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• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 r m;, Intelligence
Directorate of
Pakistan:
Identity Dilemma and
Islamic Revitalization
NESA 83-10027
February 1983
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rE~"~E+~` Directorate of Confidential
Pakistan:
Identity Dilemma and
Islamic Revitalization
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Confidential
A'ESA83-10027
February 1983
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Pakistan:
Identity Dilemma and
Islamic Revitalization
Key Judgments President Zia's Islamization concept, which is designed to attain what he
in ormation available calls "Islamic Democracy" by restructuring Pakistan's political, economic,
as of 6 January 1983 and social institutions along more traditional lines, will weaken as the
was used in this report.
movements inconsistencies become apparent and opposition to it mounts.
Zia, a pious but pragmatic politician, will gradually moderate his Islamiza-
tion program to try to broaden its appeal beyond the growing middle class.
As long as Islamization remains on a moderate course, it will not provoke
major changes in US-Pakistan relations.
Zia will encounter major obstacles and growing opposition as he tries to
guide Pakistan on the course of Islamization:
? He lacks the charisma to spark a Khomeini-style religious revolution.
? The Pakistani population is too diverse, its special interests too numerous,
and its sense of nationhood too undeveloped for a groundswell of support
for Islamization to arise.
? Regional and ethnic differences, as well as the presence of a sizable Shia
minority, hinder the cooperation necessary to carry out the program.
? Large segments of the population-including businessmen, industrialists,
professional people, large landowners, and key bureaucrats-are resisting
the program.
? Replacing Western-style economic and judicial systems with Islamic ones
is difficult.
? The Islamic clergy, which plays a key role in implementing Islamization
at the local level, lacks popular support among villagers and farmers.
Neither the conservative religious parties nor the fundamentalist student
groups-which support the goal of a rigorous Islamic state-have the
support among the populace to force Zia to accelerate Islamization. If,
however, the Zia regime is replaced by a more conservative Islamic one, a
cooling, at least temporarily, of relations with the United States and the
West would ensue, but such a regime would not follow the Iranian pattern
in rejecting the United States.
Confidential
NESA 83-10027
February 1983
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Pakistan: The Revitalization Model
Vague and Wavering:
? Anti-Ahmediya rioting;
lack of consensus on
? Five major ethnic groups;
nature of Islam (1953)
32 distinct languages
? Nine-year struggle to
? Unsettled social and
frame first constitution
political conditions after
(1956)
partition
? Civil war and loss of East
Pakistan (Bangladesh)
(1971)
? Failure of Bhutto's
"Islamic Socialism" to
establish satisfactory
identity (1971-77)
? Implement Islamic
principles as model for
political, social, and
economic life
? Remove foreign
influences to simplify
cultural inventory
Implementation and
Communication
Adaptation
Sorting Out Changes
Koranicallv ordained
consultative bodies:
? Islamic Ideology
Council
? Federal Advisory
Council
Inconsistencies,
ambiguities, and opposition
revealed:
? Plan drawn from narrow
social and political base
? Resistance from senior
bureaucrats
? Economic realities not
met by Islamic system
? Confusion in Islamic legal
system
II I
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Pakistan:
Identity Dilemma and
Islamic Revitalization
President Zia-ul-Haq's program to achieve "Islamic
Democracy" through "Islamization"-the restructur-
ing of Pakistan's political, economic, and social insti-
tutions along traditional Muslim lines-is, in our
view, the latest attempt to solve the longstanding
identity dilemma that has plagued Pakistan since its
creation in 1947. Historically, Pakistani leaders have
been unable to find a symbol strong enough to unite a
country comprising five ethnic groups that speak 32
distinct languages. Religion was the primary criterion
used to carve Pakistan from India, but conversion of a
religious belief into a guiding principle for a modern
state has continued to be elusive. In the five and a half
years since the coup that toppled the government of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia has tried to defy the odds-
with moderate success-by gradually introducing Is-
lamic reforms to transform Pakistan into a cohesive
nation based on a traditional Islamic model
Development of Pakistan's Identity Dilemma
Vague Beginnings. Although Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
the founder of Pakistan, had successfully harnessed
Islamic symbols and slogans to forge a nation separate
from predominantly Hindu India, he was unable to
transform the symbolism into structured policies and
programs once Pakistan had been created. Students of
Pakistan believe that the harsh practical realities of
the postpartition period forced the country's political
leaders to devote their energies to the survival of the
state rather than to pursuit of an Islamic identity.
Settlement of 7.5 million Muslim refugees from India,
conflict with India over Kashmir, Muslim-Hindu
communal rioting in the Punjab, and emigration of
5.5 million Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan to
India contributed to a breakdown of law and order
that left the survival of the new nation in doubt. The
death of Jinnah a year after partition and the assassi-
nation of his successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, less than
two years later intensified the fragile condition of the
new state.
Raising Doubts. According to academic specialists,
doubts within Pakistani society that led to Zia's
revitalization movement began and grew from three
A Model for Religious Revitalization
Analytical psychologists and anthropologists theorize
that the loss of a people's identity is one of the major
causes for the widespread return to traditional reli-
gious values in the Third World today. They believe
that infusion of foreign, particularly Western, ways
has led to a serious deviation from indigenous cultur-
al values. They further theorize that the resulting
unsettled social conditions have set the stage for
creation of religious revitalization movements, partic-
ularly in the Muslim world, which seek to reinforce
group identity along more traditional religious lines.
Analytical psychologists have discovered a pattern
that both societies and individuals follow when seek-
ing to resolve an identity dilemma. Anthropologists
incorporating these psychological theories have ana-
lyzed the process, which they call revitalization, that
societies use to establish a new and more satisfying
self-image.
According to their theory, revitalization movements
strive to bring coherence to a society by eliminating
those foreign cultural traits that appear to inspire
self-doubt and by combining those values that are
left, foreign as well as indigenous, into a more orderly
cultural structure. Revitalization movements usually
portray the society's new identity in dogmatic state-
ments that, in the society's view, cannot be chal-
lenged.
Just as the original identity dilemma contributes to
social instability, the revitalization movements tend
to be destabilizing. The movements usually soften
their early dogmatic stance by reincorporating some
of the cultural traits expelled in the initial restate-
ment of identity. Thus, the final phase of a revitaliza-
tion movement is usually a balance between the
social stability that existed before revitalization and
the narrowly restated identity that occurred at the
height of revitalization.
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Confidential
major setbacks to Pakistan's quest for a national
identity (see the chart):
? The violent anti-Ahmediya disturbances in the Pun-
jab in 1953.
? The nine-year struggle to frame the national consti-
tution of 1956.
? The civil war and subsequent loss of East Pakistan
(Bangladesh) in 1971.
The demonstrations against the small (less than 1
percent of the population), but politically and econom-
ically powerful Ahmediya sect resulted in a declara-
tion by the government that the Ahmediyas were not
Muslims and not entitled to full rights of Pakistani
citizenship. The demonstrations and ensuing declara-
tion, based on the charge that the Ahmediyas were
heretics because they believe Muhammad was not the
final prophet, led to the establishment of a national
court of inquiry to determine the true nature of Islam.
The ulama (religious scholars) who testified before the
court could agree only that the Ahmediyas were not
Muslims. In our view this lack of consensus on the
nature of Islam emphasizes the difficulties that Zia
faces in implementing Islamization today.
The protracted debate accompanying the drafting of
the constitution of 1956 further underlined the nearly
intractable differences between Islamic traditionalists
and modernist reformers. The nine years required to
reach a compromise revealed the lack of any clear
model for an Islamic state or any systematic method
of introducing Islamic principles into a workable
political system. As a result of the debate, the consti-
tution confined Islamic principles to the preamble and
to a clause stipulating that no law could be contrary to
Islamic law (sharia) or tradition.
The loss of East Pakistan in the civil war of 1971,
combined with already troublesome regional, ethnic,
and linguistic differences, added to popular doubts
about the basis of Pakistan's nationhood.
A conference of leading Pakistani academic figures
was convened at the University of Islamabad in 1973
to probe the basis of Pakistan's identity in light of the
loss of the eastern wing. The participants failed to
offer workable ways to solidify a sense of nationhood
and made only vague recommendations to establish
"a new Pakistan" based on a renewed and reinforced
emphasis on Islam in the writings of traditionalists
and fundamentalist political thinkers.
Renewed Doubts. We believe that the regime of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which came to power in 1971,
failed to overcome Pakistan's identity dilemma
through a religiously based revitalization of society
largely because of the popular perception that Bhutto,
a modern secular politician with a bent toward social-
ism, was not committed to his religious platform. He
advocated "Islamization" of Pakistan's political and
economic system in response to an ulama ruling that
socialism was heretical and that the growing power of
the religious parties should be encouraged. According
to his critics, Bhutto tried to increase his appeal to
Muslim traditionalists solely out of political expedien-
cy. These charges, whether valid or not, served to
unify the opposition religious parties into a political
coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).
Bhutto attempted unsuccessfully to curb the growing
strength of the PNA by stressing Islamic themes in
speeches and by implementing measures such as
outlawing alcoholic beverages, gambling, and night
clubs. His religious opponents, however, dismissed
these overtures to Islam as politically motivated stop-
gap measures and accused him of rigging the national
elections of March 1977. Unable to quell the street
violence after the election rigging charges, the Bhutto
government fell to a military coup in July 1977.
In his first speech after taking office as Chief Martial
Law Administrator, General Zia set the tone for a
more rigorous Islamic revitalization by saying that
"Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam,
will survive only if it sticks to Islam." Thus was born
Zia's "Islamization" program.
Plan for Revitalization: Zia's World View
We believe that Zia's design for Islamization springs
from his personal experiences (see box). Unlike his
predecessors, who were members of the Westernized
elite, Zia is a member of the indigenous, inward-
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he has no great liking for, or understanding
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? Born in East Punjab in 1924 into the Arain caste, a
low-status caste of small landholders.
? Inherited deep religious beliefs from his fat her, who
was a civilian clerk for the Royal Indian Air Force
and active in religious affairs.
? Left college to join the British Indian Army and
was commissioned as "emergency officer" in 1945.
Failure to attain his military education from the
prestigious Indian Military Academy set him apart
from regular officers.
? Served in Jordan in 1969-70 as armor adviser to
King Hussein.
? Commanded Pakistan's 1st Armored Division and
then the II Corps from 1972 until 1975.
? Named Chief of Army Staff (Pakistan's highest
military post) in 1976.
? Led a successful coup against Bhutto in July 1977;
named Chief Martial Law Administrator.
of, Western political traditions.
a genuinely pious Muslim with no wish to "modern-
ize" his religion.
Zia's religious convic-
tions have grown stronger during his more than five
years in office. His intense religious faith,
has given him the courage to
he regarded his appointment as Chief
of Army Staff as an "act of God" and interpreted the
successful surgery on his youngest child, who is
chronically ill, as a sign from God to lead Pakistan
toward a more Islamic way.
According to US Embassy and scholarly analyses,
support for Islamization is centered among Pakistanis
from backgrounds similar to Zia's-the growing mid-
dle class, often called the vernacular elite, which
comprises bazaar merchants, small industrialists, pro-
fessionals, middle-level civil servants, military offi-
cers, university students, and small landowners and
clergy. This group, with its strong emphasis on tradi-
tional values, stands to gain most from Islamization
and is most eager to establish a national identity
based on a religious model. Members charge that the
Westernized elite, which had played such a key role in
supporting Zia's predecessors, does not represent
Pakistani society and is a deterrent to attaining a
satisfatory national self-image.
Unlike Iran, where the Islamic revolution has been
propelled by a charismatic leader, Zia-despite his
religious zeal-has refrained from trying to build a
cult of personality. Instead, in our opinion, he believes
that the Islamic model has universal appeal in Paki-
stan and that the country can be transformed into an
Islamic state through decree and institution building
(see table 1).
Implementing Revitalization: The IIC and the FAC
Zia has organized two institutions-the Islamic Ideol-
ogy Council (IIC) and the Federal Advisory Council
(FAC)-to facilitate the transition to a new Islamic
order. Shortly after he ousted Bhutto in 1977, Zia
? Assumed the presidency in September 1978.
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Table I
Pakistan: Status of Islamization
Islamic prohibitions Bans alcoholic beverages, night In force Designed to "cleanse" Pakistan so-
clubs, usury, Western dress by gov- ciety of foreign influences.
ernment workers, gambling; advo-
cates seclusion of women.
Huhud ordinances Prescribes punishments for certain Proclaimed in 1977 Punishments not yet upheld by
crimes according to the Koran, such higher civil courts. Shariat court
as stoning to death for adultery, ruled stoning un-Islamic, but decree
amputation of a limb for thievery. could be reversed.
Five daily prayers, one of "five In force Government offices break for pray-
pillars of Islam." ers; department heads lead prayers.
Shariat courts to try all cases Civil and criminal cases to be tried In progress Any Muslim citizen can challenge
Friday replaces Sunday as Friday is traditional Muslim holi- In force
weekly holiday day.
any law as being un-Islamic under
shariat system; ulama (Islamic
scholars) to sit on bench; courts to
operate without lawyers.
Businesses are free to stay open on
Friday but must close for noon
prayer and mosque attendance.
Urdu declared national Ian- Urdu replaces English as language In force slow process: bureaucrats and edu-
guage of government, education, and mass cational leaders trained in English;
communications. measure seen as step backward by
Westernized elite.
Daawa-Islamic education Spread message of Islam. Promulgated June 1982 $1 million to be spent to teach
principles of Islam in schools and
universities.
Qarz-e Hasna Financial assistance to promising In force
indigent students.
Create national and Islamic Create new education curricula and In progress
identity textbooks based on Islamic model.
Zakat Compulsory alms tax for the poor, In force
one of "five pillars of Islam," intro-
duced nationally on small scale.
$500,000 initially earmarked; to be
increased to $1.5 million in 1982-
83.
Progress expected to be slow; no
consensus of view on Islam.
Mandatory zakat of 2.5 percent per
annum levied on all institutional
savings of $100 or more; raised to
$200 in 1981. Through March 1982
total collections of $160 million
distributed to orphans, widows,
handicapped, disabled, and poor
students. Shia Muslims, whose in-
terpretation of zakat differs from
new law, are exempt.
Ushr Tax on agricultural produce. In effect with winter To be collected from landholders;
1982/83 crop tax to be 5 percent of value of
produce (less 10 to 25 percent cost of
production); non-Muslims, non-
Pakistanis, those who receive zakat,
and those who produce less than 5
wasqus (about 430 pounds) are
exempt.
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Table I (continued)
Interest-free working capital loans
to be provided.
Leasing and "hire purchase" Interest-free investment instrument
introduced to open industrial invest-
ment to persons of limited means.
Small Business Finance Provides financial assistance con-
sistent with Islamic principles of
finance to small industrial concerns.
New measure June 1982 A "temporary partnership" be-
tween customer and bank; profits to
be distributed, after payment of
management fee, to customer ac-
cording to ratio agreed on by both
parties.
rent for use of industrial equipment;
under hire purchase, payment in-
cludes portion for acquisition of
ownership as well as rent.
Currently provides up to $15,000 to
industrial concerns with assets up to
$50,000. Loan limit is to be raised
to $50,000 with assets of $150,000.
reinstituted the Islamic Ideology Council, which had
been established by the constitution of 1973, as the
principal instrument to implement, institutionalize,
and give sanction to Islamization. Zia charged the
IIC, which has no power to enforce its recommenda-
tions, with the following tasks:
? To steer the country in the path of correct Islamic
practices in all fields.
? To test current legal statutes for their conformity
with Islamic law and practice.
? To advise the government on those laws and prac-
tices that would implement a truly Islamic society.
The IIC has taken stands on religious issues independ-
ent of-and often in conflict with-President Zia
which, in our opinion, impairs its effectiveness as a
revitalization tool. We believe that its independent
views, well to the right of Zia's more pragmatic
approach to an Islamic state, have gained it a reputa-
tion within the government for making radical politi-
cal, economic, and social recommendations that would
require revolutionary change to implement. Zia, ac-
cording to Pakistani press reports, has rejected some
IIC recommendations:
? An Islamic political system that would have permit-
ted opposition political parties.
? The plan for a national education system.
The 350-seat Federal Advisory Council, which ful-
filled Zia's pledge to convene a representative consul-
tative body, first met in January 1982. It is, as Zia
said in a speech inaugurating the Council, an interim
body designed to encourage the building of his
planned "Islamic Democracy" and eventually facili-
tate the transition to civilian rule. It, like the IIC, has
no legislative authority.
he FAC lacks the independent creden-
tials of the IIC and merely endorses proposals. Em-
bassy reporting indicates that its membership is
composed of Zia's allies and that members are either
from the right of center or are from the moderate
ranks of the old Pakistan People's Party. Religious
figures outnumber all other categories of members,
but large landowners and tribal leaders also have
disproportionately large representation. Leftists have
been excluded, and potential opposition groups such
as labor leaders, journalists, and lawyers have only
token representation.
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Highlights of the Islamic Ideology Council's
Recommendations for an Islamic Political System
? Adult franchise should be pro-Islamic.
? Female franchise should be allowed, provided wom-
en observing purdah may designate a proxy.
? Rights of non-Muslims to vote should be forfeited if
they act in a manner derogative to Islam or the
Islamic state.
? Political parties should be allowed, but only if they
demonstrate firm faith in Islam and the ideology of
Pakistan.
? Government should be federal; regional divisions
should be elevated to provincial status in order to
"do away with political prejudices."
? The president should be male, Muslim, sane, and at
least 40. He may serve up to three five-year terms.
? Legislative powers should rest with a National
Assembly made up of 60 elected members, 25
representing trades and professions, 15 chosen by
the president, and seats guaranteed for non-
Muslims.
? The president should be bound by the Assembly's
In our opinion, the FAC is clearly under the thumb of
Zia, but his claim that the Council represents the
Koranic injunction for consultation between leaders
and followers helps to legitimize his martial law
regime. The FAC gives the appearance of representa-
tive government without the danger of the people's
actually making or enforcing decisions. The Islamic
nature of the FAC is emphasized in news coverage by
the government-controlled Pakistan Times]
In addition to the shortcomings of the IIC and the
FAC in carrying out their missions, we believe that
other cracks in Islamization are beginning to show as
the economic and social programs based on an Islamic
model are put into practice.
Adaptation: Opposition and Inconsistencies Revealed
We believe that Pakistan's revitalization through
Islamization has reached the stage labeled by anthro-
pologists as "adaptation," which characteristically
occurs when a society, upon implementing the revital-
ization plan and discarding foreign institutions and
values, begins to uncover inconsistencies and gaps in
the plan. On the basis of the theoretical revitalization
model, the patterns of other revitalization movements,
and events unfolding in Pakistan, we expect Zia to
encounter major obstacles and growing opposition as
he tries to guide Pakistan through this process of
The Opposition. The chief opposition to Islamization
comes from the formerly powerful elite-bureaucrats,
businessmen, industrialists, lawyers, large landown-
ers, and Westernized women-who not only are losing
their political influence but believe that they stand to
lose their wealth and customary lifestyle as well.
According to US Embassy reporting, most members
of this group are nonpracticing Muslims who resent
the restrictions such as the prohibition of alcohol that
Islamization has already imposed on their behavior.
According to Embassy reporting, the Westernized
women are among the most vocal opponents of the
restrictions-such as limiting women to teaching or
nursing-that Islamization has introduced.
The US Embassy does not believe that Zia can count
on even the tacit support of religious conservatives.
The Embassy, as well as Pakistani academic sources,
believes that Zia's policies fall far short of the
conservatives' goals for an Islamic state and that,
consequently, the Islamic parties may increasingly
move into open opposition to the regime in order to
assert leadership over the masses and fundamentalist
student groups. Left-of-center political parties and
Shias form other significant centers of opposition to
We believe that the bureaucracy is one of the major
obstacles to attainment of a state based on Islamic
principles. It has tried to curb the influence of the
religious conservatives-the IIC and the religious
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(onttdential
parties-in order to head off challenges to its own
political hegemony and, we believe, with at least Zia's
tacit approval, to bar a more radical road to Islamiza-
tion. According to Embassy reporting, a group of
senior bureaucrats under the leadership of Finance
and Planning Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan has
slowed the pace of Islamization by obstructing IIC
proposals. Ishaq's
reluctance to enforce zakat (the Islamic alms tax) and
an interest-free banking system ensures that both
measures will fail.
Islamic Economics: Ideals Meet Reality. In our view,
the three key ingredients of an Islamic economic
system that have already been introduced on a small
scale as part of Islamization-zakat, ushr (tax on
farm production), and interest-free banking-would
all pose severe drawbacks if they formed the basis of a
contemporary economic system:
? The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that Paki-
stanis already complain that zakat is regressive and
that wealthy Pakistanis are able to avoid payment
by circumventing the collection system. We believe
that even pious Muslims who agree with the concept
of zakat would resist paying compulsory zakat
administered by local bureaucrats because they
believe that it should be given voluntarily.
? Government officials at both national and provincial
levels are skeptical that ushr can be implemented as
an official government tax:
- The officials point out that replacement of the
present land revenue system by a locally adminis-
tered tax would remove national and provincial
government influence at the village level.
Local committees, lacking the statistical data to
calculate the tax, would be unable to allocate the
ushr payments equitably.
- Local groups would feud over the value of crops
and amounts to be paid for ushr.
? According to Embassy reporting, the experiment
with interest-free banking, which began in 1980, is
already faltering. The amount deposited in profit-
and-loss-sharing accounts has leveled off at about
35 percent of total bank deposits, foreign as well as
Pakistani, in the country. (Since foreign banks are
not required to conform to Islamic laws, they have
been thriving.)
Confusion in the Legal System. We believe that
replacement of the present Western-style judicial
system with an Islamic system of justice, as envi-
sioned under Islamization, would encounter opposi-
tion from the legal establishment. The legal establish-
ment, according to Embassy and press accounts,
scorns the shariat court system, shies away from
Islamic legal reforms, and seeks to legitimize existing
Western-style practices and codes by reinterpreting
Islamic law. The courts have resisted imposing Islam-
ic punishments such as lashings, amputations, and
.tonings for criminal offenders.
Even if this judicial change was accomplished, we
expect that the lack of restrictions on cases tried by
the shariat court would lead to confusion, legal bottle-
necks, and to an overloaded system. The shariat
courts have the authority to rule on the petition of any
citizen on the repugnancy to Islam of any law except
the constitution.
Antimullah Feelings. In our opinion, the rise of the
village mullah (Muslim clergy), whose power has been
heightened by Islamization, will ultimately work
against Islamization. The mullahs, according to many
observers, have never been popular. Farmers and
villagers regard them as puppets of the landlords and
parasites on the local community. Since features of
Islamization at the local level such as zakat distribu-
tion and enforcement of codes of behavior are influ-
enced by the mullah, we expect that the movement
could backfire as the unpopular clergy tries to exert
more control.
Regional Rivalries.' We expect regional and ethnic
rivalries, which remain a major factor in Pakistan's
identity dilemma, to hinder the cooperation necessary
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to carry out Islamization. Resentment of Punjabi
domination of the government has often been ex-
pressed by the minority groups (principally Sindhis,
Baluch, and Pushtuns). According to academic
sources, Islamization is seen by the minorities as one
more move by the Punjabis (who comprise 55 percent
of the population) to maintain the dominant political
role that they have held since the birth of Pakistan.P
Sunni-Shia Secular Differences. We believe that
traditional Muslim sectarian tensions will continue to
work against successful Islamization. Tensions be-
tween the Sunnis and Shias, who comprise less than
10 percent of the total Pakistani population, have
often erupted into violence. According to Embassy
reporting, although the Shias support in principle
Zia's moves toward a more Islamic state, they believe
that the Sunni-dominated government discriminates
against them, fear that Islamization will have a Sunni
bias, and have already resisted many of the points of
Islamization:
? According to the Embassy, the Shias staged protest
demonstrations against zakat in Islamabad in 1980
on the grounds that their beliefs did not oblige them
to pay the state-sponsored tax. They have since been
exempted from zakat.
? The Shias have also been exempted from ushr,
although they did not actively lobby against it.
? Shias complain that they are underrepresented on
the Federal Advisory Council and on the Islamic
Ideology Council, according to Embassy reporting.
? Shias claim that they have been unable to express
their religious views on radio or television and that
the media offend their religious sensitivities. Their
dissatisfaction on this issue sparked a massive pro-
test in Islamabad in July 1980.
Conservative Disarray
There are two conservative segments of society-the
religious parties and the fundamentalist student
groups-that support Islamization and normally
would be major factors in favor of its success. Both,
however, support a more rigorous model for an Islam-
ic state than Zia and a more radical approach to
achieve it, and we believe that Zia sees them as more
a detriment than a help in achieving his Islamization
In our view, disarray among conservative religious
parties, which have long advocated establishment of
an Islamic state, hinders Islamization because they
are unable to agree among themselves on how to
attain their common goal (see table 2). They all oppose
foreign influence and advocate broader use of the
sharia, but none has set forth an explicit model for an
Islamic state nor plans on how to attain it.
We also believe that the rightwing students, who
would prefer a tougher Islamization program, lack the
organization and support to do much about it. Our
Embassy reports that a number of fundamentalist
students regard Zia's regime as being un-Islamic and
that they believe that Zia has been exploiting Islam
for his own political purposes by announcing plans to
introduce Islamic measures and then implementing
them only superficially or not at all.
he students are fragmented re-
gionally and polarized politically, split about equally
between the right and left. The Islami Jamiat Tulaba
(IJT), the best organized and potentially the most
troublesome group, has been restrained by pro-Zia
leaders in the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), its parent political
We believe that the IJT's recent success in campus
elections indicates that the organization has consider-
able attraction for many of Pakistan's young elite. It
dominates most campuses in the Punjab and has
shown its determination to hold power by stockpiling
weapons, intimidating political opponents and univer-
sity administrators, and fixing student elections. De-
spite its attraction among the students, we believe the
IJT lacks an issue that would galvanize off-campus
support unless Zia retreated significantly on Islamiza-
tion and lost the support he currently eniovs from the
vernacular middle class.
Outlook
We do not believe that President Zia will be able to
resolve Pakistan's identity dilemma through Islamic
revitalization. In our view, the Pakistani population is
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Table 2
Pakistan: Major Islamic Parties and Sects
Parties
Jamiat-ul-i-Islam (JUI)
Ideological/Theological
Leanings
Membership composed of orthodox Sunnis Appears to be strongest among tribes.
of Hanafi school.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) Emphasis on mystical elements of Islam Broad following among uneducated rural and urban
Advocates return to Koran and traditions Smallest of Islamic parties; greatest suppport from
of the Prophet and first four Caliphs; "vernacular elite": believed to be loosely tied to
doctrine consistent with extremist Wahabis Muslim Brotherhood in other Islamic countries:
of Hanbali school. alleged to receive financial support from Saudi
Arabia.
Sects
Ahl-e-Hadis
Attracts young elite; well organized, has denurnstrat-
cd willingness to confront authorities: 7ia government
appears to have no effective control over LIT.
Most puritanical of Pakistani sects; advo- Not politically active, but has place on Islamic
cates strict application of Koran and tradi- Ideology Council and representation on Federal Advi-
tions of the Prophet. sort' Council equal to JUL JUP, and JI.
Seeks moderate Islamic course between Not politically active, but has seat on Islamic Ideology
puritanical Ahl-c-Hadis and Hanafi ortho- Council.
doxy
tco diverse, its special interests too numerous, and its
sense of nationhood too undeveloped for a groundswell
of support to arise. We believe that resistance to the
elements of Islamization that have already been initi-
ated such as zakat, ushr, interest-free banking, and
traditional dress in government offices indicates the
problems that Zia will encounter if he continues to
promote the program. Pakistan's difficulties in estab-
lishing a cohesive national identity over the course of
its 35-year history support our thesis that Zia faces
major obstacles in tying national identity to an Islam-
ic model.
While we agree with other observers that Islamization
enjoys strong appeal among Pakistan's vernacular
Supports Islamization with reservations; antagonistic
toward three leading religious parties, each of which
exploits anti-Shia prejudices among Sunnis.
middle class, we believe that this group is not yet
strong enough to parlay its support into political
power. We expect resistance from other groups within
the society-ranging from Westernized elites and
bureaucrats to peasants-to continue to work against
implementation of all or specific facets of Islamiza-
tion and to dampen Zia's hopes for creation of an
"Islamic Democracy."
Although their influence is ebbing, we expect the
Westernized elite and the upper echelon of the bu-
reaucracy to continue to lead the opposition to Islam-
ization. Members of these groups have traditions
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deeply rooted in British intellectual and legal institu-
tions and see Islamization as a threat to their inter-
ests. The bureaucracy has already dragged its feet in
implementing many of the measures of Islamization,
and we expect no change in its attitude.
Even though we project a dim future for Islamization
as perceived by Zia, we nonetheless believe that he
will continue to press for additional measures to mold
Pakistan to his design for an "Islamic Democracy."
We believe that his own religious convictions as well
as support and pressure from the vernacular middle
class and conservative groups such as the students will
keep him on this course. For this reason and because
of the ripple effects of the worldwide Islamic "resur-
gence," we expect Pakistan to continue to incorporate
more Islamic ways and institutions into its political
and economic fabric for the foreseeable future. We do
not believe, however, that these changes will trigger
widespread support for an Iranian-style Islamic revo-
We do not believe that either the conservative reli-
gious parties or the rightwing students have the
organization or support to overthrow Zia, let alone to
follow an Iranian model to achieve an Islamic state.
In our view, Zia would have to falter dramatically on
his Islamization course to unify rightwing opposition
and to galvanize support from other groups that
currently support Islamization. We also expect that
opposition from the Westernized segment of society as
well as Pakistan's undeveloped sense of nationhood
would work against the replacement of the Zia regime
In our view, a moderate course to a more Islamic
society would not necessarily trigger changes in Paki-
stan's foreign policy detrimental to the West. We
would expect, however, a cooling of relations with all
non-Muslim countries as Pakistan establishes its Is-
lamic credentials and builds closer ties with other
Muslim states. As long as the United States maintains
good relations with key Muslim countries, particular-
ly with Saudi Arabia, and avoids a high profile in
Pakistan, we would not expect the evolution of a more
Islamic society in Pakistan to impair Islamabad's
relations with the United States.
Pakistan Versus Iran:
The Basic Differences
In addition to the factors that prevent a successful
identity renewal through religious revitalization, we
believe that four other social and economic features
of Pakistan distinguish it from prerevolutionary Iran
and work against a successful Islamic revolution
along the Iranian model:
? Religious groups in Pakistan are more divided-
both between and within the Sunnis and Shias-
than in Iran.
? Pakistan has no religious or spiritual capital, such
as Qom in Iran, to concentrate religious dissent.
? Zia, unlike the Shah, is from the lower middle
class and understands the values and needs of the
shopkeepers, government servants, minor clerics,
and other members of this class. Unlike their
Iranian counterparts who provided the muscle for
the revolution, they have benefited from Pakistan's
economic development and support the regime.
? Pakistan's economic development and accompany-
ing cultural change have been neither as far reach-
ing nor as threatening to the traditional classes as
they were under the Shah.
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