INDIA: THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNAL AND CASTE CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000300110002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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NESA 83-10185
August 1983
~ 314
Intelligence
Directorate of
India: The al tinge of
Coln and Caste Conflict
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India: The Challenge of
Communal and Caste Conflict
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution fro Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief South Asia Division, NES~
Secret
NESA 83-10185
August 1983
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India: The Challenge of
Communal and Caste ConflictF__7 25X1
Key Judgments The rising incidence and intensity of religious and caste violence in India
Information available over the past year:
as of 23 June 1983 ? Pose a long-term challenge to India's political stability.
was used in this report.
? Raise concerns in New Delhi about the security of disturbed border
areas.
? Strain the country's relations with the United States, Pakistan, and the
Islamic states of the Middle East.
Since Prime Minister Gandhi's return to power in 1980, increasing
polarization of the majority Hindu community and minority Sikh and
Muslim groups has injected new religious tensions into the society and
politics that threaten the secular basis of the Indian state. Gandhi's policy
of encouraging the expectations of minority groups has led to rising
demands that contribute to a growing Hindu backlash, sparked by Muslim
and Sikh revivalist movements. Civil disorders have occurred as dissatisfied
minorities goaded by militant communal leaders have clashed with police
and national security forces. In Assam and Punjab, political and economic
demands by activists have led to communal conflict, major civil disturb-
ances, and secessionist movements directly challenging national authority.
Since 1980, caste conflict between untouchables and higher status Hindus
has likewise become a source of endemic civil disorder in both rural and ur-
ban areas. The increasing assertiveness of low-caste groups in pursuit of
their interests poses a rising threat of rural violence directed against civil
authorities as well as higher caste groups.
New Delhi's continuing inability to contain religious and caste tensions has
damaged Gandhi's image and eroded her electoral base. The inability of
state governments to control such confrontations at an early stage forces
the national government to intervene at a later stage when resort to
repressive measures is virtually essential to restore order. Muslims and
untouchables-key groups in Gandhi's past electoral victories-have be-
gun shifting their votes from the ruling Congress Party in protest over the
perceived incompetence and indifference of state and local Congress Party
authorities.
iii Secret
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August 1983
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Although, in our judgment, caste and communal conflict do not threaten
the stability of the Indian political system in the short term, in the longer
term the government's continuing failure to resolve these problems may
result in widening confrontations between militant communal groups and
government authorities. We believe that unless the government evolves new
strategies for defusing communal and caste demands by the time elections
are next due in 1985, its increasing resort to repressive measures will
probably spur new opposition coalitions capable of undercutting the
Congress Party's majority in parliament. Any new government dependent
for its tenure on electoral alliances would probably have even greater
difficulty initiating controversial reforms and tough security measures
required to restore order.
Violence among communal groups in India has also damaged Gandhi's
reputation abroad and complicated her foreign policy. Her publicly voiced
suspicions that Pakistan and the United States are contributing to tensions
in two border states-Punjab and Assam-have become potential obstacles
to the rapprochement she seeks with both countries. Adverse comments
about New Delhi's treatment of Indian Muslims by Islamic officials and
press in the Arab states have sparked official protests from New Delhi,
which is committed to improving relations with those states. Gandhi's
abiding fear of foreign intervention in Indian domestic affairs, in our view,
deflects her attention from the social, economic, and political sources of
religious and caste conflict and reduces her ability to develop new policies
to meet changing circumstances.
Despite Gandhi's suspicions, communal conflicts in India are chiefly
products of domestic conditions, not foreign intervention. Nevertheless,
foreign powers have sought to advance their interests by exploiting existing
tensions. The Soviets have engaged in clandestine efforts to discredit the
United States and undermine Indo-Pakistani rapprochement. Although
Islamabad may have contributed to the Sikh agitation in Punjab, we do not
believe that the Arab states have instigated communal unrest, even though
their involvement in funding Indian Muslim institutions fuels New Delhi's
fears of Islamic fundamentalism from abroad.
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India: The Challenge of
Communal and Caste Conflict
Gandhi's Most Serious Domestic Problem Figure 2
Since Prime Minister Gandhi's return to power in India: Hindu-Muslim Riots, 1972-82
1980, she has publicly acknowledged that the growing
scope, duration, and militance of perennial caste ' and
communal 2 conflict have become her most serious Official number
domestic problem. The Indian press has documented 0 Convicts
that a number of state governments have failed to 0 Deaths
contain rising tensions between the Hindu majority
and the Sikh and Muslim religious minorities. In two 500
violence-ridden border states-Assam and Punjab-
religious revivalists are taking over regional move-
ments, according to US Embassy reporting and the 400
Indian media. In our view, the new religious dimen-
sions of the longstanding separatist sentiment in these
states have complicated prospects for a political reso- 300
lution of regional demands.
Communal groups are increasingly making demands
on New Delhi that, in our view, threaten the secular
basis of the Indian Government. Press reporting indi-
cates that the growing polarization between religious
communities has fueled outbreaks of civil disorder
serious enough to strain the capabilities of state police
as well as nationally controlled security forces.
zoo
100
F_~ --I I
flict to instigation by opposition parties and foreign
powers,
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government's policy of encouraging caste and reli-
gious minorities to voice their expectations has led to Hindu-Muslim and caste conflicts have also mounted
rising demands from these groups that may provoke a since 1980 as disadvantaged groups abandon their
Hindu backlash. traditional reliance on government promises and ag- 25X1
Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim fun amenta ist gressively defend their own interests, often in defiance 25X1
leaders have deliberately magnified growing economic of government authority. 25X1
and political rivalries between religious groups.
' Caste refers to the hereditary classes into which Hindus in India
are divided by orthodox Hindu tradition. A person's caste tradition-
ally dictated his social status, rules of social intercourse, customs,
and occupation.
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Figure 3
India: Hindu-Muslim Riots by State and Union Territory, 1981-82
1981
1982
Jammu and Kashmir
Haryana
Delhis
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Gujarat
Madhya Pradesh
West Bengal
Orissa
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Tamil Nadu
Kerala
Meghalaya
Assam
Manipur
Tripura
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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Principal Indian Muslim Organizations
In general, the multiplicity of political parties at the
national and state levels has limited the potential
influence of these organizations on Muslim politics,
according to Embassy reporting.
The Jamaat-e-Islami (Society of Islam)-reputed to
be the best organized Muslim group-claims only
2,900 members but is influential among Muslim
intellectuals. It seeks in principle to convert all
Hindus to Islam. The Jamaat has largely avoided an
active political role, concentrating instead on uphold-
ing religious orthodoxy and supporting continued
juridical status for Islamic personal law in India.
The separate Kashmir Jamaat unit has advanced
candidates for local and state elections with little
success.
The Tablighi Jamaat (Missionary Society) is report-
edly the most popular Islamic movement in India but
lacks organizational structure or formal leadership.
Like the Jamaat, it is guided by the Muslim ulama,
or clergy. Founded over a century ago, the Tablighi
Jamaat holds that the solutions to the problems
confronting Muslims lie in religious piety.
The Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Hind (Congregation of Indian
Scholars of Islamic Law) was founded in 1919 to
counter Hindu efforts to reclaim converts to Islam. In
its capacity as a pressure group, it has enjoyed
considerable access to and influence on the Congress
Party. In the past year, it has moved away from the
ruling party. The Jamiat has supported secular gov-
ernment and communal harmony as being in the best
interest of the Muslim minority and counseled Mus-
lims not to form their own political party.
The Majlis-e-Mushawarat (Consultative Council),
founded in 1964, is a loose confederation of disparate
Islamic organizations. It has aimed with limited
success to marshal Muslim political support for
individual candidates subscribing to a nine point
manifesto of traditional Muslim demands. In prac-
tice, it has been hampered by divisions amon its
member groups.
Muslims: Abandoning Accommodationist Politics
Hindu-Muslim tensions have heightened during the
past three years as a new generation of urban Mus-
lims reject their community's longstanding image of
quiescent, second-class citizenship. India's 70 million 25X1
Muslims-about 12 percent of the population-re-
main educationally and economically disadvantaged
and geographically scattered. According to Embassy
and press reports, Muslims have not made even
limited progress toward improving their status despite
their strategy of delivering electoral support to Hindu-
dominated parties-chiefly the ruling Congress
Party-in exchange for promises of concessions and
protection.
In the face of unredressed grievances, some Mus-
lims-particularly those of the lower and lower mid-
dle class-have turned to fundamentalist Islamic
organizations that emphasize the threat posed by
Hindu society to the Muslim minority, according to
press analysis. The Muslim fundamentalists seek solu-
tions to the community's problems through a return to
religious orthodoxy and the retention of Islamic per-
sonal law rather than through participation in elec-
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In addition to the more visible activities by fundamen-
talist groups, a new Muslim middle class has emerged
that is bolder in its pursuit of higher status, according
to US Embassy and Indian press sources. Although
their numbers and the extent of their influence are
still unclear, these Muslims have aggressively worked
toward improving their social and economic status
and gaining greater access to political power. The
Indian media report that they have demanded in-
creased access to jobs, educational opportunities, and
separate political representation.
This new generation of urban Muslims is reportedly
weighing more critically the benefits of continued
support for the ruling Congress Party, according to
US Embassy and Indian press reporting. These
sources indicate that the new political confidence of
these Muslims is fueled by increased economic clout,
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Traditional Muslim religious school in Old Del-
hi. The orthodox education offered by Muslim
clergy in such schools fails to prepare young
Muslims to compete with Hindus in the job
Muslim Grievances and Demands
which results in part from the inflow of funds from
the Arab states through trade and expatriate remit-
tances. A leading Muslim Congress Party politician
told Embassy officials that Muslims can no longer be
taken for granted. They will cast their votes for those
who they believe offer the greatest likelihood of
protection and promotion of their economic advance-
ment-including the Communist parties.
Indian commentators report that Muslim politicians
have become more vocal in expressing their commu-
nity's grievances, above all their lack of physical
security. Muslim representatives have formed an in-
formal caucus to voice their concerns. Forty-five
Muslim members of parliament submitted a memo-
randum of grievances to Prime Minister Gandhi in
November 1982 on the eve of elections in two key
southern states. They reminded Gandhi of her elec-
tion promises in 1980 to increase Muslim representa-
tion in the police forces, to prosecute officials-
principally state police officers-who fail to protect
minority rights, and to offer compensation for loss of
life and property in riots. Muslim votes for opposition
parties contributed to the Congress Party's defeat in
both Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, according to
the press
Embassy reporting indicates that rising Muslim asser-
tiveness has contributed to the unusual severity of
communal rioting since 1980. Muslim leaders have
A recent memorandum from an Indian Muslim group
to the Home Secretary in New Delhi summarized the
major grievances of India's Muslims as follows,
according to the Indian press:
? The government's inattention to the disadvantaged
social and economic status of the Muslims, includ-
ing their low representation in trade and commerce
and their declining representation in government
jobs.
The memorandum proposed as remedies that:
? The electoral system be changed to one of propor-
tional representation.
? State and national government jobs including those
in public-sector companies be reserved for Muslims
in proportion to their numbers.
? A minority Economic Development Corporation be
created to actively aid Muslims in economic
development.
? The "educational backwardness" of Muslims be
alleviated by liberal government grants to Muslim
educational institutions, particularly those teaching
in Urdu, the language shared by most Indian
Muslims.
? The advisory Minorities Commission be granted
constitutional status and powers of inquiry.
? The Islamic personal laws retain their juridical
status.
encouraged militant confrontations with authorities
and with the majority Hindu community, according to
press reports. Young urban Muslims have increas-
ingly defended their perceived prerogatives against
police as well as Hindus. They allege discrimination
against them by the predominantly Hindu police,
according to the Indian media.
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Figure 4
...1 HyderAbid
Vijayawada*
Booonederye repro enlahon ie
t n ce sarily authoritative
INDIA
Muslim population concentration
50% and above
20% to 50%
10% to 20%
Below 10%
tt City prone to Hindu-Muslim
conflict
Selected state or union territory
boundary
{KA
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The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (People's Party of
India) is widely viewed as India's best organized,
most viable opposition party. It derives much of its
strength from its affiliation with the paramilitary
RSS (see below), inherited from the erstwhile Jan
Sangh Party. Formed in 1980 after the dissolution of
the coalition Janata Party, the BJP claims a mem-
bership of approximately 2.5 million and has had
some success in byelections. It has attempted to
broaden its base of support beyond its core member-
ship of north Indian Hindus. The president of the
BJP is A. B. Vajpayee, who served as Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the 1977-80 Janata Party national
government.
The Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) (National
Sew Help Organization) is a militant, anti-Muslim
cultural organization dedicated to the revival of a
Hindu way of life. It exercises political influence
through the BJP. The RSS equates Indian citizenship
with the dominant culture-Hindu and Hindi-speak-
ing. Its activities include paramilitary training for
young male members. The RSS claims over a million
members and has recently scored its first major
membership gains in the south.
Rising Hindu Chauvinism
In the past three years, increased Muslim activism
and a growing number of conversions to Islam among
disadvantaged Hindu untouchables in the south have
snurred a national Hindu backlash.
the rapid growth of Hindu
chauvinist organizations that seek to redefine the
secular Indian state as a Hindu nation reflects histori-
cal fears of an expansionist, militant Islam. Embassy
officials note that the popular Hindu view of India as
surrounded by Islamic states colors the majority's
view of the Muslim minority.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (The Hindu Way
Assembly) is reportedly the fastest growing Hindu
communal organization. Founded in 1964, it seeks to
reconvert Hindus who have embraced either Islam or
Christianity. Like the RSS, the VHP labels Chris-
tians and Muslims as `foreigners. " It became promi-
nent in 1981 after it sought to counter the conversions
to Islam of Hindu untouchables in the south. The
VHP is headed by a former princely ruler, Maharana
Bhawant Singh Mewar. It has units in every district
of India as well as abroad.
The Virat Hindu Samaj (VHS) (Hindu Spiritual
Association) is a Hindu revivalist organization found-
ed in 1981 by a former member of the ruling Congress
Party, Karan Singh. The VHS has stressed the unity
of Hindus irrespective of caste rather than the threat
of Islam. (c)
between state police and militant Hindus.
The Hindu Unity Center (HUC) is a new umbrella
organization that includes the RSS and the VHP
among its member groups. The HUC was formed
earlier this year in response to Hindu conversions to
Islam. The Hindu Resurgence Conference it spon-
sored last February was banned by the Tamil Nadu
state government, resulting in violent confrontations
the presence of Islam or Christianity-India's
"foreign-based" religions-as challenges to the na-
tional, or Hindu, identity. Indian press sources have
noted that provocation of Muslims by members of
Hindu organizations often precedes outbreaks of com-
munal rioting. Following the conversion of untouch-
ables to Islam in the south, Hindu villagers launched
punitive attacks on both Muslims and untouchables.
The reaction against conversions has widened to
include attacks on Christian institutions and persons
in the south, according to Embassy and press sources.
Hindu chauvinist organizations traditionally rooted in
the northern Hindi-speaking states have recently reg-
istered their first major growth in south India, accord-
ing to the press. The chauvinists view any increase in
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The resurgence of Hindu nationalism has brought
Hindu organizations into conflict with state authori-
ties. For example, the prohibition of the meeting of a
Hindu umbrella organization earlier this year in
Tamil Nadu sparked major protest demonstrations by
the Hindu militants that resulted in an estimated
50,000 arrests, according to Indian press reports
Punjab: From Regionalism to "Holy War"
In the past year, fundamentalist Sikhs in Punjab have
sought to transform agitation by moderate leaders of
the Sikh Akali Dal Party into a "holy war" against
alleged discrimination by the "Hindu" national gov-
ernment,
According to US and Indian press reports, the
Sikhs-a minority in India but a majority in Pun-
jab-have demanded control of territories and waters
now shared with adjacent states, increased autonomy
for Punjab on a par with Jammu and Kashmir's
special constitutional status, and special religious
rights in the state. In our view, the apparent stalemate
in two-year-old negotiations with the national govern-
ment has facilitated the rise of militant Sikhs. The
fundamentalist leaders have successfully mobilized a
growing segment of Sikh Punjabis to challenge gov-
ernment authority, according to Embassy reports.
We believe growing Sikh chauvinism threatens hither-
to harmonious Hindu-Sikh relations in Punjab. The
widening influence of fundamentalist leader
Bhindranwale has restrained moderate Akali Dal
officials from criticizing his anti-Hindu rhetoric, ac-
cording to Indian media correspondents. Although
most Sikhs have traditionally regarded their faith as
an offshoot of Hinduism, many Sikh fundamentalists
are now demanding that they-like the Christian and
Muslim minorities in India-receive constitutional
recognition as a separate ethnic-religious community
with their own personal laws. Press sources report that
a growing minority of the Sikhs in Punjab support
extremist demands for an independent Sikh nation,
"Khalistan."
Attacks on Hindus and growing Sikh militance have
sparked Hindu fears for the safety of their community
in Punjab. Encouraged by Hindu nationalist organiza-
tions-notably the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh
(RSS)-Punjabi Hindus have begun organizing to
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 Militant Sikhs battle police in Punjab earlier
this year
defend their interests, according to the Indian media.
Hindus responded to the formation early this year of a
75,000-man Sikh "martyr's army" by forming a
Hindu counterforce about 1,200 strong.
Assam: From Nativism to Communal War
The massacres in Assam earlier this year-in which
tribal Assamese, Hindus, and Muslims slaughtered
each other-resulted when regional leaders lost con-
trol of a three-year-old protest against Bengali immi-
grants, according to US Embassy sources. Hindu and
Muslim communal leaders stepped into the breach.
The longstanding antagonism between native Assam-
ese and Bengali immigrants had hitherto been devoid
of religious conflict. Communal leaders have success-
fully recast it as a confrontation between predomi-
nantly Hindu Assamese and Muslim Bengalis. Rising
Hindu-Muslim tensions have damaged a long record
of generally harmonious communal relations and di-
minished prospects for a negotiated settlement of
Assamese demands, in our judgment.
The violence that has claimed as many as 7,000 lives
and displaced a quarter million people since last
February was sparked when Assamese student leaders
led a boycott of state elections to protest voting rights
for Bengalis who have entered the state since 1961.
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Fear of assimilation by the Hindus particularly in
urban Punjab-underlies the Sikhs' political activ-
ism. The objectives of various Sikh groups now
united in opposition to New Delhi have ranged from
secession to economic, political, and religious conces-
sions that would increase Sikh dominance in Punjab.
According to the press, recent demands have
included:
? Annexation of Punjabi-speaking areas of adjacent
states.
? Sole control for Punjab of Chandigarh, the state
capital now shared with the adjacent state of
Haryana.
? Formal declaration of Amritsar as a holy city.
? Sole control of river waters now shared with neigh-
boring Haryana and Rajasthan.
? Separate religious codes for Sikhs, who are now
governed by Hindu marriage and property acts
Other demands supported by many Sikhs in Punjab
include:
? The grant to Punjab of total autonomy, with New
Delhi retaining control over defense, foreign policy,
communications, currency, and railways.
? Reversal of New Delhi's 1980 decision to recruit
army personnel on the basis of a state quota
system. The Akalis allege the new rule would
reduce Sikh representation in the Army from its
current 15 percent to 1.5 percent.
The Assamese militants have agitated since 1980 for
the deportation of the state's 5 million "foreigners"-
chiefly Bengalis from Bangladesh-who they claim
have displaced them from jobs and threatened their
political control of the state, according to the Indian
press. Demands from tribal groups for their own
tribal state and the presence of Indian as well as
Bangladeshi Bengalis have further complicated the
disturbances in Assam.
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Principal Sikh Organizations in Punjab State
The Akali Dal Party is the chief political arm of the
Sikhs in Punjab. In the 1950s and 1960s it agitated
for the formation of a semiautonomous, Punjabi-
speaking state-' Sikhistan. " The Akali demands
resulted in the separation of predominantly Hindu,
Hindi-speaking portions of Punjab to form a new
state, Haryana. In the diminished Punjab the Akalis
remained dependent on alliances with non-Sikh par-
ties for their intermittent control of the Punjab
government. In 1981 the Akalis lost power to the
Congress Party and promptly launched a new agita-
tion for semiautonomy. Common opposition to the
Congress has united disparate factions of the Akalis
in the past two years. The party's leader, Longowal,
has so far resisted identification with Sikh separat-
ism but has increasingly been outflanked by Sikh
other terrorist acts. Recent press reports indicate
popular support for the Dal Khalsa-and for Sikh
separatism-is growing among Punjabi Sikhs.
The Bhindranwales are an order founded by a local
Sikh religious leader of that name before 1930,
according to the press. Its leader is entitled to the
honorific "Sant" before his name and "Bhindran-
wale" after it. Under the current leader-Sant
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale-the Bhindranwales
have become prominent and have carried out assassi-
nations of members of the rival Nirankari sect,
Punjabi political leaders, and opponents of Sikh
chauvinism, by their own admission. In the past two
years Sant Bhindranwale has became the moving
extremists who favor secession.
The Dal Khalsa (Khalsa Group) is a small, clandes-
tine Sikh organization linked with and possibly fund-
ed by Sikh separatist leaders based in the United
States, Britain, and Canada, according to the press.
The Khalsa is believed to have about 200 young male
members and was reportedly behind the 1981 hijack-
ing to Pakistan of an Indian Airlines domestic flight.
Members of the group have claimed responsibility for
assassinating critics of separatist leaders and for
Assam has provided fertile ground for the expansion
of such communal organizations as the Hindu RSS
and the Muslim Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Hind and Jamaat-
e-Islami. The RSS now claims 40,000 members in
Assam. Capitalizing on the predominance of Muslims
among the Bengali immigrants, the RSS and its
parent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have proclaimed
Assam in danger of being engulfed by Muslim infil-
trators unless Hindu rule can be reestablished, ac-
cording to the Indian press. Hindu and Muslim
organizations participating in relief efforts have used
the occasion to spread communal propaganda.
In our view, the violence in February has resulted in
political conditions that dim prospects for a swift
return to civil order. According to press reports, the
force behind Sikh unrest in Punjab.
The Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhakar Committee
(SGPC) (Temple Management Committee) is the rul-
ing religious body of the Sikhs and controls all Sikh
places of worship. Together with the Akali Dal, the
SGPC is widely viewed as the guardian of Sikh
culture. G. S. Tohra-head of the SGPC for the past
15 years-has consistently supported extremist lead-
er Bhindranwale in opposition to New Delhi and the
Congress Party Punjab government, according to
press reports.
Army and the paramilitary Border Security Force
and Central Reserve Police, dispatched by New Delhi
to restore order after Assam police failed to do so,
remain in control of large areas with no immediate
prospect of withdrawal. The state has suspended some
civil rights. The situation is further complicated by
the sympathy of most state police for the Assamese
agitators and their participation in violence against
immigrants. Assamese student leaders continue to
reject New Delhi's proposals to complete polling
suspended when violence erupted and to set up tribu-
nals to identify immigrants. According to Embassy
sources, the state chief minister owes his limited
progress toward restoring peace to factional divisions
among the militants
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Principal Assamese Political Organizations
Active in 1983 Unrest
The All Assam Students' Union (AASU) is a federa-
tion of Assamese student organizations formed in
1948 to promote preservation of the Assamese lan-
guage and culture. Its membership includes most
Assamese students. The AASU seeks the identifica-
tion of all Bangladeshi immigrants to Assam since
1951, deletion of their names from the electoral rolls,
and their ultimate deportation. AASU tactics have
included strikes, bombings, and shootings.
The Sweccha Sevak Bahini (SSB) is a paramilitary
group operating under the umbrella of the AASU.
Established in 1980, the SSB has provided terrorist
support for the Assamese agitation movement against
Bengali 'foreigners--particularly Muslims. It is
affiliated with the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh and is now operating under-
ground. The size of its membership is unknown. It is
currently headed by Joy Nath Sharma, a law gradu-
ate of Gauhati University.
The All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP)
was founded in 1977 as an umbrella organization for
all Assamese political organizations outside the
AASU. Its mission is to counter perceived discrimina-
tion by the national government against Assam and
submersion of its native culture. The AAGSP's tac-
tics range from political negotiations to terrorism.
Since the February 1983 elections, the organization
has become dominated by Hindu communal groups.
Caste Conflict
In the past three years, rising activism among India's
once-passive "untouchables" has sparked conflicts
with higher caste Hindus that threaten rural order
and challenge New Delhi's efforts to eradicate dis-
crimination based on caste. Frustrated with the Con-
gress Party's perceived failure to raise their social
and economic status and defend their interests, the
"untouchables"-referred to as the "scheduled
castes"-have loosened their longstanding ties with
Gandhi's Congress Party and threatened to launch a
Untouchables, "Scheduled Castes, "and "Other
Backward Classes"
The "Untouchables '-considered below even the
lowest echelon of the traditional Hindu caste hierar-
chy-comprise approximately 1 50 million people.
Caste status is inherited and defines the group within
which an individual's marriage and most social rela-
tionships take place. Traditionally, caste membership
also defined occupation. "Untouchables "-so named
because they were confined hereditarily to such ritu-
ally polluting tasks as leatherworking and sweep-
ing-were enjoined from touching anything to be used
by "caste" Hindus. The "Untouchables" themselves
comprise diverse castes
`Harijan'-meaning "Children of God" -is the term
by which Mahatma Gandhi referred to the untouch-
ables in his effort to counter the social and religious
stigma attached to them.
The term "Scheduled Castes" replaces "Untouch-
ables"in the constitution, which bans untouchability.
Together with the "Scheduled Tribes, " they are
assured of government measures to offset past social
and economic handicaps
and tribes.
The "Other Backward Classes" (OBCs) are caste
groups additional to the "Scheduled Castes" desig-
nated by the state governments to receive special
educational and employment benefits to offset their
relative social and economic "backwardness. " The
OBCs seek a constitutional amendment to extend to
them the benefits applying to the scheduled castes
The state and national governments provide the un-
touchables with preferential access to educational
institutions, government employment, housing, and
other benefits, but Indian Government reports ac-
knowledge that the scheduled castes continue to com-
prise the bulk of India's poorest citizens. In our view,
their ability to take advantage of government benefits
mass protest, according to the press.
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An untouchable reading the Koran during conversion ceremony.
The number of conversions to Islam in 1981 alone exceeded the
total from 1935 to 1980, raising Hindu fears of Islamic expansion-
is limited in part by discrimination against them,
which persists despite a constitutional ban on un-
touchability. At the same time, state governments
have enlarged the clientele for government benefits to
include "other backward classes," according to press
analysis. We believe the expanded eligibility for gov-
ernment benefits in some states poses a threat of
competition between untouchables and "other back-
ward classes" that may further impede advancement
many rural untouchables into indentured labor. Land-
less untouchables in northern and western states have
increasingly taken the law into their own hands and
tried to compel landowners to comply with minimum
wage and land ceiling laws. According to press re-
ports, untouchables armed with village-manufactured
guns have also resisted local police, who they believe
discriminate against them, according to the Indian
press.
by the scheduled castes.
the Indian press note that
in recent years untouchables have become most mili-
tant in rural areas. Press sources indicate their con-
tinuing privation is due in part to the failure of state
governments to enforce land-reform legislation. While
"other backward classes" in some states have benefit-
ed by overall economic growth, poverty has driven
The growing activism of the untouchables has brought
retribution by higher status groups in many parts of
India, according to press reports. Caste Hindus have
razed entire scheduled caste villages in some in-
stances. Efforts by untouchables to escape the social
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stigma of their status by converting to Islam have
provoked unprecedented violence against scheduled
caste groups in the south.
Growing numbers of higher status Hindus are de-
manding that New Delhi curtail its special programs
for the untouchables, while other low-status groups
are seeking access to the programs, according to the
Indian media. Since 1980, conflict between untouch-
ables and higher status Hindus has spread to urban
areas where upwardly mobile peasant groups seeking
to increase their share of professional and government
jobs believe their progress is blocked by guaranteed
quotas for scheduled caste members. In 1981 and
1982 statewide violence erupted in Gujarat as higher
caste Hindus protested reserved seats for untouch-
ables in professional schools.
We believe the increasing activism of the untouch-
ables reflects in part their loss of faith in the ruling
Congress Party's commitment to advance their inter-
ests. Press sources indicate the party has steadily lost
their votes since 1980-particularly in the northern
and western states that have the highest concentration
of untouchables. Recent Indian press analysis indi-
cates loss of untouchable support contributed to the
defeat of the Congress Party in two key southern state
elections last February.
New Delhi's Response
We believe Prime Minister Gandhi is unwilling to
address weaknesses in her government's capabilities to
contain disturbances, despite her recognition of the
political costs of rising communal and caste tensions.
Rather than strengthening poor state government and
police performance, she has centralized crisis manage-
ment largely in her own hands and built up higher
level security forces. In our view, Gandhi's preference
for political palliatives rather than institutional re-
form is typified by her recent creation of a one-man
governmental commission to investigate the distribu-
tion of authority between national and state govern-
ments.
Political. In the past, Gandhi tried to remain aloof
from civil disturbances, but the declining ability of
state governments to contain communal conflicts at
the local level has compelled her to intervene, accord-
ing to US diplomats and Indian press sources. Her
own policies have in large measure contributed to the
need for direct intervention from New Delhi, in our
judgment. She has appointed weak chief ministers,
tolerated continuing factional squabbles within the
state units of her party, and has frequently ignored
state-level party organization, according to press re-
porting. We believe these efforts to ensure her control
have eroded the responsiveness of state governments
to Gandhi's priorities, their ability to transmit grass-
roots information to New Delhi, and their effective-
ness in managing local crises.
In our view, New Delhi has responded to communal
and caste conflict by seeking to forestall further
violence, sidestep blame, and minimize the political
costs to her party of continuing tensions rather than
address underlying grievances. Gandhi has relied on
such traditional responses as:
? Minimizing disturbances as the work of radicals,
foreign powers, or opposition parties.
? Offering symbolic concessions to moderate agitators
while excluding extremists from negotiations.
? Delaying substantive talks while government-
appointed commissions study underlying problems.
? Relying on her direct involvement and prestige to
defuse incipient violence.
The continuing conflict in Assam, Punjab, and else-
where has called into question Gandhi's strategy for
managing crises, according to many Indian political
commentators. Embassy and press sources have de-
scribed her response to the turmoil in Punjab as "too
little, too late." In our view, Gandhi's intervention in
communal conflicts only after they have reached the
crisis stage limits prospects for their successful resolu-
tion and undermines her claim to be the sole national
leader capable of maintaining public order.
Gandhi's personal role in resolving diverse communal
problems has created a bottleneck in decisionmaking
that slows New Delhi's response to crises, according
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he ineffectiveness of
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Gandhi's strategy has damaged her image, strength-
ened extremist leaders at the expense of moderates
seeking redress through negotiations, and increased
Local and state police lack effective grievance proce-
dures and are forbidden to strike, according to press
sources.
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government reliance on repressive measures
Security. The limited success of Gandhi's political
strategies has increased the frequency and visibility of
New Delhi's security response to communal conflict.
Although we judge that India is able to control civil
disorders, the declining performance of local and state
police has added to problems of maintaining order. As
a result, New Delhi is being increasingly compelled to
deploy paramilitary-and occasionally military-
forces to troubled areas.
Police. New Delhi has traditionally relied on a gradu-
ated response to civil disturbances, according to reli-
able Indian commentators. The system is designed to
shift responsibility upward as required from local to
state-level police. The State Provincial Armed Con-
stabularies, numbering about 242,000 men nation-
wide, are the states' initial recourse when unarmed
local police are unable to cope with a problem,
according to Embassy reporting.
A range of problems not yet addressed by the govern-
ment has reduced the capabilities of state and local
police in recent years. Embassy and press sources
report that some units of the state police are demoral-
ized and highly susceptible to political corruption.
These observers note that the police have contributed
to the breakdown of public order by resorting to force
too quickly during confrontations-particularly
against untouchables and Muslims, who allege dis-
criminatory treatment. According to diplomatic
sources, increased press coverage of police ineptitude,
brutality, and corruption has fed public hostility and
even violence against the police.
In some instances, police violence has stemmed from
working conditions that are poor even by Indian
standards, particularly for the enlisted ranks. The
Indian police system divides local and state police into
the professional Indian Police Service, which staffs
middle- and senior-level positions nationally, and con-
stable or enlisted ranks, which have virtually no
opportunities for promotion or geographic mobility.
The decline in state and local police performance
comes at a time when police face new levels of
resistance to their authority. Embassy and press re-
porting indicates that since 1980 the widespread use
of illegal arms by Hindus and minority groups in
confrontations has complicated police efforts to re-
store order. Similarly, rural violence has become
intractable with the spread of village-manufactured
guns and the increased resort to force by low-status
groups-including the untouchables.
Paramilitary. Faced with problems among state and
local police units, the state and national governments
have increasingly resorted to the use of paramilitary
forces, a shift that has heightened friction among
different security forces. Each of the paramilitary
forces has a distinct internal security mission in
addition to its military functions. Two of these para-
military groups-the Border Security Force and the
Central Reserve Police-have become key partici-
pants in riot control.
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Differences in rank, organization, and training proce-
dures have created problems when two paramilitary
forces have been assigned to cope with civil disorders,
according to diplomatic and press sources. The Indian
press reports that tensions between the military forces
deployed to states and the locally based state police
have been exacerbated by the tendency of the state
governments to retain paramilitary forces under their
control as long as possible. The paramilitary forces
themselves have experienced morale problems stem- 25X1
ming from limited opportunities for promotion and
the absence of grievance procedures,
In our view, since her return to power in 1980, Gandhi
has sidestepped the problems of both police and
paramilitary by merely expanding the roles of para-
military and army units in managing civil disorders.
Rather than consolidating existing paramilitary units,
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iF YOU BELIEVE ALLTN,AT NONSENSE
ABOUT YOUR WORK/Ni UN pOf/7/Cq:
ifAVE YOU TRRNSFERRED '
This cartoon conveys ironically the ruling party's
response to charges by the Police Commission
that arbitrary political intervention by politicians
(such as the Congress politician on the right)
undermines the performance of the police (con-
New Delhi has formed still another such force-the
Special Police Force-to deal exclusively with caste
and communal conflicts. Gandhi's Congress Party has
withheld from publication most portions of the Na-
tional Police Commission's reports and recommenda-
tions on police working conditions, according to press
reports. Press sources indicate New Delhi recently
declined to accept the findings of a Commission
report describing the frequent interference of politi-
cians as a major impediment to police performance.
Army. Embassy and press sources have reported that
the growing responsibility of Army troops in perform-
ing internal security duties is distasteful to the tradi-
tionally apolitical Army. The upward delegation of
responsibility for public order, with the Army often
replacing or assuming command over paramilitary
units and the police relegated to a minor role, has
reportedly demoralized state and paramilitary forces.
The Army has tried to maintain a low profile in the
control of internal disturbances such as those in
Assam, according to US diplomats.
cumulatively strained the capabilities of India's secu-
rity forces and highlighted long-term problems result-
ing from Gandhi's policies, in our view. The growing
trend toward crisis management by New Delhi has
weakened state governments and delayed the govern-
ment response. Delays have in turn fueled the rise of
communal politics that undermine the secular basis of
the Indian Government.
We believe Gandhi's dominance of the Indian politi-
cal scene is secure in the short term in the absence of
another nationally recognized leader, but the steady
deterioration of the Congress Party's political base
will pose formidable problems for her successor. Gen-
erally reliable Indian media commentators believe the
failure of the government to reduce tensions has
contributed to the breakdown of longstanding elector-
al alliances with minorities that help ensure the ruling
party's tenure. Press reports indicate that Gandhi's
perceived failure to protect the Muslims in Assam will
probably swell the recent defections of Muslims from
the Congress Party. Growing Sikh chauvinism in
Punjab is fueling Sikh support for the Akali Dal at
the expense of the Congress Party. Untouchables are
voting independently. According to Embassy sources,
Gandhi may be trying to offset such losses by seeking
greater support from Hindus in the populous north
who generally vote for the opposition Bharatiya Jan-
ata Party.
Foreign Policy Implications
We believe the deepening communal and caste ten-
sions in India have several implications for US strate-
gic and diplomatic interests in South Asia. Growing
communal conflicts complicate India's efforts to im-
prove ties with the United States, Pakistan, and the
Arab states by increasing Gandhi's fears that these
governments seek to destabilize her government. Her
tendency to blame the "foreign hand" for her domes-
tic political problems-including communal and re-
gional strife-has engendered friction in India's rela-
tions with these countries, according to respected
Prospects
In our judgment, widening civil disorders have al-
ready eroded important elements of the Indian politi-
cal system's future stability. These conflicts have
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This cartooon from the prestigious English-language Indian
Express spoofs Gandi's return to power in 1980 on a platform of
Gandhi's suspicions that Washington is contributing
to unrest in Punjab and Assam could-in our
judgment-become a growing obstacle to the closer
ties she has sought with the United States in the past
two years. Heightened distrust of US intentions to-
ward India could lead New Delhi to renew its harsh
censure of Washington's security assistance to Islam-
abad. Embassy sources note Gandhi has publicly
stated that the United States is the only base for the
Sikh separatist movement, which she views as a threat
to India's stability.
New Delhi views Washington's actions regarding the
Khalistan movement-including the decision last
March to allow a visit by a separatist leader based in
England-as a major irritant in Indo-US relations.
The Indian press has also reported Gandhi's state-
ments implying possible CIA involvement in Assam.
We believe Hindu-Muslim tensions-including those
in Assam-have strained New Delhi's relations with
Islamabad and the Arab states.
indicates that Gandhi suspects the Arab states are
funding Muslim dissidents in India, but at the same
time she is eager to project India as a country in
which Muslim interests are protected. New Delhi's
recent diplomatic demarches to Pakistan and the
Arab Gulf states concerning their press treatment of
the Assam crisis may foreshadow further strains in
India's relations with these countries, in our judg-
ment. Increased concern about Pakistani intervention
in India's internal affairs could impede forthcoming
negotiations on a nonaggression pact or friendship
treaty between the two countries.
The continuing disorders in India have already creat-
ed opportunities for involvement by Moscow. Al-
though Gandhi continues to believe Indian interests
are served by close relations with Moscow, her suspi-
cions of Soviet interference in domestic politics set 25X1
limits on the relationship and contribute to her desire
to strengthen ties with the West. Gandhi's concerns
appear to be well founded. Earlier this year we
learned of Moscow's plan to undertake active meas-
ures to heighten New Delhi's fear of Islamic funda-
mentalism-we believe with a view to undermining
Indo-Pakistani detente.
fears regarding US and Pakistani intentions.
Moscow has sought to chill Indian relations with the
United States, China, and Pakistan through disinfor-
mation campaigns. The pro-Soviet Indian press and
Soviet media-including Indian-language broadcasts
beamed at India-regularly feature articles alleging
US and Chinese involvement in Assam, US interven-
tion in Punjab, and Pakistani involvement in Hindu-
Muslim conflicts. The pro-Moscow Indian media car-
ried reports earlier this year of purported US plans to
"balkanize" India. Respected Indian news publica-
tions as well as the US Embassy sought to discredit
the reports as disinformation efforts. Despite Gandhi's
misgivings about Soviet activities in India, we believe
Moscow's clandestine efforts have exacerbated her
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Appendix
Muslim
Abdullah Bukhari
Organizational Relationship to
Affiliation Government
Influential Imam (religious An outspoken critic of Gandhi's
head) of principal mosque in policies concerning Indian Mus-
Delhi-the Jama Masjid. lims. He publicly advocates
that Muslims oppose her
government.
Member of Janata Party. Mem- Initiated memorandum to Gan-
ber of Upper House (Rajya dhi earlier this year listing con-
Sabha), Parliament. cerns of Muslim members of
parliament.
Principal Muslim religious lead- Has publicly criticized all politi-
er (Imam) of Lucknow, Uttar cians for their role in communal
Pradesh State. Particularly in- conflict.
fluential among Muslims in
northern India.
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The Politics of Communalism: Prominent Leaders (Continued)
Organizational
Affiliation
Relationship to
Government
Has headed Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), best organized op-
position party, since its forma-
tion in 1980. In 1968 helped
found its predecessor, the Jan
Sangh Party.
Heads the Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), a
paramilitary organization dedi-
cated to Hindu revivalism. The
RSS is affiliated with the BJP.
Heads the Virat Hindu Samaj
(VHS), a Hindu revivalist orga-
nization.
A leading critic of Gandhi, he is
widely viewed as a potential
challenger to her leadership.
Gandhi frequently blames the
RSS for communal strife. She
banned the RSS during her
emergency rule, 1975-77, and
imprisoned Deoras during that
period.
Resigned from ruling Congress
Party in 1977, in opposition to
Gandhi's emergency rule. Cites
differences with her as principal
obstacle to his rejoining the
party.
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JCC[Vt
The Politics of Communalism: Prominent Leaders (Continued)
Sikh
Dr.iagjit Singh Chauhan
Organizational Relationship to
Affiliation Government
British-based leader of Sikh sep- Government revoked his pass-
aratist "Khalistan" movement port and excluded him from
since 1980. India several years ago. Chau-
han has challenged these actions
in an Indian High Court.
President, Akali Dal Party- Has increasingly represented
largest and oldest Sikh political Sikhs of Punjab in negotiations
party in Punjab State. with national government for
greater state autonomy. His po-
sition has become less moderate
under pressure from J. S.
Bhindranwale.
Extremist leader of the funda- Favors separate Sikh nation op-
mentalist Bhindranwale sect posed by New Delhi. Gained
and the Sikh agitation in Pun- national attention in 1981 when
jab. he was arrested for murder of a
critic of Sikh separatist move-
ment. Remains accused of
crime, though was released in
1981 following protest riots by
his followers.
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The Politics of Communalism: Prominent Leaders (Continued)
Organizational Relationship to
Affiliation Government
Briefly imprisoned earlier this
year after election violence be-
gan in Assam. The AASU op-
posed holding February elec-
tions in Assam.
Bhrigu Phukan and Prafulla Leaders of the All Assamese
Mahanta Students' Union (AASU).
Head of the Sweccha Sevak Imprisoned under National Se-
Bahini, anti-Muslim "volunteer curity Act in February 1983.
force" of the AASU. Also a Released under parole as a con-
member of Hindu nationalist dition imposed by the AASU
RSS. for participation in negotiations
with New Delhi earlier this
year.
Convenor of the All Assam Opposed holding February state
Gana Sangram Parishad elections in Assam.
(AAGSP)-ethnic Assamese
political umbrella organization.
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