MEXICO: LABOR-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100040007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Mexico:
Labor-Government Relations
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
ALA 83-10789
December 1983
Copy ,13
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Mexico:
Labor-Government Relations
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-
Caribbean Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10189
December 1983
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Mexico:
Labor-Government Relations
Key Judgments Mexican labor unions-almost wholly co-opted by the ruling party-are
/itjormation available showing few signs of militancy despite soaring prices, declining real wages,
os of7 November 1983 rising unemployment, and shortages of food and consumer goods. By and
was used in this report.
large, organized workers have been hurt but have not borne the brunt of
austerity, and their leaders have been able to claim some success in
preserving jobs and curbing the effects of inflation on labor.
The continued loyalty of organized labor~onstituting only an estimated
20 to 25 percent of the nation's work force but politically influential
beyond its numbers-is essential for the maintenance of IMF-mandated
austerity and for short-term political stability. Union officials, neverthe-
less, foresee the hardships caused by austerity creating growing demands
for redress that they can ill afford to ignore. Moreover, President de la Ma-
drid is concerned that disquiet over the grim economic times could
reinvigorate nonestablishment unions and enable them to effectively
challenge government policies. So far, however, sharp criticism of govern-
ment policy by Communist-dominated unions has no more than embar-
rassed the ruling party.
We see numerous dangers to the existing labor-government relationship,
but no single factor is likely to cause a crisis. Political missteps by de la
Madrid, Mexico's inability to pull out of its economic tailspin, and
potential disarray in the labor movement's hierarchy would have the
highest potential for disruption.
Although some strains will almost inevitably develop as Mexico works its
way through its financial predicament, we believe that well-established
lines of communication, a perceived need for cooperation, and the demon-
strated flexibility of both labor and government leaders will forestall
serious confrontation. At this juncture, breakup of the system that has
served organized workers so well seems unlikely.
Friction between labor and government seems most likely to develop as
economic activity picks up when unions will look for healthy economic
bonuses in exchange for previous sacrifices. As long as unions focus on
bread and butter issues, even a sharp upswing in the number of strikes
would not be threatening to the regime.
Secret
ALA 83-]0/89
December 1983
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Prolonged economic stagnation, while causing increased labor militancy,
would be, on balance, less a problem than fissures in the Mexican political
system. If oil prices drop sharply or a global financial crisis occurs,
however, the resulting plant shutdowns and massive layoffs would touch off
union calls for debt repudiation and controls to protect Mexican businesses
from competition.
A leadership vacuum within the labor movement poses the greatest
unknown. Continued strong performance by the President would alleviate
most immediate problems. Jockeying for power among leaders of the major
progovernment union or the inability of successors to labor chieftain Fidel
Velazquez to restrain labor demands could touch off a restructuring of the
movement and its relations with the government.
US and multinational firms are likely to face increased problems from
unions when the economy begins to recover. Labor probably discounts the
harmful effects of currency depreciation and negative economic growth on
foreign-owned companies and sees them as better prepared than domestic
firms to make concessions. At the same time, US firms could face pressure
from the government to restrain wage settlements and thus avoid interun-
ion tensions.
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Progovernment Unions
Nonestablishment Unions
Unions During the Economic Downturn
Concentration on Bread and Butter Issues
The President
The Economy
Labor Discipline
Additional Factors
Potential for Foreign Meddling
Vulnerability of US Firms
Implications for the United States
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M E X I C O
Quer~taro~
Guadalajara
MEXICO
+ ~ eracruz
Puebla
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Mexico:
Labor-Government Relations
Introduction
The continued loyalty of organized labor-largest and
best organized sector of the ruling Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI}-is essential for the success of
President de la Madrid's austerity program and is the
key for Mexico's short-term political stability. So far,
despite soaring prices and declining real wages, work-
ers show few signs of discontent. This has allowed the
President some flexibility in implementing the painful
measures necessary to rekindle economic growth.
Union leaders, nevertheless, are concerned over triple-
digit inflation, rising unemployment, and shortages of
food and consumer goods. They foresee growing de-
mands for redress that they could ill afford to ignore.
Failure by de la Madrid to keep labor's support could
presage severe strains on the nation's political system,
while measures necessary to hold labor's allegiance
could lead to the unraveling of the recovery program.
Neither of these extremes appears imminent or inev-
itable, but maintaining good labor-government rela-
tions will require de la Madrid's close and constant
attention.
In assessing the course of labor-government relations,
this paper reviews the role and influence of organized
labor in the Mexican political system, examines labor-
government relations during the economic downturn,
identifies crucial variables that could splinter the
relationship, and discusses the outlook for that rela-
tionship over both the near and long term. The
appendixes provide an overview of progovernment and
nonestablishment unions in Mexico.
Labor in Perspective
Progovernment Unions. Organized labor in Mexico,
representing close to one-fourth of the nation's labor
force and over two-thirds of all full-time workers, is
primarily an apparatus of political leverage. Integrat-
ed into the post-Revolutionary corporatist structure
by an elaborate network of rewards and control
mechanisms, union leaders channel government in-
structions to members and keep party strategists
abreast of grassroots concerns and problems. They
also help mount progovernment demonstrations and
supply the high turnouts and the votes necessary to
justify PRI claims that it represents the views and
interests of the majority of Mexicans. Strikes are rare
and work stoppages seldom correlate with economic
factors such as the rate of inflation. Because the
federal government regulates contract negotiations
and oversees a broad range of social welfare pro-
grams, unions are more interested in ensuring that
organized labor's guarantees and privileges are pro-
tected than in being the advocates of labor rights. 25X1
Union functionaries, anxious to retain their jobs and
improve their chances for advancement, generally
cooperate with the government and restrain rank-and-
file demands detrimental to ruling party-government
interests. Recalcitrant workers are expelled from their
locals and, because of strict union shop requirements,
lose their jobs. Dissident victories in shop elections are
voided. Union thugs exert physical "persuasion" when
The high wages and impressive fringe benefits union-
ized workers receive play an important role in guaran-
teeing labor quiescence. Members constitute the elite
of the labor force and their standard of living is above
that of the majority of Mexicans. They reap the lion's
share of the benefits from extensive government social
programs. Union owned and operated buslines, stores,
hospitals, schools, and recreational facilities also con-
tribute to their privileged status.
25X1
Although labor is subordinate to the state, the behind-
the-scenes influence of union leaders can affect gov-
ernment policy. According to the US Embassy, Fidel
Velazquez-longtime head of the nation's largest
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The large majority of Mexican laborers, reflecting
the continued importance of small-scale agriculture
and high levels of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, do not belong to unions. Academic sources
estimate that just 20 to 25 percent of Mexico's total
work force of some 21 million is unionized. Among
full-time workers, however, 60 to 70 percent belong to
unions, and those in essential industries petroleum,
electrical, transportation, steel, and mining-are well
organized. In addition, over 90 percent of plants
employing more than 25 workers are unionized,
according to US officials. Paralleling traditional
male dominance in the workplace, women are a
distinct minority among unionists.
Sectoral differences are pronounced. Approximately
90 percent of existing unions-covering about two-
thirds of organized workers-are in the mant4factur-
ing sector. Most are small and centered in the
country's industrial heartland. The Federal District
and the northern state of Nuevo Leon contain the
most union workers, both as a percentage of the
economically active population and in absolute num-
bers. According to academic estimates, because of the
union organization, the Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM onsults fre uentl with the Presi-
dent,
Labor's
numerous elective and appointive posts as well as
representation on influential administrative bodies
such as the National Minimum Wage Commission
also provide organized labor some say in decisionmak-
ing.' 25X1
Nonestablishment Unions. The governing elite toler-
ates the existence of several nonestablishment union
organizations, but, because of the substantial rewards
progovernment union members receive and the PRI's
talent for emasculating potential troublemakers, only
a small minority of unionized workers-perhaps less
' For a detailed discussion of pro overnment labor unions, see
appendix A. 25X1
rapid expansion of thefederal bureaucracy during the
last two administrations, government employee
unions-with less than 1 percent of the number of
unions-account for nearly 40 percent of organized
workers. Somewhat more dispersed geographically
than their industrial counterparts, their membership
is predominantly in the capital. F~jfective agricultural
unions or associations are virtually nonexistent al-
though those in the state of Sinaloa in northwest
Mexico appear to be more than paper organizations.
Since World War II union members have become
increasingly differentiated by skill, income, and sta-
tus. Service workers and laborers in the building
trade generally fare worse than industrial workers.
Skilled workers or crgl'tsmen are an aristocracy
among unionists. They frequently serve as middlemen
in management-labor dealings, and many become
supervisors. Most have middle-class aspirations.
Workers in the powerful Petroleum Workers' Union
rank as the best paid in the country. Employees of
foreign-owned firms particularly in the automobile
industry-also tend to receive high salaries.
than 5 percent-are represented by organizations not
affiliated with the ruling party. Opposition political
parties have made little headway in building a follow-
ing among workers. Although Marxists have managed
to attract enough support to establish footholds in
many PRI-affiliated unions, we believe the PRI's
success in co-opting leftist leaders has undermined
even this limited foundation. At the same time, the
Communists' emphasis on organizing students has
made them appear unsympathetic to the problems of
workers. Underscoring its conservative, middle-class
outlook, the center-right National Action Party places
little emphasis on proselytizing workers and claims no
union affiliates.Z
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Table 1
Leading Progovernment Union Organizations a
Confederation of Mexican Fidel Velazquez At least 1.5-2 million workers; includes Mexico City, Mexico State, So-
Workers (CTM) aviation, cement, construction, electri- nora, Puebla, Guadalajara,
cal, farm, hotel, paper, printing, and Queretaro
sugar workers
Federation of Government Manuel German Parra 1.5-2 million workers; includes most Mexico City, state capitals
Workers Trade Unions Prado bureaucrats and secondary school
(FSTSE) teachers
Regional Confederation of Antonio J. Hernandez 150,000 members; includes textile,
Mexican Workers (CROM) shoe, garment, and maritime and port
workers
Veracruz, Mexico City
Revolutionary Confedera- Alberto Juarez Blancas 500,000 members; includes food and Mexico City
lion of Workers and Peas- beverage, textile, transportation, and
ants (GROG) hospital workers
General Confederation of Lorenzo Valdepenas 30,000 members
Workers (CGT) Machuca
a All are members of the PRI-sponsored Congress of Labor.
b Precise figures for union membership are lacking, and wide
differences of opinion exist among observers of Mexican labor.
Some, for example, estimate CTM membership at 4-5 million.
Note: A number of large national unions affiliated with the ruling
party remain outside the organizations listed above.
Unions During the Economic Downturn
Organized labor's willingness to accept harsh auster-
ity measures during 1983 is a solid indicator that the
intricate give and take that characterizes labor-gov-
ernment relations is working even under the strains
imposed by the severe economic downturn. Recogniz-
ing the seriousness of the country's economic plight
and the potential for instability, Fidel Velazquez has
put his substantial political weight on the side of
moderation. His declarations of support for the gov-
ernment, calls for broader labor-government coopera-
tion, and rejection of aCommunist-proposed labor
alliance helped smooth the troubled transition from
the Lopez Portillo to the de la Madrid administration
by reducing tensions and allowing the new President
the time and the flexibility to launch a recovery
program, build his image as an effective leader, and
persuade international financiers of his commitment
to austerity.
Velazquez has been exceptionally responsive to
private-sector problems. (s NF rrc oc)
IMF strictures, while painful for labor, have not
drawn much fire, and criticism of austerity has been
tempered with effusive declarations of loyalty. No
major strikes by Progovernment unions have occurred,
even though Progovernment union leaders on occasion
have threatened widespread work stoppages. We be-
lieve such statements are aimed at deflecting rank-
and-file complaints that their interests have been
forgotten and at offsetting criticism from nonestab-
lishment unions. Velazquez's attacks against opposi-
tion parties-especially since the National Action
Party's strong showing in local elections in northern
Mexico-point to continuing support for the ruling
party. Nevertheless, the government is concerned
about the potential for labor unrest and remains
watchful of incidents that could spark problems.
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Table 2
Leading Nonestablisbment Trade Union Organizations
National Federation of 70,000, works closely with
Independent Unions (FNSI) managements
Independent Workers 20,000, in decline; strongest in
Union (UOI) automobile industry and airlines
University Workers
Union (SUNTU)
Monterrey Center right
Federal District, state capitals Dominated by Unified Socialist
Party
Single National Union of Nuclear 3,500
Workers (SUTIN) e
Authentic Labor Front (FAT) Unknown, controls a handful
of locals
a Precise figures for union membership are lacking, and wide
differences of opinion exist among observers of Mexican labor.
Some, for example, estimate SUNTU membership at 30,000.
n SUTIN is, however, a member of the progovernment Congress of
Labor.
Concentration on Bread and Butter Issues. Labor
moderation, however, is not unconditional, and union
strategists have doggedly defended the economic in-
terests of their rank and file. Job preservation remains
the top priority; unionists-particularly during the
early stages of the crisis-repeatedly told US Embas-
sy officials they would forgo major wage increases if
faced with the alternative of plant closings and unem-
ployment. Businessmen, in part hemmed in by regula-
tions requiring large severance payments and other
benefits for full-time workers who are laid off, have
responded with such moves as cutting hours and
splitting jobs to keep employment up. Simultaneously,
the federal work force has been expanded. Even
though unemployment is rising nationally and now,
according to some private-sector Mexican economists,
exceeds 20 percent, among unionized workers it is
probably less than 10 percent. On balance, union
members have suffered less from the ravages of
austerity than most other workers.
Slowing inflation has also been a major goal. Labor
leaders have linked acceptance of small wage hikes to
government and business efforts to prevent rapid price
Federal District Close ties with Unified Socialist
Party
Christian-Democrat, militant,
associated with opposition
leftist parties
increases. Vociferous calls for an emergency wage
hike this spring after large cuts in fuel and milk
subsidies were in large part aimed at alerting the
government to union sensitivity about high inflation.
Rising demands for rent controls and curbs on busi-
ness profits, as well as the formation of watchdog
committees to prevent price gouging by merchants,
reflect labor's intent to do more than jawbone. Labor
leaders may feel some satisfaction in the lower month-
ly inflation rates reported for September and October
and hope that upward pressure on prices will ease
further in coming months
The government's efforts to ensure access of work-
ers-organized or not-to basic necessities have given
union leaders the opportunity to concentrate on the
job preservation issue. Dietary mainstays such as
beans, rice, and tortillas are still affordable because of
continuing federal subsidies. Government grain pur-
chases for state-owned stores are maintaining supplies
in urban areas. In addition, the administration has
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reduced taxes on low-cost housing and medicines, kept
public transportation fares low, extended medical
benefits to some unemployed workers, opened food
distribution centers in Mexico City, and started a jobs
Crucial Variables
The severity, depth, and duration of the country's
economic malaise almost inevitably will come to
strain labor-government bonds, and we see a likeli-
hood that de la Madrid will soon feel significant
pressure to backtrack on key facets of his economic
reforms. Even though early compromises held up in
1983 and most union leaders accepted the need for
retrenching, labor discipline will be increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain as the economic hardships multiply.
Most likely, accommodations between labor and
government will prevent the worst cases-decisive
alienation of labor or abandonment of the economic
recovery program. Particular developments, nonethe-
less, could tilt the Mexican situation toward one of
those extremes. For example, indefinite prolongation
of Mexico's economic doldrums, political missteps by
de la Madrid, or the death of aged Fidel Velazquez
and subsequent disarray in the labor leadership have
high potential for disruption.
program.
Trouble With Independents. Nonestablishment
unions-particularly those with links to opposition
leftists-have been a problem for the President, and
he is concerned that the hardships caused by austerity
could give them the issues to attract a large following.
So far, however, the independents have not displayed
much strength, even though their sharp criticism of
belt-tightening measures and ability to carry out
several strikes have been embarrassing to the ruling
party. The President's efforts to undercut them-
described by the Embassy as the strongest against
nonestablishment unions in years-have included
threatening to void the contract of the striking Com-
munist union at the National University and shutting
the doors of the parastatal company another leftist
union was picketing.
The President. As the paramount player in Mexico's
authoritarian political structure, the President, by his
skill in juggling the conflicting demands of powerful
interest groups, will shape the course of labor-govern-
ment relations. A series of blunders by de la Madrid
or the public's perception of him as indecisive would
spell a loss of confidence even if the economy were in
good shape. His death, because there is no vice
president and a successor must be selected by Con-
gress, would jolt the political system severely.
25X1
A technocrat by training and regarded as a political
neophyte at the time of his nomination, de la Madrid
has so far shown considerable knowledge and skill in
enforcing austerity. His tactics-generally regarded
as tough but fair-have diffused issues around which
antigovernment forces could coalesce. Efforts to re-
build public enthusiasm for the ruling party, badly
strained by the greed and corruption of the Lopez
Portillo administration, include opening up the candi-
date selection process, placing younger members of
the party in important positions, and restructuring
state and local affiliates. The President has also
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Table 3
Strikes and Work Stoppages, 1983
7 February-24 March: 8,000 to 10,000 work- Workers demanding 60-percent in-
ers strike government-owned automobile crease in wages and protesting
plants near Mexico City. Union involved has planned layoff of 2,500 workers.
some ties to UOI. Nonviolent.
29 April-May: 40,000 to 50,000 members of Protesting austerity. Nonviolent.
Communist-dominated university unions
stage 3-day protest. Since held over a week-
end, only 1 working day lost.
25 May: Communist-dominated faction of To publicize demands for 100-per-
teachers' union stages 1-day work stoppage. cent emergency wage increase.
Upward of 150,000 teachers participate. Nonviolent.
1-25 June: Communist-affiliated Nuclear Demanding 50-percent wage in-
Workers' Union pickets parastatal company. crease. Nonviolent.
Some 3,500 workers affected.
2l June: large progovernment teachers' Protesting austerity. Nonviolent.
union-under pressure from Communist fac- ,
lion stages partial 1-day work stoppage.
Some 200,000 workers involved.
1-28 June: Communist-dominated unions Demanding 40- to 100- percent
strike the National University and 10 other wage increase. Nonviolent.
state universities. Approximately 45,000
workers participate.
21 July: staff (and students) of large teachers' Protesting proposed closure of the
college in Mexico City. Some 3,000 partici- school. Blocked traffic in down-
pants. town Mexico City.
18 October: leftist parties and front groups To protest government austerity
call fora 1-day, nationwide work stoppage. program. Nonviolent.
20-percent wage hike plus monthly food allow-
ance. Layoffs not revoked.
Administration takes hardline stand. Closes com-
pany's doors. Status of union still in flux.
Administration declares the strike nonexistent.
Workers to prevent termination of contract and
loss of jobs-return to work. No pay raise.
Administration puts heavy pressure on leftist
parties. Security elements beefed up. Participa-
tion is minimal because progovernment unions
refuse to join.
proved adept at taking advantage of the ruling party's
ability to move in various directions at once to reduce
strains. For example, the government has reassured
nationalists who are disturbed by Mexico's adherence
to an IMF-imposed economic program by participat-
ing in the Contadora group.
The President's handling of labor has been particular-
ly impressive, even though
his technocrat-dominated adminis-
tration has not cultivated top labor leaders. He has
provided progovernment unionists with enough "vic-
tories" to keep their followers in line, but has avoided
giving hard-hit businessmen the impression that he is
totally in the union camp. Indeed, his success in
keeping wages down has earned applause from busi-
nessmen and international bankers. In choosing the
new head of the large government employees' federa-
tion, de la Madrid selected a PRI stalwart with
substantial political experience who can be counted on
to work closely with the administration. Nonestablish-
ment unions, though troublesome and embarrassing,
generally have been forced to toe the line through
indirect pressures and threats.
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One of de la Madrid's main goals when he took office
was to cut real wages to lower consumption. As a
measure of his success, real wages have fallen nearly
20 percent during the first three quarters of 1983.
Last December's minimum wage negotiations-a tra-
ditional guideline for union settlements throughout
industrv-culminated in a moderate, two-stage wage
boost for workers: 25 percent in January, with a
promised 12 percent in July. Although there was
some pressure to boost this summer's hike and move
it forward several months, the President remained
adamant and allowed only a /5.6-percent rise in
June.
Government-affiliated unions are disappointed over
the continuing fall in real wages, but their near-
unanimous compliance has allowed the President to
go a long way toward meeting IMF targets. Even the
most boisterous progovernment unions-the electri-
cians and telephone workers-have settled quietly
and for less than their original demands for 50-
percent hikes. Moreover, the labor-business-govern-
ment solidarity pact signed in August implies a wage
freeze for the remainder of the year.
fares, and, as part of the movement toward a single
national standard, regional variations in minimum
wages were again narrowed. In addition, minimum
wages can now be raised more frequently than the
traditional annual increase. This move gives labor an
opportunity to push for it.s longstanding goal of
indexing wages to inflation. Mexico City-after a
brief hiatus-has also started to pay traditional
bonuses to bureaucrats and government emplvvees.
To uphold the status of Fidel Velazquez and other
progovernment labor leaders as well as ensure their
continued support for his hardline policti~, the Presi-
dent has not allowed nonestablishment unions much
leeway in wage negotiations. According to press and
US Embassy reports, a monthlong strike in the
summer of 1983 by nonacademic employees of the
National University-represented by Mexico's larg-
est Communist-led labor organization-ended with
no pay increase for the strikers. The administration
was in/]exible during bargaining sessions and was
prepared to rule that the strike was "nonexistent "
and to terminate the workers' contracts.
To forestall worker unrest, both the government and
the private sector have offered other rewards. Some
companies have boosted fringe benefits, while other
employers have increased contributions to worker
cafeterias as well as paying bonuses-tax free under
Mexican law for good attendance. The administra-
tion postponed plans to raise public transportation
Maintaining labor's support has been the major politi-
cal objective so far during de la Madrid's administra-
tion, and he has favored its interests just enough to
keep its allegiance. He is keenly aware, however, that
the inner balance of the ruling party would be
jeopardized by excessive concessions to a single sector.
Although many of labor's gains have-and will con-
tinue to-come at the expense of the major sector of
the PR[ dominated by the middle class, labor's sway
has not yet increased relative to the other two compo-
nents of the party.
25X1
We believe that the President will continue to seek
further cuts in real wages in 1984. We believe labor
will accept wage settlements about 10 percent below
the rate of inflation. As compensation, however, labor
will demand significant increases in nonwage fringe
benefits 25X1
25X1
according to US Embassy reports, some unionists 25X1
were disappointed with the scarcity of prolabor ap-
pointees in de la Madrid's administration. De la
Madrid's decision to increase union representation in
Congress in 1982, while demonstrating labor's impor-
tance, was essentially symbolic because the Congress
plays a minor role in the legislative process.
25X1
25X1
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Just how far de la Madrid can go in keeping labor on
board without meeting unacceptable opposition from
within the Dart is unclear.
The Economy. A continuing decline in economic
activity over an extended period, especially if com-
bined with continuing high inflation, could set the
stage for a weakening of presidential control. To
convince workers to make short-term sacrifices, the
President and progovernment labor leaders have
heavily emphasized the prospects for future improve-
ment. Emphasis on job preservation has so far served
the best interests not only of workers but of business
and the middle class, and we see few indications of
rank-and-file dissidence. Velazquez's claims that un-
employment remains within acceptable bounds are
probably not exaggerated, and his comments to US
Embassy officials that another wage increase will not
be sought this year points to a willingness to give the
President additional time. Moreover, the accessibility
of the United States to unemployed workers or new
entrants into the job market has also acted as an
outlet on labor unrest.
Nevertheless, the outlook for Mexico's economy re-
mains grim. Even under the best circumstances, we
see little chance for the beginning of recovery until
mid-1984. Although the decline may soon begin to
bottom out, during de la Madrid's first eight months
in office real GDP fell at an annual rate of 6 percent,
inflation ran in the triple digits, and imports of capital
and consumer goods plummeted. Next year, inflation
is likely to fall to the 30- to 40-percent range, but, at
best, economic activity will stagnate.
Factors beyond de la Madrid's control could damage
the economy and prolong the need for belt tightening.
A dip in oil prices or higher interest rates would throw
domestic austerity efforts off track. Failure by the
private sector or multinational firms to begin reinvest-
ing would also dampen recovery. Default by a large
debtor nation such as Brazil or Poland could limit
access to additional international funds.
While it is difficult to determine the point at which
worker patience would be breached, indefinite sacri-
fice cannot be in the cards. Job preservation will not
suffice during a period of stagflation, and we believe
pressure for more militant stands will grow. Indeed,
the union rank and file strongly oppose food price
increases and will press their leaders to lobby for
changes in relevant government policies. While
progovernment labor leaders would probably comply
in order to undercut appeals from opposition parties
and nonestablishment unions, the government would
continue to make only those concessions necessary to
keep labor on board. A wave of victories by dissidents
in local shop elections would send a clear message that
policy changes were in order. Strikes by unions affili-
ated with the ruling party would be a sign that the
difficulties plaguing the system were too complex to
handle in traditional, behind-the-scenes negotiations,
and the risk of a fracture in the political system would
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.As the dominant figure in the country's premier union
organization for over 40 years, 83-year-old Fidel
Velazquez plays a crucial role on the labor-political
scene. He acts both for the government in its relations
with the labor movement and for the workers in their
dealings with the government. He is one of a handful
who have immediate access to the President, and his
imprimatur is sought by government officials on
domestic policy decisions. Many academics-citing
the adage that presidents come and go but Velazquez
remains-regard him as, perhaps apocryphally, the
most powerful individual in Mexico.
There is little doubt that Velazquez's fealty to the
survival of the ruling party-government complex is
absolute. He rejects both capitalism and Communism
and views himself and his cohorts as coresponsible
with the government for directing the destiny of
Mexico. While acquiring a reasonable share of the
benefits of Mexico's rapid economic development
between 1940 and 1980 for his rank and file, he has
proved a paragon of moderation, preferring concilia-
tion to threats. During the economic crisis he has
strongly supported the conservative economic policies
imposed by the President. In fact, the Communists
accuse him of selling his soul to the government and
private enterprise.
Velazquez has been in command of the CTM since
1941, and his unchallenged authority within that
organization allows him to run it like a microcosm of
the PRI. No local or regional CTM official would
risk a major move-such as a strike or antigovern-
ment protest-without consulting him. He rewards
loyalty, but those that step out of line are quickly
chastised and required to do penance. Government
leaders, in return for the vast patronage they place at
his disposal, depend on him to head off dissent within
labor and to persuade the rank and file to acquiesce
to policies that would cause riots in other countries.
Close personal contact with leaders of other q/filiated
unions as well as influential members of the govern-
ing elite also enable him to exert influence over the
labor movement as a whole. He has not-according
to US Embassy sources-enriched him.ce(jduring hi.c
long tenure, a fact that adds to his public stature.
While labor's symbiotic relationship with the ruling
party is unlikely to change with a new man at the
helm of the CTM, the process of finding a successor
to Velazquez will test the political system's eapacitt'
to adjust to shocks from within. The new leader will
be hard pressed to develop the loyal following as well
as the sense of what can be accomplished that
Velazquez has acquired in over 40 years of practice.
As a consequence, the tone and temper of labor-
government relations could acquire some harsh over-
tones as the new man adjusts.
Although the CTM has afair degree ofautononty, x~e
believe the President will "select" Velazyuez's suc-
cessorfrom among a number of CTM candidates,
who will then be "elected" by the CTM's member-
ship. Because most prominent CTM leaders below
Velazquez are in their eighties and apparentli~ lack
the talent to do the job well, the President i.c more
likely to dip into the younger echelon of CTM officers
to find a replacement for Velazquez. Because labor's
support is essential for the ruling party's continued
political hegemony, the principal criterion for leader-
ship will be loyalty and acceptability to the governing
elite rather than accountability to mass constituen-
cies. 25X1
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Labor Discipline. Disorganization within labor's hier-
archy would magnify existing low-level tensions over
how to respond to the economic crisis. Up to now the
masterful manipulation of Fidel Velazquez-83 years
old and in relatively good health for his age-has held
workers together and labor continues to speak with
one voice. Because he has no heir apparent, however,
and because those who might take his place lack his
influence and contacts, Velazquez's death or incapaci-
tation will cause a vacuum at the top which could
complicate continued union-government cooperation.
Established institutional controls should provide de la
Madrid with enough leeway to replace Velazquez
without precipitating a crisis. Nevertheless, jockeying
for influence among senior union leaders could pro-
long uncertainty. In addition, Velazquez's successor,
particularly if the economy does not improve, is likely
to be under considerable pressure from within the
labor movement to demonstrate the strength of his
commitment to worker interests.
De la Madrid's hardest decision in the event of
Velazquez's death will be whether to break up the
CTM. Proponents of division claim small units are
easier to manipulate and would prevent another pow-
erful, Velazquez-like figure from emerging. The fact
that Velazquez's ability to control the unions has been
a key element in the success of austerity, however,
argues for the utility of a powerful but loyal person-
age
De la Madrid appears inclined to keep the CTM
intact
US Embassy
officers agree that continued CTM integrity seems to
be de la Madrid's intent and describe rumors about
dividing the organization as the reaction of techno-
crats who have felt Velazquez's wrath. Indeed, be-
cause the political selection process has emphasized
technocratic skills in recent years, union chieftains,
with their long experience in manipulating the popu-
lace, will find themselves in greater demand as leaders
try to maintain political balance.
Even if he lives out the remainder of de la Madrid's
six-year term, Velazquez's success in maintaining
labor discipline is not guaranteed. Some signs of
distancing from Velazquez are already noticeable. We
believe more conservative members of the Labor
Congress have sought to gain favor with de la Madrid,
in part because they disapprove of Velazquez's han-
dling of wage negotiations. The CTM's increased
congressional representation-largely at the expense
of other labor confederations-has also caused hard
feelings. Even the de la Madrid administration has
made gestures toward other leaders. Indeed, praise for
several small labor organizations by the Labor Minis-
ter coupled with a decision by insurance industry
workers to terminate their affiliation with the CTM
may indicate some dimming of Velazquez's star.
Moreover, the powerful Petroleum Workers' Union is
wary of administration attacks on corruption and
could break ranks.
Potential for Foreign Meddling
Mexico's unsettled economic situation has raised the
specter of meddling by foreign powers. Leaders of
mainline labor unions, however, are demonstrably
part of the establishment and tend to be conservative
and strongly anti-Communist. While nonestablish-
ment unions and unorganized laborers might, under
later, changing circumstances, present attractive tar-
gets for Cuban or Soviet interference, we believe
Moscow and Havana are now more interested in
maintaining mutual good will. Mexico is widely re-
spected in international circles for its independent
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policies, which are usually sympathetic to the Third
World and often of propaganda value to the Commu-
nist states.
While friendly relations with Cuba and the USSR are
an important part of Mexico's claim to independence
from the United States and add to the regime's
standing among leftists at home, the government
clearly remains wary of Soviet and Cuban intentions.
Mexico City permits Havana and Moscow-and non-
communist diplomats-to maintain a wide range of
contacts with opposition leftist parties, but does not
countenance any outside interference in internal poli-
tics. We believe it would react with vigor-as it has
done in the past-to any misstep by Havana or
Cuba. At present Havana's large diplomatic and
commercial contingent in Mexico City appears to
concentrate on giving organizational, financial, and
nonmilitary assistance to the various revolutionary
groups that it supports in other Latin American
countries. Cuba, however, has also provided organiza-
tional advice and presumably other forms of nonmili-
tary support to opposition leftist parties and
Communist-dominated front groups.
attempt to influence the government.
The Soviet Union. Moscow's links with progovern-
ment unions, in part because labor leaders such as
Fidel Velazquez are staunch anti-Communists, are
limited. Although Soviet delegations have attended
recent labor conferences in Mexico, the Soviet-spon-
sored Permanent Committee for Labor Unity in Latin
America (CPUSTAL~headquartered in Mexico
since 1978-has not developed contacts within the
mainstream of Mexican labor. It has abided by what
US Embassy sources claim was an unwritten promise
extracted by Lopez Portillo in 1978 not to interfere in
the domestic labor or political scene, although the
Soviets applauded the organization of a coalition of
the Mexican Communist Party with four smaller
leftist parties in 1981. The coalition is plagued by
disunity and chary of outside influence, and, as a
result, we see it as a poor spear carrier for any
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The Outlook for Labor-Government Relations
1984. Hard tests of de la Madrid's political acumen
lie ahead. Imposing another year of austerity will
require politically risky cuts in public spending and
employment. Continuing restraint will hit business
hard, causing new bankruptcies and increased unem-
ployment. We believe the President will continue to
emphasize constraints on consumption, and, as a
result, real wages will once again fall, although the
loss will be less dramatic than in 1983.
During the year, because of economic pressures, we
expect disruptive incidents to occur and sharp rhetoric
to issue from both sides. In addition, Labor Minister
Arsenio Farell-according to press and Embassy re-
ports-has offended Velazquez, and that could mean
problems in the wage negotiations scheduled for 1984.
Some strikes or sporadic violence could materialize.
Nevertheless, well-established lines of communication
between both government and labor leaders, a need
perceived by both sides to cooperate, and their demon-
strated flexibility will probably forestall serious con-
frontation. In the face of mounting losses by private
businesses, leaders of PRI-affiliated unions are likely
to continue to stress job preservation and cooperation
with business and government. On occasion, the Presi-
dent may need to employ selective use of force to
maintain order, but his early establishment of author-
ity and his success in reducing the atmosphere of
anxiety suggest he will remain in control of events.
Because of their weakness and the effectiveness of the
President's policies, we anticipate that nonestablish-
ment unions will not make many gains next year.
Mexico City will remain sensitive to union activities
that it believes have a political end. In such cases, as
in the Communist-sponsored railroad strikes in 1958
and 1959 that threatened to undermine the PRI's
predominance over labor, the government will react
quickly and with force.
The Mid-1980s. Friction between labor and govern-
ment, as in other developing countries, seems most
likely to develop as economic growth picks up. We
expect union members to demand economic bonuses
in exchange for previous sacrifices. As long as the
system appears to reward labor and the traditional
return to a more traditional level
hierarchical structure is seen as the avenue for ad-
vancement, increases in labor agitation will remain
within established norms. Indeed, as long as unions
focus on bread and butter issues, even a sharp up-
swing in the number of strikes would not be regime
threatening and would probably receive the Presi-
dent's nod. Even at such a juncture, breakup of the
system that has served labor so well would be unlike-
ly, and labor's political influence would eventually
If opposition parties manage to convert discontent
with poor economic performance into national politi-
cal support or attract large numbers of disgruntled
PRI members, the governing elite might have to make
more substantive changes in the polity to maintain
labor's support. Administration moves to meet labor's
longstanding demands fora 40-hour workweek and
unemployment insurance, or for the appointment of
unionists to subsecretarial slots in important economic
offices, would be key indicators that labor's influence
over policy formation was growing. Attempts to head
off political dissidents by "opening" the system would
also-by fostering competition for labor support-
cause labor's influence to escalate.
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Downside Risks. While the chances are much better
than even that labor-government relations will remain
on an even keel and allow the Mexican system to
weather the storm safely, the fluidity of the situation
makes for significant downside risks. A political crisis
causing the personal links tying the system together to
fray and the government to appear rudderless would
be most disruptive. In such circumstances-which we
consider unlikely because de la Madrid has demon-
strated that he is willing to use the enormous power of
the presidency and that he understands the Mexican
system-Mexico City could bend to the pressures of
competing interest groups and thus abandon rational
decisionmaking. Labor, as a result, would take an
increasingly independent course, guided more by eco-
nomic self-interest than a commitment to the system.
Opposition parties might capture a significant ele-
ment of the Labor Congress's affiliates, and nonestab-
lishment unions-especially if a charismatic leader
emerged-would have a new appeal. Demands for
higher wages and work stoppages would skyrocket as
labor-business accommodation dissolved. Under these
circumstances, the government might seek to use any
improvement in its international credit rating to in-
crease borrowing from foreign banks. Such steps
would temporarily boost economic activity but invite a
new crisis.
The outlook for Mexico's safe passage through its
economic crisis could also be altered by international
developments. For example, if such economic blows-
which we do not expect-as a sharp drop in oil prices
or a global financial crisis occurred, union reaction to
the inevitable widespread plant shutdowns and mas-
sive layoffs would be rapid and highly nationalistic.
Calls for unilateral debt repudiation and new controls
to shield Mexican businesses from foreign competition
would be followed by demands for the nationalization
of foreign-owned industries, particularly pharmaceu-
ticals and automotives. To maintain its legitimacy and
hold labor's allegiance, the administration would feel
compelled to respond favorably. After the euphoria of
debt repudiation and nationalizations evaporated,
however, labor-government relations would soon begin
to deteriorate as competition for shares of a reduced
economic pie began anew.
A leadership vacuum within the labor movement after
Velazquez departs the scene poses the greatest
unknown. Continued strong performance by the Presi-
dent, especially if the economy improves, would allevi-
ate most immediate problems. Maintenance of the
status quo will be enhanced because union leaders
perceive that labor's socioeconomic interests are best
served by cooperation with the administration as well
as by the lack of political activism among the majority
of workers. Over the longer run, however, jockeying
for power among CTM leaders or the inability of
Velazquez's successors to restrain labor's demands
could touch off a complete restructuring of the labor
movement and its relations with the government.
Severe internal factionalism within the CTM leading
to the formation of large rival federations would mark
a major crossroads in the 50-year dominance of the
ruling party. It would redefine the boundaries of the
political system and expand the range of socioeconom-
ic demands and policy issues confronting national
decisionmakers. In such circumstances, which we
consider possible but at present unlikely, opposition
parties would challenge the PRI's preeminence and a
separate labor party might emerge. Because labor
support is crucial to the PRI's political hegemony, we
expect party strategists to try to preserve overall unity
within organized labor. Replacing ineffective leaders
or bolstering the status of other federations-while
potentially disruptive-would be reasonable policy
options for de la Madrid 25X1
Vulnerability of US Firms. In our opinion, US and
multinational firms are likely to face increased prob-
lems from Mexican labor, especially when the econo-
my picks up. Union leaders probably discount the
harmful impact currency depreciation and negative
economic growth have had on foreign-owned compa-
nies and see them as better prepared than domestic
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could face pressure from Mexico City to keep wage
settlements within the limits established by the Na-
tional Minimum Wage Commission because the gov-
erning elite is concerned that excessive settlements
could generate interunion tensions.
Implications for the United States
In our view, because labor's influence is generally
restricted to domestic economic concerns and because
we see good union-government relations continuing,
we expect labor problems to have little direct impact
on the broad range of bilateral issues concerning
Washington and Mexico City. To protect jobs, how-
ever, union leaders will continue to resist initiatives to
join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which hurts short-term prospects for US
businessmen to increase exports to Mexico. In addi-
tion, labor can also be expected to lobby for export
subsidies which US businesses would protest
Deteriorating government-labor relations-although
de la Madrid's skillful handling of labor during the
past 12 months has significantly lessened the chances
for trouble-would create some problems for the
United States. Most, however, would be relatively
limited so long as Mexico's basic political structure
remained intact. For example, employment difficul-
ties would spur a new upsurge of illegal migrants to
the United States. Moreover, a rise in the wage bill or
a breakdown in labor discipline would hit US firms in
Mexico and ultimately foreign banks that had large
loans outstanding to private firms.
Should the economic crisis and consequent labor
problems eventually become unmanageable and lead
to political instability-a scenario we find unlikely
but nonetheless well within the range of possible
outcomes-the implications for the United States
assume significant proportions. In such unsettled cir-
cumstances, the United States would face an unprece-
dented set of economic, political, and social problems.
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Appendix A
Progovernment Unions
Unions affiliated with the ruling party represent an
estimated 4-5 million workers-at least 95 percent of
organized labor. Most fall into three general catego-
ries: government employee unions; confederations or
groups of trade unions; and national industrial unions,
where, similar to the United States, workers are
organized along industry lines. The Confederation of
Mexican Workers (CTM) is the largest of over 30
confederations, dwarfing both the Regional Confeder-
ation of Mexican Workers (CROM) and the Revolu-
tionary Confederational Workers and Peasants
(GROG). The Government Employees' Union
(FSTSE), however, has more members than the CTM,
according to some academics. National industrial
unions~f which the Railroad, Mining, and Petro-
leum Workers' Unions are the largest-account for
approximately 1 percent of progovernment unions.
The diversity of unions in the PRI's fold-workers
covered range from actors and musicians to bureau-
crats and teachers-gives some groups more political
weight than others. Because the Petroleum Workers'
Union can paralyze the economy by shutting down oil
production, it is probably the strongest union in the
country. The type of pressure it can bring to bear on
the government, however, is not duplicated elsewhere
in organized labor. Scholars are divided over the
power and influence of the CTM and the FSTSE.
Some, pointing to the FSTSE's contribution of more
successful party and bureaucratic leaders, give it the
edge. Stressing the concentration of CTM members in
the crucial manufacturing operation and the personal
influence of its leader, Fidel Velazquez, others be-
lieve-and we agree-that it is still the most impor-
tant union organization in the country.
Union Cooperation
Although official unions belong to the Congress of
Labor (CT), an umbrella organization aimed at coor-
dinating labor's views on political and economic
issues, they are not a monolithic group. The hierarchi-
cal structure of Mexican society tends to reinforce
vertical links and dilute development of horizontal
relationships. Sharp local, regional, and personal ri-
valries and intense competition for membership and
economic and political rewards divide state and re-
gional federations. According to academics, sympathy
strikes or protests are uncommon, and, despite the
absence of ideological cleavages, members provide
only lukewarm support for political candidates from
other unions. Even intraunion cooperation is frequent-
ly tenuous because federations are made up of guilds
(workers in the same profession), enterprise unions (all
workers in a particular plant), and mixed unions
(workers in various activities in a single municipality).
Moreover, industry-specific demands are difficult to
articulate because workers in single industries are
distributed among different regional and national
confederations. 25X1
Mexico City contributes to organizational diversity to
help ensure continued subordination to the state. As
potential counterweights to the large and powerful
CTM, small confederations, such as the CROM, are
kept active. The dynamic Government Employees'
Union, although represented in the Labor Congress, is
considered part of the PRI's popular sector and thus
competes with trade unions for government largess.
Because they are more difficult to control, both for
the government and confederation leaders, national
industrial unions are discouraged. Trade unions are
prohibited from joining ranks with rural organiza-
tions.
The fragmented organizational structure of pro-
government unions tends to limit their influence on
government policy to issues where a general labor
consensus exists. This structure also reduces the
chances of a serious challenge to the system. Reflect-
ing the narrow range of available options, labor
leaders focus most of their attention on timely eco-
nomic concerns rather than ideological matters.
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Internal Structure and Control Mechanism
The CTM as well as other national confederations-
paralleling the corporatist structure of the PRI-are
hierarchically ordered and relatively noncompetitive.
Leadership is based largely on personal loyalty, and,
in most cases, union elections are pro forma. There is
little circulation among labor leaders. Corruption is
endemic. The rank and file generally shy away from
actions not approved by their leaders, who, to encour-
age passivity, award loyal members with better paying
jobs, less dangerous assignments, or better shifts.
To maintain the long-established pattern of govern-
ment control, the governing elite has adopted a wide
variety of techniques to keep official unions in line. In
addition to encouraging structural divisions, a com-
prehensive federal labor code requires unions and
their leaders to register with the Secretariat of Labor.
Registrations can be denied and unregistered unions
lose the right to represent workers. Similar require-
ments are also used to void the election of leaders that
the government opposes. Because government-domi-
nated arbitration and conciliation boards~perating
at the state and federal level~ecide on the legality
of strikes and resolve most labor-management dis-
putes, Mexico City can use the decisions of labor
boards to its advantage. Additionally, government
threats to end access to government funds effectively
supplement the complex network of legalistic controls
because most unions raise few funds from member-
ship dues.
Because politics does not loom large in the eyes of the
rank and file, government control over labor is en-
hanced. Even though union leaders are politically
active, most workers do not perceive their participa-
tion in national politics as a means to alter govern-
ment policies. Rather, workers rely on union leaders
to watch out for their best interests.
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Appendix B
Nonestablishment Unions
Nonestablishment unions constitute-according to
US Embassy estimates-approximately 5 percent of
unionized labor. They control no essential industries
and, reflecting their limited membership, most have
local rather than regional or national bases. Neverthe-
less, the de la Madrid administration closely watches
them-especially those with leftist links. Failure to
control their wage settlements could encourage an
upward shift in salary levels and jeopardize both Fidel
Velazquez's ability to hold official labor in line and
the President's image as a leader. More importantly, a
growing independent union sector would, by offering
both political incumbents and the regime's opponents
new opportunities for the competitive mobilization of
political support, weaken the PRI's political domi-
nance.
Center-Right Unions
The National Federation of Independent Unions
(FNS[) is the largest nonestablishment organization;
it was founded the same year as the CTM-1936-
and is concentrated almost exclusively in the northern
industrial city of Monterrey. Because workers in
FNSI affiliates enjoy higher pay, more fringe bene-
fits, and better working conditions than workers in
other unions, the organization is decidedly nonmili-
tant and work stoppages rare. It is close to the CTM
in terms of its view on labor-management relations,
but competition for members often strains relations.
The FNSI has no formal ties with any political
organization. We believe efforts by employers in
Monterrey to maintain fringe benefits and save jobs
make labor unrest there unlikely.
Nonideological Unions
The Independent Workers Union (UOI), traditionally
more aggressive in defending its members' interests
and more inclined to strike in support of their de-
mands, is Mexico's most visible independent organiza-
tion. It is plagued by internal disunity, however;
workers in a Volkswagen plant recently left the
organization. It has made little progress in attracting
new adherents because the CTM adapted its strate-
gies to offset the UOI's appeal, and Lopez Portillo
took a more conservative orientation toward labor
than his predecessor. 25X1
There is little, moreover, in the UOI's performance in
recent years to suggest it is prepared or willing to
embark on a broad antigovernment campaign. Con-
centrated in high-paying jobs-primarily in auto as-
sembly plants around Mexico City-members are
reluctant to compromise their gains by associating
with opposition leftist parties. Indeed, their leader-
Juan Ortega Arenas-frequently takes potshots at the
PSUM and did not participate in aleftist-sponsored
national work stoppage during October. ~~ 25X1
Leftist-Dominated Unions
Leftist parties have made little headway among work-
ers, despite greater public exposure allowed by the
1977 electoral reforms and increased organizational
activity. US Embassy sources estimate less than 1
percent of organized labor is leftist dominated. Gov-
ernment hostility and leftist factiousness have restrict-
ed gains to Marxist pockets some large, most
small-in many unions. Communists control only two
unions outright. 25X1
The Communists' most notable unionizing success to
date has been among university workers and profes-
sors where they have managed to organize some 20
affiliates under an umbrella organization-the Single
National Union of University Workers (SUNTU).
Nevertheless, Mexico City prohibits SUNTU from
representing workers on a nationwide basis, thus
avoiding a large organization that could drive a wedge
between the PRI and official unions or provoke
campus unrest reminiscent of 1968. Individual affili-
ates of SUNTU, however-including the largest and
most prominent at the National Autonomous Univer-
sity of Mexico-are recognized as official bargaining
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units. Because of government hostility, infighting
among leaders, and competition from progovernment
unions, membership in SUNTU appears to have
reached a plateau. The government's hardline stance
in recent wage negotiations with the affiliate at the
National University has also hurt SUNTU's image.
Communists have also successfully organized workers
in Mexico's fledgling nuclear industry. Leaders of the
Single Union of Workers of the Nuclear Industry
(SUTIN), representing bureaucrats and a handful of
miners, hold low-level offices in the Unified Socialist
Party and are among the most vocal critics of auster-
ity. Because the government decided to close the
parastatal company employing most SUTIN mem-
bers when the union went out on strike this summer,
its future is cloudy.
Communists dominate dissident groups within several
progovernment unions. Those in the traditionally left-
ist-leaning National Syndicate of Educational Work-
ers are the largest and most vocal. Particularly in
southern Mexico, dissident demands for salary in-
creases and democratization of the union are fre-
quently punctuated by protest marches and work
stoppages. While the government has granted dissi-
dents several seats on the union's executive board to
head off more trouble, Mexico City has refused to
make major concessions or grant substantial wage
hikes. Communist pockets also exist in the railroad,
mining, and telephone unions, but none matches the
size or the level of activity of those in the teachers'
union. In addition, a small, loosely organized federa-
tion, the Authentic Labor Front (FAT), has close ties
with the Unified Socialists, but the Embassy reports
that its member affiliates control no factories.
Although the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Par-
ty (PRT) appears to be picking up its recruitment
efforts, no other leftist party comes close to matching
the Communist Party's inroads among labor. Leftist
efforts to channel worker discontent with austerity
into political support have foundered on the leftists'
internal disunity. Although leftist parties have held
several antigovernment demonstrations, the PSUM
and the PRT field competing front groups. In addi-
tion, the PRT appears to be concentrating its recruit-
ment efforts in areas of Communist strength-such as
the National University-rather than trying to chip
away at PRI strongholds.
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