SOVIET AGRICULTURE: REVIEWING A CORE PROGRAM

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• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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ill WU F* I f~~
Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Soviet Agriculture:
Reviewing a Core Program
L '. 9 J 1 ,~ 6 S is ~.~
R t i ~"1'?"d.
L~~~ Y3.`'ti:5iJa
Secret
GI 83-10038
February 1983
COPY 3 3 7
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Directorate of
Soviet Agriculture:
Reviewing a Core Program
This paper was prepared byl 25X1
of the Agricultural Assessments 25X1
Branch of the Office of Global Issues. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Strategic Resources Division, OGI, on
Secret
G/ 83-10038
February 1983
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Soviet Agriculture:
Reviewing a Core Program
Key Judgments A 15-year effort to develop the agricultural base of the Russian Noncher-
Information available nozem Zone' (RNCZ)-a vast region incorporating 13 percent of the area
as of 10 February 1983 and 23 percent of the population of the USSR-was launched with much
was used in this report.
fanfare in 1976. It constitutes the largest single agricultural development
effort Moscow has undertaken since the New Lands program in the 1950s.
Under the program, agricultural production in the zone is slated to more
than double by 1990, with major increases in grain output as well as in oth-
er crops. To accomplish this, the program calls for heavy capital invest-
ments, widespread land reclamation, increased use of fertilizers, and the
building of large-scale, highly mechanized, and specialized agricultural
enterprises. So far the program has been a failure on almost every score.
Farm output in the zone has actually declined since 1977, and the rate of
decline was sharper than for Soviet agriculture overall. During 1976-80 the
zone accounted for only 14.5 percent of total Soviet agricultural produc-
tion, well below the planned share and less than the contribution the region
made during the 1971-75 period.
The decline in agricultural production, paralleled by lagging progress in
construction, mechanization, and land reclamation, has occurred despite
heavy investment. During 1971-75, RNCZ agricultural investment totaled
19.7 billion rubles, 15 percent of the investment in agriculture for the
country as a whole. During 1976-80, investment rose to 31.9 billion rubles,
almost one-fifth of the USSR total. Despite the failures of the last half
dozen years, we see no slackening in investment. During 1981-85 the area's
agriculture investment is scheduled to increase by 23 percent, compared to
an 11-percent increase for the USSR overall.
The principal reasons for the program's failure are the dismal climate and
the low quality of the region's soils. Beyond this the area suffers from
shortages of skilled farm labor and the backwardness of Soviet agrotechno-
logy. No less important in explaining the limited progress of the program is
the inferiority of the area's rural infrastructure, the improvement of which
remains a prerequisite to the realization of agricultural production goals
established for the RNCZ.
Given the size of investment in the RNCZ and the scope of its development
plan, some enhancement of the area's contribution to the USSR's farm
economy is inevitable. The draining and irrigation of limited tracts of land
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GI 83-10038
February 1983
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seem within reason, but the 1990 target for land reclamation will not be
met. New villages of several thousand people each will be created, but the
larger "agro-cities" are not within reach. Because of shortfalls in the road
construction program, only a skeletal system of all-season interfarm roads
will exist by 1990. Both farm machinery and fertilizer deliveries will
increase substantially but will nevertheless be inadequate to meet the farm
output goals planned for the end of this decade.
Although the regime recently reaffirmed its intention to make the USSR
self-sufficient in grain and livestock production, it will not be able to do so
any time soon. The reality of recurring large crop shortfalls, to which the
RNCZ annually contributes, has forced the USSR to become a heavy, if
irregular, buyer in world agricultural commodity markets.
Neither the outright pur-
chase nor the illegal acquisition of Western agrotechnology, however, is
likely to result in significant and lasting improvements in Soviet agricultur-
al production. This would require fundamental changes in the Soviet
system, but none appear to be forthcoming, either in the much ballyhooed
Food Program or elsewhere.
25X1
25X1
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2. USSR-RNCZ: Comparison of Planned Expansion in Agriculture
During 1976-80
3. RNCZ: Agricultural Development and Production,
1976-80 Compared to 1971-75
4. RNCZ: 1981-85 Plan Compared With Previous Plans and
Accomplishments
3. USSR and Northern Plains: Average Length of Frost-Free
Period (Days) 10
4. Comparison of Average Annual Precipitation in the USSR and
Northern Plains 1 1
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Figure 1
Nonchernozem Regions
European nonchernozem zone
Russian nonchernozem zone
Major agricultural area boundary
Autonomous republic (ASSR) or oblast boundary
Economic region boundary
0 500 1000 Kilometers
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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Soviet Agriculture:
Reviewing a Core Program
Introduction
The Soviet Union is committed to a highly touted
program to develop agriculture in the Russian Non-
chernozem Zone, based on the policy that each region
should become self-sufficient in food production to the
extent possible. By devoting special attention to agri-
cultural development in the RNCZ, the Soviets ex-
pect to substantially increase production and maintain
a highly stable, "guaranteed" output of crops and
livestock. The Soviet perception of the RNCZ's agri-
cultural potential is heavily predicated on making
better use of the zone's relatively high average annual
level of precipitation, but ignores other factors that do
not favor agricultural production.
Moscow has equated the potential impact of this 15-
year program (1976-90) to the benefits that were
realized from its first regional agricultural project-
the "New Lands" program, conceived by Khrushchev
in the mid-1950s. It brought some 40 million hectares
of unused land into cultivation. However, the success-
ful development of the New Lands-which now ac-
count for nearly 70 million tons of grain output yearly
or about a third of the average Soviet total-contrasts
sharply with the ineffectiveness of the RNCZ pro-
gram.
The term nonchernozem refers to relatively infertile
soils with a low potential for agricultural production.
Soviet nonchernozem lands extend eastward from the
western Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics
across northern Siberia to the Soviet Far East, cover-
ing more than half of the USSR. The Russian
nonchernozem program, however, covers only the
Northwest, Northern, Central, and Volga-Vyatsk eco-
nomic regions and Perm, Sverdlovsk, Udmurt, and
Kaliningrad Oblasts in the RFSFR (figure 1). The
RNCZ covers 280 million hectares and is approxi-
mately equal in area to Western Europe or to the
United States east of the Mississippi River. It includes
some 13 percent of the USSR and 14 percent of all
Soviet cultivated land, and contains 23 percent of the
country's population. The 14,000 industrial enter-
prises of the region have a considerable capability for
modernizing and servicing the agro-industrial sector.
The RNCZ is situated at the latitude of Canada's
prairie provinces. Its climate, however, is more moder-
ate-comparable in temperature to the Dakotas,
Montana, and Minnesota and in precipitation to
eastern Nebraska and Minnesota, although peak rain-
fall comes later in the summer. RNCZ soils more
closely resemble those of northern Michigan and
Wisconsin or New England. In 1977-its best year
since the inauguration of the program-the RNCZ
accounted for about 16 percent of Soviet agricultural
production, about 12 percent of all grain, and 16
percent of all meat. Since then, the zone's absolute
production and the value of its farm output have
declined (table 1).
Genesis of the RNCZ Program
Planning for the RNCZ program was initiated in
April 1971 when a party-state commission was
formed to assess the agricultural potential of the area.
The plan was finally adopted in July 1974, and work
was begun early in the 1976-80 planning period. The
program is more ambitious than parallel efforts under
way in other Soviet regions. Agricultural inputs and
investment funds, for example, are designed to grow
faster in the RNCZ than elsewhere. Measures re-
quired to expand and maintain the RNCZ agricultur-
al base are, however, considerably more complex than
those used to develop virgin and unused parcels in the
semiarid, sparsely populated New Lands, to which the
RNCZ program is often compared.
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Table I
RNCZ: Production of Agricultural Commodities,
Selected Years
Year Gross Agricultural Key Agricultural Commodities
Production (million tons)
(billion rubles, 1973 prices)
Total
Crops
Live-
stock
Meat
Milk
Eggs a
Grain
Potatoes
Vegetables
Flax b
1972
16.2
5.9~
10.3
2.1
17.4
10.6
17.3
17.9
3.3
205
1973
18.9c
8.2 c
10.7
2.1
18.3
11.4
21.5
33.7
5.2
164
1974
18.2
6.8c
11.4 c
2.2
19.2
12.5
21.4
20.6
4.3
159
1975
19.2
7.7
11.5
2.4
19.3
13.0
18.8
30.7
4.6
238
1976
17.4
6.5
10.9
2.2
18.4
13.0
26.4
19.2
3.0
186
1977
19.4
7.4
12.0
2.3
19.8
14.2
24.3
25.2
3.4
210
1978
18.1
6.4
11.7
2.5
19.1
15.0
22.7
20.3
3.6
111
1980
16.5
5.3
11.2
2.3
17.4
16.2
15.7
16.5
3.5
113
1981
16.9
6.0
10.9
2.3
16.0
17.1
NA
18.0
4.2
92
Sources: Narodnoye khozyaystva RSFSR v ... godu, selected years.
a Billion units.
b Thousand tons.
Converted from 1965 prices, by interpolating from 1970 and 1975
data in both price weights.
The Scope of the Program
In the absence of a comprehensive planning docu-
ment, only a sketch of the 15-year RNCZ program
can be put together from bits and pieces of informa-
tion published in a wide variety of Soviet sources. The
major goals to be achieved by 1990 include:
? Draining of some 9-10 million hectares, of which
7-8 million hectares are to be drained using buried
tiles.
? Irrigation of 2-2.5 million hectares.
? Both draining and irrigation of some lands that are
too wet in spring but too dry in summer.
? Other land improvements on 8-10 million hectares,
including increased application of lime and fertiliz-
ers.
The drainage goal represents 10 times the amount of
drained land that was added to the RNCZ network
during 1971-75. Moreover, the buried tile method,
although minimizing interference with tilling and
harvesting operations, is a costly approach to land
drainage. The 2-2.5 million hectares in the RNCZ to
be developed for irrigation by 1990 represents six
times the amount added during 1971-75 and is equiv-
alent to one-sixth of all USSR irrigated land existing
The RNCZ program also provides for the wholesale
restructuring of rural settlements into larger popula-
tion centers, primarily consolidated residential centers
for individual sovkhozes and kolkhozes. One Soviet
projection calls for the replacement of the existing
143,000 small, isolated hamlets with 15,400 larger
settlements. The object is to improve the quality of
rural life, to slow the migration of farmworkers to
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Table 2
USSR-RNCZ: Comparison of Planned Expansion
in Agriculture During 1976-80
USSR RNCZ RNCZ as % USSR RNCZ RNCZ as %
of USSR of USSR
Production of farm products
All farm products, official measure
(billion rubles, 1973 prices)
113.7
17.9
15.8
146.5
24.4
16.7
Grain (million tons)
181.5
19.7
10.9
235.0
31.0
13.2
Potatoes (million tons)
89.8
26.0
29.0
104.0
35.3
33.9
Vegetables (million tons)
23.0
4.3
18.8
30.0
6.0
20.0
Meat (million tons)
14.0
2.2
15.7
17.3
2.9
16.8
Milk (million tons)
87.4
18.4
21.1
102.0
23.0
22.5
Eggs (billion units)
51.4
11.4
22.2
66.8
15.6
23.4
Wool (thousand tons)
442.1
17.1
3.9
515.0
18.5
3.6
Gross fixed investments (billion rubles)
131.5
19.7
15.0
170.7
35.0
20.5
Tractors (thousand units)
1,667.0
287.0
17.2
1,900.0
380.0
20.0
Trucks (thousand units)
1,102.0
189.0
17.2
1,350.0
230.0
17.0
Grain combines (thousand units)
449.0
73.0
16.2
538.0
94.0
IT 5
Fertilizer (million tons)
307.0
63.0
20.5
467.0
120.0
25.7
Gross additions to drained land
(thousand hectares)
4,374.0
953.0
21.8
4,700.0
1,800.0
38.3
By covered drainage
NA
NA
NA
NA
1,265.0
NA_
Gross additions to irrigated land
(thousand hectares)
4,552.0
512.0
11.2
4,900.0
667.0
13.6
Liming of acid soils (million hectares)
28.7
15.0
52.3
47.0
22.9
48.7
Sources: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v ... godu, selected years,
Narovodnoye khozyaystvo RSFR v godu, selected years, and other
Soviet press reports.
urban centers in search of nonfarm employment, and on individual farm enterprises, a goal that is common
to bolster labor productivity in agriculture. All new to all Soviet agricultural regions. Mechanization and
housing is to have electricity, modern plumbing, larger scale operations, for example, are supposed to
central heating, and gas ranges-features now largely permit greater use of specialized, highly skilled labor
absent in rural settlements. and, in turn, foster higher productivity per worker.
The nationwide goal of stimulating livestock output
A major part of the RNCZ program is designed to by shifting herds into specialized, large-scale com-
promote the concentration, specialization, mechaniza- plexes is being actively pursued in the RNCZ pro-
tion, and industrialization of agricultural production gram. Although most complexes in the RNCZ are
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expected to obtain feed and replacement animals from
member farms in their interfarm or agro-industrial
organizations, many receive feedstuffs through state
allocations. By 1990 practically all RNCZ beef and
three-fifths of RNCZ pork sold to the state are to be
produced or fattened at specialized livestock complex-
es instead of at traditional sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
The RNCZ plan calls for the annual production of
most major agricultural products to more than double
1974 levels. Grain production, for example, is to reach
43 million tons by 1990, more than twice the 1971-75
average, while output from other Soviet grain areas is
to grow by less than one-third. By 1990 the RNCZ
grain area is to exceed 20 million hectares, compared
to an average of 15.3 million hectares during 1971-75.
The additional area sown to grain will come from an
increase in arable land, a reduction in the area
devoted to forage crops, and a reduction in the
amount of land left fallow. Similarly, by 1990 RNCZ
production of potatoes is planned to reach 42 million
tons, compared to the 26-million-ton average of 1971-
75 and the 21-million-ton average during 1976-80F-
After Seven Years: Meager Results
The program for accelerating RNCZ agricultural
development has been a failure thus far. According to
published Soviet data, farm output in the zone has
actually declined since 1977. The RNCZ share of
total Soviet agricultural production also declined-
from 15.8 percent in 1971-75 to 14.5 percent in
1976-80. This occurred even though the RNCZ is
getting a significantly greater share of resources, as
shown in the following tabulation:
Allocations of agricultural 15.0 18.7
investments
Productive fixed capital (end of 14.7 17.0
period)
Food Production. According to official Soviet statis-
tics, food production has declined in the RNCZ since
the program was initiated. Overall production of crops
during 1976-80 declined by 10 percent over the
previous five-year period, and the value of livestock
production increased only 6 percent; planned growth
in these two areas had called for increases in the
range of 30 to 60 percent. The increase in the total
value of livestock production resulted largely from
higher state procurement prices rather than higher
output. Meat production increased 5 percent but milk
production rose by only 1 percent. Plans had called for
production increases of 30 and 25 percent, respective-
ly. Only egg production increased substantially-
about 30 percent-but the plan called for a 40-
percent rise. At the end of 1981, the number of cattle
and sheep was significantly below 1975 levels, reflect-
ing the zone's poor harvests of forage crops. Grains
and other concentrated feeds brought in from other
regions, however, permitted an increase in swine and
poultry numbers.
Performance in other food sectors was almost as bad.
The production of potatoes and vegetables in the zone
declined by one-fifth during 1976-80. By 1980 the
RNCZ was producing only 25 percent of all Soviet
potatoes and 14 percent of all vegetables, compared to
planned shares of 34 and 20 percent, respectively.
With the exception of eggs, the RNCZ share of total
USSR output of important foodstuffs has gradually
declined since the 1961-65 period. Soviet open source
reporting indicates that in 1981, the third successive
year of unfavorable weather in the USSR, RNCZ
production of grain did not increase, although the
output of potatoes, vegetables, and forage crops was
considerably above the depressed levels of 1980. Pre-
liminary Soviet reporting indicates only limited im-
provements in RNCZ farm output in 1982.
Construction. Soviet sources reveal that compared to
the 1971-75 level, capital investment expenditures for
the RNCZ agricultural sector during 1976-80 rose 62
percent; the plan called for a 78-percent rise. By way
Total 15.8 14.5 of comparison, total Soviet agricultural investment
13.8 11.4 increased by only 31 percent. While the investment
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Table 3
RNCZ: Agricultural Development and Production,
1976-80 Compared to 1971-75
1971-75 1976-80 Percent
Change
All farm products
(billion rubles, 1973 prices)
17.9
17.9
0
Of which:
All crops (billion rubles, 1973 prices)
7.2
6.5
-10
Livestock products (billion rubles, 1973 prices)
10.8
11.4
6
Grain (million tons)
19.7
21.3
8
Potatoes (million tons)
26.0
21.2
-18
Gross fixed investments (billion rubles, 1973 prices)
19.7
31.9
62
Tractors (thousand units)
287.0
NA
NA
Trucks (thousand units)
190.0
NA
NA
Grain combines (thousand units)
73.0
NA
NA
Mineral fertilizer (million tons, standard units)
63.0
85.1
35
Land reclamation (gross additions, thousand hectares)
Drainage
953.0
958.0
Liming acid soils (million hectares)
Inventories of agricultural resources c
All productive assets (billion rubles)
22.9
35.8
56
All cattle (million head)
18.2
18.1
-1
Cows (million head)
7.7
7.7
0
Swine (million head)
8.3
9.5
14
Sheep and goats (million head)
8.0
6.7
-16
Silage harvesting combines (thousand)
35.0
43.0
23
Drained land (thousand hectares)
2,071.0
2,721.0
31
Of which:
Sources: Narodnoye khozvaystvo RSFSR v ... godu, selected years.
a Annual average output for five-year period.
b Total for period.
c End of period.
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expenditure plan was underfulfilled by 9 percent, cost
overruns and unfinished construction led to far great-
er shortfalls in implementation. For example, only
half of the scheduled land drainage and irrigation
development was completed. Similarly, gross short-
falls occurred in various projects to reconstruct the
RNCZ rural infrastructure-both in new agricultural
production and processing facilities and in the massive
resettlement program. The intrafarm road construc-
tion program is lagging by some 20,000 kilometers
because of a lack of organization, plans and designs,
resources, and funds.
Fertilizers. Mineral fertilizer applications, planned to
double during 1976-80, increased only 35 percent.
Applications of organic fertilizer and other agrochem-
icals were also far below planned levels. During 1976-
80 the tonnage of lime applied to RNCZ lands
increased by only 70 percent rather than doubling as
was planned. Application of 8 to 10 tons of lime per
hectare in recent years reportedly reduced soil acidity
in Leningrad and Moscow Oblasts by one-half, which
partially explains why yields are higher there than in
the rest of the RNCZ. Elsewhere, however, the
treatment of acid soils has been limited by a shortage
of quality liming materials. Indeed, according to
Soviet journals, soil acidity is increasing in many
RNCZ regions.
Production Associations. As of 1979, the latest year
for which we have official Soviet data, nearly 120
interfarm production associations had been organized
in the RNCZ for raising and fattening cattle, pigs,
and poultry. Of this total, 68 state associations for
producing milk, beef, pork, vegetables, fruit, and
seeds and 23 enterprises for producing and processing
agricultural products have been set up. Except in
poultry raising, the increased efficiency and output of
livestock products that the modernized, specialized
livestock-raising complexes were to have provided are
largely absent in the RNCZ (and elsewhere in the
USSR).
Like other regions, the RNCZ has encountered unex-
pected difficulties with this program. Rather than
constructing entirely new facilities, some planners
believe that more investment should be channeled into
modernizing existing farmsteads. According to the
Soviet press, two-thirds of all the newly built livestock
complexes, feedlots, and poultry farms put into opera-
tion in the USSR have not yet reached planned
capacity output.
Farm Machinery. The increased inventory of stand-
ard farm machines does not include all of the kinds of
equipment the RNCZ needs. Of an entire series of
farm machines planned and designed especially for
the RNCZ-including units for constructing drain-
age, removing brush and stones, spreading fertilizer
and agrochemicals, and harvesting grain-only a few
have even been tested. Development of machinery
designed for the special no-till or minimal tillage
practices suitable for use in the RNCZ is grossly
lagging. These practices are needed to permit earlier
spring seeding in order to, in effect, lengthen the short
growing season, to conserve soil and soil moisture, to
reduce fuel and other costs, and to minimize agro-
chemical pollution.
Rural Labor. Rural outmigration from the RNCZ is
an acute and worsening problem, far more so than in
other Soviet agricultural regions. The zone's rural
population has declined to roughly three-fourths of its
1970 level. The latest open source data show that
during 1976-79, 426,000 grain combine operators,
tractor drivers, and other farm machinery experts
were trained in the zone while the number actually
working on farms in the RNCZ increased by only
50,000; moreover, 30 percent of the farms lacked
enough staff for even a single shift. Although industri-
al workers are periodically assigned to farm work,
farm machinery remains idle for lack of operators.
Only 26 percent of the graduates of higher and
secondary rural schools within the zone remain to
work on farms. About half of the 30,000 personnel
recruited annually by farms from professional and
technical colleges soon leave for other employment.
Some Soviet demographers are now proposing that
surplus farm workers in Central Asia be imported into
the RNCZ, but only a small number have been
relocated so far.
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Amending the Program
Several policy decisions, announced in the Soviet press
during the 1976-80 period, are intended to restructure
the development of agricultural operations in the
RNCZ and to offer alternative solutions for stemming
rural outmigration. The decentralization of light in-
dustry and its integration into farm enterprises are
being encouraged to provide off-season employment
and training for farm workers. In Gorky Oblast, for
example, farms have 3,000 such subsidiary enter-
prises. Funds intended for productive investment are
being diverted to provide grants for resettled families,
tenure bonuses to encourage rural employment, and
courses to train rural workers to run modern farming
operations. Wage rates on RNCZ farms and land
reclamation projects have been increased to equal
those in other high-priority agricultural regions. Fi-
nally, Moscow has threatened to punish responsible
executives if they fail to improve the pace of agricul-
tural development in the RNCZ.
Plans for 1981-85. Belatedly announced in a decree
in mid-April 1981, the Soviet 1981-85 plan targets for
the RNCZ countryside clearly indicate that recon-
struction-and expected farm output-will not be
accomplished within the original schedule, and certain
projects may be revised or even abandoned. Despite
setbacks, however, the RNCZ program continues to
receive high priority. During 1981-85, RNCZ fixed
capital investment in agriculture is planned to in-
crease by 23 percent, compared to about 11 percent
for all of the USSR. The RNCZ share of USSR
agricultural investment is targeted to reach almost 21
percent, compared to 18.7 percent during 1976-80
and 15.0 percent during 1971-75. Whereas the Sovi-
ets planned a 35-percent increase in RNCZ agricul-
tural output during 1976-80 over the level reached
during 1971-75-and achieved no growth at all-they
now postulate only a 30-percent increase by 1985
above the 1976-80 level.
Even if the 1981-85 land drainage and irrigation plans
are realized, three-fourths of the originally projected
1990 land improvement goals will remain to be
completed during 1986-90. Planned 1981-85 fertilizer
application is scarcely greater and the area to be
treated with lime is 20 percent less than was called for
in the 1976-80 plan. RNCZ farms are to receive
somewhat more new machinery during 1981-85 than
was planned during 1976-80, a period for which
actual deliveries have not been reported.
Of the scheduled investment in RNCZ agriculture
during 1981-85, expenditures on nonproductive rural
construction are to increase by 77 percent, leaving
only a 12-percent increase in investments directly
related to agricultural production. The 1981-85 plan,
however, calls for building only a third as much
housing as was scheduled in the 1976-80 plan. The
still uncertain direction of the resettlement program is
evident in Soviet plans to construct by 1985 one or
two model settlements in each oblast-10 years after
the initial decision to reconstruct the RNCZ country-
side intensively. Although some new villages of sever-
al thousand people are being created, the larger
"agro-city" types are not expected for 10 to 15 years.
Moreover, it is now proposed that houses in aban-
doned villages be made available to urban workers
and pensioners as summer homes or full-time resi-
dences. Those individuals, in turn, could be used to
supplement the rural labor force seasonally and to
carry out private farming.
The Soviets continue to expect RNCZ production of
most agricultural commodities to increase at much
faster rates than output in the USSR overall, as
follows:
1981-85 Plan, Percent
Increase Over 1976-80
RNCZ
USSR
Gross agricultural production
30
12-14
16-19
5-8
Vegetables
35
10-13
54
23
15-18
Eggs
21
5-7
Milk
13
14
RNCZ outputs of potatoes, vegetables, and eggs are
to increase by three times and of grain by twice their
respective all-USSR growth rates. Only milk produc-
tion in the zone is to match the national rate of
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Table 4
RNCZ: 1981-85 Plan Compared With Previous
Plans and Accomplishments
1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
Actual Plan
Plan Actual
Gross agricultural output a
(billion rubles, 1973 prices)
Fixed capital investment in
agriculture b (billion rubles, comparable prices)
Gross additions to land improvement,
(thousand hectares)
Nonproductive rural construction b
(billion rubles)
Improved roads
(thousand kilometers)
Sources: Narodnoye khozyaystva RSFSR v ... godu, selected years; c The Soviets describe these as "hard surfaced"; actually, most are
other Soviet press reports. covered with crushed rock or gravel rather than paved with concrete
Average annual. or asphalt.
b Total for the period.
increase, but RNCZ meat production is to grow much thus unlikely to meet the goals planned for it. The
faster. The zone's meat output in 1985 would have to region has a number of handicaps (figures 2, 3, and 4):
exceed the 1981 level by 48 percent in order to fulfill
the 5-year plan.
Deficiencies of RNCZ Farmlands
In addition to the many economic and political con-
straints, the RNCZ program to increase farm output
rests on a shaky climatic and agronomic base and is
? A lack of warmth limits farming to areas well below
60? latitude. Overall, the growing season is much
shorter than in most other Soviet farmlands. Only
the southern borders of the RNCZ average more
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Figure 2
Major Soil Zones
Chernozem
Prairie
Podzolic intergrade
Chestnut and desert
Sandy or shallow inclusion
The United Stems Oowrnm.nt has not recognized
the ineappo soon of Etlon4, Letvie, and Lithwnr
into th. Sov.i Union. Other bound.ry rpnwntetbn
is not neceewriy wthoritehre. (543783)
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Soviet Union
Figure 3
Annual Frost-Free Period
r
i 160
1140
The Unfted States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not neoesearity authoritative. (543783)
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Soviet Union
Figure 4
Annual Precipitation
Th. United Stares Oovvnrrent hes not reoopniznd
the incorporehon of Estonia, Lot,*, and Lithuania
into the Sorat Union. Other boonduy representation
ie not ec.rrwrey outhoritative. (543783)
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Table 5
RNCZ: Soviet Survey of Farmland Deficiencies
Surveyed Areas That Are b
Area a
Highly
Acid
All agricultural land
(thousand hectares)
49,034
31,308
Cultivated land
(thousand hectares)
30,696
27,356
Natural pastures and meadows
(thousand hectares)
17,750
3,699
Source: A. 1. Monov, I. G. Averin, and V. P. Pogozhev, Se!'skoye
khozyaystvo Nechernozemnoy Zony RSFSR, Moscow, 1978,
pp: 12-22, and p. 120.
a Surveyed area does not equal areas now held by agricultural
enterprises. In 1981 they held 46.9 million hectares of all agricultur-
al land, including 31.8 million hectares of cultivated land.
b Any given area may be deficient in more than one form.
Excessively Very Extremely Seriously
Marshy Stony Sandy Eroded
than 140 frost-free days per year; near the Urals the
average is only 95 days. Moreover, a wide variation
in seasonal temperatures produces a high likelihood
of damage to growing crops.
? Unfavorable topography and unproductive soils are
severe constraints in many areas. The predominant-
ly fragile soils are better suited to forage crops and
forestry than to the intensive raising of grains and
other food crops. They are acidic, badly leached,
and eroded, and their capacity to retain moisture
and plant nutrients is limited.
? Although the RNCZ averages more precipitation
than most other crop regions, the variability and
untimeliness of rainfall limit the benefit to growing
crops and often interfere with the timely seeding
and harvesting of crops.
? RNCZ farmlands are fragmented by interlocking
ravines, swamplands, rivers and streams, and over-
grown, stony, sandy, or otherwise inferior lands.
RNCZ fields are generally small, irregularly
shaped, and relatively unsuited to the use of large
farm machinery.
? A short growing season and unstable weather makes
the timing of agricultural operations particularly
crucial. Fieldwork, however, is frequently not done
on time because of shortages of farm machinery and
qualified farm labor. Crop losses are relatively
larger in the RNCZ than in other USSR farming
regions.
Virtually all RNCZ land, even the best, requires some
degree of ameliorative treatment to produce at accept-
able levels (table 5). According to Soviet reports, some
8-9.5 million hectares, roughly a fifth of all RNCZ
farmland, is so wet that the growth of crops is
seriously stunted. Additional lands are affected to a
lesser degree, making a total of at least 13.8 million
hectares, 30 percent of all RNCZ farmland, that is
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poorly drained. The extent of wetness along with other
related deficiencies limits the use of most of the wet-
lands to natural meadows and pastures and compli-
cates the harvesting of hay and the grazing of ani-
mals. Seasonally wet cropland cannot be tilled and
planted until late spring, shortening the growing
season and rendering crops vulnerable to early fall
frosts. At times, excessive wetness may destroy grow-
ing crops or prevent the passage of harvesting equip-
ment
Soviet surveys indicate almost two-thirds of all
RNCZ agricultural land, including practically all the
cultivated land, is highly acidic. Soil acidity interferes
with plant metabolism, restricting the availability of
nutrients and their assimilation by crops. It can be
alleviated by periodic applications of finely ground
limestone and other calcium-bearing materials, which
benefit yields directly, and also through more efficient
use of fertilizers. The supply of industrially prepared
lime materials, however, has been limited.
The most important single natural factor restricting According to the Soviet press, more than three-
RNCZ agricultural potential is the high proportion of fourths of all RNCZ tilled land and much other
sand in the soils now used or proposed for crop RNCZ farmland are classified as low to very low in
production. Most RNCZ soils contain too much sand available phosphorous compared to only one-half of
and too little clay, which seriously limits their capaci- all Soviet tilled land. Like acidity, phosphorous defi-
ty to store moisture and nutrients. Soviet surveys ciency restricts crop yields directly and limits the
indicate extreme sandiness-85 percent or more uptake of other nutrients. A lack of phosphorous also
sand-on 1.1 million hectares of agricultural land, delays crop maturation, a critical factor in regions
including 660,000 hectares of cultivated land. More- with a short growing season. Similarly, most RNCZ
over, at least one-third of RNCZ farmland, as much mineral soils are deficient in the other primary nutri-
as 14 million hectares, is classified as excessively ents-nitrogen and potash-and trace element defi-
sandy, more than 50-percent sand ciencies are common on coarse-textured, heavily acid,
Soviet surveys also indicate that stones seriously
interfere with the productivity of some 1.7 million
hectares of agricultural land, including 1.3 million
hectares of tilled land. Other statements in the Soviet
press describe 300,000 hectares as being extremely
rocky, at least 2.5 million hectares of tilled land as
significantly stony, and a much larger area of mead-
ows and pastures as rocky to some degree. It is costly
to farm stony land because fieldwork must be slowed
to prevent farm equipment breakage and operator
injury. The abrasive action of stones accelerates wear
of tillage surfaces on farm machinery, and machines
need to be equipped with costly protective devices.
Within the RNCZ, the Soviets classify some 6 million
hectares, mostly cultivated, as seriously damaged by
soil erosion, thereby reducing potential crop yields. As
much as two-thirds of RNCZ cultivated crops are
grown on slopes vulnerable to water erosion, while
sandy soils and drained peat soils are particularly
subject to wind erosion. Control of erosion is ham-
pered by the use of inappropriate machinery and
cropping practices
and poorly drained soils.
Outlook
Comparisons of the RNCZ with other Soviet regions
and with analogous regions in other countries suggest
that the agricultural potential of the RNCZ is signifi-
cantly greater than has yet been demonstrated, but
well below Soviet expectations. Environmental condi-
tions militate against making the RNCZ an intensive
and efficient producer of agricultural commodities.
The large capital investments in RNCZ farmland will
not increase agricultural output unless accompanied
by equally large allocations of agrochemicals, farm
equipment, and other supplies. Moreover, much of the
rural construction effort is peripheral to agricultural
development. More attractive opportunities for skilled
workers in the expanding urban and industrial centers
of the RNCZ will only worsen the shortage of farm
labor in the zone.
The RNCZ program, although still broadly support-
ed, is not without its critics. Thus it will remain
vulnerable to priority shifts in favor of other agricul-
tural projects and regional development programs
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with potentially better payoffs. Comprehensive pro-
grams to develop agriculture in the RSFSR Central
Chernozem Region and in Siberia and the Far East
were launched in 1981 and 1982, respectively. Al-
though less well endowed than the RNCZ program,
these new regional development schemes will be com-
peting with the RNCZ for greater shares of the funds
allocated to the Soviet agricultural sector. Moreover,
the large share of investment being allocated to
USSR agriculture leaves insufficient resources to
develop other sectors of the agro-industrial complex in
order to utilize farm output more efficiently. One-
fifth or more of farm products is now lost during
transportation, storage, processing, and distribution.
The future of the RNCZ program is uncertain.
Brezhnev, the chief designer of Soviet agrarian policy
and mentor of the RNCZ program, can no longer be
held accountable for the meager returns from such
highly concentrated regional investment schemes as
the RNCZ. Andropov has already indicated that the
Food Program 2 should be carried out without any
foot-dragging but at this early date has not taken a
position on the soundness of continuing to develop
RNCZ agriculture at such a very great cost to the
economy. Unless performance in the zone improves
significantly over the next two to three years, the
RNCZ effort could very well be scaled back sharply if
not scrapped altogether.
Foreign Policy Implications
During the unveiling last May of the Food Program
for the 1980s, the Soviets publicly underscored their
intention to make the USSR self-sufficient in grain
and livestock production. Nevertheless, the reality of
recurring crop failures, in the face of a continued
commitment toward improving the consumer diet, has
forced the USSR to become a major, if irregular,
buyer in world agricultural commodity markets.
Moreover, the failure of the RNCZ program and of
other efforts to increase and stabilize agricultural
' "Food Program" refers to the current set of Soviet agrarian policy
measures, collectively designed to achieve a better coordinated,
more efficient, overall development of the agro-industrial complex.
In this way, within resource limits, the Soviets hope to increase
farm output and also to reduce losses of agricultural commodities
en route to consumers.F_____1
production has forced the Soviets to hedge their bets
by establishing access not only to commodity imports
but to Western agrotechnology as well.
Moscow's pursuit of alternative solutions to its food
problems seeks to tap Western know-how in several
ways. Soviet scientists and agricultural specialists
continue to participate in international scientific and
technical information exchanges and to negotiate
foreign technology purchase agreements. For exam-
ple, Moscow is currently seeking a license to manufac-
ture the latest in US grain harvesters, the rotary
combine. The Soviets are also negotiating with a
British firm for the most advanced single cell protein
(SCP) technology. SCP can be used as a livestock feed
supplement. The Soviets regularly import roughly
one-third of their agricultural pesticides-primarily
sophisticated types of herbicides, insecticides, and
fungicides that they cannot produce on their own. The
USSR also recently expanded its fertilizer production
capacity, using a wide array of Western technology.
Other major purchases have included technology for
large cattle feedlots, tractors, forage harvesters, and
cotton gin plants.
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Moscow's apparent belief that at least a partial
solution to its agricultural problem lies in the acquisi-
tion of Western technical know-how is highly ques-
tionable. Soviet attempts to absorb Western nonmili-
tary technology generally have been unfruitful, and
many of the failures have occurred in the agricultural
sector. Foreign agrotechnology innovations usually
require considerable modification before they can be
successfully adapted to Soviet growing conditions and
managerial practices. Despite the fact that the Soviet
agro-industrial complex received more than a third of
all investments during 1976-80, its disappointing per-
formance persists. This suggests that fundamental
changes in the system are necessary, but none appear
to be in the offing.
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