(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Directorate of
Intelligence
Uruguay:
Rough Road Toward
Civilian Rule
,~ >iot ~t
Secret
Secret
ALA 83-10135
August 1983
Copy ~ ~ ~,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Uruguay:
Rough Road Toward
Civilian Rule
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10135
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
Uruguay:
Rough Road Toward
Civilian Rule
Key Judgments Return to civilian rule-the issue that captures by far the greatest national
!glormation available interest in Uruguay-is proving more difficult than any of the principals
as 4128 July 1983 expected. The Uruguayan military is committed to restoring the structure
was used in this report.
of a civilian government, but only if the armed forces are able to protect
their institutional interests. The military government has scheduled nation-
al elections for late next year, permitted internal party elections, and
initiated preliminary negotiations with the major political parties for a new
constitution. As civilian politicians have resisted attempts to give the
military greater constitutional political license, however, the armed forces
have begun to show increasing doubt about the wisdom of allowing the
transition to proceed. Increasingly, both sides have come to recognize they
are poised between resuming traditional civilian dominance or permanently
institutionalizing apolitical role for the military.
Critical public statements and a hardline negotiating stand in the constitu-
tional talks-which the government has twice suspended-are evidence of
the military's present state of mind. In our view, the armed forces may
make minor concessions but will not abandon their demand for an
irrevocable role in politics, at least on the important national security
issues, where they seek not only a permanent political advisory role but
greater latitude to pursue terrorists.
The political parties remain on the defensive. Although they can count on
general popular sentiment for a return to civilian rule, they have been
unable effectively to mobilize political support-from labor, students, or
the church-which could be used to press the military.
Continued military pressure on civilian party leaders, who need to appear
responsive to antimilitary constituencies, could easily result in further
interruptions in the constitutional talks. In July, the military announced
that should the parties not cooperate, it would write its own constitution
and proceed with elections in 1984. Both sides, however, have been careful
to leave the door open to continued dialogue
iii Secret
ALA 83-!0135
August /983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
We believe the military's tough stance will lead at least some political
party factions to plead that they must-however reluctantly~ompromise
or risk losing their role in reestablishing a functioning party government.
Major internal divisions within the parties-of which there is already some
evidence---could occur, and this may be one of the military's unstated
goals.
Even if the military miscalculates and, with its hard line, drives the parties
together rather than apart, we doubt the civilians would be able to summon
sufficient political muscle to force the military to back down, at least
during the remainder of the year. Political and labor networks have so
atrophied under military rule that we believe they could not be rejuvenated
any time soon.
President Alvarez, responsible for initiating the transition process as Army
commander in 1977, personifies the military's growing institutional misgiv-
ings and toughening stance. If civilian politicians refuse to cooperate in the
constitutional negotiations altogether, he may try to exploit the military's
doubts to perpetuate himself in office.
Should Uruguay, for whatever reason, fail to complete the transition to
civilian rule according to schedule, the United States would face a
substantially more difficult bilateral relationship. There would be in-
creased criticism of the United States from civilian sectors that would
attempt to spotlight the failures of quiet diplomacy on the presumption that
Washington could force its will on the military. Touchier relations with the
armed forces would center on human rights issues, which the politicians
would almost surely attempt to highlight in seeking wider international
support.
Secret iv
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1 _
The Road to Military Control
1 _
The Decision To Liberalize
2 _
The Military's Growing Ambivalence
2
General Factors in the Military Apprehension
3
Alvarez's Personal Ambition
4
The Bumpy Negotiations
5
The Civilian Dilemma
6
Ferreira and the Blancos
8
The Colorados
8
Outlook
9
Implications for the United States
10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
Uruguay:
Rough Road Toward
Civilian Rule
Of all the problems facing Uruguay, the return to
civilian rule is most important. Most politicians,
according to a variety of reporting, recognize that the
country is at a historical crossroads between reverting
to traditional 20th-century civilian dominance or per-
haps permanently institutionalizing apolitical role for
the military.
Other issues are not paramount. There is relatively
little conflict between civilians and the military over
financial policies, perhaps partly because of the
numbing effect of Uruguay's long-term economic
deterioration. Indeed, key economic issues already are
largely determined by a civilian technocracy, and a
transfer of governing power to a body of civilians the
military finds acceptable probably would not greatly
alter economic policy. Similarly, the broad outlines of
Uruguayan foreign policy are largely determined by
the balancing act the country must maintain between
two giant neighbors-Brazil and Argentina. Unlike
neighboring Argentina, human rights concerns are
not nearly so unsettling or spotlighted an issue.
After nearly 10 years of military rule, the Uruguayan
armed forces are engaged in a process of restoring
civilian government, with elections scheduled for
1984. Difficult negotiations that began in May be-
tween civilian politicians and the military over a new
constitution are critical: the military is seeking for-
mal, legal mechanisms that will give it license to
protect its interests following the transition.
Because the talks have broken down on a number of
occasions, and for a variety of other reasons, Uru-
guay's transition process may be the most problematic
of several now under way in South America. With the
Uruguayan process at midpoint, this paper evaluates
the relative strengths and strategies of the key play-
ers-the armed forces, President Alvarez, and the
civilian politicians. It also gauges the prospects for the
successful completion of the transition and draws
Uruguay was a rich, confident, and politically ad-
vanced country during the early decades of this
century and took great pride in being known as the
Switzerland of Latin America. It was especially
known for its progressive social welfare system and
commitment to democratic politics
Long-term deterioration began to settle in after
World War II, however. Export markets for such
primary products as wool gradually weakened, and
the pastoral sector began to decline. The economic
growth rate from 1945 to 1960 was, on average, a
negative 0.2 percent. Declining confidence levels re-
sulted in Uruguay's emigration rate climbing to the
highest in the world; the population was nearly stag-
nant.
The country's political institutions became increasing-
ly unwilling or unable to cope with changing circum-
stances, in particular a crippling rise in the cost of
living of over 4,000 percent in the decade of the
1960s. In effect, the country would no longer pay for
its crushing welfare system. Strikes and labor agita-
tion grew. By the early 1970s an urban guerrilla
organization called the Tupamaros had emerged,
whose early emphasis was on a major public relations
campaign that targeted the entrenched bureaucracy
and used stolen documents and informants to attempt
to show that the politicians had grown corrupt, inef-
fective, and unrepresentative. Its activities gradually
progressed from bank robberies, statedly for the bene-
fit of the poor, to kidnaping and murder designed to
overthrow the existing political system. To many, the
system seemed incapable of responding well on either
the public order or political fronts. At the same time,
a leftist political coalition began to challenge the
country's traditional two-party system
some implications for the United States.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
With conditions approaching chaos-police forces
were outmatched and many attorneys and judges
were subject to intimidation-the military stepped in.
The armed forces were convinced that prominent
politicians were guilty of corruption and hindering
effective prosecution of the war against the Tupa-
maros and so assumed power in a nearly bloodless
coup in 1973. Led by senior Army officers, the armed
forces dissolved Congress, suspended elections, and
banned all leftist organizations-including political
parties, front groups, and labor confederations. Al-
though the major parties-the traditionally rival Col-
orado and Blanco Parties-and the small, conserva-
tive Catholic Civic Union were not banned, their
activities were severely restricted and their principal
leaders proscribed.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, when the
armed forces were actively engaged in fighting the
guerrillas, their rationale for governing was relatively
strong and therefore grudgingly tolerated by most of
the population. The coup stood out, however, as a
historical anomaly-an act that violated a nearly
unbroken succession of democratic governments. By
the mid-1970s, after the terrorists' defeat, low-key but
pervasive civilian sentiment for restoring democratic
institutions began to build.
Even though the Army's hold on political power
remained virtually unchallenged, disagreement began
to emerge within the ranks over whether the military
should remain in power, according to US Embassy
reporting. Army Commander in Chief, Gen. Gregorio
Alvarez-now President-led those favoring a return
to democratic rule
In mid-1978 ultrarightwing elements of the Army
initiated a campaign against Alvarez that included
personal attacks, black propaganda, and, in its final
stages, the organization of hit squads to assassinate
Alvarez. Although units loyal to Alvarez ultimately
put down that immediate threat, the Army remained
polarized into rightwing and moderate camps well
into 1980 Partly
to resolve its internal conflict over the issue, and
partly to test popular support for its continued rule,
the government submitted a promilitary draft consti-
tution to a national plebiscite in November 1980.
The stinging rejection of the armed forces' proposals
at the polls by a 57-percent vote seriously weakened
the position of military hardliners and gave renewed
impetus to advocates of liberalization. Alvarez, as the
principal leader of the Army's moderate faction,
became Chief of State in September 1981 after
retiring from the armed forces. Officers who had
outspokenly opposed the transition were gradually
retired. Upon assuming the presidency, Alvarez gave
his personal commitment to adhere to a fixed time-
table for return to civilian rule.
Since then, the government has lifted proscriptions
against some prominent politicians, decreed laws lib-
eralizing political activity, encouraged the reactiva-
tion of traditional parties, conducted internal party
elections nationwide, and begun preliminary negotia-
tions with the parties over a new national constitution.
The Military's Growing Ambivalence
While the willingness of the armed forces to move as
far as they already have indicates a general desire to
go forward with the transition, institutional misgiv-
ings appear to have grown. Alvarez and the military
apparently initiated the transition expecting their
withdrawal to leave behind a significantly altered
political landscape with new and presumably more
cooperative politicians coming to the fore and with
little possibility of a return to the turmoil of the early
These expectations have been largely unrealized, how-
ever, as:
? Antimilitary candidates gained well over 60 percent
of the vote in both parties in last November's
elections of party leaders.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
The Uruguayan Democratic Convergence
The Uruguayan Democratic Convergence (CDUJ was
formally organized abroad in 1980 by Blanco Party
exile Juan Raul Ferreira from disparate elements of
the radical left, although it claims to be broadly
representative of the opposition
According to the US Embassy, Juan
Ferreira remarked privately that the organization
had received financial support from Nicaragua and
Cuba, and the organization has reportedly issued a
variety of declarations supporting Nicaragua, Cuba,
Grenada, and the Salvadoran guerrillas.
reforms. Juan Ferreira has stated publicly that his
organization supports economic centralization, na-
tionalization of the banking and foreign trade sectors,
and agrarian reform.
The CDU's potential for influence in the Blanco
Party-and therefore in national politics-is magni-
fied because Juan Raul Ferreira is the son 4f Blanco
leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, and the younger
Ferreira is thought to have considerable sway with
his father on political questions.
some CDU members hold
leadership positions in both the CDU and a principal
Blanco Party faction headed by the elder Ferreira.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Since its creation, the CDU has maintained an im-
placable hostility toward Uruguay's military govern-
ment and vigorously sought to undermine the regime
by attacking its human rights record. In addition, the
CDU appears to favor radical economic and social
? Old-line, proscribed politicians retain considerable
influence in both major parties.
? Conservative efforts to promote a promilitary presi-
dential candidate have suffered a series of reverses.
The military's growing doubts about the wisdom of
liberalization have been reflected in a variety of
public and private statements by Uruguayan Govern-
ment officials. For example, in April the Minister of
the Interior, an Army general, publicly warned that
antimilitary declarations by prominent politicians
could result in an interruption of the transition. This
was the first time a major figure had failed to soften
such a warning by also reiterating a continued overall
commitment to the transition.
of the radical left.
they are particularly concerned about the potential
influence of the Uruguayan Democratic Convergence
(CDU}-a radical leftist antimilitary group currently
associated with the Blanco majority faction. The 25X1
group, founded by the son of the Blancos' most
popular leader, is viewed by the military as a harbin-
ger of increased leftist inroads when a civilian govern-
ment takes power.
The military's fears appear based almost wholly on
worst case projections that would take years to play
out, in our estimation. The remnants of the Tupa-
maros are in exile and generally inactive. Leftist
political groups like the CDU are primarily active in
student and youth wing organizations, where more
General Factors in the Military Apprehension
In this climate of growing antimilitary sentiment, the
armed forces feel threatened by a possible resurgence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
radical solutions are traditionally embraced. Within
the population at large, the memory of the violence of
the 1970s and the military intervention seems likely to
act as a brake on extremist activities for some time.
Nonetheless, with the Tupamaro campaign so fresh in
the minds of most military men, many armed forces
officers are not content to leave the country's future
political direction entirely to chance and the guidance
of civilians
Institutionally, the Army, which carried the primary
leadership role of the anti-Tupamaro campaign, is
probably the service that is most uneasy with the
prospective return to democracy.
many officers who have en-
joyed the special advantages of governing-dual sala-
ries, index-linked pensions, and prestigious positions
as mayors or members of boards of state enterprises-
are less likely to be committed to relinquishing rule to
civilians. Younger officers-not involved in the war
against the terrorists-are more willing than some of
their senior commanders to return to the barracks.
Alvarez's Personal Ambition
President Alvarez's personal stance toward liberaliza-
tion appears to have mirrored attitudinal changes in
the military institution as a whole. Despite a ringing
endorsement of the transition at his inauguration in
1981, the political reverses since then-that is, the
rise of antimilitary sentiment in the parties and public
at large-have caused the President to be more
cautious in his public and private statements. For
example, although he reiterated his dedication to a
return to civilian government in a conversation with
the US Ambassador last April, he also stated that he
was determined to ensure that it did not produce a
government controlled by "enemies of democracy."
Gregorio Conrado Alvarez Armellino
Ambitious and nationalistic, President Gregorio Alvarez, 57, is a
pragmatic political moderate. Vehemently anti-Communist and
firm in his opposition to terrorism, he played a key role in
Uruguay's antisubversive campaign, utilizing his organizational
skills and persistence. Di/fcult to get close to, Alvarez does not
communicate easily and is q/ten blunt and abrupt in conversations.
He does, however, have considerable charm, which he can turn on
and oJJ'at will, and he has, on occasion, demonstrated aJlairjor
public relations. Some oJhis countrymen have described the
Beyond institutional interests, Alvarez appears to
harbor personal ambitions and has at least explored
several political alternatives. Last March he publicly
called fora "new political option"-evidently a party
to include the conservative minority factions of the
two major parties that would serve as a vehicle for his
own candidacy.
25X1 ~
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
Table 1
Negotiating Positions of Military and Civilian Leaders
Political role for the
armed forces
To be institutionalized through aconstitution- Armed forces participation acceptable in some
ally sanctioned advisory body, the National form, but only if authorized in regular (and
Security Council (COSENA), composed of hence, revocable) legislation, not in the
military and civilian representatives. constitution.
Lifting of proscriptions Christian Democrats and some individual All proscriptions to be lifted against parties
against parties and politicians from traditional parties may have and individuals.
civilian politicians their rights restored; many Socialist and Com-
munist Party members, and radical politicians
to remain banned.
Freedom of expression and Security forces must be free to act against Democratic freedoms to be constitutionally
freedom of assembly subversion by limiting individual rights- guaranteed, with subversion to be treated as
various controls proposed on elected officials an exception.
and politicians.
Authorization to suspend up to 15 days for Authorization to suspend no more than
accused terrorists. 48 hours.
Selection of general officers Candidates to be selected by the military, No stated position, but under previous consti-
subject to approval by the president and the lotion generals were selected directly by the
legislature. president, with the consent of the Senate.
(Some officers allege this created excessive
politicization of promotions.)
The Bumpy Negotiations
With renewed and widespread political activity in-
creasing the armed forces misgivings, the military has
responded by adopting an increasingly blunt and
confrontational style with civilian politicians. It has
served notice that, at a minimum, its prerogatives in
the antisubversion area must be constitutionally safe-
guarded. According to tatements
by high-ranking regime officials, the armed forces
will proceed with the transition only if the new
constitution includes:
? A provision granting the armed forces a permanent
institutional role in politics.
? Military license to suspend due process for a short
period if necessary to pursue terrorists.
? Guarantees that an investigation into the prosecu-
tion of the 1970s war against the Tupamaros will
not be undertaken.
These provisions would, of course, allow the military a
free hand to deal with a resurgence from the left.
To date, the constitutional talks-begun on 13 May-
have made little progress, and the military has created
a political climate reflective of its harder line. Since
the talks began, the military government has closed a
Blanco newspaper and has arrested a leader of a
ranchers' organization, some 25 allegedly Communist
youths, and a prominent Blanco politician-twice-
for criticizing the government. When Blanco leaders,
in response, indicated in June that they planned to
withdraw from the negotiations, the military preempt-
ed this move by suspending the talks briefly.
A second suspension in July resulted from the parties'
general frustration over the failure to narrow differ-
ences over how to deal with subversion. The civilian
negotiators know that the public is loath-as it dem-
onstrated in the 1980 plebiscite-to include in any
new constitution provisions that allow the armed
forces to deal with subversion at the expense of
individual liberties.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Table 2
Major Components and Factions of
Colorado and Blanco Parties
Subsequently, the government alarmed party leaders
by announcing that the armed forces would draft a
new constitution on their own if the political parties
would not participate in the constitutional negotia-
tions. The military further hardened its stance in
early August, when it announced severe temporary
restrictions on political activity, including censorship.
The US Embassy reports, however, that, while the
formal negotiations were suspended, the two sides had
been meeting privately in an attempt to get the talks
The civilian politicians have so far had little maneu-
vering room in the transition process, caught between
armed forces demands and their own dominant anti-
military constituencies. Moreover, the resources the
parties can call upon to pressure the military appear
limited. Student and labor groups, which a decade ago
were large and controlled by the left, are subdued and
less committed to open protest.' Despite an apprecia-
ble demonstration of labor strength at a May Day
rally this year, the Uruguayan labor movement is
hampered by the absence of right-to-strike laws and
the lack of protection for union organizers against
dismissal. Although somewhat more active than in
recent years, the movement remains politically insig-
nificant, according to US Embassy reporting. Neither
has the church become an effective political force,
either on its own or in conjunction with the political
parties.
Similarly, economic conditions are unlikely to boost
civilian fortunes significantly. Unlike neighboring
Argentina, the Uruguayan military-adroit enough to
' Indeed, one Communist-dominated labor confederation at its peak
in the late 1960s represented 250,000 workers, whereas the largest
recognized labor federation now active represents no more than
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
The Role of the Economy in the Transition Process
In the mid-1970s the military liberalized the econom-
ic and financial system, and these reforms helped
mute popular criticism of the military's rule by
paying handsome dividends during 1975-80.?
? Economic growth averaged 5 percent per year.
? Unemployment Jell to 6 percent, the lowest level in
years, by the end of the period.
? There were surpluses in international payments,
and exports were greatly divers~ed. By the end of
1980, official reserves had been built up to a level
equivalent to three months of import coverage.
The government's economic program was less suc-
cessful, however, in reducing strong inflationary pres-
sures; prices increased an average oJmore than SO
percent annually between 1976 and 1980.
Beginning in late 1981, economic performance deteri-
orated sharply. Adverse external economic conditions
and occasional domestic policy mistakes have con-
tributed to a protracted recession and serious exter-
nal payments difficulties. Domestic output fell 1 S
percent, unemployment mounted to 1S percent, irEfla-
tion remained near 40 percent, and wages fell 30
percent between late 1981 and early 1983. Mean-
while, as exports dropped off and cheap imports
flooded in, short-term borrowings doubled and re-
serve levels dropped by two-thirds. Uruguay s debt
servicing burden nearly tripled by early 1983 and the
country saw itse(florced to begin selling off gold
holdings to meet its external payments. To gain
essential debt relief; the government recently negoti-
ated with the IMF a $410 million standby arrange-
ment and with bankers a $1 billion refinancing
program
rely on competent technocrats-has a generally cred-
itable track record in the economic arena. The Uru-
guayan population has also exhibited a traditional
tolerance for declining living standards, and the eco-
nomic outlook, although troubled, is not dismal.
The comparative inability of the parties to mobilize
their forces, when measured against the potential
IMF-mandated austerity and a slow world economic
recovery will limit economic improvements in Uru-
guay over the period oJthe transition. Strict mone-
tary and fiscal targets are likely to depress both
domestic investment and consumption. The huge de-
valuation will likely increase inflation above last
year's 20 percent but will also give some boost to
exports. An export rebound along with a drop in the
cost of oil imports could wipe out most of the $800
million balance-ol-Payments d~cit recorded in 1982.
Nonetheless, according to the US Embassy, these
current debts and other~nancial constraints on
growth probably will not be overcome until a strong
world recovery boosts exports, particularly to neigh-
boring countries, and interest rates decline.
Barring a sudden economic downturn, however, we do
not expect economic problems to be a major factor in
the military's calculations relative to retaining power.
Although a peaceful May Day demonstration of some
20,000 was successfully organized, to date, the popu-
lation has remained generally passive toward the
deteriorating economic conditions. In part, this atti-
tude results from gradual accommodation to a broad,
secular economic decline made easier by the avail-
ability of a societal scifety valve in the form of
emigration. In the severe contraction of the last two
years, however, an additional explanation for this
passivity is the reluctance of politicians and the
public at large to corEfront the government too boldly
on economic issues-however severe-while the fate
of liberalization hangs in the balance.
25X1
25X1
readiness of the security forces to react to any chal-
lenge by civilian politicians, has meant in practice
that the costs to the military of their own intransi- 25X1
Bence in the talks, if not minimal, are at least
bearable
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Wilson Ferreira A[dunate
Wilson Ferreira, the 64-year-old exiled leader oJ'the Por la Patria
(PLP) faction of the Blanco Party, has long been a principal target
oJmilitary enmity. Ferreira has been described by both US
Embassy ojfcers and Uruguayan politicians as poised, charismat-
ic, and intelligent and as a brilliant orator. According to some
Ferreira and the Blancos
The most outspoken and stridently antimilitary party,
the Blanco Party, has been both dominated and
constrained in recent years by the single personality of
Wilson Ferreira Aldunate. Ferreira, who narrowly
failed to win the presidency in 1971, is characterized
by partisans as a progressive and nationalist.
is technically banned from participation in politics
and lives in exile, his longtime sway over the Blanco
Party heightens military fears of a return to the early
1970s. The military has recently reconfirmed its
profound distaste for Ferreira by taking the unusual
step of reissuing a warrant for his arrest, based on his
activities in the early 1970s, according to press and
Embassy reporting.
Ferreira's continued control over the party is not
guaranteed, however, despite the success of his faction
in the 1982 internal party elections. The Blanco Party
is deeply divided
and Ferreira's majority faction, the most
antimilitary of the principal factions in any recog-
nized party, is split over key issues. First, Ferreira
has been unwilling to renounce the radical left,
exemplified by the CDU, which his son heads. Sec-
ond, considering his historically antagonistic attitude
toward the armed forces, the degree to which Ferreira
is sincerely committed to resolving differences with
the military in order to achieve a democratic govern-
ment is being questioned by moderates. The US
Embassy has reported that, while moderate Blancos
respect Ferreira, they believe his continuing intransi-
gence, militancy, and personal political aspirations
could lead to a delay or even cancellation of the
transition process
The Colorados
Like their traditional Blanco rivals, the Colorados are
also dominated by antimilitary factions. They appear
to be less militant, however, and somewhat more
flexible in dealing with the military. Since their
convention last April, they have avoided strident
antimilitary rhetoric. In addition, we believe the
presence within the party of a sizable promilitary
faction led by a conservative former president, Jorge
Pacheco Areco, helps to moderate party policy.
Although the two major parties appear to be roughly
comparable in strength,Z the Colorado Party enjoys
greater unity. The moderate leadership of Julio San-
guinetti is accepted, according to US Embassy report-
ing, by all important factions. Colorado youth, unlike
their Blanco counterparts, are incorporated directly
into regular party factions and generally follow or-
ders. Radical leftists within the party are overshad-
owed by moderates and have little influence.
Based on the November 1982 party elections, the Blanco Party is
now slightly larger, probably because of support from members of
banned leftist parties who have no other legal party for which to
vote. If one or more of these parties-the Christian Democrats or
Socialists, for example-were allowed to reestablish itself, it
would undercut Blanco strength and possibly leave the Colorados
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
~ecre~
Julio Maria Sanguinetti
Julio Sanguinetti, 47, currently heads the principal faction of the
Colorado Party, the moderate Unidad y Reforms (the former List
ISJ. According to US Embassy oJfcials, he is a longtimefriend of
and political adviser to its proscribed and traditional leader, Jorge
Batlle. Sanguinetti became general secretary oJ'the Colorado Potty
in November /982-hisfrst elected party post-and has been
publisher of its weekly tabloid since 198/. Described by US
officials as highly intelligent, dynamic, and articulate, he is a
political moderate who has occasionally been critical of the United
Sratesfor not publicly supporting the needfor democratic elections
In our judgment, the transition will be difficult and
constitutional negotiations, assuming they proceed,
are likely to suffer periodic interruptions that will
reflect the continuing differences between the military
and the political parties. Since the negotiations began,
the armed forces have grown more confident and
tougher in their approach to the parties, and we
expect this general trend to continue. What consensus
President Alvarez has forged is centered on the
military's demands for a constitutionally sanctioned
role to contain and combat subversion. We believe the
armed forces, at least for the short term, will hold to a
substantial portion of their demands in the expecta-
tion that they hold the trump cards. Further, military
leaders probably recognize that their toughness has
most seriously affected their primary civilian nemesis,
Ferreira. Indeed, neutralizing him politically is their
likely interim tactical goal.
split into moderate and radical groups.
As the year progresses, we judge that even intermit-
tent military inflexibility will place increasing
pressure on the parties to make concessions. The
alternative to concessions-a threatened imposition of
a constitution by the military-is anathema to most
civilians. Some factions and leaders probably will
argue that they must, however reluctantly, compro-
mise or risk losing an opportunity to reestablish a
functioning party government by 1985. The internal
party debate alone may begin to diminish Ferreira's
importance and following.' We do not expect him to 25X1
compromise his views, and his faction could easily
Such an event could allow both camps more room for
flexibility. The military would be more likely to
stomach the risks of transition if a united Colorado
Party-traditionally closer to the armed services-
were facing a more divided Blanco bloc. The Colora-
dos would hope to cast themselves further in the mold
of pragmatic moderates, especially if they sense that
they could coax some concessions from the military.
The Blanco majority, if it broke with Ferreira, might
have little choice except to participate in the only
game in town.
We judge that even if, in their recent threat to impose
a constitution, the armed forces have overstepped
their mark and ultimately succeed only in driving the
parties together, the civilian leaders currently lack the
means seriously to confront the government. They
have been unable, as yet, to mobilize enough effective
support-through unions, student groups, the church,
or international opinion-to force the military signifi-
cantly to modify its stance. Even a united civilian
political sector would, in our opinion, be unlikely to
and openly attacked Ferreira, declaring that no one individual has
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
face down the military, even if it could maintain
cohesion for a period of months. Because Uruguayan
civilian structures have so atrophied under military
rule, we doubt the parties would be able, at least for
the balance of this year, to mobilize sufficient labor or
popular support in the streets to put the military on
the defensive
Such actions would instead increase the possibilities
that Alvarez would more aggressively seek extension
of his own mandate by one mechanism or another. His
intent in already testing military support for perpetu-
ating himself in office beyond 1985 may indicate that
he has belatedly realized the futility of his own
candidacy in an open election. Even an alliance of
promilitary factions united behind him would be
unlikely to outpoll the leading presidential contenders
of either major party, based on demonstrated
strengths in the November 1982 party elections and
the overall antimilitary sentiment reflected in the
1980 plebiscite. Thus, postponement of the timetable
or manipulation of the terms of the transition-such
as the imposition of the military's constitution-to
discourage full party participation in the national
elections appear to be the only viable options for
Alvarez to extend himself in officel
If no agreement has been reached with the political
parties by late 1984 over the armed forces' role in a
new civilian government, military commanders might
well be inclined to put off elections for several months
and make minor concessions in an effort to reach an
agreement. Senior officers would probably find this
course preferable to the more dramatic alternative of
imposing aconstitution-and perhaps agovern-
ment--0n the nation without popular consent. The
latter would risk jeopardizing military unity, which,
while not threatened by short-term measures to keep
civilians under control, could be eroded by an indefi-
nite postponement of liberalization.
If Uruguay fails to complete the transition to civilian
rule, we believe it would result in a more strained and
complicated bilateral relationship, with increased crit-
icism of the United States. Civilians, without suffi-
cient domestic political muscle to extract concessions
from the military, would seek wider and stronger
international backing. Because they view the United
States as having substantial leverage in the smaller
countries in the hemisphere, the advocates of civilian
rule would be increasingly tempted to hold Washing-
ton at least partly accountable for any transition
failure and could target the ineffectiveness of US
quiet diplomacy. Over the longer term, the situation
in Uruguay could be more conducive to activist and
radical elements in the parties gaining greater control,
thereby making relations with the United States more
difficult when civilian rule is eventually reestablished.
US relations with the Uruguayan military-which
had been strained during the late 1970s as a result of
differences over human rights issues-would also be '
likely to become more sensitive. Human rights issues
would almost certainly become more of a peg for
civilians in their efforts to focus attention on the
Uruguayan political process. Although US security
and economic interests in Uruguay are, in global
perspective, negligible, the situation would be a trou-
bling distraction in a region where the overall US
political stake is growing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/14 :CIA-RDP84S00897R000100020003-3