LDC DEBT POSITIONS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000400140003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
Intelligence
and Prospects
LDC Debt Positions
GI 83-10166
August 1983
Copy 460
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
and Prospects
LDC Debt Positions
This paper was prepared b~
the Office of Global Issues.
OGI,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, International Finance Branch,
Secret
GI 83-10166
August 1983
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Summary
Information available
as of 27 June 1983
was used in this report.
and Prospects
percent typical during the late 1970s.
After almost a full year of international financial difficulties, the Third
World debt issue is far from being solved. Despite some easing in the
growth of LDC debt service payments last year, the international financial
system remains vulnerable to debtors' inability to meet repayment terms.
The rise in debt service payments in 1982 slowed to about half the rise in
1981, in large measure because LDCs were limited in the amount of new
debt they could acquire in the aftermath of the international financial
disruption that began to take hold last August and interest rates were
lower. At the same time, however, the drop in LDC export revenues that
accompanied global recession pushed the aggregate ratio of debt service to
export earnings up to almost 35 percent in 1982, well above the 15 to 20
America.
Third World debt remains highly concentrated in a relatively small
number of countries. The 10 largest debtors accounted for almost 65
percent of the total $596 billion LDC debt at yearend 1982; of these,
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, and Venezuela held about half of
the total. Of these top five, all but South Korea are currently in the process
of renegotiating their debt. Total US bank claims on LDCs rose to $121
billion at yearend 1982 from $109 billion in 1981, with Mexico and Brazil
together owing $45 billion, or about half the US banks' claims on Latin
The dominance of large debtors and highly exposed US banks makes the
international financial system fragile and vulnerable to shocks on either
side:
? Although many of the large, heavily exposed banks are aware of the need
to support LDC economic adjustment efforts, they fear that other banks
may refuse to lend new money or even seek to reduce their present loan
exposures.
? Major influences on bank lending will be the outcome of the debt
rescheduling exercises in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, and the adher-
ence of these countries to IMF programs. Should private creditors view
these actions as failing to assure a reasonably steady stream of debt
repayments, we believe that they would substantially reduce lending to
LDCs in general for at least several years.
iii Secret
GI 83-10166
August 1983
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? The disturbance in the interbank money markets-where banks borrow
from other banks-that occurred late last year may continue to limit
LDC bank access to this source of funds. In addition, many non-US
developed country banks that were lending to the Third World depended
heavily on this market.
? Uncertainty about the behavior of smaller banks increases the concern of
major banks that countries presently not encountering debt servicing
difficulties are vulnerable to a sharp curtailment of bank lending. This
uncertainty has caused banks to fear the emergence of regional debt
problems outside of Latin America and thus be reluctant to lend
substantial new money to many LDCs.
Whether the LDCs can get through the present crisis and restore their
development momentum hinges on several conditions: interest rates do not
rise substantially; demand for LDC exports increases; LDCs adhere to
IMF austerity measures; and banks, governments, and multilateral institu-
tions continue to grant emergency assistance to LDCs. Moreover, we
believe that several large debtors will continue to turn to Washington-as
they have several times already-for direct assistance and help in influenc-
ing private debt renegotiations.
How each of these complex conditions evolves over the next several years
will determine the strength and direction of risks to the stability of the
international monetary system. Against that perspective, this research
paper provides the baseline details for judging the size and significance of
the debt problem for individual LDCs and for a number of country
aggregates.
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LDC Debt Positions
and Prospects
Debt Developments in 1982
The Volume of Debt. The rapid buildup in the level of
aggregate LDC external debt that occurred during
most of the past decade slowed considerably in 1982.
Total LDC debt' increased 11 percent to $596 billion,
compared with growth of 17 percent and 16 percent in
1980 and 1981 (see table 1). The major reason behind
the slowdown in LDC debt growth was the reluctance
of creditors-primarily private banks-to increase
their lending to LDCs during the last half of 1982 in
the wake of the Latin American economic and finan-
cial problems. The slower growth in external debt was
most noticeable among the non-OPEC LDCs. Their
debt-$497 billion at yearend 1982-increased 12
percent compared with 20 percent in 1981. Among
the eight OPEC countries lacking large asset hold-
ings, however, debt increased substantially faster-by
8 percent in 1982 versus less than 1 percent during
Service Payments. Debt service payments for the
LDCs also increased at a slower pace in 1982. Total
payments in 1982 were $127 billion,' up 17 percent
from 1981; in contrast, the 1981 figure represented a
31-percent increase over the 1980 total. This pattern
held true for both the non-OPEC and OPEC aggre-
gates. The slower growth of LDC debt service pay-
ments was related to the decline in new bank lending,
but it was largely explained by the drop in world
interest rates during 1982.
Lower interest rates on floating-rate debt resulted in a
decline in the interest portion of total LDC debt
service from 55 percent in 1981 to 51 percent last
year. When compared with exports of goods and
services, however, interest payments accounted for 18
percent of the LDC total, up from 16 percent in 1981.
' These data constitute disbursed debt of all maturities, exclusive of
IMF credits and military debt, for 100 LDCs. For additional
methodological details, a discussion of sources for the data used,
and a list of the LDCs in our data base, see appendix A.
A discussion of the debt positions of key LDCs is contained in
appendix C, and debt tables for the 100 LDCs are given in
appendix D.
Table 1
Aggregate LDC Debt and Debt Service
459 535 596
391
Medium- and long-term
(MLT)
Official sources
Principal (MLT)
38
Interest (total)
31
23
8
308
Medium- and long-term
261
Official sources
104
157
47
54
Principal (MLT)
30
Interest (total)
24
39 49
44 60
32 41
12 19
368 443
300 354
120 134
180 220
68 89
64 84
30 36
34 48
170
304
122
127
63
65
50
15
497
398
151
247
99
100
47
53
41
12 25X1
16
18
17
50
54
54
17
19
21
15
19
25
Principal (MLT) 8
10
13
Interest(total) 7
9
12
MLT 5
6
8
2
3
4
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Figure 1
Aggregate LDC External Debt, 1973-82'
Private creditors
Q Official creditors
The importance of this ratio is that interest payments
are considered essential for LDCs, whereas principal
repayments can be rolled over or delayed, as in the
case of the Mexican debt moratorium.
Although the growth of debt service payments slowed,
a drop in LDC exports of goods and services pushed
the aggregate LDC debt service ratio from 29 percent
in 1981 to a record 35 percent in 1982.3 Several major
non-OPEC debtors were the driving force behind the
high ratio-Argentina (98 percent), Brazil (83 per-
cent), Chile (79 percent), Morocco (77 percent), Peru
(70 percent), and Mexico (64 percent) were all well
above the average. Some smaller LDCs also regis-
tered high debt service ratios in 1982, including
Guinea-Bissau (74 percent) and Madagascar (70 per-
cent).
Throughout this paper, the debt service ratio is defined as total
debt service (medium- and long-term principal plus interest pay-
ments on debt of all maturities) as a percentage of exports of goods
and services. If short-term interest is excluded, the figures for the
same two years were 21 percent and 28 percent, respectivelyF_
Composition of Debt. The share of LDC medium-
and long-term debt held by private creditors fell
slightly for only the second time in the 1973-82
period. However, private creditors-mainly commer-
cial banks-remained by far the most important
source of funds for LDCs, accounting for almost two-
thirds of total medium- and long-term debt (see
figure 1)
US banks continued to be a major source of funds for
LDCs. US bank claims on LDCs 'totaled $121 billion
at yearend 1982, which was around 35 percent of total
bank claims on LDCs. Latin America accounted for
most of the US bank claims-about $83 billion. The
largest countries in terms of US claims at yearend
1982 were Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and South
Korea (see table 2).
These data exclude loans to offshore banking centers-Bahamas,
Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Leba-
non, Liberia, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, and Singapore-
because of the inability to separate loans used for domestic purposes
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Table 2
Selected LDCs: Debt Held by US Banks
US Bank
Share of
US Bank
Share of
Claims
BIS Total
Claims
BIS Total
(billion US $)
Bank Debt
(billion US $)
Bank Debt
(percent) a
(percenl)a
June 1982
December
June 1982
June 1982
December
June 1982
1982
1982
Total
115.2
121.2
36
India
0.5
0.9
32
Of which:
Iran
0.5
0.5
21
Mexico
24.9
24.4
39
Nicaragua
0.4
0.4
54
Brazil
18.9
20.4
34
Bolivia
0.4
0.4
37
Venezuela
11.0
11.6
41
Pakistan
0.3
0.2
39
South Korea
8.6
11.0
43
Paraguay
0.3
0.3
59
Argentina
8.6
8.2
34
Sudan
0.3
0.2
23
Chile
6.3
6.1
53
Honduras
0.3
0.2
48
Philippines
5.6
5.7
49
Kenya
0.3
0.2
30
Taiwan
4.5
4.8
70
Jamaica
0.2
0.3
47
Colombia
2.7
3.2
50
Zambia
0.2
0.2
33
Indonesia
2.5
3.0
31
Tunisia
0.2
0.2
19
Peru
2.4
2.5
45
Gabon
0.2
0.2
25
Ecuador
2.2
2.0
47
Guatemala
0.2
0.2
48
Thailand
1.5
1.8
32
Zaire
0.2
0.1
17
Egypt
1.5
1.2
28
Trinidad and
0.1
0.2
20
Algeria
1.3
1.2
17
Tobago
Nigeria
1.3
1.9
19
Cameroon
0.1
0.2
15
Iraq
0.1
0.2
34
Jordan
0.1
0.2
17
Uruguay
0.7
0.9
62
Malawi
0.1
0.1
45
Ivory Coast
0.6
0.6
18
El Salvador
0.1
0.1
27
Dominican
0.5
0.5
59
Syria
0.1
NEGL
12
Republic
Senegal
0.1
0.1
17
Ghana
NEGL
NEGL
8
Total Bank for International Settlements bank debt data for end of
December 1982 are not available.
The portion of LDC external debt that is short term
(less than one-year original maturity) declined only
slightly from 20.6 percent in 1981 to 20.4 percent in
1982, even though the volume of short-term debt in
1982 grew at less than half the rate of the previous
year. The drop in the short-term portion of the debt
was largely caused by lender cutbacks in short-term
credit lines-particularly in Latin America-and the
refinancing of short-term credits into longer term
credits by several major debtors such as Argentina
and Venezuela. On average, the non-OPEC LDCs
reduced the short-term portion of their debt, while the
OPEC countries increased theirs.
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Distribution of Debt. LDC external debt continued to
be concentrated in a small number of countries in
1982. The 10 largest LDC debtors-Brazil, Mexico,
South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, Indonesia,
Egypt, India, Chile, and Algeria-accounted for
nearly 65 percent of total LDC debt last year; nearly
half of the total was held by the first five. With the
exception of Egypt and India, all of these LDCs have
depended heavily on private sources of financing. For
example, the five largest debtors-Brazil, Mexico,
South Korea, Argentina, and Venezuela-accounted
for 58 percent of total LDC debt from private sources,
including short-term debt. With four of these five
countries experiencing financial difficulties by late
last year, private banks not surprisingly have been
greatly concerned over their LDC exposure. F__1
The regional distribution of debt remained heavily
weighted toward Latin America in 1982, with these
countries accounting for 52 percent of total LDC
debt. Private sources hold 87 percent of Latin Ameri-
can debt, with US banks providing about 30 percent
of the private total. The aggregate debt service ratio
for Latin America was 57 percent, well above the
overall LDC average of 35 percent. In addition, the
aggregate debt-to-exports ratio 5 of 240 percent for
Latin America topped the LDC average of 163
percent.
East Asia had the next highest concentration of LDC
debt, with 19 percent of the total. Over 70 percent of
East Asian debt was held by private sources, and US
banks held about one-third of this. The group's 1982
debt service ratio was the lowest of any region-15.7
percent-as was the debt-to-exports ratio of 83 per-
cent. These figures were part of the reason that
lenders regarded East Asia as perhaps the only credit-
worthy region among the LDCs during the better part
of 1982
North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia
together had a yearend 1982 debt of nearly $110
billion, 18 percent of the LDC total. Private sources
supplied only 40 percent of this group's total debt,
with US banks accounting for 13 percent of the 1982
private total. These countries' aggregate debt service
Table 3
LDC Debt Reschedulings
Number of Number of Amount
Reschedulings Countries Rescheduled
(billion US $)
1980
1981
1982
11 2.0
12 2.5
8 0.5
average-23 percent and 113 percent, respectively.
Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only about 10
percent of total LDC debt. The debt was split almost
evenly among official and private creditors; about
15 percent of the private debt at yearend 1982 was
held by US banks. Four countries-Nigeria, Ivory
Coast, Zaire, and Zimbabwe-together accounted for
about 55 percent of the debt from private sources but
only 19 percent of the official debt. When these
countries are excluded, official sources accounted for
almost two-thirds of Sub-Saharan African debt. The
group's debt service ratio of about 24 percent and
debt-to-exports ratio of 146 percent were both below
the LDC average.
Debt Reschedulings
There were 10 LDC debt reschedulings completed in
1982, as compared with 12 in 1981, and the amount
of debt rescheduled dropped from $2.5 billion in 1981
to $0.5 billion last year (see table 3). These figures are
somewhat misleading because at least eight other
countries-including major debtors such as Brazil,
Mexico, and Argentina-initiated talks during the
latter half of 1982 to renegotiate some $35 billion in
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Interest Rates, Inflation, and Exchange Rates:
Their Impact on Debt
Despite falling nominal interest rates, we estimate
that LDC interest payments on medium- and long-
term debt rose from $41 billion in 1981 to $50 billion
in 1982. The average London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) for 1982 fell to 12.2 percent from the
previous year's 16.8 percent, but there was a lag of
several months before lower rates were reflected in
substantially lower debt service payments. Even
though LIBOR fell, the average cost of debt from
private sources (private interest payments divided by
total private debt) registered an increase in 1982 (see
figure 2). The high interest rates struck Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico particularly hard because the
major portion of their external debt is tied to floating
interest rates. Countries such as India and Pakistan
were not substantially affected because they depend
primarily on fixed-interest loans with long maturities
from official sources.
The decline in the rate of inflation among the indus-
trial nations has increased the real level of future
LDC debt service payments. According to several
financial publications, during the late 1970s many
LDCs viewed fixed-rate loans as an attractive source
of funds because they expected that inflation would
erode the real burden of debt service payments. The
debt, but no formal agreements were signed by year-
end. Five reschedulings in 1982 involved debt owed to
official creditors, with the other five covering debt
owed to private sources. Two countries-Malawi and
Senegal-rescheduled both official and private debt
(see table 4).
For official debt reschedulings, the forum in each case
was the Paris Club where a group of creditor govern-
ments renegotiated the debtor's obligations on the
same terms. Although the terms reported in IMF and
other financial publications were generally consistent
with those of earlier reschedulings-eight- to nine-
and-a-half-year maturities, three-and-a-half- to four-
and-three-quarter-year grace periods, with interest
World Bank estimates that in 1981 between 50 to 55
percent of all medium- and long-term debt was on a
fixed-rate basis. The slower rate of US inflation-
annual inflation as measured by the US wholesale
price index fell from 9.1 percent in 1981 to 2.1
percent in 1982-will force LDCs to exchange more
real goods and services to repay their debt obliga-
tions
We believe that the appreciation of the US dollar also
reduced the capacity of LDCs to service their debt,
and it may have contributed to the decline in foreign
bank lending to LDCs. As the dollar rose in value,
the price of many LDC exports declined in terms of
the dollar, while the value of dollar-denominated
debt was unchanged. At the same time, the apprecia-
tion of the dollar inflated the value of dollar loans to
LDCs in terms of the domestic currency of non-US
banks. However, the capital of non-US banks-
equity, subordinated debentures, and provisions for
loan losses-that was denominated in their domestic
currency did not increase. We believe the strong
dollar may have caused banks-especially in West-
ern Europe-to exceed their internal country expo-
sure limits in terms of capital, and thus forced them
to halt new loans to certain LDCs.
rates determined on a bilateral basis-exceptions to
standard procedures were made in the cases of Mada-
gascar and Senegal:
? Short-term debt is normally excluded from coverage
by the Paris Club, but Madagascar's short-term
arrearages were rescheduled in the 1982 agreement
because, according to the IMF, the creditors consid-
ered the debt problem in that country to be especial-
ly severe.
? Financial publications stated that in Senegal's
agreement debt owed by private entities that was
not guaranteed by the government was excluded
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Table 4
1982 LDC Debt Reschedulings
Month
Amount
Rescheduled
(million US $)
Maturity
(years)
Grace
Period
(years)
Interest
Rate
(percentage points
above LIBOR)
Madagascar
July
107 a
9.25
4.75
NA b
Malawi
September
25
8
3.5
NA
Senegal
November
74
8.5
4
NA
July
13
6
3
1.75
November
42
6.5
3
1.875
Nicaragua
March
55
10
5
0.75
Senegal
June
77
6.5 to 7.5
3 to 4
2.0
a Amounts rescheduled for these countries included debt in arrears.
b Interest rates on debt rescheduled by official creditors is deter-
mined on a bilateral basis.
Source: IMF and press reports.
from the rescheduling because the Government of
Senegal was unwilling to accept obligation for those
debts.
The terms for the five private reschedulings with
commercial banks were generally tough, with the
notable exception of Nicaragua. Terms of that agree-
ment were much more generous than those secured in
other bank reschedulings, according to financial pub-
lications. The $55 million in debt payments were
distributed over 10 years with a five-year grace period
at a spread of 0.75 percentage point above the London
J Financial publications indicated that creditors
were concerned that other countries would be tempted
to use similar tactics in debt renegotiations, but
reschedulings since then do not reflect any trend in
that direction.
Outlook for 1983-84
We believe that private banks will not substantially
increase their lending to LDCs during 1983-84. Ac-
cording to the IMF, net new bank lending probably
will fall below the 1982 level of $25 billion in 1983,
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), and both principal compared to $51 billion during 1981.
and interest arrearages were included under the
agreement. Usual terms for bank debt reschedulings
call for a five- to seven-year maturity, a two- to three-
year grace period, and a spread of 1.5 to 2.25 percent-
age points above LIBOR.
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Figure 2
LDCs: Average Cost of Debt From Private Sources"
-OPEC LDCs
All LDCs
Non-OPEC LDCs
-- Three-month LIBOR
1 1
1973 74 75 76 77 78
I I 1 1
79 80 81 82
The number of debt reschedulings, in our judgment,
will increase in 1983, probably to at least 15 coun-
tries. Four LDCs have already rescheduled a portion
of their debt this year, and 16 other countries are in
the process of seeking debt relief (see table 5). The
amount of debt rescheduled in 1983 already totals
$3.2 billion, and completion of ongoing reschedulings
by major debtors such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argen-
tina will sharply increase the total.
Importance of IMF-Supported Programs. We believe
the outcome of the major debt rescheduling exercises,
along with countries' adherence to IMF programs, are
crucial to the overall LDC debt problem. Private
creditors need to perceive that debtors have in place
realistic and sound adjustment programs. Indeed, as
part of the rescheduling efforts under way for major
borrowers such as Brazil and Mexico, banks have
linked their new lending decisions to compliance with
programs supported by the Fund. Should private
creditors view the major programs as failing to pro-
vide for an assured stream of debt repayment, we
believe that they would substantially reduce lending
to LDCs in general for at least several years.
Government leaders in debtor countries already face
increased political opposition as they try to implement
the IMF austerity measures. These programs include
reductions in public spending and domestic money 25X1
growth, which at least temporarily will cause rises in
unemployment along with reductions in real income.
So far, major debtors' success in meeting IMF targets
is mixed. According to financial publications, Argen-
tina and Mexico met their first-quarter targets; how-
ever, bankers fear that future targets will be missed.
Press reports indicated that Brazil missed some of its
first-quarter targets, but the IMF and the Brazilians
are currently discussing ways to get the country back
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An issue that has generally been considered by
financial observers to be of minor importance but
which could have an impact on the ability of LDCs to
work their way out of financial crises is intra-LDC
debt. We estimate that intra-LDC debt accounts for
about 8 to 10 percent of the LDC total. This figure
could be somewhat higher, however, because of the
lack of information regarding short-term and private
nonguaranteed debt. Breakouts of LDC debt by indi-
vidual creditors are very difficult to obtain because of
reluctance on the part of both lender and debtor to
make that information public.
The limited data available to us originates from two
major sources. The OECD publishes medium- and
long-term external debt data broken out by general
categories, two of which are "OPEC" and "Other
LDCs. " Data under these headings are basically
bilateral official loans. These figures do not cover all
intra-LDC debt, however, because export credits and
bank loans made by LDCs are not separated from
those made by industrial countries. The most recent
OECD debt data are for yearend 1980, and these
figures indicate that 6.4 percent of the total debt is
held by LDCs. OPEC countries hold 4.3 percent of
the total, while the non-OPECfigure is 2.1 percent.
The OECD data, however, are not broken down by
individual creditors.
The second major source of information on intra-
LDC debt is the World Bank. The data on public and
publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt by
individual creditors are published on an intermittent
basis and are generally included in World Bank
country studies. The major shortcomings of this data
are that: information is not available for all coun-
tries; no figures are available on short-term debt and
private nonguaranteed medium- and long-term debt;
and no aggregate LDC totals are published.
The importance of intra-LDC debt is most noticeable
when a country or countries are financially squeezed,
as during the past 12 months. Both creditor and
debtor can be negatively affected by such an event.
For example, Bolivia, which experienced debt repay-
ment problems in late 1982, was unable to make
payments on debt owed to Argentina and Brazil. The
nonpayment of these funds coincided with lender
cutbacks in loans to Argentina and Brazil which, in
turn, contributed to the liquidity problems of those
two LDCs. A further impact of the intra-LDC prob-
lem was the unwillingness of Brazil to extend further
credits to Bolivia.
The extent to which individual LDCs are creditors
for other LDCs is nearly impossible to determine
because of the lack of detailed information. In our
judgment, however, some general relationships are
noticeable from the available data:
? Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are probably the
largest LDC creditors to Latin America, but these
countries have limited lending activity beyond that
region.
? LDC debt held by Middle Eastern OPEC nations,
such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is not restricted
to any one region, although the heaviest concentra-
tion of borrowers appears to be in Africa and the
Middle East.
? Asian and African countries generally are not ma-
jor lenders to other LDCs. Exceptions to this are
Hong Kong and Singapore, which primarily provide
trade financing for their exports.
The ongoing financial problems of the major LDC
debtors will likely preclude any major increase in
their lending to other LDCs over the next few years.
Industrial country governments, multilateral institu-
tions, and foreign private banks thus will remain the
most important sources of funds for LDC debt.
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Table 5
Status of 1983 LDC Debt Reschedulings
Month
Amount
(billion US $)
Type
Completed reschedulings
Ecuadora
January
1.0
Private
Sudan
February
0.5
Official
Bolivia
May
0.7
Private
Zambia
May
1.0
Renegotiations in progress
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Senegal
Honduras
Togo
a Negotiations were completed in January, but the rescheduling will
take effect on 31 December 1983.
many of the larger banks
have welcomed the rescheduling operations worked
out with the major debtors and the IMF but are
concerned about debtor requests for additional funds.
Several IMF publications indicate that, although
many of the large, heavily exposed banks are aware of
the need to support the adjustment efforts, these
banks fear that other banks, especially the smaller
ones, may refuse to lend new money or even seek to
reduce their present exposures. Any reduction in, or
even refusal to increase, their exposure to a country
would increase the burden on major creditor banks.
To the extent that this occurs, the heavily exposed
banks would have to choose between further increas-
ing their own exposure or possibly inducing a disrup-
tive adjustment process which could result in a down-
grading in the classification-and thus potential
writeoffs-of their loans to financially troubled coun-
tries.
Discussions with bankers reveal that the uncertainty
about the behavior of smaller banks also increases the
concern of major banks about countries that are not
presently encountering debt servicing problems. Many
of these countries-such as South Korea and Indo-
nesia-are vulnerable to a sharp curtailment of bank
lending. this uncertain-
ty has caused banks to fear the emergence of regional
debt problems outside of Latin America, with the
result that banks, in general, are reluctant to lend
substantial new money to many LDCs.
25X1
The ability of banks to fund their external lending by
borrowing in the interbank market could serve, in our
estimation, as an additional factor in slowing future
lending to LDCs. The easy access that many non-US-
based banks had to the interbank market in recent
years aided bank lending to LDCs. Several financial
publications indicate that during 1982, however, the
interbank market was disrupted because foreign
branches and subsidiaries of certain LDC-based
banks were using the interbank market to fund loans
to their own countries, which were experiencing pay-
ments problems. By late 1982, some LDC-based
banks found their access to interbank borrowing 25X1
severely curtailed as other banks questioned their
ability to repay loans. In several cases, most notably
Brazil, difficulties in maintaining interbank funds
were a key factor in their payments difficulties during
1982-83. In our judgment, LDC banks will continue
to find their access to this market substantially limit-
ed during 1983-84.6
The disturbance in the interbank market probably
also added to the reluctance of smaller non-US-based
banks to lend to LDCs and could constrain lending
during 1983-84. According to several IMF studies,
many of these banks, along with some large non-US
banks, were concerned about funding risks-inability
to borrow in the interbank market to finance their
international loans. The absence of lending by these
banks made the task of selling down large syndicated
credits considerably more difficult for the lead banks.
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Although publicized syndicated credits to LDCs dur-
ing the first three months of 1983 were roughly $18
billion compared to $11.5 billion during the same time
last year, $13.5 billion were credits to Mexico and
Brazil, which we cannot view as voluntary lending.
LDC Dependence on an Improved World Economy.
Prospects for an alleviation of the LDC debt burden
will depend largely on an improving world economic
environment. In our judgment, many LDCs cannot
solve their debt problems by merely reducing imports.
Increased demand for LDC exports and lower world
interest rates would substantially relieve the debt
service burdens. For example, the IMF calculates that
at a LIBOR of 10 percent, a 1-percentage-point
decline eventually leads to a 7-percent reduction in
total LDC interest payments.
We believe that even in the best possible circum-
stances where countries meet their IMF targets, LDC
debt service burdens will not improve much in 1983.
LDC export revenues are not likely to increase sub-
stantially because of weak developed country demand
for LDC exports. The IMF, for example, currently
projects only a 1-percent increase in the dollar value
of world trade for the year. In addition, we believe
that LIBOR will not drop much below 9 percent
throughout 1983. Under these circumstances, many
LDCs will require more assistance from banks, gov-
ernments, and multilateral institutions throughout
1983-84.
The outcome of the LDC debt problem is of great
importance to the international financial community.
Total LDC debt owed to banks located in the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) reporting area
exceeded $315 billion at the end of June 1982. Many
of the largest Western banks have lent heavily to
financially troubled countries. For example, the five
largest Latin American debtors-Mexico, Brazil, Ar-
gentina, Venezuela, and Chile-owed the top nine US
banks over $42 billion at yearend 1982, or nearly one
and a half times the total capital of these banks.
Whether the LDCs and the international financial
system can get through the present financial crisis
hinges on several factors: interest rates do not rise
substantially; demand for LDC exports increases;
LDCs adhere to IMF austerity measures; and banks,
governments, and multilateral institutions continue to
grant emergency assistance to LDCs. How these
complex factors evolve over the next several years will
determine the size and direction of any further shocks
to the international financial system from the debt-
troubled LDCs.
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Appendix A
Methodology
Sources of Data
The primary data sources used for debt and debt
service estimates are the World Debt Tables (WDT)
published by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) and The Maturity
Distribution of International Bank Lending published
by the Bank for International Settlements. The WDT
provides information up to 1981 on medium- and
long-term official and officially guaranteed debt and
debt service positions for 101 countries. Its compilers
attempt to include all medium- and long-term debt of
governments and other official agencies as well as
private debts that are guaranteed by an official
agency in the debtor country. The WDT also supplies
estimates on private nonguaranteed debt and debt
service for 17 countries.
The semiannual BIS publication' provides informa-
tion on external assets of commercial banks located in
the G-10 countries, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark,
Ireland, and certain foreign affiliates, with the most
recent data being the positions at the end of June
1982. External assets include bank loans and other
debt instruments held by reporting banks, such as
bonds. The assets are broken down into debt maturing
in one year or less, debt maturing in over one and up
to two years, and debt maturing in over two years
Another important source of data is the External
Debt of Developing Countries published by the
OECD. The OECD provides medium- and long-term
debt and debt service estimates of both official and
private nonguaranteed debt up to 1980. Its compilers
attempt to include all medium- and long-term debt on
an individual country basis. In addition, the OECD
covers more countries than the WDT. Other data
sources include debt and debt service information
published in country studies by the IMF, debt esti-
mates made by LDC governments, embassy esti-
mates and open-source
report
' The BIS also publishes a quarterly report on the asset positions of
Western banks, but it does not break down the data by maturities,
and the data are not as comprehensive as those in the semiannual
Estimating Medium- and Long-Term Debt
For most countries we made a base estimate of
medium- and long-term debt from WDT and BIS
data. The base was derived by taking WDT data and
comparing that portion of disbursed debt owed to
financial markets with medium- and long-term debt
estimates derived from BIS data.8
When the BIS estimates on medium- and long-term
LDC debt exceeded the WDT's debt owed to financial
markets, the difference was added to the WDT's
estimate. When the WDT had data on nonguaranteed
debt, the BIS medium- and long-term estimate was
compared to the WDT's total debt-including private
nonguaranteed-owed to financial markets. In cases
where the BIS estimate exceeded the WDT's, the
difference was added to the WDT estimate.
To obtain 1982 debt estimates, we projected the WDT
1981 estimates and the end of June BIS data to
yearend 1982 and combined the two figures. Al-
though the WDT does not have 1982 individual
country estimates, it does publish aggregate estimates
under three country groupings: major LDC borrow-
ers, low-income African countries, and all other
LDCs. These aggregates are divided between debt
owed to official and private sources. To obtain specific
country base estimates on official and officially guar-
anteed debt for 1982, we multiplied the 1981 WDT
debt totals for each LDC by 1 plus the percentage
change from 1981 to 1982 of the WDT aggregate
To obtain yearend 1982 BIS estimates on medium-
and long-term debt owed to banks, we multiplied the
BIS the end of June 1982 semiannual data by 1 plus
the percentage change in total bank assets from the
end of June to the end of December 1982 of the BIS
quarterly report on the external positions of banks.
'To estimate medium- and long-term bank debt for a particular
year, the BIS assets maturing within one year are subtracted from
total assets, and then the prior year's assets maturing within one to
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We then combined the projections for WDT and BIS
data to form a 1982 base estimate.
We also used OECD data to form a base estimate for
countries that do not report their debt to the IBRD, or
in instances where we believed a large portion of
nonguaranteed debt was not caught by the WDT or
the BIS.
Once the base estimates on medium- and long-term
debt were made, we used other information to adjust
the estimates. For example, IMF external debt and
debt service estimates were a key source of informa-
tion for adjusting the base estimates, especially for
1982. In addition, we used 1982 debt estimates
published by the IBRD when available. We also used
embassy reporting along with
LDC government and open-source reports to adjust
the base estimates.
Estimating Short-Term Debt
For most countries, we estimated short-term debt by
subtracting our BIS medium- and long-term debt
estimates from total BIS assets. We only made esti-
mates for the years 1979-82, because BIS coverage
was less complete prior to 1979.
not make short-term debt estimates with BIS data for
countries where major offshore banking activities
were present because of the inability to separate loans
used by the host country and loans involved in the
offshore banking facilities. The offshore centers for
which short-term debt estimates were not made were
The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Hong Kong, Leba-
non, Liberia, Panama, and Singapore.
Quality of Debt Statistics
In our judgment, these debt estimates can be viewed
as minimum levels. For many countries there were
substantial data gaps, especially in the area of short-
term debt and private nonguaranteed debt. Due to
these problems the debt and debt service estimates
should be interpreted with care. For example, our
short-term debt estimates generally cover only debt
held by banks and exclude nonbank credits, most of
which are trade related. For the larger debtors such as
Brazil and Argentina, however, estimates available
from IMF and debtor country sources tended to pick
up some of the nonbank short-term debt. Our discus-
sions with financial experts have revealed that no firm
estimates on the magnitude of nonbank debt are
available
Countries in the Data Base
Our data base is comprised of 100 LDCs, including 92
non-OPEC and eight OPEC countries:
Non-OPEC LDCs: Afghanistan, Argentina, The
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, the Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hong Kong,
India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta,
Uruguay, Western Samoa, Yemen Arab Republic,
Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Zaire,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
OPEC LDCs: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela
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Appendix B
Eurocurrency Interbank Market
The Eurocurrency interbank market performs a valu-
able role in linking nonbank depositors to nonbank
borrowers. Often banks find themselves being offered
more deposits than they can profitably use by lending
to a nonbank customer, while other banks are unable
to fund all their profitable lending opportunities.
Therefore, the interbank market allows a bank to lend
its excess funds to another bank in need of funds. In
the Eurocurrency market a bank with surplus funds
does not have to directly find a bank needing funds for
nonbank customers. The surplus funds can be quickly
deposited in one bank, which redeposits them in
another. Each bank can transfer the funds until they
reach a bank with a potential nonbank borrower. Any
particular bank is not necessarily aware of the initial
source or final use of the relevant funds. Loans to
nonbank customers are in many cases funded initially
from interbank borrowing because the market is a
ready source of funds.
The Eurocurrency interbank market has grown from
$160 billion in 1970 to $1.5 trillion in 1982 and
accounts for over two-thirds of the total Eurocurrency
market, according to estimates made by Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company. Other sources of Euromar-
ket funds include individuals and corporations, whose
deposits grew from $30 billion to $485 billion from
1970 to 1982, and official institutions, whose deposits
grew from $15 billion to $90 billion during the same
period. The rapid growth of official deposits was
largely the result of an increase in deposits by OPEC
members since the 1973-74 oil price hikes.
The key interest rates on Eurocurrency deposits are
the London interbank bid rate and the London Inter-
bank Offered Rate. The bid rate is the interest rate
the largest commercial banks in London pay for
borrowing funds in the interbank market, while the
offered rate is the rate at which these banks will lend
to other top name banks. The interest rates differ,
depending on the currency and maturity. The bid rate
is typically one-eighth to one-fourth percentage point
below the offered rate. The rates paid by the smaller
banks are tiered above LIBOR, with the degree of
Table B-1 Billion US $
Estimated Size of Eurocurrency Market
Total
Liabilities
Liabilities to
Nonbanks
Liabilities to
Central
Banks
Liabilities to
Other Banks
1970
110
30
15
65
1971
145
30
15
100
1972
210
35
25
150
1973
315
55
40
220
1974
395
80
60
255
1975
485
90
65
330
1976
595
115
80
400
1977
740
145
100
495
1978
950
190
115
645
1979
1,235
260
145
830
1980
1,525
345
150
1,030
1981
1,860
440
130
1,290
90
1,480
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial
Markets, various issues.
tiering dependent on market conditions. The London
interbank offered and bid dollar rates move closely
with the US certificate of deposit rate for similar
maturities after adjusting for the reserve require-
ments.
The interbank market is of great importance to the
smaller Eurobanks-banks that accept foreign cur-
rency deposits-because large depositors, such as
central banks and corporations, are often reluctant to
place deposits with smaller banks for safety reasons.
As a consequence, some smaller Eurobanks tend to
rely almost completely on the interbank market for
funds for their Eurocurrency lending. On the other
hand, large banks tend to be net lenders in the
interbank market.
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Before the crisis of confidence precipitated by the
Herstatt collapse in 1974, some Eurobanks paid little
attention to the banks to which they lent. The West
German bank failed in June 1974 as a result of its
large speculative losses in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. At the time of the bank's closing, Herstatt had
large outstanding interbank commitments, and conse-
quently several banks suffered losses on loans made to
the West German bank.
For a period of time following the collapse, many
banks withdrew funds from other banks that were
thought to be in trouble. As a result, some of these
banks were forced to pay higher interest rates to
attract required funds. Some smaller banks were
driven out of business due to the inability to obtain
sufficient funds. If the panic in the interbank market
had spread, massive and quick central bank support
by many countries would have been required to stem
the collapse of other banks.
Banks now devote considerably more resources to
assessing their activity in the interbank market. A
Eurobank will establish both formal and informal
lines of credit in the market, often with a very large
number of other banks. Banks watch the percentage
of their funds drawn from particular banks to avoid
too great a dependence on a small number of inter-
bank participants. In some cases a Eurobank may try
to discover for what purpose another bank is seeking
its funds. For instance, when a bank is closely linked
with its national government, it can be particularly
difficult to determine the motive for seeking interbank
funds. An interbank loan to an LDC Eurobank could,
in turn, be directly lent to the developing country's
government. If the country should have debt servicing
problems, the banks in that country could possibly
become illiquid or insolvent. As a result, the LDC
bank would default on its interbank loan. The close
relationship between banks and central governments,
therefore, frequently affects the lending bank's assess-
ment of risk and interest rate charged on its interbank
loan.
An additional concern about the interbank market is
that if a bank faces an insolvency problem, it can
directly affect many other banks from which it has
borrowed funds. This could lead to a temporary, but
sharp, cutback in interbank lending as banks curtail
credit to questionable banks. Lending to LDCs would
be significantly reduced as many banks would be
unable to fund new loans.
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Appendix C
Individual Country Debt Positions and
Prospects
Brazil
Brazil's external debt rose from $74.4 billion in 1981
to $85.4 billion in 1982 as its current account deficit
soared to $15 billion. After the Mexican liquidity
crisis in August 1982, banks drastically reduced
medium- and long-term lending and began to cut
back short-term, trade-related credits. Last Septem-
ber and October, the Brazilian authorities approached
their largest bank creditors and the US Government
for emergency assistance and initiated discussions
with the IMF. The US Treasury made three disburse-
ments totaling $1.2 billion from its short-term Ex-
change Stabilization Fund. A bridging loan of $1.2
billion also was arranged by the major industrial
nations through the BIS and was augmented by $250
million from Saudi Arabia in early January. F_~
In late December, Brazil approached its bank credi-
tors with a formal four-part request for assistance:
$4.4 billion in new medium-term loans; $4.7 billion in
refinancing of amortization payments; the rollover of
$8.8 billion in short-term facilities; and the mainte-
nance or reestablishment of over $10 billion in inter-
bank funds for Brazilian banks abroad. The disburse-
ment of the $4.4 billion in new funds is tied to
Brazilian compliance with IMF targets. So far, the
first three requests have been accepted by the banks,
according to press reports. Many creditors, however,
are unwilling to go along with the fourth and resume
their interbank lending. Moreover, press reporting
indicated that Brazil missed some of its first-quarter
targets, which caused the IMF and the banks to hold
back temporarily disbursement of new loans. In our
judgment, Brazil will need several billion dollars more
in loans before the end of 1983 or the government
may be forced into a total payments moratorium.
Mexico
Mexico's external debt rose from $51.4 billion in 1980
to $83.2 billion in 1982 as the country borrowed
heavily to finance government spending. The world oil
glut and the overvalued peso were two major factors
contributing to the deteriorating balance of payments.
By mid-1982, most banks were reluctant to extend
new credits. Moreover, capital flight increased due to
the expectation of further peso devaluations; a major
devaluation had occurred in February 1982. By Au-
gust, Mexico had exhausted its foreign exchange
reserves, and the authorities approached the United
States for emergency assistance. The Federal Reserve
responded by letting Mexico draw down $500 million
under a swap arrangement. In addition, the monetary
authorities of the major lending countries extended
financial assistance through the BIS totaling $2 bil-
lion. The Mexican authorities also publicly requested
a 90-day postponement of all principal falling due.
Creditor banks on 23 November agreed to a further
120-day postponement. The IMF granted Mexico an
extended arrangement on 23 December for $3.9 bil-
lion on the condition that commercial banks provide
$5 billion in new money; the new loan was put
together in late February 1983.
Disbursement of the $5 billion credit is contingent on
Mexican compliance with the IMF targets. Mexico
met its first-quarter targets, but embassy and press
reports indicate that bankers are concerned that the
government will miss future targets. As inflation rises,
we believe the Mexican authorities may cave in to
union demands for higher salaries and increases in
food subsidies. According to financial publications
and press reporting, bankers are concerned that the
government may be unable politically to continue with
the austerity measures supported by the IMF, which
could hold up new lending and lead to a total
payments moratorium.
South Korea
South Korea's external debt increased 80 percent
between 1979 and 1982 to $37.2 billion, but it has not
experienced any serious debt management problems.
Korea has maintained a good credit reputation among
international lenders because of its large and diversi-
fied export base and sound financial management,
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according to financial publications. Despite high in-
terest rates and sluggish exports, Korea's debt service
ratio-21 percent in 1982-remains low compared to
large Latin American borrowers. According to em-
bassy reporting, Korea intends gradually to convert a
large portion of its $14.1 billion short-term foreign
loans into longer maturities. We believe South Korea
will not experience major debt servicing problems
during 1983-84 unless the country is cut off from
international capital markets because of banker reluc-
tance to lend to LDCs in general.
Argentina
Argentina's external debt rose from $19.3 billion in
1979 to $36.7 billion in 1982. A new economic team
assumed office at the end of 1981 and took major
steps to float the peso, reduce the fiscal deficit, and
cut the growth in the money supply. These efforts,
however, were brought to an abrupt halt with the
outbreak of the war over the Falkland Islands in April
1982. During the second quarter of 1982, trade was
severely disrupted, private capital flight reached mas-
sive proportions, and payments arrearages exceeded
$2 billion, according to financial reports. Argentina's
problems were compounded by the severe bunching of
amortization payments. By August 1982, roughly half
of total external debt was scheduled to fall due before
the end of 1983.
Argentina began negotiations with the Fund in Sep-
tember 1982 on a 15-month program supported by a
standby arrangement. As a condition for Fund ap-
proval, the IMF requested that creditor banks under-
take a three-part package that included: disbursement
of the first tranche of a $600 million bridge loan; $1.5
billion of new medium-term financing for 1983; and
the rescheduling of principal falling due in 1983,
including short-term maturities. Disbursement of the
medium-term loan is conditional on Argentine com-
pliance with the IMF targets, which the government
met during the first quarter of 1983. In our judgment,
however, Argentina may miss future targets due to
the weak political position of the present government,
which could lead to a loss of confidence by private
creditors and a reluctance to lend new money.
Venezuela
Venezuela's debt rose from $30.3 billion in 1981 to
$33.7 billion in 1982. Nearly 45 percent of total debt
in 1982 was short term. During early 1982, Venezuela
attempted to restructure a large portion of its short-
term debt into longer maturities. Depressed oil reve-
nues, poor debt management, and domestic economic
stagnation-along with Venezuela's vocal support for
Argentina during the Falklands conflict-were the
main reasons behind the failure of government efforts
to arrange a $2.5 billion restructuring loan on favor-
able terms,
Throughout 1982, domestic concern about the deteri-
orating cash flow and the overvalued bolivar sparked
large-scale capital flight.
failure to halt capital flight and the inability
to refinance maturing debt and rein in import growth
caused foreign exchange reserves to drop by nearly
$9 billion in 1982.
In late February 1983, the government implemented a
three-tiered exchange rate system in an attempt to
halt the drain on reserves. Shortly thereafter, Caracas
suspended principal repayments and requested a debt
rescheduling. Venezuela presently is negotiating with
a bank advisory committee on the principles for
rescheduling some $16 billion in credits maturing in
1983 and 1984. According to Embassy and press
sources, however, bankers are concerned that the
government lacks a coherent economic adjustment
plan, and they have continued to refuse to refinance
without an IMF stabilization program in place. The
present government, in our judgment, fears embar-
rassment in the December 1983 presidential and
congressional elections should it be forced to accept
IMF austerity measures. To prevent further depletion
of its central bank reserves, Venezuela has extended
its 90-day repayment moratorium through Septem-
ber. In addition, Venezuela has requested a compen-
satory facility from the IMF for about $1 billion.
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Indonesia
Indonesia's external debt rose from $19.8 billion in
1981 to $23.5 billion in 1982. Heavy investment in
development projects and declining oil export reve-
nues were the major factors behind the rapid rise in
debt. Indonesia ran a $7 billion current account
deficit in 1982. Press reporting and financial publica-
tions indicate that the government recently became
concerned over the deteriorating balance of payments,
as total reserves excluding gold fell from $5.2 billion
in the first quarter of 1982 to about $1.8 billion in
March 1983. According to press reporting, Jakarta
intends to cut the deficit by canceling a number of
major development projects in 1983. In our judgment,
Indonesia currently does not have a debt servicing
problem, but it could experience payments problems
in late 1983 should oil prices fall further or nonoil
exports fail to rebound with global economic recovery.
India
India's outstanding external debt amounted to $21.5
billion in 1982, up from $18.6 billion the previous
year. Of this amount, $19.1 billion are loans from
official sources. India has turned increasingly to
private sources of funds since 1980, and disburse-
ments from private loans jumped sharply last year.
Much of the private debt is for energy or industrial
projects. New Delhi maintains close control over
foreign borrowing by both public and private entities
and is adhering to IMF-imposed restrictions on new
commitments of government or government-guaran-
teed borrowing on nonconcessional terms. India's debt
service ratio was only 15 percent in 1982. Neverthe-
less, we believe less favorable borrowing terms from
multilateral agencies, rising private debt, reduced
support from the IMF, and a surge in payments for
military imports will strain the balance-of-payments
position by the mid-1980s.
Chile
Chile's external debt doubled between 1979 and 1982,
from $9 billion to $18.3 billion. Private-sector borrow-
ing was the major factor in the expansion. Chile's
financial position rapidly deteriorated starting in late
1980 as the peso sharply appreciated in real terms and
world copper prices fell. In early 1982, the overvalued
peso precipitated large capital outflows, and in the
second half of 1982 the Chilean authorities negotiated
a two-year standby program with the Fund.
The financial situation became more difficult in early
1983 due to a major bank crisis in which the Chilean
Government liquidated three banks and intervened in
the operations of five other banks, according to
embassy reporting. Shortly after the crisis began,
Chile requested a 90-day postponement of principal
repayments on short- and medium-term debt as an
interim step until it could work out arrangements for
debt rescheduling with its creditors. Chile requested
an additional 90-day extension on principal repay-
ment in April. Embassy and press reports indicate
that Chile also missed first-quarter IMF targets, but
the IMF has proposed a program that it claims would
get Chile back on track by summer. The IMF also
requested that banks proceed with the rescheduling
exercise. So far, commercial banks have come to a
preliminary agreement to lend $1.3 billion in new
money, and they are negotiating to refinance about $3
billion in short- and medium-term debt maturin in
1983-84.
Egypt
Egypt's civilian external debt stood at $18 billion at
yearend 1982. This external debt, although high
relative to most LDCs, has not yet posed a serious
repayment problem because of its relatively long
maturity structure and concessional interest rates,
according to financial publications. Roughly 70 per-
cent of Egypt's medium- and long-term debt is owed
to governments and multilateral institutions. In our
assessment, foreign aid disbursements are not likely to
increase much over the next few years, unless oil-rich
Arab states decide to reopen the pipeline. Moreover,
the economy remains extremely vulnerable to adverse
external influences, such as agricultural import prices,
petroleum prices, and the willingness of private lend-
ers to continue to roll over short-term loans.
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In addition to civilian debt, we estimate Egypt has
about $6.5 billion in outstanding military debts.
About two-thirds is owed to the Soviet Union, al-
though Egypt stopped servicing this debt in 1977.
Most of the rest is US Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
credits which have grown rapidly since the peace
treaty with Israel. Interest payments on the FMS
credits are rising rapidly and could contribute to
future debt repayment difficulties.
Most Western banks are growing increasingly wary of
providing balance-of-payments loans to Egypt; how-
ever, embassy reporting indicates that Arab-owned
banks appear willing to pick up some of the slack.
Egypt continues to depend on foreign bank willingness
to roll over short-term credits. Total short-term debt
in 1982 stood at $3.5 billion. We believe that any
sharp decline in short-term lines of credit, whether
stemming from a loss of confidence in Egypt or as a
fallout from LDC debt problems in general, would
pose major liquidity problems for Egypt.
Philippines
Total Philippine debt-excluding IMF obligations-
at the end of 1982 stood at $16.2 billion, up from
$13.8 billion at yearend 1981. The Philippine current
account deficit rose sharply in 1982 to roughly $3.3
billion, largely because of a 13-percent decline in
merchandise exports and an increase in interest pay-
ments. Philippine short-term debt rose by $0.6 billion
to $4.2 billion during 1982, and we believe the
authorities will need to monitor closely future short-
term borrowing. The IMF stabilization program
adopted by the Philippine authorities for 1983 aims
for a substantial cut in the current account deficit.
According to the program, the government will reduce
imports by damping domestic aggregate demand and
by adopting a flexible exchange rate policy. We
believe the Philippines, however, may have to resched-
ule part of its debt during 1983-84 if refinancing of
short-term debt proves unsuccessful
Peru
Peru's external debt rose 16 percent during 1982 to
$11.7 billion. During 1982, the current account dete-
riorated as the price of Peruvian metal exports fell.
The government requested an extended Fund ar-
rangement in April 1982, which was approved in
June. During the first quarter of 1983, Peru initiated
discussions with foreign banks, and by mid-May the
government completed a financial package that in-
cluded $450 million in new credits, refinancing of
$320 million in principal repayments falling due
between March 1983 and March 1984, and mainte-
nance of about $2 billion in short-term credit lines.
According to embassy reporting, Peru is now seeking
to reschedule some $1 billion owed to Western gov-
ernments through the Paris Club.
Nigeria
Nigeria's total external debt at yearend 1982 stood at
$10 billion, up from $6.7 billion in 1980. The coun-
try's balance-of-payments position has deteriorated
rapidly since 1981 due to the downturn in the world
oil market and poor economic management. In April
1982, the government undertook a series of austerity
measures including restrictions on imports, higher
import duties, and cutbacks in government spending.
Nigeria is currently experiencing a severe liquidity
crisis and is quickly amassing substantial short-term
arrears; financial sources estimate arrearages could
be as high as $6 billion. Most commercial banks have
ceased further credit extensions because of govern-
ment delays in making interest and principal repay-
ments on letters of credit, according to press and
financial reporting.
Since January 1983, Nigeria has been involved in
protracted discussions with its commercial creditors in
an attempt to refinance arrears and secure badly
needed new money. In early June, press reports
indicated that Nigeria and its major foreign creditors
reached an agreement in principle to reschedule a
portion of the country's short-term trade debt.
Nigerian financial officials have met with IMF repre-
sentatives several times this year, and, while it ap-
pears certain that the country will have to undertake
an IMF-sponsored program, we believe it is unlikely
that any formal agreement with the Fund will be
announced before the December presidential elec-
tions.
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Malaysia
Malaysia's external debt grew by 45 percent during
1982 to $9.9 billion as a result of major foreign
borrowing for development projects. The debt-to-
exports level of 71 percent, however, remains very low
in comparison to most developing countries. Accord-
ing to the IMF, Malaysia's trade balance deteriorated
in 1982, and the current account deficit rose sharply
to roughly $3.7 billion. Export growth remained slug-
gish during 1982, while imports grew by 13 percent.
The widening deficit in the services account primarily
reflected increased interest payments on foreign debt.
For 1983, the IMF projects a moderate increase in
export growth as world market conditions improve
and a current account deficit about the same as in
1982. Although interest spreads on first-quarter 1983
borrowing were slightly higher than last year, we
believe Malaysia will have no problem in managing its
debt during 1983-84
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Appendix D
Key Statistical Series
This section contains the individual debt tables for the
100 LDCs covered in this paper, along with other
pertinent statistical series, including three debt ratios:
total debt service to exports of goods and services;
total interest payments to exports of goods and serv-
ices, and total yearend debt to exports of goods and
services. These tables are:
Table D-1: Debt ratios that include total (short-,
medium-, and long-term) debt for the
years 1980-82.
Table D-1
Selected LDCs: Comparative Debt Ratios
Debt Service/Exports a
1980
1981
1982
All LDCs
22
29
35
11
16
18
119
143
163
OPEC LDCs
14
22
25
7
10
11
66
81
90
Algeria
31
32
42
12
13
16
123
114
128
Ecuador
23
31
48
13
20
26
157
196
246
Gabon
19
15
15
6
5
5
62
47
45
Indonesia
12
13
22
6
7
10
84
83
118
Iran
19
45
22
7
8
4
67
46
15
Iraq
Nigeria
4
10
17
3
6
9
25
44
63
Venezuela
26
29
32
16
20
19
122
124
144
Non-OPEC LDCs
26
32
39
14
18
21
150
170
195
Afghanistan
1
144
129
144
Argentina
49
81
98
29
45
47
242
303
369
Bangladesh
9
13
21
5
7
12
336
387
441
Belize
2
1
3
43
38
69
Benin
4
5
16
Bolivia
33
36
57
20
24
29
238
276
328
Botswana
7
9
11
3
5
4
36
48
49
Brazil
62
62
83
33
36
50
278
276
356
Burma
26
31
38
11
10
15
321
295
350
Burundi
Table D-2: Debt ratios that include only
medium- and long-term debt in the
calculations. Data are available for
the years 1973-82.
Table D-3: Debt and debt service tables for 100
LDCs. Debt service for 1983 is based
on debt incurred through yearend
1982 and therefore excludes any new
debt incurred in 1983.
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Table D-1
Selected LDCs: Comparative Debt Ratios (continued)
Debt Service/Exports a
Interest/Exports b
Debt/ Exports
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
Cameroon
15
20
33
8
11
15
127
150
184
Central African Republic
2
7
5
1
4
3
124
159
129
Chad
17
16
15
5
5
5
140
131
167
Chile
51
88
79
24
42
37
191
274
305
Congo
12
10
34
7
5
13
112
100
123
Costa Rica
23
21
33
17
16
19
181
191
233
Cyprus
10
12
15
5
7
7
53
60
60
Djibouti
18
2
3
17
1
1
15
16
17
Egypt
22
30
36
7
12
15
172
186
211
El Salvador
9
12
15
6
8
8
73
101
109
Ethiopia
6
10
16
3
5
6
122
161
171
Fiji
4
6
6
2
4
4
35
47
45
Gambia, The
4
10
21
4
8
11
163
211
228
Ghana
7
15
18
3
9
11
88
143
213
Guatemala
10
11
11
6
7
7
66
86
104
Guinea
21
19
34
7
7
11
197
242
287
Guinea-Bissau
43
40
74
10
12
17
370
436
410
Guyana
18
22
41
8
11
17
143
182
272
10
10
15
4
5
7
157
165
183
Ivory Coast
27
32
51
12
16
25
141
158
217
Jamaica
15
19
30
9
9
16
99
99
179
Jordan
18
19
23
9
10
10
111
103
114
Kenya
14
21
27
8
10
13
123
148
160
Lesotho
1
3
5
NEGL
1
3
21
34
42
Madagascar
17
37
70
11
16
25
314
366
422
Malawi
30
36
50
16
20
22
224
225
256
Malaysia
5
8
11
3
5
7
33
53
71
Maldives
2
4
11
2
3
5
129
146
148
Mali
8
25
25
3
9
8
301
283
301
13
20
39
7
9
22
283
267
461
7
12
14
5
8
8
60
76
79
Mexico
46
53
64
26
34
34
208
249
252
Morocco
41
50
77
22
28
36
239
300
382
Nepal
1
2
4
1
2
3
65
80
104
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Table D-1 (continued)
Debt Service/Exports a
Interest/Exports b
Debt/Exports
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981
1982
1980
1981 1982
Pakistan
23
21
27
11
11
13
293
283 344
Papua New Guinea
6
9
17
3
7
10
50
7g 98
Paraguay
17
17
149
171 169
Peru
28
30
_
196
240 277
Philippines
18
22
144
160 202
Rwanda
3
3
4
2
2
3
95
104 116
Senegal
27
19
19
10
11
9
148
194 155
Seychelles
10
3
8
10
2
4
96
53 68
Sierra Leone
18
28
33
5
9
11
146
188 219
Solomon Islands
NEGL d
NEGL
5
NEGL
NEGL
2
13
14 33
Somalia
6
I1
15
2
4
10
376
341 476
South Korea
20
21
21
13
14
14
121
119 131
Sri Lanka
10
13
19
5
8
11
119
144 163
Sudan
16
29
27
11
20
24
409
623 622
Suriname
1
1
1
NEGL
1
1
5
6 9
Swaziland
7
7
10
4
4
4
58
48--57-_-
Syria
20
21
28
7
9
10
113
111 147
Taiwan
7
8
9
4
5
4
35
39 ---38
Tanzania
26
35
40
14
15
18
261
254 346
Thailand
15
21
24
10
14
14
98
115 126
263 305
30 37
112 156
Uganda
6
16
32
10
13
20
180
173 129
Upper Volta
9
10
14
9
10
9
173
173 189
Uruguay
18
20
33
7
9
10
97
112 169
Western Samoa
17
19
22
10
8
10
200
240 238
Yemen Arab Republic
15
19
27
13
15
15
290
338 346
Yemen, People's Democratic
Republic
19
21
37
12
13
16
336
383 396
Zaire
23
25
25
1
6
11
218
292 296
Zambia
25
28
35
12
13
16
187
214 219
Zimbabwe
3
10
20
13
20
26
46
79
Ratio of total debt service (medium- and long-term principal b Ratio of total interest payments to exports of goods and services.
repayments plus interest payments on debt of all maturities) to Ratio of total debt (all maturities) to exports of goods and services.
exports of goods and services. d Less than 0.5.
23 Secret
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Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
LDC Average
Debt service/exports
14
11
13
12
13
17
18
16
21 _
28
Interest/exports
5
4
5
4
4
6
7
7 -_
9
12 -
Debt/exports
94
69
85
88
92
105
93
85
98
117
OPEC LDC Average
Debt service/exports
13
7
7
7
8
11
12
12
19
22
Interest/ exports
4
2
2
2
2
4
5
5
7
8
Debt/exports
85
34
40
45
52
70
59
52
62
69
Algeria
Debt service/exports
Interest/ exports
Debt/exports
159
84
122
134
159
223
169
119
109
122
Debt service/exports
11
9
8
9
11
Interest/exports
4
2
2
2
4
8
9
11
16
23
Debt/exports
69
34
53
55
83
121
135
138
171
217
Gabon
Debt service/exports
15
5
6
8
14
26
21
18
15
14
Interest/ exports
3
1
2
2
3
8
6
5
5
5
Debt/exports
82
52
62
88
105
108
77
55
44
40
Debt service/exports
10
6
10
11
13
21
Interest/ exports
3
2
3
4
4
6
Debt/exports
174
93
124
122
113
128
97
75
72
102
Debt service/exports
20
9
6
5
5
7
10
18
43
21
Interest/ exports
5
2
2
1
1
3
4
6
7
3
Debt/exports
90
25
24
21
30
42
44
59
39
10
Debt service/exports
11
4
3
3
2
3
3
3
7
8 -.
Interest/exports
3
1
1
1
- b
1
1
1-
3
3
Debt/exports
51
16
13
15
14
13
10
9
24
28
Nigeria
Debt service/exports
6
2
4
5
2
1
3
4
8
15
Interest/ exports
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
4
7
Debt/exports
39
15
15
13
13
22
22
20
35
48
Debt service/exports
8
6
8
7
12
Interest/ exports
3
2
2
2
3
6
t
b
D
38
18
22
42
58
t/expor
s
e
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Table D-2 (continued)
Non-OPEC LDC average
Debt service/exports 15 13 16 15 16 20
Interest/exports 5 5 6 5 5 7
Debt/exports 97 91 111 112 114 120
Afghanistan
Debt service/exports 18 16 11 7 10 12
Interest/ exports 5 4 2 2 3 4._
Debt/exports 403 329 340 253 278 290
Argentina
Debt service/exports 27 26 35 30 25 37
Interest/ exports 9 9 11 8 7 10
20 18 22 30
8 8 10 14
110 101 110 135
1
204 142 128 143
30 36 67 89
12 16 31 37
Debt/exports 114 107 135 138 112 126 141 151 221 290
Bahamas, The
Debt service/exports 1 1 2 2
Interest/exports
Debt/exports 11 12 14 13 15 12
Bahrain
Debt service/exports
Interest/exports - - - - - 1
Debt/exports 5 4 5 4 7 8
Bangladesh
4 -- 3 4 7
1 -1 2 3
10 9 14 19
Debt service/exports 2 6 17 13 12 15 11 7 10 20
Interest/exports 1 2 4 6 5 6_ 5 3 5 10
Debt/exports 87 237 406 400 406 407 337 326 371 429
Barbados
Debt service/ exports
Interest/exports
Debt/exports
Belize
Interest/exports
Debt/exports
Benin
Debt service/exports
Interest/exports
Debt/exports
4 4 7
2 2 3
20 19 36
2 1
1 1
36 34 37
2 3 4 14
1 l 7
80 179 220 257
Debt service/exports
Interest/exports
Debt/exports
34 29 32 55
15 _ 16 20 27
226 210 248 305
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Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a (continued)
Debt service/exports
17
18
19
13
11
14
9
7
9
11
Interest/ exports
7
9
6
4
3
5
4
3
5
4
Debt/exports
143
134
127
103
94
81
49
36
47
48
Brazil
Debt service/exports
36
36
42
38
42
57
63
56
55
76
Interest/exports
11
16
21
15
15
22
26
27
29
42
Debt/exports
180
204
234
255
260
321
286
240
237
292
Burma
Debt service/exports
26
13
17
20
17
17
24
26
31
38
Interest /exports
6
3
5
5
5
7
9
11
10
15
Debt/exports
137
119
146
165
220
288
307
321
293
349
Burundi
Debt service/exports
3
3
6
4
3
4
3
10
11
20
Interest/ exports
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
4
7
Debt/exports
Cameroon
Debt service/exports
5
4
5
5
6
10
11
14
19
31
Interest/exports
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
10
13
Debt/exports
45
47
55
71
84
94
108
120
144
172
Central African Republic
Debt service/exports
5
6
8
2
4
4
2
2
7
5
Interest/exports
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
-
3
2
Debt/exports
69
82
93
88
90
93
95
121
154
126
Chad
Debt service/exports
4
3
6
4
10
18
21
17
16
15
Interest/ exports
1
1
1
1
2
4
6
5
4
5
Debt/exports
41
49
65
74
88
158
164
140
130
166
Chile
Debt service/exports
17
18
37
39
44
54
43
46
77
71
Interest /exports
5
6
11
11
10
14
14
19
31
29
Debt/exports
221
188
237
180
177
199
159
154
206
239
Colombia
Debt/exports
144
124
123
99
87
79
82
87
122
137
Comoros
Debt service/exports
2
2
5
5
4
2
1
2
7
9
Interest/exports
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
4
6
Debt/exports
34
43
47
185
234
234
194
379
369
352
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Debt service/exports 12 12 14 13 10 24 25 17 14 28
Interest/exports 4 4 5 5 4 7 8 11 9 14
Debt/exports 65 65 83 89 80 97 124 135 149 191
Interest/exports 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 5 6
Debt/exports 25 41 52 40 43 53 45 47 54 52
_ Debt/exports
Dominican Republic
Debt service/exports 43 24 25 20 25 25 19 19 25 32
_ Interest/exports 5 4 5 3 8 8 5 5 7 11
_ Debt/exports 171 129 192 165 182 192 185 150 156 176
El Salvador
_ Debt service/exports 6 6 10 5 8 6 5 7 9 12
Interest/exports 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 5 5
_ Debt/exports 30 38 38 35 29 46 36 54 79 87
Ethiopia
Debt service/exports 6 5 7 6 6 7 5 6 9 16
Interest/exports 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 6
Debt/exports 74 73 98 103 102 127 115 120 157 167
10 9 10 15 15 19 27 18 20 38
3 4 3 4 4 8 7 10 11 15
80 69 61 94 97 121 99 110 98 151
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a (continued)
Debt service/exports
5
5
6
7
4
8
7
6
10
14
Interest/ exports
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
4
7
Debt/exports
111
98
77
77
79
85
80
80
114
181
Debt service/exports
7
7
7
7
5
6
7
8
9
10
Interest/exports
3
2
2
2
2
3
4
4
5
6
Debt/exports
35
30
43
46
40
50
55
52
72
92
Debt service/exports
53
28
19
17
24
22
26
20
18
33
Interest/exports
20
12
7
5
6
6
8
6
5
10
Debt/exports
1,058
672
342
315
275
277
265
189
232
276
Debt service/exports
NA
NA
NA
NA
6
1
1
42
39
73
Interest/ exports
NA
NA
NA
NA
6
1
1
8
11
16
Debt/exports
NA
NA
NA
-102
77
101
356
360
432
402
Debt service/exports
7
5
4
11
12
16
29
17
20
39
Interest/ exports
3
3
3
7
6
5
8
6
10
16
Debt/exports
104
70
78
123
145
139
157
133
171
261
Debt service/exports
11
9
11
11
8
6
4
5
9
7
Interest/exports
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
3
Debt/exports
66
60
68
69
77
85
100
84
120
123
Debt service/exports
6
8
11
13
13
14
18
16
20
32
Interest/exports
3
4
4
5
5
7
8
9
12
13
Debt/exports
55
69
98
99
101
108
108
121
155
194
Debt service/exports
1
2
4
1
1
3
3
3
4
37
Debt/exports
5
7
14
6
7
9
11
12
11
121
Debt service/exports
21
19
15
13
12
12
11
10
9
14
Interest/ exports
8
7
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
Debt/exports
306
277
225
206
190
185
155
154
160
176
Debt service/exports
7
8
9
9
12
15
20
24
28
48
Interest/ exports
3
3
4
3
4
7
8
9
13
22
Debt/exports
59
49
63
59
75
101
116
120
136
191
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Secret
Table D-2 (continued)
14
18
30
Interest /exports
8
9
16
Debt/exports
Jordan
Debt service/exports
17
22
Interest/exports
8 -
9
Debt service/exports
6
5
6
9
7
10
12
12
19
26
Interest/exports
3
3
3
3
3
4
6
6
8
12
Debt/exports
72
60
67
79
74
88
111
109
136
152
5
7
Interest/exports
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
Debt/exports
8
6
7
17
10
12
12
17
19
21
Debt service/exports
1
1
3
4
Interest/ exports
-
I
Z
Debt/exports
Liberia
Debt service/exports
5
5
8
5
6
5
13
6
6
19
Interest/exports
2
1
I
1
2
3
4
4
4
9
Debt/exports
43
44
57
69
84
88
109
140
Madagascar
Debt service/exports
5
3
3
4
4
4
7
12
34
68
Interest/exports
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
5
13
23
Debt/exports
60
78
85
97
176
276
350
406
Malawi
Debt service/exports
9
10
11
11
13
15
22
27
35
48
Interest/ exports
5
5
5
5
4
7
11
13
19
20
Debt/exports
204
219
240
Malaysia
2
3
5
Debt/exports
27
44
58
Maldives
Debt-service/ exports
Interest/ exports
Debt/exports
NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a (continued)
Debt service/exports
7
3
4
4
6
7
6
7
20
25
Interest/exports
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
3
4
7
Debt/exports
370
407
372
336
312
420
295
299
254
299
Mauritania
Debt service/exports
9
7
21
38
22
17
33
11
16
36
Interest/ exports
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
5
5
18
Debt/exports
75
80
99
193
251
379
311
268
244
431
Mauritius
Debt service/exports
2
1
2
2
2
3
5
7
11
13
Interest/exports
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
7
7
Debt/exports
23
13
14
19
20
36
48
55
70
73
Debt service/exports
30
27
42
48
55
62
71
39
40
54
Interest /exports
10
12
17
19
19
19
21
19
21
24
Debt/exports
155
166
244
285
297
255
212
160
174
172
Debt service/exports
11
7
8
13
17
31
35
39
44
73
Interest/exports
3
2
3
5
8
14
17
20
23
32
Debt/exports
80
60
90
148
228
259
247
225
268
349
Debt service/exports
-
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
3
Interest/exports
-
-
-
-
1
1
1
1
1
2
Debt/exports
18
23
21
26
45
45
52
65
75
96
Debt service/exports
22
12
13
15
17
17
15
14
31
51
Interest/ exports
6
7
8
7
8
8
9
7
16
27
Debt/exports
107
105
134
116
130
146
186
308
329
442
Niger
Debt service/exports
3
4
5
8
13
11
13
20
19
44
Interest/exports
1
1
2
2
3
4
6
9
10
19
Debt/exports
54
90
68
78
86
92
88
105
131
224
Oman
Debt service/exports
NA
1
2
2
6
10
10
8
2
3
Interest/exports
NA
1
2
2
2
3
1
1
Debt/exports
13
14
19
26
39
41
32
13
12
15
Debt service/exports
19
19
26
20
23
24
24
20
17
25
Interest/exports
8
8
10
9
10
11
10
8
7
11
Debt/exports
383
379
406
412
471
426
329
273
258
327
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
secret
Table D-2 (continued)
Debt service/exports
16
14
7
9
13
34
16
13
13
14
Interest/exports
5
5
4
5
6
7
8
7
7
7
Debt/exports
84
58
68
94
101
112
83
63
59
61
Papua New Guinea
Debt service/exports
1
3
4
4
4
4
4
6 __
7
15
Interest/ exports
1
2
3
3
2
3
2
3
5
8
Debt/exports
44
38
60
44
44
46
37
47 _
65
83
Paraguay
Debt service/exports
14
11
14
12
10
12
15
22
22
30
Interest/exports
5
4
4
4
3
5
6
10
10
12
Debt/exports
110
88
97
109
94
109
111
125
129
133
Debt service/exports
19
14
19
21
21
24
23
17
22
33
Interest/ exports
5
5
5
6
6
7
9
9
I1
16
Debt/exports
78
66
88
116
121
129
118
111
118
150
Rwanda
Debt service/exports
9
9
10
16
11
21
19
16
23
30
Interest/exports
3
2
3
4
3
4
4
3
5
8
Debt/exports
61
80
99
120
121
124
119
131
161--
194
Singapore
Debt service/exports
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
2
1
2
Interest/ exports
1
1
1
1
-
I
1
1
I
Debt/exports
11
8
9
10
10
10
9
7
6
6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a (continued)
Debt/exports
NA
NA
NA
NA
2
3
8
13
14
33
Somalia
Debt service/exports
5
6
5
3
9
7
15
5
11
13
Interest/exports
2
2
1
1
2
2
6
1
3
8
Debt/exports
181
214
202
260
393
362
434
368
340
462
South Korea
Debt service/exports
17
12
13
11
10
11
14
13
14
16
Interest/exports
6
4
5
4
4
4
5
6
6
8
Debt/exports
92
88
101
77
69
68
73
74
76
82
Sri Lanka
Debt service/exports
13
12
22
20
15
10
9
8
9
16
Interest/exports
4
3
3
4
3
3
3
3
5
8
Debt/exports
114
102
96
109
94
107
102
106
122
139
Sudan
Debt service/exports
12
14
21
14
10
12
10
9
13
16
Interest/exports
3
5
6
4
5
7
6
5
3
13
Debt/exports
103
210
240
253
260
322
462
360
525
532
Debt service/exports
NA
NA
-
-
-
-
1
Interest/ exports
NA
NA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Debt/exports
NA
NA
2
2
1
6
6
4
5
5
Swaziland
Debt service/exports
9
3
3
2
1
4
6
6
7
10
Interest/exports
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
3
4
Debt/exports
34
22
20
23
26
54
64
54
47
57
Syria
Debt service/exports
8
7
9
9
9
22
20
18
17
25
Interest/exports
2
1
1
2
2
7
5
5
5
7
Debt/exports
69
46
54
76
107
145
110
97
90
123
Debt service/exports
4
3
5
4
5
5
5
5
6
8
Interest/exports
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
Debt/exports
21
20
31
28
28
24
21
22
24
29
Debt service/exports
8
6
8
7
10
15
22
24
33
38
Interest/ exports
2
2
3
3
3
6
10
12
13
16
Debt/exports
106
132
170
154
183
217
229
247
241
332
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Secret
Table D-2 (continued)
14
7
6
10
291
8
5
2
3
Debt service/exports
14
9
9
13
13
17
15
16
18
26
Interest/exports
4
3
3
4
5
7
7
8
7
11
Debt/exports
117
79
82
110
146
161
124
114
109
151
Debt service/exports
9
5
6
4
4
4
4
4
15
31
Interest/ exports
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
4
Debt/exports
62
69
85
75
47
98
112
170
168
124
Debt service/exports
5
5
6
5
5
6
5
8
10
13
Interest/ exports
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
Debt/exports
53
56
68
84
117
142
159
170
170
183
Debt service/exports
24
37
44
31
33
48
14
16
17
27
Interest/ exports
6
9
9
9
8
7
7
8
10
13
Debt/exports
89
126
120
107
100
93
89
81
92
117
Debt service/exports
NA
11
7
28
10
16
13
16
18
22
Interest/exports
NA
5
3
4
4
7
6
8
9
9
Debt/exports
NA
136
106
170
140
209
166
196
236
238
Yemen (Arab Republic)
Debt service/exports
22
22
11
8
8
9
18
13
17
25
Interest/exports
3
2
2
1
1
3
7
5
7
8
Debt/exports
529
484
479
279
294
269
213
276
324
328
Yem
Rep
en (People's Democratic
ublic)
Debt service/exports
4
6
10
5
5
8
12
16
21
36
Interest/exports
2
3
3
1
1
3
4
8
8
10
Debt/exports
91
145
218
172
262
350
362
317
383
391
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Table D-2
LDC Debt Ratios a (continued)
Debt service/exports
13
14
20
9
9
9
16
22
22
24
Interest/exports
5
5
7
5
6
6
8
11
12
13
Debt/exports
98
92
185
198
226
217
223
206
273
282
Debt service/exports
30
8
10
11
21
28
18
22
24
32
Interest/ exports
7
3
5
6
7
9
6
9
9
12
Debt/exports
58
55
131
118
154
169
138
165
188
194
Zimbabwe
a For these ratios, only medium- and long-term debt and debt service
figures are used in the calculations.
b Less than 0.5 percent.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
Table D-3
LDC Debt and Debt Service
Total debt
668.2
788.4
828.6
930.0
1,071.3
1,215.9
1,196.0
1,109.0
1,032.0
1,006.0 NA a
Medium-long-term
668.2
788.4
828.6
930.0
1,071.3
1,215.9
1,174.0
1,095.0
1,025.0
1,000.0 NA
Official sources
652.2
768.4
795.8
892.8
1,037.1
1,170.1
1,129.0
1,055.0
1,000.0
990.0 NA
Private sources
16.0
20.0
32.8
37.2
34.2
45.8
45.0
40.0
25.0
10.0 NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
22.0
14.0
7.0
6.0 NA
Total debt service
30.1
38.3
27.2
25.3
38.3
51.9
11.9
12.0
11.2
10.7
102.6
Principal (MLT)
21.0
28.8
22.2
16.9
26.5
36.9
5.1
7.0
7.0
7.0
80.0
Interest(TOT)
9.1
9.5
5.0
8.4
11.8
15.0
6.8
5.0
4.2
3.7
22.6
Medium-/long-term
9.1
9.5
5.0
8.4
11.8
15.0
4.2
3.0
3.0
3.0
22.0
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.6
2.0
1.2
0.7
0.6
Argentina
Total debt
4,283.3
5,047.3
4,850.6
6,453.5
7,542.9
9,850.0
19,327.4
27,161.8
35,670.7
36,680.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
4,283.3
5,047.3
4,850.6
6,453.5
7,542.9
9,850.0
13,996.4
16,876.8
26,066.7
28,898.0
NA
Official sources
893.5
1,086.6
1,125.0
1,189.3
1,267.8
1,652.5
1,870.8
1,902.8
1,913.9
1,910.0
NA
Private sources
3,389.8
3,960.7
3,725.6
5,264.2
6,275.1
8,197.5
12,125.6
14,974.0
24,152.8
26,988.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
5,331.0
10,285.0
9,604.0
7,782.0
NA
Total debt service
1,013.6
1,247.6
1,255.7
1,395.0
1,692.6
2,913.6
3,661.9
5,478.6
9,539.8
9,762.7
9,
476.9
Principal (MLT)
680.0
807.2
868.5
1,009.1
1,224.0
2,131.9
1,801.1
2,260.9
4,204.2
5,111.9
5,
411.1
Interest (TOT)
333.6
440.4
387.2
385.9
468.6
781.7
1,860.8
3,217.7
5,335.6
4,650.8
4,
065.8
Medium-/long-term
333.6
440.4
387.2
385.9
468.6
781.7
1,221.1
1,777.8
3,702.9
3,717.0
3,
287.6
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
639.7
1,439.9
1,632.7
933.8
778.2
Bahamas, The
Total debt
62.4
81.1
96.8
89.4
108.6
96.1
99.3
101.9
163.2
229.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
62.4
81.1
96.8
89.4
108.6
96.1
99.3
101.9
163.2
229.0
NA
Official sources
18.0
16.4
36.0
33.9
13.5
11.1
8.5
11.8
17.0
19.0
NA
Private sources
44.4
64.7
60.8
55.5
95.1
85.0
90.8
90.1
146.2
210.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
Table D-3
LDC Debt and Debt Service (continued)
Bahamas, The (continued)
Total debt service
7.5
9.1
16.0
13.8
40.3
18.8
33.6
33.7
49.3
84.1
77.7
Principal (MLT)
4.8
4.9
7.0
8.0
34.2
12.9
23.6
21.6
28.7
48.2
41.2
Interest (TOT)
2.7
4.2
9.0
5.8
6.1
5.9
10.0
12.1
20.6
35.9
36.5
Medium-/long-term
2.7
4.2
9.0
5.8
6.1
5.9
10.0
12.1
20.6
35.9
36.5
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Total debt
32.2
54.1
71.1
70.3
152.0
180.1
156.6
147.0
160.0
180.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
32.2
54.1
71.1
70.3
152.0
180.1
156.6
147.0
160.0
180.0
NA
Official sources
27.2
44.1
51.1
61.3
65.0
76.1
91.6
105.0
120.0
140.0
NA
Private sources
5.0
10.0
20.0
9.0
87.0
104.0
65.0
42.0
40.0
40.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Total debt service
1.9
3.7
7.3
7.3
29.7
33.8
25.8
23.9
26.3
27.6
31.2
Principal(MLT)
1.3
2.1
4.7
4.9
22.0
21.7
15.2
14.7
15.7
17.2
21.2
Interest (TOT)
0.6
1.6
2.6
2.4
7.7
12.1
10.6
9.2
10.6
10.4
10.0
Medium-/long-term
0.6
1.6
2.6
2.4
7.7
12.1
10.6
9.2
10.6
10.4
10.0
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
Total debt
367.6
1,010.8
1,610.9
1,938.0
2,301.7
2,787.0
2,903.7
3,630.7
4,036.9
4,497.8
NA
Medium-/long-term
367.6
1,010.8
1,610.9
1,938.0
2,301.7
2,787.0
2,873.7
3,524.7
3,868.9
4,378.8
NA
Official sources
271.6
896.9
1,494.0
1,823.4
2,175.1
2,622.8
2,691.1
3,373.5
3,707.4
4,124.4
NA
Private sources
96.0
113.9
116.9
114.6
126.6
164.2
182.6
151.2
161.5
254.4
NA
Principal (MLT)
6.2
15.8
51.2
35.6
43.4
56.3
47.8
41.1
55.5
98.4
125.5
Interest (TOT)
4.1
8.1
15.2
28.2
26.0
43.7
48.7
51.3
78.0
118.3
122.0
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Barbados
Total debt
25.8
27.0
34.0
39.8
63.4
78.4
Medium-/long-term
25.8
27.0
34.0
39.8
63.4
78.4
ial sources
Off
2
4
4.8
12.9
19.0
35.9
43.8
ic
.
Private sources
23.4
22.2
21.1
20.8
27.5
34.6
Total debt service
Principal (MLT)
3.6
3.3
3.8
1.2
4.1
1.7
3.9
1.9
11.6
9.1
11.4
6.8
Interest (TOT)
0.3
2.6
2.4
2.0
2.5
4.6
Medium-/long-term
0.3
2.6
2.4
2.0
2.5
4.6
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Total debt
NA
NA
16.0
20.0
19.6
30.2
Medium-/long-term
NA
NA
16.0
20.0
19.6
30.2
Official sources
NA
NA
6.0
6.0
7.6
21.2
Private sources
NA
NA
10.0
14.0
12.0
9.0
Total debt service
NA
NA
0.7
1.6
2.0
1.8
Principal (MLT)
NA
NA
0.1
0.9
1.2
0.6
Interest (TOT)
NA
NA
0.6
0.7
0.8
1.2
Medium-/long-term
NA
NA
0.6
0.7
0.8
1.2
Benin
Total debt
57.8
80.8
89.6
111.3
144.1
172.0
Medium-/long-term
57.8
80.8
89.6
111.3
144.1
172.0
Official sources
42.5
51.8
61.9
84.0
116.6
143.7
Private sources
Short-term
Principal (MLT)
NA
15.3
1.8
NA
29.0
5.5
27.7
NA
5.3
NA
27.3
3.4
NA
27.5
3.1
NA
28.3
3.7
t (TOT)
I
t
0
5
7
0
0.7
0.9
0.8
2.1
eres
n
.
.
Medium-/long-term
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.9
0.8
2.1
89.3
111.1
202.3
227.5
NA
89.3
111.1
202.3
227.5
NA
53.2
72.0
97.2
104.0
NA
36.1
17.7
10.2
39.1
20.4
11.3
105.1
37.8
18.5
123.5
55.3
30.6
NA
57.2
29.4
7.5
7.5
9.1
9.1
19.3
19.3
24.7
24.7
27.8
27.8
74.9
61.3
55.5
78.7
NA
38.9
47.3
54.5
70.7
NA
31.9
37.3
37.5
50.7
NA
7.0
10.0
17.0
20.0
NA
36.0
14.0
1.0
8.0
NA
6.3
3.9
2.2
5.3
5.5
0.9
0.7
0.7
1.5
1.7
5.4
3.2
1.5
3.8
3.8
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.8
3.0
4.3
2.0
0.2
1.0
0.8
208.6
460.9
564.0
656.0
NA
192.6
446.9
549.0
616.0
NA
158.8
195.6
214.9
244.0
NA
33.8
16.0
2.5
251.3
14.0
4.4
334.1
15.0
6.5
372.0
40.0
17.7
NA
NA
40.0
4.7
4.5
6.1
20.9
40.8
2.8
2.5
3.5
16.1
36.8
i o
A n
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
Table D-3
a LDC Debt and Debt Service (continued)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total debt
707.3
781.0
882.4
1,106.8
1,457.3
1,761.4
2,463.0
2,515.4
2,835.9
3,112.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
707.3
781.0
882.4
1,106.8
1,457.3
1,761.4
1,941.0
2,220.4
2,551.9
2,900.0
NA
Official sources
400.8
441.5
469.6
565.3
690.9
842.9
955.9
1,130.8
1,322.7
1,415.0
NA
Private sources
306.5
339.5
412.8
541.5
766.4
918.5
985.1
1,089.6
1,229.2
1,485.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
522.0
295.0
284.0
212.0
NA
Total debt service
63.8
89.6
96.4
125.0
174.1
379.3
353.7
344.8
375.0
544.4
765.0
Principal (MLT)
41.1
62.8
66.8
83.1
112.0
285.6
161.3
133.0
126.0
264.4
503.3
Interest (TOT)
22.7
26.8
29.6
41.9
62.1
93.7
192.4
211.8
249.0
280.0
261.7
Medium-/long-term
22.7
26.8
29.6
41.9
62.1
93.7
129.8
170.5
200.7
254.6
240.5
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
62.6
41.3
48.3
25.4
21.2
Botswana
Total debt
214.9
254.1
278.3
284.2
293.9
270.8
285.6
273.2
285.4
304.3
NA
Medium-/long-term
214.9
254.1
278.3
284.2
293.9
270.8
279.6
273.2
284.4
301.3
NA
Official sources
111.8
131.2
147.2
163.0
178.7
117.9
129.9
147.3
160.0
171.0
NA
Private sources
103.1
122.9
131.1
121.2
115.2
152.9
149.7
125.9
124.4
130.3
NA
Short-term
NA
6.0
0.0
1.0
3.0
NA
Total debt service
25.8
33.6
42.3
35.2
35.2
46.7
51.6
49.7
53.3
70.6
73.2
Principal (MLT)
14.6
17.4
29.7
24.9
25.0
28.6
27.7
26.2
26.1
42.8
46.1
Interest (TOT)
11.2
16.2
12.6
10.3
10.2
18.1
23.9
23.5
27.2
27.8
27.1
Medium-/long-term
11.2
16.2
12.6
10.3
10.2
18.1
23.2
23.5
27.0
27.4
26.8
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.7
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.3
Total debt
12,634.0
19,114.0
23,298.0
28,177.0
35,120.0
46,468.0
59,022.0
64,659.0
74,391.0
85,400.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
12,634.0
19,114.0
23,298.0
28,777.0
35,120.0
46,468.0
51,486.0
55,759.0
63,791.0
70,000.0
NA
Official sources
2,862.0
3,708.0
4,222.0
4,850.0
5,605.0
6,376.0
6,661.0
7,292.0
7,748.0
8,000.0
NA
Private sources
9,772.0
15,406.0
19,076.0
23,927.0
29,515.0
40,092.0
44,825.0
48,467.0
56,043.0
62,000.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7,536.0
8,900.0
10,600.0
15,400.0
NA
Total debt service
2,500.0
3,390.0
4,195.0
4,239.0
5,697.0
8,318.0
12,162.3
14,371.0
16,680.0
19,998.0
17,540.0
Principal (MLT)
1,700.0
1,919.0
2,100.0
2,521.0
3,664.0
5,191.0
6,508.0
6,794.0
7,089.0
8,100.0
7,000.0
Interest (TOT)
800.0
1,471.0
2,095.0
1,718.0
2,033.0
3,127.0
5,654.3
7,577.0
9,591.0
11,898.0
10,540.0
Medium-/long-term
800.0
1,471.0
2,095.0
1,718.0
2,033.0
3,127.0
4,750.0
6,331.0
7,789.0
10,050.0
9,000.0
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
904.3
1,246.0
1,802.0
1,848.0
1,540.0
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558ROO0400140003-3
Total debt
231.6
277.8
281.1
335.8
540.2
876.4
1,286.6
1,585.7
1,839.8
1,997.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
231.6
277.8
281.1
335.8
540.2
876.4
1,264.6
1,585.7
1,829.8
1,991.0
NA
Official sources
183.6
223.2
236.5
271.2
414.5
683.9
976.8
1,228.8
1,450.4
1,552.0
NA
Private sources
48.0
54.6
44.6
64.6
125.7
192.5
287.8
356.9
379.4
439.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
22.0
0.0
10.0
6.0
NA
Total debt service
44.2
30.1
33.5
41.4
42.4
50.3
102.9
130.8
194.6
217.2
227.5
Principal (MLT)
33.5
22.1
23.7
31.8
29.6
29.7
63.4
75.8
130.2
131.0
137.8
Interest (TOT)
10.7
8.0
9.8
9.6
12.8
20.6
39.5
55.0
64.4
86.2
89.7
Medium-/long-term
10.7
8.0
9.8
9.6
12.8
20.6
36.9
55.0
62.7
85.5
89.1
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.6
0.0
1.7
0.7
0.6
Total debt
7.8
9.4
18.0
21.0
40.6
69.4
116.2
150.2
168.6
187.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
7.8
9.4
18.0
21.0
40.6
69.4
108.2
143.2
163.6
182.0
NA
Official sources
6.7
8.1
11.6
14.7
33.9
58.8
96.0
128.9
149.0
169.0
NA
Private sources
1.1
1.3
6.4
6.3
6.7
10.6
12.2
14.3
14.6
13.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
8.0
7.0
5.0
5.0
NA
Total debt service
0.9
0.9
2.0
2.8
2.8
2.7
4.5
8.3
9.2
13.9
15.1
Principal (MLT)
0.7
0.7
1.6
2.3
2.2
1.7
2.2
4.5
5.0
8.6
9.4
Interest (TOT)
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.6
1.0
2.3
3.8
4.2
5.3
5.7
Medium-/long-term
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.6
1.0
1.3
2.8
3.3
4.7
5.2
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.5
Total debt
236.8
274.2
372.1
514.2
823.3
1,245.0
1,960.7
2,350.3
2,398.9
2,571.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
236.8
274.2
372.1
514.2
823.3
1,245.0
1,849.7
2,225.3
2,298.9
2,410.0
NA
Official sources
209.7
241.5
293.0
346.2
508.8
722.1
1,013.8
1,186.7
1,307.2
1,399.0
NA
Private sources
27.1
32.7
79.1
168.0
314.5
522.9
835.9
1,038.6
991.7
1,011.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
111.0
125.0
100.0
161.0
NA
Total debt service
24.6
25.3
35.9
39.2
56.7
132.4
208.1
269.9
315.0
456.4
445.4
Principal (MLT)
15.0
14.1
20.8
20.3
28.6
80.0
108.4
117.4
137.8
248.4
254.3
Interest (TOT)
9.6
11.2
15.1
18.9
28.1
52.4
99.7
152.5
177.2
208.0
191.1
Medium-/long-term
9.6
11.2
15.1
18.9
28.1
52.4
86.4
135.0
160.2
188.7
175.0
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
13.3
17.5
17.0
19.3
16.1
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0558R000400140003-3
Table D-3
LDC Debt and Debt Service (continued)
Total debt
53.8
65.0
75.5
89.7
118.1
137.2
160.8
212.2
238.1
167.1
NA
Medium-/long-term
53.8
65.0
75.5
89.7
118.1
137.2
151.8
206.2
231.1
164.1
NA
Official sources
28.6
32.2
40.1
47.4
54.3
60.0
73.7
145.1
162.0
130.8
NA
Private sources
25.2
32.8
35.4
42.3
63.8
77.2
78.1
61.1
69.1
33.3
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
9.0
6.0
7.0
3.0
NA
Total debt service
3.6
4.9
6.4
2.3
5.3
5.9
4.0
3.4
11.0
6.6
21.0
Principal (MLT)
2.8
3.7
4.2
1.6
3.9
4.3
1.6
2.2
5.2
3.1
16.4
Interest (TOT)
0.8
1.2
2.2
0.7
1.4
1.6
2.4
1.2
5.8
3.5
4.6
Medium-/long-term
0.8
1.2
2.2
0.7
1.4
1.6
1.3
0.4
4.6
3.1
4.3
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.1
0.8
1.2
0.4
0.3
Total debt
38.4
53.5
67.1
95.4
116.5
173.5
209.7
182.3
157.6
167.4
NA
Medium-/long-term
38.4
53.5
67.1
95.4
116.5
173.5
196.7
182.3
155.6
166.4
NA
Official sources
29.4
33.9
48.3
73.1
94.9
128.9
142.4
138.3
129.5
147.0
NA
Private sources
9.0
19.6
18.8
22.3
21.6
44.6
54.3
44.0
26.1
19.4
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
13.0
0.0
2.0
1.0
NA
Total debt service
3.3
3.6
6.2
5.3
13.2
19.7
27.0
21.8
19.4
15.0
13.3
Principal (MLT)
2.8
2.9
4.8
4.4
10.8
14.8
18.5
14.8
14.0
9.8
8.6
Interest (TOT)
0.5
0.7
1.4
0.9
2.4
4.9
8.5
7.0
5.4
5.2
4.7
Medium-/long-term
0.5
0.7
1.4
0.9
2.4
4.9
6.9
7.0
5.1
5.1
4.6
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.6
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.1
Total debt
3,177.2
4,325.0
4,371.9
4,364.4
4,644.5
5,924.5
9,025.3
11,977.9
16,739.8
18,272.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
3,177.2
4,325.0
4,371.9
4,364.4
4,644.5
5,924.5
7,548.3
9,643.9
12,560.8
14,344.0
NA
Official sources
1,559.9
2,137.7
2,245.4
2,154.7
2,051.9
1,906.7
1,668.9
1,537.0
1,416.0
1,460.0
NA
Private sources
1,617.3
2,187.3
2,126.5
2,209.7
2,592.6
4,017.8
5,879.4
8,106.9
11,144.8
12,884.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1,477.0
2,334.0
4,179.0
3,928.0
NA
Total debt service
241.6
413.6
674.5
955.9
1,140.6
1,617.5
2,219.5
3,211.4
5,384.7
4,719.9
4,414.1
Principal (MLT)
172.0
275.8
473.1
700.7
880.5
1,186.6
1,358.6
1,711.5
2,802.3
2,523.1
2,534.6
Interest(TOT)
69.6
137.8
201.4
255.2
260.1
430.9
860.9
1,499.9
2,582.4
2,196.8
1,879.5
Medium-/long-term
69.6
137.8
201.4
255.2
260.1
430.9
683.7
1,173.1
1,872.0
1,725.4
1,486.7
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
177.2
326.8
710.4
471.4
392.8
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Colombia
Total debt
Medium-/long-term
Official sources
Private sources
Short-term
Total debt service
Principal (MLT)
Interest (TOT)
Medium-/long-term
Short-term
Comoros
2,285.7 2,410.9 2,723.0 2,851.4 3,054.6 3,258.3 5,896.7 7,304.7 8,419.3 9,281.0 NA
2,285.7 2,410.9 2,723.0 2,851.4 3,054.6 3,258.3 3,980.7 5,087.7 6,134.3 6,818.0 NA
1,477.3 1,599.9 1,715.6 1,772.5 1,850.5 1,987.2 2,136.2 2,388.1 2,640.1 2,825.0 NA
808.4 811.0 1,007.4 1,078.9 1,204.1 1,271.1 1,844.5 2,699.6 3,494.2 3,993.0 NA
NA NA NA NA NA NA 1,916.0 2,217.0 2,285.0 2,463.0 NA
296.3 390.8 350.2 382.8 415.8 517.3 1,070.1 1,175.5 1,505.6 1,715.1 1,741.0
184.6 252.9 210.3 233.3 254.9 305.5 536.4 437.3 520.3 670.2 745.7
111.7 137.9 139.9 149.5 160.9 211.8 533.7 738.2 985.3 1,044.9 995.3
111.7 137.9 139.9 149.5 160.9 211.8 303.8 427.8 596.8 749.3 749.0
NA NA NA NA NA NA 229.9 310.4 388.5 295.6 246.3
Medium-/long-term 1.7 4.3
Official sources 1.7 4.3
Private sources 0.0 0.0
4.7 18.5 23.4 28.1
4.7 18.5 23.4 28.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total debt service 0.1
Principal (MLT) 0.1
Interest (TOT) 0.0
Medium-/long-term 0.0
Short-term NA
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
38.7 49.3 66.5 74.0 NA
38.7 49.0 64.3 73.0 NA
0.0 0.3 2.2 1.0 NA
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 NA
0.2 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.8 2.0
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.3
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.3
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
227.0 322.6 406.2 451.0 537.5 820.3 1,061.5
Medium-/long-term 227.0 322.6 406.2 451.0 537.5 820.3 899.5
Official sources 171.6 190.7 247.4 272.8 355.5 507.0 573.3
Private sources 55.4 131.9 158.8 178.2 182.0 313.3 326.2
Short-term NA NA NA NA NA NA 162.0
Total debt service 20.8
Principal (MLT) 13.8
Interest (TOT) 7.0
Medium-/long-term 7.0
Short-term NA
29.2 46.0 33.5 45.3 41.7
19.7 32.9 19.1 30.4 25.3
9.5 13.1 14.4 14.9 16.4
9.5 13.1 14.4 14.9 16.4
NA NA NA NA NA
1,148.5 1,169.0 1,487.4 NA
941.5 1,105.0 1,375.4 NA
559.5 551.8 627.0 NA
382.0 553.2 748.4 NA
207.0 64.0 112.0 NA
141.2 128.0 118.5 406.4 452.8
78.1 55.6 62.1 252.7 309.5
63.1 72.4 56.4 153.7 143.3
43.7 43.4 45.5 140.3 132.1
19.4 29.0 10.9 13.4 11.2
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Table D-3
a LDC Debt and Debt Service (continued)
Total debt
274.0
353.4
496.3
635.9
778.4
993.7
1,722.2
2,205.2
2,381.2
2,567.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
274.0
353.4
496.3
635.9
778.4
993.7
1,378.2
1,640.2
1,854.2
2,105.0
NA
Official sources
154.3
178.2
241.4
306.2
390.7
516.2
614.9
775.6
891.9
954.0
NA
Private sources
119.7
175.2
254.9
329.7
387.7
477.5
763.3
864.6
962.3
1,151.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
344.0
565.0
527.0
462.0
NA
Total debt service
49.1
64.1
84.5
93.9
98.1
249.1
320.7
281.6
265.0
359.3
532.1
Principal (MLT)
34.0
40.4
55.9
60.4
59.7
180.6
187.0
74.4
69.3
154.1
264.4
Interest (TOT)
15.1
23.7
28.6
33.5
38.4
68.5
133.7
207.2
195.7
205.2
267.7
Medium-/long-term
15.1
23.7
28.6
33.5
38.4
68.5
92.4
128.1
106.1
149.8
221.5
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
41.3
79.1
89.6
55.4
46.2
Cyprus
Total debt
107.3
151.2
156.3
184.4
245.0
348.3
488.6
587.4
705.3
744.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
107.3
151.2
156.3
184.4
245.0
348.3
407.6
520.4
627.3
650.0
NA
Official sources
40.8
50.2
55.3
80.5
102.7
131.7
150.9
164.6
187.3
201.0
NA
Private sources
66.5
101.0
101.0
103.9
142.3
216.6
256.7
355.8
440.0
449.0
NA
Short-term
Total debt service
19.9
27.5
31.7
38.0
39.5
53.2
80.5
105.7
137.2
189.9
180.4
Principal (MLT)
12.4
15.4
21.2
27.3
25.9
30.2
33.2
50.2
60.3
104.2
99.6
Interest (TOT)
7.5
12.1
10.5
10.7
13.6
23.0
47.3
55.5
76.9
85.7
80.8
Medium-/long-term
7.5
12.1
10.5
10.7
13.6
23.0
37.6
46.1
63.6
74.4
71.4
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
9.7
9.4
13.3
11.3
9.4
Djibouti
NA
NA
0.4
0.6
1.0
1.1
.9
1.9
1.9
NA
NA
0.6
0.4
0.9
15.9
1.3
1.2
1.3
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Total debt
413.7
503.9
624.2
799.5
911.3
1,027.4
1,459.4
1,892.9
2,103.3
2,161.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
413.7
503.9
624.2
799.5
911.3
1,027.4
1,158.4
1,440.9
1,493.3
1,725.0
NA
Official sources
252.8
262.3
299.3
354.1
408.6
453.6
532.7
718.6
827.1
1,000.0
NA
Private sources
160.9
241.6
324.9
445.4
502.7
573.8
625.7
722.3
666.2
725.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
301.0
452.0
610.0
436.0
NA
Total debt service
49.9
67.8
102.9
127.9
143.3
150.4
356.4
295.6
414.8
485.7
401.2
Principal (MLT)
33.7
41.8
71.1
92.9
102.6
95.5
233.7
101.5
148.2
262.6
209.2
Interest (TOT)
16.2
26.0
31.8
35.0
40.7
64.9
122.7
194.1
266.6
223.1
192.0
Medium-/long-term
16.2
26.0
31.8
35.0
40.7
64.9
86.6
130.8
162.9
170.8
148.4
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
36.1
63.3
103.7
52.3
43.6
Egypt
Total debt
2,423.7
3,078.9
5,089.5
5,916.0
8,272.4
10,415.7
13,411.9
15,790.4
17,663.4
21,471.0
NA
Medium-/long-term
2,423.7
3,078.9
5,089.5
5,916.0
8,272.4
10,415.7
12,219.9
13,835.4
14,812.4
18,000.0
NA
Official sources
1,614.8
2,023.8
3,887.8
4,735.0
6,814.6
8,507.0
9,554.0
10,659.0
11,591.0
12,500.0
NA
Private sources
808.9
1,055.1
1,201.7
1,181.0
1,457.8
1,908.7
2,665.9
3,176.4
3,221.4
5,500.0
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1,192.0
1,955.0
2,851.0
3,471.0
NA
Total debt service
617.3
579.8
665.3
703.5
1,145.3
1,340.2
1,415.3
2,030.4
2,892.1
3,695.5
3,362.8
Principal (MLT)
541.8
482.6
532.4
583.4
794.2
909.1
.939.2
1,343.1
1,754.6
2,210.5
2,037.5
Interest (TOT)
75.5
97.2
132.9
120.1
351.1
431.1
476.1
687.3
1,137.5
1,485.0
1,325.3
Medium-/long-term
75.5
97.2
132.9
120.1
351.1
431.1
333.1
413.6
652.8
1,068.5
978.2
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
143.0
273.7
484.7
416.5
347.1
El Salvador
121.7
195.7
225.8
312.6
332.0
463.7
798.7
846.4
980.0
981.7
NA
121.7
195.7
225.8
312.6
332.0
463.7
522.7
628.4
770.0
784.7
NA
94.7
103.6
145.1
189.0
240.1
312.7
388.2
497.8
651.8
697.0
NA
Private sources
27.0
92.1
80.7
123.6
91.9
151.0
134.5
130.6
118.2
87.7
NA
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
276.0
218.0
210.0
197.0
NA
Total debt service
24.3
29.2
62.3
49.3
86.7
63.3
100.4
108.3
120.0
131.3
123.1
Principal (MLT)
18.5
21.8
53.3
32.1
67.2
34.0
32.4
37.0
38.3
62.4
59.5
Interest (TOT)
5.8
7.4
9.0
17.2
19.5
29.3
68.0
71.3
81.7
68.9
63.6
Medium-/long-term
5.8
7.4
9.0
17.2
19.5
29.3
34.9
40.8
46.0
45.3
43.9
Short-term
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
33.1
30.5
35.7
23.6
19.7
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