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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000200090004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Vietnam:
Integrating the South
EA 83-10101
June 1983
Copy 3 0 3
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Directorate of secret
Vietnam:
Integrating the South
This paper prepared b
Office of East Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council. (u)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 83-10101
June 1983
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secret
Summary
Information available
as of 30 May 1983
was used in this report.
Vietnam:
Litegrating the South
Vietnam's success in controlling Indochina and projecting its influence
throughout Southeast Asia rests essentially on two factors: the willingness
of the USSR to provide military and economic aid, and Hanoi's ability to
maintain domestic political and economic stability. The first appears
secure. To achieve the second, Hanoi has since 1975 concentrated on
creating a unified, stable Vietnam capable of becoming a regional power.
ture in the fertile Mekong Delta.
The task has been formidable. When Saigon fell in April 1975, the south
was in chaos, buffeted by the dislocation of over 8 million rural Vietnam-
ese, the creation of dozens of anti-Communist guerrilla groups, the
breakdown of the export-oriented economy, and the disruption of agricul-
? The media and schools are under state control.
? Thousands of northerners have been relocated to the south.
? The once influential religious sects have been neutralized.
? Southern chauvinists in the party ranks have been replaced.
In its drive to bring the south under control, Hanoi focused on establishing
political and military security; creating a reliable political cadre and
population; and socializing the southern economy. The first two programs
have proceeded smoothly:
? Armed resistance within Vietnam has been reduced to a nuisance level.
the leadership is now trying to bring under control.
Socialization of the southern economy has not been as successful. Hanoi's
attempts between 1975 and 1979 to force rapid socialization of the south
by heavyhanded fiscal controls and collectivization led to a serious decline
in industrial and agricultural production. Hanoi has since pursued a more
gradual approach based on the employment of production incentives. This
program, in turn, has stimulated the growth of a large private sector that
domestic policy goals.
We see no prospects, however, that these economic problems will force the
leadership to divert its attention and resources from its drive to control
Indochina. Hanoi appears to have learned from the mistakes of its earlier
collectivization program and is unlikely to push socialization hard enough
to seriously threaten production. Recent improvements in economic per-
formance, moreover, appear to have convinced the leadership that it can af-
ford to continue socialization without disrupting either its foreign or
iii Secret
EA 83-10101
June 1983
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Vietnam
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Boundary representation is not
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in Vetnam are shown without
diacritical marks.
505892(546744)6-83
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Vietnam:
Integrating the South
Hanoi was forced in 1975 to contend with both
immediate and potential opponents to its rule. The
first task was to eliminate the armed groups that
arose in the Mekong Delta following the collapse of
the Saigon government. But Hanoi also had to deal
with thousands of demobilized South Vietnamese
soldiers and former Saigon officials, as well as the
politically active religious sects.
The Delta's ethnic Vietnamese armed resistance
groups, which numbered 5,000 to 6,000 personnel in
the summer of 1976, were divided into dozens of
separate groups with virtually no outside channels of
support. Some of the Communist troops who had
participated in the final offensive against South Viet-
nam moved into the Delta to combat them. By 1978,
military operations, installation of document controls
and registration to impede free movement, and the
penetration of the resistance by counterintelligence
operatives had eliminated the most dangerous ele-
ments. The 20 Vietnamese divisions located south of
Da Nang in late 1975 were reduced to 12 one year
later and to one at the end of 1982.
the Ministry of the Interior's Ho Chi Minh
City office now has only about 200 public security
personnel working specifically against "counterreac-
tionaries" in the south-a category that also includes
dissidents, intellectuals, and black-marketeers. The
reduction in Hanoi's military commitment and the
transfer of responsibility to public security officials
suggest that the resistance groups have been almost
destroyed, their few surviving members now constitut-
ing a police problem
The only remaining active resistance group in south-
ern Vietnam consists of nonethnic Vietnamese.
Fulro-the Unified Front for the Liberation of Op-
pressed Races-is a 20-year-old hilltribe separatist
movement in the Central Highlands that stages road
ambushes and conducts small raids on isolated gov-
ernment posts. The government's constant patrol- 25X1
ling-the only remaining infantry division in the
south is located in the Central Highlands-has caused
Fulro to lose 2,000 men since 1981, according to 25X1
admissions by the movement's leaders. Fulro now
claims an armed strength of 9,000,
Unlike the ethnic Vietnamese opposition groups, Ful-
ro's exclusively tribal nature has made it difficult to
infiltrate. Hanoi therefore is trying to change the
ethnic composition of the Central Highlands in an
attempt to reduce Fulro's operational range and its
ability to avoid detection by Vietnamese troops. The
sparsely populated, hilltribe-dominated mountain
provinces have been flooded by thousands of Vietnam-
ese settlers since 1976. Vietnamese press accounts, for
example, state that in one district in Gia Lai-Cong
Turn Province alone, 25,000 Vietnamese were reset-
tled between 1976 and 1982. Another media report
stated that Quang Nam-Da Nang Province sent
80,000 persons to the Central Highlands from 1976 to
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Hanoi has also neutralized the religious sects once
prominent in South Vietnamese politics. The virulent-
ly anti-Communist Hoa Hao sect was a major target
of Communist military operations between 1976 and
1978. Hanoi 25X1
isolated Hoa Hao areas, constricting the flow of food
and supplies and closing the sect's schools, libraries,
and pagodas. Many leaders were arrested or killed.
Others, such as Hoa Hao Central Church head Le
Quang Liem, were released from prison in return for
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Vietnam's 2 million Cao Dai-a syncretist sect in Tay
Ninh Province and the Mekong. Delta-suffered a
similar fate. Although the sect offered little resist-
ance, its property was confiscated and its top 30
leaders were sent to reeducation camps. New, pro
government priests have taken their place
These sects, as well as the Buddhists-active and
powerful opponents of several Saigon governments-
and the Catholics-who dominated these same gov-
ernments-remain under tight control.
proselytizing is limited by the
government, most seminaries and monasteries are
closed, and few new acolytes are admitted to train for
the priesthood. The four groups are represented by
official organizations, such as the Vietnam Buddhist
Church, and are headed by persons willing to support
government policies.
the groups are laced with informers, and
their most intransigent-and often most capable-
leaders are either dead or in prison.
Tri Quang, one of the most formidable Buddhist
activists during the 1960s, was in detention from 1975
to 1980. Since his release in late 1980, his movements
have been closely watched by public security officials.
In addition to neutralizing the religious sects, Hanoi
has sent thousands of former Saigon government
officials and soldiers to "reeducation" camps, thus
reducing the resistance pool of potential recruits and
leaders. According to the US Embassy in Bangkok,
Hanoi still uses imprisonment to isolate what it
considers to be the most dangerous elements from
society. Refugees report that as many as 100,000
persons remain in 40 to 50 camps
Those who are released are kept under surveillance by
the public security police, who have established an
extensive network throughout the south. According to
a late 1982 Vietnamese magazine article, the "enemy
list" includes former Saigon soldiers and officials,
former non-Communist politicians, and Catholics,
Buddhists, and ethnic Chinese. All persons must
register with the local authorities, and former camp
inmates must obtain permission to stay away from
home overnight.
The massive refugee exodus that began in 1975 also
eliminated a potential source of resistance. Originally
composed of anti-Communist South Vietnamese fear-
ful of retribution, by 1978-79 the exodus was joined
by as many as 250,000 ethnic Chinese going overland
to China. The economic downturn following unifica-
tion and the attempts to socialize the southern econo-
my added thousands more
Some antiregime activities are conducted by exile
groups, but we believe the three leading organizations
have had little success in establishing a presence
inside Vietnam. Two of these groups-former South
Vietnamese Air Force officer Le Quoc Tuy's Bang-
kok-based Movement for the Liberation of South
Vietnam, and former Saigon Admiral Hoang Co
Minh's United Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam-have infiltrated some men and supplies
into southern Vietnam, but we have no information
indicating they have been able to mount any opera-
tions.
they have been unable to operate effectively inside the
country because of the success of the regime's coun-
terintelligence apparatus, which identifies local "reac-
tionaries," maintains files on suspected troublemak-
ers, and monitors their movements. Last July, for
example, the public security office publicized the
capture of Vo Dai Ton, a former Saigon Army
lieutenant colonel who was trying to infiltrate into
Vietnam.
The third group is the Chinese-supported National
Salvation Front, whose titular head is former Viet-
namese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan. It also
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includes several southerners involved in the old Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government that ruled South
Vietnam in 1975-76.
Ithe group does little
more than disseminate propaganda. The exact role
China plays in financing or arming anti-Hanoi exiles
Taming the Southern Party
While using military force to end armed resistance,
Hanoi began to transform southern society and the
Communist Party in the south. Hanoi merged the two
Vietnams in 1976 over the objections of southern
party cadre who had hoped to solidify their positions
before unification. Those southerners who opposed the
merger were overridden and often removed.
Tran Bach Dang, head
of the Viet Cong Culture and Information Section in
1975. Dang resented northern control over southern
artistic, cultural, and information affairs and openly
opposed the merger. By early 1976 the party had
stripped Dang of his position and transferred him to
Hanoi, where he was ordered to attend a political
indoctrination course. Eventually Dang was given a
powerless party position that he still holds.
Other officials suffered similar fates. General Tran
Van Tra, one of the most prominent southern military
officers during the war as well as Central Committee
member and commander of the Seventh Military
Region, lost his Central Committee membership and
his regional command in 1977 for opposing the mere-
er and the accompanying economic policies.
many former Viet Cong
officers brought into the People's Army of Vietnam
were removed at about the same time
Hanoi at an early stage showed its intent to remove
potential opposition among the southern party cadre
by issuing two documents facilitating the introduction
of northerners into the south. The first was Resolution
24, issued in March 1976, which stated that party
positions would be assigned on the basis of merit and
sound moral standing rather than geographic origins.
The second-Directive 232, issued in June 1978-
called for the investigation and possible removal of
party cadres with relatives who worked for the Saigon
government or cadres who had been detained or 25X1
imprisoned by the Saigon authorities. Both occur- 25X1
rences were common among southernersF____1 25X1
The introduction of northerners into the party was 25X1
clearly intended to break down southern particular-
ism, but it was also necessary to staff the local party
structure. Because of the underground nature forced
upon the southern party during the war, South Viet-
namese party membership vastly underrepresented
the area's population. This situation continues today.
In 1982 out of 1.6 million Communist Party mem-
bers, only 200,00 to 300,000 are from the south. Ho
Chi Minh City, according to the Vietnamese press,
has only 40,000 party members compared with Ha-
noi's 150,000. 25X1
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Hanoi has moved beyond party purification to develop
a loyal southern population by resettling thousands of
northerners in the south. One media account last
November, for example, stated that 95,000 people
were sent to four southern provinces during the first
nine months of 1982. Another account stated that 2
million people would be sent to new economic zones- 25X1
underdeveloped, remote areas-by 1985. One and a
half million had been resettled in these zones by 1981,
although not all of those resettled were northerners
sent to the south.
the Central Committee expected reset-
tt emeate loyal population centers in the south
as well as to relieve the tremendous population pres-
sure in northern Vietnam's Red River Valley.F_~
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The party is employing what we consider to be other
effective approaches to encourage loyalty among the 25X1
southerners over the long term. First is control of
education. All students are subjected to intensive
teaching in "revolutionary ethics."
beginning in the fifth grade, students are given 25X1
two hours of indoctrination per week. Professors are
controlled by the Patriotic Intellectuals Association
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formed in 1975. Students are also watched, with
university students categorized as either "normal" or
"special"-the latter belonging to the revolutionary
class. In the next five to 10 years, children who have
been exposed solely to the Communist educational
system will reach the age for military service or for
activism in the Youth Union-primary recruiting
grounds for the party.
Secondly, to ensure that unauthorized views are not
widely available, Hanoi is waging a cultural war.
During its last major campaign in 1981, the party
finally closed Tin Sang, the docile but independently
owned newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City. The city's
book market, which did a brisk trade in pre-1975 used
books, was cleansed of "degenerate culture." Accord-
ing to the Vietnamese press, hundreds of millions of
books (over 340,000 titles) and nearly 1,000 journals
were eliminated. Cassette tapes were confiscated as
well. These measures have not ended the underground
traffic in Western and unauthorized Vietnamese
books and music, but the restricted flow of such items
helps isolate the southerners from views outside the
party-approved norm.
Writers and other artists have also been commanded
to offer approved literature. A major article in the
September 1982 issue of Tap Chi Cong San, the party
journal, highlighted the important role "progressive,
patriotic, revolutionary, and socialist literature" plays
for the regime in creating the "new socialist man" in
the south. The party journal admitted, however, that
the quality of socialist literature was not always high
and that writers and artists had to become better
organized if they were to be effective.
Hanoi has had the most difficulty integrating the
economy of the south. From the moment of victory in
1975, Hanoi began to install its own people in top
economic posts. The Westernized technical and pro-
fessional elite who remained after Saigon's fall were
rusticated or sent to reeducation camps. The ruling
structure imposed in their place, however, had been
conducting war for 30 years and was totally unpre-
pared to manage, let alone transform, the complex
capitalist economy that existed in the south. Hanoi
ordered caution and patience in socializing the south,
particularly in expanding the share of goods, distribu-
tion, and income under state control.
Vietnamese press accounts indicate that from 1975
through late 1979, the regime emphasized controls to
suppress capitalist activity. Bank accounts were fro-
zen, private businesses were closed, and trade was
severely restricted. There were no compensating
measures, however, to promote socialist economic
activity.
In much of the countryside, collectivization was
pushed hard. According to official statistics, the
coastal and Central Highland provinces were about
80 percent collectivized, measured by households in-
corporated. But in the Mekong Delta, which produces
40 percent of Vietnam's rice, this effort met with
peasant resistance. Only 10 percent of the Delta's
households and 7 percent of its land were incorporat-
ed, leaving nearly 11 million peasants operating inde-
pendently. Forced sales of grain to the government at
dictated low prices and the use of roadblocks to
prevent peasants from transporting grain to sell in
cities reduced incentives to grow more than enough to
meet family needs. While data are not available,
press accounts indicate that the urban
and rural programs led to a rapid decline in the
south's total industrial and agricultural production.
Faced with widespread malnutrition and the outbreak
of war with China and Kampuchea, Hanoi in 1979
adopted emergency correctives to stop two years of
declining production. The collectivization drive and
resettlement program were suspended; physical barri-
ers such as roadblocks to transport and trade were
removed; agricultural taxes were frozen for five years
at about 10 percent of previously established levels of
output; increases in agricultural output were exempt-
ed from taxes through 1984; and permission was
granted for a wide range of private enterprises, in
many cases based on withdrawals from formerly
frozen bank accounts.
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Finally, in 1981, the "end-product contract system"
was introduced. Although media accounts indicate
that this system varies with the locale, in most areas it
involves turning over plots of collectivized lands to
individual peasant families who contract to supply
grain in stipulated quantities to the state; any excess
belongs to the peasant. The collectives themselves
undertake only infrastructural development, such as
construction of irrigation facilities and establishment
of seed nurseries. The official media report major
improvements in effective use of land and fertilizers
and in work attendance and intensity since the system
began to be widely applied about mid-1981.
These policies, along with favorable weather, arrested
the decline of the economy. In 1981, according to
Vietnamese statistics for the entire country released
to the IMF:
? Gross domestic product rose 2.7 percent after de-
clining 3.7 percent in 1980.
? The grain harvest increased by 1 million tons to
about 15 million tons.
? Industrial production grew by 1.9 percent after
declining 10.4 percent the previous year.
But the incentive measures also fostered a private
sector that now produces and markets the majority of
the south's crops and consumer goods.
private traders buy hidden grain
from Mekong peasants for sale in Ho Chi Minh City
and other urban centers. The profits are used for
financing small-scale private industry, for hoarding
and speculation, and for the illegal diversion of goods
from state channels. The Vietnamese media report
that the profits of the private sector have also been
used to corrupt officials and divert state raw materi-
als, fuels, and manufactured products into illegal
domestic and export channels. Private traders now
flaunt Western consumer goods and build large
houses. the city's Chinese dis-
trict, Cholon, has flourishing markets specializing in a
wide variety of items ranging from dried fish to
television sets and other Western goods supplied by
Cholon's counterparts in Singapore and Hong Kong,
all protected by local officials. The private sector, a
recent Vietnamese account admits, controls at least
60 percent of all retail trade in the south.
The Vietnamese press in April disclosed that state
enterprises also are involved in the private sector.
They are reported keeping part of their output for
unauthorized exchanges or sale outside the state plan.
They then seek outlets in the private sector in order to
make profits and to obtain raw materials the state
cannot supply.
When the first postwar, five-year plan (1976-80)
ended, the Soviet press indicated that the socialist
part of Vietnam's economy as a whole was producing
less than 60 percent of the gross social product, the
Communist measure of industrial and agricultural
production
Steps taken by Hanoi to compete with the private
sector have worsened the plight of officials, who are
dependent on government subsidies for food and
essential goods. Increases of 600 to 700 percent in
1982 government farm procurement prices-passed
on through the economy-were accompanied by sala-
ry increases to government personnel of only 100 to
200 percent. The money the government printed to
pay the procurement prices drove inflation to well
over 100 percent, according to IMF estimates. The
effect was to force considerable participation in the
private sector by the very officials charged with
suppressing it.
The problem of pushing socialization without forcing
down production presents the leadership with a real
dilemma. Although we do not believe Hanoi will
employ the drastic-and destructive-measures it
used unsuccessfully to socialize the south in 1975-79,
we also doubt the leadership has substantially im-
proved its ability to manage the economy. This is
reflected in the Vietnamese media, which carry con-
flicting views on how to proceed. Ideological journals
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note that private trading stimulates production of food
and light industrial goods that would not be available
otherwise. They concede that the traders also perform
distribution and credit services for which state or ans
have yet to develop the resources or capabilities
On the issue of collectivization of the Mekong Delta,
the leading party journal early this year analyzed the
problem as a complex class struggle, quoted Lenin on
the need to use coercive and dictatorial measures on
the enemy, and cited help from the USSR and better
management as the keys to success. In contrast, the
same journal in a later issue warned cadres against
"imposing new production relations mechanically
when the productive forces do not require them yet."
This time the journal urged that peasants in collec-
tives still be paid for their contribution in land, that
private plots be continued, and that the end-product
contract system be employed.
During preparatory meetings for the Fifth Party
Congress in March 1982, Vietnamese officials argued
bitterly over the timing and pace for restricting the
1979 concessions and for renewing the socialization
drive. The hardliners gained ground after a second
year of good weather and improved economic per-
formance in 1982. The leadership now appears united
in advocating tighter controls over the private sector
and the resumption of collectivization in the south
With a goal of having all southern peasants in
collectives by 1985, Hanoi cautiously resumed collec-
tivization. Some 5,800 new collectives were formed to
bring the total for the south to about 9,800. For the
south as a whole, however, the percentage of peasant
households and of cultivated land in collectives re-
mains only 21.3 percent and 15.6 percent, respective-
ly, according to the press.
Hanoi has also resumed restrictions on money and
goods sent to Vietnam from friends and relatives
overseas; recipients are now restricted to three pack-
ages a year
controls on other areas are
tightening as well. Earlier this year, for example, the
party closed 51 privately owned restaurants in Ho Chi
Minh City.
Vietnam appears to have finished laying the basic
foundations for political and cultural integration.
Hanoi no longer faces a serious internal challenge to
its rule over the south, southern particularism within
the party has been stifled, and the generation-long
task of changing the attitudes of southern Vietnamese
through control of education and culture is under
way.
We believe Hanoi now intends to soften the image of
northern domination. With the departure of what
Hanoi considered southern chauvinists, young south-
erners with little memory of an autonomous southern
party wing will be recruited to strengthen party ranks.
In fact, press and refugee reporting suggests that
especially strong recruiting efforts are being made in
the south.
In addition, we expect the present ruling circles of the
Communist Party to take account of southern inter-
ests. Of the 15 full and alternate members of the
Politburo, five-including General Secretary Le
Duan-were born in southern Vietnam, and two more
spent a considerable part of their careers there.
Minister of the Interior Pham Hung, born in the
Mekong Delta and belonging to the inner circle of the
Politburo, is known as the leading spokesman for the
south. Another southern Politburo member, Vo Van
Kiet, is instrumental in economic planning; he is
rumored to have opposed extensive collectivization in
the south
Hanoi's ultimate goal-to collectivize the south and
destroy the private sector-cannot be achieved quick-
ly. Despite the fact that most Mekong peasants
remain outside the collectives, the state has been able
to increase its share of crops grown in the Delta from
17 to 25 percent by increasing procurement prices.
The 1 million tons collected from the Delta in each of
the last two years has been critical to maintaining
support for government and industrial workers, cad-
res, and soldiers. We believe, however, that resistance
to a collectivization program pushed too fast could
result in the same declines in production experienced
in 1975-79.
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In addition, to establish the tens of thousands of new
collectives on a strong footing, Hanoi would have to
divert scarce trained manpower; tools, motorized
equipment, and construction equipment from other
uses. Hanoi also suffers from shortages of improved
seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation pumps. Finally, Hanoi,
according to official press reports, has no food reserve
to cushion against declines in output.
Control of overseas remittances also presents a prob-
lem. They are an important resource for Vietnam, but
they also lead to increased participation in the free
market. Remittances and packages provide the Viet-
namese with an estimated $100-200 million a year in
hard currency, as well as a range and quality of goods
Vietnam cannot hope to produce for many years)
Judging from repeated media statements that an
acute class struggle in trade and distribution will last
for a protracted period, the regime does not see an
early triumph over the private sector in the south.
Hanoi envisages a gradual process whereby more and
more of society's goods and services are provided by
the state until the private sector disappears. Progress
is dependent on the ability of the state sector to
produce or to purchase an increasing share of goods
and on whether the state managers can become more
competitive in energy and skills with their free market
counterparts. Neither development seems likely soon.
Except for the problems in the economic sector,
Hanoi's move toward integration appears on track.
Nevertheless, there are several factors that could
increase the cost and slow the pace of the program:
? A sharp drop in agricultural production. Caused by
bad weather, resistance to collectivization, or a
combination of the two, a food shortage would force
Hanoi again to back off from socialization. This
shortage could also affect Hanoi's gains in political
and cultural integration by provoking interregional
squabbling over allocation of resources. The serious-
ness of the shortage, the weather, and Soviet will-
ingness to increase food aid would be the factors
determining how soon socialization could be re-
sumed. The drop in Soviet food aid-from 1.5
million tons in 1979, a disastrous crop year in
Vietnam, to 300,000 tons per year in 1981 and
1982-suggests the Soviets would increase aid to
avoid famine but not to facilitate the collectivization
program.
? The spread of the private sector to the north.
southern goods are
already being sold in small but growing black
markets in Hanoi, Haiphong, and other northern
urban centers. Cadre and government workers
themselves are beginning to depend on these mar-
kets for goods not available from the government.
Harsh controls could create a backlash from the
northern population, the party's main source of
support.
? A large increase in outside aid to the resistance. An
increase in resistance activity would force Hanoi to
divert more resources to internal security. But even
with a substantial increase in foreign aid-which we
believe is unlikely-the resistance is not likely to
become an unmanageable problem. Aid would have
to be channeled through Laos or Kampuchea, both
under Vietnamese control, and past Vietnam's per-
vasive internal security system. Travel through
Kampuchea would also involve cooperation with
both Communist and non-Communist Kampuchean
resistance groups. Moreover, there appears to be no
leader who could organize an effective resistance.
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