TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Terrorist Exploitation of
the International Legal System
it bilAII A WI
Secret
GI 83-10040
March 1983
Copy 4 0 7
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Directorate of
1 ~p Intelligence
Terrorist Exploitation of
the International Legal System
This assessment was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Terrorist Groups Branch, OGI,
Directorate of Operations.
Secret
GI 83-10040
March 1983
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Terrorist Exploitation of
the International Legal System) 25X1
Key Judgments In recent years, terrorist groups have sought to exploit the international
Information available legal system both for propaganda purposes and for securing release or
as of 1 March 1983 better treatment for their captured members. Although government offi-.
was used in this paper.
cials fear that even limited terrorist success in the legal arena could
establish precedents that would give such groups significant legal, political,
and operational advantages, we believe such concerns generally are
overdrawn. Nevertheless, terrorist groups that have had some success are
likely to increase and refine their use of these tactics, and other groups are
likely to emulate them.
Although democratic states rely heavily on extradition to bring interna-
tional terrorists to trial, such efforts often run afoul of traditions of political
asylum and considerations of national sovereignty which the defendants
are able to exploit. The legal defense most often used by terrorists to avoid
extradition is the "political offense exception"-a standard provision in
extradition agreements that rules out extradition for an offense deemed to
be essentially political.
Another defense used by terrorists is to claim prisoner-of-war status under
the terms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocols. Such status provides immunity for acts that normally are
considered common crimes but are permissible in time of war as long as
they conform to the customary laws of war. Claims to POW status have
been used more successfully as a propaganda issue than as a legal
defense.
In response to the terrorist threat, the international community has enacted
a series of conventions and agreements. Although these accords often lack
sufficient sanctions to compel compliance, they do place states on record as
being prepared to take certain measures in response to terrorism and thus
can be used to publicize a signatory country's noncompliance. An exception
is the 1978 Bonn Antihijacking Declaration, which by providing severe,
specific sanctions demonstrates that nations can agree on, and will take,
effective legal action when they believe their vital interests are threatened.
Generally, however, more effective legal remedies have been taken at the
national level. By limiting, in specific circumstances, constitutional guaran-
tees-such as freedom of speech, association, and movement-and by
restricting access to counsel, bail, and speedy trial, such legislation makes
the operational climate less hospitable for the terrorist.
Secret
GI 83-10040
March 1983
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French liberal asylum policy and tolerance of
terrorist groups result in increasing blood-
shed, such as car bomb in Rue Marbeuf that
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Terrorist Exploitation of
the International Legal System
By adroit use of the legal system, captured terrorists
are sometimes able to gain a degree of recognition-
even legitimacy-that they could never win in open
battle. Even if the terrorist fails to win his freedom-
and this is usually the case-exploitation of the legal
system enables him to publicize his struggle while in
custody. This study examines the primary legal de-
fenses used by terrorist groups and the efforts of
governments to counter these defenses.
The Political Offense Exception
Most extradition treaties contain a political offense
exception, which is intended to differentiate political
dissidents from common criminals and to protect the
former from being forcibly returned to the country of
their alleged crime. Although political terrorism does
not fall clearly into the category of political activity
envisioned by the framers of most such treaties,
neither is it explicitly excluded. Prominent terrorist
groups that have attempted to take advantage of the
political offense exception include the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), both wings of the
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the West
German Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Italian
Red Brigades (table 1).
In modern practice, the political offense exception is
based on two landmark British cases: the Castioni
decision of 1891 and the Meunier decision of 1894.'
These decisions established that a common crime
could be considered political and nonextraditable if it
were an integral part of an act committed to further
political objectives and aimed at the institutions of the
regime rather than at the general public. In addition,
a judicial consensus among the legal establishments of
Western nations maintains that proportionality must
exist between the violence employed and the antici-
The political offense argument has been used to best
effect when the country requesting extradition is
perceived to be repressive and when sympathizer
groups mobilize popular support on behalf of the
defendant. Customarily, for an extradition request to
receive serious consideration, the alleged offense must
be regarded as a crime by the country to which the
request is made and the penalties in the two countries
must be similar.
International efforts to counter use of the political
exception by terrorists have been impeded by the lack
of an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a
"political offense." Many states are reluctant to sub-
scribe to any definition that might abridge national
sovereignty by limiting their right to determine
whether or not an offense is extraditable. The French,
for example, attach particular importance to their
tradition of political asylum-"the sacred principle"
of foreign relations-and strongly resist efforts by the
European Community to narrow the political offense
loophole.
A case that illustrates the extent to which political
interests can drive extradition policy involved Rolfe
Pohle, an RAF arms procurer and one of five terror-
ists freed from West German jails in exchange for
kidnaped Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz.
Arrested in Athens, Pohle fought German extradition
efforts by pleading the political offense exception.
pated political gain.
' The Castioni and Meunier decisions form the basis for the
American judiciary's view of the political offense exception. Prac-
tices vary from country to country, but in Europe the Belgians,
Dutch, and in particular, the French have adopted a more liberal
interpretation of these landmark cases. F__~
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Table I
Political Offense Exception: Key Terrorist Extradition Cases
Requested by/ Incident Group Outcome
Requested of
West Germany/Greece Pohle case (1976). Freed from a German RAF Extradition affirmed. An Athens court
jail in return for a kidnaped Berlin mayoral denied extradition on grounds that act
candidate, Pottle fled to Greece where he constituted a political offense; after the
was arrested. German Government exerted extremely
heavy pressure on the Greek Government,
the Greek Supreme Court reversed the
decision.
West Germany/ France Croissant case (1977). Charged with pro- RAF Extradition affirmed. A French court re-
viding operational support to the RAF, jected initial German warrant on grounds
Croissant fled to France and requested that charges cited were political and non-
political asylum. ored only one of 15 charges in second
warrant. Croissant became a cause celebre
among French Leftists and an embarrassment
to President Giscard.
West Germany, Abu Daoud case (1977). Organizer of the Black Extradition denied. The French Govern-
Israel/France 1972 attack against the Israeli Olympic September ment under heavy Arab pressure denied
team, Daoud was arrested by French au- (PLO) extradition on grounds that the German
thorities in 1977. warrant was technically defective and had
not been followed by an official request
through diplomatic channels. The Israeli
request was denied on grounds that the
offense had not taken place on French soil
and therefore the Franco-Israeli extradi-
tion agreement did not apply.
West Germany/ Folkerts case (1978). Germany requested RAF Extradition affirmed. The Dutch Supreme
Netherlands extradition for crimes including the murder Court denied extradition for Schleyer mur-
of German industrialist, Hanns-Martin der on political offense grounds. Folkerts
Schleyer. was ultimately extradited on other charges,
but court finding alarmed both German
and Dutch officials as it placed the Dutch
Government in the position of appearing to
sanction political murder.
Italy/France Piperno case (1979). Extradition requested Red Brigades Extradition affirmed. The French court
for complicity in the kidnaping and murder rejected the initial Italian warrant on
of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo grounds that the cited offenses were politi-
Moro. cal but ultimately honored two of the 46
charges listed in a second warrant. Piperno
was returned to Italy where the Italian
court released him for lack of evidence.
Great Britain/United McMullen case (1979). Great Britain re- PIRA Extradition denied. A US court deter-
States quested extradition for the bombing of mined that McMullen's acts constituted a
British Army barracks in England. political offense. The court agreed with
defense argument that an insurrection of a
political nature existed in Northern Ireland
and that the British Army and its military
facilities were legitimate targets.
Great Britain/United Mackin case (1980). Great Britain request- PIRA Extradition denied. A US court deter-
States ed extradition for wounding a British mined that Mackin's act constituted a
soldier in Belfast. political offense, and the court commented
favorably on the legitimacy of the PIRA
efforts.
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Requested by/ Incident
Requested of
Spain/France Linaza case (1981). Spain requested extra-
dition for the murder of six Civil Guard
members, assassination of a municipal
councilor, and the bombing of Spain's
nuclear facility near Milano.
Israel/United States Abu Eain case (1981). Israel requested
extradition for a bombing that killed two
and wounded 36 in a Tiberius market
square.
Great Britain/United Quinn case (1982). Extradition requested
States for the murder of a British constable.
ETA-M Extradition denied. A French court, for the
first time since the death of Franco (1975),
ruled to extradite an ETA member, but
President Mitterrand, by refusing to return
Linaza, fulfilled an election pledge to the
Linaza family and the French Basque
population that no ETA member would be
extradited.
Extradition affirmed. Political offense ex-
ception argument was not accepted by the
court because the act was clearly directed
against the civilian populace and not the
installations of the Israeli Government.
PIRA Extradition affirmed. For the first time a
US court found for extraditing an Irish
militant. The decision, however, must be
reviewed by the District Court and then
may be appealed to Circuit Court and
ultimately to the US Supreme Court.
Piperno case (1982). Extradition requested Red Brigades
for supporting Red Brigade activities and
complicity in the Moro and other murders.
supply problems or terrorist reprisals.
In another case involving West German interests,
however, the terrorist was the beneficiary of success-
ful political pressure. Black September member Abu
Daoud, who was wanted for organizing the attack
against the Israeli Olympic team during the 1972
Munich games, was arrested when he illegally entered
France in 1977. The French court rejected both West
German and Israeli efforts to obtain custody and
released Daoud on narrow and dubious legal grounds.
Extradition denied. A Canadian court re-
jected three separate Italian extradition
requests citing political offense exception
and technical legal considerations.
According to the press, the French
Government had been subjected to heavy Arab pres-
sure and feared that strong action would invite oil
Terrorist Successes and Failures. Of all European
terrorist groups, Spain's ETA has been most success-
ful in avoiding extradition. Using France as a safe
haven, both the Military Wing (ETA/M) and the
Political Military Wing (ETA/PM) have exploited the
French Government's tradition of political asylum, its
liberal interpretation of the political offense excep-
tion, and its desire to placate the French Basque
minority. Since 1975, the French Government has
honored none of the more than 20 Spanish requests
for the extradition of ETA fugitives. French recalci-
trance, we believe, is reinforced by an historic enmity
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toward Spain and a particular distaste for the Spanish
security forces, which are regarded as holdovers from
the Franco regime. Spain has no effective leverage
and is dependent on French good will if it is to attain
other foreign policy objectives, such as entry into the
European Community
Although not as successful as the ETA in the narrow-
ly legal sense, Northern Ireland's PIRA has made
sophisticated use of the political offense exception. By
mounting well-coordinated, large-scale media and po-
litical action campaigns in Ireland and abroad, the
PIRA has been able to rally support, increase recruit-
ment, raise funds, and generate sympathetic publicity.
Often PIRA fugitives flee to the United States which,
according to the Department of Justice, has never
extradited an Irish republican militant. An encourag-
ing development occurred in September 1982, howev-
er, when a US federal magistrate found for extradi-
tion in the case of William Quinn, wanted by the
British Government for the murder of a British
constable. The decision still faces a review and ap-
peals process that could extend to the US Supreme
Court.
Earlier key PIRA decisions involved the Peter
McMullen (1979) and Desmond Mackin (1980) cases,
in which US courts denied extradition on grounds that
the acts constituted political offenses. The court
agreed with defense arguments that a state of political
insurrection existed in Northern Ireland and that the
British Army and its military facilities were legiti-
mate PIRA targets-findings that were exploited by
PIRA propagandists.
West Germany's RAF has been involved in several
highly publicized extradition cases but has not been
successful in preventing extradition. In some in-
stances, however, RAF sympathizer groups have gen-
erated considerable, favorable publicity.
The Red Brigades have made less use of the political
offense exception than most other major terrorist
groups, largely because they are involved in fewer
extradition cases. Also, since the Italian political
system is widely perceived by West Europeans as
accommodating a diversity of views, the credibility of
such a defense is reduced. However, the political
offense exception has impeded repeated efforts by the
Italian Government to bring to justice Franco Pi-
perno, alleged mastermind of the Aldo Moro murder.
In 1979 after a lengthy extradition hearing in France,
Piperno was returned to Italy but was acquitted by an
Italian court for insufficient evidence. The govern-
ment again sought to apprehend Piperno in 1982, but
this time a Canadian court denied extradition on
grounds of the political offense exception and techni-
cal legal considerations.
POW Status and the Geneva Conventions
Some captured terrorists have demanded that they be
accorded prisoner-of-war status under the provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols. Such status provides significant ad-
vantage to a captured terrorist because, according to
the laws and customs of war, a combatant is afforded
immunity for acts that in time of peace are considered
common crimes. Moreover, inherent in the granting of
POW status is the implication that the terrorist
group, by being treated as an army at war, has
achieved a degree of political legitimacy
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''[The killing] of Aldo Moro is
an act of revolutionary jus-
tice-the highest act of human-
ity possible in a class divided
society. " Renato Curcio, Red
RAF lawyer Klaus Croissant
(in rear seat), an architect of the
POW defense and himself a
principal in an extradition bat-
tle, photographed accompany-
ing Jean-Paul Sartre to visit
Andreas Baader in Stammheim
Prison. Driver is Hans-Joachim
Klein, who was wounded in
1975 attack on OPEC Head-
quarters led by "Carlos.'
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Although governments are loath to grant formal
POW status to captured terrorists, they have accord-
ed POW protection in cases when terrorism assumes
the proportions of a general insurgency, in the hope
that doing so would foster humane treatment of
captured government soldiers. Such situations, while
not common, have been documented in some 10
internal conflicts since the mid-1950s. During the
Vietnam war, for instance, the United States and
South Vietnam accorded captured Viet Cong POW
treatment; from 1972 to 1976, the British granted
Irish terrorists a special status that afforded many of
the same guarantees.
Terrorist Successes and Failures. Terrorist claims to
POW status have been more successful as a propagan-
da weapon than as a courtroom tactic. Irish Republi-
can militants, for example, claimed POW status early
in their struggle (1916-20) and have continued to use
the issue not so much as a legal defense but as a
means to obtain political recognition. Although the
British Government has generally refused to recog-
nize these claims, the militants continue to exploit the
issue with the public, using the terms POW status,
political status, and special status interchangeably.
The Provisional Sinn Fein, the political arm of the
PIRA, established a POW department to marshal
international support during 1980-81 for the hunger
strikers demanding special status. Although the strik-
ers' demands were not met, it was generally acknowl-
edged by terrorism experts that the strike had provid-
ed short-term but significant political and organi-
The RAF of West Germany also has had some
success in using the POW ploy as a propaganda
weapon. In February 1981, nine imprisoned RAF
terrorists began a hunger strike to demand POW
status. This strike quickly spread to other prisons in
West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Supporters
and sympathizer groups mounted a Europe-wide cam-
paign and filed petitions with the United Nations
Representatives of the American Indian
Movement march in Belfast in support of the
Human Rights Commission. The West German Gov-
ernment did not grant POW status, but press report-
ing suggests that the campaign fed anti-German
sentiment among European leftwing intellectuals and
others predisposed to believe the worst about German
treatment of political dissenters.
Members of other terrorist groups such as the Red
Brigades and the Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) have also claimed
POW status on occasion. Red Brigade members
arrested after the kidnaping of General Dozier in
December 1981 identified themselves as prisoners of
war, in contrast to previously arrested Brigadists who
claimed to be political prisoners. The latter approach
having failed, these terrorists may have decided that
the POW issue, because of the specific guarantees
accorded by the Geneva Conventions, offers greater
leverage. To our knowledge, the claim has not influ-
enced the government in its treatment of Brigade
members-probably because authorities perceive that
granting such status would be tantamount to acknowl-
edging the Brigades as a legitimate political force.F-
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ASALA's demands that its captured members receive
political status and treatment as prisoners of war have
not been upheld in the courts. ASALA efforts to
exploit the issue as propaganda have been primitive-
preaching to the converted rather than expanding the
organization's appeal beyond those already committed
to the cause. ASALA relies on intimidation rather
than political manipulation of the judicial process to
secure release or better treatment for its captured
members. However, because the group's demands
have been met at times, the uninformed public could
infer that claims to special treatment by ASALA
terrorists have some validity.
We believe that the POW defense, like the political
offense exception, is used to best effect by ethnic
separatists because such groups often can persuasively
point to a history of serious grievances, documented
government repression, organized armed resistance to
the central authority, and a base of popular support.
Basque and Irish separatists thus can make a more
compelling case than an anarchic group such as the
German Red Army Faction. Traditional Marxist
groups probably occupy a middle ground with regard
to their ability to exploit such legal defenses effective-
In contrast to the political offense exception, which is
limited to situations involving extradition, claims to
POW status have a much wider application. However,
as a legal defense, such claims are less likely to
succeed, primarily because POW status is granted by
the victim government whereas political offense ex-
ception requests are determined by a third party
usually not directly involved in the matter. The
success of either approach largely depends on the
interests of the government holding the terrorist, the
integrity of the judiciary, the capabilities of sympa-
thizer groups to manipulate public opinion, and the
nature of the crime itself.
International Legal Efforts-Often Flawed
In response to the terrorist threat, the international
community has enacted a series of conventions, decla-
rations, and agreements dealing with the problems
posed by aircraft hijackings, extradition, threats to
internationally protected persons, and the taking of
hostages.
More than any other act, aircraft hijacking has
mobilized the international community (table 2). Un-
der the aegis of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, three international conventions have
been adopted-the 1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970
Hague Convention, and the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion. These conventions provide a legal framework for
dealing with attacks against civil aviation, but none
mandates sanctions strong enough to force a state to
comply. In 1978 a major step was taken to rectify this
weakness when a declaration was formulated and
signed in Bonn by the heads of state of the Seven
Summit Countries.2 This declaration provides for a
cutoff of services by the airlines of the signatory states
to any country refusing to return a hijacked aircraft
or failing to extradite or prosecute an aircraft hijack-
The effect of such accords is difficult to gauge. A
precipitous drop in skyjacking occurred in 1973-
when the number of offenses fell to less than half the
1969-70 high-after the three conventions but some
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Table 2
Antiskyjacking Agreements
Tokyo Convention (1963) Clarifies jurisdiction over alleged offender. Although this convention provides no effective means
to bring a skyjacker to justice, it established a
Provides legal principles for dealing with offenses precedent for multilateral action.
committed aboard an aircraft.
Montreal Convention
(1971)
an alleged offender and impose "severe" but unspeci- thereby allowing any country holding an alleged
fled penalties. skyjacker to try him, but did not establish priority of
jurisdiction in event of competing claims nor deal with
a hijacking initiated or attempted before takeoff or
after landing.
Extends provisions of The Hague Convention to
sabotage and attacks against airports, navigation
facilities, and aircraft on the ground.
Employs The Hague extradite-or-prosecute formula,
but leaves the determination of "severe" penalties to
the state holding the fugitives, thereby providing a
loophole that enables a state to fulfill the letter but not
the spirit of the agreement.
Bonn Declaration (1978) Asserts that when a country refuses to extradite or Since the airlines of the signatory states carry an
prosecute an aircraft hijacker or to return the hijacked estimated two-thirds of the non-Communist world's
aircraft, the airlines of the Seven Summit Countries air passenger traffic, the Bonn Declaration provides
will halt service to the offending state. the means to effectively punish countries that violate
the antiskyjacking conventions.
five years before the Bonn Declaration.' Open source
literature ascribes the marked decrease to improved
airport security, lessening publicity value, and an
antiskyjacking agreement in 1973 with Cuba. A PLO
declaration in 1975 that skyjacking would be treated
as a crime served as a further deterrent.
Other international agreements that deal with inter-
national terrorism are also flawed. For example, both
the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism and the 1979 UN Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages permit a state to deny extradition
if an act is judged to be a political offense. In general,
' During 1973-80, terrorists averaged five skyjacking attempts per
year. In 1981 a significant increase occurred, which was probably
sparked by the successful Pakistan Liberation Army skyjacking in
March and which reflected an increase in Latin American terrorist
activity. In 1982, six terrorist skyjackings were attempted-a total
international agreements designed to counter the ter-
rorist threat lack strong, effective sanctions and con-
tain loopholes that enable signatory states to evade
the spirit of the agreement. They do, however, provide
a legal framework for action and put countries on
record as being prepared to take certain measures in
response to terrorism. They can also be used to
publicize a country's noncompliance.
National Law-The More Effective Response
The most effective legal measures to counter interna-
tional terrorism have been national rather than inter-
national, and West Germany has been a leader in this
effort. Such legislation makes the operational climate
less hospitable for the terrorist by limiting, in specific
circumstances, constitutional guarantees-such as
freedom of speech, association, and movement-and
by restricting access to counsel, bail, and speedy trial
(table 3).
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Table 3
Selected European Countries: Key Provisions of
National Legislation Used to Counter Terrorism a
Austria
Association with a terrorist CC
deemed a criminal offense
Advocacy of terrorist acts deemed CC
a criminal offense
Detention without formal charges CC
for limited time
Temporary restriction or ban on None
lawyer-client contact
Monitor lawyer-client communi- CC
cation
Interrogation without counsel PC
present
Exclusion of defense attorney PC
from trial
Belgium
France
Italy
Nether-
lands
Spain
Switzer-
land
United
Kingdom
West
Germany
CC
A/EL
A/EL
CC
CC
CC
A/EL
A/EL
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
CC
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
CC
CC
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
None
None
A/EL
None
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
CC
CC
A/EL
CC
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
PC
PC
A/EL
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
PC
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
PC
A/EL
A/EL
A/EL
a Cited in general provisions of the national criminal code (CC) or the
national procedural code (PC) or provided for by special antiterror-
Trial without defendant present PC
ist/emergency legislation (A/EL).
In 1968, in response to leftwing student violence, the
FRG passed legislation that facilitated implementa-
tion of a "state of emergency," during which the
federal government was empowered to:
? Enact legislation that would supersede existing state
laws for the duration of the crisis.
? Deploy the Federal Border Guards throughout the
states.
? Issue instructions that would be binding on federal
administrative authorities and on otherwise inde-
pendent state officials as well.
Laws were also passed that made it a criminal offense
to support an act directed against the constitution or
to encourage others to commit such acts. The penal
code was amended in 1971 and again in 1975 to
permit the police, prosecuting authority, or court to
exclude a defense attorney from participating in a
particular trial. The exclusion order may be issued by
either the Higher Regional Court or the Federal
Court of Justice, but not by the court hearing the
case. Grounds for exclusion include suspicion of par-
ticipating in an offense, aiding or abetting an offense,
endangering the security of the state, or abusing the
right of contact with an incarcerated client in order to
commit an act that could compromise the security of
the penitentiary.
In 1977, in direct response to the RAF kidnaping and
murder of German industrialist, Hanns-Martin
Schleyer, Germany passed a law that provided for a
two-week ban on contact between a prisoner and the
outside world when such contact could facilitate
terrorist operations. Such bans, which included visits
from defense attorneys, could be extended up to one
month if affirmed by judicial decree. In addition,
since 1978 a lawyer and a terrorist client may be
separated during consultations by use of a glass
security barrier
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The German penal code was also amended in response
to early RAF hunger strikes to permit trial in the
absence of the accused, if the accused is responsible
for his inability to be present. Other provisions permit
a trial to continue after the accused has been removed
from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, provided
he has been given an opportunity to plead the charge.
Since their inception, the German antiterrorist laws
have been controversial. In 1975, the German Section
of Amnesty International published an open letter to
call attention to "the steadily worsening political
climate in the Federal Republic," and the Reuters
News Service reported that the International Com-
mission of Jurists had criticized the government for
endangering the rule of law. Of all the legislation, the
contact ban law has drawn greatest fire, and the West
German Lawyers' Association has urged its repeal.
Some democratic Germans believe that such legisla-
tion could presage a return to totalitarianism. The
statutes, however, have been carefully drawn and in
our opinion judiciously applied.
Italy, too, has enacted tough antiterrorist legislation
that permits search without warrant, detention up to
48 hours without charge, interrogation without coun-
sel present, and holding an offender for up to five
years before trial. After the Dozier kidnaping, au-
thorities tightened prison regulations in an effort to
sever channels of communications between Red Bri-
gade members and jailed Brigade leaders. One of the
most effective measures, passed in 1982 but since
lapsed, provided reduced sentences for repentant ter-
rorists. Although Italian authorities had obtained
information through plea bargaining in the past, this
law formalized such arrangements and provided a
legal basis for fulfilling prior promises as well. F_
Outlook
We believe that terrorist exploitation of the interna-
tional legal system will increase. Although precedent-
setting courtroom victories remain unlikely, groups
that have realized propaganda successes will probably
refine their tactics to extract maximum political
advantage. We expect them to concentrate on devel-
oping international support to increase their credibil-
ity and prestige with target audiences. The less so-
phisticated groups already attempting to exploit the
system, albeit on a primitive level, most likely will
emulate these efforts.
We expect terrorist groups increasingly to bring their
cases before international bodies such as the United
Nations and Amnesty International. Even when the
findings of these organizations do not favor the
terrorist, the fact that terrorist groups are accorded a
serious and respectful hearing, we believe, serves to
increase their stature among potential adherents. F_
We may also see greater manipulation of national
legal processes by the overt political arm of terrorist
groups in an effort to disrupt programs and policies of
target governments. Such maneuvers could include
legal action to enjoin governments from initiating
defense-related projects, nuisance suits against key
government officials, or attempts to exploit cases in
litigation that involve social or environmental con-
cerns. These actions may be taken solely for their
propaganda value, with the aim of broadening the
group's political constituency. Through exploitation of
the legal system and other nonviolent tactics, terror-
ists can multiply their options, wage war at a variety
of levels, and thereby become more difficult to neu-
tralize.
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