ZIA S PAKISTAN: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000200020004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
z n = Intelligence
Zia's Pakistan:
The Politics of Survival
An Intelligence Assessment
~~?.'sZ t/e'1
NESA 83-10090
May 1983
336
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Directorate of Secret
Zia's Pakistan:
The Politics of Survival
This assessment was prepared by~ of the
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
NESA 83-10090
May 1983
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Zia's Pakistan:
The Politics of Survival) 25X1
Key Judgments President Zia-ul-Haq faces no substantial challenge to his rule for now,
Information available although some senior Army and security officers believe public opinion is
as of 15 March 1983 shifting against him and doubt that his government will survive the next
was used in this report.
two years. Zia, however, has proved a shrewd political survivor and could
buy more time for his regime if the economy continues to grow, the
opposition remains divided, and the political initiative remains in his hands.
Zia's authoritarian regime has avoided overly repressive policies, though it
has dealt firmly with organized demonstrations. It has given the country
nearly six years of domestic stability and substantial economic progress.
Zia also has been able to deal effectively with external threats. He has
stood up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, while keeping channels open to a
negotiated settlement; he has improved relations with India; and he has
succeeded in gaining major economic aid and arms assistance from the
United States.
The President ultimately depends on the Army to remain in power.
Although significant sentiment exists in the military for an end to martial
law, most senior officers strongly believe the Army should remain united
behind General Zia, who retains his position as Chief of the Army Staff.
The Army as a whole is well disciplined and will back the regime as long as
the domestic scene remains peaceful. Zia, however, cannot be certain of the
Army's support if it is called upon to put down civil disorders, particularly
in the all-important province of Punjab.
Zia rules through a closed, highly centralized circle of military and civilian
advisers. He has used arrests, travel restrictions, and censorship to keep his
political opponents off balance. His main resistance, the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a coalition of eight opposition parties, is
poorly organized and so far has lacked both a popular issue and an effective
leader to galvanize an anti-Zia campaign. Its efforts over the past year to
mount demonstrations against the regime have failed. The Pakistan
People's Party, the party of the late Prime Minister Bhutto and the
strongest group in the MRD, remains the most popular party in Pakistan,
but it lacks strong organization and is factionalized. It depends on a
dispersed constituency of the rural and urban poor that is best mobilized at
the polls.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10090
May 1983
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Zia has marginally responded to calls for broader civilian participation by
the establishment of elected local bodies and the appointive Federal
Advisory Council, but neither of these moves has greatly strengthened his
public support. The regime apparently has been aided by the acquiescence
of the conservative political parties, Islamic fundamentalists, and interest
groups such as bazaar merchants and local religious leaders that have
benefited from Zia's policies. Support from these groups has kept the
urban areas quiet, but Zia cannot count on them if the economy falters or
if he makes a political or religious blunder.
Zia benefits, too, from popular fear that external enemies of Pakistan,
particularly India or the Soviets in Afghanistan, would exploit domestic
unrest. There is also concern in Punjab that a mass opposition movement
could unloose serious separatist pressures in Baluchistan and possibly Sind.
Given the right circumstances, however, a mass opposition movement could
arise rapidly and with little warning. Should the economy decline, a
powerful opposition leader emerge, the situation in Afghanistan somehow
become less threatening, or Zia blunder, the regime could find itself
seriously threatened. In such an event, the Army probably would replace
Zia with a more popular general who would negotiate a return to civilian
rule on terms the Army could accept. The Army would attempt to preserve
the present US-Pakistan relationship, but, if a Pakistan People's Party
government succeeded in taking over, US-Pakistan ties, as well as Paki-
stan's stand on Afghanistan, probably would be significantly weakened.
Indications that the opposition was beginning to coalesce against Zia or
that'local police could not contain disturbances would be signs of serious
trouble for the regime. So far, seriously disaffected groups in Pakistan,
including lawyers, politicians, students, and minority Shias, have not
combined against Zia, and local authorities have been able to deal
effectively with most protests. Still, recent demonstrations by students over
university issues, transport workers over increases in fuel prices, and
Sunnis angry at government concessions to Shias have increased the level
of unrest in Pakistan.
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Zia will attempt to retain the political initiative over the next six months.
He may hope that local elections this fall will provide an outlet for public
grievances and has promised to provide the country with a framework for
Islamic governance by mid-August. Zia's initiative probably will include
nonpartisan national elections, with candidates screened for their Islamic
fervor, and some provision for a political oversight role for the armed
forces. Increasing dislike for the continuation of martial law among the
public and the Army will make it difficult for Zia to renege on his
promises. Nevertheless, the sharp departure that Zia apparently envisions
from the parliamentary system enshrined in the 1973 constitution could
bring opposition, political, and interest groups together and provoke serious
protests.
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KABUL,
---.--- Administrative boundary
WAZIR Selected Pushtun tribe
MARRI Selected Baluch tribe
Boundary represental,on s
not necessarily aulhontat:ve
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Zia's Pakistan:
The Politics of Survival
Zia in Power
Over the years President Zia-ul-Haq has proved to be
a shrewd politician and has ruled Pakistan longer than
any other leader except Ayub Khan (1958-69). With-
out a political party of his own, he has relied on the
Army to stay in power, while deftly employing. censor-
ship, house arrests, and occasional secret negotiations
to keep the opposition off balance and manageable.
He has played Army politics with skill,
easing out those generals who op-
posed his policies and filling key positions with his
own supporters. At the top, he has capably mediated
between powerful policy constituencies, although his
detractors claim he has succeeded more by avoiding
controversial decisions than by solving critical prob-
lems. By identifying his policies with Islam, Zia has
gained the tacit support of key interest groups-
bazaar merchants and Sunni clerics-and, we believe,
made it difficult for his opponents to criticize him
without seeming to challenge the religious basis of the
state.'
Zia has been aided by the absence of a commanding
alternative to his rule among opposition leaders and,
in our view, by public fears-particularly in the all-
important province of Punjab-that the Soviets or
Indians would exploit internal unrest or that an
opposition movement would unloose dangerous sepa-
ratist pressures in Sind and Baluchistan. By securing
substantial economic and military aid from Saudi
Arabia and the United States, he can claim to have
strengthened Pakistan's defense capabilities without
having compromised its nonaligned status.
Over the past year, however, there have been signs of
increased impatience within key pro-Zia constituen-
cies over the continuation of martial law and stronger
calls in the country for a return to civilian government
through elections. Students, regional elites, Shias, and
some influential interest groups are seriously disaf-
fected with the Zia regime.
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he major opposition leaders believe Zia is
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becoming increasingly vulnerable to opposition pres-
M
sures.
and
believe the tide of public opinion
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is turning against Zia and are increasingly skeptical
about the regime's ability to contain possible internal
We believe Zia probably can cope with such growing
restiveness if he acts soon to schedule some form of
elections as part of a major political initiative, but he
lacks an organized constituency outside the Army and
he could find his hold on power challenged if the
economy stagnates, he blunders, or a popular leader
emerges to unite the opposition. In our view, it is
highly unlikely that Zia's leadership would survive
prolonged disturbances, particularly in the Punjab.
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The Army
Zia ultimately depends on the Army to preserve his
rule. As Chief of the Army Staff, Zia holds the
loyalty of the Army,
in extraordinary circumstances he could be re-
moved from power by the Army high command and
the corps commanders acting together. Coup plotting
by middle and junior grade officers against military
rulers is not unknown in Pakistan's history, but
command discipline has remained firm and no such
conspiracy has gone beyond the preliminary stages
before being discovered. It is worth noting, however,
that twice military presidents-Ayub Khan in 1969
and Yahya Khan in 1971-have resigned from office
when it became clear they had lost the support of the
Army.
strong initial support within the Army for the imposi-
tion of martial law has declined over the past several
years. In 1977 most officers accepted the need to take
over the riot-plagued Bhutto government, but in the
past year, middle and
junior grade officers have become increasingly skepti-
cal about the continued efficacy of martial law. They
worry that the Army may already have stayed too
long in power and faces a popular backlash that will
benefit radical political elements that want to reorga-
nize the Army and exclude it from politics.
Sentiment for a return to the barracks is strongest
among junior and middle grade officers and some
senior officers in regular troop commands
These officers would be called
upon to lead their men into the streets if the Army
were ordered to oppose demonstrators. They are
particularly angered at growing evidence of serious
corruption in the Martial Law Administration. They
believe this is undermining public confidence in the
Army and diminishing its capacity to defend the
country. They worry further that in the long term
Zia's Islamization program will threaten the unity of
Pakistan by creating divisiveness among the country's
many Muslim groups and sects.
The line officers so far have had less influence on Zia
than those in the Martial Law Administration, many
of whom have benefited directly from the power and
Mohammed Ali Jinnah,
Governor-General
Liaquat Ali Khan,
Prime Minister
Khwaja Nazimuddin,
Prime Minister
Mohammed Ali of Bogra,
Prime Minister
Ghulam Mohammed,
Governor-General
Chaudhri Mohammed Ali,
Prime Minister
Hussain Shahid
Suhrawardy,
Prime Minister
I. I. Chundrigar,
Prime Minister
Firoz Khan Noon,
Prime Minister
Iskander Mirza,
President
Mohammed Ayub Khan,
President and Field Mar-
shal
Gen. Yahya Khan,
President
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister
Chaudhry Fazal Elahi,
President
1953 Removed by Governor-General
Ghulam Mohammed
1955 Removed by Governor-
General Ghulam Mohammed
1955 Died in office
1956 Lost parliamentary
majority
1957 Removed by President Iskander
Mirza
1957 Removed by President Mirza;
lost majority
1958 Removed in coup d'etat led by
Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan
1958 Removed by Chief Martial Law
Administrator Gen.
Ayub Khan
1969 Transferred authority to
Gen. Yahya Khan and resigned
after a mass movement, Novem-
ber 1968 to March 1969, led in
West Pakistan by Z. A. Bhutto
and in East Pakistan by
Mujibur Rahman
1971 Resigned after the fall of
Dacca and loss of East Pakistan;
power transferred to Chief Mar-
tial Law Administrator Z. A.
Bhutto
1977 Removed in coup d'etat led by
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, after March
to July urban riots; later execut-
ed for murder conspiracy
1979 Resigned to protest martial
law, but probably pushed out by
Zia
under Zia, Martial Law officers have
penetrated all walks of Pakistani life, from state-run
industrial enterprises to the diplomatic service and
privileges of rule.
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thus are reluctant to give up their new-found perqui-
sites. Many fear entrusting their personal well-being
to the mercies of vengeful politicians if martial law is
ended. The Army's expanded role in Pakistani life has
enabled it to co-opt some-but by no means all-
disgruntled officers into the Martial Law
Administration.
Nevertheless, dissent within the Army over Zia's
policies has begun to appear inside his administration.
Zia and the senior generals will at some
point accept a gradual return to civilian rule, but it
will have to be on their own terms. In our view, they
are likely to insist on the creation of a Higher
Command Council to protect their interests and give
them a veto over the country's major foreign and
domestic policies.
If the regime is faced with serious civil disturbances,
particularly if the Army is ordered to quell mass
protests in its home province of Punjab, we believe the
pressures inside the Army to remove Zia will become
intense. In such circumstances, we judge the Army
will act quickly against Zia to protect itself and
prevent an opposition movement from being taken
over by radical leaders who would insist on far-
reaching changes in the country's political system
there is a
broad grass-roots desire for an end to martial law and
return to civilian government through elections. Presi-
dent Zia, nevertheless, we believe, retains the grudg-
ing respect, if not the love, of most of his countrymen.
He has performed shrewdly as a mediator between
competing interests at the top-a traditional style of
leadership that requires a reputation for piety and
evenhandedness rather than the "charismatic" quali-
ties of the political party leader.
Zia is an inherently
cautious leader who deliberates at length on major
decisions. Lacking a broad popular constituency, he
rules more by appeasing powerful interest groups on
policy issues and by avoiding controversial decisions
than by seeking confrontation. Although he has sus-
pended much of the political system established under
the 1973 constitution, he has not significantly altered
major items of social legislation inherited from his
populist predecessor. His regime, however, is quick to
maintain order and put down opposition agitation. F_
Key Decisionmakers. Zia rules Pakistan through a
Martial Law Administration that imposes Army and
other ad hoc lines of authority upon regular govern-
clear executive responsibilities can be singled out, and
Zia appears to select his advisers on the basis of trust
rather than function.
two fairly discrete
decisionmaking groups can be discerned around Presi-
dent Zia. The first is a small group of core advisers
who figure in the day-to-day running of the country.
Zia's closest adviser on
all issues, both foreign and domestic, is Lt. Gen.
~rif, a relatively junior lieuten-
ant general, has never commanded more than a
brigade and is not a member of any clique in the
President Zia also relies on Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul
.Zahman Khan, a senior lieutenant general who heads
the Inter-Services Intellieence Directorate.)
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Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Paki-
stan's top diplomat L
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Ghulam Ishaq Khan holds, among
other portfolios, the Finance Ministry and is widely
regarded as a policymaker and administrator of out-
standing ability. He is widely perceived to enjoy major
influence on domestic affairs and is Zia's chief adviser
on financial and budgetary matters. The fact that he
is also a career civil servant gives him great stature
with the bureaucracy, the "steel frame" of adminis-
tration that reaches down to the village level and
without which Pakistan could not be governed.
Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan only re-
placed Agha Shahi in mid-1982,
of an aristocratic family of prepartition India, Yaqub
has stood out over the past decade as a man of keen
political insight and as Pakistan's ablest ambassador,
having served successively in Washington, Moscow,
and Paris. Like Shahi, Yaqub has both the experience
and ability to emerge as Zia's top adviser on foreign
These four advisers are regular attendees at policy
meetings and function as an inner cabinet. Two other
advisers can be considered members of the inner
group
The most senior of these is
Gen. Muhammad Igbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee. A popular officer second
only to Zia in seniority, Iqbal has questioned some of
Zia's policies but reportedly has a key role in the
development of Pakistan-Saudi relations. The second
irregular member is Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan,
Governor of Baluchistan and Commander of the
Army's II Corps. Related to Zia by marriage and
widely respected in the Army, Rahimuddin reportedly
is Zia's choice to succeed him as Chief of the Army
Staff.
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Depending on the issue at hand, other cabinet minis-
ters and provincial governors will attend policy meet-
ings of the inner circle. On matters of crucial import
to the regime-such as maintaining order-Zia will
turn to a somewhat wider decisionmaking group,
This includes the
three other provincial governors-all senior lieutenant
generals, but without troop commands-and the
Army high command, including the corps command-
ers and senior officers at Army General Headquar-
On less sensitive issues,
Zia will ask for a recommendation from the federal
ministry involved or the provincial governor. A deci-
sion is then made at a meeting between Zia, who is
normally assisted by Lt. Gen. Arif, and the appropri-
ate cabinet minister or governor.
The Federal Advisory Council
Aware of the highly ambivalent public attitude to-
ward his regime and its narrow base, President Zia
has since December 1981 attempted to create at least
the appearance of popular participation through the
Federal Advisory Council (FAC), also known as the
Majlis-i-Shura. Zia, however, has been careful to
retain real decisionmaking authority. The FAC has no
legislative powers, but it can "discuss all national
problems" and recommend the adoption of new laws
and the amendment of existing ones. The Council is
appointive, with the President naming its chairman
and exercising the right both to call and adjourn
Council sessions.
The members of the Council represent a broad range
of interest groups in Pakistan, much on a corporate
pattern. The rural areas are represented by landown-
ers and chiefs from locally dominant tribes and
baradaris (lineage brotherhoods)-virtually all of
whom have served or have close relatives who have
served in every national and provincial legislature in
the last half century. The urban areas are represented
by a cross section of religious figures, businessmen,
lawyers, and other professionals. The major political
parties all have known members in the FAC, though
no party can be represented officially, and some
members have been expelled from their parties and
professional associations for joining the body. Zia has
kept about 70 seats-one-fifth of the total-unfilled,
possibly hoping to attract more prominent political
leaders as the Council evolves.
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In our view, the Federal Advisory Council has neither
been as ineffective as its detractors charge nor gained
nearly the public support Zia probably hoped it
would. It has functioned as a sounding board both for
government policies and public concerns. Members
have used the opportunity to question cabinet minis-
ters and to discuss a range of key issues, including the
allocation of the Indus River waters, press censorship,
and the problems of Pakistani workers in the Arab
Gulf states.
ore recently, President Zia has
looked to the Council to help frame Islamic laws on
controversial subjects.
We believe that, over time, the FAC will become
increasingly frustrated by bureaucratic inattention to
its recommendations and probably will press for a
grant of real authority. Already its members have
shown a tendency to organize into groups to coordi-
nate their demands on the bureaucracy. The largest
grouping is under the informal leadership of Council
Chairman Khwaja Safdar-a veteran Muslim League
politician and former senator.
Local Government
Many pro-Zia politicians believe the rural, town, and
municipal councils, by providing an outlet for local
demands and grievances, have been an important
factor for stability
Established in 1979, with 70 percent of the electorate
voting, the local bodies generally have functioned
responsibly, despite the fact that the majority of the
councilors originally identified with the opposition
Pakistan People's Party. The local councils, however,
have a narrow tax base and are unable to compete
with the powerful and entrenched civil administration,
appointed by the provinces, which continues to pro-
vide almost all local government services.
The local bodies could become more influential if
proposals by a national planning body that they be
given 10 percent of Pakistan's development funds are
implemented. This would allow the government to co-
opt local leaders by making local bodies channels for
patronage, but it could also cause more divisiveness at
the local level as various groups compete for develop-
ment funds. Elections for the local councils, scheduled
for later this year, will be the best indicator in some
years of the popular strength of the regime and its
opponents.
such a reappraisal may be in the offing
Zia's Fair-Weather Civilian Constituency
Zia so far has encountered only weak party opposition
and has been able to garner indirect support from
several key parties and interest groups. Support from
these groups-if only tacit-has been crucial in en-
abling him to maintain public order, particularly in
the cities. mass opposi-
tion movements that have led to changes of regime in
Pakistan have been almost exclusively urban phenom-
ena. They were composed of alienated interest groups
that, having lost in policy decisions, used emotional
issues like official corruption or anti-Islamic behavior
to arouse the urban population. Evidence that key
interest groups are reconsidering their support for the
current regime would be an important danger signal
for Zia. Fragmentary evidence including growing
criticism from Sunni religious leaders suggests that
The Jama'at-i-Islami. The Jama'at is a small, funda-
mentalist religious party influential among students,
merchants, and professionals. Founded by Maulana
Maudoodi, the leading Muslim religious thinker in
20th-century India and Pakistan, the Jama'at-i-Islami
has old links with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
and strong relations with the Saudi regime,
JI is the best organized and best funded
party in Pakistan. Its shock troops are credited with
leading the violent street agitation that resulted in the
overthrow of Prime Minister Bhutto in 1977. The
party's student group-the Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulaba
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(IJT)-enforces its dominance of student politics at
key universities in Punjab and Sind through violent
and aggressive tactics. Aware that it lacks the num-
bers to win elections, the JI concentrates on taking
control of influential professional and labor groups
from the inside.
Zia consults often with the current head of the
Jama'at, who also is a distant relative, according to
Embassy sources. Some of the President's ideas-for
example, the FAC-reflect the Jama'at platform.
Publicly, the party maintains its distance from the
regime and joins other opposition parties in calling for
elections and a return to civilian rule. It has not joined
the opposition Movement for the Restoration of De-
mocracy, however, and it has kept its student group
and street agitators out of MRD demonstrations.
Embassy sources report that the IJT has effectively
restricted leftist student groups to campus infighting
and has been the main group opposing separatist
student fronts in both Baluchistan and Sind. The
party leadership opposes anti-Zia agitation at this
time, citing the external threats from India and the
Soviets in Afghanistan.
tensions inside the
Jama'at-i-Islami recently have appeared between the
more conservative, pro-Zia Punjab Group and the
Karachi Group, which wants more active opposition
to the current regime. The Karachi Group reflects the
stronger currents of anti-Zia public opinion present in
Karachi as well as pressure from impatient IJT
student leaders who want to usher in a more Islamic
government. So far the Punjab Group has remained in
the ascendancy and kept the students under control,
although last April IJT students caused a national
outcry when they attacked the offices of two Lahore
newspapers that had criticized their organization.
The Muslim League. The League traces its lineage to
the party that founded Pakistan, but today it is a
splintered group that has local support only in those
areas where tribal leaders or influential landlords still
hold membership. The strongest of the three League
splinter parties has offered its platform to Zia and
urged him to contest elections, but it would be unable
to provide him with a credible national political base.
The League parties have the support of conservative
tribal chiefs in Baluchistan and the North-West
Frontier Province and could give Zia at least a
minimal foothold in these two provinces. Some youn-
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Party (PPP) chief minister of Punjab, hope to revive 25X1
the Muslim League, but there are no indications that
The Mainline Muslims. Given the deep divisions
among the clergy in Pakistan and the variety of
competing schools of Koranic interpretation and Is-
lamic jurisprudence, we believe that the emergence of
a mass religious movement is unlikely in the absence
of a Khomeini-like charismatic leader. In Pakistan
such leaders have emerged only on a local basis and
have failed to extend their influence to national
politics. Escalating social change and economic pres-
sures amid an atmosphere of Islamic resurgence,
however, could produce such a leader and a country-
wide movement, although we see no indications of
either. Nevertheless, even in normal circumstances,
most observers agree that the clergy have consider-
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chants, local mullahs can readily sway the urban
lower classes that are crucial to the success of any
mass movement.
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The two main Sunni political parties are publicly
opposed to Zia's policies, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Islam (JUI), which participated in an earlier cabinet
under Zia, has now joined the MRD. The ostensibly
larger of the two parties, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Pakistan (JUP), is poorly organized and unable to
enforce its will on the thousands of mosque associa-
tions that constitute its base of support, according to
most observers. We believe both the JUI and JUP
depend on mosque-level clerics for support and influ-
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toward Zia are more ambivalent. The introduction of
courts employing Islamic law and the funding of
religious schools through Islamic taxes have markedly
enhanced the economic and social position of the
urban and small town clergy. Although the ulema
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want more rapid Islamization, many observers have
noted they are afraid agitation might replace Zia with
a leftist leader. If they see the public mood shifting
decisively against Zia, however, we believe they would
attempt to capture at least a portion of any agitation
by the secular parties.
The Shias. The Shias, who constitute between 15 and
25 percent of the population, are skeptical of Zia's
Islamization policies because they fear that Sunni
legal interpretations and customs will be enforced to
the exclusion of their own. Better organized and more
volatile than the Sunni groups, Shia demonstrators
three years ago virtually closed down Islamabad to
gain a hearing for their demands on religious issues.
Many controversial issues remain unsettled, and more
will emerge as Islamization proceeds. In our view, the
government has worked quickly and effectively to
head off local Sunni-Shia conflicts, but the potential
for more serious disturbances has been enhanced by
Zia's push for Islamization.
small business activity has expanded mas-
sively during the Zia years, largely to fill the demand
for consumer goods by families with members work-
ing in the Arab Gulf states.
= more than 1 million households have been raised
above the subsistence level by remittances from the
Gulf, which total more than $2 billion annually.
Bazaar merchants were a key element in the over-
throw of the Bhutto regime and have benefited great-
ly from the economic stability brought by Zia. The
traditional bazaar associations are strong supporters
of a more Islamic Pakistan. Although they agree that
some form of elections should be held, they have
opposed agitation to achieve this end because they
fear the economically destructive effects of a mass
movement and do not want the Pakistan People's
Party to return to power.
In our view, Zia could face strong pressure from the
bazaars if government regulations and the lack of
credit resources hamper the expansion of growing
merchant enterprises, if bureaucratic and military
corruption becomes too pervasive, or if the flow of
remittances from the Gulf begins to decline. Knowl-
edgeable observers believe that criticism in the ba-
zaars of stifling bureaucratic controls on economic
activity and official corruption has been increasing.
Last June, according to US Embassy sources, the
influential Karachi Bazaar Merchants Association
sided with the MRD in calling for a general strike to
protest Israel's invasion of Lebanon-a move that was
indirectly aimed at the Zia regime.
Industrialists. The large industrial houses welcomed
the coup in 1977 that ended years of economic chaos
and a policy of industrial nationalization. Embassy
sources note that they have benefited from the relative
stability brought by the current regime but are disap-
pointed that Zia has not revised labor laws to favor
management or adopted policies allowing private
firms to expand into areas currently controlled by
These problems, together with concerns about the
long-term impact of the Soviet presence in Afghani-
stan and the staying power of the Zia regime, have
kept private investment down in Pakistan and encour-
aged the continuing flow of capital abroad,
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The Bureaucracy. The civil service in Pakistan is the
framework holding the country together. Under the
overall direction of the Martial Law Secretariat, the
civil service implements the policies of the Zia regime
down to the village level. In most cases, observers
agree, the bureaucracy deals directly with powerful
interest groups and is subject to an almost constant
barrage of criticism in the press and from political
parties-including the Jama'at-i-Islami-for its unre-
sponsiveness and corruption. Civil service support is
essential to the proper maintenance of order, and
governments-such as Bhutto's-that acted strongly
against the interests of the bureaucracy have suffered
nearly crippling sabotage of their programs from
below once their grip on power began to weaken.F_
Zia has permitted the bureaucracy a powerful voice in
secure now and that Zia is considering economic
policies proposed by Mahbub ul-Haq, a former World
Bank official who now runs the Planning Commission
and who reportedly backs stronger support for private
industry. Zia also has presided over the military's
penetration of the bureaucracy at all levels.
serving and retired military officers
civil servants
have little respect for the administrative abilities of
their military counterparts and deeply resent the
blockage of promotions that results from military
appointments. Their dissatisfaction with the military
could well be further fueled by legislation that elimi-
nates civil servants' judicial right of appeal if dis-
missed from service. While ostensibly passed to help
weed out corrupt officials, the order would also enable
the military to place compliant bureaucrats in key
positions. Currently, there are no indications of broad
sabotage of Zia's policies, but if his hold should
weaken, we believe Zia could find it increasingly
difficult to enforce his orders or cope with a growing
public order crisis.
The Main Opposition
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The
major opposition to Zia is gathered in the Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a loose
coalition of eight parties. Although MRD leaders
profess to believe the time is ripe for a mass move-
ment against the present regime, their efforts to
initiate such a movement have failed so far. Last June
the MRD attempted to exploit the Lebanon crisis by
leading demonstrations against the Israeli invasion
and then turning them against President Zia as an
ally of Israel's ally, the United States. During Zia's
visit to the United States in December, the Movement
joined with protesting lawyers in an effort to embar-
rass Zia for suspending the 1973 constitution, but, as 25X1
in June, the demonstrations fizzled and the govern-
ment placed MRD leaders under temporary house 25X1
arrest. The Movement has endorsed student demands 25X1
over educational issues in Sind and Punjab and 25X1
reportedly is believed attempting to exploit the recent- 25X1
ly announced rise in the prices of gasoline and oil,
according to Embassy sources
By itself the MRD evidently is unable to organize a
mass anti-Zia movement. Its leaders lack credibility
with a public that distrusts most politicians and is not
prepared to sacrifice current economic stability sim-
ply to hoist them back into power. To be effective, the
Movement needs an issue that cuts across diverse
interests, a leader or group that can unite the opposi-
tion, and a general consensus that the time for Zia's
exit has come. In our view, a general decline in the
economy-or even a period of stagnation-probably
would result in more active public opposition to Zia.
Many observers believe that only the Bhutto wom-
en-the widow and daughter of executed Prime Min-
ister Z. A. Bhutto-are capable of bringing the people
into the streets, but the regime has kept both under
control through various forms of pressure, including
house arrest. Although most Pakistanis would prefer
another form of government, we believe they are
reluctant to act against Zia while Pakistan faces the
Soviet threat from Afghanistan.
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The MRD is united only by a common determination
to end martial law and gain access to political power
for party leaders
It should hold together as long as Zia continues to
shun elections, but we believe it probably would break
up if Zia called elections or brought moderate Peo-
ple's Party politicians into an interim administration.
The smaller parties in the MRD deeply distrust the
dominant PPP and have failed to get it to agree to
contest less than a majority of seats in a new election.
In view of the weak response to MRD calls for
demonstrations, the moderates in the Movement prob-
ably are reassessing their earlier view that the public
is ready for anti-Zia agitation.
the moderates-most of whom
are landlords, lawyers, and tribal chiefs-have always
been concerned that their reluctance to back a popu-
lar movement would give more radical groups unham-
pered leadership over street demonstrations and hence
over the course and ultimate objectives of the move-
ment. At the same time, they recognize that some
mechanism that does not threaten the military leader-
ship must be devised to peacefully transfer power. By
organizing protests, we believe the moderates seek
leverage in future negotiations with Zia, and some of
them would accept positions in an interim cabinet
provided the regime scheduled national elections.
The leftists, on the other hand, want to confront the
regime in the streets and make the authorities employ
excessive force against demonstrations
They hope to take control of a mass
movement and keep it going until the Army is forced
to negotiate a transfer of power on the left's terms.
The leftists are more active and better organized than
nent MRD secretariat that is largely staffed by their
own cadres,
The Pakistan People's Party. The strongest element
in the MRD, the PPP remains the most popular party
in Pakistan and probably would win an unfettered
national election. Although the party lacks a strong
Nusrat Bhutto, PPP Chairman,
reportedly suffering from can-
organization and is divided by ideological and person-
al factionalism, we believe it represents for many
Pakistanis the most plausible alternative to military
rule.
The PPP has failed to rectify its problem of ineffec-
tive leadership since the execution of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, its founder and major inspiration. Bhutto's
widow, Nusrat, who currently heads the party, has not
proved a forceful leader and has failed to exploit a
number of opportunitie
She claims to be suffering from lung cancer and
currently is in Europe for medical treatment. While
convalescing in Germany and France, Nusrat has
been active in meeting PPP leaders and in speaking
out in the press against the Zia regime. Her daughter,
Benazir, is regarded by the party's rank and file in
both the Punjab and Sind as its most promising leader
and the person most capable of filling her father's
shoes She
remains under house arrest at her family's ancestral
home in Sind. Pakistani officials believe that Benazir,
as not lost her will to
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Factional problems continue to plague the PPP, and
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there are rumors inside the party o LOA-1
secret and unauthorized contacts between President
Zia and one of their number, Ghulam Mustapha
Jatoi. Jatoi, an influential landlord and Chief Minis-
ter of Sind under Bhutto, is a plausible choice to head
an interim cabinet if Zia decides to call elections.
According to Embassy reporting, Zia sounded out
Jatoi on such a possibility in 1981, but the abrupt
termination of contacts by Zia in late 1981 has made
Jatoi more cautious about Zia's real intentions.7 25X1
Benazir Bhutto has many of
her father's political abilities
participate in politics. They believe that, if freed, she
could incite a major upheaval in Sind Province, where
her father is regarded as a martyr.
According to press reports, Nusrat has appointed
Benazir as Acting Chairman of the PPP during her
own absence in Europe. The day-to-day affairs of the
party, however, are guided by a Steering Committee
composed of senior provincial party leaders.
either the PPP or the MRD can make even short-term
gains against the present government. PPP leaders are
extremely concerned that violence by Al-Zulfikar, a
terrorist group headed by Bhutto's sons, is making it
more difficult to incite opposition to Zia. Public
revulsion at assassinations claimed by Al-Zulfikar
and the regime's identification of the group with the
PPP have, according to PPP leaders, undermined
their own credibility. They believe that the wave of
violence last fall hurt MRD efforts to build up
opposition momentum before Zia's visit to the United
States.
AI-Zulkar. Since it first appeared publicly during
the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner in March 1981,
the small Al-Zulfikar terrorist organization has been
able to mount periodic incidents in Pakistan.' During
the past year it has claimed responsibility for several
bombings and the assassination of a prominent pro- 25X1
Zia member of the Federal Advisory Council. Al-
though the group does commit occasional dramatic
acts of violence, it lacks the capability to overthrow
the Zia regime. Nevertheless, bombings and assassi-
nations undermine public confidence in the regime's 25X1
ability to maintain order. 25X1
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unacceptable the organization's use of Kabul as a
base, 25X1
Ithe Bhutto brothers admit they need
Soviet and Afghan help for now but say they only
want to punish Zia for the execution of their father
and will not become tools of Soviet policy.
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become more respectable. We believe they may now U
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ZuUkar terrorist group
be aware that terrorist violence has been counterpro-
ductive and are considering other forms of political
subversion.
The Lawyers. The lawyers have been among the most
disaffected interest group in Pakistan, largely because
their professional interests have been severely dam-
aged by Zia's curbing of the courts and introduction
of Islamic law. Zia also has outlawed political activi-
ties by bar associations to keep them from becoming
centers of opposition. Former Prime Minister Bhutto
effectively used provincial and district bar associa-
tions to spread opposition to the Ayub regime in 1968.
Since last fall, prominent politicians have been ac-
cepting invitations to address the Karachi Bar Associ-
ation, and the government has responded by arresting
the Association's two top officers.
In mid-January 30,000 lawyers staged a countrywide
boycott of the courts to demand the restoration of the
1973 constitution, but this protest failed to attract
active support from other interest groups. Lawyers are
not an especially popular group in Pakistan, according
to experts. Most Pakistanis regard them as elitist,
expensive, and the product of the landed class. The
military and Islamic courts apparently have consider-
able popular support in the country because of their
quick and inexpensive justice.
The Separatists. Separatism remains Pakistan's most
serious long-term problem. Punjabis, who constitute
more than half the population and dominate the Army
and bureaucracy and who have most felt the conse-
quences of Pakistan's three wars with India, are the
group that most strongly asserts Pakistani national-
ism. Two other groups-Pushtuns from the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Muslims from
north and west India who migrated to Pakistan at the
time of partition-have had significant roles in the
government and Army, but their weight has dimin-
ished somewhat as the Punjabis have become more
assertive. Like the Punjabis, they have done well in
business and industrial ventures.
the Sindhis and Baluch have had
almost no place in the Army and only slight participa-
tion in the civil administration and commerce. The
politics of Sind has been dominated by a class of
wealthy landlords-Bhuttos, Talpurs, Jatois, Pirza-
das-that historically has seen its interests linked
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with similar groups in Punjab and the NWFP. Balu-
chistan has been a land of martial tribes, whose chiefs
worked out a substantial measure of local autonomy
with the British and whose accession to Pakistan had
much to do with the Pakistan Army and little to do
with their real aspirations.
Baluchistan is Pakistan's potentially most unstable
region, although the province has remained fairly
peaceful since the latest insurgency ended in 1977.
Tensions have been rising, however, between the
Afghan refugees-most of whom are Pushtuns-and
Baluch locals, who see themselves becoming a minor-
ity in their own province. Prior to the influx of the
refugees, about 45 percent of the population was
Pushtun. Further, the Baluch continue to resent what
they regard as rule by an alien Punjabi administration
and oppose development efforts that they believe
undermine their tribal culture. These issues provide
fertile ground for tribal guerrillas, several hundred of
whom have returned over the last year to insurg
camps in Baluchistan from exile in Afghanistan
Zia also faces serious disaffection in Sind, where the
pressure of an emergent Sindhi middle class against
the hold of a largely Punjabi administration has
created significant unrest.
'Zia and his Army have virtually no support
among ethnic Sindhis, who regard Bhutto as a hero
and blame the Punjabis for his death. The "Sindhu-
desh" (Free Sind) movement so far remains largely
confined to the student community and probably does
not pose a serious threat to Pakistan's unity.
Zia has at least the tacit support of
the migrant communities that dominate the cities and
commerce of the province. Radical PPP elements and
other leftists, however, have strong support in the
province and have linked themselves to Sindhi aspira-
tions. In our view, they could make it difficult for the
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
Islamabad claims 2,922,341 Afghan refugees were
registered in Pakistan as of the end of February 1983.
They were distributed by province as follows:
North-West Frontier Province
2,148,251
Baluchistan
706,261
Sind
19,396
Punjab
44,858
Azad Kashmir
2,360
Capital Territory
1,215
The US Embassy in Islamabad believes these figures
are inflated by an average of 15 to 20 percent. Inflation
of Baluchistan's figures may be even higher. Figures
for the Punjab are likely to increase as refugees
continue moving from the NWFP into the camp at Isa
Khel, which is one of two camps in Punjab slated to
hold 100,000. F__~
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Only in the NWFP, where Pakistani Pushtun tribes-
men generally support Islamabad's policies on Af-
ghanistan, has the demand for another partition of
Pakistan significantly weakened. The demand for an
independent "Pushtunistan," historically supported by
Kabul but never by more than a minority of Pakistani
Pushtuns, has lost momentum since the Soviets invad-
of resistance to the aims of an atheistic superpower in
Afghanistan.
The presence of approximately 2 million Afghan
refugees in the province, however, poses serious long-
term problems for Islamabad. Ties of culture and
kinship so far have kept tensions manageable, but the
Pakistanis are worried about the political and social
consequences of a permanent refugee population. In-
fluential autonomy-minded politicians in the NWFP
recently have become more open in their criticism of
orlyl
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Zia's refugee policy and the use of Pakistani territory
by Afghan isurgents. They worry that refugee and
insurgent groups will support the Islamic party that
backs Zia. Although a manifestation of growing
concern among Pakistani Pushtuns, we believe their
political activities will increase tensions between refu-
gees and locals
Soviet Subversion
Pakistan's leaders have become increasingly con-
cerned about external support for subversion inside
NWFP Governor Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq told high
US officials that the Soviets had stepped up their
efforts to arouse disaffection against Islamabad in the
tribal areas, making 1982 the most difficult of the
past five years in maintaining order along the frontier
with Afghanistan
Although Kabul has long been involved with Pushtun
and Baluch separatists, the reported increase in Soviet
and Afghan activity in the NWFP probably is largely
a result of Soviet intelligence requirements generated
by the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, howev-
er, Moscow and Kabul may hope to gain leverage with
Islamabad by stirring up traditional tribal rivalries,
fomenting discord among refugees and locals, and
encouraging opposition activity by students and trade
Moscow also maintains contacts with leftist opposition
groups, particularly in Karachi, where the Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy appears strongest
and where leftist labor unions have significant sup-
port. Some moderate MRD leaders have told Ameri-
can diplomats they believe the Soviets have helped
finance leftists in the MRD and are encouraging them
to become better organized and more active. These
include the radical wing of the Pakistan People's
Baluch separatism is also a potential issue for Soviet
exploitation, although rumors of Soviet involvement
remain unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the chief of the
most powerful and militant Baluch tribe, Sardar
Khair Bakhsh Marri, has been in Kabul for more than
guerrillas by themselves cannot defeat the Pakistan
Army, we believe that a renewed insurgency with
Soviet and Afghan assistance would put Islamabad
under severe pressure
Outlook for Zia
Probably the most important factor that will affect
the stability of the Zia regime in the next two years
and beyond is the economy. If it falters, key groups,
such as the bazaar merchants, may shift their support
away from Zia. We believe that economic stagnation
or decline, because it would frustrate strong expecta-
tions, could create the broad discontent that opposi-
tion parties and interest groups need to organize an
anti-Zia mass movement. In addition, the public could
become more conditioned to the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and less disposed to support the regime
in power.
Zia clearly has benefited from the economy's strong
performance under his rule-the result of good har-
vests, stable economic policies, the increased security
of private ownership, and a steady flow of worker
remittances from abroad. His cautious economic poli-
cies, however, may not continue to produce growth in
the years immediately ahead, and the possibility of an
economic downturn cannot be ruled out. F_
Pakistan's external financial position
remains dangerously dependent on world crop prices
Party, which probably has links to Al-Zulfikar.
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The economy continued its favorable progress last
year, growing by 6.1 percent. Industrial growth led
the way with 12.1 percent, but the agricultural sector
also registered a gain, growing by 3 percent. The key
ingredients of this successful performance have been
favorable trends in:
? Weather and international prices for Pakistan's
exports.
? Commercial borrowing on the international capital
markets.
? Inflows of foreign concessional aid and workers'
remittances.
? Capacity expansion in public-sector industry and
acreage expansion in agriculture.
? Adequate financial management under President
Zia over the last five years.
Prospects for continued, rapid economic growth are
uncertain at best, however, because:
? World demand and prices for Pakistan's key agri-
cultural exports have begun to decline, lowering the
expected growth in export earnings.
? The rate of growth in workers' remittances has
slowed.
? Pakistan is already using virtually all of its cultiva-
ble land.
and the vagaries of workers' remittances. Price in-
creases are a growing concern to the common man,
and, we believe, Zia's policy of reducing subsidies for
food and energy-if it goes far enough-could be
exploited in the potentially volatile urban areas by the
opposition parties.
Zia's position also will depend on how well he stays
ahead of demands for elections and an end to military
rule. These pressures, we believe, will grow as Paki-
stan completes its sixth year under martial law this
summer. Some observers believe that the longer Zia
maintains the status quo without assuming the politi-
cal initiative, the more difficult it will be to ease
control without an explosion. Last year, President Zia
eased restrictions on the press but quickly reimposed
censorship after newspapers printed opposition state-
ments severely criticizing the regime for corruption,
? Politically popular showcase industrial projects
initiated under the former regime are nearing com-
pletion. Zia, however, is committed to major West-
ern creditors and to invest public funds in any new
public enterprises. 25X1
? The prospects for large-scale private industrial
investment for new projects are bleak.
? Net concessional foreign aid inflows are declining,
owing to a massive foreign debt service liability
The continuation of structural problems in key areas
of the economy probably will result in another period
of economic decline, unless there is a substantial
pickup in net inflows of foreign aid and workers'
remittances:
? A heavy oil import bill, together with a slower 25X1
growth in workers' remittances and export earnings
will keep Pakistan's balance of payments tight for
some time.
? New foreign loans are required not only for devel-
opment purposes but also to repay old loans that
will reach the amortization stage and become due
for repayment in the next few years.
its failure to maintain order, and its continued imposi-
tion of martial law.
The President has promised a scheme for "Islamic
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by-step grant of legislative authority to the Federal
Advisory Council. It may also set the stage for
formalizing a Higher Command Council-a supreme
military council to oversee the security of the state.
The plan probably also will involve some form of
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1 110-44--
This recent newspaper cartoon protests increases
in fares and energy prices. The caption reads.
"Preparing the skeleton. " The figure represents
We think it more likely that Zia will wait at least
until 1984 before calling an election, although some
might urge him to act sooner to take advantage of
Pakistan's economic progress and his foreign policy
successes. Zia does not have a detailed blueprint for
the future and is an inherently cautious leader. He
may use rumored cabinet changes to bolster his
position before introducing his scheme for Islamic
government. Further, we believe Zia would not make
major changes without first positioning Lt. Gen.
Rahimuddin Khan to succeed him as Chief of the
Army Staff.
External events might also be exploited by opponents
of Zia. Although any direct military pressure on
Pakistan, either by the Soviets from Afghanistan or
the Indians, probably would work to strengthen the
regime unless Zia somehow blundered, the US-Paki-
stan relationship could be more problematic. Zia has
been bolstered by the economic assistance and mili-
tary sales agreement with the United States. He can
claim to have begun the most significant upgrading of'
Pakistan's defense capabilities in 20 years.
Pakistanis generally support
the new relationship for the security it provides
against external threats, but most are skeptical of the
durability of US commitments and know that the
United States will not assist Pakistan against an
Indian attack. Should the relationship falter over US
nuclear concerns or the package either fail in Con-
gress or emerge much reduced, we believe that Zia's
position both with the public and the elites will be
significantly undermined.
An Alternative Scenario
It is possible that President Zia's plan for Islamic
government will be insufficient to contain growing
opposition to Army rule. Zia, who has maintained
martial law longer than any other military ruler in
Pakistan, may find it impossible to loosen political
restraints without losing control of the pace of events.
Moreover, a decision to replace the 1973 constitution
with an "Islamic system" could rapidly focus opposi-
tion to the current regime. Although all the elements
are present to a degree, we do not see the mix of
issues, leadership, and intense public discontent that
we believe would be necessary for a mass opposition
movement to emerge. Nevertheless, such movements
can coalesce rapidly-often taking off from a seem-
ingly insignificant event-and with little warning and
cannot be ruled out in the next one to two years.
The chief danger to Zia does not come from the
extreme left-most Pakistanis have little patience
with Marxist ideology-but from a centrist coalition.
Because of its image and internal disunity, the MRD
so far has failed to present itself as a credible
opposition movement. In recent student elections,
however, moderate to left-of-center alliances won
significant victories, in most cases defeating the Is-
lamic fundamentalist IJT. Student politics have on
occasion led the way in Pakistan, and should other
groups-labor and urban middle class professionals-
take heart from these events, we believe Zia could
find himself under serious pressure.
In our view, should a mass movement emerge, it most
likely would be a center-left coalition of parties and
interest groups. PPP leaders probably would dominate
such a movement, using populist themes and Islamic
socialist rhetoric to galvanize mass support. Such a
movement would insist on the removal of Zia and the
Army's agreement to an interim government prior to
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holding elections. If the Army held out against these
demands, we believe more radical leftist leaders could
gain at least partial control of the movement
The Islamic right is a growing force in Pakistan and
could pose a threat to Zia, although its identification
with the regime would present initial problems. The
Jama'at-i-Islami and its student group could mount
strong street-level opposition to a government it op-
posed, but theological splits and rivalries probably
would stand in the way of a wider unity of Islamic
groups. Most Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims and, as
such, are less susceptible to the inflammatory rhetoric
characteristic of Shia Islam. Nonetheless, the Islamic
right played a major role in destabilizing the Bhutto
regime, particularly in the urban areas. The combina-
tion of social discontent and clerical agitation occa-
sionally has been explosive in Pakistan.
some influential elements of the clergy
are becoming disillusioned with the slow pace of Zia's
Islamization program and could offer the President
growing opposition.
In the event of a mass movement, we judge that the
Army probably would replace Zia quickly with a
more popular general who could negotiate a return to
civilian rule on terms that would protect the Army's
interests. Alternatively, a popular general might adopt
the populist rhetoric of a movement and attempt to
consolidate his own regime once protests died down.
An effort by conservative generals to hold out against
a burgeoning movement, however, could weaken the
Army's position in eventual negotiations. At a mini-
mum, we believe the Army would seek to retain at
least a tacit veto over Pakistan's major foreign and
domestic policies. In the longer run, the Army, even
without Zia at its head, would remain the country's
most coherent institution, and its mainly conservative
leaders would step in again if civilian rule began to
falter.
Implications for the United States
As long as President Zia-ul-Haq remains in control,
we believe US relations with Pakistan probably will
be more affected by external developments than by
internal events. Large new influxes of refugees from
Afghanistan, a. breakdown in peaceful relations be-
tween refugees and locals, or a falling off of interna-
tional assistance for the refugees could force Zia to
adopt a more flexible stand on Afghanistan. We
believe, however, that Pakistan's position would still
first depend on its own strategic interests and then on
the degree of international support it receives.
US-Pakistani relations would suffer if Zia were over-
thrown during a mass opposition movement. Opposi-
tion groups of all political persuasions almost certain-
ly would adopt strident anti-US positions. In our view,
the Army would attempt to protect the relationship
during negotiations with opposition leaders, and,
should the moderates win out, the relationship would
remain essentially unchanged. If more radical ele-
ments emerged victorious-which seems more like-
ly-both the US-Pakistani relationship and Pakistan's
stand on Afghanistan probably would be weakened.
Statements of PPP leaders, particularly those of the
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Bhutto women, indicate that a Bhutto government 25X1
would downgrade relations with the United States, 25X1
accept the reality of Indian hegemony in South Asia,
and attempt to weaken the Pakistani Army. We
believe that a PPP government probably would recog- 25X1
nize the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan, seek
more economic aid from Moscow, and put pressure on
the Afghan refugees to return home-an extremely
delicate and probably impracticable task
A regime of the Islamic right would remain commit-
ted to opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan and to
resisting New Delhi's regional ambitions. We believe
it would assume an even stronger identity with the
Muslim world-particularly Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Gulf states-and probably would deemphasize
relations with the United States, though not to the
point of forfeiting US arms and economic aid. There
is a significant strain of anti-Westernism among
Pakistani clerics, who see Western society as materi-
alistic and morally bankrupt. They would seek to limit
Western cultural influence, but, in our view, they are
pragmatic enough to realize that only the United
States has sufficient economic and military power to
counter Soviet ambitions in the area.
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