SPAIN: REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000200020003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Spain:
Regional Autonomy
and Political Stability
State Dept. review completed
Confidential
EUR 83-10123
CR 83-11847
May 1983
Copy 360
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Directorate of uontiaential
Spain:
Regional Autonomy
and Political Stability
This paper was prepared by
Office of Euro can Analysis, with a contribution
from Office of Central
Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean
Branch, EURA
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations
Confidential
EUR 83-10123
CR 83-11847
May 1983
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Spain:
Regional Autonomy
and Political Stability
Key Judgments The peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy in post-Franco
Information available Spain is without parallel in modern Europe. Equally remarkable has been
as of 1 April 1983 the simultaneous transformation of Spain-once one of the most highly
was used in this report.
centralized countries in Europe-into a de facto federation of autonomous
communities. The Spanish experiment in devolution is the first major
concession to regionalism on a national scale in Europe since the establish-
ment of the German Federal Republic. This study assesses the prospects
for the autonomy process and its impact on Spanish political stability.
For centuries a divisive issue in Spanish politics, the regional question was
"solved" by General Franco through repression. Forty years of denying the
ethnic and linguistic diversity of Spain, however, only exacerbated regional
tensions. After Franco's death in.1975, Spain suffered a veritable explosion
of regionalism that affected not only such traditional centers as the Basque
Country and Catalonia, but also much of the rest of the nation. We view
this expansion of regional consciousness as in part a repudiation of
Francoism. Although much of the post-1975 regional assertiveness has
proved to be ephemeral and imitative, it created an atmosphere favorable
to large-scale devolution when Spain's new leaders were drafting a
democratic constitution during the period 1977-78.
The 1978 Constitution attempted to resolve the regional question by
dividing Spain into autonomous regions, each with an individually tailored
statute of autonomy detailing the regional government's powers. Madrid
retained control over international relations and defense, but was empow-
ered to delegate authority over a wide variety of internal matters to the re-
gions. Although the autonomy system on paper looked like a workable
compromise, it was implemented during 1978-81 in a haphazard and
accelerated fashion that in our view threatened to negate the political and
administrative benefits of devolution. We believe that the proliferation of
regional parties, the granting of regional status to several provinces, the
costly duplications of bureaucracies, and disputes over regional symbols
and languages contributed significantly to political instability in Spain
during the two years leading up to the abortive military coup of
23 February 1981.
The coup attempt-spawned in large part by the alleged disintegration of
the state-highlighted the perils of a makeshift and undisciplined autono-
my process. The governing Union of the Democratic Center party (UCD)
and the opposition Socialists (PSOE)-both bearing a share of the
iii Confidential
EUR 83-10123
CR 83-11847
May 1983
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responsibility for the chaotic implementation of devolution-recognized
the need to restructure the regional autonomy system. During 1981-82 the
two parties negotiated the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the
Autonomy Process (LOAPA), which limited the number of autonomous
communities, established orderly procedures for transferring authority to
the regions, limited the size and budgets of regional governments, and
created a special fund to channel public investment into the less developed
regions.
The fashion in which the LOAPA was formulated temporarily elevated
political tensions. The UCD and the PSOE nearly disrupted the precarious
public consensus for decentralization by excluding the regional parties
from the negotiations over the bill and by introducing into the LOAPA a
number of controversial clauses. Only by referring the LOAPA to the
nation's Constitutional Tribunal before it became law-thereby lending
credence to assertions by LOAPA supporters that they were not trying to
undermine the constitutional provisions on autonomy-was some of the
political tension attenuated in the months preceding the parliamentary
election on 28 October 1982.
We believe that the results of the election confirmed this trend toward a
less divisive treatment of autonomy questions. The election demonstrated
that the regional parties-even in the Basque Country and Catalonia-
have begun to lose strength relative to the national parties. National unity
has also been strengthened by a peaking of regional enthusiasm in general
and an acceptance by the right that the autonomy system does not threaten
to destroy the state. The majority government formed by the PSOE has as-
sured the regional parties that it is committed to autonomy even though it
accepts the modifications called for by the LOAPA. The regional govern-
ments and parties have responded favorably to this new, more relaxed,
atmosphere. They have dropped their threats to fight the LOAPA with
civil disobedience and administrative noncompliance. Instead, they have
pledged to abide by the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal and to
negotiate with Madrid on the still unresolved details of devolution.
We also believe that national institutions-the monarchy, the parties, and
the Constitutional Tribunal-are sufficiently strong to preserve the unity
and stability of the state. As the autonomy process is completed over the
next three to four years, it is our view that greater administrative efficiency
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and the recognition that some regions have special needs will help resolve a
problem that has drained strength from the Spanish polity for centuries.
This has substantially improved prospects for the long-term stability of the
nation's democratic institutions.
Notwithstanding this favorable outlook, there are two matters that could
set back the peaceful resolution of the regional autonomy issue. One is
Basque terrorism. Despite the acceptance of autonomy by moderate
Basque parties, the hardline terrorists of Basque Land and Liberty (ETA)
will, in our view, be satisfied with nothing short of independence. Although
the development of regional institutions should continue to reduce popular
support for terrorism in the Basque Country, we expect ETA terrorism to
remain a significant irritant in Spanish politics for the near and medium
term. The other critical issue is the military. While content for now to let
the country's civilian leaders try to find a workable balance between the as-
pirations of the regions and those of the state, the military is still prone to
equate the pursuit of regionalism with disloyalty to Spain. The military's
devotion to national unity so defined could prove counterproductive if a
regime led or inspired by the armed forces came to power. Such a
government might be tempted to reverse the Constitution's autonomy
provisions-with potentially explosive political consequences.
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Spain: Autonomous Regions and Major Ethnolinguistic Groups
NORTH
OCEAN
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-Isla ds Alborbn
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Melilla,
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France
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Barcelona'
Balearic
Sea
Balearic
Islands
Majorca
Romance Basque
Catalan
Castilian (Spanish)
- Region boundary
o 50 100 Kilometers
0 5o 100 Miles
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Spain:
Regional Autonomy
and Political Stability
Franco's Legacy: Deceptive Peace
Political friction between Madrid and Spain's re-
gions-especially Catalonia and the Basque Coun-
try-played a key role in the collapse of the Second
Spanish Republic and the outbreak of the Civil War
(1936-39). The importance of regionalism in weaken-
ing the political fabric of pre-Civil War Spain was
reflected in the draconian actions taken by Franco to
suppress regional sentiment. Even before the war
ended, the Franco regime repealed the autonomy
statutes granted by the Second Republic; only the
Provinces of Navarre and Alava-which had sided
with the General-were allowed to retain a limited
degree of administrative autonomy. Regional lan-
guages and culture were implacably suppressed. Most
ominously, Franco linked centralism to the cardinal
values of his regime: hypernationalism, ultra-Catholi-
cism, and ultraconservative authoritarianism. Before
1936, the regionalist-centralist controversy had re-
mained largely outside the bounds of the competition
between left and right. Forty years of Francoist rule,
however, inextricably associated centralism with the
political right. Regionalism became a banner under
which virtually all the regime's opponents could unite,
and devolution-for the first time in Spanish histo-
ry-became firmly linked with leftist politics.
Franco partially loosened his centralist policies during
the 1960s. Any hope he may have had that three
decades of Spanish nationalist propaganda had signif-
icantly weakened regionalist sentiment, however, was
quickly dashed. In Catalonia the granting of limited
freedom to publish in and to use the Catalan language
revived semidormant cultural and political feelings.
The Basque response was far more lethal: latent
separatist tendencies reappeared in the form of the
Basque Land and Liberty (ETA) terrorist organiza-
tions. ETA never seriously destabilized the Franco
regime, but Franco's severe repression of what the
international press described as a national liberation
movement helped to undermine what little credibility
his regime ever enjoyed.
Spain: Native Speakers of Official Languages
Basque 1.4%-
Galician 8.1%-
Catalan 16.2%-
Castilian 74.3%
(Spanish)
The extent of Franco's failure to suppress regionalism
became fully evident after 1975. The problem, howev-
er, did not simply revert to pre-Civil War status,
when only the "historical regions" of Catalonia, the
Basque Country, and Galicia had demanded special
treatment from Madrid. During the period 1975-78
voices were raised for autonomy in areas-Andalusia,
for example-which had previously shown little inter-
est in the idea. The passion for regionalism was also
part of a general rejection, noted by numerous schol-
ars and journalists, of nearly everything associated
with the defunct dictatorship. At the same time,
support for devolution was for many in the political
elite an easy way of establishing credentials as a
leftist or "lifelong democrat."
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Spain's regions can be grouped into three categories
with regard to the intensity of autonomist sentiment:
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Mass support for
political autonomy is high in both regions, despite the
presence of large unassimilated immigrant communi-
ties from elsewhere in Spain. According to a 1978
survey, 21 percent of Basques favored eventual inde-
pendence for their region, while another 54 percent
wanted some degree of autonomy. The same survey
showed that 11 percent of Catalans desired eventual
independence, and another 65 percent hoped for some
measure of autonomy. Regional parties promoting
either independence or extensive autonomy-gar-
nered 36.5 percent of the Basque vote and 22 percent
of the Catalan vote in the parliamentary election of
1977. National parties of both the left and the center
have found it necessary to grant considerable autono-
my to their Basque and Catalan organizations in
order to make them attractive to local voters.
Navarre, Galicia, and Andalusia. Here popular re-
gional sentiment is considerable, but it has seldom
engendered widespread separatist or anti-Spanish
feelings. In fact, the 1978 survey revealed only a 9-
percent preference for independence in Navarre, 8
percent in Galicia, and 5 percent in Andalusia. Na-
varrese regionalism is in part a defensive reaction
against Basque desires to annex the province, which
is partly Basque-speaking. Popular support for the
regional culture and language in Galicia and Andalu-
sian resentment of perceived economic mistreatment
by Madrid lie behind a moderately strong desire for
decentralization in these two areas.
Other Regions. We would argue that elsewhere in
Spain regional consciousness has never been high; on
the mass level it has been overshadowed by either
Spanish nationalism (Castile, La Mancha) or subre-
gional loyalties (Aragon, Balearic Islands). In most of
these areas, demands for autonomy were generated
from the top down, a product of regional elites who
feared being ignored by Madrid if they did not
clamor as loudly as the Basques and Catalans. This
`defensive regionalism "found only tepid popular
support and has proved far less lasting than even the
Andalusian or Galician varieties. But during the first
three years of the post-Franco era local politicians
exerted enough pressure, and the press sufficiently
exaggerated the extent of genuine popular desire for
decentralization, that regionalism was publicly per-
ceived as an ascendant force everywhere in Spain.
A First Stab at the Problem
During the year prior to the parliamentary election in
June 1977, the government of Prime Minister Adolfo
Suarez was preoccupied with transforming Spain into
a democracy. The election of a constituent assembly
charged with drafting a new constitution brought the
regional question to the fore. The Suarez regime
adopted a two-pronged strategy to deal with this
challenge. The pressing Basque and Catalan cases
received immediate and individual attention, whereas
.the less strident demands of the other regions were
put off pending the development of a general package
addressing the new structure of the state.
The government's first step was to grant Catalonia (in
September 1977) and the Basque Country (in January
1978) ambiguous "preautonomy" status. The "preau-
tonomy councils" thereby created lacked concrete
administrative or legislative authority, but they served
as an explicit acknowledgement by Madrid that Fran-
coist centralism was dead. Combined with the lifting
of the dictatorship's sanctions against regional lan-
guages and symbols, preautonomy at least partially
met Basque and Catalan demands. It also laid the
groundwork for negotiations between the government
and the principal Basque and Catalan regional politi-
cal forces-the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and
the Catalan Convergence and Union Coalition (CiU).
Preautonomy was only a temporary palliative; a com-
prehensive approach to the regional problem had to
await the constitutional debates of 1978. The Consti-
tution-approved in December of that year-rejected
both an explicitly federal system and the solution
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adopted during the 1930s, a unitary state with conces-
sions to a few select regions. An ill-defined compro-
mise was eventually agreed upon granting extensive
powers to the regions but stopping short of formal
federalism.
We suspect that Spain's political leadership did not
fully appreciate the implications of the wide-ranging
decentralization mandated by the Constitution. To
placate the right Madrid theoretically reserved for
itself all but the most innocuous administrative au-
thority. However, the provision that allowed Madrid
in practice to delegate a significant number of these
powers to the regions via the autonomy statutes made
possible the creation of a federal system in all but
name. We believe that Madrid's intention in granting
a unique statute to each region was to allow for higher
levels of autonomy in the more developed and region-
ally conscious areas. Government officials probably
did not anticipate that all the regions would ultimate-
ly demand the same powers conceded to the Basque
Country and Catalonia.
Over the Precipice?
The immensity of the autonomy process mandated by
the Constitution would have challenged the most
stable and methodical of governments; the Suarez
administration of 1979-80 was distinguished by nei-
ther of these characteristics. The Constitution provid-
ed a legal framework for devolution, but it was the
government's responsibility to establish a timetable
and assure the orderly transfer of powers to the
regions. In our view, the Suarez government failed to
accomplish these goals, partly because of its own
political weakness, and partly because negotiations
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Key Element of the Autonomy System
? Spain is divided into "Autonomous Communities, "
each with an elected legislature and executive.
? Each Autonomous Community receives an individ-
ually tailored statute of autonomy detailing the
regional government's authority.
? Madrid retains absolute control of defense and
international relations.
? The central government holds primary authority
over justice; commercial, labor, and civil law; regu-
lations affecting the monetary and banking systems;
public safety; and general educational norms. The
state can delegate part or all of these powers to the
regions.
? Autonomous Communities can declare a regional
language as co-official with Spanish.
? The transfer of powers to the regions takes place via
a "two-track" system. One route (envisaged for the
Basque Country and Catalonia) results in rapid
movement toward full autonomy, while the slower
process (designed for the remaining regions) phases
in regional powers over a five-year period.
? A Constitutional Tribunal exists to adjudicate
disputes between Madrid and the regions.
with the Basque PNV and a coalition of Catalan
parties over the content of their regions' respective
statutes of autonomy left Suarez little time during
1979 for the overall coordination of the autonomy
process.
In our view, the Suarez government made matters
worse by accelerating a process it could neither
supervise nor control. From September 1977 to Octo-
ber 1978, preautonomy councils were granted to 13
regions, encompassing the bulk of the peninsula. Polls
reveal that in Galicia and Andalusia there was consid-
erable popular demand for quick progress on autono-
my, but in many other regions the initiative stemmed,
in our view, as much from Madrid as from the
periphery. The motives behind these actions are still
not entirely clear. We believe that on one level Suarez
was trying to cash in on a popular issue and give his
government a fashionable leftist cachet. On another
level Suarez probably believed that a rapid general-
ization of the autonomy process would somehow
dilute or undermine the influence of Basque and
Catalan regional politicians and parties. The govern-
ment was soon faced with a chaotic situation that
threatened not only its own stability but also the
integrity of the Spanish state.
The regionalist chaos of 1979-80 had several specific
manifestations:
? The proliferation of demands by single provinces for
recognition as regions.
? Jurisdictional clashes between overlapping regional
and national bureaucracies.
? The growth of regional political parties which
threatened to undermine the national party system.
(See appendix B for a full discussion of the regional
parties.)
? Discord over the proper use of regional symbols and
languages generating political tensions.
? Demands to speed up and equalize the autonomy
process in all regions, which further strained the
system.
To its credit, the Suarez government eventually per-
ceived the dangers of the process it had helped set in
motion. Suarez first attempted to decelerate and
reorder the autonomy process during the debate on
the autonomy statute for Andalusia, which the re-
,gion's preautonomy council wanted the government to
process as quickly as possible. The government's
procrastination on Andalusian autonomy was opposed
by several regional parties and the opposition Social-
ists (PSOE). The political battering suffered by the
UCD during this dispute marked, in our view, the
beginning of the party's decline in Spanish politics.
Combined with the UCD's losses in the regional
elections in 1980 in the Basque Country and Catalo-
nia, the Andalusian autonomy conflict decisively
weakened the Suarez government. The dispute also
suggested that any reordering of the system could not
be successfully imposed by the UCD alone, but would
have to emerge from a consensus of the government
and the opposition.
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Genesis of the LOAPA
A perception in some military circles that the autono-
my process was careening out of control was widely
understood to be a key motive behind the assault on
the Chamber of Deputies on 23 February 1981 in
Madrid by disgruntled military officers. The more
politically sophisticated of the plotters made clear in
their public statements that they objected to what
they viewed as the excesses of regionalism, not to the
concept itself. The radical faction behind the abortive
coup, however, was in our view unalterably opposed to
the idea of regional devolution. But both groups
openly denounced the process as it unfolded during
1978-80 as a threat to Spanish national unity. We
believe that other factors-terrorism, the weakness of
Suarez's government, the fear of Communism-in-
censed the military, but it would be difficult to
exaggerate the emotive force of the regional question
in the barracks.
During the year following the failed coup-when
Spanish politics was conditioned by the fear of a more
successful military rebellion-Madrid attempted
again to slow down and reorganize regional devolu-
tion. The result was the Organic Law for the Harmo-
nization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA) presented
to Parliament during the summer of 1982. As impor-
tant as the coup attempt was in shaping the politi-
cians' thinking about regionalism, it would be simplis-
tic to attribute the LOAPA's origins solely to the
politicians' desires to placate military hostility toward
autonomy. Concern over the direction and speed of
the autonomy process preceded the coup attempt and
was shared by a wide segment of the political spec-
trum. In fact, the Union of the Democratic Center's
(UCD's) effort to rein in Andalusian autonomy had
begun in September 1980, when Territorial Adminis-
tration Minister Martin Villa had urged revision of
the procedures for accession to autonomy for all
regions. Furthermore, the LOAPA itself, although
first proposed by the UCD, became a joint initiative
of the UCD and the Socialists, who negotiated the bill
laboriously during 1981-82. The bill aimed at limiting
both the speed and the scope of the unwieldy autono-
my process. Specifically it called for:
? Limiting the total number of Autonomous Commu-
nities to 17, thereby halting the proliferation of
single-province regions.
? Processing the autonomy statutes for all regions
except Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, and
Andalusia via the slow track provided for in the
Constitution.
? Limiting strictly the size and budgets of the regional
cabinets and legislatures.
? Restructuring the procedures for transferring taxing
authority and administrative powers from Madrid
to the regions.
? Creating an Interterritorial Compensation Fund to
funnel public investment to the poorest regions.
There was widespread concern among both the
government and the opposition that regional autono-
my would exacerbate the already considerable eco-
nomic disparities between the more and less devel-
oped areas. The UCD government argued that these
disparities, if unchecked, would eventually generate
public resentment in the poorest regions that could
severely undermine national unity.
The bill's supporters publicly pledged that it would
not undercut the authority of the already constituted
Autonomous Communities. The Basque and Catalan
regional governments and parties vigorously opposed
the measure, however, instinctively fearing that Ma-
drid would interpret the law in ways harmful to their
interests. By spurning the regional parties' requests to
help draft the bill, the UCD and the PSOE assured
that they would suspect the worst.
To combat what were perceived as real dangers to
devolution, the Basque, Catalan, and Andalusian
regional parties-along with the Communists, who
were miffed at having also been excluded from the
law's drafting-formed an "anti-LOAPA front" in
September 1982. PNV-controlled municipalities
staged a 24-hour work stoppage to protest the bill, and
the party publicly threatened to sponsor civil disobedi-
ence and administrative noncompliance by its elected
officials if the LOAPA became law. In Catalonia vast
anti-LOAPA demonstrations raised political tensions.
By the fall of 1982 it seemed that the LOAPA,
designed to reduce the danger of regionalist-induced
political instability, had only aggravated the problem.
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Demonstration against the
LOAPA in the Basque Country
There was, however, one bright spot on the horizon.
Realizing that the bill's constitutionality was at issue,
the Socialists-quickly seconded by the UCD-pro-
posed that it be referred to the Constitutional Tribu-
nal before receiving final parliamentary approval.
This lent credence to assertions by LOAPA support-
ers that they were not trying to undermine the
Constitution's provisions concerning autonomy. The
court's acceptance of the case helped minimize the
extent to which autonomy became an issue during the
1982 election campaign.
The Socialists in Power:
Ebbing of the Regionalist Tide?
We believe that the referral of the LOAPA to the
Constitutional Tribunal was indeed a decisive turning
point in the autonomy process. It signaled a willing-
ness by both regional and national parties to desist
from mudslinging and begin a more constructive
debate on regional issues. This trend has been re-
inforced by a number of developments over the past
six months: the overwhelming victory of the Socialists
in the election last year, the formation of a govern-
ment in Madrid not beholden to the votes of regional
parties for survival, indications that regional enthusi-
asm in general has peaked, and acceptance by the
right of the autonomy system. These factors have, in
our view, created an environment in which the region-
alists are prepared to accept the assurances of the
Socialist government that it is committed to autono-
my even though it intends to implement the key
adjustments envisaged in the LOAPA. The tension
surrounding the regional question has subsided signif-
icantly in recent months, and we believe that the
autonomy process is no longer one of the chief
obstacles to political stability in Spain.
Last October's election provided the clearest evidence
of the changing mood. Some of the Socialists' elector-
al success was due to the national scope of the
election; Spanish voters have tended to give greater
support to regional parties in regional elections. Nev-
ertheless, the Socialists' showing in the Basque Coun-
try and Catalonia-where the party had been in
decline and was forecast to do poorly-demonstrated
that a Madrid-run party can still triumph in areas
with highly developed regional identities. The Social-
ists are now the premier political force in Catalonia-
with 24 deputies to 12 for the CiU-and,have pulled
almost even with the PNV in the Basque Country.
Thus the PSOE demonstrated that its support of the
LOAPA was not a significant electoral handicap even
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in those areas most skeptical of the government's
intentions on the autonomy issue. We believe that the
voters sensed that the purpose of the bill was to
modify, not emasculate, the autonomy-system and
voted accordingly.
Also significant is evidence that regionalist enthusi-
asm in general has peaked. The election slowed the
five-year growth trend of regional parties, reducing
the danger that the proliferation of such parties would
seriously weaken national political associations. In the
Basque Country, for example, the proportion of the
electorate voting for regional parties dropped to 53.7
percent from 64.5 percent in 1980, and the decline in
other regions was comparable. The Andalusian So-
cialist Party, whose emergence in the national election
of 1979 had seemed to herald an ominous splintering
of the party system, lost over three-fourths of its
voters and has been reduced to extraparliamentary
status. Furthermore, voters backed moderate regional
parties at the expense of more radical, quasi-separat-
ist forces. The moderate PNV widened its lead over
the two parties generally associated with branches of
ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskadiko Ezkerra
(EE). In Catalonia, separatist parties-never serious
political contenders-saw their tiny fraction of the
vote further reduced.
Another factor contributing, in our view, to the
current regionalist detente has been the right's accept-
ance of autonomy. The leading rightist party,
Manuel Fraga's Popular Alliance (AP), had previous-
ly lobbied to rid the Constitution of what it perceived
as the most dangerous concessions to regionalism.
During and after the 1982 campaign, however, it
conspicuously failed to defend hardline centralism
and uttered not a word about constitutional revision.
In fact, the president of the AP-controlled Galician
regional government has become a vociferous propo-
nent of autonomy and has publicly lamented the slow
pace at which power is being transferred from Ma-
drid. We believe that only the ultraright continues to
oppose devolution in principle, and we conclude that
the association of regionalism with anti-Francoism, so
pervasive during 1975-78, is on the wane. Now that
the autonomy process is more controlled, the right has
fewer worries about the integrity of the Spanish state
and is seeing that it, too, can gain from the system.
The PSOE government also has played a key role in
reducing tension over the autonomy question by de-
clining to use its absolute majority in Parliament to
ram through measures harmful to regional interests.
Instead, it has begun a well-orchestrated public cam-
paign to assure the Basque, Catalan, Galician, and
Andalusian regional governments that Madrid views
the LOAPA as in no way reducing the basic powers
already granted to these regions in the statutes of
autonomy. The Minister for Territorial Administra-
tion-a drafter of the LOAPA whose appointment
had initially angered some regionalists-has initiated
a series of what appear to us to be constructive
contacts with top regional leaders. His ministry has
appointed well-qualified and sympathetic interlocu-
tors to act as "Delegates of the Government" in the
autonomous communities. On a higher level, Prime
Minister Gonzalez has met with Jordi Pujol and
Carlos Garaicoechea, presidents respectively of the
Catalan and Basque regional governments, and all
three have publicly affirmed their support for the
autonomy process as currently restructured. In our
view the Socialist government's finesse and diplomacy
in dealing with the regions contrasts favorably with
the manner in which the LOAPA was formulated and
the disregard for regional sentiment that character-
ized the last phases of the UCD administration.
The regions have responded favorably to the changed
atmosphere in Madrid. Notwithstanding their pre-
electoral pledges of unalterable opposition to
the LOAPA, both the PNV and the CiU have now
announced their willingness to accept whatever deci-
sion the Constitutional Tribunal renders concerning
the law's constitutionality.' Talk of civil disobedience
and administrative noncompliance in the Basque
Country and Catalonia has virtually ceased. Presi-
dents Pujol and Garaicoechea have expressed publicly
their contentment with the pace of and the procedures
' The LOAPA is still under review by the court; a decision is
expected before mid-1983. Press reports indicate that the Tribunal
may find several of the most imprecise and controversial articles of
the law unconstitutional. In that case a new version would be
drafted to meet the court's objections and to mollify the members of
the (now dissolved) anti-LOAPA front. In the best of circumstances
the revised LOAPA would obtain the parliamentary approval, or at
least the acquiescence, of the moderate regionalist parties-the
PNV and the CiU-in addition to that of the PSOE and the AP
before becoming law.
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governing the transfer of powers from Madrid to their
regional administrations; all the transfers are sched-
uled to be complete by late 1983.
Outlook: Enhanced Political Stability
We believe that the flexibility recently shown by all
parties involved in devolution heralds a new phase in
the movement toward regional autonomy. Our read-
ing of the public record suggests that for the first time
in contemporary Spanish history, a broad consensus is
emerging regarding the desirability of giving Spain's
regions autonomy within certain clearly defined lim-
its. With the exceptions of the ultraright-including
elements of the military-and the Basque separatists,
no important political force in Spain today questions
either the need for automomy or the broad outlines of
the solution adopted in the 1978 Constitution. The
process is far from complete: outside of the Basque
Country and Catalonia, Madrid has divested itself of
only 10 to 15 percent of the powers slated ultimately
for the regions. This process, decelerated by the
LOAPA, will not be complete for all regions until
1985 at the earliest. Nevertheless, the progress made
so far has gone a long way toward resolving a problem
that has consistently weakened the Spanish polity in
the past. In our view, this has substantially improved
prospects for the long-term stability of Spain's demo-
cratic institutions.
In particular, we believe that political leaders in
Catalonia and the Basque Country are striking a
balance between regional assertiveness and solidarity
with the rest of Spain. It should be noted that the
slogan used by Catalan anti-LOAPA demonstrators
even during the tense months before the election last
year implied loyalty to Madrid: "Change Catalonia
from Madrid? No! Improve Madrid from Catalonia!"
Acceptance of a Spanish vocation is not so well
developed in the Basque Country, but we think that
the successful implementation of Basque autonomy
will over the long run diminish separatist sentiment.
At the very least, a functioning regional government
will have a better chance than Madrid to mobilize
Basque opinion against ETA. We believe that the
expansion of the duties of the regional police force to
include counterterrorist activity-at present it is re-
stricted largely to symbolic and traffic duties-will be
a key feature of .this process: Basque politicians have
often affirmed that when ETA shoots its first Basque
Basque regional policeman:
taking aim at ETA?F--
policeman, all but the most fanatical separatists will
finally become disillusioned with the terrorist
organization.
We believe that the more general problems of devolu-
tion are also being successfully addressed. The Inter-
territorial Compensation Fund established by the
LOAPA should at least prevent the autonomy system
from worsening existing economic imbalances among
the regions. Madrid is taking care to assure that
regional institutions replace, rather than overlap, the
national administration. There is a chance that this
process may actually reduce red tape and make the
bureaucracy more responsive, if only because routine
decisions will no longer have to be referred to Madrid.
At the very least, the transfer of government employ-
ees from central to regional jurisdiction will help
modernize the Spanish administration and bring it
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Confidential
more into line with European norms. In 1977-before
autonomy got under way-only 19 percent of Spanish
public servants were employed by municipal or pro-
vincial government, compared with an average 41
percent in the European Community. The transfer of
people will be accompanied by a transfer of funds.
According to academic estimates, the autonomy
system will eventually reduce the ratio of central
government expenditures as a percentage of total
public-sector spending from over 80 percent to under
50 percent. Among the world's major federal states
only Canada and Australia allot a greater proportion
of public-sector expenditures to regional and local
government.
A final reason for optimism is the strength of many
national institutions and symbols, which we believe
will hold in check the centrifugal forces engendered
by regionalism. Not only are the revitalized national
political parties-particularly the PSOE and the
AP-playing a role, but some regional parties, appar-
ently sensing their reduced influence since the last
election, have begun, as well, to search for ways to
increase their impact on the national political scene.
The leftist Basque Euskadiko Ezkerra party has be-
gun to give public emphasis to its class, rather than its
regionalist, character, and has hinted at closer cooper-
ation with the PSOE. In Catalonia, CiU leader
Miquel Roca has questioned his party's preoccupation
with parochial Catalan issues and is openly pushing
for a federation of regional parties designed to recon-
struct a centrist movement at the national level.
Another key unifying force is the Constitutional
Tribunal. Lack of respect for the decisions of its
Second Republic counterpart contributed significant-
ly to the regional tensions that helped bring about the
Civil War. The present court, however, has already
established its authority. It has heard several impor-
tant disputes between Madrid and the regions, and its
decisions have been accepted by all parties. We
believe that its judgment regarding the constitutional-
ity of the LOAPA will reinforce the Tribunal's repu-
tation as a respected and impartial arbiter.
One more national institution should be mentioned:
the monarchy. Once scorned by many as Franco's
handpicked successor, King Juan Carlos has, in our
view, transformed himself into a symbol of national
King Juan Carlos and Prince Felipe:
symbols of national unity )
pride and unity. That the vast majority of the popula-
tion views Juan Carlos as the King of all Spaniards
was shown by the recent request of the Catalan
regional government that Crown Prince Felipe be
proclaimed Prince of Gerona-the traditional title of
the heirs to the medieval Catalan monarchy. Thus the
Catalans clearly see their regional identity reflected
in the national symbol of monarchy.
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... But Problems Remain
Notwithstanding this favorable outlook, there are
several factors that could disrupt the orderly transi-
tion to greater regional autonomy. In our view, the
foremost of these is Basque terrorism. Despite efforts
by the PNV and the Basque regional government to
discredit the terrorists, roughly one-sixth of the
Basque electorate continues to vote for parties (espe-
cially Herri Batasuna) linked to various branches of
ETA. Although the successful development of Basque
institutions can be expected over time to reduce
recruitment and popular support for ETA, we believe
that the hardcore terrorists and their dwindling civil-
ian allies will continue to be satisfied with nothing
short of absolute independence. The recent collapse of
the tripartite talks among Herri Batasuna, the PSOE,
and the PNV regarding terrorism has, we believe,
convinced Madrid at least for now of the futility of
pressing for a negotiated solution to Basque violence.
Spain's democratic institutions are sufficiently resil-
ient for the near future to tolerate both the existing
level of terrorism and the police procedures designed
to combat it. In our view, only rapid and significant
escalation of violence would threaten the development
of the autonomy system and Spain's political stability
in general.
Basque terrorism retains this potential to generate
instability largely because segments of the armed
forces and the ultraright could use it as a partial
justification to intervene in politics. In our view,
terrorism alone is unlikely to induce the military to
intervene in politics in the short term. However, it is
possible that a combination of economic collapse,
serious social disorder, government meddling in inter-
nal military affairs, and resurgent terrorism could
provoke a coup d'etat. Once in power, the military
might be tempted to reverse some of the Constitu-
tion's provisions for autonomy-with potentially ex-
plosive political consequences. A military-led or in-
spired regime would almost certainly alienate the
regions, thereby increasing political instability and in
all likelihood hastening its own demise.
While less dramatic than the threats posed to autono-
my by terrorism or military intervention, several other
potential threats could have more immediate impact.
Disputes may develop concerning the pace and nature
of the transfer of the powers Madrid has yet to hand
over to the regions. Less developed regions may prove
initially inept at handling their new powers. Basque
regionalists may renew their divisive campaign to
integrate the Province of Navarre into the Basque
autonomous community. The creation of separate
Catalan and Spanish school systems and media in
Catalonia could retard the integration of the region's
Spanish speakers into the Catalan-speaking elite, with
serious consequences for social cohesion.
Successive governments will have to address these
challenges as the country's new territorial and admin-
istrative configuration is fleshed out. Luckily, the
decision to recognize rather than suppress Spain's
regional, ethnic, and linguistic diversity has, we be-
lieve, strengthened Spanish democracy and enhanced
the prospects for long-term political stability. Having
successfully absorbed the shocks of the first phases of
regional autonomy, Spain appears well positioned to
see the process through to a favorable conclusion.
25X1
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Confidential
Appendix A
Regionalism in
Spanish History
After Yugoslavia, Spain is the most ethnically and
linguistically varied of the major European states.
Barely three-fourths of the people are native Spanish
speakers; the remainder speak the related Romance
languages of Catalan or Galician, or the primitive
Basque tongue. These ethno-linguistic fissures imper-
fectly parallel historical and political divisions. Spain
grew out of the free federation of several kingdoms,
and the country's 18th century Bourbon monarchs
never quashed regional sentiment and autonomy as
effectively as did their French cousins. The memory
of independent kingdoms is still alive in Catalonia,
Navarre, and to a lesser degree Galicia. And the
Basques, while never forming an independent state,
take pride in having resisted both Roman and Muslim
invaders and in having received special privileges from
the Crown of Castile.
This particularism has been a source of political
weakness and instability throughout Spanish history.
Friction between Castile and Aragon contributed
decisively to Spain's 17th-century decline; the Cata-
lans rebelled on several occasions and did not hesitate
to ally themselves with the French against Madrid.
Similar dynastic struggles, intertwined with regional
loyalties, precipitated the War of the Spanish Succes-
sion (1701-14), which removed Spain from the ranks of
Europe's great powers. Bourbon centralization
brought a temporary veneer of stability, but regional
and local sentiment reemerged during the early 19th
century. The sway of localism reached unmatched
heights in 1873, when a Federal Republic was pro-
claimed. Entire provinces, counties, and even cities
declared themselves independent and openly flouted
Madrid's authority. Only military intervention pre-
vented the total disintegration of the state.
Catalonia and the Basque Country and to a lesser
extent in Galicia. The expression of these feelings
aroused deep fears of separatism elsewhere in the
country and stimulated a counternationalism in Cas-
tile, the Spanish-speaking heartland. In fact, only
Basque regionalism contained a strong separatist
component. Catalan regionalists, blessed with a liter-
ary and cultural renaissance, were far more confident
of their identity and far less strident in their demands.
This was succinctly expressed in the slogan "for a free
Catalonia within a reborn Spain!" Basque regional-
ists, on the other hand, developed a theory of Basque
racial superiority in order to compensate for their lack
of a vibrant culture and a language adaptable to the
needs of the modern world.
Basque and Catalan regionalism had especially seri-
ous consequences because the Basque Country and
Catalonia contained the bulk of Spanish industry and
the country's first modern political parties. Basque
and Catalan demands for regional autonomy preoccu-
pied the central government during the first third of
the 20th century, deflecting attention from other
serious social and economic problems. The Second
Republic granted statutes of autonomy to Catalonia,
the Basque Country, and Galicia, but the immense
distrust between Madrid and the regions could not be
easily overcome: disputes between regionalists and
Spanish nationalists ranked second only to fear of
Communism and fascism as a cause of -the Republic's
collapse and the Civil War (1936-39).
No sooner were the centrifugal tendencies of the
Federal Republic subdued than a new challenge to
Spanish unity emerged: regional nationalism. Modern
regionalist sentiment, based more on the mystique of
shared language and culture than on the historical or
local loyalties that had fueled past disputes between
Madrid and local authorities, arose after 1875 in
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uonnaential
Appendix B
Regional Parties
in Spain
Although the parliamentary election of 1982 substan-
tially strengthened Spain's principal national par-
ties-the Socialists and the rightist-Popular Alli-
ance-the regional parties still play a key role in the
political system. Truly independent regional parties-
directed from a regional capital rather than from
Madrid-are strong only in the Basque Country,
Catalonia, and, to a far lesser extent, Andalusia and
Navarre. The national parties, however, have in our
view maintained their electoral supremacy in part
through granting considerable autonomy to their re-
gional branches. While party discipline is invoked on
major issues, the Basque and Catalan affiliates of
both the PSOE and the Communist Party (PCE) are
allowed considerable leeway on exclusively regional
matters. Generally, national parties have been able to
head off confrontations with their regional branches
by offering them special privileges or the freedom to
adopt policies slightly at variance with those of the
mother party. Both the Basque and Catalan Social-
ists, for example, were allowed to form their own
parliamentary groups in past legislatures, and the
PSOE did not force them to speak out publicly in
favor of the Organic Law for the Harmonization of
the Autonomy Process. In some cases, however-for
example, in the Communist Party and its Catalan
affiliate (PSUC)-quarrels over substantive issues be-
tween a regional branch party and Madrid have
imperiled the party's unity.
Only one branch party and one branch party leader
have attained real political stature and influence. The
PSUC has always exercized considerable authority
within the Spanish Communist Party by virtue of its
size: although Catalonia accounts for only 15 percent
of Spain's population, it contains more than a third of
its Communist voters. The PSUC, however, suffered
along with the PCE in the October 1982 parliamenta-
ry election, losing nearly three-fourths of its support.
Although its relative importance within Communist
ranks continues, these ranks are now so depleted as to
deprive the PSUC of a significant voice in Spanish
politics.
The only branch party leader to become a spokesman
'for his region and a significant political player is
Rafael Escuredo, leader of the PSOE's Andalusian
affiliate. This is almost entirely a personal triumph;
the Andalusian branch of the PSOE has never en-
joyed the autonomy granted to the Basque and Cata-
lan Socialist parties. As president of the Andalusian
regional government, Escuredo has attained levels of
influence and name recognition rivaled among region-
al politicians only by the presidents of the Basque and
Catalan regional governments. By contrast, the lack-
luster AP president of the Galician regional govern-
ment has been unable to establish an independent
identity. He and his party remain completely over-
shadowed by the AP's national leader.
The national parties of the right-the AP and the
defunct Union of the Democratic Center-have made
far fewer concessions to their regional branches. We
believe this stems largely from the pervasive associa-
tion of regionalism with leftism and anti-Francoism in
the years immediately following 1975. In those days a
rightist party could stand at most for minimal admin-
istrative autonomy within a still highly centralized
state structure. This pattern tended to carry over into
the internal organization of these parties. As the
equation of regionalism and leftism has waned, right-
ist forces have shown more sympathy with regional
causes and may grant greater autonomy to their
regional affiliates in the future.
Basque Parties
Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vas-
co). The oldest regional party, the PNV was founded
by Sabino Arana, the father of Basque regionalism, in
1895. Initially an ultraclerical, far-right authoritarian
party, the PNV advocated forming the Spanish
Basque Country, the contiguous Province of Navarre,
and the small French Basque region into an independ-
ent nation. Handicapped by the frailties of Basque
culture and language, Arana and the PNV empha-
sized alleged Basque racial superiority and called for
the expulsion of non-Basque immigrants from the
Basque Country.
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Table 1
Percentage of Vote in the Basque Region, 1977 to 1982 a
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
29.3
27.1
38.1
31.3
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE)
6.0
8.0
9.9
7.7
Herri Batasuna (HB)
15.0
16.5
14.7
Subtotal, regional parties
35.3
50.7
64.5
53.7
National parties
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE)
25.8
18.6
14.2
Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)
12.5
16.5
8.5
Communist Party (PCE)
4.4
4.4
4.0
1.9
Popular Alliance (AP) d
4.3
3.3
4.8
11.1
Other e
17.7
6.4
4.0
5.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a Includes the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya.
b National legislative election.
c Election to Basque regional parliament.
d In 1982 AP and UCD presented joint lists in the Basque region.
e Includes minor regional and national parties, null and blank votes.
25X1'
The PNV has mellowed considerably over the past
half century. It is now a centrist, Christian Democrat-
ic party. The attractiveness of Basque independence
has diminished, and the party officially accepts the
Constitution's autonomy provisions. A small segment
of the party, however, still clamors for eventual
separation from Spain and accuses the PNV leader-
ship of having "betrayed" Sabino Arana's ideals.
In the past the PNV refused to condemn the separat-
ist-terrorist organization, Basque Land and Liberty,
partially to guard against accusations of less than
total commitment to regionalism, partially because
top party leaders were genuinely, skeptical about
working out a satisfactory compromise with Madrid
concerning devolution. ETA grew out of a PNV youth
group in the 1950s, and the party, instinctively sym-
pathetic to some of the group's goals if not its
methods, was reluctant to criticize it openly. In 1980,
however, the party won the regional parliamentary
election and established a PNV government in Vitoria
under regional President Carlos Garaicoechea. This
Confidential
has given the PNV a stake in the autonomy system
established by the Constitution and has speeded its
evolution toward a more moderate regionalist posi-
tion. We believe that the PNV now fully recognizes
the danger ETA poses to both Spanish democracy and
Basque autonomy and will cooperate in efforts-on
both the political and police levels-to combat the
terrorist organization.
The Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra). EE was the
first party to mount a successful challenge to the
PNV's monopoly of regionalist politics in the Basque
Country. It did this from a leftist perspective, at-
tempting to weld socialism to Basque regionalism. EE
began as a coalition of small proindependence parties,
all openly boasting of their links to the political-
military branch of ETA; indeed, the party's leader-
ship always has included some amnestied ex-ETA
terrorists. Despite these origins, EE has grown steadi-
ly more moderate during its seven years of existence.
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While not formally dropping the goal of eventual
separation from Spain, EE has for now accepted
autonomy for the Basque Country as the best avail-
able alternative. The party has even attacked ETA-
especially that organization's military wing-for
pointlessly provoking the military. During the past
year EE has attempted to strengthen its socialist
credentials by fusing with a fragment of the Basque
branch of the PCE and emphasizing the need to
defend class, as well as regional interests. This strate-
gy has not paid off electorally: in the parliamentary
election of 1982, EE's share of the Basque vote
dropped for the first time since its formation. This
disappointment was followed by the resignation of the
party's more militantly regionalist members. We be-
lieve that EE, unable to compete with the PSOE as a
socialist party and caught between the regionalist
options of the PNV and Herri Batasuna, has little
hope of attracting more than the 7 to 10 percent of the
Basque electorate it has traditionally represented.
Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna). Founded in 1978 by
the fusion of several Communist and non-Communist
regional parties, HB has become the most radical and
disruptive of the Basque political groups. Although it
considers itself a leftist party-and many of its
founders are Marxist-Leninists-HB is vague in its
socioeconomic proposals; its economic plank is so
innocuous that virtually any party could subscribe to
it. The party's driving force is the aim of total and
immediate independence for the Basque Country and
the defense of ETA, especially its military branch.
Unlike EE, HB has resolutely refused to moderate its
positions. Despite its status as the third-largest party
in the region (with a steady 15 to 16 percent of the
vote) and despite having elected deputies both to the
national and regional parliaments, HB neither recog-
nizes nor participates in either Spanish national or
Basque regional institutions.' The party continues to
back ETA and shows no sign of losing the allegiance
of its over 200,000 Basque voters. HB today does little
more than foster Spanish-Basque enmity, but its
persistence as a major regional party indicates that a
' Ironically, the refusal of the 11 HB deputies elected to the
regional parliament in 1980 to take their seats enhanced the
governability of the Basque region. Their absence gave the PNV an
absolute majority of those deputies present and voting, enabling it
to form a stable one-party regional government.
significant proportion of the Basque population re-
mains dissatisfied with autonomy. We believe that a
decline in HB's vote would be a clear sign that the
Basque region was coming to grips with its status as
an autonomous community.
Catalan Parties
Convergence and Union (Convergencia i Unio). CiU
is a coalition of Jordi Pujol's Convergencia Democra-
tica de Catalunya party and the much smaller Chris-
tian Democratic Unio Democratica de Catalunya
party. Dominated by Pujol and his party, CiU occu-
pies a position in Catalan politics roughly analagous
to that of the PNV in Basque affairs: both are
moderate, center-right parties that control their re-
gion's autonomous government. CiU, however, lacks
the proindependence and racist roots of the PNV. It is
heir to an open, broadly liberal tradition of regional-
ism that has always seen Catalonia as an integral part
of Spain. The indigenous middle class that is the
coalition's principal support has always been more
confident than its Basque counterpart of its ethnic
identity. Consequently, CiU lacks the intense suspi-
cion of Madrid and the residual separatist ambitions
that still occasionally make themselves felt in the
PNV.
Since the regional election of 1980, CiU has dominat-
ed the Catalan regional government. Regional Presi-
dent Pujol has adopted cautious, conservative socio-
economic policies not far removed from those
advocated by the AP. But Pujol has always sought to
distance his coalition from the right, largely, in our
view, because of the popular tendency until recent
years to equate rightism with centralism. CiU consist-
ently emphasizes its centrist vocation, and Pujol's
lieutenant, Miquel Roca, has even suggested that the
coalition serve as the axis around which a revitalized
statewide centrist political force could be formed.
Such a project is testimony to CiU's lack of parochial-
ism, but it may be overly ambitious. We believe that
the prospects are poor for either a statewide centrist
party or a federation of parties and that CiU runs the
risk of losing hardcore regionalist support if it appears
to be compromising its political independence.
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Table 2
Percentage of Vote in Catalonia, 1977 to 1982 a
Convergence and Union (CiU)
16.0
16.1
27.7
22.3
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)
4.5
4.1
8.9
4.0
Subtotal, regional parties
20.5
20.2
36.6
26.3
National parties
Socialist Workers Party (PSC-PSOE)
28.4
29.2
22.5
43.6
Communist Party (PSUC)
18.2
17.1
18.7
4.7
Union of the Democratic Center (CC-UCD)
16.8
19.1
10.5
2.0
Popular Alliance (AP)
3.8
3.7
2.3
15.0
Other d
12.3
9.8
9.4
8.4
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a Includes the Provinces of Lerida, Gerona, Barcelona and
Tarragona.
b National legislative election.
c Election to Catalan regional parliament.
d Includes minor regional and national parties, null and blank votes.
Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya). During the 1930s ERC was the
dominant party in Catalonia and controlled the re-
gional government. Today it is something of a politi-
cal oddity, the only major Spanish party to insist upon
its republican and leftist credentials, while opposing
any hue of Marxism or socialism. Its leader, Heribert
Barrera, has used his position as president of the
regional parliament to stir up antagonism between
Catalan- and Spanish-speaking residents of the region
and to portray his party as the only true defender of
Catalan interests. Despite its militant Catalanist ide-
ology and often shrill rhetoric, ERC, in our view, has
demonstrated its pragmatism by supporting the CiU
regional government; it cannot be described as a
Catalan equivalent of EE or HB. ERC regularly
garners 5 to 9 percent of the regional vote.
Other Regions
The only significant regional party outside Catalonia
and the Basque Country is the Andalusian Socialist
Party (PSA). The PSA claims that underdeveloped
Andalusia has been economically exploited by Madrid
and the wealthy Basque and Catalan regions. The
PSA's radicalism, however, has been strictly verbal;
politically it has operated in a highly pragmatic-
some have said unprincipled-fashion, cutting deals
with both former Prime Minister Suarez and the
right. We believe that this excess of political flexibili-
ty contributed significantly to the PSA's collapse in
the parliamentary election of 1982, when it slipped to
under 4 percent of the regional vote and lost all of its
five deputies in Madrid. Unlike the Basque and
Catalan parties, the PSA has failed to improve its vote
count in regional as opposed to national elections. We
believe this indicates that much of the regionalist
fervor that followed Franco's death is subsiding and
that only areas with distinctive linguistic, cultural,
and political traditions-in practice, Catalonia and
the Basque Country-will support viable regional
parties.
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