EGYPT: STATUS OF THE COPTIC COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000200060003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
. Egypt: Status of the
Coptic Community
State Dept. review completed
Secret
NESA 83-10103
May 1983
312
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Egypt: Status of the
Coptic Community
Israeli Division, NESA,
the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis with
a contribution from the Office of
Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Arab-
This assessment was prepared by
Council
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Secret
NESA 83-10103
May 1983
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Egypt: Status of the
Coptic Community
Key Judgments The status of Egypt's Coptic Christian minority of some 3-4 million has for
Information available centuries been a sensitive and often troublesome issue for the country's
as of 15 April 1983 Muslim rulers. One of the primary concerns of President Mubarak has
was used in this report.
been to avoid any personal decision that would trigger sectarian violence
and perhaps destabilize his regime. The tight security measures in effect
since Sadat's assassination in October 1981 have so far contained the
activities of both Muslim and Coptic extremists. They also have prevented
sectarian clashes such as those that occurred during the last years of the
Sadat regime.
Mubarak has followed generally balanced sectarian policies that in some
respects have proven beneficial to Copts. His moderate political and
religious views have raised hopes among Copts that the government is
sensitive to their concerns. Mubarak's willingness to address Coptic
complaints about discrimination and harassment by Muslim fundamental-
ists, however, will depend largely on whether he believes the complaints are
fair and whether the solutions are acceptable to the moderate Muslim.
majority.
The two most sensitive and controversial issues for Copts-Sadat's decree
in 1981 revoking state recognition of the head of the Coptic Church, Pope
Shinuda, and efforts to broaden the application of Islamic law-are
unlikely to be resolved quickly. Mubarak will probably delay any final
decision on Pope Shinuda's status until the Copts have exhausted the
judicial appeal process. Egypt's parliament is studying the possibility of
expanding the use of Islamic law and is scheduled to make its recommen-
dations later this year. A favorable ruling would alarm the Coptic
community as well as many moderate Muslims, and Mubarak is likely to
minimize or dilute any expanded usage of Islamic law.
Whatever the outcome of these issues, we believe that incidents of
sectarian violence are almost inevitable in the years ahead. Many of the
underlying causes of Muslim-Coptic tensions still exist. The appeal of
religion as a solution to social problems remains strong among Egyptian
youth. Copts and Muslims also continue to harbor suspicions about each
other's political intentions.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10103
May 1983
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Isolated incidents of religious strife would be embarrassing for Mubarak
but would not necessarily weaken his position. There is a danger, however,
that even a limited communal incident in Cairo could escalate and lead to
large-scale riots over other issues such as economic grievances. Prolonged
unrest of this nature would be difficult to control and could threaten the
stability of the regime.
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Egypt: Status of the
Coptic Community
The status of Egypt's Coptic Christian community is
a complex and potentially destabilizing issue for the
Mubarak government. During the last years of the
Sadat regime, the normally good relations between
Egypt's Muslims and Copts deteriorated significantly.
In the summer of 1981 the most serious sectarian
violence since the 1940s broke out in the working-
class Cairo district of Zawia al-Hamra. Over 100
Egyptian Muslims and Copts were killed or seriously
wounded in riots that stemmed from a feud over the
purchase of a tract of land by a Copt on which
Muslims wanted to construct a mosque.
In September, one month before his assassination by
Muslim extremists, President Sadat moved against
some 1,500 Muslim and Coptic critics of the regime,
charging them with inciting sectarian violence.
Church-state relations reached a low point as Sadat
arrested some 120 Coptic clergy and laymen. He also
revoked government recognition of Pope Shinuda as
head of the Coptic Church, charged he politicized the
papal office, confined him to a monastery in Wadi
al-Natrun outside Cairo, and appointed a committee
of five politically conservative bishops to discharge
Shinuda's duties.
Heightened tensions between Muslims and Copts
resulted from several factors, especially the post-1967
religious revival that spurred the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism and a corresponding Coptic militan-
cy. Pope Shinuda, elected in 1971, provided militants
with a charismatic, tough-minded leader who was
willing to risk confrontation with the Sadat regime in
order to champion Coptic rights.
In the early 1970s Copts became increasingly worried
about Sadat's encouragement of Islamic fundamen-
talism as a counter to the threat he perceived from the
leftist opposition. the US Em-
bassy in Cairo note that, by the late 1970s, Copts had
begun to doubt Sadat's willingness or ability to
protect them from harassment by Islamic fundamen-
talist groups. The most insecure Copts also came to
believe Sadat would endorse official adoption of Is-
lamic law, which Copts believed would turn Egypt
into a Khomeini-style theocracy with religious minor-
ities reduced to second-class status.
Muslim-Coptic tensions also stemmed from the frus-
tration evoked by the rapid changes in the 1970s.
Sadat's domestic and foreign policies, which turned
Egypt toward the West, placed tremendous stress on
Egyptian society. For example, his "open door" eco-
nomic policy appeared to erode traditional cultural
values and created a larger gap between rich and poor
than had existed in the Nasir years. The peace treaty
with Israel divided Egypt from the rest of the Arabs
and brought no quick resolution to the Palestinian
problem. Many Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists saw
Western influence in these developments and alleged
Coptic complicity. 25X1
US Embassy ~reporting has shown that
Mubarak is sensitive to Coptic questions when formu-
lating policies to maintain domestic political stability
and a positive image abroad. For example, the status
of Pope Shinuda has had special review in the Nation-
al Defense Council, and Mubarak is briefed regularly
on Coptic issues by the Minister of Interior and the
Prime Minister. If he moves too quickly on Coptic
issues such as rehabilitating Pope Shinuda, he risks
angering the Islamic right and a possible outbreak of
sectarian violence. Indefinitely delaying such deci-
sions, however, risks playing into the hands of Coptic
militants who are willing to embarrass the regime
abroad by turning the status of the Pope and of Copts
in general into a human rights issue.
Coptic Grievances
There are numerous charges and countercharges
about the existence of official discrimination against
Copts in Egypt. We have not substantiated many
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Egyptian youth participating in
Muslim-Coptic clashes in the
Zawia al-Hamra dis in of
Cairo during June 1981
Coptic complaints, but in our judgment a degree of de
facto discrimination does exist. We also believe that
some Coptic allegations are exaggerated.
Coptic grievances include both those that concern the
church as a religious institution and those that Copts
claim affect their civil rights. Copts assert that the
government has purposely undercounted their num-
bers in order to limit access to such things as govern-
ment jobs and scholarships. They argue that census
officials frequently record Christian names as Mus-
lim. According to the 1976 census, Copts comprise
6.31 percent of the population or presently about 2.75
million. We believe that there are at least 3 million
Copts in Egypt, and some suggest
the actual figure could be as high as 10 percent or 4.5
million. Coptic activists insist it is even higher. Emi-
grant groups in North America claim that Copts
comprise at least 20 percent of the population, but we
believe this figure is inflated.
Coptic leaders complain that they must obtain per-
mission from the government to build or repair
churches while Muslims do not suffer from similar
restrictions on mosques. They also argue that they
often have difficulty convincing local administrators
of the necessity for a new church, one of 10 conditions
that must be met to receive a government building
permit. As a result, church leaders claim, they must
build temporary "illegal" churches that have in the
recent past been the special targets of arson and
bombings by Islamic extremists. A recent US Embas-
sy report quoted one bishop in Upper Egypt as stating
that because of permit difficulties, only six of 14
churches built in recent years were legal.
Religious endowments are a major source of income
for the Coptic Church, and
church leaders have tried to recover about
200 endowments confiscated in 1968 by the Ministry
of Religious Endowments. Copts argue that President
Nasir had acknowledged that Coptic religious endow-
ments were under the control of a board appointed by
the Pope. They charge that the Ministry of Religious
Endowments, which is responsible for Muslim funds,
justified the confiscation on the grounds that some
beneficiaries might be Muslims.
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the Coptic leadership has found this particu- 25X1
larly unjust and continues to lobby the government, so
far unsuccessfully, for their restitution.
The Copts are particularly sensitive about discrimina-
tion in education. They place great value on educa-
tional excellence and believe that the state education-
al system is biased against them. For example,F__-] 25X1
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Coptic Christians are the only significant religious
minority in Egypt, representing some 6 to 10 percent
of the total population and over 95 percent of Egypt's
Christians. The word Copt is an Arabized Greek
word meaning `inhabitant of Egypt." The Copts
claim descent from Egyptians converted by the Apos-
tle Mark. They withstood Byzantine persecution for
being monophysites (believing that the divine and
human natures of Christ are one, indivisible and
indistinguishable) and resisted conversion to Islam
after the Arab conquest in the seventh century. Their
long history has given Copts a deep awareness of their
Egyptian heritage, and they are fervent nationalists.
The Coptic Church in Egypt has maintained a sepa-
rate identity from the theologically similar Eastern
Orthodox Church, largely because the isolation of
the Copts under Islamic rulers encouraged an inde-
pendent clergy and papacy. The Coptic Church today
belongs to the World Council of Churches, maintains
a dialogue with the Vatican, and retains spiritual
leadership over its sister church in Ethiopia.
Today's Copts are ethnically and linguistically indis-
tinguishable from Egypt's Muslim majority. During
the 19th century Egyptian rulers gave Copts equal
citizenship with Muslims, freeing them from the
(Copts did disproportion-
ately well in examinations for government scholar-
ships abroad before the addition in 1973 of an
interview. Copts now claim they receive only 2 per-
cent of such scholarships because the interview estab-
lishes their religious identity. Additionally,
Coptic student com-
plaints that Muslim professors impede their progress
and fail to give them recognition even when they are
academically superior to Muslims competing for
school honors and good jobs.
Copts also contend, apparently with justification, that
they are discriminated against when seeking govern-
ment-controlled jobs and senior civil service positions.
restrictions of official minority status under Islamic
law. During this period the government abolished
such discriminatory measures as special clothing and
a special tax. For the first time Copts became liable
for military service and acquired the same electoral
rights as Muslims. The Egyptian constitution of 1971
guarantees Christians the same rights as Muslims
even though Islam is recognized as the state religion.
Copts reside throughout Egypt but are a majority in
no one area. According to the 1976 Egyptian census,
some 60 percent of all Copts live in Upper Egypt,
mainly in the governorates of Asyut and al-Minya,
where they account for almost one-fifth of the popula-
tion. Additionally, about 10 percent live in Cairo and
another 6 percent in Alexandria, according to Egyp-
tian Government data (see map). 25X1
Copts are represented in every social and economic 25X1
class or example,
Copts form a majority of Cairo's rubbish collectors.
They also are particularly numerous as businessmen
and in the professions where they comprise a high
proportion of lawyers, engineers, doctors, and phar-
macists. Copts, however, appear underrepresented at 25X1
high levels of the civil service, the armed forces,,
Even if hired, they claim to have few opportunities for
advancement. Many Copts view the few prominent
Christians in government service, such as Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali, as token
representatives. there 25X1
appears to be a Coptic quota of less than 10 percent in
~Sadat in 1979 received a Pamphlet 25X1
written by Coptic laymen claiming that there were
less than 20 Copts among the more than 700 appoint-
ed positions in the civil service and in government-run
companies.
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Egypt: Religious Affiliation by Governorate, 1976
Frontier Governorates:
Marsa Matruh-)
50
a Other affiliations are statistically insignificant.
Gaza Strip
(Israeli occupied-
Ad Daq lah yah~~ ~~~~
Complete statistics for Sina'
(Sinai) are not available
Aswan T
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Although Copts are found in the police and
armed forces, they complain that they rarely achieve
high rank. Copts note further that few Christians are
on university faculties and in the diplomatic service,
and almost none are appointed governors or hold high
positions in government publishing houses.
Over the past 10 years Copts have increasingly
claimed that they are victims of legal discrimination
as well. The US Embassy has noted Coptic complaints
that, in personal status cases involving Christians and
Muslims, they often face Muslim judges who apply
Islamic law. They further note correctly that cases
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Coptic rubbish collectors built this church in the middle of a? Cairo
trash dump where they live. The building appears to be one of the
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between two Christians of different sects are subject
to Islamic law but fail to point out that this stems in
part from the inability of the different Christian sects
to agree on common procedures for personal status
cases
against Copts. They have also complained of police
brutality during confrontations between Copts and
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Another major source of apprehension among Copts
has been Islamic fundamentalist sponsorship of legis-
lation in parliament to apply Islamic law more widely.
Although Copts acknowledge that they were able to
lobby successfully against such legislation in 1977, the
Islamic right engineered the passage of an amend-
ment to the constitution in 1980 that identifies Islam-
ic law as the major rather than a major source of
legislation in Egypt. Copts are strongly concerned
that a parliamentary commission report due to be
released in late 1983 will recommend the broader
implementation of Islamic law in Egypt.
If Islamic law replaces the French-based legal system,
Copts fear a return to the second-class status of the
19th century. Islamic law categorizes Copts as "Peo-
ple of the Book," guaranteeing them certain rights but
at the same time relegating them to subordinate
status. If Islamic law were fully implemented, Copts
would have to pay a special tax not levied on Muslims,
could not serve in the armed forces, apparently would
not be able to bear witness against a Muslim in
criminal cases, and probably would not be able to act
in a supervisory position over Muslims.
The Copts' sensitivity to legal discrimination is closely
linked to the growing strength of the Islamic right and
the Islamic coloration they believed Sadat gave his
regime. Copts blamed
the growth in sectarian strife on the Sadat govern-
ment's initial toleration of Islamic fundamentalist
groups. Copts charged that Sadat largely ignored
Islamic fundamentalist harassment of Christian stu-
dents in the universities, the burning and bombings of
Coptic churches, and violent personal attacks on
Copts.
The US Embassy reports that Copts believe officials
in the Ministry of Interior and many in the governor-
ates share the Islamic fundamentalists' anti-Christian
sentiments. They cite the recently retired governor of
Asyut in Upper Egypt as particularly prejudiced
Muslims generally 25X1
see Copts as secretive and clannish, a trend they say
has increased in recent years. Muslims point out that
Copts prohibit intermarriage and now claim that
many Copts do not allow their children to talk or la
with Muslim youngsters. 25X1
Muslims believe Copts are paranoid about
discrimination both in the workplace and in educa-
tional institutions.
Muslim attitudes are revealed in an old Egyptian joke
about an aspiring radio announcer who, when asked 25X1
why he had not gotten the job, stuttered "because I
am a C-C-C-Copt." 25X1
If Muslims cannot appreciate Coptic perceptions of
discrimination, many also fail to understand why
Copts are so worried about the implementation of
Islamic law. An Egyptian newspaper editor, who is a
Muslim exposed to Western education, told a US
Embassy officer that it was ridiculous for Copts to
fear Islamic law since it would free them from
military service and from certain burdensome taxes
paid by Muslims. Many moderate Muslims also be-
lieve that Pope Shinuda politicized his office, and they
agreed with Sadat's moves against him in September
1981. 25X1
In recent years Islamic fundamentalists have in-
creased the level of anti-Coptic rhetoric in their
pamphlets and newspapers. Many of their allegations
are wildly exaggerated. For example, the Muslim
Brotherhood's periodical al-Dawa claimed in May
1980 that a primary Coptic goal was to expel Muslims
from Egypt. It charged that the Copts were involved
in a conspiracy to establish a minority dictatorship
when they made demands for more positions in the
civil service and the cabinet. The periodical cited
Shintida's ban on birth control for Copts as proof of a
plot to increase their numbers and take over the
country. 25X1
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Islamic extremist groups have charged in pamphlets
that the Copts are agents of Western imperialism and
such foreign powers as Israel and the United States.
they accuse the Copts
of seeking to establish an independent state around
Asyut and al-Minya. Muslim extremists also have
alleged that Copts are receiving financial assistance
and arms from foreign powers, especially the United
States, which purportedly backs Coptic aspirations
and hopes to use them as a "fifth column" inside
Egypt.
Coptic Activists and Militants
The most vocal advocates of Coptic rights have been
members of the church hierarchy, particularly Pope
Shinuda, and Coptic emigrant groups. Additionally,
there are numerous Coptic religious and social groups
that are comparable to Islamic societies in Egyptian
universities.' Reports from the US Embassy suggest
the possible existence of secret Coptic militant groups
similar to those formed by Islamic extremists.
The election of Pope Shinuda in 1971 gave political
activists in the church a dynamic, well-educated, and
tough-minded leader around whom they could rally.
They believed the Pope should not only be a religious
leader but also the champion of Coptic civil rights.
According to the US Embassy, political activists in
the church appear to be a minority but have had a
disproportionate influence on church policy because
the Pope shares their views. Many of the 120 Coptic
clergy and laymen arrested in September 1981, and
subsequently released by Mubarak, were from the
core leadership of the politicized faction in the
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Little information is available about today's militant
Coptic organizations. In the early 1950s, partly in
response to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood,
a radical movement arose known as the Coptic Nation
that called for a separate state, had its own flag and
uniform, urged the revival of the Coptic language,
and demanded its own radio station. Outlawed by
Nasir in the mid-1950s, Egyptian authorities estimat-
ed its membership to be about 90,000,
there are no radical Coptic groups today that can
claim as large a membership as the Coptic Nation,
nor do any known Coptic groups presently pose a
serious threat to the regime. The US Embassy, how-
ever, has noted the apparent existence of at least three
radical Coptic groups including Jund al-Massih (Sol-
diers of the Messiah), the al-Karma Society, and the
Sons of the Gospel Society. Jund al-Massih is ru-
mored to be a paramilitary organization that is strong
in Upper Egypt. The al-Karma and the Sons of the
Gospel Societies were both banned by Sadat in Sep-
tember 1981, and several of their members were
imprisoned. According to the US Embassy, both these
organizations are still illegal, but there are indications
that they may be reorganizing underground. The al-
Karma Society is active principally in Cairo but also
has branches in Upper Egypt. It is ostensibly a
charitable group. The Sons of the Gospel Society is a
group of clergy and laymen active in the universities
in Upper Egypt, especially in Asyut, Sohag, and
Qena.
The Coptic Church leadership has denied the exist-
ence of paramilitary groups
DAfter Sadat's crackdown in September 1981,
however, the Egyptian press alleged that Copts were
being trained by Christian Phalangists in Lebanon
and that arms shipments were being received by
Copts in Egypt
Coptic emigrant groups in North America have lob-
bied aggressively for Coptic interests in Egypt. They
have actively petitioned the United States and other
foreign governments to cite Egypt as a human rights
violator regarding the Copts. Coptic emigrants dem-
onstrated against Sadat during his tours to the United
States in 1980 and 1981 and have placed open letters
in US newspapers calling for the release of Pope
Shinuda. In late 1982 the Coptic groups in North
America sent a letter to Mubarak demanding that he
release Pope Shinuda and return him to public life,
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that the bishops' committee established by the govern-
ment be removed from control over church activities,
and that the constitutional amendment passed in 1980
calling for the application of Islamic law not be
implemented.
The Coptic Church in Egypt has had generally poor
relations with Coptic emigrant groups. On several
occasions over the past 10 years Pope Shinuda has
denounced the activities of those groups for antago-
nizing the regime and hurting rather than helping
Copts in Egypt.
=Shinuda urged Coptic emigrants in the United
States not to demonstrate against Mubarak during his
visit in January 1983. Technically, Pope Shinuda
controls Coptic clergy and laymen overseas. Coptic
lobby groups abroad, however, are not recognized as
official representatives of the church. The US Embas-
sy recently quoted Bishop Grigorius-a member of
the bishops' committee and the leading church theolo-
gian-as stating that relations with emigrant groups
in North America were presently strained.
Church-State Relations Under Mubarak
Mubarak's personal style and his moderate political
orientation have so far been acceptable to most Copts.
Mubarak practices his religion discreetly, and he
appears to be more of a secularist than was President
Sadat. Tight government security measures since the
Sadat assassination and the official crackdown on
Muslim extremists have eased the confrontational
atmosphere evident between Muslims and Copts in
1981. The government also is prosecuting the Sadat
conspirators for crimes they committed against Copts,
including murders, robberies, and the burning and
bombing of churches.' Mubarak, moreover, has re-
leased virtually all the Copts arrested by Sadat in
1981 except the Pope.
The major point of contention between Mubarak and
the Copts centers on the rehabilitation of Pope Shin-
uda. In early April 1983 an Egyptian court complicat-
ed the Shinuda issue by ruling that Sadat's decree
deposing the Pope was constitutional. The court also
ruled that the bishops' committee he appointed must
be replaced by an interim pontiff until new papal
elections can take place. Copts received the ruling
with shock and indignation since it was widely be-
lieved that the court would overturn Sadat's decree. 25X1
the Pope's lawyers to appeal
the ruling to a higher court, but any new decision will
take several months. 25X1
The government has allowed articles by Muslim
fundamentalists to be published in new Islamic news-
papers owned by the country's secular parties, a move
that has generated additional resentment among
Copts. The two Coptic newspapers-al-Watani and
al-Karazah-that were banned by Sadat have not
been reinstated, nor have Copts been allowed to start
new publications. The US Embassy has speculated
that Coptic publications will be permitted when the
Muslim Brotherhood gains approval to resume pub-
lishing its journal. 25X1
Mubarak's delay in resolving Pope Shinuda's status
by allowing the issue to be decided in the courts
reflects the government's decision to maintain the
appearance of a balanced policy toward Christians
and Muslims. Egyptian officials believe that the
Pope's return to public life would be provocative while
some 280 Islamic extremists are on trial for the Sadat
assassination and subsequent insurrection in Asyut.
Additionally, the Mubarak government has received
mixed signals from the Coptic community over the
status of Pope Shinuda. Several conservative and
influential laymen have suggested that the Pope's
continued detention is acceptable and indicated their
concern that his release might renew Muslim-Coptic
hostilities. Nevertheless, the Coptic bishops have
made clear that they view Pope Shinuda as their
ecclesiastical leader and do not recognize the govern-
ment's right to interfere in internal church affairs.
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Outlook
Despite the current calm, outbursts of renewed sectar-
ian strife probably will recur. Many of the underlying
causes of Muslim-Coptic tensions are still present.
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The appeal of religion as a solution to personal and
social problems remains strong among Muslim and
Coptic youth. Copts and Muslims, moreover, are
highly suspicious of each other's political intentions. If
Mubarak is forced to impose austerity measures in
response to financial problems caused by falling world
oil prices, economic and social pressures in Egypt are
likely to worsen. As in 1981, a minor incident could
spark communal riots in the overcrowded, lower class
neighborhoods of Cairo or in Upper Egypt, where
sectarian tensions run deep.
One of Mubarak's primary concerns will be to avoid
any decision that might trigger sectarian violence and
destabilize his regime. Normalization of the govern-
ment's relationship with the Coptic community will
remain subordinate to Mubarak's attempts to project
an evenhanded approach toward the sectarian issue.
Mubarak will try to delay any final decision about
Pope Shinuda as long as he believes that his rehabili-
tation could jeopardize confessional peace or reduce
moderate Muslim support for his efforts to eliminate
threats from Muslim extremists. Mubarak probably
calculates, moreover, that the Copts pose less of a
security threat to his regime than the Islamic radicals.
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Appendix A
The Copts Under Nasir and Sadat
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Following the military coup of 1952 Nasir began
exerting increased government influence and control
over both Muslim and Coptic institutions. In 1954 he
set a precedent for government intervention in church
affairs. At the request of both the Coptic Higher
Community Council and the Holy Synod of Bishops,
Nasir issued a government decree unseating the Cop-
tic Pope following an internal church scandal. In 1959
another presidential decree established rules for the
papal election, and in 1962 Nasir abolished the lay
council, leaving the Pope as the only officially recog-
nized representative of the Coptic Church. After 1968
Nasir placed some 200 charities endowed by Chris-
tians under the supervision of the Ministry of Reli-
gious Endowments.
During parliamentary elections in 1957 Nasir began
the practice of appointing Christian deputies when no
Copts were elected. The tradition of appointing at
least one Coptic minister to every cabinet also dates
from the Nasir period. Often the Coptic minister
served as an intermediary between the government
and the Coptic community
Little sectarian strife and few church-state problems
were evident under Nasir, in part because of the tight
political hold his regime maintained. The Coptic
Patriarch, Kyrillos VI (1959-71), avoided involvement
in national politics and formally supported govern-
ment policy. Nasir's policies toward the Muslim and
Coptic communities generally were evenhanded. He
suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood by the mid-1950s
but also outlawed Coptic extremists who called for a
separate nation.
The impact of Nasir's economic and social policies on
the Christian community was mixed. Coptic peas-
ants-the largest group-profited from land reform
that split up the large estates of wealthy rural fam-
ilies. The nationalization of large businesses, however,
probably hurt Copts more than Muslims. The com-
pression of the private sector in the 1960s also hurt
Copts in nonagricultural pursuits by restricting busi-
ness activities and career opportunities. Copts, more-
over, became increasingly convinced that opportuni-
ties for them in the civil service, the public sector, and
universities were slim, and thousands emigrated in the
late 1950s and 1960s to North America, Australia,
and Western Europe 25X1
Under President Sadat, Muslim-Coptic tensions and
strains in church-state relations increased significant-
ly. Sadat's first major involvement in this problem
took place in 1972 when Muslims set fire to a
temporary church in al-Khankah, a small town west
of Cairo. Pope Shinuda mounted an immediate pro-
test by sending about 100 priests from Cairo to march
on the town. Annoyed with the Coptic demonstration,
Sadat refused to approve the construction of a church
in al-Khankah. Instead, he appointed a parliamentary
commission to study Coptic claims that they were
unable to acquire permits to build churches in suffi-
cient number to meet the demands of growing congre-
gations. After the commission reported that only 500
of some 1,400 Christian places of worship had re-
ceived building permits, Sadat promised to allow 50
churches to be built per year and to fund two new
churches in the new satellite cities near Cairo. This
first encounter with Pope Shinuda, however, led Sadat
in 1973 to press for the reestablishment of the Higher
Lay Council in the hope that laymen might prove a
moderating influence on the Pope and church policy.
25X1
Sectarian problems emerged again in 1977 when
Islamic fundamentalists sponsored draft legislation to
apply Islamic law in cases of libel, theft, and apostasy.
In response, Pope Shinuda orchestrated a strong
protest from the Coptic community in Egypt and
Coptic emigrants abroad. The government withdrew
the legislation but not before the controversy generat-
ed frustration and suspicion among both Copts and
Muslims. 25X1
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Thereafter, Muslim-Coptic clashes increased, espe-
cially in the Coptic heartland of Asyut and Minya,
and Islamic extremists burned and bombed several
churches. Some deaths and several serious injuries
occurred. Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric was inflam-
matory and questioned Coptic loyalty to Egypt. In
part, Islamic fundamentalist groups appeared to be
venting their frustrations on the Copts over events
such as the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Sadat's
offer of refuge to the Shah of Iran, and the Israeli
bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981
Copts were understandably fearful over the upsurge
in Muslim-Coptic tensions. Church leaders, however,
seemed to exploit and sensationalize even the most
inconsequential incidents. Pope Shinuda reportedly
warned Copts that they might have to arm to protect
themselves. In early 1980 the church hierarchy went
into retreat as a protest against communal violence
and later accused the Ministry of Interior of ignoring
attacks on Copts. The demonstration of Coptic emi-
grants during Sadat's US tour in April 1980 angered
him, and shortly after his return he launched a
scathing public attack on the leadership of the Coptic
Church for becoming involved in politics. Thereafter,
Sadat ignored Pope Shinuda and began to cultivate
Coptic laymen considered loyal to the regime. Among
these were Talaat Yunaan, a journalist, who was
given responsibility for Coptic affairs in the National
Democratic Party, and Albert Barsum Salama, who
handled Coptic issues as Minister of State for Emi-
25X1 gration and Egyptians Abroad Affairs
Church-state and Muslim-Coptic relations continued
on a downward slide, and sectarian clashes peaked in
June 1981 when violence broke out in the working-
class Cairo district of Zawia al-Hamra, resulting in
well over 100 dead and wounded. Coptic emigrants
again demonstrated against Sadat when he visited the
United States in August. The low point was reached
in September 1981 with Sadat's crackdown on secular
and religious opponents.
Before the deterioration of Sadat's relations with the
Coptic community, he had expressed sympathy for
Coptic Christians in many of his speeches, and his
economic policies benefited Copts in general. Sadat's
attempts to liberalize Egypt's economy pleased many
businessmen and shopkeepers who comprised an influ-
ential sector of the Coptic community. His conserva-
tive, pro-Western policies coincided with those of
most Coptic clergy and laymen. Additionally, Sadat's
peace with Israel and the break with the Arab states
were generally well received among Copts.~ 25X1
Sadat was also responsible for giving Copts greater
prominence in government, although many Copts
continued to claim such actions were only tokenism.
In the parliamentary elections of 1979 Sadat assured
the election of several Copts, and he appointed 10
Christian deputies to parliament. He also increased
the number of Copts in the cabinet. Butrus Ghali, the
current Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, is a
Copt appointed by Sadat who holds an important and
sensitive post. General Fuad Aziz Ghali, a hero of the
1973 war, had an unprecedented career for a Copt.
He held high-level administrative positions in the
armed forces and was appointed a,provincial governor
in 1980.
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