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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000100100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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E?F Directorate of t
, Intelligence
Turkey:
The General Election
An Intelligence Assessment
Seeret
EUR 83-10248
October 1983
Copy 2 U80 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Turkey:
The General Election
the Directorate of Operations.
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
This paper was prepared by
Europe Division, EURA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean Branch, Western
Secret
EUR 83-10248
October 1983
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Turkey:
The General Election 25X1
Key Judgments A new civilian administration will be installed in Turkey after the
Information available parliamentary election on 6 November, but the generals who have ruled
as of 30 September 1983 since 1980 clearly are planning to retain a substantial behind-the-scenes
was used in this report.
political role until they are convinced security and stability are permanent
fixtures. Kenan Evren, until recently Chief of the General Staff, has
already been elected President, a position he will occupy until 1989. The
military's political framework, moreover, concentrates power in the Presi-
dent's hands, weakens the legislature, and restricts admission to the
political arena to those political parties strong enough to overcome a series
of statutory hurdles. After the election, the ruling military council is
scheduled to disband and reconstitute itself as a civilian advisory body to
the President, empowered to oversee all acts of parliament and the
government ministries.
The Turkish public so far has acquiesced in the generals' plans. Most
Turks perceive a clear connection between the no-holds-barred political life
of the past and the political impasses and violence that plagued the country
prior to the military takeover in 1980. Consequently, Turks in general have
not pushed hard for the removal of the limitations on political activity
imposed by the generals.
Within the context of the "guided democracy" the generals have set in
place, the ruling council has permitted some political parties to contest the
election. We believe the conservative Nationalist Democracy Party, headed
by retired Gen. Turgut Sunalp, almost certainly will win a significant
plurality, if not a majority, of the seats. The ruling generals have already
endorsed the NDP unofficially and are now trying to better the NDP's
chances by limiting the number of political parties participating in the
election.
In their efforts to give the election a semblance of legitimacy, the generals
have given their tacit support to Necdet Calp's center-left Populist Party,
but it is clear they do not intend this party to win many seats in the new
parliament. The generals also have not blocked the emergence of Turgut
Ozal's center-right Motherland Party, which offers the only real alterna-
tive to the military-backed parties. The MP might pick up a large portion
of the votes of those disillusioned with the controlled electoral process, but
it is unlikely to gain enough support to keep the NDP from becoming the
largest party.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10248
October 1983
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Despite the controlled nature of the process, the election is, nonetheless, a
significant step that will mark the beginning of a six-year transition to
democracy. Important indications of how the process is proceeding would
include whether Evren lifts martial law and permits parliament to initiate
legislation or have a voice in formulating broad government policy. We
expect the new parliament probably will be solidly conservative, giving
Evren virtual carte blanche-at least in the short term-to pursue his
austere economic measures and pro-Western foreign policy.
In our view, Evren's character and the new constitutional framework will
be adequate to guarantee political stability for the next year or so. We
think, though, that the sheer weight of Turkey's socioeconomic problems
and the increased complexity of the governing process will make it difficult
for the civilian regime to maintain the momentum established by the
military rulers. As a result, criticism of the regime probably will emerge,
and Evren could be tempted to impose harsh measures to maintain control.
The municipal elections, which must be held not later than the fall of 1984,
will be the first open test of the ability of the new civilian government to
weather the challenge. In the final analysis, we believe the era of guidance
by Evren and his advisers that Turkey is now entering is likely to last for at
least several more years.
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Turkey:
The General Election
The Home Stretch
The parliamentary election on 6 November will end
three years of direct military rule and usher in a new
phase of political experimentation that will blend
civilian government and indirect military control. The
generals have set up a new political framework and
are attempting to ensure that only those individuals
acceptable to the ruling military council are permitted
to engage in politics. While the commanders have
long been committed to the restoration of civilian rule,
they have consistently and openly made clear their
intention to retain a substantial behind-the-scenes
political role for the indefinite future.
President Kenan Evren, who was elected President
last November and who stepped down as Chief of the
General Staff on 1 July appears confident that he will
weather the coming period of uncertainty, during
which civilian leaders are likely to put to the test the
constitutional and statutory framework he designed.
He has been manipulating the electoral process for
some time to minimize potential problems. In May,
for example, the ruling National Security Council,
composed of the President and the four service chiefs,
dissolved the Great Turkey Party, the putative succes-
sor to the banned Justice Party. The Council subse-
quently declared unacceptable a number of the found-
ing members of several other political parties.
Combined, these actions undoubtedly reinforced the
widely held belief that the generals planned to maxi-
mize their chances of success before the election. F_
Despite the military regime's popularity and successes
in bringing terrorism under control, turning the econ-
omy around, and restoring public confidence in gov-
ernment, Embassy reporting shows the Turkish public
is anxious to return to the give-and-take of democratic
life. The roots of multiparty democracy run deep in
Turkey, and the Turks generally cannot do without
the organizing, debating, and voting that pluralism
entails. In our view, most Turks also see a clear
connection between the no-holds-barred political life
of the past and the frequent political impasses and
violence that plagued the country before the military
intervened. As a result, they have not pushed hard for
the removal of the limitations on political activity
imposed by the generals.
The generals' actions appear to have provoked nega-
tive responses only from a segment of the political
elite. Some of the former politicians who are barred
from politics for several years seem to have become
bolder and more outspoken in their criticism of the
military regime. According to press reporting, for
example, former Prime Minister Demirel and his
colleagues were placed under detention precisely
because they tried to circumvent the generals' prohi-
bitions. President Evren and the ruling council, more-
over, have been drawing fire from the press. This has
prompted the generals to close down two moderate
newspapers and a weekly journal and to bring charges
against several columnists and publishers for running
articles critical of the government's policies. While
the generals' had promised an election by spring 1984,
we believe the ruling council may see holding the
election this fall as a way of minimizing the further
growth of such disenchantment in the political class.
The generals might also be thinking that returning the
country to civilian rule now could help refurbish
Turkey's image in Western Europe, which in the past
three years has been greatly tarnished. Despite the
sharp differences between the military regime and
many West European governments over human rights
policy, Turkey's leaders must know that they need
Western cooperation to fight Armenian terrorism
directed against Turks and to undertake a credible
military modernization. The generals, staunch advo-
cates of the principle of westernization propounded by
Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, proba-
bly also would like to see Turkey brought back into
the West European fold.
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The Rules of the Game
The generals have consistently said privately and
publicly their new political system is designed to
purge the country of what they believe was the
inordinate power wielded before the military takeover
by politicians such as ex-Justice Party leader Suley-
man Demirel and former Republican People's Party
chief Bulent Ecevit. They also have said they want to
establish a political system that will foster greater
the generals blame the old political elite
and the former constitutional order for bringing the
country to the brink of civil war in the 1979-80 period.
At that time, leftwing and rightwing extremism was
taking a high toll in lives and economic productivity,
and the bickering politicians were unable, or unwill-
ing, to address the nation's problems.'
Consequently, soon after assuming power in 1980 the
ruling military council suspended key provisions of the
1961 Constitution, disbanded all political parties, and
vowed to bar from politics those seen as having
contributed to the instability. It also began work on a
new political framework designed to overcome the
perceived weaknesses of the previous system: too
much individual freedom, not enough state authority,
irresponsibility and divisiveness in government, and
an incompetent bureaucracy. The generals' public
pronouncements suggest that the military regime
envisaged a new political system that would give
greater weight to state prerogatives, strengthen the
executive's ability to deal with domestic crises, and
limit to two or three the political parties that play an
important role in parliament. Bemoaning the failure
of past military efforts to reform the political system,
the commanders also have said publicly that they
want to establish a political framework that would
make military intenvention in politics unnecessary.
The generals' vision is now enshrined in the new
constitution, promulgated last fall and endorsed over-
whelmingly by the public in a referendum last No-
vember, as well as in the laws governing political
parties and elections enacted this spring.' Their dis-
trust of civilian politicians has led them to make
modifying the political framework difficult. The new
constitution, for example, makes it arduous for the
Grand National Assembly to amend the fundamental
law during the next six years. As long as Evren is
president, the passage of a proposed amendment to
the constitution, will require a three-fourths majority
vote in parliament. Even if Evren were to veto the
amendment and parliament were to override that
veto, the President could submit the proposal to a
national referendum.
The generals' desire to narrow the range of options
available to the politicians and to create a two-party
system is reflected in other restrictions they have
imposed. Both the Constitution and the Political
Parties Law, for example, prohibit the establishment
of parties espousing Marxist, separatist, or religious
views. They also prohibit former party leaders and ex-
members of parliament from entering politics for up
to 10 years. The statutes, moreover, limit a party
chairman to no more than six consecutive terms of
two years each, after which he may run again only
after four years have elapsed. Aimed at keeping
politics pure, the Elections Law requires members of
the military and the bureaucracy, including university
professors, to resign their posts if they should seek
political office.'
The most significant feature of the laws pertaining to
political parties and elections is the requirement that
a political party meet certain criteria in order to
qualify for seats in parliament. If a party is successful
' Prime Minister Ulusu and some members of the Cabinet have
already announced their intention to run for parliamentary seats as
independents on a party slate. Their "nonpartisan" status means
that they need not resign their posts. There is precedent for this: the
1965 Political Parties Law also permitted a person to run as an
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The President
? Can call parliament into special session.
? Can call for elections when the government loses a
vote of confidence or when no government can be
formed.
? Presides over the Council of Ministers.
? Appoints some members of the judiciary and the
Council of State. Appoints all members of the
Higher Education Council and the State Superviso-
ry Council and all university rectors.
? Can submit to national referendum any law passed
by parliament over his veto.
The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Parliament
? The Prime Minister and the Cabinet together are
responsible for the implementation of general
policy.
? The Prime Minister and the Cabinet must submit
the government's program to the National Assem-
bly and obtain a vote of confidence.
? Parliament may empower the Council of Ministers
to issue decrees for a limited period.
? Parliament elects the President from among its
members for a seven-year term.
? Parliament has the right to declare war.
? Parliament may question and censure government
ministers.
? The government must strive to ensure economic
stability
Basic Individual Rights and Freedoms
? The state must strive to remove social, political,
and economic obstacles that limit the rights and
freedoms of the individual.
in organizing at all-the law stipulates it must have
30 founding members and be approved by the military
council-it must then submit its program to the
Interior Ministry and the Public Prosecutor. Once
approved, a party must organize in at least 34 of the
country's 67 provinces to be eligible to participate in
elections. It is not permitted, however, to form
branches at the village or neighborhood levels. Even
more restrictive is the "double barrage" system, under
? Individuals have freedom of expression, assembly,
association, and collective bargaining.
? The state may not impose ex post facto laws or
restrict the freedom of the press.
? An individual is innocent until proven guilty.
Restrictions on Rights and Freedoms
? The Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship
of the President, can declare a national emergency
for a period of up to six months, subject to parlia-
mentary approval.
? The government may curtail some basic rights and
freedoms during states of emergency.
Curbs on the Abuse of Power
? Officials accused of the improper use of authority
will be subject to prosecution.
? One-tenth of the members of parliament may open
an investigation of the Prime Minister or other
ministers.
? Parliament may impeach the President for high
treason
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Transitional Provisions
? The National Security Council is transformed into
an advisory Presidential Council after the general
election.
? Former leaders of political parties are prohibited
from participating in politics for up to 10 years. 25X1
? Evren is elected President for a seven-year term
with the same popular vote that approves the
constitution
which a party must first win at least 10 percent of the
nationwide vote and then a minimum number of votes
in at least one province' to qualify for seats in
parliament.
' The law says that a party must obtain at least as many votes in a
province as are equal to the quotient of the total votes cast in that
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A few temporary articles appended to the laws cover
only the election this fall. One of these requires the
political parties to draw up their election slates-in
the future, party primaries must be held-and re-
quires the electorate to vote a straight party ticket.
Another temporary provision imposes a $12 fine for
failing to vote. Perhaps the most important provisional
article commits the military regime to hold a general
election on 6 November
The Key Players
Evren and the ruling military council are the pivotal
actors in the political process. They have set the tone
and the rules of the election and are now trying to
ensure conformity with their plans. We believe,
Evren-the chief architect of the regime's political
framework-seems to consider a strong hand a neces-
sity until, in his view, the Turks are imbued with an
adequate sense of political responsibility and modera-
tion.
Evren has shown few qualms about taking stern, but
legal, steps either to weaken the parties he does not
support or to exclude them from the political process.
The US Embassy in Ankara reports that the generals
already have given their tacit support to the conserva-
tive Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), headed by
retired Gen. Turgut Sunalp, and to the center-left
Populist Party (PP) led by former government official
Necdet Calp. They have not, moreover, blocked the
establishment of the center-right Motherland Party
(MP), led by former economic czar Turgut Ozal,
despite the possibility that it might detract from the
NDP's support.
Both the NDP and the PP have programs that accord
well with the military's prescriptions. In addition to
calling for the pursuit of Kemalist economic poli-
cies-rapid economic growth along Western lines and
state ownership of key industries-and a pro-Western
foreign policy, both parties are claiming in their
platforms to represent all political classes. The ranks
of both include retired military officers, former bu-
reaucrats, ex-trade unionists, and some former mem-
bers of the Consultative Assembly.
Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party seems to offer the
only real alternative to the NDP and the PP. The MP
espouses an unfettered free enterprise system, an
approach made popular by Ozal in his economic
stabilization program of 1980. The party also stands
for conservative religious values and asserts that
Turkey should be open to the world of Islam, to
trading with the Arabs, and to serving as a bridge
between the Arab countries and Europe. The MP
appeals to business groups benefiting from the auster-
ity measures-as well as to tradesmen, farmers, many
members of the former Justice Party, and religious
elements. The party's main asset in one view, is Ozal's
popularity-he receives much of the credit for Tur-
key's improved economic performance since 1980-
and his record as a political "survivor."
All the other political groups that have applied to the
Interior Ministry for recognition as political parties
(see table) have fallen away either because they failed
to fulfill legal requirements or because they were
disqualified by the ruling military council. The gener-
als rejected, for example, the founding members of
the Correct Path and Social Democratic Parties
(SODEP), making it impossible for either group to
participate in the election. To keep their hands in
politics at this point, the members of these and other
such parties have little choice but to throw their lots in
with qualified parties, hoping to win favorable spots
on election slates or get some minor government post
in the new civilian government.
The State of Play
We believe the NDP is almost certain, given the
military's support, to obtain at least a plurality, if not
a majority, of the votes in the election. The extent of
the NDP victory will, in our opinion, depend on the
degree to which the ruling council's recent actions-
the exclusion of the Correct Path and Social Demo-
cratic Parties from politics, the closure of newspapers,
the jailing of several columnists-translate into pro-
test, and therefore anti-NDP, votes.
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Conservative Political Parties Formed
Since 16 May 1983
Great Turkey Party (dissolved by decree in Ali Fethi Esener
May 1983)
Nationalist Democracy Party
Motherland Party
Correct Path Party
New Birth Party
Supreme Duty Party (ordered closed by
Constitutional Court)
New Order Party
Virtue Party (under investigation)
Republican Conservative Party (under
investigation)
Prosperity Party
Our Party (dissolved voluntarily)
Tranquility Party (under investigation)
Banner Party
Center left
Social Democratic Party
Populist Party
Turgut Sunalp
Turgut Ozal
Yildirim Avci
Kemal Avsaroglu
Baha Vefa Karatay
Leader unknown
Leader unknown
Leader unknown
when the government banned the Great Turkey Party,
commonly regarded as the successor to the banned
Justice Party. The perception of the NDP as Evren's
personal creation also encouraged some traditionally
conservative, religious elements to gravitate toward
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Ali Turkmen
Mithat Ceylan
Ahmet Celebi
Yasar Yurtovel
Cezmi Kartay
Necdet Calp
7- ,
Evren's worries about the center left in our view are
probably unfounded. Even if the election were com-
pletely open, we think historical voting patterns and
the backlash against the center left-press reporting
shows Turks in general blame the left for many of
Turkey's problems-almost certainly would give the
conservatives the upper hand (figure 1). This suggests
that Evren's concerns about Ozal have less to do with
the fate of the center right than with face. Evren
simply may not relish the prospect of seeing an
In spite of Evren's endorsement, however, the NDP
must overcome some obstacles if it is to win big. For
one thing, Embassy reporting suggests that both the
generals and the public consider Sunalp too inflexible
and too inexperienced to be an effective national
Although its chances of winning are slim, Ozal's
Motherland Party has had greater success than the
NDP in attracting supporters, especially since May
' There is much speculation in Turkish political circles about
Ulusu's role in the government after the election. Most Turkish
political observers believe that Evren would like Ulusu to be prime
minister. Some pundits have suggested, however, that Ulusu might
instead be named chairman of the National Assembly. In either
case, he would need to win a parliamentary seat, and he recently
announced his intention to run as an independent on the NDP
upstart challenge his own man.
Not surprisingly, given the ruling military council's
strong preference for the center right, the generals
have given little support to the Populists beyond
6 Evren and Ozal have personal and philosophical differences. We
believe that Evren regards Ozal as epitomizing the system that
spawned the anarchy and chaos that led to the 1980 military
takeover. Evren also probably considers Ozal's economic views as
being somewhat contrary to Ataturk's principle of statism
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Figure 1
Shares of Votes by the Right and the Left
of the Political Spectrum, 1961-79
Percentage of votes
70
20 1961 65 69 73 77 79
Election year
undercutting the other center-left parties that have
sprung up. If the Populists qualify for participation in
the election at all, they are likely, in our view, to find
it difficult to attain the 10-percent nationwide vote
necessary to win seats in parliament. The PP seems to
have failed in recruiting prominent social democrats,
and various press reports suggest that the party is on
the verge of collapse.
Figure 2
Shares of Major Political Party Votes in
National Assembly Elections, 1961-79
1961 65 69 73 77 79a
Election year
a Even though in the 14 October 1979 election the Justice Party won the five
contested Assembly seats, the RPP losses kept the parliamentary arithmetic
for the two major parties much the same.
and the Republican People's Party together averaged
74 percent of the vote and nearly 82 percent of the
seats in parliament (figures 2 and 3). Nonetheless,
during this period the larger parties often had to rely
on the support of minor parties, such as the Islamic
fundamentalist National Salvation Party and the
neofascist Nationalist Action Party, to establish gov-
erning majorities. These small parties, as a result,
acquired disproportionate amounts of power.
The NDP's competition in the election is, therefore,
likely to come mainly from the MP. If Evren could get
over his pique with Ozal, we think he probably would
not be averse to having a two-party system under
which two center-right parties vied for control-a
situation that existed in the 1950s. Many Turks would
probably argue, in our view, that the country would be
better off with two parties that were less alike, but the
generals will still not have much trouble selling the
notion of a two-party system. Even as splinter parties
proliferated in the period 1961-79, the Justice Party
The Balance of Power
Although the military regime shows every intention of
making good this fall on its promise to return a
limited measure of power to civilians, democracy will
not be firmly reestablished in the country for some-
time. By the time of the election, direct military rule
will have lasted three years. Indirect military control
of politics is likely, we believe, to last much longer-
at least until the parliamentary election in 1988. It is
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Figure 3
Share of Votes and Seats by Party in
National Assembly Elections, 1961-79
Justice Parts
11KI Republic Peoples Party
Small parties, Independent
Percentage of votes
61
Security Council will resign their commissions imme-
diately after the election and reconstitute themselves
as a civilian advisory body to the President, em-
powered by the Constitution until the end of Evren's
term to oversee the government machinery, legisla-
tion, and ultimately the politicians.
Evren and his colleagues on the Presidential Council
will have a great deal of power. Under the new
Constitution, only the President is empowered to
appoint the Prime Minister, the government minis-
ters, and most senior government officials. Various
councils attached to the president's office, moreover,
will supervise the operations of the government, rele-
gating parliament's watchdog function to secondary
importance. The President's right to submit important
legislation to national referendum, even after parlia-
ment has overridden a presidential veto, will greatly
undercut the National Assembly's ability to take bold
steps on controversial issues.
Parliament, however, will retain some residual au-
thority that could eventually translate into real power.
60 For one thing, the Constitution requires that all
legislation gain the approval of parliament. Evren
50 ? technically could submit large numbers of bills to
1e6l 65 69 73 77 79 in the unlikely event the center right wins less than a
majority in the election or if the center left fares well
in municipal elections next year. By that time, the
military council will have dissolved. Evren, moreover,
will not have any say over who runs in the municipal
elections and this could make for a more freewheeling
contest. Beyond Evren's term, another factor will
clear to us that Evren and his colleagues will not affect a balance of power between the executive and
relinquish power until they believe security and politi- legislative branches: parliament's responsibility to se-
cal stability are permanent fixtures in Turkey.~~ lect the president every seven years.
Evren is trying to consolidate his power without
seeming too repressive. He already has resigned his
position as Chief of the General Staff. The Constitu-
tion stipulates that the other members of the National
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The Likely Policies of the New Regime
Odds are that Evren is likely to find it relatively easy
to persuade the new parliament to extend the gener-
als' economic recovery program and their efforts to
fight terrorism. The President and his ministers will,
in our judgment, try to focus on economic and social
issues the military regime has been unable to resolve:
an excessively large public sector, an inequitable tax
structure, an outdated banking system, high unem-
ployment, and inadequate public housing.
The new civilian regime is also likely to adopt the
foreign policies of the military regime. Evren is a
staunchly pro-Western secularist who sees no alterna-
tive to Turkey's military and political ties to the West.
We believe he will want to build on the basic cordial-
ity that has characterized US-Turkish relations in the
past three years. We see little chance, however, that
he will advocate revising Ankara's longstanding policy
of denying Washington the use of Turkish territory
for any military operation outside the NATO context.
Evren's grip on the political process could tighten in
the unlikely event that the Aegean and Cyprus dis-
putes flare up or if Turkey is drawn into any of the
conflicts in the Middle East, such as the Iran-Iraq
war. Turkey's relations with Greece appear to have
improved somewhat in recent months, but the Middle
East conflicts pose some immediate problems for
Ankara. The Turks reportedly are worried, for exam-
ple, about the use of Kurds-Turkey has a sizable
Kurdish minority-as combatants in the Gulf war.
Ankara's relations with Syria, which reportedly has
been training and supporting anti-Turkish terrorists,
have also deteriorated markedly. As the principal
foreign policy decisionmaker, Evren conceivably could
delay relaxing his hold on politics until these and
other foreign policy issues are addressed to his satis-
faction.
The government is likely, in our view, to seek im-
provements in Ankara's relations with Western
Europe, which have deteriorated sharply in the past
three years. Five West European nations have
brought charges against Turkey in the European
Human Rights Commission, and the Council of Eu-
rope already has voted to exclude Turkish members,
to be selected after the election, from the Council's
Parliamentary Assembly. We thus doubt that the
transfer to civilian administration will lead to a rapid
improvement in Turkish-West European relations.
We expect Evren will also advocate expanding eco-
nomic ties to Middle Eastern countries if for no other
reason than to undercut Ozal, who has been the most
outspoken exponent of this course. In this effort, we
think Ankara will focus on preserving its strong
economic links to countries like Iran and Iraq for the
purpose of enhancing the export sector, which has
expanded dramatically in the past three years.
For reasons already noted, most members of parlia-
ment will toe Evren's foreign policy line when it comes
time to vote. To establish their nationalistic bona
fides, however, many members of the National As-
sembly will, we believe, be tempted to argue in debate
for a more independent foreign policy; closer ties to
the Arab world; and a tougher stance on Aegean
seabed, airspace, territorial issues, Cyprus, and
Greek-Turkish relations. The conservative makeup of
the Assembly probably would make it prone to favor
closer relations with the United States, providing
Washington is forthcoming on military and economic
aid.
Outlook
The short-term outlook for political stability under
civilian rule is good. Evren's strong presence and the
new constitutional framework will, in our view, com-
bine to yield a governing process with a measured,
conservative character. At least for the near term, we
believe that his former colleagues in the military will
be quick to lend the President their moral support at
the first sign of divisiveness am ng the political elite,
political violence, or serious public dissatisfaction with
the policies of the government.
While the new constitutional framework is thus likely
to produce the stable governments Evren and the
generals want, we think the new administration will
have trouble demonstrating continued progress in
coping with Turkey's massive economic and social
problems. Although there will still be many restric-
tions on political activity, the governing process will
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inevitably be more cumbersome and complex than it
was during the past three years. Evren, for example,
will be obliged to work through the parliament, and,
although it will be sympathetic, it will also be full of
politicians inclined to act with at least one eye on the
future possibility of establishing independent political
bases in a more openly democratic system. In short,
the legislature will be something less than the rubber-
stamp it has been for Evren since 1980. Even the
Constituent Assembly, formed soon after the generals
came to power to act as the legislative branch of
government, has shown a willingness to defy the
ruling military council on occasion. The Assembly, for
example, recently shelved a proposal by Admiral
Turner, a National Security Council member, to
restrict the 1984 municipal elections to those political
parties participating in the general election.
Added to such procedural questions, there is the sheer
weight of Turkey's domestic problems. The generals
have made impressive progress toward stopping the
terrorism that was claiming an average of 20 lives a
day before the military takeover, but they have so far
dealt more with symptoms than with causes. Al-
though about 40,000 terrorists have been jailed since
1980, little has been done to eradicate the conditions
that spawned them-high unemployment in over-
crowded, service-poor urban areas and an insufficient-
ly developed commitment to traditional Western po-
litical values, such as the concept of a loyal opposition,
limited experience with political moderation, and the
slow pace of social and political change compared
with rapid industralization. And on the economic side,
the success of the general's austerity measures masks
a lack of progress toward addressing structural defi-
ciencies like an antiquated tax system and inefficient
public sector.'
We think that having to grapple with such intractable
problems will test the government's tolerance for the
criticism of its policies that is sure to arise. Given
Evren's penchant for security and stability we expect
him to wield a heavy hand until he is convinced that
the politicians will act responsibly. We also expect the
' The 1980 economic stabilization program led to the reduction of
the inflation rate from 120 percent in 1979 to 25 percent this year,
to the elimination of the consumer shortages, and to the dramatic
Turkish military to take a more active interest in the
country's political development, especially if the poli-
ticians again begin to act divisively. Indeed, if the new
government is criticized severely for failing to produce
solutions Evren could be tempted to delay lifting
martial law, which will remain in place until parlia-
ment rescinds it, or to impose other restrictive meas-
ures to maintain control. In the final analysis, we
cannot rule out another military intervention in Turk-
ish politics if the economic and internal security
situations take a turn for the worse and the new
administration is unable or unwilling to cope with the
problems
We would view certain actions that Evren might take
within the next year as indicators of whether the
country is progressing toward the restoration of demo-
cratic rule. Permitting members of parliament to
initiate legislation or to have a voice in formulating
broad governmental policy, for example, would indi-
cate a softening of Evren's stand on political partici-
pation. The lifting of martial law, moreover, would
suggest a desire on the part of the military to return to
the barracks, an action that would go a long way
toward placating Evren's foreign and domestic critics.
Finally, the municipal elections that by law must be
held by fall 1984 could also be an indicator of how
relations are developing between civilian and military
authorities under the new Constitution. The generals
have introduced legislation to restrict the number of
parties contesting the local elections to those compet-
ing in the general election. The Constitutional Com-
mittee of the Consultative Assembly has rejected the
proposal, but the ruling military council could still
override the rejection and limit the number of parties
in the municipal elections. If the campaign is not
restricted in this way, however, competition for the
municipal election could be a lively affair compared
with the tightly controlled election process unfolding
this fall. The question is whether Evren and the
generals will have developed enough trust in the
Turkish elite by then to let politics take its course
under the rules they have laid down. On balance, we
think the generals will lean toward maintaining some
form of "guided democracy" for at least several more
years.
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Biographic Profiles
Necdet Calp
The Populist Party chief is known as a technocrat and an effective administrator.
He has served several tours as a provincial governor and, until he resigned to
establish the Populist Party, was attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The 61-
year-old Calp has considerable political experience, having been active in the now-
banned Republican Party for many years, but we believe he lacks the personal
presence necessary to achieve national prominence.
Turgut Sunalp
An ex-general, the 65-year-old leader of the Nationalist Democratic Party is still
more a military man than a politician. He has a reputation for outspokenness that
may have been the cause of his retirement from the military in 1976 after 40 years
of service. We believe he is perceptive and decisive. As a civilian, he has served as
Ambassador to Canada. We expect him to maintain his longstanding pro-US
views, although as in the past he will not hesitate to criticize specific US policies.
Bulend Ulusu
Prime Minister Ulusu, 60, has been an effective liaison between the Cabinet and
the ruling military council. An ex-admiral, Ulusu is a team player and an excellent
organizer with a quick and retentive mind. While most reports indicate that he is
firm and self-confident, others note his receptiveness to criticism and his soft-
spoken, easygoing approach to management. Prior to his appointment as Prime
Minister in 1980, he served tours as Deputy Minister of Defense and as
Commander of the Navy
Turgut Ozal
Turgut Ozal first designed the economic stabilization of 1980 program and then
found himself retained by the military regime to implement the measures. He
resigned in July 1982, however, over what he publicly called "a disagreement in
implementation." Ozal, about 56, is known for his integrity, competence, frank-
ness, and self-confidence. In addition to serving as Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of State under former Prime Minister Demirel, he has also worked in the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
talists.
Kenan Evren
Elected Turkey's seventh president in November 1982, Kenan Evren has been
Chairman of the ruling National Security Council since the military takeover in
1980. He served as Chief of the Turkish General Staff from 1978 until this year.
US Embassy officials describe Evren, about 65, as soft-spoken, modest, cautious,
and thoughtful. He is also known to have a strong sense of duty and to be self-reli-
ant. He is both decisive and comfortable with wielding authority. He is, however,
receptive to advice and tends to avoid conflict when possible. His devotion to the
principles of Ataturk and to secularism at times make him seem rigid in his
rejection of demands for political participation by the left and Islamic fundamen-
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