nasser. He speaks
excellent Arabic, holds a Ph.D. in economics from
Cairo University, and has extensive contacts in the
Arab world, particularly among leading figures in
Algeria, Syria, and the PLO. He visited Libya in
1981, according to US Embassy
reporting. We have seen no evidence, however, that he
receives significant Arab assistance.
Lumumba lacks political experience and seems to
have no clearly formulated ideological position; he has
voiced both democratic and Marxist views on differ-
ent occasions. Lumumba could be chosen to represent
the party in a future government, but we believe he
would not be a strong figure.
successor regime.
Military Men
In our judgment, there are a number of military
officers who-by virtue of their ability and the sup-
port they enjoy in the armed forces, and in some cases
because of their ethnic, family, or political connec-
tions-could forge major roles for themselves in a
Vice Adm. Lomponda wa Botende, State Secretary for
National Defense. The second-ranking military offi-
cial after the President (Mobutu himself holds the
post of Defense Minister), Vice Admiral Lomponda
directs the day-to-day operation of Zaire's defense
establishment. Mobutu has also relied increasingly on
Lomponda to carry out sensitive assignments abroad.
During the first half of 1982, Lomponda supervised
Zairian operations in Chad as part of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping force in
that nation. In February 1983 Mobutu sent Lom-
ponda to Israel to discuss proposals for expanding the
Israeli military aid program in Zaire.
Lomponda is a capable administrator. The Navy
became the best organized and equipped branch of the
Zairian military when he was Navy Chief of Staff
from 1976 to 1980.
Lomponda is known as a skilled political infi hter
who enjoys Mobutu'
the is widely dislike m t e
military, however-particularly among junior offi-
cers-because of his reputation for ethnic favoritism
and corruption. Lomponda, a member of Mobutu's
Ngbandi ethnic group from Equateur Region, ap-
pointed a disproportionate number of Equateurians to
We think the 47-year-old Lomponda might well con-
trol the armed forces in a post-Mobutu regime,
particularly if Mobutu influences the succession proc-
ess. Lomponda would be likely to run the military as
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he and Mobutu do now-in a highly ethnic-oriented,
autocratic manner, tolerating corruption among sen-
ior officials in return for their loyalty. He could
probably count on the support of the Equateurians
who occupy most of the senior positions in the mili-
Singa, 51, has served as Governor of Shaba Region
(1979), Commander of the National Gendarmerie
(1972-77), Ambassador to Uganda (1970-72), and
Chief of the National Security Service (1965-69). A
visitor to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1973, he is
reputed to be friendly toward the United States.
Lt. Gen. Boteti Nkok'ea Nkanga, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Zairian Armed Forces. General Boteti appears
to be a protege of Mobutu and is reportedly being
groomed by the President for eventual leadership of
the armed forces. He is a member of the Mongo tribe
from Equateur Region.
Although he lacks formal military training, Boteti has
a reputation among Western military missions in
Kinshasa as an intelligent and fairly capable officer.
He is said to be honest by Zairian standards and has
appointed competent subordinates. Although he re-
portedly has extensive ties with influential Equateur-
ian officials, he has remained largely uninvolved in
ethnic infighting within the government. Indeed, he
seems to lack forcefulness and may not be a major
figure in a post-Mobutu government unless Mobutu
himself is able to influence the succession process and
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Lomponda is friendly toward the West and has
cooperated with US military and Embassy officials in
Kinshasa. As head of the airlift to Chad in 1982, he
sought to ensure that Zairian troops guarded the US
Embassy compound in Ndjamena when rebel forces
occupied the cit
Gen. Singa Boyenge Mosambay, Chief of Staff, Zair-
ian Armed Forces. Perhaps the military's most profes-
sional and competent senior officer, General Singa
has directed the armed forces since 1980. He has long
been one of the few non-Equateurians among senior
officers-a reflection of his good military record, his
reputation for being relatively honest, and especially
his loyalty to Mobutu. As commander of field opera-
tions in Shaba Region in 1977 and as military
governor there in 1978, Singa proved to be one of the
few competent commanders during the invasions in
those years by the FLNC. He reportedly is popular
among military officers.
During the past two years,
Singa appears to have
become increasing y rustrated over the military's
weaknesses.
vate Singa, possibly to the position of State Secretary
for National Defense, the number-two spot in the
military hierarchy. Because of his position and his
good reputation, Singa could well become an impor-
tant figure in a future government. We believe, based
on Embassy reporting, that Singa would favor estab-
lishing a more broadly based government.
the composition of a new regime.
Boteti, 46, was Army Chief of Staff from 1978 to
1981, Air Force Chief of Staff from 1972 to 1974,
military attache and later Ambassador in Tel Aviv
(1968-72), and military attache to Paris (1967-69). He
appears to be well disposed toward the West.
Lt. Col. Mahele Bokungu, Deputy Commander, 31st
Brigade. Since 1981, Lt. Col. Mahele has been the
deputy commander of the French-commanded bri-
gade that is one of the Zairian Army's best combat
units. This brigade, located in Kinshasa, is a key prop
of the regime-as well as a possible threat.
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French and other Western military advisers who have
worked closely with Mahele concur that he is one of
the most capable officers in the Zairian armed forces. 7FX1
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He is also one of the few officers in key positions who
has had combat experience; he led the recapture of
the Kolwezi airport from the rebels who invaded
Shaba Region in 1978. Mobutu subsequently became
apprehensive over Mahele's growing popularity in the
military and sentenced him to 10 years in prison on
trumped-up charges of misconduct. Mahele was soon
released, however, and appointed as a battalion com-
mander.
Earlier in the 1970s, Mahele had served as chief of
Mobutu's presidential security guard. Mobutu now
seems to trust Mahele, an Equateurian, and reported-
ly may name him as commander of the 31st Brigade
some time next year when he returns from a training
program in France. The actual leadership of the unit,
however, will probably be kept in French hands.
Mahele is respected within the Zairian military. He
seems to be favorably disposed toward the West.
Col. Nzimbi Ngbale, Commander, Special Presiden-
tial Brigade (BSP). Nzimbi heads one of the Army's
best units, the 2,000- to 2,500-man BSP. Since last
year the Brigade has been undergoing retraining by
Israeli military advisers. Based in Kinshasa, the BSP
is charged primarily with protection of the President
and other senior officials, but it is also prepared to
deploy against civil disturbances in the capital. In
view of the Brigade's strategic location and compe-
tence, Nzimbi could play an important role in the
period following the sudden death of the President.
An Equateurian and relative of Mobutu, Nzimbi
works directly under Mobutu. According to the US
defense attache, he is intelligent, competent, and
might be slated for a more senior military post at
some point.
Nzimbi accompanied Mobutu on an official visit to
the United States in 1979. Although we lack specific
information on his political orientation, we do not
believe Mobutu would have named him to the sensi-
tive post of BSP commander unless he were highly
loyal to the President and shared his pro-Western
views
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