THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE OF THE LEBANESE FORCES MILITIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000300100004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Political, and Military
Role of the Lebanese
Forces Militia
An IaftHimce A ae t
State Dept. review completed
Secret
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August
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The Political and Military
Role of the Lebanese
Forces Militia
This paper was prepared b~
The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, on
Directorate of Secret
(1A Intelligence
Secret
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The Political and Military
Role of the Lebanese
Forces Militia
Key Judgments The Christian Lebanese Forces militia seriously threatens Lebanese do-
Information available mestic stability and the extension of central government authority. Second
as of 27 July 1983 only to the Army as an indigenous military force, the key objective of the
was used in this report.
4,000-man militia is preservation of Christian Maronite hegemony in
Lebanon's predominantly Muslim society. In our view, political support for
President Amin Gemayel is more likely to evaporate because of the
Lebanese Forces than because of any other single factor.
Relations between the government and the militia are constantly shifting.
The assassination of President-elect and former Lebanese Forces Com-
mander Bashir Gemayel and a rift-probably temporary-between the
militia and Israel, its main benefactor, enabled the Lebanese Government
earlier this year to make limited political gains at Lebanese Forces
expense. Since then, the Lebanese Forces militia has taken advantage of
Gemayel's preoccupation with the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to resume
its activist role.
The Lebanese Army is the only instrument of central government authority
and is thus critical to government efforts to maintain public order. As the
government attempts to extend its authority in territories vacated by
foreign forces, it will have to contend with the efforts of the Lebanese
Forces to subjugate the Druze, harass the Palestinians, and suppress the in-
creasingly vocal Shia community. Gemayel will use the Army to stand
between contending factions, but he will not want to use it to confront the
militia. Direct confrontation could split the Army as occurred during the
civil war. The Army's role, therefore, will be limited by the political deals
the President can work out with factional leaders.
If the Army can check factional violence and reassure confessional
groups-a less likely prospect-the justification for the Lebanese Forces
will be greatly diminished. Only then would Gemayel attempt to weaken
the militia, although the central government will not be strong enough to
eliminate it for the near future. Unless the Lebanese Forces militia can be
brought to heel, its actions will jeopardize US policy objectives of restoring
the preeminence of central government authority in Lebanon.
The occupation of Lebanon by Syrian and Israeli troops has so limited
government authority, however, that many factional leaders now believe de
facto partition is inevitable and see little to be gained from cooperating
with the government. The period following the redeployment of Israeli
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forces will be critical. Should the government arrange and enforce a truce
between Druze and Christians, the ability of Lebanese Forces leaders to fo-
ment trouble and thereby justify their own and the Lebanese Forces
existence will diminish. Government failure to establish its authority in the
area, however, would harden the partition mentality and embolden the
Lebanese Forces. The result is likely to be renewed civil war.
Under these circumstances, we expect the Lebanese Forces will move to
consolidate control over traditional Christian areas, setting the stage for a
Phalange-dominated ministate. Gemayel probably would then abandon
efforts to reach new power-sharing arrangements with other religious
groups and cast his lot with the militia, knowing that he would need its sup-
port to retain leadership.
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The Political and Military
Role of the Lebanese
Forces Militia
In August 1976 the Lebanese Front, a loose coalition
of the four major Christian political parties, formally
established the "Unified Command of the Lebanese
Forces" to coordinate the military operations of the
parties' militias in their fight against the Palestine
Liberation Organization and its leftist Lebanese al-
lies. The parties' militias were unified in name only,
however, and for several years remained subordinate
25X1 to their parent groups.
Bashir Gemayel, then commander of the Phalange
Party militia, worked for the unification of the Chris-
tian militias and often used force to impose his
leadership. By the end of 1980, the Lebanese Forces
had a rudimentary general staff and a Command
Council composed of representatives of each of the
political parties, although Bashir had established Pha-
lange predominance in the organization. At the time
of the Israeli invasion in June 1982, Bashir was
moving toward the realization of his objective, a
25X1 conventional Christian army
The Lebanese Forces under Bashir's leadership be-
came an assertive political force. Bashir instilled in his
followers a militant philosophy that rejected the clan
politics of previous generations in favor of a new
political order that would not be hostage to confes-
sional interests.' We believe he intended the Lebanese
Forces to be his vehicle for long-term control of the
Lebanese political system.
The Lebanese Forces viewed Bashir Gemayel's elec-
tion to the presidency in August 1982 as a guarantee
of its legitimacy and predominance in Lebanese poli-
tics. Bashir's assassination in September and the
' There are more than a dozen recognized religious, or confessional,
groups in Lebanon. The country's political structure, fashioned
under the French mandate, apportions high-level political, military,
and civil service positions among confessional groups, according to
an unwritten National Covenant between leading Christian and
Muslim politicians acknowledged in 1943. The Covenant is based
on the 1932 census-the last taken in Lebanon-which showed a
slight Christian majority. The population balance has shifted in
favor of the Muslims, and their demands for more equitable power-
sharing arrangements are fundamental causes of confessional con-
Phalange Forces in East Beirut celebrate the
election of Bashir Gemayel as President of Leba-
non in August 1982.
I&C
Lebanese Forces militiamen read news of Basmr
Gemayel's assassination in September 1982.
subsequent election of his brother Amin ushered in a
period of uncertainty for the Lebanese Forces. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reports, the militia lost some
of its elan and cohesion following Bashir's death.
Although its leaders wanted to maintain their organi-
zation as a unique military force, the loss of Bashir's
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The philosophy of the Lebanese Forces generally
reflects the political ideology of Lebanon's Maronite
Christians, particularly the Phalange Party. A strong
opponent of pan-Arabism, the Phalange is determined
to preserve Maronite hegemony to ensure that Leba-
non will never be dominated by the Muslim majority
or absorbed into a larger Arab state. The Phalange
acknowledges Lebanon as an Arab country but be-
lieves its multisectarian population should serve as a
bridge between the West and the Arab world and be
neutral in Arab politics.
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dynamic leadership led them into a series of compro-
mises with the new central government. Since then,
the Lebanese Forces has taken advantage of the
President's preoccupation with the Lebanese-Israeli
withdrawal negotiations to resume its activist ro1e.F-
Military Objectives
At various times over the past four years, Lebanese
Forces leaders have mentioned their objectives both
publicly and privately. The most important military
goals are:
? To recover formerly Christian villages in the Shuf
and Alayh districts and establish Christian domi-
nance in these areas.
? To attack and destroy Sulayman Franjiyah's rival
Christian militia in the north and bring Franjiyah's
stronghold under Phalange control. Former Presi-
dent Franjiyah, a Syrian ally, is considered a traitor
to Christian Lebanon, but the Lebanese Forces is
unable to act against Franjiyah until the Syrian
troops protecting him withdraw.
0- 1-
Christian combatant with crucifix and picture of
the Madonna surrounded by ammunition on
hood of jeep.
? To expand Lebanese Forces control at least as far
south as the Awwali River.
? To kill or force out most Palestinian refu ees in
Lebanon.
With or without success, Lebanese Forces efforts
disrupt Lebanese society and threaten central govern-
ment authority.
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Figure 1
Lebanon: Controlled Areas
Lebanese Forces
Bo.nda y S ~t4tion is
not nswsrriy authwitatin.
BEIRUT
Juniyah
*'Alayh
'ALAYH
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Table 1
Lebanese Forces Command Council
Fadi Fram (President) Phalange
Naum Farah
Fuad Rukkuz
Charles Ghustin
Nabil Karam
Eli Aswad
Nuhab Shalut
Samir Tawil
Georges Adwan
Fawzi Mahfuz
Below the regional command level, we believe the
Lebanese Forces militia relies heavily upon the mili-
tias of the component parties of the Lebanese Front,
especially the Phalange.'
The Lebanese Forces militia is essentially a defensive
organization, experienced and competent in urban
warfare and house-to-house fighting, but inexperi-
enced and untrained in conventional military tactics.
Apart from Samir Ja'ja and a few other high-ranking
Lebanese Forces officers, we believe most Lebanese
Forces commanders do not have formal military
Nadim Shawayri Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr
Organization of the Lebanese Forces
The Lebanese Forces militia is headed by a Command
Council of 15 men. In principle the Command Coun-
cil implements, through the commander, military and
political decisions made by the coalition of Lebanese
Christian parties.
Lebanese Forces
ea quarters performs all the staff functions of a
regular army headquarters (see foldout at end of
paper). In addition, there are staff positions responsi-
ble for various civilian functions, including external
relations, finance, and the Phalange Party radio.
These may be directly subordinate to the Command
Council rather than to the Lebanese Forces com-
mander. Subordinate to the general staff are the
heads of the military branches-probably staff posi-
tions-and five regional commanders who apparently
have line authority for military operations in their
regions.
training.
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acurut
Lebanese Forces recruits in
training at Christian security
garrison.
Weekend warriors: Lebanese
Forces irregulars drill on
Sundays.
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Amin has since proved more adept at handling the
militia. In our judgment, he has learned to exploit the
influence of his father, Pierre, over the militia leader-
ship in general and Lebanese Forces Commander
dency in September 1982
Shifting Alliances
The relationship between the Lebanese Forces and the
central government has changed with political devel-
opments since Amin Gemayel's election to the presi-
willing to cooperate with him.
During Amin's first four months in office, we believe
the militia took advantage of the President's apparent
lack of assertiveness in order to stymie his initial
efforts to extend government authority beyond West
Beirut. The lack of an effective military counter-
weight to the Lebanese Forces and Israeli support for
the militia left Amin with little leverage. The Presi-
dent's initial inability to deal effectively with the
militia seriously damaged his credibility with conserv-
ative Muslims and leftist groups who initially were
Embassy reporting indicates that most militia leaders
view Amin as representing old-style clan politics and
accuse him of taking advantage of his family position
for personal gain.
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The Gemayels: Amin, Pierre,
and Bashir.
Fadi Fram in particular. Pierre, as head of the
Gemayel family and founder and head of the Pha-
lange, commands respect and loyalty within the Leba-
nese Forces. Fram, moreover, is married to a member
of the Gemayel family, a circumstance that reinforces
Amin was able to marshal moderate support during
the Phalange Party Politburo elections held in June
1983 to narrowly block Lebanese Forces militant
Samir Ja'ja from winning a seat in that body. Al-
though many observers see this as a significant victory
for the President, the closeness of the vote, in our
view, illustrates the tenuous balance between the
his deference to the senior Gemayel
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Amin himself is an experienced and able politician.
Embassy reports detail Gemayel's careful backroom
dealing with the Lebanese Forces that enabled him to
deploy the Lebanese Army into the militia stronghold
of East Beirut in February and to restore government
control over the lucrative illegal ports that had been
the main source of revenue for the militia. A Leba-
nese official close to the President told US Embassy
officials that Gemayel hoped gradually to take over
Lebanese Forces finances in a tactical move that
would eventually enable the government to control the
According to US officials in Beirut, Amin's success in
negotiating with the Lebanese Forces indicated that
earlier reservations over what the militia perceived as
his pro-Muslim attitudes had faded and that the
Christian community and the Lebanese Forces ap-
25X1 peared to have accepted Amin's policies.
President and his opponents.
A wary, but working relationship appears to have
developed between Amin and Lebanese Forces lead-
ers. We believe it is temporary, based in part on
mutual need and on the recognition of a basic identity
of interests-the removal of Syrian, Palestinian, and
Israeli forces from Lebanon. Moreover, we believe
militia leaders see no immediate alternative to Amin
and realize he has US backing. There is no active
Christian opposition to Amin or any organized effort
to undermine his policies. 25X1
Political Attitudes: The Lebanese Forces and the
Muslims
The initial confidence of militia leaders in the ability
of the Lebanese Forces militia to subordinate non-
Christian factions to its rule has been tempered, in
our view, as it realizes it cannot necessarily count on
Israeli backing. As a result, militia leaders appear
ready to reach a political accommodation with some
religious and political factions.
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Amin Gemayel with Druze
leader Walid Junblatt: No
meeting of minds.
P alange Party leader Pierre Gemayel and militia
commander Fadi Fram have publicly called for coop-
eration between them and "responsible" Muslim lead-
ers to dispel the belief that the Phalange and the
Lebanese Forces were not interested in cooperating
with other communities and were working only for
their own objectives. US Embassy reports indicate,
however, that these groups remain skeptical. The
Lebanese Forces single-minded determination to
dominate, if not permanently alter, Lebanon's politi-
cal process is dramatically underlined by the militia's
violent and bloody actions against Palestinians, Leba-
nese Druze, and other leftist groups.
Phalange efforts to restore ties with the Sunni elite
are motivated, we believe, by a desire to restore the
conservative balance in Lebanese politics. Old-line
Sunni leaders recognize that by allying themselves
with leftists and radicals they have "backed the wrong
horse" during the last eight years and, in our
judgment, are now prepared to cooperate with the
government in anticipation of important political
appointments. According to US officials, rank-and-
file Sunnis are much less supportive of the govern-
ment because they believe it represents Phalange and
Lebanese Forces interests and therefore discriminates
against them. This view is reinforced by the govern-
ment's acquiescence to the continued existence of the
Lebanese Forces, while it has disarmed all leftist
fighting units within its reach
We believe the Lebanese Forces attitude toward the
Shia community clearly has shifted over the past year.
Amal, the most important Shia organization, sought
to improve the Shias' economic and political lot by
forging an opportunistic alliance with the Lebanese
Forces. Its support for Bashir Gemayel's bid for the
presidency contributed significantly to his electoral
victory.
With the departure of the PLO from Beirut and the
weakening of its leftist allies, however, the Lebanese
Forces militia is less in need of Shia support, and the
cooperation that existed before the Israeli invasion
has deteriorated. The US Embassy reports that the
Shias distrust Christian intentions, and the Lebanese
Forces militia, for its part, regards the Shias as
untrustworthy, politically unreliable, and open to in-
fluence from revolutionary Iran.
The conflict between the Maronites and the Druze,
which goes back more than a century and a half, is
not so much religious as a contest for territory. With
the outbreak of the civil war, the Druze became the
linchpin of the National Movement, a coalition of
leftist factions allied with the PLO. The Israeli occu-
pation of the Shuf and Alayh districts last summer
forced the withdrawal of the Palestinian and Syrian
protectors of the National Movement.
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The Druze handed the Christian militia a major
military setback in late February by driving the
Lebanese Forces out of the strategically important
village of Alayh. The fighting also panicked many
Christians into abandoning their homes in the area.
The Lebanese Forces and the Palestinians
A primary goal of the Lebanese Forces is the eradica-
tion of the PLO presence in Lebanon and the elimina-
tion of as many of the country's Palestinian residents
as possible. The Lebanese Forces regard the bulk of
Lebanon's 400,000 Palestinians as usurpers whose
political activities and revolutionary goals triggered
the civil war of 1975-76.
The latest Lebanese Forces campaign against
Palestinians began last September, following the
assassination of Bashir Gemayel, with the massacre of
Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.
Private comments made to US officials in Lebanon by
numerous factional leaders make clear that all parties
in Lebanon are aware of the militia's role in the
massacre, but nearly all have refrained from public
comment. According to US Embassy reports, this is
partly out of fear of retribution by the Lebanese
Forces, but also because many believe that salvaging
Lebanon's unity is more important than attaching
. 25X1 blame for the massacre.
Since early February an organized campaign of vio-
lence against Palestinian civilians launched by the
Lebanese Forces has been under way, and there have
been numerous United Nations reports of evictions,
kidnapings, and murders of Palestinians, especially in
the south. One Embassy report points out that for
many rightwing Christians, the plight of the
Palestinians in Lebanon-even the massacre of last
September-is not an aberration or an atrocity, but a
25X1 justified act of revenge.
President Reagan greets President Gemayel at
White House.
Impact on US Interests
The actions of the Lebanese Forces could jeopardize
US policy objectives in Lebanon aimed at restoring
central government authority throughout the country.
All political factions-including non-Phalange Chris-
tians-fear political and military domination by the
powerful minority militia. General political support
for Amin Gemayel is more likely to weaken, in our
view, because of the continued existence and activities
of the Lebanese Forces than because of any other
single factor, including relations with Israel.F-----125X1
Until the role of the Lebanese Forces is resolved and
its activities constrained, other factions will attempt to
rebuild their own military capabilities and form alli-
ances that could lead Lebanon back into civil war.
Domestic tranquillity depends in part upon President
Gemayel's ability to bring the Lebanese Forces to
heel. It is important for US credibility that a clearly
preeminent central government emerge in Lebanon,
backed by a credible army. 25X1
Outlook
In our view, the future of the relationship between the
government and the Lebanese Forces depends primar-
ily on whether foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon.
The occupation of Lebanon by Syrian and Israeli
troops has so limited government authority that many
factional leaders now believe de facto partition is
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inevitable and see little to be gained from cooperating
with the government. This attitude is likely to harden
following the redeployment of Israeli troops in the
south, and renewed factional violence seems inevita-
ble.
Under these circumstances, we expect the Lebanese
Forces will move to consolidate its control over tradi-
tional Christian areas, setting the stage for a
Phalange-dominated ministate. Amin will then be
under less pressure to appease Druze, Shias, and
Sunnis and will probably consolidate his political
position with the Christians. His objectives and those
of the Lebanese Forces would then more nearly
coincide, and the central government would lose any
prospect of obtaining the support and allegiance of
Lebanon's non-Christian communities.
Paradoxically, if foreign forces withdraw, Lebanese
Forces-government relations probably will become
increasingly strained. We believe that Amin, to ex-
tend central government authority, will have to com-
promise with other confessional groups and oppose
Lebanese Forces policies.
Near-Term Prospects. Lebanon's history of confes-
sional strife guarantees that private militias will re-
main an important feature of Lebanese politics. For
the near future, the Lebanese Forces will be the
strongest of the militias, but its strength and influence
will depend on the continued weakness of the Leba-
nese central government.
The Lebanese Army, the instrument and symbol of
central government authority, will be the crucial
factor in the government's ability to control the
Lebanese Forces. Gemayel will use the Army to stand
between contending factions, but he will not want to
use it to confront the militia directly for fear the
Army will dissolve along confessional lines as it did
during the civil war. The effectiveness of the Army
will depend on the political deals Gemayel and Army
Commander Tannous can make with the Lebanese
Forces and other militias to permit the Army to
25X1 perform security duties in confessional areas.
Although the Lebanese Forces militia is probably
aware of these constraints on government use of the
Army, we believe militia interests would not be served
by provoking the Army. The military aims of the
Lebanese Forces would be frustrated by the Army's
presence, but in our judgment militia leaders probably
still view the Christian-dominated Army as a political
ally. In other words, if Army deployment becomes
inevitable, Lebanese Forces leaders probably believe
that other militias and confessional groups will be
bigger losers than they as a result.
The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Shuf and
Alayh districts will be the critical test of this relation-
ship. Should the government arrange and enforce a
truce between Druze and Christians, the ability of
Lebanese Forces leaders to foment trouble and there-
by justify their own and the Lebanese Forces exist-
ence will diminish. Government failure to establish its
authority in the area, however, will embolden the
Lebanese Forces, and the prospects are excellent that
it will reassert itself as an aggressive military and
political factor. The likelihood that escalating violence
would precipitate Syrian and possibly Israeli involve-
ment then increases markedly. The result is likely to
be renewed civil war.
If the government succeeds in the Shuf, it will
continue to face challenges to its authority from the
Lebanese Forces in other areas. The government will
have to control Lebanese Forces efforts to harass and
eradicate Palestinians, take revenge on Franjiyah and
his followers, and suppress the increasingly vocal
Shias if it is to achieve preeminence and prevent
chaos.
Long-Term Prospects. Over time, the Lebanese
Government probably will try to weaken the militia
by dissolving it or by transforming it into a less
If the militia were dissolved, it would probably
reemerge as a strictly Phalange militia, firmly
under the control of the Phalange Party.
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Militiamen loyal to the Shamuns would probably
cleave to the National Liberal Party, while those
loyal to the Tanzim Party and the Guardians of
the Cedars would rejoin their parties. The result
would be a significant weakening of the power of
the Lebanese Forces and a consequent increase
in the power of the central government.
? Incorporation into the Army: Incorporating the
Lebanese Forces as a distinct unit into the Army
would be, we believe, politically disastrous.
- Incorporation would reinforce Druze and Mus-
lim fears that the Army is an instrument of
Christian dominance, thereby weakening the
Army's legitimacy.
The Army could accept individual militiamen-a
policy that would help the military meet its
manpower objectives while maintaining confes-
sional balance. Incorporating Lebanese Forces
officers would be more difficult, however, since
the Army's officer corps already is heavily Chris-
tian. In addition, many Lebanese Forces officers
probably would not meet Lebanese Army officer
standards.
? National Guard: A senior Lebanese Forces official
suggested in October 1982 that the militia be
retained as a regional "National Guard" stationed
in Maronite Christian-dominated areas. Other reli-
gious groupings such as the Druze and the Shias
would be allowed to maintain their militias in their
regions.
This proposal would resolve one of the most
difficult issues that faces the Lebanese Govern-
ment-what to do with the numerous, mutually
antagonistic militias. It would legally recognize
the militias, however, and represent an impor-
tant cession of central government authority. It
could set the stage for a de facto sectarian
partition of Lebanon.
to prevent Palestinian infiltration from Syria.
- Such an arrangement would appease hardliners
in the Lebanese Forces by keeping the organiza-
tion intact but would ensure that the bulk of the
force was away from Beirut.
- Lebanese Forces units already share responsi-
bility with the Lebanese Army for policing the
frontier between Syrian forces and the Chris-
tian heartland in the north and east.
- This solution might also be acceptable to other
religious groups in Lebanon, who fear the Leba-
nese Forces will become a tool to suppress
internal opposition to ensure Christian domi-
nance.
In our view, neither dissolution of the Lebanese
Forces nor its incorporation into the Army are likely.
The government probably will not be strong enough to
eliminate the militia altogether, and political realities
militate against incorporation. Far more likely, in our
view, is the transformation of the Lebanese Forces. If
the central government extends its control to the
Lebanese borders, the border guard option is the most
feasible. Should de facto partition occur, the Leba- 25X1
nese Forces will remain concentrated in Christian
areas and probably become a "national guard."
Whether or not Gemayel succeeds in transforming the
militia, it will remain an important power base for
Lebanese Christian extremists. The militia will con-
tinue to oppose and constrain government efforts to
reach political agreements with the non-Christian
communities in Lebanon. Any threat to the Christian
community will encourage a resurgence of the Leba-
nese Forces. 25X1
? Border Guard: Another alternative would be to
form the Lebanese Forces into a border guard under
the Surete Generale or the Internal Security Forces
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Figure 3
Lebanese Forces Command Structure
Comaud Council
Cor r aader
Fadi Frem
Deputy Couaader
Eli Aswad
Chief of Staff
Fuad Abu Nadr
Deputy Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff
AWubtratiou/Logistics Operations
Assad Said Elias Zayak
I
G-f G-2 G-3
rf tttlte Affairs Military Iutellipsuce Operatlou
Joseph Shaul Abbas Abbas Namtallah Qayl
Matary Branches
Infantry
Elias Zaak
Artillery
Antoine Bridi
Navy
Joseph Ghurayib
Engineering
Jacques Manassa
AAA/Anti-Armor
Michel Qassas
Armor
Augustin Taygu
Communications
Ghassan Naddaf
Regional Military
Corrods
Beirut
Masud Ashkar
Northern
Samir Ja'ja
Eastern
Naji Butrus
Southern
Nazu Najjarian
Zahlah
Joseph Ilyas
1
G-S
Psychological Operations
Fadi Hayak
Special Units
SKS
(Phalange)
J. Assayan
May be the same as:
Bodyguard
Quick Reaction
(Phalange)
E. Ziyad
May be the same as:
Commandos
Secret
External Relations
Naum Farah
Coa enter Center
Nabil Mitn
Voice of Free Lebanon
Siyan Azi
Intelligence
r Eli Hubayka
Finance
Cyril Butrus
Police
Dib Anastas
Reserves
Nizar Najjarian
Regional Defense
Joseph Edde
General Secretary
Kayroz Barakat
L General Military hspector
Sami Shidyak
589948 8-83
19
possible line of authority
G-4
Logistics
Reja Murakadi
Secret
Approved For Release 2008110/08: CIA-RDP84S00556R000300100004-9
 Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000300100004-9
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/08: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000300100004-9