OMAN: OIL SYSTEM VULNERABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000300030004-5
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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Oman:
Oil System
Vulnerability
Secret
GI 83-10101
April 1983
Copy 2 8 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Oman:
Oil System
Vulnerability
Vulnerability Branch, OGI,
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Energy
This paper was prepared by
Secret
GI 83-10101
April 1983
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Oman:
Oil System
Vulnerability
Key Judgments The simplicity of Oman's oil production and export system-which
Information available supports 60 percent of the country's gross national product-makes it
as of 11 March 1983 highly vulnerable to military or terrorist action. The destruction of oil
was used in this report.
facilities at Mina al Fahal, Oman's only export terminal, would totally shut
down exports and cut Omani export earnings by over 90 percent during re-
pairs.
We believe the extended loss of oil export revenues-about $3.6 billion
annually-caused by destruction of Oman's key oil facilities would
threaten the stability of the regime unless foreign financial assistance was
made available. US interests, in particular, would be affected far more
than the negligible impact that the loss of Omani exports of approximately
340,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude would have on the world market.
Oman's location on the Strait of Hormuz, gateway to the Persian Gulf, and
its military facility access arrangements with the United States make
Oman an important element of US strategy in Southwest Asia.
We believe Iran currently poses the most likely military threat to Omani
oil facilities. The Khomeini government has already demonstrated its
willingness and ability to destroy foreign oil production and export
facilities. Although Oman also has disputes with most of its Arab
neighbors on a variety of issues-several of which are linked to Oman's
growing relationship with the United States-we do not believe these
disputes pose as great a threat to Oman's oil facilities.
contingency plan would be the creation of an inventory of critical parts that
could quickly replace equipment damaged in an assault. During periods of
crisis, manual operation of the oil system would ensure maximum flexi-
bility and reliability.
Secret
GI 83-10101
April 1983
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Oman:
Oil System
Vulnerability
Oman and Oil '
More than 90 percent of Oman's export earnings and
60 percent of its GNP are derived from crude oil
sales. With oil production currently targeted at more
than 360,000 b/d, the $3.6 billion per year in export
revenues earned is vital to the stability of the Sultan-
ate. While Oman's oil exports are not significant in
the world oil market, the stability of the generally
cooperative Qaboos regime is of substantial impor-
tance to the United States' strategic interests in
Southwest Asia. Oman's location on the Strait of
Hormuz-through which one-fifth of the Free
World's crude oil is currently shipped-and its prox-
imity to Iran, the USSR, and the increasingly impor-
tant Indian Ocean area all make Oman a valued ally
of the United States in a highly volatile region.
The Omani Oil System
The crude oil exports that maintain Muscat's national
revenues are produced at three locations from 19
oilfields operated by Petroleum Development (Oman)
and from one oilfield operated by the French firm Elf
Aquitaine (table 1):
? North Oman-The Fahud-Yibal area contains six
oilfields that generate nearly 60 percent of Oman's
current production.
? Central Oman-The Qarn Alam area also contains
six oilfields and serves as the point through which
the remaining 40 percent of the country's produc-
tion flows. Elf's only producing oilfield is located in
central Oman.
the seven fields producing in this area.
The crude oil terminal at Mina al Fahal handles all of
Oman's petroleum exports. Historically, Oman has
provided bunker service to loaded tankers exiting the
Strait of Hormuz (figure 2). As crude oil became
available for sale, it was added to the bunker service.
At present, tanker loadings are handled by two single
point moorings (SPMs) capable of loading crude oil
and bunker fuel, and a third SPM that loads bunker
fuel only. Delivery of crude oil to tankers is by gravity
flow from two elevated tank farms. Bunker fuel is
pumped to the ships from tanks near sea level (fig-
ure 3).
Potential Threats to the System
We believe Iran presents the greatest potential threat
to the Omani oil export system. The Iranians have
adequately demonstrated their ability to target key
petroleum facilities by their strikes on Iraq's offshore
oil-loading terminals at Mina al Bakr and Khor al
Amaya in November 1980 and on Kuwait's gas-oil
separation plant at Umm al-'Aysh in October 1981.
The gunboat and commando attack on the Iraqi
terminals eliminated about two-thirds of Iraq's export
capacity for the remainder of the war.
Khomeini government
support Muscat has provided Baghdad in its war with
Iran, combined with the Sultan's good relations with
the United States and general endorsement of Arab
positions toward Iran, could serve as an excuse for a
punitive attack, given the general vindictiveness of the
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Figure 2
Strait of Hormuz
Rams
Ma'rid
Ra's al Khaymah;.
At!(haiph6
United Arab
Boundary representation is r,.
not necessarily authoritative
lazireh-yc
Hegyam
Bukha
Persian Gulf
$
Emir
Kilometers
0
Nautical Miles
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Bathymetry
20 50 100 fathoms
0 37 91 183 meters
Geographical limit of the Strait of Hormuz
Iran-Oman continental shelf boundary
12-nautical-mile limit
Directed traffic lane
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Figure 3
Single Point Mooring System
Loading or li....... 1~~~
discharging tanker ?'' % 'o
Cif /l i~ y~yt3~
Mooring lines ~'?
Rotating
moorin Floating hoses
Product distribution
unit
Rotating balance
arm
Pipeline end -
nmanifold
(lose marker
lights
Flanged hose
connections
Anchors or
anchor pile
arm
Submarine pipeline
to shore tank farms
Underbuoy hoses
Underbuoy hose
\ floats
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We believe Oman also f ces lesser threats from some
-offf its Arab neighbors.
Despite a reconcili-
ation agreement concluded last year between Oman
and South Yemen, Aden's long-term intentions to-
ward Muscat remain in doubt. Moreover, Oman's
continued support of the Camp David Agreements, its
full diplomatic relations with Egypt, and its facility
access agreements with the United States have also
drawn considerable criticism from Arab states and
organizations. Although we do not expect trouble in
the near term on these points, we cannot rule out the
possibility of conflict in the years to come.
Oman: Estimated Maximum Thousand barrels
Sustainable Crude Oil per day
Productive Capacity a
a Maximum sustainable capacity is the maximum production rate
that can be sustained for several months; it considers the experience
of operating the total system. Individual field capacities are based on
observed production rates. Pipeline constraints between Qarn Alam
and Nahada restrict the flow of oil from the Central, South, and Elf
Aquitaine fields.
b Capacity at Rima, which came on line in October 1982, may
expand above this level.
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The loss of all crude oil storage at Mina al Fahal
would not necessarily halt crude exports for an ex-
tended period, in our judgment. The storage tanks
could be bypassed, once critical pipeline repairs were
completed, by switching the oil flow between the
SPMs as long as one tanker was being loaded at all
times. Oil production, however, would have to be
substantially reduced, if not stopped, during loading
disruptions. Dedication of a large tanker to act as a
floating storage facility could minimize downtime
under these circumstances.
practical in the current economic environment.
The security of export operations could also be
improved by the construction of underground storage
at Mina al Fahal. The relatively high cost of building
such a.facility possibly as high as $50 million,
according to one estimate probably makes it im-
The replacement of ruptured pipeline at Nahada to
restore the flow of oil from the northern fields could
probably be accomplished within a few days if appro-
priate pipeline sections and installation equipment
were securely stockpiled. Based on industry standards
for equipment supply leadtimes, we believe, however,
that it would take over a year to acquire replacements
for the three pump units that constitute the Nahada
booster station. The station's remote location would
also hinder transportation and installation. Partial
restoration of exports from the central and southern
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fields might be accomplished by cannibalizing the
more seriously damaged pumps to repair at least one
pump in the station or by moving standby equipment
from other locations to Nahada. An inventory of spare
parts would facilitate this partial restoration process,
and modular pump/driver units could augment pro-
duction while repairs were in progress.
crude oil could present significant problems.
We believe acquisition and maintenance of a spare
parts inventory of booster and shipping pumps, their
associated drivers, and rolled steel plate for the
reconstruction of tanks is the best planning option.
Inclusion of water disposal pumps, transformers and
switchgear in the inventory would also be useful. For
maximum flexibility, the oil pump/driver combina-
tions would be modularized so they could be used in a
variety of applications. As a temporary measure, an
excavated pit with a synthetic liner could serve as a
settling tank. While this approach is simple, inexpen-
sive, and relatively invulnerable, the inability to flare
dangerous vapors and the risk of dirt entering the
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We believe the most efficient option available to
Muscat for reducing its vulnerability to oil export
disruptions is the development of a strategic inventory
of critical parts that could quickly replace equipment
damaged in an attack.
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IIna
crisis, all facilities could be operated manually rather
than through the normal centralized and automated
control process. This would require installation of a
new communications network to ensure reliable oper-
ation of the system in an emergency. While labor
intensive, this approach would allow a much quicker
resumption of production and offers far greater reli-
ability and flexibility in a crisis. 25X1
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We believe the most efficient option available to
Muscat for reducing its vulnerability to oil export
disruptions is the development of a strategic inventory
of critical parts that could quickly replace equipment
damaged in an attack.
25X1
IIna
crisis, all facilities could be operated manually rather
than through the normal centralized and automated
control process. This would require installation of a
new communications network to ensure reliable oper-
ation of the system in an emergency. While labor
intensive, this approach would allow a much quicker
resumption of production and offers far greater reli-
ability and flexibility in a crisis. 25X1
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