GREECE: PAPANDREOU AND THE MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000200010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
DIA review
completed.
and the Military
Greece: Papandreou
State Dept. review completed
Secret
EUR 83-10117
April 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
and the Military
Greece: Papandreou
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This paper was prepay
of European Analysis.
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Branch, EURA,
Comments and queries are we come and
may be directed to the Chief, Iberia-Aegean
Operations and the National Intelligence Council
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Secret
EUR 83-10117
April 1983
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Secret
Greece: Papandreou
and the Military
Key Judgments The election of Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister in
Information available October 1981 was a source of deep concern to the Greek officer corps,
as of 1 April 1983 which is politically conservative, staunchly pro-West, and heir to a long
was used in this report.
tradition of intervention in politics. Keenly aware of military concerns,
Papandreou as Prime Minister has placed a high priority on reassuring
officers that he is not a reckless ideologue but a pragmatist who will work
vigorously for Greek interests. We believe his performance in office thus
far has left the majority of active duty officers content to remain in the
barracks-nursing a reputation badly bruised during the 1967-74 dictator-
ship, rebuilding military capabilities, and focusing attention on the per-
ceived Turkish threat.
After his election, Papandreou assumed the defense portfolio and appoint-
ed a highly regarded former officer as one of his deputy defense minis-
ters-moves designed both to assuage military sensitivities and to caution
against "political activity" within the officer corps. In general he has
respected normal retirement and promotion patterns and has selected well-
qualified professionals for the top military posts. In addition, Papandreou
has kept defense spending high and increased pay and benefits for officers
and enlisted men-important signals to a military that sometimes has
moved against the government partly for bread-and-butter reasons.
More importantly, in our judgment the majority of active duty officers are
relieved by Papandreou's handling of foreign policy thus far. We believe
the military will tolerate his hardline tactics vis-a-vis NATO and the
United States in the hope of gaining additional assistance, provided these
tactics do not point to withdrawal from NATO or severance of the bilateral
security relationship with the United States-
Despite their strong commitment to
the West, however, many military officers continue to harbor resentment
toward NATO and the United States for failing to stop the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In short, the military is above all else strongly
nationalistic, and its pro-Western views have not prevented it from backing
a tough stand in the current US base talks. Moreover, Papandreou's call
for a Western security guarantee against Turkey and a balance of power in
the Aegean reflects, in our judgment, the concerns of the majority of
military men, who since 1974 have considered Turkey the primary threat
to Greek national interests. The views of Papandreou, politicians, and
military men converge to a greater degree on the Turkish issue than on any
other.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10117
April 1983
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Ultimately, the "depoliticization" of the military will depend, in our
opinion, on the political environment within Greece itself-the develop-
ment of strong democratic institutions, the commitment of both civilian
and military leaders to work within the system, and a general belief in the
fairness of the political process. Although many problems remain, the
Greek political system appears to be evolving gradually toward a pattern
more closely resembling the West European norm. This trend, if it
continues over the long run, will be the surest guarantee against the
praetorian politics so prevalent in the past.
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Greece: Papandreou
and the Military
Andreas Papandreou's victory in the national election
18 months ago caused concern among Greek officers,
most of whom probably had hoped for the reelection
of the conservative New Democracy Party. The mili-
tary-which has a long tradition of intervening in
politics-had long worried about the growing popular-
ity of Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK), and the Prime Minister's fiery preelection
rhetoric served only to increase its misgivings.
Papandreou and the military seem to have worked out
a modus vivendi in the intervening months. On bal-
ance, we believe the Prime Minister's performance in
office has tended to allay military fears-although
many in the officer corps will continue to remain
uneasy about Papandreou and his long-range aims
A Pattern of Intervention
The Greek officer corps traditionally has viewed itself
as the guardian of "national honor and ideals"-a
mandate it has interpreted broadly to include vigi-
lance against domestic as well as foreign enemies. In
the 19th century the Greek military acted as a
liberalizing force. The officer corps and the political
elite shared the same social background and values,
and the two generally worked in concert to initiate
change. However, politicians and military officers
began to diverge socially and culturally early in the
20th century. The 1909 "Goudi revolt" by junior and
noncommissioned officers who were not members of
the traditional elite set in motion a pattern of military
intervention that was to characterize Greek politics
for the next six decades. Throughout the 1920s and
early 1930s, the coup d'etat became the normal means
of transferring power, as liberal and royalist factions
within the officer corps-together with their political
patrons-vied for control of the government. Each
new regime purged the military and elevated or
reinstated officers loyal to its goals.
The accession to office of a royalist general, loannis
Metaxas, who headed the government from 1936 until
his death in 1941, ushered in a period of relatively
stable military rule. The outbreak of World War II
drew the politically active military back into the
barracks and put an end to much of the earlier
factionalism by uniting the military against a com-
mon external enemy. During and after World War II
and the Greek Civil War, the military began develop-
ing into a relatively cohesive force, taking on much of
the conservative and pro-Western coloration that still
characterizes it today.' At the same time, it retained
its role as a vibrant extraparliamentary force, in part
because of the weakness of the civilian governments:
between 1946 and 1952 some 16 different civilian
administrations ruled Greece.
' During the 1950s Greece solidified its commitment to the West
and NATO-a move given impetus by the vast amounts of
American economic and military aid entering Greece in the
postwar years. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in early 1953
concluded a base agreement with the United States that is still in
effect. The military benefited in particular from Western aid and
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By the early 1960s, friction between military and
political elites began to resurface. Greek political
culture was shifting away from the strong antileftism
of the 1950s, and left-of-center politicians were gain-
ing a degree of popular acceptance. These changes,
however, were not reflected in the military, which
tended to view the rise of the center-left as a threat to
its security-and, by extension, the security of the
nation
The growing divergence between military and civilian
leaders culminated in the coup d'etat of 21 April
1967. In order to head off an election victory by
liberal politician George Papandreou-Andreas's fa-
ther-some 20 middle-grade Army officers took con-
trol of the government.' The colonels involved claimed
.their action was necessary to "save the nation" from
chaos and Communism. However, the fear of personal
setbacks-most ran the risk of being retired from
service in the event of an election victory by the elder
Papandreou-and grievances over pay and benefits
also figured prominently in the decision to intervene.
A countercoup attempt by the. King and royalist
generals in December failed, and the King went into
exile.
The colonels carried out an extensive purge of the
military and civilian bureaucracies, removing not only
those suspected of harboring liberal or leftist senti-
ments but also those identified as royalists. Approxi-
mately 600 officers were dismissed from active duty
in the first year after the takeover. During their seven
years in power, the colonels were accused of using
torture and other forms of brutality against their
political opponents; they-and consequently the mili-
tary in general-acquired a repressive image in the
eyes of many Greeks. Attempts to liberalize came too
late, and the regime found itself the target of growing
'George Papandreou had previously resigned as Prime Minister in
mid-1965 in a controversy involving his son Andreas. The younger
Papandreou was accused of conspiring with a small clandestine
group of leftwing officers known as ASPIDA (Shield), but the
charge was never proved. The King blocked efforts by George
Papandreou to make changes in the military hierarchy and dismiss
his Minister of Defense, who had been tasked with investigating the
group. The elder Papandreou resigned as a result, and the country
lapsed into two years of economic and political instability under a
public opposition.' In July 1974 the junta backed an
ill-fated coup on Cyprus which prompted a Turkish
invasion of the island. Militarily, Athens was not
equipped to respond to the Turkish move-seven
years of wielding political power had eroded the
combat readiness and professionalism of the military.
A group of officers in northern Greece refused to
answer the junta's orders to mobilize, successfully
demanding instead the resignation of its leaders and
their replacement by civilian politicians.
Depoliticizing the Military
When Constantine Karamanlis was invited out of self-
imposed exile in 1974 to head the new government of
national unity, he faced an exceedingly fragile situa-
tion.' Although the military had relinquished power,
junta supporters remained in key positions. Moreover,
Greece faced a potential war with Turkey, and the
need to maintain morale within the officer corps
precluded an extensive shakeup of the armed services.
On the other hand, there was intense public pressure
for the systematic dismissal of those who had support-
ed and cooperated with the junta.
Karamanlis moved swiftly but cautiously to consoli-
date civilian control over the government and the
armed services. He also attempted to lay to rest the
two issues that in the past had caused the deepest and
most bitter divisions within Greece and had encour-
aged the politicization of the military. He scheduled a
referendum in which voters rejected the monarchy,
and he legalized the Communist Party-thus making
their opposition into the open.
Seeking to minimize the trauma to the officer corps,
Karamanlis punished only the top leaders of the junta
and deflected blame away from the military in gener-
al. Ultimately, only about 50 officers were convicted
'In November 1973 the gradual buildup of anti-junta sentiments
culminated in clashes between students and military police that led
to the deaths of several students and marked the beginning of the
end for the military regime. Subsequently, George Papadopoulos,
the original leader of the 1967 coup, was unseated in an Army-
backed countercoup led by Dimitrios loannides, the head of the
military police.
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of crimes related to the 1967 military takeover and
subsequent events. Another 200 officers were dis-
missed from service, but most of those whom the
government distrusted were simply assigned to non-
sensitive posts or retired during the normal promotion
cycle.
As Prime Minister, Karamanlis left his mark on the
military not only through his firm insistence on
civilian control but also through his efforts to build up
defense capabilities and foster a sense of professional-
ism within the officer corps. The military clearly
benefited from many of the changes he introduced.
Defense spendin for example, generally exceeded
previous levels the
defense budget in 1977 was equal to about 27 percent
of the national budget and 7 percent of the GDP-a
significant increase from the early 1970s (see table 2
on Defense Effort). In early 1977, Greece began
serious development of a domestic arms industry and
as a first step provided for construction of an aircraft
maintenance facility at Tanagra. That same year,
women were admitted to service for the first time.F_
Parliament also passed a bill in 1977 restructuring the
armed services. The new structure provided for decen-
tralizing command authority within the general staff
and rotating the position of chief of the Hellenic
National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) among the
three services. In theory the proposed rotation of the
Prime Minister Papandreou almost certainly
consults President Karamanlis on issues of
special concern to the military.
top military post reduced the role of the Army, which
traditionally had overshadowed the two smaller
branches. Out of deference to the size and political
clout of the Army, however, neither Karamanlis nor
George Rallis-his successor as Prime Minister-
broke with the tradition of naming Army officers as
chief of HNDGS. In addition, civilian control over the
military was strengthened by the establishment of the
Supreme National Defense Council-made up of the
Prime Minister, the Chief of the HNDGS, and
selected Cabinet officials.6 The Council was given
6 In July 1982, the Papandreou government established the Council
on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA) as part of a
larger restructuring of the Cabinet. KYSEA-made up of the
Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and
Public Order; and the Deputy Ministers of Defense and Foreign
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responsibility for setting national security policy and
ultimately approving all promotions, retirements, and
assignments.
Papandreou's Approach
Papandreou began to moderate his radical rhetoric
and to court centrist elements in both the electorate
and the military as early as 1977-after the parlia-
mentary election in which the Socialists became the
major opposition party. During his election campaign,
Papandreou showed a keen sensitivity to the practical
issues that affect the officer corps and that in part
have triggered past military interventions. Many of
his promised military reforms-especially regarding
pay and benefits-were designed to appeal to the
officers. In addition, the strongly nationalistic mili-
tary found his stand against negotiations with Turkey
compatible with its own views. However, Papan-
dreou's demands for the "dejuntification" of the
armed services, withdrawal from NATO, and removal
of US bases continued to cause considerable concern
within the officer corps.
Since his election, Papandreou has moved swiftly to
try to ease concerns within the military.' He assumed
the post of Defense Minister himself, and press
accounts reveal that he devotes a significant amount
of time to addressing military audiences and attend-
ing military functions. He has surrounded himself
with highly regarded military advisers who, for the
most part, are apolitical. He also has affirmed his
intention to keep defense spending up and has fol-
lowed through on his promise to increase pay and
benefits-even though this has added considerably to
the already overburdened budget.
The Key Issues
Most officers probably would give Papandreou a
mixed rating in his performance thus far. There is
every reason to believe the officer corps approves
certain of Papandreou's decisions, particularly those
to increase military benefits and to adopt a tough line
with Turkey. At the same time, it tolerates-and
probably will continue to tolerate-the Prime Minis-
ter's tactics toward US base negotiations and Greece's
relations with NATO, as long as his actions do not
significantly damage security relations with the West.
On issues that could affect the composition and
orientation of the military, however, we believe the
officer corps will continue to be suspicious and nerv-
ous-especially if it perceives increasing leftist influ-
ence in the armed services. So far, Papandreou has
remained within the bounds of acceptable action
tacitly set by the military.
We believe, nonetheless, that the military will contin-
ue to watch Papandreou's performance more closely
than that of his immediate predecessors. Embassy,
reporting indicate that
ter's ultimate aims.
some critics of the Papandreou
regime have been -disturbed at what they view as the
large number of changes in the senior ranks of the
officer corps since the Socialists came to power.
Consequently, they have accused the government of
making personnel changes in the armed forces on the
basis of political rather than professional criteria.
Indeed, shortly after assuming office, Papandreou
replaced all his service chiefs and much of his general
staff. He also retired approximately 131 colonels last
year-one-fourth to one-third of the total in the
ground forces
Under the Greek system, however, a high level of
turnover is normal. The moderate conservative opposi-
tion newspaper Kathimerini, one of the more reliable
Greek papers, has noted, for example, that the num-
ber of personnel changes last year was "impressive"
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The Officer Corps: Continuity and Change
Years of intervention in politics, the legacy of the
junta period, and the reforms of the Karamanlis era
have all contributed to the complex character of the
officer corps which Papandreou has inherited. The
officers with whom he must deal form an important
sociopolitical interest group-sharing a conservative
world view, a common social background, and collec-
tive professional concerns. Selective recruitment and
history have nurtured conservative views. Many cur-
rently active duty senior officers grew up during the
Metaxas era and experienced combat during World
War II and the Civil War. During the period from
1950 to 1974, officers with liberal or leftist sympa-
thies were systematically eliminated from the mili-
tary and kept out of the service academies. Despite
his removal of many former junta supporters, Kara-
manlis did not fundamentally change the recruitment
system or alter the conservative complexion of the
armed services. To this day military education fos-
ters strong anti-Communist sentiments, a basic dis-
trust of the left, and a wariness of politicians
The social composition of the officer corps also
contributes to the conservative political and social
attitudes of the military. Since the early part of the
century, a military career has attracted primarily
young men from rural areas and small towns. Ac-
cording to academic studies from the early and mid-
1970s, a high proportion of officer school candi-
dates-most of whom presumably are now company
or field grade officers-come from the poorer areas
of Greece such as Macedonia and the Peloponnesus.
The fathers of most are farmers or tradesmen. The
only exceptions are naval officers, about two-thirds of
whom come from urban, middle and upper class
families. The social profile of new cadets in all three
service branches, according to these studies, had
changed little from the previous two decades. In
contrast, the civilian political elite is drawn primarily
from the urban, educated, and upper middle class
stratum of society. This divergence in social back-
ground has grown wider in the last two decades and
has contributed to the tension between civilian and
military leaders.
Officers tend to cast their mission in almost sacred
terms-a tendency upon which politicians often play
when seeking to rouse national spirit. Papandreou
himself, in various speeches, has referred to the
officer as "not only a mere citizen but a citizen
entrusted with a holy task. " In the past, officers
sometimes interpreted their mandate to protect
Greece's national security and territorial integrity
very broadly. Alleged internal threats from the politi-
cal left-which was often blamed for the "moral and
social decay" of the country-were used to justify
military intervention. In fact, however, disputes over
bread-and-butter issues sometimes were of greater
significance
Since 1974, a certain ambivalence has characterized
the military's perceptions of its role, its attitudes
toward civilian government, and its relations with
Western allies. The Greek electorate has undergone a
gradual shift to the left, and, although, the officer
corps retains its conservative character, we believe it,
too, has been affected by changing political and social
currents. The West European model of the profes-
sional soldier gradually has begun to overlay earlier,
more colorful self-images of military virtues and
ideals. A staunch commitment to the West has been
tempered by disappointment at a perceived tilt by
NATO and the United States toward Turkey in
recent years. Finally-and perhaps most important-
ly-the military is still recovering from the negative
image it acquired during the 1967-74 period.
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a In Greece, the promotion-retirement system is based on time in
grade and on seniority, which is calculated according to years in
service and class standing. When an officer is promoted, all officers
senior to him in that same service must be either promoted or retired.
Because competition at the top is especially intense, as many as one-
third or more colonels and generals are normally retired in a given
year; thus, it is not unusual for the entire senior-level staff to be
replaced every two or three years.
b These figures represent the total retirements in these categories for
1983.
Source: Kathimerini, 10 March 1983, from information provided by
the Ministry of Defense.
National Defense General Staff. He also was able to
position General Kouris, the Air Force Chief of Staff
and a particular favorite of his, to ascend eventually
to the post. So far, Papandreou has faced only one
major personnel crisis. His Navy Chief of Staff
resigned last year after three months in the position in
a dispute over the control of assignments, and the
Prime Minister passed over three senior naval offi-
cers-thereby forcing their retirement-to appoint a
relatively unseasoned officer, Nikolaos Pappas, to the
top Navy post.10 The decision prompted criticism in
the conservative press
Despite these changes, we believe appointments and
promotions so far-while prompting some grumbling
in the ranks-have not provoked any serious dissatis-
faction within the officer corps or among respected
conservative politicians. In fact, according to Embassy
reporting, former Defense Minister Averoff-current-
ly leader of the conservative opposition-remarked,
after general staff changes were announced early last 25X1
year, that he was not disturbed by the command
changes and that he believed the new chiefs of staff
but "not much different" from past years.' This is
supported by data released by the Ministry of Defense
last month (see table 1).
To fill the top military slots, Papandreou-like his
predecessors-used the established selection system to
promote officers whose records indicated they were at
least neutral toward his government.' His choices for
the most part were well-respected professionals who
had risen through the ranks under the watchful eyes
of previous administrations. The track record of his
general staff officers indicates that they are strong
anti-Communists who are firmly committed to the
Western alliance.
Under the 1977 law that restructured the armed
services, Papandreou was able to appoint a naval
officer for the first time as chief of the Hellenic
? Kathimerini reflects opposition views generally in line with the
New Democracy Party, and thus its assessment of the review cycle
is significant
would serve national rather than party interests.
We believe Papandreou is aware of the sensitivity of
the promotion-retirement issue, and therefore we ex-
pect fewer changes during the 1983 cycle. So far this
year Papandreou has not made any changes in his
chiefs of staff, and the number of senior-level retire-
ments announced last month does not appear exces-
sive, given the pool of eligible candidates for promo-
tion and the lack of headroom. Senior-level personnel
action is normally effected in March, and we have no
reason to believe that the announced retirements were
connected to recent rumors of coup plotting activity.
10 Under Greek law the chiefs of staff recommend promotions,
retirements, and assignments to the Ministry of Defense, which in
turn submits them for approval to the Council on Foreign Policy
and National Defense. On occasion. the Council may overrule the
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Benefits and Pay. Papandreou has tried to win the
confidence of the military by introducing a package of
benefits that, although modest, has almost certainly
boosted morale while improving the living conditions
of both officers and enlisted personnel. The govern-
ment instituted housing allowances for officers early
last year that range from $50 to $170 per month, with
quarterly cost-of-living adjustments depending on
marital status, rank, and years of service. It also
began an investigation of the Officers' Autonomous
Housing Organization to discover why it had helped
only 4,185 out of 15,962 officers locate quarters.
Shortly thereafter the government also began provid-
ing medical benefits-including hospital, maternity,
and dental care-for immediate relatives of recruits
who were not covered under any other insurance
program.
Last July a new pay scale for enlisted men went into
effect. Single soldiers now receive from $7 to $13
monthly, depending on their rank, while their married
counterparts earn from $44 to $111, depending on
number of children. Although military pay is still
low-forcing recruits to depend on help from their
families-the press reported that the new pay scale
represented a 500-percent increase and added approx-
imately $17.5 million to the 1982 budget. Other
programs to upgrade the quality of life in the military
are likely to follow. The government, for example,
wants to expand and encourage university-level edu-
cational opportunities for officers and enlisted men.
Recruitment. Since coming to power, Papandreou has
had to balance the demands of the left for "democra-
tization" of the armed forces against tacit pressures
from the officer corps to preserve its conservative
identity. The Prime Minister's actions so far suggest
that he will follow an incremental, go-slow ap-
proach-especially on the sensitive question of re-
Under the colonels' regime entrance to the military
academies was strictly controlled, and only recruits
judged to be "politically reliable" were admitted. The
Karamanlis government made some changes in re-
cruitment procedures after 1974 to screen out extreme
changes in these procedures that would open up
military academies to a more politically diversified
The Papandreou government has begun implementing
group of recruits.
A parliamentary amendment
screening applicants to the academies.
passed last September increases the size of entering
classes. Children of officers and enlisted men killed in
the line of duty and children and brothers of disabled
war veterans are now admitted on the basis of.high
school performance, rather than an entrance examina-
tion. The press also reports that background activity
investigations are no longer supposed to be used in
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Officers nonetheless are worried by the efforts of
radical leftists to enter the military academies. Less
well-known members of the Communist Party,
reprimanded for hazing a freshman recruit who alleg-
edly was a Communist. Such incidents, if they contin-
ue, are likely to cause considerable uneasiness among
officers.
Based on the measures adopted so far, it is clear that
Papandreou wants to open up academies to members
of his own party, but at the same time keep out the
Communists-in part because they are his staunchest
domestic opponents and in part because their entry
would create a backlash on the right. Papandreou's
room for maneuver in balancing the demands of the
left and the concerns of the right on recruitment
policy is especially narrow.
Reorganization of the National Guard. In September
Parliament passed a bill reorganizing and reducing
the size of the Battalions of National Defense (TEA),
which had come to be closely identified with the
discredited policies of the 1967-74 military junta. The
new law, which renamed the organization the Greek
National Guard, calls for a manpower reduction of
10 percent in border and island areas and 70 to 90
percent in the interior.
Thus wt eliminate about one-third of
the 85,000 men who currently serve in the battalions.
In addition, approximately 150 of the 810 regular
military officers assigned to the TEA are to be
transferred to combat units)
Although the reorganization of the TEA initially
received criticism in the conservative press, the
changes were not as extensive as Papandreou's critics
had feared. We doubt that the changes caused serious
sponsored bill.
concern among conservatives, either in political or
military circles. In fact, in the end the conservative
New Democracy Party voted for the government-
Defense Priorities. Like the Karamanlis and Rallis
administrations, the Papandreou government contin-
ues to emphasize defense spending to maintain a
balance of power in the Aegean; expansion of the
domestic defense industry, including licensing and
coproduction arrangements with foreign firms; in-
creased self-sufficiency in spare parts; and diversifica-
tion of arms sources. Last year,
military expenditures equaled about 21
percent o reece's total budget and almost 7 percent
of its gross domestic product (GDP), up significantly
from the early 1970s.
The defense burden, however, gradually has become
more onerous because of the slower economic growth,
higher inflation, and larger current account deficits in
the last two to three years. Although military expendi-
tures have placed a strain on the budget and diverted
funds from social programs, Papandreou has promised
the military that he will not cut defense spending.
Given the current tensions with Turkey, the public
supports this policy.
Like successive governments since 1974, the Papan-
dreou government wants to develop a domestic de-
fense industry in order to conserve foreign exchange
over the long term and reduce dependence on the
United States. The government also hopes to diversify
Greece's sources of weaponry, and since early last
year it has been evaluating and discussing potential
defense industrial cooperation arrangements and
equipment purchases
'Z In April 1982 Greece signed a general five-year defense agree-
ment with France that, while vague, opens the way for cooperation
in arms supply and in design and manufacturing. A trip by the
Deputy Defense Minister to West Germany in early May resulted
in an agreement for the joint production of Leopard tanks. At
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Table 2
Defense Effort, 1973-82
GDP (billion US $)
16.3
18.8
20.8
22.6
Defense expenditures
(million US $)
674.8
1,050.0
1,422.8
1,557.3
Equipment b (percent)
9.4
12.7
20.5
20.3
Construction c (percent)
7.1
4.5
6.1
5.3
Pay and allowances d
(percent)
38.1
41.7
34.2
32.4
Other operating
expenses (percent)
45.4
41.1
39.2
42.0
Defense expenditures
as percent of GDP
4.1
5.6
6.8
6.9
Total budget expenditure
(billion US $)
3.5
4.3
5.3
5.8
Defense expenditures
as percent of budget
expenditures
19.3
24.7
27.1
26.9
Population (millions)
8.9
9.0
9.0
9.2
Armed forces (military
and civilian) (thousands)
209.5
212.4
212.5
214.8
Armed forces (military
only) (thousands)
184.3
185.9
185.1
186.3
Military and civilian personnel 6.4
as percent of labor force
6.5
6.5
6.5
a Estimated.
b Major equipment and missiles.
c Includes NATO common infrastructures and national military
construction.
d Military and civilian personnel.
Reporting from US Embassy)
sources indicates that the military is satisfied with the
government's defense budget and supports its empha-
sis on a domestic arms industry. It is more ambiva-
lent, however, about efforts to diversify sources of
supply. On the one hand, officers have expressed a
decided preference for American equipment, and they
worry that diversification would pose problems in
terms of maintenance and logistics.
Secret
26.2
31.7
38.5
40.1
36.7
39.9
1,838.5
2,124.5
2,420.4
2,275.5
2,578.4
2,745.4
20.3
18.1
17.7
18.8
20.5
19.1
6.4
5.2
4.0
2.8
2.6
2.5
33.0
34.1
36.0
35.5
33.6
35.7
40.3
42.6
42.3
42.8
43.3
42.7
7.0
6.7
6.3
5.7
7.0
6.9
6.7
8.2
10.1
9.9
11.1
12.9
27.3
26.0
23.9
23.0
23.2
21.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
215.5
215.7
215.9
210.7
212.7
211.2
186.5
186.4
186.5
186.2
187.6
185.7
military's reaction so far suggests that it would accept
a government decision that points toward limited
diversification.
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Relations With Turkey. In our judgment, Papan-
dreou's hardline policy on Turkey and the Aegean,
which differs more in tone than in substance from
that of his predecessors, has struck a responsive chord
among military officers. Since the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in 1974, the military has encouraged a tough
stand on Turkish-Greek relations-a position bol-
stered by popular opinion, which, as reflected in press
reporting, sees Turkey as a growing regional power
with designs on Greek territory. Military concern over
the Turkish threat was reflected in the post-1974
defense program, which emphasized rearmament and
modernization of the Air Force and Navy. Greek
forces were redeployed to face possible Turkish ag-
gression in Thrace and the Aegean, and fortifications
on the islands close to the Turkish coast were
strengthened in response to the establishment of a
Turkish "Aegean" army.
Greek fears stem primarily from what Athens views
as Turkish attempts over the last eight years to
redefine the "status quo" in the Aegean. Disputes
center on continental shelf rights, the definition of
territorial waters, airspace boundaries, militarization
of the Greek islands, and NATO command and
control responsibilities. After Greece's withdrawal
from the military wing of NATO in 1974, Turkey
began to press for a share in NATO command and
control in the Aegean and also for an equal division of
an elite special forces-type unit
seabed resources. Post-1974 Greek governments un-
der Karamanlis and Rallis were willing to talk to
Turkey about their differences, believing that negotia-
tions minimized the risk of confrontation. Although
the two sides remained far apart on fundamental
issues, some progress was made. In early 1980 Turkey
dropped its demands for control of civil air traffic over
the eastern half of the Aegean; late in the year it
agreed to postpone resolution of NATO command
and control issues, thereby opening the way for Greek
reentry into NATO. In return, Greece adjusted its air
corridors to facilitate Turkish commercial traffic and
eased some of its unilateral restrictions on military
flights in the Aegean.
Reintegration," which, upon Greece's reentry in 1980,
assigned command and control responsibility in the
Aegean to NATO's Commander in Chief, South
(CINCSOUTH), pending the resolution of disputes
between Greece and Turkey. The military preferred
instead the earlier Haig-Davos proposals, which
would have allowed Athens to maintain command and
control while discussions were held with Ankara on a
new arrangement. It also opposed any concessions on
airspace and air traffic control.
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The officer corps opposes any formula for joint control
which, in effect, would give Turkey military responsi-
bility for the security of some Greek islands. Greek
military planners probably fear that such joint control
could provide Turkey with a justification at some later
date for a military move against one or more of the
Greek islands. The military's rigid posture toward
Turkey is tempered to some extent by the belief that
an armed conflict between the two NATO allies
would be mutually disastrous
to negotiate a settlement on Aegean issues
We believe Papandreou is inclined to talk tough while
trying to minimize the risk of conflict. Both Papan-
dreou and the military probably would prefer to bide
their time-maintaining tensions at a manageable
level and putting off sensitive decisions that will
require compromise. This artful procastination will
almost certainly become more difficult over time. In
our opinion, the military ultimately could prove to be
the greatest constraint on the Prime Minister's ability
The Greek military's support for close relations with
the United States and NATO stem from a combina-
tion of emotional, ideological, and practical reasons:
? The United States helped reorganize the Greek
armed services after World War II and lent support
to forces fighting the Communists in the Civil War.
Since 1946 Washington has committed about $6.1
billion in military and economic aid to Greece. US
and Western military aid also has poured in through
NATO.
? Despite vacillations in public and government atti-
tudes toward the United States and NATO, Greek
officers have continued to work closely with their
US counterparts. Many have received training in
the United States.
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? The armed forces are highly dependent on the
United States for spare parts and maintenance. An
estimated 80 to 90 percent of the Greek weapons
inventory is of US origin. 25X1
? Notwithstanding the events of 1974, officers see
membership in NATO and cooperation with the
United States as among the most effective guaran-
tees against Turkish aggression. 25X1
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post-1974 governments made an effort to reduce 25X1
military reliance on the United States while, at the
same time, reaffirming their commitment to Western
defense interests. Even during Karamanlis's tenure as
Prime Minister, the
military was disturbed by many o tie government's
policies. In our opinion, it accepted Karamanlis's show
of independence primarily because he was a politician
with impeccable conservative credentials whose un-
derlying commitment to the West was not in doubt.
The military is less certain of Papandreou's ultimate
goals and thus would probably be more disturbed if
the current government moved far along the same
path. 25X1
So far, however, Papandreou has not interfered with
day-to-day military relations between Greece and the
United States. For example, US ships have been
allowed to visit Greek ports more frequently than in
the past. In September 1982 the Prime Minister
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responded positively to a US request to allow long-
range reconnaissance flights out of Crete in support of
the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon-in this case
overruling the military. The US Embassy
re ations etween 0 t-
cers an t etr ree counterparts continue, in most
cases, to be open and friendly
Papandreou also has moved away from his preelection
demand for immediate dismantling of the US bases
and instead has spoken of setting a timetable for their
eventual removal. We believe this shift reflects, in
part, the Prime Minister's growing awareness of the
economic benefits-as well as the advantages to
Greek defense-to be derived from the continued
operation of the bases. We think it also reflects his
sensitivity to the military's position
This does not mean, however, that either Papandreou
or the military will be any less tough on specific points
in the ongoing Greek-US negotiations. Last month,
for example, the government signaled its displeasure
over Washington's original FY 1984 military aid
proposals for Greece and Turkey by threatening to
suspend US reconnaissance flights from Hellenikon
airbase. A preservation of the 7-to-10 aid ratio be-
tween Greece and Turkey has been a key Greek
demand throughout the negotiations. The military's
behavior during past base talks indicates that officers
will encourage the government to set high demands,
and we believe they will support Papandreou's limited
Although Greek-NATO relations have been more
troubled under Papandreou than in the recent past, it
appears that Papandreou has acted for the most part
with the concurrence of his military advisers. Before
pulling out of two NATO exercises in May 1982,
withdrawing from a six-member exercise last Novem-
ber, and canceling participation in an annual NATO
exercise this February, Papandreou almost certainly
consulted with trusted military experts such as the Air
Force chief, General Kouris." The disappointment
expressed by some senior Army field officers over the 25X1
November withdrawal probably stemmed more from
the last-minute nature of the cancellation and the loss
of training experience than from differences with the
government over the Turkish aspect of the issue.
In our judgment, Greek officers view continued par-
ticipation in NATO as vital to Greek interests but are
willing to risk NATO disapproval to underscore their
position on Aegean issues and prod the Alliance into a
more active role in settling Greek-Turkish disputes.
We suspect they are less happy with-but willing to
accept-the Prime Minister's more aggressive ap-
proach on political issues in NATO forums as long as
it does not significantly affect long-term security 25X1
relations with the West.
'? Athens withdrew from one of the exercises in May to protest
continued Turkish violations of Greek-claimed airspace. It pulled
out of maneuvers in November 1982 and February 1983 because
NATO failed to respond positively to its request to include the
island of Limnos as a target area in the exercise. Athens and
Ankara dispute the legality of militarizing Limnos, and NATO
generally has avoided involvement in the controversy by not
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we see most trends in Greek politics today working
against a successful military intervention. The domes-
tic political climate in Greece today is stable. The
Socialists won the 1981 election by a wide margin,
and Papandreou's personal popularity remains high.
Charges of fraud, which often accompanied elections
in the 1960s, have not been leveled in elections since
1974, and issues which divided the country in the
past-such as the fate of the monarchy and the
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legalization of the Communist Party-have been set-
tled. If Papandreou sticks to his present course, we
expect the Socialists to gain increased acceptance as a
responsible party, in the process reducing uneasiness
within the officer corps. Moreover, the last military
intervention damaged the reputation of the officer
corps so severely that we doubt any politician of
standing today would lend his support to a coup.
Without civilian support, an attempted intervention
could turn into a bloody confrontation-a price we
believe few officers would be willing to pay.
In our view, the risks of military intervention should
continue to decline over time. The military appears to
be adopting an increasingly "neutral" position on
political issues and in general becoming a more
professional service. In the last analysis, the "depoliti-
cization" of the military will depend, of course, on
Greece's acquiring the attributes of a modern West-
ern state-strong democratic institutions, the com-
mitment of both civilian and military leaders to work
within the system, and a general belief in the fairness
of the political process. Although many problems
remain, Greece appears to be evolving gradually
toward a pattern more in line with the West European
norm. This trend, if it continues in the long run, will
be the surest guarantee against the praetorian politics
so prevalent in the past.
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