NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES: PROPOSALS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
r~-~ rl Intelligence
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones:
Proposals and Prospects
Seeret
EUR 84-10003
January 1984
317
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Intelligence 25X1
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones:
Proposals and Prospects
This paper was prepared byl Office
25X1
of European Analysis, with contributions from
Office of African and Latin
25X1
American Analysis, and
Office of
Near East and South As
ian Analysis.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
25X1
directed to the Chief, European Issues Division,
EURA,
25X1
Secret
EUR 84-10003
January 1984
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 1 January 1984
was used in this report.
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones:
Proposals and Prospects F__] 25X1
weapons-related research.
Proposals for nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) have received increas-
ing attention during the past few years and may figure prominently in the
Conference for Disarmament in Europe (CDE) now under way in Stock-
holm. Nevertheless, discussions about such zones have produced more
smoke than fire. The only multilateral agreements on the subject now in
force apply to the seabed, outer space, and Latin America. Antinuclear
groups often hold up the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) as a model, but Brazil, Chile, and especially
Argentina have refused to implement the treaty and are pursuing nuclear-
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment.
The Soviet Union promotes the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free
zones as a way, we believe, of weakening the military capabilities of the
United States and its allies. The Soviets are also attempting to create
uncertainty in the West about the need for nuclear weapons, sow dissension
among Western countries, and encourage resistance in Western Europe to
appear increasingly susceptible to antinuclear arguments.
The obstacles to enforceable, multilateral NWFZs are formidable in every
populated area of the globe. It has proven almost impossible to reconcile
the competing interests of countries that possess nuclear weapons, of others
that are developing a nuclear capability, and of those that want to avoid the
pressures and dangers they perceive from the first two groups. While
multilateral NWFZs are not making much headway among the govern-
ments of the world, polls, press commentaries, and statements by some
politicians show a slow drift in public opinion in most developed countries
toward accepting the nuclear-free concept. Leftist parties in particular
being in office in both Australia and New Zealand.
We believe that the South Pacific is the area where NWFZ proponents
have the most chance of success over the next few years. At minimum,
however, creation of a South Pacific zone would require leftist parties
In Western Europe, where the NWFZ debate is intense, only a Nordic
zone is a possibility in the short term. The Socialist government in Greece
is openly advocating a Balkan zone, but it would be reluctant to alienate its
key NATO allies to the advantage of its archrival Turkey, which adamant-
ly opposes a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Balkans. The West German
iii Secret
EUR 84-10003
January 1984
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Social Democrats, now in opposition, are moving closer to formal support
for a Central European zone, but if they assumed power, they could only
endorse such a proposal at great risk to West Germany's NATO role.
We expect that during the next few years the longing for denuclearization
on the national level will complicate US initiatives in NATO. At a
minimum, such sentiments will make political establishments more reluc-
tant to accept defense measures that might stir up antinuclear sentiment.
Possible actions to reduce public anxiety about nuclear weapons, such as
restricting the movement of weapons, reducing the number of storage sites,
or denying port access to nuclear-armed ships, could hamper US military
operations in some areas.
At the maximum, the persistence of such views-coupled with an advent to
office of strong leftwing governments-could lead Norway and Denmark,
for example, to formally denuclearize their countries. The same would be
possible in the Netherlands, but only if the political balance shifted
drastically to the advantage of the Labor Party.
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Summary iii
Soviet Policy 1
Western Europe 2
Changes in Norwegian and Danish Attitudes 4
Central Europe 6
The Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone 8
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Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones:
Proposals and Prospects
Increases in superpower tensions and the strong media
spotlight on nuclear weapons in recent years have
stimulated a search for alternatives to the status quo
in strategic affairs. One of the ideas mentioned most
frequently by journalists, politicians, and strategists
intent on reducing nuclear dangers is the creation of
nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs). Although all
such proposals would prohibit nuclear weapons in a
particular area, other provisions vary considerably,
according to particular regional concerns. In many
Third World regions, for example, zone proposals are
designed to respond to concerns such as radioactive
fallout from testing, nuclear waste disposal, the possi-
bity of nuclear accidents, and nuclear proliferation.
The implications of these proposals for US interests
also vary according to geopolitical and military
factors. In Europe-where NATO's nuclear power
helps balance the Soviet Union's conventional power
and geographical advantage-the United States has
opposed suggestions for NWFZs. The United States
has also criticized a proposed zone in the South
Pacific because it would be a major constraint on US
naval forces. On the other hand, the United States has
supported the concept of a NWFZ in Latin America
(established in 1967 by the Treaty of Tlatelolco), and
has backed proposals for such a zone in the Middle
East.
for peace; to show independence from one of the
superpowers; to put a rival country in a bad light; or
to serve as a token that can be bartered away or
moderated if concerned countries will provide a de-
sired quid pro quo. This is not, of course, to underesti-
mate the domestic political dimensions of NWFZ
proposals, as these are often used to boost the fortunes
of parties or individuals.
Proposals for formal multilateral NWFZs are only
one aspect of the desire to be "nuclear free"; this
sentiment has also given rise to policies that exclude
or restrict the presence of nuclear weapons within
particular countries. Most, but not all, countries have
renounced (at least officially) the possibility of devel-
oping nuclear weapons of their own by adhering to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further-
more, national policies which prohibit deployment or
storage of nuclear weapons, ban visits by ships or
overflights by aircraft carrying such weapons, or
retain the right to approve such movements on a case-
by-case basis, form a confusing patchwork of restric-
tions worldwide.
Soviet Policy
The Soviets generally promote the establishment of
NWFZs in the West and the Third World. This
policy undoubtedly stems from Soviet belief that:
? Soviet sponsorship of such zones will be accepted by
some in the West as evidence of the USSR's
peaceful intentions.
Motivations of Non-Communist Countries
Politicians throughout the world have joined in the
clamor for NWFZs with different degrees of sincerity
and activism. In our judgment, only a few wholeheart-
edly share the reasoning of antinuclear activists and
have a personal commitment to creating such a zone.
Many governments have a more utilitarian view. For
them, advocacy of NWFZs may be used as an
instrument of foreign policy: to demonstrate a desire
? As the legitimacy of the NWFZ concept grows,
politicians and publics outside the Soviet sphere will
question the rationales of their countries' security
policies.
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Major NWFZ Proposals
Treaty ofTlatelolco (in force
since 1967)
Signed protocol with
reservations
Antarctic Treaty (in force since
1959)
Signatory
Seabed Treaty (in force
since 1972)
Outer Space Treaty (in force
since 1967)
Signatory
Central Europe
1957 (Rapacki
Plan)
Eastern Bloc; some leftist Swedish demarche (1982)
parties in Western Europe
Scandinavia
1963 (Kekonnen Finland, Sweden; Nordic
Sweden (1982)
Encourages action by
Plan)
leftist parties
Nordics
Balkans
1957
Romania, Bulgaria
Greece; Bulgaria (both current)
Cautious support
Middle East
1970s
Most Arab states
Annual UN resolutions
Cautious support
Africa
1970s
Many
Annual UN resolutions
Cautious support
South Asia
1970s
Pakistan
Annual UN resolutions
Cautious support
Indian Ocean
Early 1970s
Sri Lanka, many others
Under consideration in UN
Nominally in favor; private
reservations
New Zealand (no longer
supports); many island
nations
Australia (1983) in South Pacific Cautious support
Forum; UN consideration
? Discussion of such zones will sow dissension among
Western countries by raising doubts in the United
States about the reliability of its allies, and by
fostering resentment against the United States for
"forcing" nuclear weapons on its allies.
? They can ensure that their own military operations
are not handicapped by falsely claiming that Soviet
nuclear weapons are not present; we believe they
sometimes do this now with visiting warships which
in fact carry nuclear weapons.
Western Europe is the region where the debate over
nuclear-weapons-free zones has been most wide-
spread, and where the most vital US security interests
are at stake. The controversy has gone deep; public
opinion generally is against, the presence of nuclear
weapons, and in some cases even municipalities have
declared themselves nuclear free. Hundreds of cities
and towns in West Germany, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Belgium have passed some form
of antinuclear resolution. In most cases, however,
these were passed more as expressions of preference
than as serious legislation, and few politicians believe
that the resolutions can stand up against the overrid-
ing authority of the national government in security
affairs.
Although there is little possibility that peace move-
ment activists will be able to parlay the municipal
NWFZs into a de facto nuclearization of entire
NATO countries, the zones hinder indirectly the
governments' efforts to accommodate US military
needs. While local governments have no direct author-
ity, for example, over proposed transits of nuclear
weapons through their communities, strong protests
against such movements may in practice make the
central government reluctant to force the issue. Suits
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filed in local courts against nuclear weapons can also
pose awkward political problems. Seeking the path of
least resistance, governments at times are inclined to
ask the United States for modifications of NATO
procedures. In our judgment, field exercises for
NATO's newly deployed INF could raise such prob-
lems in the basing countries.
Public opinion surveys indicate that excluding nuclear
weapons is a popular idea among West Europeans,
with some qualifications. Recent polls in several
NATO countries show that more people view the
presence of nuclear weapons in their country as
unacceptable than accept them as necessary for deter-
rence. Moreover, when asked how they would vote if
there were a binding referendum to remove nuclear
weapons, large majorities in Italy and the Nether-
lands-and a plurality of 43 percent in West Germa-
ny-say they would vote yes. Another recent survey
covering some of the same countries indicates that
when the factor of Soviet conduct is introduced,
respondents tend to be more cautious, though substan-
tial antinuclear sentiment remains.
So far, government policy in most NATO countries
has not reflected the negativism shown in the polls
about nuclear weapons. Surveys generally do not
measure how deeply respondents feel about an issue;
in our view this is not lost on politicians, who some-
times judge that nuclear weapons issues, if handled
skillfully, need not become a major factor in voting
behavior. Nevertheless, we believe that the trend
among political leaders toward use of public opinion
polling, combined with the appearance of strong
"peace" groups playing on nuclear themes, probably
will make governments increasingly cautious on nu-
clear weapons issues.
Scandinavia
A proposal by Finland's President Kekkonen in 1963
is the cornerstone of the debate regarding a Nordic
zone, even though Soviet Premier Khrushchev had
proposed a denuclearized Scandinavia four years
earlier. The so-called Kekkonen Plan called for the
four Nordic countries-Finland, Sweden, Norway,
and Denmark-to formalize their nonnuclear status
and create a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Sweden re-
acted positively to the concept, but the idea met
Soviet Maneuvering in Scandinavia
Occasional tantalizing suggestions from the USSR
about a possible zone have led leftist parties to
perceive a Soviet flexibility on territorial coverage
and to criticize NATO governments for not pursuing
the issue. For example, President Brezhnev said
publicly in June 1981 that the Soviet Union did not
rule out consideration of measures applicable to its
territory in areas adjoining a Nordic zone. He also
stated that the USSR would be willing to pledge no
first use of nuclear weapons against the Nordic
countries.
Peninsula or include the Baltic in a NWFZ.
The deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee
told a Norwegian minister in July 1981 that the
USSR was ready to negotiate anywhere and any time
about a zone. The Soviet campaign lost much of its
momentum, however, when the Soviet press agency
Novosti disseminated an article that was picked up
by the Western press stating that the Soviets were not 25X1
prepared to withdraw nuclear weapons from the Kola
In 1983, however, Soviet efforts again intensified.
The first hint came in March when a Soviet general
told a Swedish television audience that the USSR
might be willing to withdraw six GOLF-class subma-
rines from the Baltic. Then in June, Andropov person-
ally stirred the pot, saying publicly that he was
willing to discuss inclusion of the Baltic and did not
rule out measures affecting Soviet territory. Finally,
the deputy head of the CPSU International Depart-
ment said in an interview last month that the USSR
was prepared to withdraw all its submarines equipped
with nuclear weapons from the Baltic. Given this
record, the Soviets or their surrogates seem likely to
introduce the idea of a Nordic zone at the CDE in
Stockholm.
opposition throughout the 1960s and 1970s from both
center-left and center-right governments in Norway
and Denmark. Although these two Nordic NATO
allies in 1957 established a policy of :not allowing
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nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, in our
analysis governments were concerned that foreclosing
NATO's nuclear option completely would cause fric-
tions with the other Allies and undermine nuclear
deterrence.
Changes in Norwegian and Danish Attitudes. The
Nordic NWFZ idea languished until the early 1980s
when, nourished by concerns about the arms race as
well as by Soviet propaganda, it took root in the fertile
soil of the Norwegian Labor Party. Labor Party
Prime Minister Odvar Nordli and other officials in
1980-81 suggested several approaches to the zone
idea. This stimulated interest among the Laborites'
counterparts in Denmark, the Social Democrats, who
were also in power. Over the past three years, leaders
of both parties have pursued the concept sporadically
while making public statements that have left crucial
points unclear:
? Is inclusion of the Baltic Sea and Soviet territory in
the Kola Peninsula adjoining Scandinavia consid-
ered a sine qua non for a Nordic zone?
? If the four Scandinavian countries alone comprise
the zone, would the Soviet Union have to agree to
remove nuclear weapons targeted on Scandinavia
from Kola and the Baltic? Or would Moscow simply
have to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against
the Nordics?
? Is a Nordic zone considered possible only in the
context of a broader East-West disarmament agree-
ment, and if so what would be the content and
timing of the agreement?
Despite the efforts of the political left, the election of
center-right governments in Norway and Denmark
has cooled the NWFZ debate. Norway's Prime
Minister Willoch privately told other Nordic prime
ministers last July that his government considered the
Nordic zone idea a dead letter; publicly the govern-
ment takes the position that a zone could only come
about as part of a comprehensive arms control agree-
ment between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The
Danish Government's current position, defined in a
parliamentary resolution it reluctantly supported in
February 1983, is to back "realistic efforts" aimed at
establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones including
In our judgment, the main objections of these govern-
ments to Nordic zone proposals is that they create
friction with other Allies and call into question their
dedication to NATO. If, however, Norway and Den-
mark could enact a permanent ban on nuclear weap-
ons while still benefiting from the NATO nuclear
umbrella-and without having to face heavy criticism
from their allies-we believe even these center-right
governments would accept a NWFZ. Public state-
ments by some officials in the foreign ministries lead
us to suspect that they see a slight possibility of this
happening if a Nordic zone could become part of a
package deal on the European nuclear balance be-
tween the United States and the USSR.
Finnish and Swedish Attitudes. Currently the main
impetus from the Western side toward a Nordic zone
comes from the neutrals, Finland and Sweden, which
have traditionally sought to minimize East-West ten-
sions in the region. The Finns, who have long been
concerned about Soviet pressures against their auton-
omy, have never really stopped promoting variations
of the one-sided Kekkonen Plan. Since NATO's INF
decision in 1979, they have pressed particuarly hard
for adoption of its basic premise-a "nuclear free"
declaration by the Nordics after negotiations among
themselves. According to the US Embassy in Helsin-
ki, the Finns view a nuclear-weapons-free zone as a
way of consolidating their legal position to resist
possible pressure from the Soviets to allow weapons
systems on Finnish soil.
The Swedish Government has been even more active
in pursuit of a Nordic zone during the past year,
although official statements have varied with differ-
ent audiences:
? Prime Minister Olof Palme told the North Atlantic
Assembly last June that a zone could be created in
return for a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use
nuclear weapons targeted against Scandinavia from
the immediate vicinity (presumably Kola). He also
mentioned vaguely that there should be "undertak-
ings" regarding the Baltic, to be negotiated in detail
later.
Eastern as well as Western territory.
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? Nebulous though these conditions were, Palme ne-
glected to mention them the same month when he
told a Finnish audience that the four Nordic coun-
tries could create a zone.
? Last November, Swedish Foreign Minister Bod-
strom said in a speech that a zone could be created
by a declaration of the four Nordic countries,
accompanied by pledges from outside powers not to
use nuclear weapons against them.
? In late December, however, Bodstrom specified that
there would have to be a denuclearization arrange-
ment for the Baltic, and a reduction of weapons
directed against Scandinavia from adjacent areas.
Although the Swedish Government's last pronounce-
ment appears to require greater concessions from the
Soviets, its track record suggests that these stipula-
tions may not survive over the long run. Swedish
officials have also said in recent months that their
government would not introduce NWFZ proposals at
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in
Stockholm because the Nordics were not agreed
among themselves. We believe, however, that if the
idea were broached by the Soviets or others at the
conference, Sweden would support it.
The Balkans
Although proposals for a Balkan nuclear-weapons-
free zone date back to 1957, Greece in 1981 became
the first Western country in the region to advocate a
Balkan zone. The socialist Papandreou government
almost immediately after coming to power suggested
a summit conference of leaders from Greece, Turkey,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania to dis-
cuss the idea of a zone. Conflicting attitudes about a
Balkan zone among the various countries precluded
agreement even on an agenda for such a high-level
meeting, so in the spring of 1983 the Papandreou
government shifted gears and sent letters to other
Balkan governments proposing an experts' meeting in
January 1984 to help pave the way for a summit.'
' Bulgaria almost immediately accepted the invitation to a meeting
in Athens. Albania, however, has refused in accordance with its
longstanding rejection of multilateral negotiating forums other than
the UN. Yugoslavia and Romania have accepted conditionally,
insisting on a broader agenda for the meeting. Turkey's response to
the invitation explicitly noted its opposition to the idea of a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in the Balkans, but seemed to accept the idea of
Chronology of Balkan NWFZ Activity
Romania proposes a Balkan zone.
USSR backs Romanian proposal,
seeking to discourage Greece from
accepting nuclear weapons.
USSR proposes NWFZ for Balkans
and part of Mediterranean.
Bulgaria proposes Balkan summit to
discuss zone; USSR supports the
proposal.
Romania again proposes Balkan
zone.
Greece proposes Balkan summit
(later changed to experts meeting) to
discuss zone.
Experts meeting scheduled for Janu-
ary in Athens.
After suggesting the meeting, Papandreou used the
attention he received from the media to publicize the -
NWFZ idea, most recently in talks with Romanian
President Ceaucescu in December.
Preparations for the experts' meeting in Athens ap-
pear to be on schedule, but disagreements between
Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and other issues
could still lead to its cancellation. Even if the meeting
does occur, Turkish and Yugoslav opposition to for-
mal negotiation on a zone, coupled with the absence
of Albania, probably will bring the initiative to a
standstill.
Nevertheless, the idea of a zone in the Balkans will
continue to be raised by the Soviets and their allies.
We believe that Bulgaria, for example, may propose
such a zone at the CDE in Stockholm. For the near
term, the Balkan zone idea fits Soviet objectives: it
provides them with a "carrot" that is a natural
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Despite the international obstacles to discussing-
much less agreeing on-a Balkan zone, Greece proba-
bly will continue to beat the drum for the idea. The
nuclear-weapons-free zone concept has deep roots in
Socialist thinking, and we believe it appeals to Prime
Minister Papandreou as a long-range goal. In his
handling of the issue, however, Papandreou seems to
be focusing mainly on the immediate political advan-
tages. A Socialist Party official noted last July, for
example, that the government was using the Balkan
zone issue to fend off attacks from the Greek Com-
munists. Advocacy of a zone allows Papandreou to
demonstrate that he is "struggling for peace" and
deflects criticism he receives for having signed an
agreement allowing US bases to remain in Greece.
Since coming to power, we believe Papandreou' has
come to appreciate that exclusion of US bases would
damage seriously Greece's relations with the United
States and NATO and substantially aid Turkey in
the bilateral competition for influence in the eastern
Mediterranean. For the same reasons, the Greek
Government is unlikely to follow through on earlier
statements that it would force removal of US nuclear
weapons from Greek soil, unless Turkey and Bulgar-
ia also exclude such weapons.
complement to one of their current "sticks"-the
threat to deploy nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe as
a "response" to INF deployment.
Central Europe
The issue of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central
Europe can be traced back to the Rapacki Plan of
1957,2 but there was a long hiatus in serious diplomat-
ic activity until recently. Active consideration of a
Central European zone was revived by the publication
in 1982 of a report by the Independent Commission
on Disarmament and Security Issues, a group of
'The Rapacki Plan, proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister in
1957, called for a ban on the production and deployment of nuclear
weapons in Poland and the two Germanys. Subsequently, East
Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed to be part of such a zone, and
the USSR lent its public support. Later versions of the plan called
for guarantees by the nuclear powers that they would not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries in the zone.
politicians and arms control experts from 17 coun-
tries. The group, popularly known as the Palme
Commission after its chairman, produced a global
"blueprint for survival" that included a proposal for a
limited Central European zone. The Commission rea-
soned that the removal of short-range "battlefield"
nuclear weapons in areas close to the East-West
dividing line in Central Europe would reduce the
pressures for nuclear escalation in the event of war.
As an illustration, the Commission suggested a zone
300 km wide (150 km on each side of the line)
encompassing parts of West Germany, East Germa-
ny, and Czechoslovakia. When Palme returned as
Sweden's Prime Minister in 1982, his government
sent a note to the United States, the USSR, and
European governments stating that Sweden supported
the 300-km idea and soliciting their views.
The Soviet Union last January issued a statement
ostensibly approving the Commission's idea for a
Central European nuclear-weapons-free zone but try-
ing to turn the proposal to greater advantage by
suggesting that the zone be 500 to 600 km wide. If
accepted, this would have encompassed virtually all
German territory, accomplishing the longstanding
Soviet goal of denuclearizing West Germany. Except
for Greece, the NATO allies sent negative responses
to Stockholm, thus foreclosing any possibility of suc-
cess for the idea. Most argued that such a zone would
disrupt existing security arrangements and undermine
deterrence while not affecting the status of the area as
a nuclear target or precluding reintroduction of nu-
clear weapons during periods of tension. We believe,
however, that these reactions probably will not pre-
vent Sweden from supporting consideration of a Cen-
tral European zone at future security conferences.
In the NATO countries, support for a Central Euro-
pean zone has been limited mainly to leftist opposition
parties, most prominently the Social Democrats in
West Germany. Some state-level Social Democratic
organizations have endorsed the proposal for a
300-km zone, and a party working group on security
issues has produced a draft report recommending
negotiations for such a zone as a first step toward
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Proposed Central Europe Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
RUSSELS* "'
Belgium
PARIS
France
0 100 200
Kilometers
Luxembourg
*VJXEMBOURG
Denfnar
*GOPENHAEN Baltic Sea
Tha United St tea Gnn,,nmant has not ,uogniaed
the incorporation It Estonia, Latvia. and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Oth,, hounda,yr,p,eeentation
is not necs,sen.ly authoritative.
b
Ir r
Soviet
Union
7
t
l
Berlin,,
}
East
*BAeSt ) Germany
Germany T'\
removing all nuclear weapons from Europe. More-
over, party Chairman Willy Brandt went so far as to
state publicly in December that he might support a
nuclear-weapons-free zone for all of Europe.
While agreement on such zones remains difficult, talk
among experts, politicians, and the press about mak-
ing countries nuclear free has helped create political
pressures on governments. Leaders have generally
handled such pressure through conciliatory gestures,
at times conceding that denuclearization may be
possible in the long run, or casting about for ways to
reduce NATO's current reliance on nuclear weapons.
Hints by allied leaders about a "pause" in US INF
deployments after the first group of missiles is in-
stalled may be in part a response to such pressures.
Poland
*PRAGUE v
Czechoslovakia
VIENNA*
BUDAPEST
Hungary
The Swedish proposal highlights a disturbing tenden-
cy of many NWFZ proposals aimed at Europe: it
ignores caveats that had been included in the Palme
Commission's plan by its authors. The report of the
Palme Commission had said that the Central Europe-
an scheme would be implemented in the context of an
agreement on parity and mutual force reductions in
Central Europe (that is, an MBFR agreement). Stock-
holm's note to other countries-though purporting to
be an endorsement of the Commission report-stated
that the zone "could promote or be linked to" an
MBFR agreement. In the first case, the implication is
clear that a Central European zone would have to
wait on an East-West accord on conventional force
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This treaty, now in effect for 22 nations, is an attempt
to combine well-defined obligations with an efficient
enforcement system. Parties to the treaty agree to
prohibit and to prevent the manufacture, testing, use,
storage, deployment, or possession of nuclear weap-
ons in their own territories. These obligations are to
be verified both by regular safeguard inspections,
conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy, and by an organization established by the treaty
known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).
Under a so-called challenge inspection system, a
member nation which suspects that a prohibited
activity has occurred or is about to occur within the
zone, can require OPANAL to conduct a special
investigation. Any report resulting from such an
inspection will be transmitted to the contracting
parties, the UN General Assembly and Security
Council, and the Organization of American States.
To date, no party to the treaty has requested a special
investigation.
An additional protocol to the treaty calls on outside
states that control territories in the zone to extend
nuclear-weapons-free status to those territories. This
protocol has been ratified by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands; France has
signed but not ratified it. A second protocol consists
of a pledge by countries possessing nuclear weapons
to respect the status of countries in the zone, and not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
parties to the treaty.
levels; in the second, a zone could clearly come first.
Implementation of a zone in that way could be
extremely detrimental to US interests because it
would hamstring NATO nuclear capability while
leaving in place the Warsaw Pact's conventional
superiority.
The Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
The example of a working nuclear-weapons-free zone
cited most often by proponents of such arrangements
is the Latin American zone created by the Treaty of
Tlatelolco in 1967. The United States and many other
governments have pointed out the usefulness of this
initial zone agreement in working toward other zones
in areas like the Middle East. The treaty demon-
strates the possibility of multinational cooperation on
nuclear weapons issues even in heavily populated and
politically developed regions, but it also illustrates
potential weak spots in such international regimes.
Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco remains a consider-
able diplomatic achievement, in the end it may not
succeed in keeping Latin America free of nuclear
weapons. The main challenges come from Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, which have signed the treaty but
rejected its implementation. Although these countries
have stated officially that they do not intend to
develop nuclear weapons, Argentina and Brazil refuse
to accept full-scope safeguards over their nuclear
facilities.
Argentina is in the most advanced stage of nuclear
development and probably will have the capability to
produce a nuclear weapon by the late 1980s or
possibly earlier. Brazil is conducting sensitive nuclear
research that may be weapons related, but we believe
it is not likely to be able to develop nuclear weapons
before the mid-1990s unless it decides to pursue a
crash program to catch up with Argentina. Chile
actively pursued wide-ranging nuclear research dur-
ing the early 1970s, but government support declined
with the advent of the Pinochet regime in 1973; the
program is only now being revitalized. In our opinion,
a nuclear explosives capability probably will remain
out of Santiago's reach for at least 10 to 15 years.
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Brazil, which in 1962 was the first Latin American
country to propose a nuclear-weapons-free zone, has
since signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It
has attached several conditions, however:
? All nations that are eligible to ratify Tlatelolco or its
protocols, including Cuba, must do so.
? No nation may violate its provisions.
? Explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes
must be permitted.
Argentina, which has signed the treaty but not rati-
fied it, has also insisted on these conditions before
ratification can take place. Moreover, Buenos Aires
has also stipulated that current disagreements over
nuclear safeguards must first be resolved with the
IAEA and the United States. Argentina participates
in OPANAL, however, and at the 1983 OPANAL
session obtained passage of a resolution condemning
the British for violating the treaty by using nuclear
submarines in the 1982 Falklands war. Chile has
signed and ratified the treaty but insists on full
ratification by all other signatories-a condition obvi-
ously aimed at Argentina-before it will implement
the treaty.
Cuba remains unlikely to sign Tlatelolco, given its
insistence on several conditions-including a US
evacuation of Guantanamo-but, in our analysis, it
has no near-term prospects of becoming a nuclear
weapons state. The only other holdouts in the zone are
Guyana and the Caribbean islands of Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, none of which
has a nuclear development program.
Although there has been considerable discussion in
international forums about a nuclear-weapons-free
zone in the Middle East, we believe the major coun-
tries in the region view the concept more as a
diplomatic gambit than as a serious disarmament
proposal. The Arab states have tried to use the
proposal to help achieve the nuclear disarmament of
Israel, but their continuing unwillingness as a group
to enter into direct talks with Tel Aviv or to express
any other form of recognition has precluded a real
diplomatic offensive. Israel has preferred to maintain
its putative nuclear monopoly in the region as one
element in a strategy designed to deter Arab attack
and force the Arab states into direct talks on peace
issues.
Egypt and Iran first introduced the concept of a
Middle Eastern zone in a resolution adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1974. The resolution called
on all states in the region to adhere to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and commended the idea of
establishing a zone. Every regular session of the
General Assembly since then has adopted a similar
resolution. Israel opposed the resolutions during the
1970s but has voted for them since 1980.
No government inside or outside the region has given
serious attention to the nuclear-weapons-free zone
idea since Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
in 1981. Many Arab governments have concentrated
on condemning Israel's action. The Israelis, on the
other hand, have continued to use the zone concept in
a pro forma way as a means of pressuring their
neighbors to negotiate directly with them and thus
accord them implicit recognition.
In our judgment, major obstacles still block the path
toward a Middle Eastern zone:
? Israel and the Arab states have no diplomatic
relations, and several Arab states still oppose Isra-
el's right to exist. There clearly is no consensus
about how to ensure their mutual security.
? The Arab states undoubtedly believe a NWFZ
would put them at a disadvantage. Public state-
ments by officials indicate that they assume Israel
already has nuclear weapons; in our judgment, they
doubt that the Israelis would observe treaty commit-
ments to renounce such weapons or open their
nuclear facilities to inspection.
? Israel, too, is unlikely to place much faith in Arab
commitments to abide by treaty restrictions.
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Pakistan has been introducing resolutions in the UN
General Assembly calling for the establishment of a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia since the
mid-1970s, when India began its nuclear weapons
testing. India has countered by proposing a bilateral
nonagression treaty that would not address nuclear
weapons. Several of the smaller countries of the
region have expressed support for a South Asian zone,
but without pursuing it in diplomatic channels. F_
We believe that a South Asian zone has little chance
of being adopted because of the deep-seated political
and military rivalry between India and Pakistan. Both
countries now possess nuclear facilities capable of
producing fissile material suitable for use in nuclear
weapons. Each is chary of the other's nuclear poten-
tial and fearful of being left behind in an arms race.
We believe, moreover, that India wants to acquire
nuclear weapons partly to protect its security against
China, which it regards as Pakistan's most important
ally.
The "zone of peace" concept applied to the Indian
Ocean differs substantially from the proposals dis-
cussed so far in that it refers to more than nuclear
weapons. The UN General Assembly designated the
Indian Ocean as such a zone in 1971 and called on the
major powers to enter into consultation with the
littoral states to eliminate all military bases, installa-
tions, and other aspects of great power military
presence as well as nuclear weapons. The zone would
encompass only the ocean area and islands and would
not affect the territories of the littoral states. The
United States has come under especially harsh criti-
cism from some countries in the region for its increas-
ing military presence in the region since the late
1970s.
The UN continues to be the focus for discussions on a
zone of peace. Countries from the region and the
Eastern Bloc have long demanded an international
conference under UN sponsorship to work toward
such a zone, but Western nations with security inter-
ests in the area, led by the United States, have
resisted such a meeting unless guidelines can be
agreed upon in advance that take into account their
views (that is, safeguard their security interests). The
US delegation to the UN has often reported that the
United States is under considerable pressure, even
from Western countries, to show greater openness to
the idea of a conference.
We expect the pressure from regional states for a
conference to increase, perhaps leading to some kind
of a meeting over the next few years. There is no
realistic possibility of a demilitarized zone's being
created, however, because of opposition from the
United States and its allies. Governments from the
Indian Ocean region have not pursued actively the
idea of concluding a treaty outside the UN frame-
work. They probably realize that they would have
considerable difficulty negotiating such a document
among themselves, and that any treaty they produced
would have little significance if the Western powers
with a presence in the region did not agree to it.
Antinuclear activity in the South Pacific initially
grew out of fears regarding US nuclear weapons
testing in the 1940s and 1950s and recently has been
fueled by France's continuing nuclear weapons tests
in French Polynesia. Proposals under consideration in
the United States and Japan for dumping nuclear
waste in the Pacific have added to the furor. These
concerns, encouraged by controversy over nuclear
weapons in the United States and Western Europe,
have created a debate in the region about nuclear-free
areas in the South Pacific. This debate has important
implications for US security interests because of the
propensity of many island governments to react
against all things nuclear, including the presence of
nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed US warships.
Antinuclear actions have been pursued at both the
national and multinational levels. None of the South
Pacific nations contemplates having nuclear weapons
of its own, and some have shown a desire to keep
foreign weapons out as well. The government of
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Vanuatu, for example, in early 1982 denied permis-
sion for port visits by US Navy ships which it
suspected might be nuclear armed. Fiji followed suit a
few weeks later, but it subsequently rescinded the
ban. This about-face may discourage for a time an
inclination by other small island nations to prohibit
US warship visits, but the possibility of such bans over
the longer term cannot be discounted.
Ship visits have also been a problem periodically in
Australia and New Zealand. Until recently, the states
of Victoria and New South Wales, which include the
ports of Sydney and Melbourne, did not allow port
visits by nuclear-powered vessels. The Fraser govern-
ment in 1982, however, established the federal gov-
ernment's primacy in determining port access, a
formula to which the current Labor government of
Prime Minister Hawke also subscribes. Local senti-
ment continues to be an important factor, however, in
the government's decisions on individual visits by
nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships.
In New Zealand, where antinuclear sentiment has
made inroads across the political spectrum, the Na-
tional Party government of Prime Minister Muldoon
has sought to cooperate with the United States even
though it has occasionally canceled visits by US
warships to avoid disruptive demonstrations. The
Labor Party, however, is considerably more radical on
nuclear issues. While in power from 1972 to 1975,
Labor leaders prohibited visits by US warships and
encouraged the antinuclear movement in the South
Pacific generally. Although the current Labor leader
has said that compromises could be worked out with
the United States regarding port visits, his party
would face strong and perhaps irresistible pressure
from the antinuclear lobby if it is returned to power in
the election scheduled for this fall.
The multinational side of the nuclear-free issue is
generally played out in the South Pacific Forum.'
This body, which began in 1972 as little more than a
social club, has gradually devoted more attention to
'The South Pacific Forum comprises the nine independent South
Pacific island nations-Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands,
Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru-
plus the New Zealand dependencies of Niue and the Cook Islands.
Australia and New Zealand participate because of their proximity
and longstanding ties to the South Pacific and because the islanders
serious political issues. In 1976, the Forum agreed in
principle that the South Pacific should be a nuclear-
free zone, but this had little significance in the
absence of action by national governments.
Last August, however, the Australian Government
introduced a proposal for a South Pacific Nuclear-
Free Zone in the Forum. Calculated to reinforce that
government's credentials in the arms control field, the
initiative was also intended to preempt more radical
proposals from the small island states. The Austra-
lians attempted to accommodate the United States by
proposing to allow transits through the area by nucle-
ar-armed and nuclear-powered ships, and by nuclear-
armed aircraft. When the islanders agreed to the idea
of a nuclear-free zone but balked at the free transit
provisions, the Forum decided to defer further consid-
eration of the proposal until the next annual meeting.
The Hawke government indicated that it would try to
produce a formulation satisfactory to the island na-
tions.
Although the current New Zealand Government re-
acted negatively to the Australian proposal, we be-
lieve that a Labor government in that country might
well support it, given the party's previous record while
in office. Moreover, it might try to influence the
Australians to abandon their previous stipulation on
military transits. With both Australia and New Zea-
land behind the idea of a nuclear-free South Pacific,
agreement by most or all of the Forum members
would become a stronger possibility. The possible
geographic parameters remain vague, but we believe
advocates of a zone may try to build it from overlap-
ping national areas, implemented through national
legislation, based on 200-mile territorial limits. Such
an arrangement could seriously impair US naval
operations in the area.
The first formal proposal at the UN to make Africa a
zone free of nuclear weapons took the form of a
resolution in 1961 sponsored by 14 African countries
concerned about French nuclear testing in the Sahara.
This resolution, which was approved by the UN
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General Assembly, asked all countries to respect the
continent as a "denuclearized zone." The Soviet
Union supported the proposal, but the United States
and its allies termed it unacceptable because there
were no provisions for control or verification.
In 1964, the members of the Organization of African
Unity issued a declaration on the denuclearization of
the continent which the UN subsequently endorsed,
with all the nuclear powers except France voting in
favor. In 1974, 26 African countries again proposed a
resolution on denuclearization which was unanimous-
ly adopted.
Despite sporadic activity in international organiza-
tions since then, we believe that an effective treaty
banning nuclear weapons from the African continent
is not a likely prospect. South Africa, whose nuclear
explosives development program has probably reached
an advanced stage, is unlikely to agree to a ban; nor
are the other African countries willing to negotiate
with the South Africans. Egypt, which is also a
potential nuclear power, does not wish to obligate
itself without assurances that Israel will forgo nuclear
weapons development. And while it would be relative-
ly easy to establish an African NWFZ leaving out the
"difficult" countries, there has not been much enthu-
siasm for a initiative that would simply confirm the
status of countries that have no possibility of develop-
ing nuclear weapons.
Antarctica was demilitarized in 1959 through the
Antarctic Treaty which was signed by 12 countries
including the United States and the USSR. This
agreement prohibits any measures of a military na-
ture, including bases, fortifications, and testing of
weapons; in effect, this constitutes a ban on nuclear
weapons in Antarctica.
The seabed has also been the subject of a treaty
prohibiting nuclear weapons.' This treaty obligates
' Officially it is called the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
the USSR had ratified it by January 1983.
the parties not to place on or under the sea floor,
beyond a 12-mile coastal zone, any nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction or any facilities
for such weapons. The treaty entered into force in
1972, and 76 nations including the United States and
A demilitarization treaty on outer space entered into
force in 1967, and 89 countries had signed it by 1982.1
This treaty, inter alia, prohibits nations from placing
nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth or on
celestial bodies, or to station them in space in any
other way.
Outlook
Despite the many nuclear-weapons-free zone propos-
als under discussion around the world, the South
Pacific is the only region where proponents of a
multilateral zone appear to have much possibility of
success over the next few years. Even there, the
creation of a zone would depend on leftist govern-
ments being in power in Australia and New Zealand,
and a mood of cooperation between the two Labor
parties which has often been missing in the past.
We believe that the next most likely zone-in Scandi-
navia-remains a long-shot possibility that could
come aboi, only if social democratic parties were in
power in Norway and Denmark. Party leaders' recent
lack of zeal in pushing the zone concept suggests that
even then they would give priority to other disarma-
ment initiatives. Nevertheless, a period of public
hysteria about nuclear dangers, combined with a
conviction that the United States was not taking their
countries' interests into account, could still induce
them to take the plunge for a NWFZ.
'This agreement is officially called the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
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At the same time, denuclearization policies on a
national level are a more distinct possibility in several
areas. In Europe, even if a multilateral Nordic zone
does not materialize, a return to office by leftist
governments in Denmark and Norway might lead one
or both to make the nonnuclear status of their coun-
tries formal and permanent. In the Netherlands,
where all major political parties' already agree that
the number of the country's nuclear tasks in NATO
should be reduced, a nuclear-free declaration is possi-
ble, but only if the political balance shifts markedly
enough to allow the Labor Party to govern alone or
with far left parties.
In other developed countries, declarations of nuclear-
free status are less likely during the next decade, but
they cannot be discounted completely. Popular fears
of nuclear catastrophe and the increasing respectabil-
ity of the "nuclear-free" escape hatch make it diffi-
cult for leftist parties with their traditional emphasis
on disarmament not to pursue the concept. As long as
the media continue to dwell on nuclear disaster, we
believe that many leftist parties will pursue the idea of
denuclearization-at least rhetorically, and in some
cases actively.
But support from a leftist party or even the election of
a leftist government does not necessarily lead toward
nuclear-free status. Much still depends on other politi-
cal circumstances: party balances, trade-offs on other
issues, and the attitudes of individual leaders. We
believe, for example, that it would be virtually impos-
sible for a country to declare itself to be formally
denuclearized unless the prime minister, foreign min-
ister, and defense minister strongly favored the idea.
And officials in these positions are often inhibited by
the possible international repercussions of their deci-
sions-especially the country's relations with friendly
nuclear weapons powers.
In the Third World, decisions by individual countries
to become nuclear free are less predictable because
they depend even more on the ideas of individual
leaders or small political elites. By adhering to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, many less devel-
oped countries have renounced the possibility of devel-
oping nuclear weapons; many government leaders
have also said that they would not allow nuclear
weapons on their countries' territory. Statutory prohi-
bitions, however, often do not exist in these countries.
In considering such bans, many leaders would not
have to worry that declaring their countries nuclear
free would disrupt their strategic situation or that of
their neighbors. In many of these countries, moreover,
a decision on denuclearization could be taken with
little or no domestic cost. On the other hand, leaders
might not have much to gain by a denuclearization
decision and might be willing to decide against this 25X1
step in the face of remonstrances from outside powers.
Whether or not countries declare themselves nuclear
free, we believe that the debate over the issue will
make political establishments more reluctant to im-
plement specific defense measures that might stir up
antinuclear sentiment. Such discussions could also
encourage governments to tighten restrictions on nu-
clear weapons by such actions as reducing the number
of storage sites, restricting the movement of weapons,
and denying port visits. These developments could
complicate US initiatives in NATO and hamper US
military operations in some areas.
We expect that the Soviets, perceiving strong discon-
tent in Western countries about nuclear weapons, will
try even harder to play to these concerns in their
propaganda. In many cases, they will encourage sur-
rogates to promote NWFZs, both to enhance the
credibility of the proposals and to avoid detailed
discussion about how Soviet compliance with zone
provisions might be verified. In areas such as the
Indian Ocean where we believe the Soviets fear their
own interests could be harmed by a "Zone of peace,"
they probably will try to avoid publicly opposing the
idea and depend on Western powers to block moves
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Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Proposed Zonesa
Africa Middle East
00o Balkans o o Scandinavia
00o Central Europe o o South Asia
Indian Ocean o South Pacific
aWith the exception of the existing zones in
Antarctica and Latin America, nuclear-weapons-free
zones (NWFZ) are represented here as their
proponents envision them. In several cases, the
areas to be covered are unclear.
Lath QtaricE ML'9C X
(created by Treaty of
Tlatelolco in 1957)
Antarctica
(demilitarized area created by Antarctic Treaty in 1959)
~c~y '~~cstCc
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