SPAIN-NATO: COMING TO GRIPS WITH MEMBERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
- ------------ --
Intelligence
Spain-NATO:
Coming to Grips
With Membership
t
EUR 84-10012
February 1984
323
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Spain-NATO:
Coming to Grips
With Membership
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of European Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean Branch,
EURA,
Secret
EUR 84-10012
February 1984
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Spain-NATO:
Coming to Grips
With Membership
Key Judgments We believe that Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has become convinced
Information available during his 13 months in power that Spain must remain in NATO.
as of 31 December 1983 Gonzalez will, we think, make good on his promise to consult the public on
was used in this report.
this issue-either through a referendum or through some less direct
means-before making any definitive commitment to the Alliance. This
consultation could take place as early as mid-1985.
Chances are slightly better than even, in our view, that Gonzalez will be
able to persuade his party and the Spanish public to agree with him on
NATO. The Socialist Party-though unenthusiastic about the Alliance-
is unlikely, we think, to balk if Gonzalez insists. Opinion polls show that
much of the public is now opposed to NATO membership, but they also
show that most Spaniards are not firmly wedded to their views. We suspect
the public would be receptive to a united effort by all the democratic
parties to publicize the benefits of NATO membership.
Lack of progress on at least one of two other issues-the bid by Spain to
join the European Community and its efforts to repatriate Gibraltar-
would pose the most serious threat to Gonzalez's attempts to win approval
for NATO membership. Of these, the EC question clearly carries the
greater weight. A delay in entry, tentatively set for 1986, could sour the
Spaniards' positive attitude toward the EC and would, we believe, subvert
efforts by the government to change popular opinion on NATO. In view of
recent statements by French and EC officials, we are moderately optimistic
that accession negotiations can be completed by the end of the year, but
problems within the Community could delay enlargement.
Even if the Spanish public sanctions continued membership in the Alliance,
full Spanish integration into NATO's military wing is unlikely before
1986. Clearing the membership hurdle will use up much of Gonzalez's
political capital, and, with parliamentary elections facing him in 1986-if
not sooner-the Prime Minister would be likely-once continued member-
ship is assured-to put the question of NATO integration aside for a time
and concentrate on issues that offer a better rate of political return.
Secret
EUR 84-10012
February 1984
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
necrer
Figure 1
Spain's Strategic Location
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
*MADRID
Spain
,(Gibraltar (U.K.)
Ceuta Melilla
'(~Sr^-:,Spain)
Madeira Islands
(Portugal)
Western
Sahara
France
Algeria
25X1'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Spain-NATO:
Coming to Grips
With Membership
Spain's continued participation in NATO remains a
major foreign policy preoccupation of the Socialist
government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. A
decision to pull out would have ramifications beyond
Spanish politics. Spanish withdrawal from NATO
would hand the Soviet Union a propaganda plum and
would be a sharp psychological blow at a time when
the Alliance is already strained by disputes over
defense spending, INF deployment, and continuing
tensions between Greece and Turkey. In wartime, the
unavailability to NATO commanders of Spanish
forces and facilities would complicate resupply mis-
sions and efforts to control strategic sea lanes off
Spain's coasts. In order to win broad support for his
election, Gonzalez campaigned in 1982 on a platform
of opposition to Spanish membership in NATO. Since
then, he has, we believe, concluded that the benefits of
remaining in the Alliance outweigh the costs. Now he
must convince the Spaniards, most of whom remain
chary of NATO membership.
It soon became apparent, however, that the new
government's position on NATO was far more com-
plex than the public statements indicated. By the end
of January 1983, Madrid had nearly finished hooking
up to NATO's integrated communications system,
had dispatched an officer to the NATO Defense
College, and had promised to participate in meetings
of NATO's Special Consultative and High Level
Groups in February. Despite the public freeze on
integration, Madrid showed every sign, according to
the US Embassy, of increasing its participation where
it was possible to do so quietly.
Gonzalez Changes his Mind. Signs that Gonzalez was
taking a more favorable view of NATO membership
began to appear last winter. Since then, Gonzalez has
confirmed his change of opinion in private conversa-
tions with European leaders and the former US
Ambassador to Spain. To date, Gonzalez has been
unwilling to take this position publicly, although in
recent statements he has come close:
After the Socialist Victory-
A Freeze and Quick Thaw
In December 1982, shortly after taking office, Prime
Minister Felipe Gonzalez established as a policy credo
the Socialists' election campaign charge that the
former government had not adequately consulted the
public before deciding to join NATO seven months
earlier. He froze Spanish integration into NATO's
military structure, saying that further integration
would depend upon receiving security guarantees
from the Allies for Spain's North African exclaves,
Ceuta and Melilla, and upon progress toward the
repatriation of Gibraltar and membership in the
European Community. Following the Prime Minis-
ter's lead, other ranking government officials stressed
publicly the need for a thorough study of the country's
defense requirements and for a referendum on NATO
before integration could resume. Spanish diplomats
suggested to their foreign counterparts that Madrid
might follow the French example on NATO.
? During a press conference in March, Gonzalez put
off the referendum promised during the election
campaign until some unspecified date, pointing to a
desire not to damage or weaken Western solidarity
at a time of serious East-West tension.
? When he visited West Germany in May, the Prime
Minister publicly supported NATO's INF decision
statement apparently took his ministers and party
by surprise-the Socialist government had previous-
ly ignored the INF issue-and may nearly have
caused the resignation of Foreign Minister Fernan-
do Moran, an outspoken opponent of NATO
participation.'
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Historical Perspective on Spain and Europe
the
Throughout much of recent history, Spain has not
been a significant international political force. Neu-
tral in two world wars, shunned by European democ-
racies for pro-Axis sympathies, and only grudgingly
accepted by the West in the later years of the Franco
government, Spain retains, in our view, a sense of
isolationism and separation from Europe. This lega-
cy is evident in the ambivalence of many Spaniards
toward the Alliance and the outright opposition of
most Spanish Socialists to NATO membership
Under Franco, the government argued that geography
and history made Spain a bridge to North Africa, the
Arab world, and Latin America. The view flourished
on both left and right that Spanish interests were best
served by an "independent "foreign policy. Limited
European receptivity to Spain forced Spanish atten-
tion inward, while concern for Spanish exclaves in
North Africa focused security interest southward,
away from Central Europe.
The later years of the Franco era saw heightened
Spanish interest in closer ties particularly commer-
cial relations-with Madrid's northern neighbors. In
1970 Spain signed a limited commercial agreement
with the EC, but only with Franco's death in 1975
was the way clear for a more vigorous "Europeaniza-
tion " of Spain. Spain applied for membership in the
EC in 1977, but Spanish concern about Western
defense lagged its interest in improved economic ties
with Western Europe. In 1981, convinced that full
participation in West European institutions was nec-
essary for both the consolidation of democracy and
Spain's defense, the Center Democratic Union govern-
ment of then Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo decided to
join NATO. Spain formally joined the Alliance in
May 1982 over strong Socialist opposition. During
the subsequent national election campaign, the So-
cialists argued that the public had been "insufficient-
ly consulted" on the decision and promised, if elect-
ed, to suspend military integration, pending a review
of Spanish defense requirements and a popular refer-
endum on NATO membership
Prime Minister had decided that eventually Spain
should integrate fully into the military structure of
NATO.
? In August the Prime Minister again confirmed his
changed attitude in private talks with US Ambassa-
dor Todman.
We believe Gonzalez's change of mind is rooted 25X1
largely in his longtime conviction that Spain, as a
Western nation, must establish the fullest possible ties
with Europe. Gonzalez's experience as Prime Minister 25X1
has, in our view, led him to see membership in NATO
as a part of the package. Three ancillary influences
have no doubt helped shape his views:
? Although-we have no evidence that any of the West
European nations have exerted strong political pres-
sure on Madrid to decide about NATO, the Allies
continue to stress the importance of Spain's mem-
bership.
? Gonzalez is publicly on record as favoring the
modernization of Spain's armed forces. We suspect
that his thinking on NATO has been influenced by
the belief that NATO membership could accelerate
the process of modernization. Embassy reporting
noted that Gonzalez did not agree with the general-
ly accepted view that membership in NATO will
necessarily turn the military's attention away from
domestic political affairs. As evidence, he pointed to
Greece and Turkey.
? King Juan Carlos meets weekly with the Prime
Minister, and their discussions focus largely on
substantive matters of government. We believe he
has subtly attempted to steer the Prime Minister in
the direction of remaining in NATO and toward
eventual military integration
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Origins of Spanish Opposition to NATO
The Military. Spain's political isolation bred in the
military an inward-looking perspective. The Spanish
armed forces traditionally have been more attuned to
internal security and the perceived threat from the
south than to any European threat. Through the end
of the Franco era, military officers were somewhat
indifferent to multilateral defense issues and forums;
some even viewed NATO as a potential political
threat to Spain's authoritarian form of government.
Since Franco's death, however, anti-NA TO sentiment
within the military has been undermined by ingrained
anti-Communism and a belief that membership
would speed military modernization. At the time of
the vote in the Cortes on NATO membership in
October 1981, senior military officers strongly and
publicly supported membership and hailed the gov-
ernment's decision as both a challenge and an oppor-
tunity to professionalize the armed forces.
The Public. Popular antipathy toward NATO has
been shaped both by the quasi-neutralist rhetoric of
the Franco regime and-since 1975-by the leftwing
parties. The Spanish view of NATO is an emotional
one, based more on fear and misperception than on
knowledge of the Alliance or understanding of inter-
national political and security factors. Polls taken
over the last few years suggest that over half the
population opposes Spanish membership. At the same
time, the polls also indicate that the public does not
feel strongly about the issue and considers itself ill
The Communists. Although the Communist Party is
not slavishly tied to the Soviet Union, it makes little
pretense of evenhandedness in foreign policy and
focuses its enmity squarely on the United States. The
Communists, who also protest the US bases in Spain,
argue that NATO is a US creation designed to
facilitate US domination of Europe. Such Commu-
nist rhetoric will increase as Spain moves toward the 25X1
referendum, and it may get a sympathetic hearing in
the nascent peace movement
The Socialists. There is among Socialists a strong
preference for an "autonomous"foreign policy that
sometimes smacks of neutralism. In contrast to the
Center Democratic Union's view that Spain's destiny
lies in close integration and alliance with Western
Europe, many Socialists argue that Spain's ties to
Latin America and the Arab world have an equal
claim on the country's attention. As opposition lead-
er, Gonzalez advocated an "active neutralist" stance
in which Spain would seek close economic ties to
Western Europe-eventually joining the European
Community-but would remain politically neutral
and outside NATO. Socialist criticism of the UCD
government's decision to join NATO emphasized that
NATO neither guaranteed the return of Gibraltar nor
ensured the security of Spain's North African ex-
claves in the event of war with Morocco.
informed on the subject
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
The Military. Change has also been evident in the
military's attitude toward NATO integration. As
recently as the late 1970s, there was skepticism
concerning the practical benefit of NATO participa-
tion and even a degree of military opposition to
NATO membership. According to defense attache
reporting, some officers, especially in the Army,
argued that NATO membership would do little to
bolster Spanish national security. In their view, the
real danger lay not in Central Europe and the pros-
pect of a Warsaw Pact attack, but in the threat of an
attack from North Africa. By contrast, during an
official review of Spanish defense policy in April
1983, senior Spanish military officers concluded that
Spain must be prepared to resist a direct attack from
Soviet-led forces.
According to the US defense attache, the military
hierarchy now has generally accepted association with
NATO. It has tended, however, to view the issue of
membership as a political question and has apparently
not pressured the government. Rather, the armed
forces is focusing on nuts-and-bolts military issues
associated with membership. Military leaders, for
example, have in recent months expressed satisfaction
with the flow of technical information from NATO,
and the Ministry of Defense has ordered Spanish
attendance at meetings where such information is
available. Moreover, the US defense attache has
reported an apparent increase over the past several
months in military-to-military contacts between Spain
and other NATO members for trainine and other
purposes.
Central to the change in the military's attitude toward
NATO were Franco's death and the subsequent flow-
ering of democracy in Spain. These two developments
freed the military from its vague fears that NATO
membership might challenge or compromise Spain's
political institutions and spawned a redefinition of the
military's role. Whereas under Franco the military
saw its job almost exclusively as protecting the regime
from internal subversion, now the way was open for
the military to find a role for itself more in keeping
with the West European norm
Not far into the process of defining a new mission,
Spain's military leaders concluded that the country's
armed forces would require fundamental reorganizing
and modernizing before they would be capable of
defending Spain from a serious foreign threat. Even
before joining NATO, the Spanish military had con-
tacts with US and West European military establish-
ments, and NATO standards and structures served as
a model for and influenced Spanish military thinking
about potential modernization of their own forces.
And there is little doubt in our minds that the shift in
military thinking about NATO was bolstered by the
hope that Spain would receive substantial moderniza-
tion assistance were Madrid to join NATO.
Favorable Signs in the Government. The military's
increasingly pro-NATO outlook is mirrored in a study
that was apparently prepared under the previous
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Figure 2. Foreign Minister Fernando Moran during press confer-
ence after his attendance for the first time at a NATO ministerial
meeting.
government but leaked to the press in June 1983 as
the findings of an interministerial group=comprising
senior officials from the Ministries of Defense and
Foreign Affairs-set up by Gonzalez to study Spain's
defense needs.' According to the press, the report
argues that neither neutrality nor bilateral assistance
pacts can fully meet the country's security require-
ments. It also concludes that membership in a multi-
national alliance would enhance national security and
yield significant technical and military assistance.
The press has noted that the study calls on the
government to begin educating the public about
' We speculate that Defense Ministry officials, most of whom
generally support the conclusions of the report, may have leaked it
either to garner public reaction before preparing the Ministry's own
report or to begin conditioning the public to accept pro-NATO
Figure 3. Alfonso Guerra. How
strong an opponent of NATO
Spain's defense needs. When queried about the press
report by US Embassy officials, government officials
denied that the study was done by the interministerial
group. The officials did not quarrel with the study's
thesis, however, leaving the impression that at least
some in the government agree with it.
Another indication of the growing acceptance in some
government circles of membership in NATO is the
level of official Spanish representation at NATO
meetings since December 1982. In early June Defense
Minister Narciso Serra attended for the first time a
meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Council.
While he-like Moran at the NATO Foreign Minis-
ters' meetings in December and June-declined to
sign the communique, the Spanish described his mere
presence as a significant step toward integration into
NATO's military structure. More importantly, after
the meeting Serra announced that Spain would par-
ticipate in future NATO exercises.
A House Divided?
The positive view of NATO is still not universal in the
government. Two key figures-Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Alfonso Guerra and Foreign Minister Moran-
continue to have reservations. Shortly after Gonza-
lez's statements in Bonn about INF, Guerra an-
nounced during a campaign swing through Cordoba
prior to the municipal elections in May that the
government would indeed hold the referendum and
that the Socialist Party would campaign for a "no"
vote. In early June at the congress of the Socialist
labor confederation, Guerra stated that the opposition
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
Secret
of most Spaniards to NATO almost guaranteed a
negative vote on the referendum. In late July he
publicly reiterated his disapproval of membership and
challenged those Socialists who disagreed with the
party's anti-NATO stance to make their views public.
This sparked debate in the press about a rift between
Guerra and Prime Minister Gonzalez.3
Guerra's statements contrast sharply with Gonzalez's
position, but how seriously the two men differ is
unclear. It is possible,
the two leaders were orchestrating their
public differences to maintain control of the left wing
of the party. Often in the past, Gonzalez has used
Guerra as a buffer and balance in dealing with
leftwing critics. When they have denounced the gov-
ernment as too moderate, Guerra has channeled their
complaints and publicly enunciated their views. We
believe that Gonzalez is counting on Guerra again
lining up behind him at the appropriate time-as he
has in similar situations in the past-perhaps bringing
the party with him.
For his part, Moran, as foreign minister, has had the
most to say publicly on NATO questions. Although he
stresses Spain's Western orientation, he has publicly
declared his intent to increase Spain's "margin of
autonomy" in foreign affairs and has questioned
whether membership in the Alliance will limit Spain's
ability to defend its vital interests-such as Gibraltar
and the exclaves. Shortly after taking office, Moran
expressed a preference for a "French solution" for
Spain-continued political ties with NATO but no
military integration. He has also suggested that
Spain's bilateral agreement with the United States
obviates any need for NATO membership. Moran is
not, in our opinion, the chief decisionmaker on NATO
matters; Gonzalez appears to hold that position. The
Embassy reports that Gonzalez chose Moran primari-
ly because of his expertise in matters concerning the
Mediterranean and North Africa.
On the surface, Guerra appears more firmly opposed
to membership than Moran, whose ideological opposi-
tion to NATO may be giving way to a practical
appreciation of the difficulties of achieving Spain's
international goals. Nevertheless, both men have pub-
licly noted that withdrawing from the Alliance could
damage other Spanish interests-such as progress on
EC integration and bilateral relations with the United
States. Such concerns, plus what we suspect is a desire
on the part of both men to stay in Gonzalez's good
graces, suggest to us that they probably will gradually
soften their opposition.
The Party
The Socialist Party is officially opposed to NATO
membership. As is the case with the government,
however, the party is in fact divided on the issue. In
our opinion, a small but influential group-including
Defense Minister Serra, Economics Minister Miguel
Boyer, and seven members of the party's executive
committee-believes it is in Spain's long-term interest
to be in NATO. Much of the rest of the party is, we
think, opposed to NATO membership, holding to the
traditional party tenet that military blocs perpetuate
international tension and still resenting the support
some Alliance members-principally the United
States-lent the Franco regime. According to the
Embassy, some of those opposed also fear that endors-
ing NATO membership could cost the party a second
term in office or force it into an unstable coalition.
Only a handful of those opposed are, in our view,
adamantly against participation in NATO under any
circumstances. Embassy and press reports suggest to
us that most of the rest, including seven members of
the executive committee-among them Education
and Science Minister Jose Maravall, Labor and So-
cial Security Minister Jose Almunia, and Culture
Minister Javier Solana-probably could accept a
decision to stay in NATO, particularly if the negotia-
tions on EC entry were moving along.
Public Opinion Problem
The concerns in the Socialist Party about the impact
of staying in NATO on the party's future electoral
chances have some basis in reality. Public opposition
to NATO has grown steadily since 1978 as the issue
has become more politicized (see inset). During the
same period, however, many of those polled have
admitted to the pollsters that their opinions are not
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
secret
Figure 4. "Neither NATO nor
Bases-Referendum Yes"
Slogan of anti-NA TO demon-
strongly held. This leads us to conclude that public
opinion on NATO could be reshaped by a concerted
campaign
The only group seeking to exploit existing anti-NATO
sentiment is the Spanish Communist Party. Accord-
ing to Embassy and press reports, the Communists
view NATO membership as an issue on which to
rebuild some of the support they lost in the last
election. Thus far, however, the party has had little
success. Public support for the Communists remains
small (less than 10 percent of the vote), and the largely
Communist-directed peace movement is tiny and inef-
fective. Both facts reflect the party's internal disarray.
The peace movement also suffers from the absence of
a sense of immediacy. Spain's geographic position and
history of isolation have kept it on the sidelines of the
arms control debate in Europe. Only recently has the
basing of nuclear arms in Europe been raised, and
only as a secondary issue. The movement also lacks
significant Socialist support. At its 'inception in 1978,
the peace movement appealed to many Socialists.
Since coming to power, however, the Socialist Party
has refused to participate in peace demonstrations,
and the movement has stopped growing. In our view,
without Socialist backing, neither the peace move-
ment nor the Communists will be able to play a
significant role in influencing public opinion on
NATO.
Key Issues
Holding far more potential than the Communists or
the peace movement for influencing the outcome of
the NATO debate are two other foreign policy issues:
Madrid's bid for membership in the European Com-
munity and the question of sovereignty over Gibraltar.
Both issues have become inextricably bound up in the
NATO equation. In the popular mind, staying in
NATO costs Spain more than it returns. Spain's
vulnerability in the event of an East-West conflict is
often cited in this regard. The tradeoff must come on
Gibraltar and the EC. Gonzalez's ability to move the
country on the NATO issue will hinge on manipulat-
ing the three variables in such a way as to convince
the Spanish public that Spain is getting about as
much on the three issues as it is giving.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
secret
The European Community. The negotiations for
Spanish EC membership have been arduous, and
Spain is pressing EC leaders to accelerate the pace of
preaccession discussions. Based on Embassy reporting
and public and private statements of EC members, we
believe the political will still exists within the EC to
find a way to bring Spain in. The Ten, however, have
become enmeshed in debates over future finances in
the Community and the reform of agricultural poli-
cies. Some EC members-France in particular-hold
that agreement on these issues must precede enlarge-
ment. Spain had hoped that the Community would
make progress on resolving its agricultural and budget
problems at its summit in Athens in December, but
there was no break in the deadlock over how to limit
runaway farm spending and relieve Britain's budget
burden. Although the members failed to issue a
communique, which might have contained some men-
tion of commitment to enlargement, the presidency's
paper did call for the completion of negotiations by 30
September 1984. Embassy reporting has suggested
that France will try to wrap up negotiations during its
six-month presidency of the EC, which ends in June.
We believe that France's EC partners probably con-
vinced Mitterrand in Athens that his concerns about
the impact of enlargement on French farmers could
best be dealt with through bilateral discussions with
Madrid. Bilateral discussions have already begun.
Gibraltar. The Socialists argued that the Calvo-Sotelo
government undermined Spain's negotiating position
by joining NATO before securing a formal guarantee
from Britain of an acceptable timetable for restoring
Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar. Immediately after
coming to power, the Socialists pointedly tied full
military integration into NATO to the recovery of
Gibraltar. By linking the two, Gonzalez apparently
hoped that other NATO members-primarily the
United States-would press Britain to return to the
negotiating table. Having failed in this, the govern-
ment has since muted public talk of linkage. The
notion, nonetheless, persists in the public mind and is
raised periodically by some government officials.
British Prime Minister Thatcher has said she will veto
Spain's bid for EC membership if the border between
Spain and Gibraltar remains closed. Spain refuses to
open it completely before Britain agrees to discuss all
Poll Results on Attitudes Toward
NATO Participation
Seven polls conducted between 1976 and 1983 show
that public opposition to Spanish membership has
grown from 17 to 56 percent, while clear support has
fallen from 40 to 17 percent and the number of
nonrespondents has fallen from 43 to 27 percent. We
believe that the 40 percent pro-NA TO figure in 1976
was an aberration, reflecting an almost impulsive
desire on the part of many Spaniards to reach out to
the West after the isolation of the Franco years. As
the post-Franco euphoria faded and other options for
establishing Spain's European credentials gained cur-
rency, NATO lost much of its appeal. Significantly,
77 percent of those questioned in March 1983 indicat-
ed they felt insufficiently informed on the issue (see
table 1). A poll published in Tiempo in June 1983
found that 49 percent of the respondents either
admitted or subsequently revealed ignorance about
NATO. Of those knowledgeable about NATO, 53
percent favored total withdrawal, 27 percent were
against military integration, and only 8 percent fa-
vored staying in the Alliance.
In an effort to break the current impasse, Moran and
British Foreign Secretary Howe agreed in September
to set up commissions of experts to study all problems
related to Gibraltar. The meetings are unlikely to
satisfy Madrid, but they may provide a means for the
Socialist government to reopen the border while ap-
pearing to be getting something in return.
Gonzalez's Strategy: Buying Time
Given the differences of opinion on the Alliance
within the government and the party and the degree
of anti-NATO sentiment in Spain, it is no accident, in
our view, that Gonzalez has avoided committing
himself publicly to a clearly pro-NATO line. We
believe he can have little doubt about the political
risks or the difficulty of trying to create a consensus in
favor of continued membership. Convincing the party
faithful that membership is the right course for Spain
is in some ways as great a challenge for Gonzalez as
the one he faced in 1979, when with great effort he
persuaded a reluctant Socialist Party to renounce
Marxism as its ideological foundation. The test of
issues, including sovereignty.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Table 1
Poll Results on Attitudes Toward NATO Participation
January
October
July
July
September
March
June
1976
1978
1979
1981
1982a
1983b
1983
28
20
13
13
17
Unfavorable
17
15
35
43
57
56
Did not know/no response
43
58
45
44
30
27
a A Spanish Gallup affiliate poll conducted in September 1982,
prior to the legislative election, found 58 percent of the population
opposed to any ties with NATO; only 15 percent of the respondents
supported full membership, and 15 percent supported "French
style" political association. Over a third of those questioned on the
subject had no opinion. Among Socialist voters, 68 percent favored
no ties to NATO. The results of this poll differed from those of the
government's poll. The one found that almost two-thirds of those
who voted for the Popular Alliance and Center Democratic Union
favored some ties, whereas the other found 38 percent "for" and 36
percent "opposed" in the AP, and 36 percent "against" and 22
percent "for" in the UCD.
Gonzalez's ability to produce another fundamental
shift in the party's orientation may come at the
Socialist congress next October.
Setting a Date. While he works out tactics to bring
the party and the rest of the country along, Gonzalez
will, in our view, continue to hide behind vague public
expressions of fealty to the Socialist Party's line on
NATO. Gonzalez first revealed this strategy during
his visit to Washington in June, when he announced
plans to hold the referendum on NATO membership
in late 1984 or early 1985. We believe the Prime
Minister stayed on the same tack in a subsequent
meeting in Madrid with Socialist members of parlia-
ment. Gonzalez held the meeting to inform the depu-
ties about the government's policies; they particularly
wanted to know if Spanish policy on NATO had
changed following Gonzalez's visit to Washington.
According to the press, Gonzalez said that the party
remained opposed to NATO and that he did not
foresee any developments that would force a revision
b Within the Socialist Party, by March 1983, opponents outnum-
bered advocates by 67 to 9 percent.
for educating the public.
of that position. Asked about rumors that the govern-
ment was planning an information campaign on
NATO before holding the referendum, Gonzalez said
the government would do little more than schedule the
referendum, letting the party assume responsibility
We believe that Gonzalez's Washington announce-
ment and his later statements were prompted by the
need to maintain the cohesion of the Socialist Party in
the short run. By setting a date for the referendum,
he, in our view, temporarily deflected criticism from
party leftists who were pressing for a date to consult
the public. He may also have drastically reduced his
options, however. Gonzalez has not repeated the date
he announced during his visit to Washington-in fact
he seems to have backed away from it recently. If the
referendum is held in 1985, Gonzalez has only a
relatively short time to achieve the successes in other
areas that might help him blunt or modify public
opposition to NATO.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Figure 5. Felipe Gonzalez.
Pondering NATO membership?
of how to pose the question. We believe the govern-
ment is still undecided about wordin .? In mid-April
1983 Moran
and Presidency Secretary Julio Feo-a close confi-
dant of Gonzalez-were responsible for drafting the
referendum and that they intended to present voters a
choice between partial or full NATO membership.
Guerra told reporters in July that the question would
be: "should Spain remain in or withdraw from the
Alliance," but his comments probably reflect his own
views rather than those of the government.
25X1
25X1
There is a slight possibility that Gonzalez could
postpone the referendum until after the legislative
election that must be held no later than October 1986.
Managing the political flak this would draw would,
we believe, be difficult but not impossible. Pressure to
hold the referendum comes mainly from the Commu-
nists and from the left wing of the Socialist Party.
Both groups want the government to clarify its stand
on the issue. Both groups would be very vocal about a
decision to postpone, but neither, in our view, could
bring enough pressure to bear to change Gonzalez's
mind.
Influencing the Outcome. Alternatively, Gonzalez
could, in our view, try to fulfill his campaign pledge to
hold a referendum on NATO by billing the legislative
election as a referendum on all his policies-staying
in NATO included. This might appeal to Gonzalez as
a way of deemphasizing the NATO issue. But it could
backfire and cost the Socialists votes. Moreover, if he
had not yet turned his party around, he could be
vulnerable to efforts by the Communists to drive a
wedge between him and the Socialist left wing.
Should Gonzalez decide to go ahead with a straight-
forward referendum, he would first face the problem
Regardless of the method he chooses, Gonzalez is
unlikely to consult the people on NATO before
conducting a campaign to educate a poorly informed
public. Indeed, we believe that Madrid already is
finding ways to influence. opinion from behind the
scenes. In late August the government-owned televi-
sion network broadcast a program on NATO and
Norway that pointed out the benefits of the "Allied
security umbrella" as well as the lower defense costs
derived from membership. El Pais, the widely read
independent, liberal newspaper, has in the last few
months presented some balanced discussions of the
pros and cons of NATO membership, stressing the
need for an objective approach to Spain's ties to the
Alliance. he
government may be behind these and other positive
articles about NATO
the government, through press secretary
Eduardo Sotillos, was encouraging publication of
articles that stress both the impossibility of neutralism
given the international situation and the isolation
`The referendum could be worded in such a way as to "legitimize"
a fait accompli. It might in effect ask voters if they want to risk
damaging Spain's interests and exacerbating international tensions
by choosing to leave the Alliance. The government could also
choose to bill NATO membership as just the military element of a
broader political and economic association with Europe. If the
government is not confident that it can avoid a vote that implies
opposition to Alliance membership, the referendum could give the
public only two options-retain the present status or militarily
integrate. Such a formulation, depending on the voters' wish, could
leave a future government-perhaps Socialist-with the problem of
figuring out how to overcome the restrictions such a vote places on
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
NATO entry
No
Figure 6. Carton mocking Felipe Gonzalez's
flip-flops on NATO.
Balancing the Equation
We believe that Gonzalez is determined to keep Spain
in the Alliance and probably will succeed in doing so.
He will, in our view, spend the next year or so laying
the groundwork for persuading the rest of the country
of the merits of this course. We believe that Gonzalez
will not seek public endorsement of NATO member-
ship until he thinks the odds are more in his favor. At
a minimum, in our view, Gonzalez will need some
visible progress on EC accession in order to push
ahead on NATO. In our opinion, Gonzalez would like
to have a date for accession set before the Socialist
congress. That is unlikely, and we believe he will
conclude that something less-perhaps completed ne-
gotiations on the agriculture dossier-is enough to
make his case for NATO. Since the Gibraltar issue is
more intractable, Gonzalez will, we believe, try to
finesse it, perhaps by arguing that NATO member-
ship offers the only possible way to resolve the
centuries-old problem.
If the EC talks stalled, Gonzalez, in our view, would
almost surely lack the political muscle to firm up
Spanish ties to NATO. His first reaction would, we
suspect, be to look-and probably find-some way to
buy more time before making good on his pledge to
consult the public on NATO. As time wore on with no
sign of progress on the EC, however, Gonzalez would
come under increasing pressure to withdraw Spain's
application for membership. In the unlikely event of
an outright collapse of talks on the EC, Gonzalez
might be forced-for reasons of political survival-to
take Spain out of the Alliance altogether.
In the coming months Gonzalez will almost certainly
cover his political bets on NATO carefully enough
that, if this worst case scenario came about, he would
not face any imminent political danger. His majority
in Parliament would still be strong, and he would no
doubt have worked assiduously enough with the mili-
tary officers as the situation deteriorated to keep the
military in his corner, consulting with key leaders on
alternative strategies for guaranteeing Spain's securi-
ty. No doubt high on this list would be a greater
emphasis on bilateral ties with Washington. Over the
longer term, however, Gonzalez would have to defend
the failure of his European policy in the next parlia-
mentary election.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
Secret
Even if Gonzalez persuades the Spanish public to say
"yes" sometime next year to continued association
with NATO, he would not be free of the NATO issue
altogether. Still unresolved would be the question of
military integration into the Alliance. Despite the
plaudits he could probably expect from NATO capi-
tals if he forged ahead, he might, we suspect, choose
to stand pat for a time. Turning the party and public
around on the issue of association will take consider-
able political capital. And we believe Gonzalez, who
will by next year be thinking seriously about his
campaign strategy for the 1986 election, might well
choose to turn his attention to issues that promise
greater political dividends. This could mean that the
integration question would not be settled until after
the election.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84S00895R000200090004-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Table 2
Attitudes of Key Leaders on Spanish Membership in NATO
Pre-1980 Echoes the Socialist line, op-
poses "bloc politics" and-until
1978-US bases in Spain. Ar-
gues that Spain should play a
role in Western defense, but not
in NATO. Believes bilateral de-
fense arrangements can better
meet Spanish security needs.
1981 At the time of then UCD a gov-
ernment decision to join
NATO, suggests that NATO
membership subordinates Euro-
pean interests to East-West
competition. Argues UCD nei-
ther sufficiently consulted pub-
lic nor used issue to recover
Gibraltar, advance Spanish in-
terests in EC, and ensure secu-
rity of exclaves. Promises a ref-
erendum on NATO if his party
wins 1982 elections and states
that his party will actively cam-
paign for negative vote on
NATO. Privately says will not
have to carry through if election
results in coalition government.
1982 Campaigns for legislative elec-
tion on opposition to NATO
membership. Upon accession to
power, promptly freezes mili-
tary integration pending refer-
endum, progress on EEC mem-
bership, and movement on
Gibraltar.
1983 Gradually moves toward recog-
nition that Spanish interests are
best served by membership;
publicly supports INF decision,
gives private assurances that
Spain will not pull out of Alli-
ance. Says national debate will
be structured to build popular
support for Spanish member-
ship; debate will focus more on
general question of membership
than on specific issue of mili-
tary integration.
Along with other Socialists
leaders, believes Spain is tied to
the West, but prefers an ill-
defined "third way" between
superpower blocs. Predisposed
to believe Spain will have great-
er independence and more lati-
tude internationally if it re-
mains out of NATO.
Architect and chief proponent
of Socialists' anti-NATO cam-
paign during parliamentary de-
bate on NATO accession.
Argues that the majority of
Spaniards disapprove of NATO
membership; strongly supports
referendum. Professes personal
view that Spain should leave the
Alliance, maintains Socialists
will campaign against NATO
prior to referendum, and chal-
lenges cabinet members who
feel differently to state their
views publicly. At the same
time, leaves open the possibility
that he may change his position.
Champion of independent
Spanish foreign policy. Sug-
gests Spanish membership in
NATO would upset existing
balance of forces in Europe,
curtail Spanish freedom to pur-
sue special role in Latin Ameri-
ca and Arab world, and would
not meet Spanish security
needs. Believes Spain-while
part of the West-should seek
autonomy within it.
Strong opponent of membership
during parliamentary debate;
argues that membership is nei-
ther necessary nor desirable.
Suggests freeze on integration
is needed to prepare Allies for
possible Spanish withdrawal.
Continues to argue that NATO
will reduce Spanish autonomy.
Says Spain is unequivocally
Western and will contribute to
Western defense but believes
this can be done outside
NATO. Argues Spanish public
wants to leave NATO and
strongly supports referendum.
In NATO councils suggests
Spain might adopt "French so-
lution." Also says bilateral
agreements cancel need for
multilateral defense arrange-
ments. Public statements also
suggest growing awareness of
possible damage to other Span-
ish interests if Spain withdraws.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Formerly mayor of Barcelona
and an important figure in re-
gional politics; no experience in
international security issues pri-
or to assuming present job. Ser-
ra's radical "bark" worse than
"bite"; as mayor, always friend-
ly to US military officers and
amenable to visits to Barcelona
by US Fifth Fleet. As Defense
Minister, remains generally re-
luctant to express public opin-
ion on NATO matters. He is,
however, a strong supporter of
NATO integration in govern-
ment councils and intends to
push for military exercises with
other NATO members.
Military Communist
Hierarchy Party
Evidence in offi- Consistent
cer corps of re- strong public
serve toward and opposition to
even some opposi- NATO and
tion to Alliance US bases in
membership; sen- Spain.
timents largely
based on Spanish
isolationist/neu-
tralist tradition.
By time of gov- Votes against
ernment decision UCD govern-
in 1981, military ment decision
notes benefits of to join
joining NATO, NATO.
including aid in
modernization of
Spanish forces.
Army less sure No change in
than Navy and strong opposi-
Air Force of tion to
benefits of NATO.
NATO, but ma-
jority support in-
tegration; remain
silent publicly,
believing the de-
cision is a politi-
cal one.
Military focusing Party pins
on nuts-and-bolts hope of recov-
issues associated ery on ex-
with membership ploiting anti-
and generally NATO
satisfied with in- sentiment of
tegration process. loose coalition
Pleased with flow of peace cam-
of technical in- paigners,
formation from ecologist
NATO. Increas- groups, and
ing contacts with activists of
other NATO mil- left-wing
itary services for parties.
training and oth-
er purposes.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/01 : CIA-RDP84SO0895R000200090004-6