CHINA S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS: PEOPLE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00554R000100170005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China's 12th Party Congress:
People, Policy, and Prospects
Secret
EA 82-10108
October 1982
337
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Directorate of
Intelligence
China's 12th Party Congress:
People, Policy, and Prospects
This assessment was pre ared b
of the Office of
as sian Analysis, an of the
Office of Central Reference. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief
Domestic Policy Branch, OEA
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 82-10108
October 1982
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China's 12th Party Congress:
People, Policy, and Prospects
0
Key Judgments Deng Xiaoping made impressive personnel gains at the 12th Party
Information available Congress that improve General Secretary Hu Yaobang's chances of
as of 20 September 1982 staying in power after Deng dies. The Congress also endorsed Deng's
was used in this report.
reform program, but we believe major obstacles remain that threaten its
realization and that will force Hu to compromise with his opponents. We
expect that:
? Beijing will meet stiff resistance in attempting to reform the lower
administrative reaches of the party and government and may be forced to
soften its reformist initiatives.
? Hu will continue to face opposition from senior military traditionalists
who pose the most serious challenge to his succession, despite efforts to
curry favor by moving closer to them on some issues.
? Beijing will continue to grope for solutions to its economic problems, and
will have difficulty in meshing a party purge and development goals so
that economic performance does not suffer.
? Ideological exhortation will fail to reverse the loss of faith in the party,
and the reformists will resort to more authoritarian methods to stifle
criticism and preserve their rule.
Gains made by Deng Xiaoping at the 12th Party Congress include:
? Placing nine supporters on the Politburo and removing former party
Chairman Hua Guofeng.
? Replacing over half of the Central Committee with members who
support his policies.
? Winning official endorsement of a party purge that will last three years
and will target members who question his policies.
Deng failed, however, to remove prominent critics of both his program and
his succession arrangements from the Politburo Standing Committee. In
our judgment, Deng will now attempt to shift the focus of policymaking
and power from the Politburo to the party Secretariat, headed by Hu.
The Congress acted on the entire range of policy questions before the
leadership:
? Military. A number of senior Army officials were relegated to advisory
status at the Congress, presaging significant shifts in the regional
military commands. Nonetheless, the influential old guard remains a
generally conservative force on the political scene, skeptical of the reform
program, and unconvinced of Hu Yaobang's ability to lead.
iii Secret
EA 82-10108
October 1982
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generally conservative force on the political scene, skeptical of the reform
program, and unconvinced of Hu Yaobang's ability to lead.
? Economy. The Congress endorsed the reformist program and indicated
that, despite acknowledged problems, it will continue. Economic develop-
ment was declared the number-one priority, but the Congress documents
and available reporting suggest to us that the Chinese are still uncertain
how to proceed. The goal of quadrupled national output by the century's
end, a 7-percent gain each year, in our view, is attainable only in the un-
likely event the Chinese can overhaul their managerial infrastructure.
? Ideology. We believe the Congress's generally conservative ideological
tone and its concern about the public loss of confidence in the party
foreshadow increasing emphasis on stricter ideological guidelines and on
combating the spread of Western values in China.
? Foreign Policy. The Congress endorsed the more nationalistic foreign
policy line of the last year. It declared an interest in broadening relations
with the United States but stressed that the Taiwan Relations Act
remains "a cloud" over the relationship. The Congress also indicated an
interest in expanding low-level contacts with the Soviet Union, but
declared that any significant improvement in relations depends upon
Moscow taking "practical steps" to diminish its threat to China.
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Secret
B. Highlights of General Secretary Hu Yaobang's Report
to the Congress
E. The Road to the 12th Congress (1977-82)
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Secret
China's 12th Party Congress:
People, Policy, and Prospects
The 12th Party Congress, which met in Beijing
1-1 1 September 1982, did not allow Deng Xiaoping
all the organizational changes he wanted, but we
believe he made impressive gains that improve Gener-
al Secretary Hu Yaobang's chances of staying in
power after Deng dies. Appointments and removals of
party leaders significantly strengthened Deng's and
Hu's positions in the Politburo and Secretariat, as
well as in the Central Committee.' The Congress
officially endorsed their pragmatic domestic and for-
eign policies, including a prospective purge of the
party membership.
Deng's gains
Party reformers under Deng succeeded in removing a
mixed bag of seven full and two alternate members of
the Politburo, replacing them with nine leaders of
demonstrated loyalty to Deng and the reform pro-
gram. Four full and two alternate members of the
Secretariat were named to vacancies created by the
reshuffle. Three of these are longstanding associates
of Hu and two are close to Deng.
Dengist gains on the Central Committee were even
more impressive. Of the 210 members, 53 percent are
new or were promoted from alternate membership in
the 1 1 th Central Committee. The percentage is higher
for new alternates. Reflecting Deng's priorities, over
two-thirds of the new members are under 60 years
old, and 17 percent of the total membership are
functional specialists, an eightfold increase. Signifi-
cantly, the military share of full and alternate mem-
bership in the Central Committee declined from
roughly 30 percent to under 20 percent.
Most important, Deng also obtained his party's en-
dorsement of a major campaign to extend over three
years, starting in late 1983, to bring about "overall
' See appendix A for a detailed breakdown of the new Central
Committee. Appendix C is a list of appointments and dismissals.=
A Pronounciation Guide
to Chinese Names in
This Paper
rectification of party style and consolidation of party
organizations." This nonviolent purge will investigate
all party members expressly for adherence to the
party's line since the third plenary session of the 11th
Central Committee in 1978, at which Deng's policy
orientation became dominant, a test we believe party
conservatives and ideologues resisted. By calling in
the party cards of 39.6 million members for examina-
tion by the Discipline Inspection Commission, the
reformers will begin the tortuous process of winnow-
ing out opponents of reform and of Hu's succession to
Deng.
The Congress also dropped former party Chairman
and Premier Hua Guofeng, a symbol of loyalty to
Mao and of resistance to reform, from the Politburo
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Standing Committee to mere membership on the
Central Committee. The titles of party chairman and
vice chairman were eliminated, leaving Hu Yaobang
at the top of the party structure as General Secretary,
charged with running daily party affairs and conven-
ing meetings of the Politburo
Politburo Politics
Although some Western observers have interpreted
Deng"s failure to remove senior party elders and
former Vice Chairmen Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian
from the Politburo Standing Committee as a major
setback for the reformers, we believe such a charac-
terization is incorrect. The pattern of events and
Deng's past behavior lead us to conclude that Deng
realized some time before the preparatory meetings
for the Congress, held in Beijing in early August, that
he would have to change tactics in the face of the
obstinate refusal of Ye, Li, and the other elders to
retire.
It is our judgment that Deng and the reform camp
were forced to retain as members of the Politburo
elderly officials who wished to remain and then opted
to pack the body with elderly allies. Deng was unable
to have a reduction in the role of the Politburo and its
Standing Committee written formally into the new
party constitution, but public statements by senior
reformers indicate that the Deng camp intends to
make the Politburo a "second-line" institution. Deng's
group plans to shift the focus of policymaking and,
therefore, power to the younger, more energetic Sec-
retariat, headed by Hu and staffed by people close to
him and Deng.l
In our view, Deng essentially is gambling that Hu
Yaobang's control of daily affairs through the Secre-
tariat will be backstopped by trusted lieutenants' orr-
the Politburo. He is also wagering that Ye and Li will
be unable to exercise great influence from the Politbu-
ro Standing Committee because of their obviously
increasing infirmity. We believe the average age of
the new Politburo, 72-six years above its predeces-
sor--means that it will be a less active institution in
any case
The Leadership Mix
Politburo. We believe it is a solid demonstration of
Deng's strength in the party that he was able to name
nine full and alternate members to the Politburo
without acquiescing in the new appointment of a
single known opposition figure. Old adversaries, how-
ever, such as Politburo and Secretariat member Yu
Quili, who takes exception to parts of current econom-
ic policy, remain in top offices. Similarly, military
officers who we suspect of resistance to Deng's efforts
to professionalize and depoliticize the armed forces,
such as Wei Guoqing and Zhang Tingfa, also retained
their seats.
The Politburo and its Standing Committee now con-
tain an absolute majority of leaders who generally
support reform policies, although differences within
the reform camp on specific issues have emerged and
will continue to complicate policymaking.Z The key
gains for the reformers, viewed from the perspective
of guaranteeing Hu Yaobang's succession to Deng,
were the removal of Hua Guofeng and Politburo and
Secretariat member Peng Chong from the leadership.
Hua steadily lost power after 1978, when Deng
succeeded in killing the personality cult then growing
z On the Standing Committee the reform majority comprises Deng,
Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Chen Yun. Unlike Hu and Zhao,
Chen is not one of Deng's proteges. He is a veteran party leader and
economic specialist holding high office in his own right. Since
returning to power in 1978, he has generally supported the reform
leadership, although tending to impose outer limits on the pace and
scope of change. Deng has assiduously cultivated his support, and
the two have frequently been paired in the media as China's most
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around Hua and began a slow rewriting of party
history and ideology. Nonetheless, Hu and Deng
could not afford to leave this symbol of loyalty to Mao
and opposition to their program on the Politburo
during the succession period. We believe Hua still
commands some popular support in the provinces, and
conceivably could have served as a rallying point for
anti-Hu forces.
The demotion of Peng Chong was an astute move that
denies high office to one of the very few individuals
young enough and sufficiently well connected to
become a rival of Hu on his own. Peng was entrusted
by Hua Guofeng with subduing Shanghai leftists
when the Gang of Four was arrested in 1976, and
after going to Beijing was responsible for the security
apparatus
The promotions of military men to the Politburo leave
the overall proportion of representation by the armed
forces roughly the same as before, but with a more
reformist cast. Yang Shangkun, who is also Perma-
nent Vice Chairman of the party Military Commis-
sion and thus oversees its daily business, has had
longstanding ties to Deng and was pilloried in the
Cultural Revolution for his leadership of the party's
sensitive General Office from 1945 to 1966. In a
promotion we view as intended to help protect the
physical security of Hu and the reformers when the
succession to Deng takes place, Beijing Military
Region Commander Qin Jiwei was made an alternate
member of the Politburo. Qin served under Deng in
the 1940s, was purged during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and has moved ahead in step with Deng in recent
years.
Of those Politburo members dropped at the 12th
Congess, one stands out as anomalous. Geng Biao,
who was appointed Defense Minister under Deng's
sponsorship against stiff military resistance in 1981,
retired to the Central Advisory Commission without
advance warning. We believe Deng may have been
forced to trade Geng away in order to obtain the other
military appointments he desired.
Secretariat. Since last spring, Deng and Hu have
demonstrated considerable freedom in staffing the
central party departments subordinate to the general
Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, despite their age and obvious railty,
remain powerful checks on Deng 's plans.
secretary.' In our view, Hu is slowly building a
personal power base in the Central Committee depart-
ments, and the Congress saw new gains for him.
Three officials with longstanding ties to Hu were
elevated to the Secretariat, and three other appoint-
ments went to officials with strong reform credentials.
Hu's longtime protege, Hu Qili, already heads the
party's General Office, guiding paperwork and ad-
ministration. We expect he will assume new authority
on the Secretariat in organizational and security
affairs and will have a major role in the rectification
campaign. Yang Yong's appointment to supervise
military affairs brings a fully trusted lieutenant of
Deng Xiaoping to the job. Deng chose Yang Yong as
his deputy when Deng regained the position of Army
Chief of Staff in 1977.
Coping With Ye and Li
We believe the retention of the Politburo Standing
Committee and its composition pose some risks for
Deng. The continued presence of Ye and Li will
ensure them somewhat more direct access to the
levers of power than if they had been relegated to the
Advisory Commission. Thus, we believe they will be
able to continue supporting their patronage networks
' A diagram of the Central Committee departments can be found in
appendix D, a chart of the new party organs and organization
approved at the Congress.
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in the party, state, and Army. They may also act as
brakes on the implementation of reform policies,
resisting or modifying decisions in the process of
consensus building. If Deng dies before Ye and Li,
they will have a major say in the outcome of the
We believe the odds favor Deng and that he probably
calculates that Ye and Li are so ill that he will outlive
them, making their retirement a moot issue.
Approving the party line: the dais at the opening session of the
Congress. From the left: Deng Yingchao, Nie Rongzhen, Hua
Guofeng, Li Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Hu Y aoban ,
Zhao Ziyang, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, and Peng Zhen.
party, and the continuation of China's wary opening
Given these circumstances, we believe Deng may have
judged that the political cost of forcibly retiring the
two elders was too high. The parternalistic nature of
Chinese politics, moreover, channels power into the
hands of individuals, not institutions. Relocating Ye
and Li to the Advisory Commission would encumber
but not end their ability to exercise influence.I
By and large the Congress endorsed the policy direc-
tion hammered out by Deng and Hu over the past few
years.' This included a reaffirmation of the party's
commitment to gradual economic reform, the cultiva-
tion of younger and better educated talent for the
The new party constitution is written in a way that will prevent the
death of Ye or Li from automatically forcing the leadership to
replace either man. Only four positions in the party leadership must
be filled by members of the Politburo Standing Committee, which
now has six members. Deng, Hu Yaobang, and veteran Chen Yun
hold all four titles: Chairman of the Advisory Commission (Deng);
General Secretary, (Hu); First Secretary of the Discipline Inspec-
tion Commission, (Chen); and Chairman of the Military Commis-
sion, (Deng). Ye, Li, and Premier Zhao Ziyang do not hold such
positions, thus their departure would not create a void on the
Standing Committee that would require immediate party action to
Rectification and Reform
The Congress committed the party to a thorough
purge beginning in the latter half of 1983. The
Congress was vague about the mechanics of the
campaign, other than to indicate that it will begin at
the top and work its way down. In our view, the delay
in starting is probably to establish and staff the
organs that will be responsible. The purge is to be
carried out gradually over three years and will involve
a review of the dossiers of all members. Those found
wanting will not have their party credentials revali-
dated.
Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi, who was the press
spokesman for the Congress, told correspondents that
the number of those ultimately dismissed would not
be large because all who are found deficient would be
given an opportunity to repent and undergo reeduca-
tion. We believe, however, Beijing would not have
given itself a year to prepare for the rectification and
another three years to conduct it to purge a small
number of recalcitrants. In our view, the number to be
purged is far greater than that suggested by Zhu-
perhaps several million.
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Also on the agenda for next year is the extension of
the restructuring of the central party and state organs
to the provinces. The process has already begun in a
few places where conditions are "especially ripe." The
presence on the Central Advisory Commission of
seven provincial first secretaries, three governors, four
military commanders, and five regional political com-
missars leads us to believe that preparations for a
fairly extensive shakeup of local organizations are
well advanced. Although it is as yet unclear whether
officials-aside from Deng-will be permitted to sit
on the advisory body and retain other party or state
positions, we expect that, in line with Deng's plans, if
those appointed to the Advisory Commission return to
their old jobs, it will be to preside over the transition
to successors. The installation of fresh leadership in
the provinces presumably will spur further adminis-
trative changes, first when new administrators seek to
emplace their own teams and later, as initial person-
nel moves take root, the network of trustworthy
replacements expands in trickle-down fashion
Army-Party Relations
Deng was able to make some small inroads into the
military's influence at the Congress, but we believe
senior political operatives in the Army remain a major
obstacle to the smooth transfer of power to Hu.
Military representation on the Central Committee
was significantly reduced, and most military members
are now commanders and technocrats, not political
commissars. A number of senior military officers also
retired to the Central Advisory Commission, creating
headroom for the younger officers needed to further
Deng's plans to professionalize the military.
The Soldier-Politicians. In our view, Deng is con-
tending with the military on two levels. First, he is
trying to limit and reduce the political influence of a
group of largely elderly, respected military leaders,
led by Ye Jianying, whose importance in the party
rose during the 1960s. This group is unwilling to yield
power and is particularly reluctant to accept the
leadership of Hu Yaobang. The reformers have ad-
vanced a variety of schemes to dilute the influence of
the military as a whole in the party's internal affairs.
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In what we see as an important impediment to the
reformers' ambitions, the new party constitution re-
tains a major political role for the military commis-
sion. We see this as perpetuating the Army's direct
influence in the deliberations of the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee, from which the commission chairman
must be chosen. Although the Congress apparently
failed to enhance Hu's personal influence on the
commission, we believe that body is no political threat
to Hu's standing as long as Deng is chairman.I
Below the Top. In order to bring about changes in the
armed forces that will make Hu's task easier, Deng
and some reform-minded senior officers are pressing
changes on the Army at a level below the top soldier-
politicians. We estimate that Deng did comparatively
well in this area at the Congress as well as in the
months before it, when "leading organs" under the
military commission were revamped. The sharp re-
duction of military representation in the Central
Committee illustrates this effort. Most members are
professional soldiers, and political commissars hold
less than a third of the military share of seats. On the
Politburo, the three new military members have
backed the reform program.
The disproportionately large share of military retirees
on the new Central Advisory Commission creates, we
believe, additional opportunities for reformers. More
than a third of the Commission consists of senior
Army men whose withdrawal from active duty will
give Deng the opportunity to promote more tractable
officers. The retirement of six old-line administrators
from the Army's leading staff schools may also
facilitate modernization of training and tactics.
Plans for the military Commission itself remain
murky. In keeping with past practice, the membership
of the Commission was not announced, and the
publicly released list of its vice chairmen disclosed no
new names. In his report, Hu indicated that the
reformers plan to increase the government's role in
daily management of the Army through its new
Central Military Council. Nonetheless, after the Con-
gress, reformist Politburo member Hu Qiaomu dis-
closed that military Commission members will hold
joint appointments on the government body. We
Chen Yun, allied with Deng on
most issues, sets economic poli-
remain skeptical that the reformers can reduce the
influence of the old guard in the military Commission
on the management of the Army in the near term.
The Economy
The Congress strongly endorsed the controversial
economic reform program begun at the Third Plenum
in 1978, and while acknowledging abuses and prob-
lems, stated that additional reforms are planned. Both
Hu's report and the new party constitution hold that
economic development is the party's principal task for
the rest of the century. Hu reaffirmed that raising
living standards will continue to be a top priority but
noted that improvements will depend on increases in
labor productivity, which we believe will be hard to
come by
Goals. In his report, Hu stated that China's "strategic
objective" is to quadruple the national product by the
year 2000, with special emphasis on resolving prob-
lems in agriculture, energy and transport, and educa-
tion and science. The remainder of the 1980s, he said,
will be spent on reforming the economic management
system, and growth will be moderate. Hu predicted
that an "all-around upsurge" would follow in the
1990s.
Quadrupling the national product is not a new goal.
Deng made reference to it in January 1980, and both
Deng and Hu have discussed it with recent foreign
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visitors including Australian Prime Minister Fraser.
Chinese treatment of the goal and comments by
senior economists at the Congress reflect a certain
defensiveness, however, that leads us to conclude some
Chinese officials believe the target is too ambitious.
One leading economist rejected a comparison of the
current goal with Great Leap Forward targets, and
another insisted that the targets have been carefully
worked out.
We believe the target is very ambitious, and attain-
able only in the unlikely event the Chinese are able to
complete the radical overhaul of their economic man-
agement structure scheduled for this decade. Quadru-
pling output by the year 2000 requires an annual
average growth of 7 percent, somewhat higher than
the 6-percent annual growth rate of the past 30 years.
Hu did not present a detailed plan for achieving this
goal, but he did give the most explicit timetable we
have seen since 1980, when the reform program was
slowed to allow Beijing to deal with the dislocations
caused by it. According to Hu, "the readjustment
period," during which Beijing will focus on bringing
down bloated investment rates, eradicating budget
deficits and inflation, and redressing imbalances
among production sectors, will last for the remainder
of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85); it was original-
ly scheduled to run three years, 1979-81. This sug-
gests to us that the leadership is aiming for growth of
perhaps 5 to 6 percent per year for the rest of the
1980s and 8 to 10 percent thereafter. Hu expressed
confidence that a master plan for reform can be
designed prior to and implemented during the Seventh
Five-Year Plan (1986-90)
Reforms. Although the Congress strongly endorsed
the goals of the economic reform program, it frankly
acknowledged the abuses and dislocations that have
accompanied it. Hu addressed specifically the thorny
issues of decentralization of economic decisionmak-
ing, the role of market forces, and China's economic
relations with the outside world, all subjects of inter-
nal debate.
Hu indicated that Beijing will reduce the discretion-
ary powers of local governments and enterprises to
invest and allocate scarce inputs. We expect they will
resist, further complicating Beijing's efforts to reas-
sert central control over the economy. He also reiter-
ated that the government intends to curtail "indis-
criminate" payment of bonuses to workers and that
procurement prices paid to peasants will be tightly
controlled. We remain skeptical about the govern-
ment's ability to do so, as similar efforts the past year
In keeping with the general theme of reasserting more
central control over the economy, the Congress
stressed the paramount role of central planning and
the "subsidiary" role of market forces. The Congress
announced that a three-tiered planning structure will
be implemented in China. According to Hu, most of
the economy, including most capital and consumer
goods, would continue to fall under the direction of 2
the central "mandatory plan." A new "guidance
plan" will cover goods whose production and distribu-
tion by collective and private enterprises can be
guided by "economic levers," such as pricing, fiscal,
and monetary policies. Market forces, the last tier,
will govern seasonal goods and small commodities
produced and sold locally. The Congress did not
elaborate on how these three plans will mesh, when
the system will go into effect, or exactly which sectors
of the economy will fall under each component. The
apparent complexity of this system and China's lack
of experience with what will be a fundamentally new
management structure for the economy suggests to us
that successful implementation will be a long time in
coming.
The Congress reaffirmed China's commitment to an
open-door economic policy and a "vigorous expansion
of foreign trade." Hu made this point a number of
times in his address and turned aside criticism from
those concerned about foreign influence in China. He
acknowledged that contact with capitalists can lead to
corruption and bourgeois values, but he insisted that
the solution is not to abandon present policy.
Ideology
The Congress stressed a pragmatic approach to Chi-
na's problems and a retreat from Maoist strictures,
but also struck a more conservative, classically Lenin-
ist, tone on ideological issues. Hu returned repeatedly
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in his address to a lack of popular confidence in
Communism and, by extension, the leadership of the
party-China's so-called crisis of confidence. In re-
sponse he stressed a harder line, indicating that
anyone who sullies socialism or the party-a reference
to China's quarrelsome intellectual and artistic com-
munity as well as to widespread antiparty sentiments
among the young-can expect harsh treatment.
The defensiveness of Hu's comments and an implicit
reference to events in Poland underscore our judg-
ment that the leadership as a whole-reformers and
conservatives-believe they face a major problem in
reviving popular respect for the party. In our view,
there are differences within the party on how best to
accomplish this rejuvenation. With the specter of
Poland in the background, some take the view that a
more open system, a responsive party, and other
domestic reforms provide the best solution. Others see
the need to crack down hard against all sources of
potential disruption. The central party leadership has
attempted to placate both groups, to the general
satisfaction of neither.
In the ideological realm, we believe the party will
continue its movement toward more orthodox
Marxism-Leninism. To shore up the party's image,
propaganda extolling socialist values will attempt to
persuade the Chinese of their superior system. More
important, however, is the tightening up that is almost
certain to accompany the propaganda campaign. We
expect recent party and government decrees that
discourage contact between private Chinese and for-
eigners will be strictly enforced and perhaps supple-
mented. The dangers of bourgeois values will remain
a prominent topic, as will unfavorable characteriza-
tions of life in the West. We expect to see prepara-
tions for the coming rectification campaign stress
orthodox themes that will reinforce this trend.I
Foreign Policy
Deng's opening speech to the Congress reflected
extreme sensitivity toward issues involving Chinese
sovereignty and independence, and we believe Deng
struck an aggressive posture on this score in part to
preempt critics of his handling of foreign affairs.
Deng has repeatedly been forced by conservative
Deng Xiaoping, architect of the
Congress and its policies, re-
mains the most powerful man
in China despite his claims of
'retiring to the second line. "~
elements in the leadership to defend his "open-door"
policy publicly over the past year and to make
adjustments giving his policy a more independent
cast, less biased toward the West. The policy state-
ment approved by the Congress endorsed this new line
in terms free of doctrinaire ideology that focused
instead on the concrete problems in China's relations
with the United States, the Soviet Union, and other
countries.
The line adopted in Deng's speech and Hu's report did
not depart significantly from that evolved over the
past two years. With added emphasis on the Taiwan
issue, Deng repeated in the same priority the goals for
the decade first enunciated in 1980: "to intensify
socialist modernization, to strive for reunification and
particularly for the return of Taiwan to the mother-
land, and to combat hegemonism and safeguard world
peace."
Relations With the United States, USSR. The de-
tailed portions of Hu's report asserted China's interest
in expanding relations with the United States, but
indicated that relations will develop "only if" the
United States adheres to the provisions of the US-
China communique on arms sales to Taiwan. This
recapitulates the line taken when the communique
was announced in August. In a statement by the
Foreign Ministry spokesman, and in a People's Daily
editorial, the Chinese hold that the Taiwan Relations
Act remains a "cloud" over the relationship that
forces Beijing to monitor US arms sales closely.
25
25
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Policy toward the USSR similarly followed lines
evolved over the past year. Beijing enumerated the
USSR's "grave threats to the peace of Asia and to
China's security"-Soviet armed forces on China's
borders, support for Vietnam, and the invasion of
Afghanistan. Hu echoed the Foreign Ministry's earli-
er response to General Secretary Brezhnev's call for
improving relations in Tashkent last March by saying:
"We note the Soviet leaders have expressed more than
once the desire to improve relations with China. But
deeds, rather than words, are important." Hu called
for "practical steps to lift their threat" to China's
security. The 1977 Congress document similarly
called for deeds rather than words.
The Congress, nonetheless, reaffirmed China's will-
ingness to "safeguard and develop" friendship be-
tween the Soviet and Chinese peoples. We believe this
formulation provides justification for continuing and
expanding low-level contacts with Moscow begun
early this year. Beijing agreed to exploratory discus-
sions with Moscow at the vice foreign minister level,
thus resuming the contacts interrupted in early 1980
after the invasion of Afghanistan. We believe the
Chinese awaited the outcome of discussions with the
United States over Taiwan before agreeing to meet
with the Soviets. In our view, Deng may also have
believed that timing his reply during the party Con-
gress would offset criticism of his handling of the
communique and foreign affairs generally.
Fraternal Parties. Hu's report repeated the recent
themes of China's ecumenical approach toward other
Communist parties. The report stressed that each
party operates under specific conditions and cannot
give or accept directions from outside. This is meant
in part to reassure Southeast Asia where several states
remain nervous about Beijing's refusal to break ties
with indigenous Communist parties and concerned
about potential Chinese assistance to these insurgen-
cies. It also tones down the strident language con-
tained in the 1977 Congress document
Hu said the Chinese party is willing to learn from
"all" parties on a basis of equality and noninterfer-
ence, probably a hint of interest in relations with the
Soviet-dominated East Europeans who do not have
party relations with Beijing. Beijing has long pursued,
General Secretary Hu Yao-
ban Den 's chosen successor.
I :J
to Moscow's annoyance, a "differentiated approach"
to the Soviet and East European parties, refusing all
dealings with the Soviet party while sounding out its
satellites. Hu's report reinforced this distinction in an
unmistakable reference to Moscow that reminded the
Congress "our party has suffered from the attempt of
a self-elevated paternal party to keep us under con-
trol."
Since proclaiming the reform agenda in speeches in
1980, Deng and his allies have, we believe, made great
progress in putting the past behind them by producing
a party judgment on Mao Zedong and publicly trying
the Gang of Four and Lin Biao's followers. This year's 2
reorganization of the party, government, and Army
bureaucracies marked a long stride toward rejuvena-
tion of the upper stratum of China's officialdom.
Their gains notwithstanding, we believe Deng and Hu
have their work cut out for them in coming months.
The Congress endorsed their policies and made some
personnel shifts that will help, but major obstacles
remain.
Rectification
The rectification campaign slated to begin next year
will be Hu Yaobang's opportunity to clean house at
the middle and lower levels of the party. These have
remained largely untouched since the Cultural Revo-
lution, and we believe they constitute a source of
opposition to reform through foot dragging, inaction,
and even outright resistance. The patronage networks
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that extend downward from Ye and Li to these levels
would not have disappeared even if the two elderly
leaders quietly retired, but we believe their obstinate
refusal to do so will stiffen the resistance of their
hangers-on.
Even with the three years alloted by the reformers for
the campaign, we expect the rectification will be a
contentious, difficult process. Hu Yaobang may be
forced to compromise on policy to pursue his enemies
and promote his followers. We expect that Ye, Li, and
the forces of conservatism they represent in the party
will continue to keep pressure on Hu, inhibit reformist
initiatives, and force a hard line on some social and
political issues, including foreign policy.
The Army
Deng's efforts to professionalize and depoliticize the
military are in the beginning stage and have produced
only limited results so far. The resistance of soldier-
politicians at the top has forced Deng to adopt
circuitous means to reform the military. We believe
this process will probably require more time than
Deng has. As a result, we expect Hu Yaobang will
still face suspicion in the military by the time Deng
leaves the scene. Up to now, Hu has demonstrated a
preference for accommodation over confrontation
with powerful adversaries. He may well try to win
support by moving toward the positions of conserva-
tive Army leaders on policy questions, restoring and
supplementing the Army bud et and ad'ustin the
reform agenda for the Army.
The Economy
While it endorsed reform, the Congress did little to
clarify specific economic policies, and we believe they
will continue to be a major focus of discussion and
dissension in the coming year. The lack of specifics
about the development program and the delay of
economic management reforms until after 1985 un-
derline that three years of experimentation have left
the Chinese still "groping" for solutions.
We expect the National People's Congress (NPC)
later this year to focus on this problem. At a mini-
mum, it should provide further details on economic
goals. A fuller version of the 1982 economic plan and
a preview of the 1983 plan are likely, and the NPC
apparently plans to finalize and adopt the Sixth Five-
Year Plan. We doubt that full details of this plan will
be made public. Nor do we expect to learn much more
about economic management reform because the im-
plementation of that initial program has been pushed
back to at least 1986, the start of the Seventh Plan.
Chinese leaders must also find a way to mesh econom-
ic reform and the upcoming rectification program so
that economic performance does not suffer as it has
during past campaigns.
The Crisis of Confidence
We believe that restoring the party's image may be
the most difficult issue to make progress on. The
solution offered at the Congress-more ideological
education and exhortation-is unlikely to produce
significant results in our view. Other campaigns, such
as the one against corruption, that are designed to
restore popular confidence in the party, seem to have
just the opposite effect and drive home its shortcom-
ings.
The clear trend we see in coping with this issue is
toward stifling all real and potential criticism. Deng
and Hu, who generally sympathize with intellectuals,
have in the past favored some loosening of strictures.
We believe they no longer can do so lest their
opponents accuse them of fostering dissent.
As practice in the Soviet Union has demonstrated,
once such a crackdown begins, it is very difficult to
ease the situation later. We believe this tendency,
combined with Hu Yaobang's evident need to bargain
with opponents in order to secure his position, will
significantly reduce the pace and scope of reforms
over the next several years. Senior reformers, includ-
ing Deng and Hu, appear to appreciate the interrela-
tionship between the failure to reform and the party's
declining prestige. Nonetheless, we believe they have
little choice but to act first to preserve their positions
atop the leadership and only then to grapple with the
ills of the society and economy.
25
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Appendix A
Figure 1
Composition of the 12th Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee
? Civilian
I Military
Newcomers
45%
Holdovers
from the 1l th
39%
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Figure 2
Composition of Selected Past Chinese Communist
Party Central Committees
^ Civilian
^ Military
8th Central Committee
(elected 1956)
9th Central Committee
(elected 1969)
10th Central Committee
(elected 1973)
11th Central Committee
( elected 1977)
12 th Central Committee
(elected 1982)
National
62%
Party
Military
Provincial
38'/,,
National
33%
Government
Party
Military
Provincial
67%
National
33%
Government
Party
Provincial
62%
National
35%
Government
Party
Military
Provincial
65%
National
44%
Military
Party
Government
Provincial
4 0?G%
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Figure 3
Percentage of Provincial Military and Civilians
on Selected Past Chinese Communist Party
Central Committees
Approximate Percentages
? Civilian
0 Military
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Figure 4
Newly Elected and Reelected Provincial Figures
on Selected Past Chinese Communist Central Committees
^ Civilian
^ Military
Holdovers
from the 9th
69%
Newcomers
29%
Holdovers
from the 10th
54%
Newcomers
42%
IHoldovers
from the 11 th
39%
Newcomers
45%
587760 10-82
Secret
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Appendix B
Highlights of Hu Yaobang's Report to the
12th Party Congress, 1 September 1982 6
Mao, Hua, and the The "left" mistakes made before and during the Cultural Revolution had a deep
Cultural Revolution and extensive influence and caused serious damage... This unavoidably involved
the mistakes made by Comrade Mao Zedong in his later years. Comrade Mao Ze-
dong's contributions to the Chinese revolution were great and indelible; that is why
over long years he enjoyed enormous prestige in the party and among the people
and will continue to do so in the years to come... During the two years before the
third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee, the question of rights and
wrongs in the party's guiding ideology was not clarified as it should have been and
the work of setting things to rights proceeded haltingly; this was because in the
early days after the smashing of the Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique, our
party was not ideologically prepared for an overall liquidation of the "left"
mistakes and also because the principal leading comrade (that is, Hua Guofeng) in
the Central Committee at the time continued to make "left" mistakes on a series
of important issues.
Class Struggle It is wrong, in a socialist society where the system of exploitation has been
abolished and the exploiting classes have been eliminated, to declare and act on the
principle of "taking class struggle as the key link.". . . However, within certain
limits, class struggle will continue to exist for a long time and may even sharpen
under certain conditions. This is not only because pernicious influences left over by
the exploitative systems and classes cannot be eradicated within a short time, but
also because we have not yet achieved our goal of reunifying our motherland and
other forces hostile to our socialist cause will seek to corrupt us and harm our
country.
The Crisis of Confidence The decade of domestic turmoil confounded the criteria of right and wrong, good
in Communism and evil, and beauty and ugliness. It is much more difficult to undo its grave spiri-
tual consequences than its material ones. For this and other reasons, many serious
problems concerning standards of social conduct now exist in our country. The
Central Committee of the party is determined to effect a fundamental turn for the
better in standards of social conduct in the next five years.
The view that Communism is but a "dim illusion" and that it "has not been tested
in practice" is utterly wrong. There is Communism everywhere in our daily life, of
which it forms an inseparable part.
All the splendid successes of the party and the people have been achieved precisely
through the inspiring example given by such a fine core of members of the party.
This is the principal aspect of our party, and whoever fails to see it, or deliberately
denies it, is committing a grave error.
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(If we believe otherwise) we will not be able to safeguard the socialist orientation of
China's modernization, and our socialist society will lose its ideals and objectives,
its spiritual motivation and fighting will lose the ability to resist the inroad of cor-
rupt influences and even develop distortedly and degenerate. Comrades, this is not
just alarmist talk but a conclusion drawn from present realities at home and
abroad (for example, Poland).
The establishment of the socialist system makes it possible for us to build a high
level of socialist spiritual civilization while striving for a high level of material
civilization, just as the development of a modern economy to a certain level and the
appearance of the most advanced class of our time, the working class, and its
vanguard, the Communist Party, make it possible to succeed in socialist spiritual
civilization which, in its turn, gives a tremendous impetus to the former and
ensures its correct orientation. Each is the condition and objective of the other.
The Economy Of the various tasks for bringing about an all-round new situation, the most
important one is to push forward the socialist modernization of China's economy
... The general objective of China's economic construction for the two decades
between 1981 and the end of this century ... is to quadruple the gross annual val-
ue of industrial and agricultural production-from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to
2,800 billion yuan or so in 2000.
In the period of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) ... We must devote our main
efforts to readjusting the economic structure in various fields, streamlining,
reorganizing, and merging the existing enterprises and carrying out technical
transformation in selected enterprises ... During the Seventh Five-Year Plan
(1986-90), we shall carry out the technical transformation of enterprises on an
extensive scale and gradually reform the system of economic administration, in
addition to completing the rationalization of the organizational structure in
various fields ... Therefore, it will not be possible for the national economy to de-
velop very fast in this decade. But if we complete the above tasks, we can solve the
problems left over from the past and build a relatively solid basis for economic
growth in the decade to follow. The 1990s will witness an all-round upsurge in Chi-
na's economy which will definitely grow at a much faster rate than in the 1980s
... In the five years between this party Congress and the next ... we must achieve
significantly better economic results, a steady basic balance in finance and credit
and basic stability in commodity prices.
A basic principle guiding our economic work is "first, feed the people and second,
build the country."
In many fields, the economic results have been far from satisfactory, and there has
been appalling waste in production, construction, and circulation ... Apart from
some objective factors not subject to comparison, the main causes for this are the
"left" mistakes of the past, which resulted in blind proliferation of enterprises, an
irrational economic structure, defective systems of economic administration and
distribution, chaotic operation and management, and backward production
techniques.
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Economic Reform In the past few years, we have initiated a number of reforms in the economic sys-
tem by extending the powers of enterprises in planning and by giving scope to the
role of market regulation. This orientation is correct and its gains are apparent.
However, as some reform measures have not been well coordinated with each other
and the corresponding forms of administrative work have lagged behind, cases of
weakening and hampering the state's unified planning have been on the increase.
This is not good for the normal growth of the national economy. Hereafter, while
continuing to give play to the role of market regulation, we must on no account
neglect or relax unified leadership through state planning.
The responsibility system for production set up in various forms in the countryside
in recent years has further emancipated the productive forces and it must be
adhered to for a long time to come. The thing for us to do is to gradually perfect it
on the basis of summing up the practical experience of the masses. In no case must
we make rash changes against the will of the masses, still less must we backtrack.
Recently, the economic responsibility system has also been initiated in industrial
and commercial enterprises with some good results. Although industry and
commerce are vastly different from agriculture, the application for the economic
responsibility system (including the system of responsibility for profit or loss in
some of the state enterprises) similarly helps to implement the Marxist principle of
material benefit, to heighten the workers' sense of responsibility as masters of the
country and to promote production.
Bonuses and Subsidies We can no longer increase peasant incomes mainly through raising the prices of
farm produce or through lowering the fixed quotas of state purchases and
enlarging the scope of negotiated prices. The increase of the average incomes of
the workers and staff must necessarily be less than that of labor productivity. We
must put a stop to the indiscriminate handing out of bonuses and subsidies without
regard to actual state of production and profit.
Economic Principles To bring about an all-round upsurge of China's socialist economy, we must
continue to carry out in all our economic work the 10 principles for economic
construction approved by the Fifth National People's Congress at its fourth
session, paying special attention to solving the following major questions of
principle. First, concentrating funds on key development projects and continuing to
improve the people's living standards ... Second, upholding the leading position of
the state economy and developing diverse economic forms ... Third, correctly
implementing the principle of the leading role of the planned economy and the sup-
plementary role of market regulation. Fourth, persevering in self-reliance while
expanding economic and technological exchanges with foreign countries.
Economic Planning and Planning should take different forms in different circumstances. Plans of a
the Role of the Market mandatory nature must be enforced in regard to the production and distribution of
capital goods and consumer goods in the state sector which are vital to the national
economy and the people's livelihood, and especially in key enterprises vital to the
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whole economy ... In addition to plans of a mandatory nature, guidance plans,
whose implementation is mainly ensured by means of economic levers, should be
used in regard to many products and enterprises ... As for a number of small com-
modities which are low in output value, great in variety produced, and supplied
only seasonally and locally, it is neither necessary nor possible for the state to con-
trol them all by planning. Enterprises may be allowed to arrange their production
flexibly in accordance with the changes in market supply and demand ... We
must correctly define the respective scope and limits of mandatory plans, guidance
plans and market regulation and, on the premise that basic stability of commodity
prices is maintained, gradually reform the pricing systems, and establish an
economic administrative system suited to China's conditions so as to ensure the
healthy growth of the national economy.
Population Growth Family planning is a basic policy of our state. We must do our utmost to keep our
population within 1.2 billion by the end of this century.
Reforming the Party A grave problem at present is that in quite a number of organizations party
discipline has slackened, right and wrong are confounded, rewards and punish-
ments are misused and there is failure to criticize or punish when necessary. This
is a problem of long standing, and no marked improvement has yet occurred in
some places .... Local party committees and party commissions for discipline
inspection at all levels have attained notable results in their major efforts to uphold
party discipline and correct the style of the party. But they have met considerable,
and in some cases, shocking, obstruction in their work.
To solve correctly the question of party leadership over government organs and
over enterprises and institutions is a highly important task in the organizational re-
form. It is necessary to achieve a proper division of labor between the party and the
government and between party work and administrative and production work in
enterprises and institutions. The party is not an organ of power which issues orders
to the people, nor is it an administrative or production organization. The party
should, of course, exercise leadership over production, construction, and work in all
other fields ... But party leadership is mainly political and ideological leadership
in matters of principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, assessment, and
supervision of cadres. It should not be equated with administrative work and the
direction of production by government organizations and enterprises.
The stipulation in the new party constitution that "the party must conduct its
activities within the limits permitted by the constitution and the laws of the state"
embodies a most important principle. It is impermissible for any party organiza-
tion or member, from the Central Committee down to the grass roots, to act in
contravention of the constitution and laws. The party is part of the people. It leads
them in making the constitution and laws, which once adopted by the supreme or-
gan of state power, must be strictly observed by the whole party.
The new party constitution explicitly stipulates that the party "forbids all forms of
personality cult."
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The practices of "what one person says goes" and of each going his own way are no
longer allowed.
During the organizational reform, we will relieve our many veteran cadres who are
advanced in age of their heavy responsibilities in "frontline" posts and at the same
time enable them to continue their service to the party, the state, and society by
utilizing their rich experience in leadership work.
In the future, in our use and promotion of cadres, we must attach importance to
educational background and academic records as well as to experience and
achievements in work.
Party Rectification The pernicious influences of the 10 years of domestic turmoil have not yet been
eradicated, and there has been some increase in the corrosive inroads of exploiting-
class ideologies under new conditions. It is true that impurities in ideology, style,
and organization still exist within the party and that no fundamental turn for the
better has been made in our party style. In the leadership work of some party orga-
nizations, signs of flabbiness and lack of unity abound.
To achieve a fundamental turn for the better in the style of our party, the Central
Committee has decided on an overall rectification of party style and consolidation
of party organizations, which will proceed by stages and by groups over a period of
three years beginning from the latter half of 1983. This task will undoubtedly be of
primary importance to the party.
In matters of organization and leadership, the consolidation will start with the
leading organs and cadres and then proceed, from top to bottom, with the leading
bodies at different levels which have already been consolidated leading the
consolidation of the subordinate and primary organizations. Bad elements must on
no account be permitted to take this as an opportunity to frame and attack good
people. We must act in, and develop further, the spirit of the Yan'an rectification
movement of 1942, follow its principle of "learning from past mistakes to avoid fu-
ture ones and curing the sickness to save the patient" and its twofold objective of
"clarity in ideology and unity among comrades" in unfolding earnest criticism and
self-criticism, and take appropriate measures to solicit opinions from the masses
outside the party. In the final stage, there will be a reregistration of all party mem-
bers and, in strict accordance with the provisions of the new party constitution,
those who still fail to meet the requirements for membership after education shall
be expelled from the party or asked to withdraw from it. At the same time,
concrete measures should be worked out to strengthen and improve party
leadership so as to effect an improvement in the work of party organizations at all
levels.
As for persons who rose to prominence by "rebellion," who-are seriously
factionalist in their ideas, who have indulged in beating, smashing, and looting,
who oppose the line followed by the party's Central Committee since its third
plenary session, or who have seriously violated the law and discipline, we must
remove with a firm hand those among them who are still in leading posts. Persons
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who have violated criminal law must be investigated and dealt with according to
law. Such people, of course, must never be put up as candidates for promotion to
leading posts.
Party Organization According to the draft constitution, the Central Committee is to have no chairman
but only a general secretary, who will convene meetings of the Political Bureau
and its Standing Committee and preside over the work of the Secretariat. Advisory
committees are to be established at the central and provincial levels to give our
many veteran comrades rich in political experience a role as consultants in the
service of the party's cause. Commissions for discipline inspection are to be elected
by party congresses at the respective levels and, within limits prescribed by the
party constitution, they are to supervise party committees and their members at
the respective levels below the Central Committee, and they may report to the
Central Committee any breach of party discipline by any of its members.
Party Control of the We must work hard to turn the People's Liberation Army into a regular, modern,
Military and powerful revolutionary armed force and enhance its defense capabilities in
modern warfare.... We must continue to strengthen the militia.... After the new
draft constitution is discussed and adopted by the forthcoming National People's
Congress, the Central Committee will continue to exercise leadership over our
armed forces through the State Central Military Commission which is due to be
set up. We must stick to the successful practices which the party has long followed
in leading the armed forces.
Intellectuals and Dissent In the past, owing to the influence of "left" ideas and the small-producer
mentality, erroneous views such as underestimation of the importance of educa-
tion, science, and culture and discrimination against intellectuals were rife in our
party over a fairly long time.... We are determined to do everything possible to
create favorable conditions in which the mass of intellectuals can work with ease of
mind and in high spirits in the interest of the people. In this regard, there is still a
good deal of painstaking ideological and organizational work to do.
We must lay special stress on the role of the intellectuals, improve the work of
ideological and political education among them to suit their special characteristics,
and actively recruit into the party intellectuals who are qualified for membership.
While exercising their freedom and rights, citizens must not impair the interests of
the state, society, and the collective, or the freedom and rights of others. While we
strive to develop socialist democracy, all our measures must help to consolidate the
socialist system and promote social production and work in other fields. On no
account will hostile, antisocialist elements be given any freedom to carry out
sabotage.
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Our struggle against grave criminal offenses in the economic sphere is now being
intensified. Among those guilty of such crimes, apart from lawbreakers in society
at large, are a tiny number of degenerates in party and government organizations
and in the armed forces who have been corrupted by capitalist ideology.... Such
destructive elements must be severely punished by law. We have won some initial
successes in this struggle. The whole party must enhance its understanding of this
struggle, take a firm stand in it, and unswervingly carry it through to the end. This
will be an important guarantee for our adherence to the socialist road.
The ideological, political, and organizational requirements (the) draft constitution
sets for party members and cadres are stricter than those in all our previous
constitutions. In stipulating the duties of party members, the draft absolutely
forbids them to use public office for personal gain or to benefit themselves at the
expense of the public interests, and requires that they firmly oppose factionalism
and be bold in backing good people and good deeds and in opposing bad people and
bad deeds.
Opening to the Outside It is our firm strategic principle to carry out the policy of opening to the outside
World world and expand economic and technological exchanges with foreign countries in
accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit.
We must refrain from indiscriminate import of equipment, and particularly of
consumer goods that can be manufactured and supplied at home.... In no
circumstances must we forget that capitalist countries and enterprises will never
change their capitalist nature simply because they have economic and technologi-
cal exchanges with us. While pursuing the policy of opening to the outside, we
must guard against, and firmly resist, the corrosion of capitalist ideas and we must
combat any worship of things foreign or fawning on foreigners.
On the one hand, we must persist in the policy of opening to the outside as well as
in our policies for invigorating the economy domestically and, on the other, we
must resolutely strike at the grave criminal activities in the economic, political,
and cultural spheres that endanger socialism. It would be wrong to attend only to
the latter aspect and be skeptical about the former, and it would be dangerous to
stress the former aspect to the neglect of the latter. All party comrades must have
a clear understanding of this principle without the slightest ambiguity.
Independent Foreign Being patriots, we do not tolerate any encroachment on China's national dignity or
Policy interests.... Our adherence to an independent foreign policy accords with the
discharging of our lofty international duty to safeguard world peace and promote
human progress.... China never attaches itself to any big power or group of
powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power.... The Chinese people
will never again allow themselves to be humiliated as they were before, nor will
they subject other nations to such humiliation.
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Relations With the Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States of
United States America in 1978, relations between the two countries have developed in the
interests of the two peoples.... However, a cloud has all along hung over the
relations between the two countries. This is because the United States, despite
having recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is
China's sole legal government and that there is only one China and Taiwan is part
of China, has passed the Taiwan Relations Act which contravenes the principles
embodied in the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations,
and it has continued to sell arms to Taiwan, treating Taiwan as an independent po-
litical entity.... Sino-US relations can continue to develop soundly only if the
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninter-
ference in each other's internal affairs are truly adhered to.
State Relations With the The relations between China and the Soviet Union were friendly over a fairly long
Soviet Union period. They have become what they are today because the Soviet Union has
pursued a hegemonist policy. For the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has stationed
massive armed forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. It has
supported Vietnam in the latter's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, acts of
expansion in Indochina and Southeast Asia, and constant provocations along
China's border. Moreover, it has invaded and occupied Afghanistan, a neighbor of
China, by force of arms. All these acts constitute grave threats to the peace of Asia
and to China's security. We note that Soviet leaders have expressed more than
once the desire to improve relations with China. But deeds, rather than words, are
important. If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations
with China and take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our
country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move toward normalization.
The friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is of long standing, and we
will strive to safeguard and develop this friendship, no matter what Sino-Soviet
state relations are like.
Party-to-Party Ties Our party develops its relations with other Communist or working-class parties in
strict conformity with Marxism and the principles of independence, complete
equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs....
Communist parties should of course help each other, but it is absolutely
impermissible for any of them to issue orders or run things for others from the out-
side. Any attempt by one party to impose its views on other parties or interfere in
their internal affairs can only lead to setbacks or failures in the revolutions of the
countries concerned. As for the practice of one party compelling other parties to
make their policies serve its own party and state policies, or even resorting to
armed intervention in other countries, it can only undermine the very foundation of
the international Communist movement.... We hold that all Communist parties
should respect each other ... we wish to establish similar contacts with a greater
number of progressive parties and organizations.
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Secret
Relations With Japan Japan is China's neighbor.... The Japanese militarists unleashed one war of
aggression after another against China.... Now some forces in Japan are
whitewashing the past Japanese aggressions against China and other East Asian
countries and are carrying out activities for the revival of Japanese militarism....
Together with the Japanese people and with far-sighted Japanese public figures in
and out of government, we will work to eliminate all hindrances to the relations be-
tween our two countries and make the friendship between our two peoples flourish
from generation to generation.
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and At this point, it should be emphasized that our party faces yet another historic
Macao task, that of joining hands with all our patriotic fellow countrymen in a common
endeavor to accomplish the sacred task of reunifying our motherland. Taiwan is
part of the sacred territory of our motherland, and the people in Taiwan are our
kith and kin.... It is China's internal affair with which no foreign country has the
right to interfere. We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong
Kong), and Aomen (Macao) and Chinese nationals residing abroad will urge the
Kuomintang authorities to take a realistic view of the situation and put the future
of our country and the interests of the nation above all else, instead of persisting in
their obdurate stand, so that talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party may be held at an early date and, together, we can bring about the peaceful
reunification of our motherland.
Policy on Insurgencies ... Revolution cannot be exported but can occur only by the choice of the people of
the country concerned. It is on the basis of this understanding that we have always
abided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence. We do not station a single sol-
dier abroad, nor have we occupied a single inch of foreign land. We have never in-
fringed upon the sovereignty of another country, or imposed an unequal relation-
ship upon it. In no circumstances will we seek hegemony.
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Appendix C
Appointments and Dismissals
New appointments are indicated by an asterisk. An (f) indicates female. Date of
appointment is in parentheses, and other major posts held are given for Politburo
and Secretariat members.
Hu Yaobang General Secretary, Chinese Communist Party (Feb 1980)
Ye Jianying Vice Chairman, Military Commission, (Nov 1966)
Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978)
Deng Xiaoping Chairman, Advisory Committee (Sep 1982)
Chairman, Military Commission (Jun 1981)
Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(Mar 1978)
Premier, State Council (Sep 1980)
Minister in Charge, State Commission for Restructuring of the
Economic System (May 1982)
Deng Yingchao Vice Chairman, Standing Committee, National People's Congress
(Mar 1978)
Honorary Chairman, All-China Women's Federation (Sep 1978)
Fang Yi Minister in Charge, State Scientific and Technological Commission
(Aug 1979)
State Councilor (May 1982)
*Hu Qiaomu Vice Chairman, Legislative Affairs Commission, National People's
Congress (Jun 1979)
Li Desheng Commander, Shenyang Military Region (Dec 1973)
First Secretary, CCP Committee, Shenyang Military Region
(Jun 1977)
*Liao Chengzhi Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978)
Director, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs (Apr 1978)
Ni Zhifu Chairman, All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Oct 1978)
Nie Rongzhen Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Mar 1961)
Peng Zhen Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Jul 1979)
*Song Renqiong Director, Organization Department of the party (Jan 1979)
Ulanhu Vice Chairman National People's Congress (Mar 1978)
Vice Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(Mar 1978)
Vice Minister, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Sep 1980)
*Wan Li Member, Secretariat (Feb 1980)
Vice Premier, State Council (May 1982)
Wang Zhen Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Sep 1980)
President, Party School (May 1982)
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Wei Guoqing Director, General Political Department, People's Liberation Army
(Sep 1977)
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978)
Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Jul 1981)
*Xi Zhongxun Member, Secretariat (Jun 1981)
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
Xu Xiangqian Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Nov 1966)
*Yang Dezhi Chief of Staff, People's Liberation Army (Feb 1980)
Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Feb 1980)
Vice Minister of National Defense (Feb 1980)
Permanent Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Sep 1982)
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
Member, Secretariat (Feb 1980)
State Councilor (May 1982)
Zhang Tingfa Commander, Air Force, People's Liberation Army (Apr 1977)
Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Jul 1981)
Chen Muhua Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Mar 1982)
State Councilor (May 1982)
*Qin Jiwei Commander, Beijing Military Region (Jan 1980)
*Yao Yilin Vice Premier, State Council (Jul 1979)
Minister in Charge, State Planning Commission (Aug 1980)
*Chen Pixian First Secretary, Hubei Party Committee (Aug 1978)
Chairman, Hubei Provincial People's Congress (Jan 1980)
Political Commissar, Wuhan Military Region (Jun 1979)
First Political Commissar, Hubei Military District (Mar 1980)
*Deng Liqun Vice President, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Mar 1978)
Director, Policy Research Office of the Secretariat (Mar 1981)
Director, Propaganda Department of the Party (May 1982)
Gu Mu State Councilor (May 1982)
*Hu Qili Director, General Office of the Party (May 1982)
Wan Li Member, Politburo (Sep 1982)
Vice Premier, State Council (Apr 1980)
Xi Zhongxun Member, Politburo (Sep 1982)
Vice Chairman National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
*Yang Yong Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Feb 1980)
Deputy Chief of Staff, People's Liberation Army (Sep 1977)
Yao Yilin Alternate Member, Politburo (Sep 1982)
Vice Premier, State Council (Jul 1979)
Minister-in-Charge, State Planning Commission (Aug 1980)
Yu Qiuli Member, Politburo (Aug 1977)
State Councilor (May 1982)
*Hao Jianxiu Minister of Textile Industry (Mar 1981)
*Qiao Shi Director, International Liaison Department of the Party (Apr 1982)
Average Ages of the Politburo Politburo: 72 Standing Committee: 74
and the Secretariat Members: 73
Alternates: 66
Secretariat: 65 Members: 67
Alternates: 53
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Secret
Discipline Inspection
Standing Committee
First Secretary
Chen Yun
Commission
Second Secretary
Huang Kecheng
Permanent Secretary
Wang Heshou
Secretaries
Wang Congwu
Han Guang
Li Chang
Ma Guorui
Han Tianshui
Cai Shunli
Chen Yun
Han Guang
Han Tianshui
Huang Kecheng
Li Chang
Li Zhengting
Li Zhilian
Ma Guorui
Wang Congwu
Wang Heshou
Ye Jianying
Xu Xiangqian
Nie Rongzhen
Full Members of
An Pingsheng
*Hu Hong
Liao Hansheng
the 12th Central Committee
Bai Dongcai
Hu Lijiao
Lin Hujia
Basang (f) (Tibetan)
Hu Qiaomu
Lin Liyun (f)
*Buhe (Mongolian)
*Hu Qili
*Lin Ruo
*Chen Bin
*Hu Sheng
*Lin Fuzhi
Chen Fuhan
Hu Yaobang
*Liu Huaqing
Chen Guodong
Hua Guofeng
*Liu Lin
*Chen Lei
Huang Hua
Liu Zhen
Chen Muhua (I)
Huang Xinting
*Liu Zhengwei
Chen Pixian
Huang Zhizhen
Liu Zhenhua
Chen Pura
Ismail Amat (Uygur)
Liu Zhijian
*Chen Renhong
Jiang Nanxiang
Lu Dadong
Chen Weida
Jiang Yonghui
*Lu Peijian
*Chen Xitong
*Jiang Zemin
Luo Qingchang
Chen Yun
Jiao Linyi
Ma Wenrui
Chi Biqing
Kang Keqing (1)
Ma Xingyuan
*Cho Nam Qi (Korean)
Kang Shien
Mao Zhiyong
*Cui Naifu
Li Desheng
*Mo Wenxiang
*Cui Yueli
*Li Dongye
*Mu Qing (Hui)
Dai Suli
*Li Lian
Ni Zhifu
*Deng Jiaxian
*Li Ligong
Nie Rongzhen
*Deng Liqun
*Li Menghua
Peng Chong
Deng Xiaoping
*Li Peng
*Peng Zhen
Deng Yingchao (f)
Li Qiming
*Qian Yongchang
Fang Yi
*Li Rui
Qian Zhengying (f)
*Fu Kuiqing
*Li Ruihuan
*Qiang Xiaochu
*Gao Yangwen
*Li Senmao
*Qiao Shi
Gu Mu
Li Xiannian
Qiao Xiaoguang
Gu Malian (0
*Li Ximing
*Qin Chuan
*Guo Liwen (f)
*Li Xipu
Qin Jiwei
*Han Peixin
*Li Xue
Qin Yingji (Zhuang)
Han Manchu
Li Xuezhi
*Qin Zhongda
Hao Jianxiu (f)
Li Yaowen
Raidi (Tibetan)
*He Dongchang
*Li Ziqi
Rao Xingli
*He Jingzhi
Liang Biye
Ren Zhongyi
*He Jinheng
*Liang Buting
Seypidin (Uygur)
*He Kang
*Liang Lingguang
*Shen Tu
Hong Xuezhi
Liao Chengzhi
*Shen Yinluo
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Alternate Members of
the 12th Central Committee
Song Ping
Song Renqiong
*Su Gang
Su Yiran
*Sun Daguang
Tan Qilong
Tan Shanhe
*Tan Youlin
Tang Ke
*Tian Jiyun
Tie Ying
*Tomur Dawamat (Uygur)
Ulanhu (Mongolian)
Wan Da
*Wan Haifeng
Wan Li
*Wang Bingqian
*Wang Chaowen (Miao)
*Wang Chenghan
*Wang Chonglun
Wang Enmao
*Wang Fang
Wang Guangyu
*Wang Guangzhong
*Wang Hanbin
Wang Heshou
*Wang Kewen
Wang Meng
*Wang Quanguo
Wang Renzhong
*Wang Zhaoguo
Wang Zhen
*An Zhiwen
*Wang Jinshan
*Batubagen (Mongolian)
*Chen Suzhi (f) (Manchu)
*Chen Ying
*Chen Zuolin
*Ding Fengying (f)
*Dong Jichang
*Dong Zhanlin
*Fang Weizhong
*Gaisang Doje (Tibetan)
*Gao Dezhan
Gao Houliang
*Gao Zhanxiang
Gong Benyan
*Han Ruijie
*Han Xu a
*He Guangyuan
*He Zhukang
*Hei Boli (Hui)
*Hu Jintao
*Hu Ping
*Huang Demao
*Huang Ganying (f)
*Huang Shu
Janabil (Kazak)
*Jiang Minkuan
*Jiang Xiesheng
*Jiang Xinxiong
*Jin Baosheng (Yao)
*Lang Dazhong (Dai)
*Li Bing (f)
Wei Guoqing (Zhuang)
*Wu Jinghua (Yi)
Wu Quanqing
Wu Xueqian
Xi Zhongxun
*Xiang Nan
*Xiang Shouzhi
Xiao Han
Xiao Hua
*Xiao Quanfu
*Xie Feng
Xie Xide (f)
*Xie Zhenhua
Xing Yanzi (f)
Xu Jiatun
*Xu Shaofu
Xu Xiangqian
*Xue Ju
*Yan Dongsheng
*Yang Bo
Yang Chengwu
Yang Dezhi
*Yang Dezhong
*Yang Di
Yang Jingren (Hui)
*Yang Rudai
Yang Shangkun
Yang Yichen
Yang Yong
*Yao Guang
Yao Yilin
Ye Fei
Li Changan
*Li Feng
*Li Gang
Li Huamin
*Li Huifen (f)
*Li Jijun
*Li Ming
Li Ruishan
*Li Shoushan
*Li Shuzheng (f)
*Li Tieying
*Liang Chengye (Zhuang)
*Liang Dongcai
*Lin Jianqing
*Lin Yincai
Liu Guiqian
*Liu Guoguang
*Liu Haiqing
*Liu Hongru
Liu Minghui
*Liu Shusheng (Hui)
Liu Weiming
*Liu Yi
*Liu Youfa
*Liu Yujie (f)
*Lu Gongxun
*Lu Liangshu
*Lu Maozeng
*Luo Gan
*Luo Shangcai (Buyi)
*Ma Hong
Ma Ming
Ye Jianying
*Yin Fatang
*Yin Yuan
You Taizhong
*Yu Hongen
Yu Mingtao
Yu Qiuli
Yuan Baohua
Zhang Aiping
Zhang Jingfu
*Zhang Shou
*Zhang Shuguang
Zhang Tingfa
*Zhang Zaiwang
*Zhang Ze
Zhang Zhen
Zhang Zhixiu
Zhao Cangbi
*Zhao Haifeng
*Zhao Shouyi
Zhao Xingyuan
Zhao Zhijian
Zhao Ziyang
Zheng Sansheng
*Zheng Tuobin
Zhou Hui
*Zhou Jiannan
*Zhou Shizhong
Zhou Zijian
Zhu Guangya
Zhu Muzhi
*Zhu Yunqian
Ma Sizhong (Hui)
*Ma Weihua
*Ma Zhongchen
*Nian Dexiang (Hui)
*Nie Kuiju
*Pan Rongwen (0
*Peng Shilu
*Qian Qichen
Qian Xuesen
*Qiao Xueting
Ren Rong
*Song Jian
*Sun Guozhi
*Sun Weiben
*Tang Zhongwen
*Tian Shixing
Wang Dongxing
Wang Fuzhi
*Wang Jialiu (f)
*Wang Jiangong
Wang Linhe
Wang Liusheng
Wang Meng
Wang Qian
*Wang Qun
*Wang Renzhi
*Wang Xuezhen
*Wang Yuefeng (Li)
*Wei Jianxing
*Wei Anshan
*Wei Mingyi
Wu Lengxi
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Secret
*Wu Weiran
Yang Yongliang
*Zhang Wannian
*Wu Wenying (f)
*Yang Zhengwu (Tujia)
*Zhang Wanxin
Wu Xiangbi (Miao)
*Yangling Doje (Tibetan)
*Zhang Xiang
*Wu Zuqiang
*Ye Xuanping
*Zhang Xintai
*Xie Fei
*Yin Changmin (f)
*Zhang Xudeng
*Xing Chongzhi
*Yin Jun (Bai)
*Zhao Dongwan
*Xing Zhikang (f)
*Yu Hongli
*Zhao Zongnai
*Xiong Qingquan
Yu Sang
*Zheng Guangdi (f)
*Xu Qin
*Yu Zhenwu
Zhou Aqing
*Xu Xin
*Yuan Fanglie
*Zhou Guangzhao
*Yan Zheng
*Yuan Jun
*Zhu Houze
*Yang Haibo
*Zhang Boxiang
*Zhu Xun
*Yang Taifang
*Zhang Gensheng
Zou Jiahua
*Yang Xizong
*Zhang Jianmin
*Zou Jingmeng
Standing Committee since
Apr 1976
Chen Yonggui
Politburo since Apr 1973
Geng Biao
Politburo since Aug 1977
Hua Guofeng
Politburo since Aug 1973
Liu Bocheng
Politburo since Sep 1956
Peng Chong
Politburo since Aug 1977
Xu Shiyou
Politburo since Apr 1969
Seypidin
Alternate since Aug 1973
Fang Yi
All were first appointed in Feb-
Hu Qiaomu
ruary 1980, when the 5th Ple-
Peng Chong
num of the 11th Central Com-
Song Renqiong
mittee reestablished the
Wang Renzhong
Secretariat.
Yang Dezhi
11th Central Committee Full
Bai Rubing
Jiang Hua
Tan Zhenlin
Members on Advisory
Bo Yibo
Jiang Weiqing
Tian Bao
Commission
Cao Lihuai
Kong Shiquan
Wang Bicheng
Chen Xilian
Kong Yuan
Wang Feng
Chen Zaidao
Li Baohua
Wang Shitai
Cheng Zihua
Li Da
Wang Shoudao
Deng Xiaoping
Li Jingquan
Wang Yiping
Du Yide
Li Qiang
Wu De
Duan Junyi
Li Renzhi
Wu Xiuquan
Feng Xuan
Li Zhimin
Xiao Jingguang
Geng Biao
Liao Zhigao
Xiao Ke
Huang Huoging
Liu Lantao
Xu Shiyou
Huang Oudong
Lu Dingyi
Zhang Caiqian
Huang Zhen
Lu Zhengcao
Zhang Pinghua
Huo Shilian
Qian Zhiguang
Zhao Xinchu
Ji Pengfei
Su Yu
Zhou Yang
11th Central Committee
Du Ping
Ren Zhibin
Xiao Wangdong
Alternate Members on
He Jinnian
Tang Liang
Xu Liqing
Advisory Commission
Li Chengfang
Wang Shangrong
Zhang Lingbin
Li Jianzhen (f)
Wu Kehua
Zhao Wucheng
Liu Daosheng
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Full Members Dropped From Baoriledai (f)
Kong Zhaonian
Su Jing (f)
the Central Committee Cai Chang (t)
Li Chang
Wang Chaozhu
Cai Xiao
Li Shichun
Wang Guofan
Cao Yi'ou (f)
Li Shuiqing
Wang Maoquan
Chen Qihan
Li Ziyuan
Wang Mingzhang
Chen Yonggui
Liu Bocheng
Wang Ping
Chu Jiang
Liu Chunqiao
Wang Xiuxiu (f)
Dai Guangqian
Liu Guangtao
Wu Guixian (f)
Ding Guoyu
Liu Jianxun
Xi Houba
Ding Keze
Liu Wei
Xue Jinda
Fan Deling
Liu Xichang
Yu Hongliang
Geng Qichang
Liu Xingyuan
Zeng Shaoshan
Guo Yufeng
Liu Zihou
Zeng Siyu
Han Guang
Lu Tianji
Zhang Fugui
Han Ying
Lu Yulan (t)
Zhang Fuheng
He Cheng
Ma Hui
Zhang Lixian
Huang Kecheng
Nie Fengzhi
Zhang Yuhua
Ji Dengkui
Ren Sizhong
Zhou Chunlin
Jiang Liyin
Ruan Bosheng
Zhou Jianren
Jie Xuegong
Song Shilun
Zong Xiyun
Alternate Members Dropped Bu Guxiang
Li Jiliang
Tang Wensheng (f)
From the Central Committee Cai Fenglan (f)
Li Qiaoyun (f)
Wang Jinling (f)
Cao Siming
Li Rinai
Wang Jinshan
Cen Guorong
Li Shoulin
Wang Jinyou
Chen Ai'e (f)
Li Yuan
Wang Junshao
Chen Renfu
Li Zugen
Wei Fengying (f)
Chen Xianrui
Liu Chonggui
Wei Xingzheng
Chen Yonglin
Liu Ruiqing
Wen Xianglan (t)
Chen Yubao
Liu Xiyao
Wu Huojin
Cheng Yitai
Liu Zhiqiang
Wu Jinquan
Ding Changhua
Lu Cunjie (t)
Wu Zhong
Du Xueran
Lu He
Xu Biaojun
Feng Pinde
Lu Jinlong
Xu Chi
Feng Zhanwu
Lu Xuguo
Xue Jinlian (f)
Guan Zehai
Lu Zhongyang
Yang Dayi
Guo Fenglian (f)
Ma Jinhua (t)
Yang Fushen (f)
Guo Yaoqing
Mao Xinxian (f)
Yang Junsheng
Hu Jindi (f)
Mei Songlin
Zhang Huailian
Hu Liangcai
Pan Shixing
Zhang Jihui
Hu Song
Qilinwangdan
Zhang Linchi
Huang Ronghai
Ran Guiying (t)
Zhang Yaoci
Huang Zuozhen
Renzengwangjie
Zhang Zhidi
Ji Guixin
Ruzi Tu'erdi
Zhao Xuequan
Ji Yinglin
Shen Chuyun (t)
Zhong Fuxiang
Jiang Baodi (f)
Shen Maogong
Zhu Shaoqing
Jiang Xieyuan
Song Qingyou
Zuo Chongyi
Jin Minghan
Sun Xuemei (f)
Tan Wenzhen (f)
Kang Lin
Tan Kebi (f)
Pan Meiyang (f)
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 Figure 5
Organization of the Chinese Communist Party
(12th Congress)
Congress Elects Central Committee Elects
Advisory Commission
(Elected by CCP Congress)
Bureau for Translating
the Works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin
Discipline Inspection
Commission
(Elected by CCP Congress)
Compilation and
Translation Bureau
International Liaison
Department
Investigation
Department
Central Political
and Judicial Group
Party Historical
Research Center
Party Literature
Research Center
General Secretary
Standing Committee
Politburo
I
Military Com fission
(Elected by
CCP Central Cmmittee)
Commission for ollecting
Party Histori l Data
Orgahization
Department
Provisional
Party Committee
United Front
Work Department
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Secret
Appendix E
The Road to the
12th Congress (1977-82)
11th Congress and First Plenum
? Ye Jianying speech presents Hua Guofeng as
? Political Bureau Standing Committee:
12-19 August 1977
Mao Zedong's chosen successor
Hua, Ye, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Wang
? Mao's contributions to the revolution praised
Dongxing
? Hua Guofeng states focus of party's work should
be struggling against Gang of Four followers
? Hua presents "Four Modernizations"
Third Plenum
? Shift of priority of party's work to economic
? Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun to Political Bureau,
8-22 December 1978
modernization
Zhao Ziyang as alternate
? First obvious criticism of Mao, stating that no
? Political Bureau Standing Committee:
leader is completely free from error
Hua, Ye, Deng, Li, Chen, Wang
? Hua conducts self-criticism, stresses importance
of collective leadership, and condemns personal-
ity cult
? Important political figures rehabilitated: Peng
Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun
? Prominent use of "seek truth from facts"
slogan, and attribution of the idea to Mao
? Important agricultural policy decision approved
in principle
Fourth Plenum
? Ye Jianying National Day speech discussed,
? Zhao Ziyang moved up to full membership in
25-28 September 1979
approved
Political Bureau
? Third Plenum decisions on agricultural policy
? Political Bureau Standing Committee remains
revised, ratified
unchanged
Fifth Plenum
? Constitution draft discussed
? Wang Dongxing dropped from Political Bureau
23-29 February 1980
? Party proposes that "four freedoms" be removed
Standing Committee and other party leadership
from draft state constitution
posts; similar fate suffered by other three
? Party Secretariat reestablished
members of "Little Gang of Four"
? Party calls for 12th Congress ahead of time (that
? Hu and Zhao raised to Political Bureau Stand-
is, prior to 1982)
ing Committee
? Liu Shaogi rehabilitated, with implicit criticism
? Political Bureau Standing Committee:
of Mao
Hua, Ye, Deng, Hu, Zhao, Li, Chen
Sixth Plenum
27-29 June 1981
Seventh Plenum
6 August 1982
? 1 September date set for 12th Party Congress
? Congress agenda approved
? Hua criticized by name, resigns party and
Military Commission chairmanships
? Hu made party Chairman
? Deng made Military Commission Chairman
? Political Bureau Standing Committee:
Hu, Ye, Deng, Zhao, Li, Chen, Hua
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