GREECE S NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY: THE OLD GUARD FADES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000100070004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Igtelligence
Greece's New Democracy Party:
The Old Guard Fades
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
Secret
EUR 83-10233
October 1983
Copy 274
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 Directorate of
Intelligence
The Old Guard Fades
Greece's New Democracy Party:
the Directorate of Operations.
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean Branch, EURA,
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Secret
EUR 83-10233
October 1983
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Secret
Greece's New Democracy Party:
The Old Guard Fades 25X1
Key Judgments We believe Greece's conservative New Democracy party-the main locus
Information available of political opposition to Andreas Papandreou's ruling Socialists and the
as of 1 September 1983 principal exponent of Western interests in the country-is in serious straits.
was used in this report.
New Democracy has been largely unable to regroup since its stunning
defeat in the 1981 national elections. In our judgment, the party would
have little chance of regaining the popular mandate it enjoyed between
1974 and 1981 if an election were held today. Reversing New Democracy's
slide will require such an effort that in the short term the party's chances of
catching the Socialists will depend more on Papandreou's performance
than on its own.
New Democracy's political weakness is, in our view, largely of its own
making. The most visible problem is a longstanding struggle for the
leadership of the party between party leader Evangelos Averof and former
premier George Rallis. Their feud preoccupied the Rallis government (in
power from May 1980 to November 1981) and has undermined New
Democracy's performance in opposition. Underlying the Averof-Rallis split
are schisms with subtle ideological and regional overtones, as well as
generational tensions between younger party leaders and the old guard-
Averof, Rallis, and President Constantine Karamanlis-which has domi-
nated Greek politics for most of the postwar period. The leadership
question could come to a head again at the party congress, which could
take place as early as next spring, and the result could be the passing of
power to a younger leader.
Factionalism, moreover, has left New Democracy in an organizational
shambles. The party began as a rally to support Karamanlis as he worked
to piece together civilian rule following seven years of military dictatorship.
New Democracy's long tenure in power-1975-81--provided little incen-
tive for building an institutional base of support at the grass-roots level. In-
stead, the conservatives relied heavily on patronage dispensed from the
capital-a tool the party lost following Papandreou's dramatic election
victory and takeover of the national bureaucracy.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10233
Dctober1983
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25X1
On balance, New Democracy's long-term outlook probably is not as grim
as current circumstances suggest. Even though a change in leadership
would be disruptive, a complete rupture in the party during the next year
or so is, in our view, only a remote possibility. The natural conservative
constituency in Greece remains quite large, and over time New Democracy
can probably expect to win back many of the centrist voters who supported
the party in the past but opted for Papandreou in the 1981 election
In the unlikely event that the party's leadership and organizational
problems led to its dissolution, New Democracy probably would reemerge
in some fashion under the strong tutelage of President Karamanlis. A rump
organization bearing Karamanlis's stamp of approval and popular brand of
progressive conservatism would face far fewer political hazards to survival
than any rightwing or centrist offshoot.
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Secret
Greece's New Democracy Party:
The Old Guard Fades
The conservative New Democracy party has yet to
mount a credible opposition to the government of
Andreas Papandreou, nearly two years into Papan-
dreou's tenure. The party is hobbled by the same
problems of leadership, image, and organization that
led to its electoral drubbing in 1981 after seven years
in power. President and former premier Constantine
Karamanlis-New Democracy's founder and elder
statesman-may be both the party's greatest strength
and its biggest liability. He continues to hold the
party together, but his moral dominance may be
delaying the fundamental changes the party probably
must make before it will be able to make another
serious run at power.
New Democracy's woes during the year or so before
the 1981 election stand in sharp contrast to the
party's successes during the previous six years.
Greece experienced impressive economic growth and
political stability in the latter half of the 1970s,
largely because of the leadership of Constantine
Karamanlis. The key to New Democracy's success at
the ballot box in both 1974' and 1977 was the partys
broad platform. Karamanlis staked out a solid claim
to the political center right, occupying the ground
between the Socialists on the left and the small
extremist parties on the far right. Rejecting conven-
tional political labels and the term "conservative, "
Karamanlis announced at New Democracy's 1979
congress that the party was "radical liberal ...
something between traditional liberalism and demo-
New Democracy's weakness came into sharp focus in
the October 1981 national election. The party re-
ceived only 36 percent of the popular vote, while
Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement won 48
percent and a solid majority of seats in parliament
(see figure). The results marked a low point in New
Democracy's fortunes. In 1974 the party polled 54
percent of the vote. It won again in 1977 but slipped
to 42 percent. New Democracy's defeat also repre-
sented one of the worst setbacks suffered by a major
conservative party in Greece during the postwar peri-
od (see map).
The party's problems had grown increasingly evident
in the 18 months leading up to the election. Parlia-
ment elected Karamanlis president in May 1980.
Whereas this was the culmination of Karamanlis's
personal plan for maintaining the greatest influence
over Greek affairs over the long term, it did force him
to forswear any formal leadership role in New De-
mocracy. The reins of both the party and the govern-
ment fell to the far less charismatic and popular
George Rallis-the Foreign Minister under Kara-
manlis. Not having come to office as the result of a
national election, the Rallis government, in our view,
lacked self-confidence from the outset. A cross section
of reporting suggests that the public came quickly to
cratic socialism.'
Karamanlis advocated middle-of-the-road policies
both to differentiate New Democracy from the dis-
credited extreme right in the aftermath of a military
dictatorship and to blunt the growing appeal of the
leftists. Karamanlis initiated a national referendum
on the monarchy-he took a neutral position-which
resulted in a decisive vote against putting the king
back on the throne. He brought to trial and jailed the
junta ringleaders, legalized the Communist Part v,
and devised and oversaw the passage of a new
Constitution, which has worked well in allocating
executive and legislative powers. On the domestic
front, New Democracy played an active part in
promoting investment and development-half of the
economy was state controlled at the time of Papan-
dreou's election-and established social welfare pro-
grams. Karamanlis's policy of "Greece belongs with
the West" was counterbalanced by an appeal to
Greek nationalism that included withdrawal in 1974
from the military wing of IVA TO, new restrictions on
US base rights, and new overtures toward the Soviet
Bloc and the Arab world.
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Greek National Elections: Share of Popular Votes for
Seats in Parliament'
LI
0 1974 1977 1981
a The Greek Parliament contains 300 seats.
b In the 1974 elections, the Greek Communist Party participated in a "United
Left" electoral coalition with eurocommunist parties called the United
Democratic Left and the Communist Party of Greece-Interior.
c The Union of the Democratic Center obtained a small share of the vote and no seats in 1981,
view Rallis as a caretaker prime minister. Domestic
policy shortcomings, Rallis's noncombative style, and
Papandreou's strident populism and nationalistic posi-
tions on foreign policy ut the government on the
defensive.
Economic problems also began plaguing the party as
rapid growth during the latter 1970s led to high
inflation and rising trade deficits. The country's entry
into the European Community in January 1981-the
by party deputies with a mere four-vote margin over
Averof. The two men long had been colleagues in
conservative politics, but the election soured their
relationship and exacerbated rather than settled the
consummation of Karamanlis's efforts to strengthen The intense rivalry between Rallis and Averof led to
the country's political links with Western Europe- considerable confusion at the top of the party in
put competitive strains on Greece's nascent industrial efforts to devise campaign tactics to counter Pa an-
sector and boosted consumer prices. The conservatives dreou.
were blamed for these economic difficulties as well as a is was, or example, able to win
for the growing inefficiency of the government bu- parliamentary approval of a law allowing the political
reaucracy and the deterioration of the urban environ- parties to increase the number of candidates on the
ment that had resulted from rapid industrialization ballots. The move was designed, we think, to allow
and internal migration.
All of this was complicated by internal party tensions,
particularly between Rallis and longtime conservative
politician Evangelos Averof. Rallis was elected leader
New Democracy 60
Panhellenic Socialist
Movement
Greek Communist Party 50
(KKE/Exterior)b
Union of the
Democratic Cenlerc _
Other 40
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Secret
1981 are, in our estimate, conservatives
gains were more than offset, in our view, by the
defection to the Socialists of many centrists who had
previously supported New Democracy. In no small
part because of this rightward shift of New Democra-
cy's constituency, most of the 26 New Democracy 25X1
deputies elected to Parliament for the first time in
Soon after the election, New Democracy ousted Rallis
and elected Averof party leader-a change which, in
our view, has not increased the astuteness of the
party's policies. Some policies have simply been ill
advised. Unsuccessful efforts to make a partisan issue
of the government's alleged negligence earlier this
year in investigating the assassination of a conserva-
tive newspaper editor stand out in this regard. One
stance, the decision late last year to boycott govern-
ment-sponsored commemorations of the role played
by guerrilla fighters-including Communists-during
World War II, was out of step with public opinion.
these shortcomings stem
Former party leader George Rallis rows away from the sinking
ship of New Democracy in his book "Hours of Responsibility."
The recently published book describes Rallis's term as Prime
New Democracy to present fresh faces to the elector-
ate and nudge out older candidates. In our opinion,
the leadership struggle, however, made it impossible
in many locales for the party to put together coherent,
25X1 attractive candidate lists.
To make matters worse, the one strategy on which
25X1 Averof and Rallis agreed flew in the face of one of
Karamanlis's keys to success: appealing to the center.
Rallis and Averof
devoted considerable energy to forming an electoral
coalition with the rightwing National Camp party of
Spyros Theotokis, which had won 7 percent of the
vote in 1977.
equally from a widespread perception in the party
that Averof is only a temporary leader and from the
maneuvering among his potential successors for the
inside track to the top slot.
In our estimate, leadership is the key to New Democ-
racy's survival. New Democracy is the only contempo-
rary Greek political party to have held together
through two changes of leadership, and a third is
probably in the offing. We believe that the 72-year-
old Averof, who recently underwent heart surgery, is
in no condition to lead the party in the election
scheduled to take place in November 1985. F_
A
long-overdue party congress, tentatively scheduled for
October, probably will be held next spring, and the 25X1
succession issue could become the focus of delibera-
tions.
Theotokis refused to form a
coalition, but he did accept a place on the at-large
New Democracy ballot. While New Democracy
picked up most of Theotokis's constituency, these
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 $AAR KATI AAA01.
AEN f~NETAI
NA NTYOEITE
0A01 APXHI"oI!..
New Democracy hostess of a costume party tells Boutos,
Mitsotakis, and Stefanopoulos-all with Averof masks-to "wear
Based on previous party caucus votes for a leader and
on an analysis of the party's factions, we estimate that
the three candidates with the best chances to succeed
Averof are parliamentary deputies Constantine Ste-
fanopoulos, Ioannis Boutos, and Constantine Mitsota-
kis. Each man has good credentials, but each has key
weaknesses. Long shots include Miltiadis Evert and
loannis Varvitsiotis, two younger deputies, and Rallis.
New Democracy deputies could compromise by
choosing someone not closely identified with any
particular faction. Such candidates are deputy party
leader Constantine Papaconstantinou and Panayiotis
Kanellopoulos, a former centrist politician and well-
regarded former Prime Minister elected to Parliament
in 1981 on the at-large New Democracy ballot. The
party also could select someone outside the parliamen-
tary delegation, such as former chief of the general
staff, retired Gen. Agamemnon Gratsios. All three
men are elderly, however, and none would offer more
than a temporary solution to the leadership problem.
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Whoever ultimately succeeds Averof will need to win
the backing of a majority of the party's parliamentary
delegation. It is this group, according to New Democ-
racy's bylaws, that will make the decision. As things
now stand, we guess that Averof and Stefanopoulos
loosely command about 60 of the delegation's 110
members. When Averof steps down, most of these
would probably line up behind Stefanopoulos. We
estimate that Rallis and Boutos hold joint sway over
about 20 deputies. With such a small base, both men
presumably could not vie for the top job at the same
time. About 15 deputies back Mitsotakis, and the
remaining 20 or so are uncommitted.'
Organization: New Democracy's Nemesis ,
Such factionalism has undermined New Democracy's
organizational machinery. Unlike the Communist and
Socialist parties, New Democracy has failed to build
an effective grass-roots base. Although this is attrib-
utable in part to prolonged incumbency and the strong
national appeal of Karamanlis, the underlying cause,
in our view, is an enduring pattern of clientalistic
politics. Greek parties historically have been dominat-
ed by notables, whose local support transcends party
identification. New Democracy, in our view, remains
more a collection of popular individuals than a mod-
ern political party.
Because the party has relied heavily on patronage to
maintain its political base, Papandreou's election vic-
tory dealt New Democracy a serious blow, particular-
ly on the local level. With the reduction in the number
of elected officials and high-level bureaucrats with
favors to distribute, local officials had little incentive
to continue party functions or generate enthusiastic
support from party members. For their part, the few
remaining high-level patrons have neglected regional
and municipal organizations. According to the US
Consul General in Thessaloniki, local New Democra-
cy officials believe themselves to be cut off from party
' Appendix A describes the factions in New Democracy's parlia-
mentary delegation, lists the party's deputies, and notes their
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Table I
New Democracy Factions in Parliament, 1983
Group Number Average Average Date
Age of Election
headquarters in Athens. As a result, New Democracy
was so unprepared for the 1982 fall municipal elec-
tions that it had difficulty recruiting candidates will-
ing to campaign against the well-organized leftist
parties.
Organizational difficulties in turn have limited the
party's ability to cultivate the broad constituency that
previously rallied to the party. For most of its exist-
ence, New Democracy has polled rather evenly among
voters of all classes and in all regions. The 1981
election results suggest, however, that the party has
lost more support in the cities than in the country-
side-an ominous development given the country's
rapid urbanization. A review of the electoral data
shows that New Democracy drew its support dispro-
portionately from the ranks of military officers, busi-
nessmen, the Orthodox clergy, and the more prosper-
ous farmers; the party did poorly among those drawn
Evert
Karamanlis, A.
Papaconstantinou,
M.
Another manifestation of the party's weak infrastruc-
ture is its financial status. Local New Democracy
committees rely on headquarters for funds. Head-
quarters, in turn, appears to depend heavily on contri-
butions from a few wealthy industrialists.
Attempts to remedy these organizational shortcom-
ings have met with limited success. The first nation-
wide New Democracy meeting took place in April
1977. The delegates did little more than review
statistics showing that New Democracy had 20,000
members in 51 regional and 233 local organizations.
25X1 25X1
to mass organizations.
Regional Ideology
Strength
Prominent
Supporters
Northern Greece Strongly pro--United Papaconstantinou
States and anti- Laskaris
Communist; pro-EC Stratos, Tsaldaris
and NATO; "go Varvitsiotis
slow" on social and Kanellopoulos, A.
economic reform
Same as Averof but (No information)
less dogmatic: on for-
eign policy and more
pro-private
enterprise
Greater Athens Same as Stefanopou- Papaligouras
and Peloponnesus los on foreign policy, Tzannetakis
but favor moderate
government interven-
tion in social policy
Crete Same as Averof on (No information)
foreign policy, liberal
social policies
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New Democracy's Stand on Key Issues:
Sober, Yet Calculating
New Democracy's current stands on key issues are
similar to those it took while in power. Averof
generally has labeled Papandreou's confrontational
approach toward the West as harmful to Greece's
credibility in NATO and the European Community.
In recent months, Averof has publicly supported the
deployment of new intermediate-range NATO mis-
siles in Western Europe, criticized Papandreou's
Balkan Nuclear Free Zone concept, and called for the
retention of US military facilities. In a quieter fash-
ion, New Democracy has urged the Socialists to
engage in a dialogue with Turkey and support the
intercommunal talks on Cyprus
On domestic issues, Averof has accused the Socialists
of trying to politicize the government bureaucracy
and create a "one-party " state. He has dismissed
positive steps" such as the introduction of civil
marriage as secondary issues. Averof has sided with
businessmen in blaming the government for dwindling
investment-foreign and domestic-and rising unem-
ployment. New Democracy gave measured support to
the retrenchment policies Papandreou unveiled earli-
er this year, even though it believes they are too
limited in scope, and the party believes that the
Socialists should ease price controls and allow pri-
vate enterprise to take the lead again in investment.
This gathering was not described by party headquar-
ters as an official convention, and serious work was
left for the full party congress-the first of its kind for
a non-Communist party in Greece-that convened in
1979. At that gathering the delegates ratified a
charter, appointed a 70-member administrative body,
and selected a 10-member executive committee. The
congress reserved a majority of seats for those not
sitting in Parliament, and local organizations were
given a greater voice in nominating candidates for
On the whole, we believe that New Democracy's
positions are more in line with US interests than are
those of the Papandreou government. The conserva-
tives find it necessary for reasons of political competi-
tion, however, to take strong stands-albeit without
Papandreou's acerbity-on issues of national impor-
tance. New Democracy is no more willing than the
government to countenance a resolution of NATO
command and control issues in the Aegean that
sacrifices Greek responsibility for the entire area.
Nor is New Democracy particularly keen on pushing
for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute in the absence
of some sort of detente with the Turks.
cal support for Arab states.
On relations with countries outside NATO and the
Community, New Democracy supports expanded eco-
nomic and political ties. Although the conservatives
have disparaged the likely benefits of the Greek-
Soviet economic protocols initialed earlier this year,
they, too, see some merit in expanded trade relations
with Communist states. The party does not advocate
that these economic policies be translated into closer
political relations, but New Democracy believes that
Greece is best served by keeping a low profile on
controversial East-West issues. The lack of Western
unanimity on Middle East issues and the importance
of Greek trade in the area renders the conservatives
nearly as uninhibited as the Socialists in their politi-
public office. Despite these efforts, the party machin-
ery has, in our view, exerted little leverage over the
deputies, who have retained control over selecting the
party leader and staffing its regional committees.
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The slow pace of internal modernization has to date
produced little serious grumbling in the party. Until
now, organized protest, in our judgment, has been
informal, unorganized, restrained, and subtle in ef-
fect. As in the case of Papandreou's Socialists, dissent
in New Democracy appears to come largely from
younger members.' Unlike their Socialist counter-
parts, however, the disaffected members of New
Democracy have directed their grievances at the
party's administrative practices rather than its ideolo-
gy or policies.
The principal locus of dissent has been the "Volvi
Movement," a relatively obscure group so called
because of its emergence in the Volvi region near
Thessaloniki. The US Consul General in Thessaloniki
reported in the late 1970s that the movement had
perhaps 1,000 rank-and-file members, who, in the
Consul General's estimate, were primarily college-
educated men in their thirties and forties from fam-
ilies where a higher education had not previously been
the norm. The group was calling for the reform of
traditional politics, the abolition of widespread brib-
ery in public administration, greater opportunities for
youth, increased internal democracy, and the decen-
tralization of authority.
Although there does not appear to be any leadership
or structure to this grass-roots movement and al-
though no New Democracy deputy is openly linked to
it, press reports have
suggested that Evert is at least a sympathizer. He was
leader of the Karamanlis youth group during the early
1960s, and more recently he has been labeled by the
press as a leader of an informal group of "new guard"
deputies, or "dauphins." Other deputies reportedly
associated with the dauphins are 36-year-old Andreas
Andrianopoulos, the party's leading representative
from Piraeus, and Stavros Dimas and loannis
Palaiokrasas-younger deputies with positions in
New Democracy's "shadow cabinet."
'The 1 June 1980 edition of / Kathimerini, a pro-New Democracy
newspaper and the country's most respected journal, quoted the
leader of the party's youth wing in Thessaloniki as criticizing the
leadership's ". . . indifferences or, rather, the guardianship, which
the party shows to our youth. They consider our youths unripe for
initiatives and view us as a useless piece of the party mechanism."
Neither the "Volvi" nor the "dauphins" appear yet to
have wielded appreciable influence in party affairs,
and New Democracy leaders-hardly sympathetic to
all the aims of these younger reformers-have dispar-
aged the Volvi publicly. In our view, the older politi-
cians in the party are well aware, however, of the need
to promote mobility within the party. While he was
Prime Minister, Karamanl s regularly recruited new
members for the party from the burgeoning ranks of
technicians and professionals. We believe, however,
that such efforts have only scratched the surface of
the problem. In our view, unless the party's leaders
more actively develop precinct-level organization and
abandon their paternalistic approach to the rank and
file, New Democracy has little chance of competing
with the Socialists' impressive machinery
New Democracy's cohesion still depends on Kara-
manlis. The Constitution puts the president above
party politics,
despite his formal retirement from the party
leadership, Karamanlis wields significant power with-
in New Democracy and that he is deeply concerned
about the party's future-especially the lack of any
clear alternative to Averof should he step down.
Karamanlis's deep involvement in the day-to-day
workings of the party further complicates the prob-
lems of party change and leadership transition. Dur-
ing the Rallis administration, Karamanlis angered the
Prime Minister and other cabinet officers by his
predilection to interfere in even mundane business. On
the eve of the vote of confidence called by Rallis
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following the 1981 election, Karamanlis's office is-
sued a plea for party unity. This move was widely
interpreted in the press
Karamanlis's inclination to stay closely involved in the
affairs of the party stems from a desire to preserve his
political legacy. We believe Karamanlis, who is deeply
committed to democracy in Greece, is concerned that
the sorry state of New Democracy could jeopardize
hard-won political stability. The President's reluc-
tance to leave the work of the party to others is also a
function of his personality. As Europe's senior states-
man-he served 14 years as premier-Karamanlis
has a high opinion of his importance in Greek politics.
His self-esteem, which some Greek observers have
described as arrogance, has never been tempered by
experience in the opposition. Yet another impetus, in
our judgment, probably is Karamanlis's conviction
that his own popularity is directly tied to that of New
Democracy and that a fractured party would make it
all the more difficult for him to influence Papandreou.
These considerations notwithstanding, our best guess
is that Karamanlis-himself an unexpected and
youthful appointee as party leader in 1955-will come
eventually to conclude that if the party is to have a
future, it must learn to get along without its aging
founder. This, we suspect, will lead him to step back
gradually from party affairs. We believe that he will
be more inclined to do so if he becomes convinced that
Papandreou has made his peace with the EC and
NATO and is likely to maintain good working ties
with the United States. Until Karamanlis does give
his successors a bit more room to operate on their
own, we believe he runs the risk of stunting the party's
development as a political movement independent of
his own considerable popularity.
Given New Democracy's leadership problems and
organizational deficiencies, we question the party's
ability in the near term to mount a potent opposition
to the government. In addition, Papandreou is still
fairly popular. Although his lack of success in improv-
ing the economy would harm the Socialists' chances
of equaling their 1981 showing if elections were held
any time soon, New Democracy would, in our view,
have only a narrow chance of ousting the government.
So much needs to be done to rejuvenate the party that
its chances of overtaking the Socialists in the short
term will depend more on Papandreou's performance
than on New Democracy's success in reunifying the
conservative movement.
Adding to the party's short-term problems, the selec-
tion of a new party leader has a good chance of
producing a minor schism. In our estimate, Stefano-
poulos's selection as leader would have the best hope
of keeping New Democracy intact, but even he is far
from universally popular in the party. We judge that
Mitsotakis's election would give New Democracy its
most dynamic and able orator in a campaign against
Papandreou. Mitsotakis, however, has a reputation for
opportunistic scheming, and his emergence could im-
pel a sizable number of deputies-20 or 30, perhaps-
to break ranks.
In the unlikely event such dissension led to a more
serious fracture, the party probably would not
completely disappear. President Karamanlis almost
certainly would become more actively and openly
involved in politics and seek to regroup his supporters
in a reconstituted New Democracy. The few right-
wing deputies might decide to link up with the
extreme conservative Progressive Party of Spyros
Markezenis or a reorganized National Camp under
Theotokis. Deputies in the Rallis-Boutos and Mitsota-
kis factions could attempt to forge a new center party,
aligning themselves with small parties such as Ioannis
Pesmazoglou's Party of Democratic Socialism, loan-
nis Zigdis's Democratic Center Union, and the Liber-
al Party. Of these various splinter groups, a rump
New Democracy under Karamanlis probably would
be the most viable entity. The extreme right would
have too narrow a base to pose a threat to the
mainline conservatives, while the centrists would face
the formidable challenge of competing with Papan-
dreou's Socialists.
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Until it solves at least some of its problems, New
Democracy will not be able to bring significant
influence to bear on the making of national policy.
While in a narrow sense this leaves Greece without a
real political opposition, it does not mean that Papan-
dreou can pursue his agenda unchallenged. The com-
bination of the pro-Western military and Karamanlis
in the presidency will continue to provide strong and
clear conservative checks on the Prime Minister's
actions.
Notwithstanding the potential strains, the chances of
a wide-open split in New Democracy during the next
year or so are, in our view, small. As long as
Papandreou retains his strength in Parliament and
President Karamanlis remains active in the political
arena, prospective conservative renegades will think
twice before bolting the party and further weakening
opposition forces. Ironically for New Democracy, the
danger of a schism could become more acute if
Papandreou were to suffer a sharp decline in populari-
ty and encounter serious factionalism in his own
party. He might, in this event, seek to lure New
Democracy deputies into his ranks with promises of
government positions. There also is the possibility that
moderate deputies in New Democracy might be
tempted to link up with like-minded deputies in
Papandreou's party if either of the two major groups
in Parliament were to develop extremist tendencies. F
If New Democracy can stay intact and begin dealing
with its problems head on, its longer term outlook
probably is better than its current political circum-
stances might suggest. The results of the October
1982 municipal elections show that the party can
draw votes without really trying. Although the control
of most municipalities shifted to the Socialists, New
Democracy was able to match the Socialist vote in
Athens and achieve a plurality in Thessaloniki in the
first round of voting.' More recently, New Democracy
students made substantial gains in university board
elections
' In both cases, the New Democracy candidates for mayor were
young and politically moderate. In addition, a portion of the
Communist Party vote-which was almost double its 1981 tally-
New Democracy established a generally favorable
record as a governing party, and it stands potentially
to be the beneficiary of any disgruntlement with
Papandreou. Given Greece's strong cultural orienta-
tion toward the West and the desire of the Greek
public for continued political and economic ties with
the West European allies and the United States,
conservative parties and their electoral platforms
should enjoy enduring support from the Greek public.
If New Democracy finds the wherewithal to put its
internal affairs in order, this natural conservative
constituency should continue to fall its way.
25X1
25X1
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Appendix A
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation
Information regarding the allegiances of deputies
within New Democracy is sparse and does not permit
definitive conclusions about the exact size or nature of
each faction. Press reports do, how-
ever, reveal some broad regional, philosophical, edu-
cational, and generational differences.
The party, in our judgment, falls into two ideological
camps, with the supporters of Averof and Stefanopou-
los in one group and the followers of Rallis, Boutos,
and Mitsotakis in another. Divisions within New
Democracy, however, are not sharp, and there are
loosely defined subfactions in each of the two groups.
A fourth or so of the parliamentary delegation ap-
pears to be uncommitted to any candidate.
The larger of the two blocs-about 60 deputies-
backs Averof and Stefanopoulos. Those closest to
Averof tend to be the oldest, their ages exceeding the
51-year-old average of all New Democracy deputies.
The Averof group includes the highest proportion of
deputies who were elected to Parliament before 1974,
and its members tend to represent the northern and
rural districts in which they were born. Prominent in
this group are Karamanlis's "circle of elders," such as
fellow septuagenarian and deputy party leader Con-
stantine Papaconstantinou. These are the old guard
conservatives, strongly pro-United States and anti-
Communist. To a lesser extent they are promonar-
chist, as well.
The 20 or so followers of Rallis and Boutos are, in our
estimate, a less diverse group, and generational differ-
ences are not as pronounced. The deputies in this
group are near or below the average age of the 25X1
delegation and must represent the more urbanized
districts of Attaki-the region encompassing 25X1
Athens-and the Peloponnesus. Even though there
are no discernible differences between the two main
factions in regard to occupation, the Rallis-Boutos
group appears to have a higher proportion of deputies
with foreign educations. As the "reformers" within
New Democracy, this group espouses the need for 25X1
social change and moderate domestic and foreign
policies.
Mitsotakis and his approximately 15 backers are
philosophically akin to Rallis and Boutos, and they
are the party's mainstay in the liberal bastion of
Crete. The age span of this group is similar to that of
the traditional Averof conservatives. Many served in
Parliament before the junta years.
The deputies who support Stefanopoulos tend to be
younger than the average age of the party's parlia-
mentary delegation. They are relative newcomers to
Parliament and nearly to a man represent electoral
districts-most of them in central Greece-of which
they are not native. Stefanopoulos shares many of the
beliefs of his elders, but he and his followers probably
are less doctrinaire in their approach to domestic
issues and the Greek left and more attuned to a
foreign policy that permits Athens some independence
from its Western allies
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Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation
Deputy
Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
First
Elected
Comments
Averof, Evangelos
1910
72
Trikala
Ioannina
Lausanne
University
Doctor of Law
Politician
1946
Leader
Anagnostopoulos,
Nikos
1929
53
Arkadhia
Athens A
National
Metsoveion
Polytechnic
School
University of
Milan a
Civil Engineer
1963
Balkos, Athanasios
1916
66
Preveza
Preveza
Military
Academy
Army Officer,
retired
Davakis, Dimitrios
1909
73
Lakonia
Lakonia
Athens
University
Pharmacist
1951
Dimas, Stavros
1941
42
Korinthia
Korinthia
Athens
University
London, N.Y.U.
Attorney
Economist
1977
Efstratiadis,
Agamemnon
1926
56
Larisa
Larisa
EMP
Civil Engineer
1977
Hatzidimitriou,
Dimitrios
1918
64
Imathia
Imathia
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1952
Hatzigakis, Sotirios 1945
37
Trikala
Trikala
Athens
University
Attorney
1974
Hatzinikolaou,
Panayiotis
1932
50
Evros
Evros
Athens
University
(dentist)
Thessaloniki
University (law)
Dentist
1963
Kalogiannis,
Elevtherios
1930
52
Ioannina
Ioannina
EMP
Ioannina
Zosimaia
Businessman
1974
Kanellopoulos,
Athanasios
1923
59
Ilia
Athens
University
Economist
Journalist
1963
Former centrist
politician
Katsigiannis,
Christos
1929
53
Attaki
Attaki
EMP
Civil Engineer
1974
Pro-Rallis?
Kontogiannopolis,
Vasilis
1942
40
Ilia
Ilia
Athens and
Paris
Universities
Attorney
1974
Rallis sympathizer?
Koutras, Panayiotis 1934
48
Thessaloniki
Thessaloniki B
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1977
Laskaris,
Constantinos
1918
64
Athens
Athens B
Athens
University
Attorney
1974
Labor leader
Lavrentidis, Isaak
1909
73
Caucasus
USSR
Serras
Athens
University
Attorney
1946
Papadopoulos,
Haralam
1944
38
Kilkis
Kilkis
Florence
Polytechnic
Institute
Architect
1974
Papaconstantinou,
Constantine
1907
75
Korinthia
At large
Athens
University
Attorney
1946
Deputy leader
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Table 2 (continued)
Deputy
Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
University
Simaioforidis,
Constantinos
1931
51
Kastoria
Kastoria
Teacher
Stamatis, Georgios
1915
67
Aitolia-
Akarnania
Aitolia-
Akarnania
Athens
University
Attorney
Stratos, Christoforos 1924
58
Akhaia
Aitolia-
Akarnania
Athens
University
Industrialist
Theoharidis,
Dimosthenis
1916
66
Florina
Florina
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
Tsaldaris,
Athanasios
1921
61
Athens
Athens B
Athens
University (law)
Columbia (social
science)
Attorney
Tsiouplakis,
Constantinos
1933
49
Khalkidhiki
Khalkidhiki
Thessaloniki
Academy
Hamburg
University
Stuttgart
Polytechnic
Professor
Tzitzikostas,
Georgios
1941
41
Athens
Thessaloniki B
Thessaloniki
University (law)
Paris University
(economics)
Attorney
Vagiatis,
loannis
1916
66
Kozani
Kozani
Supreme
Agriculture
School
Columbia
Farmer
Varvitsiotis,
loannis
1933
49
Athens
Athens B
Athens
University
Freiburg
University,
West Germany
Attorney
Vogiatzis, Georgios
1913
69
Evvoia
Evvoia
EMP
Civil Engineer
Stefanopoulos group
Stetanopoulos,
Constantinos
1926
56
Akhaia
Akhaia
Athens
University
Attorney
Alexiou, Thomas
1925
57
Xanthi
Xanthi
Thessaloniki
University (law)
Commercial
Agent
Bletsas, Stylianos
1934
48
Rodopi
Rodopi
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
Damianos,
Theodoros
1955
27
Athens
Drama
Advanced
School of
Economic and
Commercial
Sciences b
Economist
Frangos, Dimitrios
1935
47
Athens
Attaki
Athens
University
Attorney
First Comments
Elected
1981
1946 Pro-Mitsotakis?
1974
1951
1963
1974
1974 Wealthiest person
in Parliament
1974
1964
1974
1974 Independent or pro-
Rallis?
1981
1974
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Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)
Deputy Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
First
Elected
Comments
Gatsos, Theofilos 1930
52
Arkadia
Pella
Thessaloniki
University
Physician _
1981
Independent?
Gkoygkourelas, 1935
Constantinos
47
Pieria
Piraievs
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1981
Kalteziotis, 1942
Nikolaos
'40
Arkadia
Arkadia
EMP
Civil Engineer
1974
Pro-Rallis?
Katsaros, Nikolaos 1937
45
Larisa
Larisa
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1981
Kratsas, Apostolos 1941
41
Athens
Athens B
EMP
Electrical
Engineer
1974
Misailidis, Georgios 1929
53
Khios
Khios
Athens
University
Attorney
1981
Moutzouridis, 1926
Georgios
56
Argolis
Argolis
Athens
University
Attorney
1981
Panourgias, 1917
Panourgias
65
Athens
Fthiotis
Military
Academy
Army officer
retired
1974
Pro-Rallis?
Papadimitriou, 1948
Eleftherios
34
Arta
Arta
Athens
University
ASOEE
New York
University
Attorney
Economist
1981
Pro-Rallis?
Papageorgopoulos, 1947
Vasilis
35
Thessaloniki
Thessaloniki A
Thessaloniki
University
Dentist
1981
Paparrigopoulos, 1922
Constantinos
60
Akhaia
Athens B
Athens
University
Attorney
1963
Polydoras, Byron 1947
35
Ilia
Athens B
Athens
University
Nevada
University
Hague Academy
Attorney
1981
Printzos, 1940
Constantinos
42
Magnisia
Magnisia
Athens
University
Physician
1977
Psarouda-Benaki, 1943
Anna
39
Athens
At large
Athens
University
Bonn University
(Ph.D.)
Attorney
Professor
1981
Pro-Rallis?
Sapsalis, 1939
Constantinos
43
Evritania
Athens A
Athens
University
Attorney
1974
Sarlis, Pavlos 1932
50
Piraievs
Piraievs A
Athens
University
London
University
Attorney
1981
Spentzari, Froso 1942
40
Ilia
Ilia
Athens
University
Pharmacist
1981
Pro-Rallis?
Tataridis, Stavros 1942
40
Evros
Evros
Massachusetts
University
Economist
1974
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Deputy
Date
Age Birthplace
Election
Education
Occupation
First
Comments
of
District
Elected
Birth
Tsiplakos,
1929
53
Voiotia
Voiotia
EMP
Civil Engineer
1981
Aristeidis
Vlahothanasis,
1923
59
Evvoia
Evvoia
Athens
Attorney
1961
Former centrist
Angelis
University
politician
Vouyioklakis, Elias
1935
47
Lakonia
Piraievs B
Pandeios Su-
Attorney
1974
preme School
of Political
Sciences, Athens
University
Vrettakos, Dimitrios 1933
49
Lakonia
Athens B
Athens
Attorney
1974
Pro-Rallis'?
University
Mitsotakis group
Mitsotakis,
1918
64
Khania
Khania
Athens
Attorney
1946
Former centrist
Constantin
as
University
politician
-
Alamanis, Stelios
1910
72
Kardhitsa
Kardhitsa
Athens
Attorney
1950
Former centrist
University
politician
University of
Gettingen
Kefalogiannis,
1916
66
Rethymon
Iraklion
Athens
Attorney
1950
Emmanuel
University
ASOEE
Kefalogiannis,
1932
51
Rethimni
Rethimni
Athens
Physician
1958
Pro-Averof?
loannis
University
Kleitos, Nikolaos
1929
53
Serrai
Serrai
Thessaloniki
Attorney
1974
University
Mantzoris, Vasilios
1935
47
Arkadia
Arkadia
Athens
Attorney
1977
University
Papadopoulos,
1931
51
Serrai
Serrai
Thessaloniki
Attorney
1981
Independent'?
Theodoros
University
Samaris, Antonis
1951
31
Athens
Messinia
Amherst
Economist
1977
Currently pro-
Harvard
Averof?
Sergakis, loannis
1914
68
Lasithi
Lasithi
Athens
Attorney
1956
Former centrist
University
politician
Sourlas, Georgios
1941
42
Magnisia
Magnisia
Thessaloniki
Oculist
1981
University
Synodinou, Anna
1927
55
Attaki
Athens A
National
Actress
1974
Pro-Averof'?
Theater School
Taliadouros,
1918
64
Kardhitsa
Kardhitsa
Athens
Attorney
1946
Pro-Averof'?
Athanasios
University
Valtadoros,
1916
66
Imathia
Imathia
PASPE
Attorney
1981
Angelus
Thessaloniki
University
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Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)
Deputy Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
First
Elected
Comments
Rallis, George 1918
65
Athens
Athens A
Athens
University
Attorney
1950
Boutos,Ioannis 1925
57
Athens
Messinia
Athens
University
London School
of Economics
Attorney
1950
Anastopoulos, 1944
Nikos
54
Messinia
Messinia
Athens
University
Physician
1974
Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Avramidis, 1927
Alexandros
55
Athens
Kilkis
ASOEE
Captain, Mer-
chant Marine
1974
Bekiris, Vasileios 1936
46
Akhaia
Akhaia
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1974
Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Bokovos, Panayiotis 1935
47
Pella
Thessaloniki A
Thessaloniki
University
Nancy Univer-
sity
Economist
1977
Fotopoulos, Christos 1928
54
Aitolia-
Akarnania
Aitolia-
Akarnania
Military
Academy
Business
Executive
1977
Pro-Averof?
Giatrakos, 1936
Constantinos
46
Lakonia
Lakonia
University
of Paris
Howard
MIT
Economist
1974
Former centrist
politician
Kalantzakos, 1928
Aristeidis
54
Lakonia
Messinia
Athens
University
Paris University
Nancy Univer-
sity
Attorney
1958
Independent?
Pro-Averof?
Krikos, Athanassios 1937
55
Fokis
Athens B
Thessaloniki
University
Tax Attorney
1974
Independent?
Livanos, Dionysios
1934
48
Athens
Aitolia-
Akarnanis
Athens
University
Oxford
University
Attorney
1974
Moutsios, Georgios
1926
56
Serrai
Thessaloniki A
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1974
Papaligouras,
Anastassios
1948
34
Athens
Korinthia
Athens
University
Brunell, London
Attorney
1981
Rallis's
son-in-law
Papolitis, Sotirios
1941
42
Piraievs
Piraievs A
Athens
University
Toronto
University
Attorney
1974
Former centrist
politician
Pavlidis, Aristotelis
1943
39
Dhodhekanisos
Dhodhekanisos
Athens
University
London
Polytechnic
Physicist
1977
Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Souflias, Georgios
1941
42
Larisa
Larisa
Civil Engineer
1974
Pro-Stefanopoulos?
Tzannetakis,
Tzannis
1927
55
Lakonia
Athens A
Naval Academy Retired Officer
1977
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Table 2 (continued)
Deputy
Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
Andrianopoulos,
Andreas
1946
36
Piraievs
Piraievs A
Athens
University
Cambridge
University
Oslo University
Politician
Bougas, Georgios
1941
41
Piraievs
Piraievs B
Athens
University
Attorney
Ermeidis,
Haralampos
1914
68
Turkey
Thessaloniki B
Athens
University
Dentist
Evert, Miltiadis
1939
43
Athens
Athens A
ASOEE
Economist
Gkelestathis,
Nikolaos
1930
52
Fokis
Fokis
Athens
University
Attorney
Gkikas, Sotirios
1925
57
Corfu
Corfu
Military
Academy
Army officer
retired
Karamanlis,
1929
53
Serrai
Serrai
Thessaloniki
Attorney
Achilles
Univeristy
Cambridge
University
Kavaratzis,
1940
42
Evros
Evros
Athens
Physician
Ioannis
University
Kontaxis,
1941
41
Arta
Arta
Athens
Attorney
Athanasios
University
Kopelouzos,
Dimitrios
1951
31
Athens
Kikladhes
EMP
Businessman
Kouvelas, Sotirios
1936
46
Ilia
Thessaloniki A
Thessaloniki
University
Civil Engineer
Manousakis, Diakos 1925
57
Dhodhekanisos
Pella
Athens
University
Dentist
Memetoglou
Giasar
1920
62
Rodopi
Rodopi
Journalist
Nianias, Dimitrios
1923
58
Kikladhes
Lesvos
Athens and
Oxford
University
Professor
Palaiokrasas,
loannis
1934
48
Athens
Kikladhes
Papadogigonas,
1931
51
Arkadia
Athens A
Naval
Naval officer
Alexandros
Academy
retired
Papakonstantinou,
1919
63
Kozani
Kozani
Thessaloniki
Attorney
Michael
University
Cambridge
University
Manchester
University
Panagiotopoulos,
1930
52
Kavala
Kavala
Athens
Attorney
Georgios
University
Sioufas, Dimitrios
1944
38
Karditsa
Karditsa
Thessaloniki
University
PASPE
Attorney
First Comments
Elected
1974 Pro-Boutos?
Rallis?
1977
1961
1974
1981
1981
1963 President's
brother
1974
1974
1981
1981
1981
1974 Former centrist
ethnic Turk
1974 Independent?
Pro-Mitsotakis
1974 Pro-
Monarchist?
1961 Former centrist
politician
1974
1981
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Table 2
New Democracy's Parliamentary Delegation (continued)
Deputy
Date
of
Birth
Age Birthplace
Election
District
Education
Occupation
First
Elected
Comments
Sofoulis,
Themistoklis
1935
47
Samos
Samos
Athens
University
London
University
Attorney
1981
Pro-Boutos?
Rallis?
Stafopoulos
loannis
1934
48
Athens
Lakonia
Naval
Academy
Naval officer
retired
1974
Independent?
Pro-Averof?
Xarhas,
Athanasios
1932
50
Fthiotis
Fthiotis
Athens
University
Attorney
1981
Pro-
Varvitsiotis?
Elected deputies no
longer in the party
Dervenagas,
Athanasios
1941
41
Trikala
Trikala
Thessaloniki
University
Attorney
1974
Kanellopoulos,
Panayiotis
1902
80
Akhaia
At large
Athens
University
Munich
University
Heidelberg
University
Author
1963
Former centrist
politician
Kokkebis, Andreas
1909
73
At large
Athens
University
Physician
1950
Former centrist
politician
Plytas, Georgios
1910
72
Athens
Athens A
ASOEE
London
Insurance
Broker
1961
Theotokis, Spyros
1908
74
Corfu
At large
Athens
University
Paris University
Lausanne
University
Politician
1934
National
Camp
party
leader
a Hereafter referred to as EMP.
b Hereafter referred to as ASOEE.
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895ROO0100070004-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9
 Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9
Secret
New Democracy Party Strength by Electoral District
Bulgaria
LESVOS
(( Iraklion
KHANIA ETHIMNI ~
SR
nn//CC~, re t e
Circles represent central city and
suburban voting patterns.
Party strength is based on the
average of votes cast in the 1974,
1977 and 1981 elections.
ZAKINTHOS,. \
Yugoslavia
Electoral district boundary
PARTY STRENGTH
Over 60% 41-45%
51-60% 31-40%
46-50?o Under 30%
50 100 Kilometers
Turkey
-\
DHODHEKANISOS
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9
 Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0895R000100070004-9