PORTUGAL: ELECTION AND POSTELECTION OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000100210002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Postelection Outlook
Portugal: Election and
State Dept. review completed
DIA review completed.
Secret
EUR 83-10109
CR 83-/1031
April 1983
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Portugal: Election and
Postelection Outlook
The author of this paper is (Office of
European Analysis, with a contribution from
Office of Central Reference. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Western Europe Division, EURA,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
EUR 83-10/09
CR 83-11031
April 1983
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Portugal: Election and_
Postelection Outlook
Key Judgments Former Prime Minister Mario Soares and his Socialist Party are poised for
Information avai/able a return to government after afive-year hiatus. The Socialists probably
as of 18 March 1983
____, ___ ,,_,_ _____, will finish first in the special parliamentary election scheduled for 25
April-the ninth anniversary of the Revolution 25X1
We believe there is a small chance that the party could win an absolute
majority, but even the most optimistic Socialists do not expect to poll more
than 40 percent of the vote. If they win a plurality, the Socialists are likely,
in our view, to seek a coalition partner to assure control of parliament.
Their choice is most likely to be the Social Democratic Party, now led by
former Prime Minister Carlos Mota Pinto. We believe any bargaining
between the Socialists and Social Democrats would be tough, and it is
possible that the Socialists would be unable to accept the Social Demo-
crats' demands. In that event we would expect the Socialists to forma mi-
nority government. 25X1
The new government will face formidable economic problems. Portugal's
current account deficit exceeded $3 billion last year, and the country
probably will have to seek IMF support before the end of the year.
Inflation is running at more than 22 percent, and unemployment remains
at about 9 percent. We believe that even a Socialist government will have
little choice but to initiate unpopular belt-tightening measures. Labor
unrest is a distinct possibility further down the road, given the likelihood
that the Communist Party will agitate among workers feeling the pinch on
their already meager resources. 25X1
The results of the election are unlikely, in our view, to break the pattern of
chronic government instability in post-Revolutionary Portugal. The press-
ing need for unpopular economic measures, the intensely partisan nature of
Portuguese politics, and the internal dissension in each of the democratic
parties almost guarantees this. We believe matters are only complicated by
a fundamental dispute between President Eanes and the parties over the
appropriate role of the president. 25X1
Although such infighting will continue, the country's foreign policy
probably will stay on an even keel. The foreign policies of a Socialist
government would differ little from those of the last several governments.
All the democratic parties are pro-West and pro-NATO, and entrance into
the European Community is a priority for all of them. 25X1
iii Secret
EUR 83-10109
CR 83-11031
April 1983
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The negotiations for renewal of the Lajes Airbase agreement, which
expired in February 1983, probably will be completed by a Socialist-led
government. We do not expect major problems. Soares recognizes the
strategic importance of the Azores both for the United States and NATO.
In addition, the Socialists have been kept apprised of the negotiations, and
we believe they are in general agreement with the terms laid out so far.
We expect a Socialist government to be generally receptive to US requests
to use Portuguese military facilities, including those on the mainland, for
other than NATO purposes. The Socialists have said, though, that they
will not grant blanket permission for such activities. This is partly a matter
of sovereignty, but the Portuguese have also stressed the increased risks
they might face in permitting expanded use of their facilities. Their most
likely concern is the possible impact on Lisbon's relations with the Arab
states and the chance of a cutoff of their oil supply. Other factors.that will
constrain the Socialists in working out military agreements with the United
States include: the military's concern that Washington and other NATO
governments do not take Portugal's military needs seriously, the probabili-
ty that the Communists will attack any agreement as a betrayal of
Portuguese interests, and the country's chronically weak economy.
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Portugal: Election and_
Postelection Outlook
The election on 25 April for Portugal's 250-member
National Assembly was precipitated by the resigna-
tion last December of Prime Minister Francisco Pinto
Balsemao's Democratic Alliance government. The
four-year-old Alliance-a center-right coalition of the
Social Democrats, the Center Democrats, and the tiny
Popular Monarchist Party-had once seemed the
antidote for the country's chronic governmental insta-
bility. After finishing a major revision of the constitu-
tion last fall, however, the coalition seemed to lose a
sense of purpose and fell prey to petty internal
squabbling.
Under attack both from his own Social Democratic
Party and from the Center Democrats, Balsemao
resigned just as the Assembly was considering the
1983 budget. After ahalf-hearted attempt by Alli-
ance leaders to put together a successor government,
President Ramalho Eanes lost patience and an-
nounced his intention to dissolve parliament. Before
doing so, however, he insisted that the Alliance parties
enact measures that would allow Balsemao's caretak-
er government to function normally until the election
and to begin chipping away at the country's serious
25X1 economic problems
The provisional budget and wage guidelines passed by
parliament before it was dissolved constituted only
small first steps toward coming to grips with the
country's alarmingly high external debt of about
$13 billion and its current account deficit, which
soared to over $3 billion-about 14 percent of GDP-
in 1982. The provisional economic measures, more-
over, have had little impact on two problems that
more directly affect the voters: an inflation rate of
more than 22-percent inflation and 9-percent unem-
25X1 ployment.
The other key issue of the campaign-though one the
politicians probably will not articulate-may be the
political system itself. A perception that politicians
are irresponsible has made the average Portuguese
somewhat cynical about the state of democracy. For
example, nearly 69 percent of those polled recently by
NORMA, a polling firm affiliated with Gallup Inter-
national, were dissatisfied with the current political
system. Over 50 percent disapproved of the conduct of
the political parties. Only President Eanes did well in
the poll; nearly 49 percent approved of his perform-
ance in office.' We suspect the Embassy is right in its
assessment that the survey is indicative not so much of
a desire to abandon democracy as to find ways to
improve the system. Even so, there seems to be a
mood abroad in the country that the politicians can
ignore over the longer term only at their own peril.
25X1
Despite the widespread concern about the efficacy of
the country's political system, the public has so far
shown little interest in this election campaign. We
believe this may stem in part from the banality of the
campaign rhetoric and an emphasis on personalities at
the expense of issues. None of the parties has offered
much in the way of specific plans for coping with
Portugal's problems. The tendency on the part of the
democratic parties to blur the distinctions among
themselves has only underscored the superficiality of
the debate. The public's indifference may also be a
function of the frequency with which Portuguese
voters have been called to the polls recently. The
25 April election will be the sixth nationwide vote in
little more than three years. 25X1
The 25 April election will differ in one major respect
from the two previous parliamentary elections: the
Democratic Alliance will not be running. The ulti-
mately fruitless efforts to replace Balsemao proved to
be the Alliance's last gasp. In the weeks that followed,
Although the poll was taken immediately after Balsemao's resig-
nation, its results are generally consistent with those of similar polls
taken in the past. 25X1
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The Political Actors-
Programs and Prospects
Breakdown of Party Seating in
Parliamentary Election of 1980
Social Democratic Party
82
Center Democratic Party
46
Popular Monarchist Party
6
Total
134
Socialist Republican Front
Socialist Party
66
Association of Independent Social
Democrats
4
the two parties drifted further and further apart. Both
parties brooded about Alliance losses in the municipal
elections last December. Although it was the Social
Democrats who first expressed a desire to go it alone
in April, the Center Democrats did not demur.
With the demise of the Alliance, there will now be
four major groups contesting the election, rather than
the three of recent years. The Social Democrats,
Center Democrats, Socialists, and Communists will
all be competing for the substantial bonus that falls to
the plurality party under Portugal's electoral sys-
tem-an advantage that has gone to the Democratic
Alliance in the past two elections. In October 1980,
for example, the Social Democrats and Center Demo-
crats running together under the Alliance banner won
47.5 percent of the popular vote. This yielded 53.6
vercent of the seats in parliament (see table).
25X1
Social Democrats
The Social Democrats' decision to withdraw from the
Alliance has, we think, left them somewhat unsure of
how to proceed. The party made a show of decisive-
ness at its congress in late February, removing Balse-
mao from power, eliminating the position of party
president, and electing a conservative triumvirate
dominated by former Prime Minister Carlos Mota
Pinto to run the party. We believe that Balsemao's
exit has abated the internal dissension for the mo-
ment. But the Social Democrats strike us as lacking
the clear sense of direction that they would undoubt-
edly hope to project on the eve of an important
election. Hoping to minimize their role in a govern-
ment that presided over a deepening economic crisis,
the new party leaders are basically ignoring the
Balsemao period and instead are focusing on the
future. The party has laid out a vague and generally
moderate program, recognizing the need for austerity
and the desirability of a broad social consensus, and
combining the themes of social justice, economic
efficacy, and support for an expanding private sector.
The party's public pronouncements suggest that Mota
Pinto and his colleagues are keeping the party's
platform and postelection plans ambiguous in the
hope of maximizing their leverage in the coalition-
building process that probably will follow the voting.
The conservative nature of the party leadership sug-
gests to us that if the Social Democrats were asked to
form a government, Mota Pinto would turn first to the
Center Democrats in his search for a coalition part-
ner. Despite recent differences between the two par-
ties, they represent known quantities for each other.
Moreover, the Social Democrats, as the larger party,
would take the lead in such a coalition, and Mota
Pinto probably would realize his longtime ambition
again to lead the government.
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A respected law professor and a former Prime Minis-
ter (1978-79J, Carlos Alberto da Mota Pinto, 46,
became the effective leader of the Social Democratic
Party in February 1983. A centrist in the party, he
shares the leadership with representatives of the
liberal and conservative wings of the party-an ar-
rangement that we believe will enable him to consoli-
date his power base within the party. US Embassy
officials regard Mota Pinto as a solid, center-left
democrat who is strongly anti-Communist and well
disposed toward the United States. We believe that he
supports his country's commitment to NATO and
entry into the European Community. A former depu-
ty in the Assembly of the Republic (1975-76J, member
of the Constitutional Commission (1976-77J, and
Minister of Commerce and Tourism (March-Decem-
ber 1977), Mota Pinto has taught full time since 1979
and is a member of the Council of State. According to
US Embassy ojfcials, he is noted for his moderation,
pragmatism, negotiating skills, and methodical-
(political style, but he is a poor
25X1
The party's deputy campaign director has told US
Embassy officials that if the Social Democrats come
within 10 percentage points of the Socialists, the party
might consider joining aSocialist-led government.
Mota Pinto is known as a tough bargainer, however,
and he would surely demand key ministerial posts and
an agreement in advance on the outlines of a govern-
ment program; we doubt that the Socialists would
acquiesce easily in such conditions
Francisco Lucas
Pires
A constitutional law expert, Francisco Lucas Pires,
who had been a vice president of the Center Demo-
cratic Party since 1978, emerged as the leader of the
party at its National Congress in February 1983. We
believe that he hopes to revive the Democratic Alli-
ance so that he can serve as Deputy Prime Minister.
Embassy ofjrcials say that Pires, 38, is the charis-
matic leader ojthe CDS youth and rank-and ale
members even though he is a poor organizer, an
i~ghter, and is often criticized by Portuguese politi-
cians as being too theoretical. Since 1980 he has
shifted from the far right to the center of his party.
Although some US State Department officials regard
this shift as merely a reflection ojPires's eclectic
political views, we agree with Embassy officials in
Lisbon that it is a calculated attempt to increase his
political power. He has promised to improve CDS
relations with President Antonio Eanes and the PS.
According to Embassy ojJicials, Pires is well disposed
toward the United States. A law professor, he served
as a deputy in the Assembly of the Republic from
1976 until 1980; since 1981 he has been Minister of
Culture and Scient~c Coordination. 25X1
Center Democrats
Diogo Freitas do Amaral resigned in late December
as leader of the Center Democrats-a move he proba-
bly thought would allow him to broaden his political
base and enhance his prospects for winning the presi-
dency in 1985. His resignation dealt the party a severe
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blow; polls taken right after the announcement by the
popular founder of the party showed that public
support for the Center Democrats had dropped from
19 to 12 percent. Freitas do Amaral's departure was
followed by a more general leadership shakeup. At the
party congress in mid-February, Minister of Culture
Francisco Lucas Pires came from the backbenches to
beat Luis Barbosa, the favorite of party regulars, for
the party's top position. We believe Lucas Pires took
advantage of grass-roots discontent and the overconfi-
dence of the Lisbon-based leadership.
It is not out of the question in our view that Lucas
Pires's victory and the defeat of the Lisbon group by
the provincial rank and file could revitalize the Center
Democrats. Despite their hard feelings, some of the
ousted leaders have agreed to head the party's lists in
important areas of centrist strength. The Embassy,
moreover, portrays Lucas Pires as a dynamic speaker
who should prove an effective campaigner, especially
among younger voters. And the provincial rank and
file-excited by their victory at the congress-are
likely to be enthusiastic campaigners in their home
areas, which also happen to be the places of the
party's highest potential strength.
Still, we believe the loss of Freitas do Amaral will not
be overcome easily, particularly given the tendency of
the Portuguese electorate to vote for the leader rather
than the party. Winning back the ground lost in the
polls will be all the harder now that the Social
Democrats have elected a conservative leadership that
may appeal to some of the Center Democrats' tradi-
tional supporters.
Publicly, Center Democratic leaders assert that their
goal in the election is to win enough seats to permit
another center-right alliance. In private, however,
they have adopted a somewhat more defensive pos-
ture. According to the US Embassy, Party Vice
President Adriano Moreira says that if the Center
Democrats won only 10 or 12 seats in the Assembly-
they controlled 46 in the last parliament-they would
not ally themselves with any other party or group. If
the party were to win 20 or 30 seats, however,
Moreira indicates that it would be prepared to make
some kind of pact with the Socialists or perhaps even
to join a Socialist government
The Socialist Party-
A Triumphant Return?
The Socialist Party emerged from the Revolution as
the most powerful party in Portugal and held office
from 1976 to 1978. It suffered significant losses,
however, in the elections of 1979 and 1980 because of
its poor governing record and its inability to compete
with the fresh image projected initially by the Demo-
cratic Alliance. In the December 1982 municipal
elections, the Socialists recouped some of those losses,
winning 31.4 percent of the vote, more than 4 percent-
age points better than their tally in the same election
The Socialists have, in our view, entered this election
campaign confidently. According to US Embassy
officials, they believe they can build on their recent
success and capitalize on the failure of the Democrat-
ic Alliance. Recognizing the conservative nature of
the Portuguese electorate, the party is running a
cautious campaign. The Socialists do not want to
promise social and economic programs that they could
not deliver under tight economic conditions. Instead,
the party is highlighting the weak and indecisive
leadership of Balsemao, the legislative ineffectiveness
of the Democratic Alliance, and the need to end the
country's economic decline. The Socialists are assert-
ing that they offer strong leadership, the ability to
establish a broad social pact to include both labor and
business, and a commitment to draw up a reasonably
precise timetable for economic and social recovery.
We believe the Socialists are in a strong position at
this juncture. Their impressive showing in the munici-
pal elections last December and the weak record of
the former Alliance parties lead us to think the
Socialists will win at least 30 to 35 percent of the vote.
Socialist leaders have told US Embassy officials that
they are focusing their campaign on disaffected liber-
al voters and on non-Socialist leftists, who may be
attracted by the prospect of backing a winner. 25X1`
The Socialists have been plagued by internal dissen-
sion. On 25 February a majority of the "ex-Secretari-
at" faction,2 which alleges that Soares leads the party
' The faction is made up of former members of the Socialist Party's
Secretariat. It covers the ideological spectrum in the party and is
held together by a strong belief that Soares's domination must be
reduced.
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Mario Soares, 58, has been Secretary General of the
Socialist Party since 1966. According to US Embassy
oljrcials, he relies on personal loyalties and,friend-
ships,for support and remains f firmly in control of his
party, although a smalllaction olprominent techno-
crats and locally popular.figures opposes his domina-
tion of the party. Embassy reporting indicates that
Soares, who was Prime Minister from 1976 until
1978, wants to run for president in 1985. We believe
that his candidacy is acceptable to the center right
because he is politically moderate and built credit
with the Democratic Alliance in 1982 through his
support on revising the Marxist-leaning 1976 Consti-
tution. We expect him to remain a viable candidate
even tf'he accepts the prime-ministership this spring.
A responsible democratic leader who is more moder-
ate than most European socialists, Soares is well
disposed toward the United States, pro-Western, and
pro-NATO. Embassy ol~cers say that Soares, as a
` vice president of the Socialist International (since
1976), has been a positive and moderatinglorce on
Central American issues. Some members of the So-
` cialist International view him as toolriendly toward
the United States; he supports US policies in Nicara-
gua, but has disagreed at times with this country s
policy in El Salvador. According to Embassy ollicers,
he has begun tolocus his attentions on southern
~gfrica and is organizing a Socialist International
conference on that regionlor later this year. A lawyer
and history professor, he served as Foreign Minister
during May 1974-March 1975 and againlrom Octo-
ber 1977 until February 1978; he is currently a
25X1 member of the Council of State.
be hurt if some of the dissidents refused to serve.
with an unnecessarily heavy hand, decided to boycott
the Socialist ticket. This decision grew out of the
refusal by the party's Political Commission to nomi-
nate anumber of the dissidents; the commission also
jeopardized the reelection of others by placing them
low on the party lists. The "ex-Secretariat" group
includes a number of prominent and well-respected
technocrats, as well as locally popular political fig-
ures. We believe the split will not affect the party's
election prospects, as the dispute is primarily over
sharing power, rather than over ideology. Moreover,
the dissidents have publicly agreed to downplay their
differences and work actively for the party in the 25X1
election. ASocialist-led government, however, could
If the Socialists come to power, party leader Mario
Soares has told the Embassy he will lead the govern-
ment. Party leaders had told US officials that he
would prefer not to do so, because leading a govern-
ment during a period of economic austerity and
possible social unrest could jeopardize his chances of
being elected Portugal's first civilian president in
1985. Soares now believes, however, that if he led the
party to power and then refused to serve, he would
further alienate voters already frustrated with the
democratic parties. 25X1
The Communist Party
Europe's most Stalinist and pro-Moscow party has no
chance of winning the election, but it is probably
hoping that popular discontent with the economic
situation will rebound to its benefit. In an effort to
appear more democratic and to avoid having to
campaign under the hammer and sickle, the Commu-
nists are running in coalition with the Communist-
leaning Popular Democratic Movement, the "Inde-
pendent Democrats of the Left," and the "Greens,"
an ecological party considered to be a Communist
front by the Embassy and some of the Portuguese
press. We expect the Communists' percentage of the
vote to remain about the same-between 15 and 20
percent. This would give them 40 to 50 seats in the
250-seat Assembly 25X1
Despite its relatively small parliamentary group, the
party is a force to be reckoned with and a potentially
disruptive factor because it controls Portugal's largest
labor federation, the CGTP-IN. Portugal has recently
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Secretary General of the Communist Party since
1961, Cunhal is an important~gure in international
communism. We believe that Cunhal s long years of
clandestine activity, punctuated by imprisonment-
including eight years in solitary co~nement-and
exile, have made him a dogmatic and inflexible
proponent of the Moscow-oriented, anti-Eurocom-
munist party line. He is publicly advocating a govern-
ment oj"all political parties. We believe this some-
what "conciliatory"statement is an effort to win back
disenchanted members and improve PCP showing in
the national election on 25 April. US Embassy
officials say that he has also labeled recent Portu-
guese initiatives in Mozambique as a "trojan horse of
neocolonialism."Aiawyer who has never practiced
that profession, he served as Minister Without Port-
Jolio during the~rst four provisional governments in
postrevolutionary Portugal (May 1974-August 1975)
and has been elected to the Assembly of the Republic
since 1976. He currently serves on the Council of
State. Cunhal, 69
the recently concluded CGTP-IN congress, officials
threatened further labor unrest if the Socialists form a
coalition with the parties of the right.0 25X1
The Communists' are following the same strategy in
this election that they have used since their ill-fated
grab for power in 1975-waiting to see what the other
parties say or do, and then attacking them. Party
leader Alvaro Cunhal led off the Communists' elec-
toral campaign by singling out the Socialists for
criticism, particularly Mario Soares, and taking
swipes at the Socialist International, NATO, and the
United States. Through its semiofficial voice O
Diario, the party has alleged that during his recent
trip to the US, Soares traded Portuguese bases and
Portuguese support of United States policy in south-
ern Africa for promises of US aid.
The Socialists probably will win at least a plurality of
seats in the Assembly. The government-building proc-
ess that would follow could take several weeks. We
believe the Socialists would try first to forge a major-
ity coalition with the Social Democrats. The Social
Democrats would bargain hard, however, and agree-
ment on the division of key ministerial posts and
government policy could prove impossible. Even if the
leaders of the two parties were to agree on these
issues, the Socialist left and the Social Democratic
right might try to prevent such an alliance. The
leaders of both parties would then have to weigh the
potential cost of driving away dissident factions
against the possibility that such splits would render
the two parties closer in outlook and goals and make a
coalition between them more durable. In the past
neither party has been willing to consider an alliance
with the other because of concern over weakening its
flanks.
If the Socialists were unable to form a coalition that
gave them a parliamentary majority, we believe they
would try to create a minority government. They
-would do so, however, only if they could win agree-
ment on a "social pact" involving the parties, the
experienced a succession of crippling transportation
strikes, in which strikers demanded higher pay and
won support from both the CGTP-IN and the demo-
cratic UGT-a confederation of Socialist and Social
Democratic unions. The Embassy believes, however,
that the Communists may be encouraging the strikers
in order to demonstrate that they still have clout. At
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business community, and labor. Leading Social Dem-
ocrats and Center Democrats have given at least
lipservice to the need for compromise among key
interest groups if the country's problems are to be
resolved, and President Eanes has long advocated a
dialogue along these lines. The Socialists are already
trying to reach a broad understanding with various
business groups about how to handle the country's
' economic problems. A prominent Socialist has told
US officials that he believes business associations
25X1 would quietly support the Socialists.
Labor stability would be crucial to the success of any
program. Socialist leaders have told the Embassy that
talks between the Democratic-UGT and the Socialists
have gone well. However, those with the CGTP-IN,
which represents the majority of workers, have not
been fruitful. We do not believe the CGTP-IN will
give up its right to strike without an advance promise
of the sort of wage and labor policies that no govern-
ment intent on austerity could afford to give. For its
part, the Communist Party has publicly claimed that
it deserves a role in the next government, in effect
threatening to block a "social pact" if it is denied a
25X1 place.
In the unlikely event the Socialists failed to win a
plurality, we would expect the former Democratic
Alliance partners to try to form a new coalition.
Despite a change of leadership in both parties, neither
party has put forth any new ideas for running the
country. We would thus expect a new government
based on these parties to follow a program similar to
that of the government that collapsed in December,
even though the Alliance's prescription was widely
judged a failure.
Regardless of the political complexion of the next
government, it will face formidable economic obsta-
cles. Apparently persuaded by a consensus among
most Portuguese economists, Socialist leaders are now
trying to convince the rest of the party to accept some
harsh realities. The projected current account deficit
of over $3 billion suggests that the IMF will have to
be called in before the end of the year, and the painful
adjustment program necessary to correct Portugal's
balance-of-payments deficit will, we believe, include
squeezing both private and public consumption. There
is thus the possibility of further labor unrest as
Portuguese workers feel the economic pinch more
acutely. Workers have objected strongly to the mini-
mal wage guidelines set by Balsemao and are striking
for higher pay. The Embassy's projected 1983 budget
deficit of over $2 billion-more than 10 percent of
GDP-shows that progress in controlling government
expenditures has been minimal; we believe the Social-
ists are unlikely to be any more successful at this than
the Alliance. Moreover, whereas it may be economi-
cally attractive to reduce government outlays by
selling inefficient state-owned enterprises to private
interests, it would be politically difficult fora Social-
ist government to move in this direction.
None of the probable outcomes of the election is
likely, in our view, to satisfy the public's yearning for
stable government. The pressing need for austere
policies that are unpopular with the public and there-
fore unappealing to the politicians would in itself
make consensus difficult. Combined with the intense
partisan tendencies among the principal political lead-
ers and the internal dissension in each of the demo-
cratic parties, the economic exigencies augur, we
think, for more of the jealous bickering that has
consumed much of the political elite's energy in recent
years. 25X1
We believe that these problems will only be exacer-
bated by the mutual suspicions of the political leaders
and President Eanes. Eanes and the politicians are
deeply at odds over the proper role of the president.
Party leaders believe that Eanes has interpreted his
powers far too broadly, weighing in too often on
matters where his authority is questionable. For his
part, Eanes has often publicly expressed frustration
over what he views as the politicians' inability to work
together for the larger good of the country. This point
of view has prompted him to step in from time to time
to avert a crisis or reestablish stability.) 25X1
The situation is further complicated by persistent
rumors among Portuguese political observers that
Eanes intends at some point to create his own broadly
based centrist party to put an end to what he sees as
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partisan squabbling. In our view the existing parties of
the center-the Socialists and the Social Demo-
crats-feel most threatened by this prospect, but
party leaders across the spectrum probably fear that
such a broad centrist amalgamation might challenge
the present multiparty nature of Portuguese democra-
cy. We believe they are concerned, moreover, that an
Eanes-led party would have some of the negative
attributes of the prerevolutionary regime, especially
its emphasis on strong personal leadership.
such activitie~This is partly a matter of sovereignty,
but the Portuguese have also stressed that they face
increased risks in permitting expanded use of their
facilities. We think their greatest concern in this
regard is the possible negative impact on Lisbon's
relations with the Arab states and the chance of a
cutoff of their oil supply. Portugal suffered a long-
term rupture with the Arab world after allowing the
United States to resupply Israel through the Azores in
1973.
The conflict between the President and the parties is
temporarily in abeyance as the politicians focus on the
campaign, but we believe it will resurface if the new
government proves unable to cope effectively with the
country's problems. The tensions could become all the
greater if Soares is Prime Minister, as he and Eanes
strongly dislike each other. The parties did restrict
Eanes's room to maneuver when they revised the
Constitution last year, but the President still can
bring substantial powers to bear, if he believes the
government is not functioning adequately. For exam-
ple, he can veto legislation and can dissolve the
government and the Assembly.
In contrast to the mistrust and bitterness that charac-
terizes the dialogue within the political elite on many
domestic matters, there is a-broad consensus among
Portugal's democratic political leaders on foreign
policy. All democratic parties in Portugal are pro-
NATO and pro-West, and the foreign policy of a
Socialist government would differ mainly in tone and
emphasis from that of its predecessor. Soares has
consistently shown, both as Prime Minister from 1976
until 1978, and in his capacity as vice president of the
Socialist International, the high value he places on
US-Portuguese cooperation.
Soares is sensitive to the strategic importance of Lajes
Airbase in the Azores, both for the United States and
NATO, and we do not foresee major problems in
concluding the renewal of the Lajes Airbase agree-
ment. Although we expect the Socialists to be general-
ly receptive to US requests to use Portuguese military
facilities for purposes other than those of NATO, they
will not, according to Jaime Gama-the Socialists'
defense spokesman-grant blanket permission for
There are other factors that will constrain the Social-
ists in working out military agreements with the
United States. Embassy and defense reporting. has
highlighted the belief of some military leaders that
Portugal is not being treated fairly either by the
United States or by the other NATO Allies in terms
of equipment support or compensation for facilities.
Although the National Defense Law of 1982 places
the military firmly under civilian control, politicians
must still take account of the needs and desires of the
armed forces in any military-related negotiations.
Press coverage of the implications of US use of
Portugal's facilities, moreover, suggests that the Por-
tuguese think such use would increase Portugal's
vulnerability to attacks by a third party.
In addition to these concerns, aSocialist-led govern-
ment would be somewhat more worried than its
predecessor about likely Communist Party charges of
selling out to the United States. Portugal's chronically
weak economy will also encourage the government to
press for significant compensation for expanded use of
military facilities.
We believe a Socialist government would maintain
Portugal's petition for EC membership. In fact, the
Socialists made Portugal's original bid to the Commu-
nity in 1977. It is quite likely that negotiations will be
concluded later this year, and Portugal could be ready
to enter the EC in 1985. One major hitch is whether
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25X1
25X1
the EC will be willing to let Portugal come in before
Spain, which is not as close to entry. To date, both the
Community and Spain have favored simultaneous
entry.
Like most of Portugal's major parties, the Socialists
have stressed that the country has a special role to
play in Africa and should move to assume it as
quickly as resources permit. The Socialists have told
Embassy officials that they want to help reduce Soviet
and Cuban involvement in Africa, stimulate greater
trade between Portugal and Africa, and act discreetly
as a go-between for the West and the Africans. A
Socialist-led government would probably continue the
African policies initiated by President Eanes and the
Democratic Alliance.
the two main former colonies-Mozambique
and Angola-are receptive to some forms of coopera-
tion, including on militar matters.
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