THE MILITARY FACTOR IN CHINESE POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: FORM

Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
DIA review
completed.
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Intelligence
in Chinese Politics
The Military Factor
DIA REVIEW COMPLETED
Secret
EA 83-10052
March 1983
Copy 4 2 0
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Intelligence
The Military Factor
in Chinese Politics
Domestic Policy Branch, OEA
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
Intelligence Council.
This paper was coordinated with the National
Secret
EA 83-10052
March 1983
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 28 February 1983
was used in this report.
in Chinese Politics
The Military Factor
The People's Liberation Army (PLA), as represented in politics by a
handful of powerful soldier-politicians, has frequently been a locus of
opposition to the reform policies associated with Deng Xiaoping. In our
analysis, however, during the period of Deng's ascendancy beginning in
1978, what the civilians have asked of the PLA they have generally
received. If the army and its leaders at times have gone along reluctantly,
they nevertheless have gone along.
We believe the following statements characterize army-party relations and
the military factor in Chinese politics today:
? The PLA does not present a solid institutional front in the face of civilian
domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
? It is not an aggressively interventionist political actor but is frequently a
reluctant partner.
? Civilian party leaders have fashioned policies that are not to the PLA's
advantage but have suffered none of the fatal consequences anticipated in
some conventional assessments of army-party politics.
? Although the PLA is an important political player, it by itself does not
have veto power over Chinese policies or in the political succession to
Deng. Senior military figures seem content to influence the political
process rather than seek to dominate it.
China's senior soldier-politicians provide the military with an important
political voice, however. The military has a long tradition of partnership
with the civilian party. It is amply represented on the party Politburo and
Central Committee, and all available evidence indicates that the party does
take into account the full range of military interests. Although civilians
clearly set the political agenda, they do so in consultation with their
military colleagues.
There are pronounced differences on some policy questions between party
and army leaders but none that the military regards as a matter of life and
death and beyond compromise. We believe that many of the recent strains
in the army-party relationship have in fact had their roots, in the PLA's
General Political Department, which last September was placed under new
iii Secret
EA 83-10052
March 1983
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
leadership. Generally speaking, a pattern of give and take, in which the
party has made modest concessions in return for support on larger issues,
has been characteristic of contemporary army-party politics:
? China's senior soldiers and the civilian leadership are generally in
agreement on the priority of military professionalization but differ over
the army's relative priority in the overall modernization plans.
? The senior soldier-politicians have generally cooperated in efforts to
revise recruitment criteria, retire aged or incompetent personnel, consoli-
date commands, demobilize excessive ground forces and support person-
nel, and purge the politically unreliable despite some reservations voiced
within the PLA.
? The problem of Mao's legacy has not completely been laid to rest, and
the army still seeks to salvage whatever elements of Mao's doctrine that
appear relevant to current conditions.
? The conservative disposition of some PLA leaders has led them and like-
minded civilians to voice reservations about some of Deng's economic
reforms and undesirable side effects generated by the policies, but
Beijing's senior civilians have generally sought to revise policies to meet
these objections.
Data on military opinions concerning foreign policy is particularly thin; we
believe foreign policy is essentially a civilian preserve.
We believe that for the duration of Deng's active political life, the party
will generally have the cooperation of the military. The prospects for Hu
Yaobang, Deng's political heir, to succeed Deng and to preserve army-
party harmony are enhanced by the continuing personnel turnover in the
PLA. Hu will be able to count on the support of senior military men who
have a vested interest in the policies initiated by Deng and who would
probably take their lead from civilian leaders with whom they are allied.
We believe that the influence of the senior officers may increase during the
succession period but not to the point where they exercise a veto over Hu's
continuation as general secretary.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
Secret
Summary
Playing the Game: The Exercise of Power
5
The Legacy of Mao Zedong
13
National Social and Economic Concerns
13
Foreign Policy
14
Succession Politics
14
The Outlook for Army-Party Relations
15
C. Probable Political Allegiances of Military Politburo Members 25
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
 Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2 l'
25X1
Deng Xiaoping ... born 1904 in Sichuan ... Chairman, Military
Commission and member, Politburo Standing Committee ...
China's paramount leader ... former political commissar, 2nd
Field Army ... Long March veteran ... apparatchik par excellence
... party Secretary General before Cultural Revolution ... PLA
Chief of Staff 1975-76, 1977-80 ... leading voice for civilian and
military reforms ... pace of public activity has slowed as younger
proteges assume more of his workload ... has stated desire to
remain politically active through 1985, enabling his oversight of
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
The Military Factor
in Chinese Politics
The Cultural Revolution era (1966-76) saw an unprec-
edented politicization of China's military establish-
ment and the expansion of the military's influence in
all aspects of Chinese life. Indeed, by the Ninth Party
Congress in 1969, the forces of the People's Libera-
tion Army (PLA) were administering the entire coun-
try and were widely perceived by Chinese and foreign-
ers alike as the only force capable of preventing chaos
following the destruction of the party and state bu-
reaucracies by Mao Zedong
The PLA's action in this period gave rise to an
interpretation of the army's role in politics that has
varied little to this day. At its most extreme, the
conventional wisdom posits that the army aggressively
asserts its institutional interests at every opportunity;
that it has across-the-board differences with China's
civilian leadership; that civilian failure to propitiate
this purported military opposition runs the risk of
some unspecified-but presumably violent-retalia-
tion; and that, as a consequence, the military in effect
remains the arbiter of Chinese politics
In our analysis, army-party relations are not nearly so
strained; although there are significant differences on
a number of issues, we judge army-party relations to
be on an even keel. Moreover, in evaluating the PLA's
political role, we believe a good case, can be made
that:
? The PLA does not present a solid institutional front
in the face of civilian political initiatives.
? It is not an aggressively interventionist political
actor-its forceful intervention during the Cultural
Revolution in fact was at the behest of the civilian
leadership.
? The civilian party leaders have fashioned policies
that are not to the army's advantage but have
suffered none of the fatal consequences anticipated
in conventional assessments of army-party politics.
? Although the PLA is an important political player,
it is in no way the overriding factor in Chinese
politics or in the political succession to Deng.
There is little information that directly illuminates
the questions involved in assessing the political role of
the army. The Chinese maintain an obsessive secrecy
about anything that concerns the military. In prepar-
ing this paper, we have drawn on the full range of
intelligence information and diplomatic and press
reporting. The bulk of our assessment, however, is
derived from analysis of Chinese propaganda. Al-
though we are confident we understand the issues in
army-party relations, our knowledge of the decision- 25X1
making process relating to those issues is less com- 0
plete.
The Political Context of
Army-Party Relations'
At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central
Committee in 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his political
allies won endorsement of a program that effectively
sought to reverse the radical political, economic, and
social orientation that had been set by Mao. Plans
initially drawn up by Deng in 1974 and 1975 to
reform the large Chinese military establishment were
also revived. The new economic priorities, then desig-
nated the "Four Modernizations," included the mod-
ernization of China's military but gave it the lowest
position on the grounds that the national economy
must improve before substantial material benefits
would accrue to the PLA
'A note on terminology: Throughout this assessment, the term
"party" will generally be used to mean the civilian party, and the
terms "army" or "military" will generally be used to designate the
PLA. In adopting this usage, we do not overlook the fact that in
many cases leaders who are customarily regarded as civilians-
Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, for example-have significant
military responsibilities or that senior military leaders of the
founding generations-Nie Rongzhen or Xu Xiangqian, for exam-
ple-may effectively transcend differences between the party and
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
The purely military component of China's reform
program called for:
? Sharp reduction in troop stength to create a "leaner,
meaner" military.
? New recruitment criteria to improve the average
education level of young enlistees and thereby pre-
pare the PLA for the advent of modern weaponry.
? Changes in training that played down traditional
Maoist people's war precepts and placed more em-
phasis on joint-service operations and warfare under
modern military conditions.
? Retirement of superannuated, incompetent, or polit-
ically unreliable officers to create headroom for a
new generation of commanders.
? A consolidation of commands, stressing the simplifi-
cation of organization and the elimination of
redundancy.
Although these changes tended to reduce the influ-
ence of the military conservatives and were unpopular
in some quarters, senior commanders endorsed them,
indicating a basic sympathy with the program's broad
goals. Indeed, since the Third Plenum, the PLA's
budget has been cut, demobilizations have reduced
the ranks by approximately 1 million, some elderly
officers are beginning to retire, the simplification of
command has begun, and the army is preparing-
along with the civilian party-for a large-scale purge
later this year.'
Deng has moved cautiously in implementing his re-
form policies, wherever possible attempting to con-
vince skeptics of the wisdom of his program rather
than ordering compliance. In making sensitive person-
nel appointments, he has taken into account the
opinions of the senior soldier-politicians. He has also
made concessions on such issues as ideology and
culture to the more conservative sensibilities of the
PLA. In instances where new economic programs
have discriminated against rural dependents of serv-
ing soldiers, adjustments have been made to benefit
military families.
' See appendix B for a summary of recent military personnel
changes. The 12th Party Congress and its creation of a party
advisory commission for senior officials has stimualted a large
turnover of high-ranking officers, especially in the regional military
Most of the issues in army-party relations today
appear to us to fall into the realm of routine politics,
which require no extraordinary measures to resolve.
In our judgment, senior military officers do not feel
alienated or powerless, nor do they seem out of
sympathy with the central goal of Deng's program:
the creation of a stable, less ideological regime gov-
erned by a collective leadership that has as its para-
mount goal the raising of living standards. Senior
military figures seem content to influence the political
process rather than seek to dominate it~
The Mechanics of Military Influence
Sources of Political Power
In no other Communist state has the military persist-
ently wielded as much influence or been consistently
so well represented in the leading party organiza-
tions-the Central Committee and its Political Bu-
reau (or their equivalent bodies). When we speak
about the "army's role" or the "military's influence,"
we are actually talking about the power and authority
of senior soldiers, essentially the military members of
the Politburo and the Secretariat, and the PLA's high
command-all probable members of the party's Mili-
tary Commission,' which sets military policy and is
China's most powerful military organization. In Chi-
nese politics influence tends to be linked to personal-
ities rather than to institutions; a person is powerful
because of who he is and the loyalties he commands,
not by virtue of the office he holds. In effect, then, the
influence of the military is essentially the sum of the
personal power of a handful of soldier-politicians
' We presume that membership on the party's Military Commission
includes not only the publicly identified members (chairman, vice
chairman, secretary general, deputies secretary general) but also:
military region commanders, directors and political commissars of
the PLA's three general departments, the Minister of National
Defense, the commanders and political commissars of the service
arms (Air Force, Navy, and so forth), and eminent senior officers
who no longer have specific job responsibilities. The membership
probably includes civilians whose work brings them into close
contact with military matters, such as heads of the armaments
ministries and public security officials. Thus, we estimate that the
Commission probably has in excess of 50 members.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Secret
i r .lianrin,g horn I,CV' in Guantg:hou !o
a!!hr Hul ka larnili member, Politburo
ti7amlint < onunitee c hairman, Aft/itar
(omntisstort "/he Doi Afcat Afarvhal"...
f one /far, it Icl'rart former afinictcr of ,\a-
tonal Dclerlve suniced (ullurul Revolution
I,vh prrcti,vr rclatirch inttar! tut ear(t, vocal
supporter of deposed parr ( hairman, llua Coo-
lenc III the mid 0-0% shared most of Deng'c
ideas on anrn ny?rms apparent lullinq out
orcr 1/ to ~ remora/, pate and scope of Deng'v
,,veto// proerarn. dc lfaoi:ation... arch-tradi-
tionalist on !/he Politburo nho has slipper/ into
senihlr tnfreyttert1 public appearances . .
,diem persislent refusals to retire, submitted res-
ienaton to 17'( rrill not return as Standing
( ommlltee ( hairntan at romin e sccsiun.~
The political prominence of China's ranking soldiers
is partly a legacy of' the Chinese revolution and the
wartime partnership between army and party. Since
the founding of the People's Republic, virtually all of
its national leaders have been forn)er soldiers whose
service in the Communist army dates from the years
when party and army were virtually indistinguish-
able.' Only in the early 1950s did career patterns
differentiate and "civilian" and "military" become
relatively unambiguous categories of leadership in
' I he m l ,striking contemporary example of civilian-military
continuity i., the I'oli bore itself, where live of the six members of
the Standing (ommiltee Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Li Xian-
ni;ut, ( hen Yun, and [III Yaobang made the Long March as
Wei Guoying ... horn about 1907 in Guang.vi .. .
7huang nationality ... member. Politburo .. .
ideological hardliner and obstructor of reform
... 3rd Field Arms' and Long March veteran .. .
served under Deng Xiaoping in 1930.s and along
with .Fu Shiyou protected Deng when he was
purged in 1976 ... longtime partt' and govern-
ment leader in native province ... presided over
bloods' suppression of Red Guards ... tran.s-
lerred to Guangzhou after Cultural Revolution
... made Director of General Political Depart-
ment after Deng'c second rehabilitation in 1977
... espoused or!hodor Maoist views long after
they had lost currency, which ultimately cost
him GPD post ... remains publicly active as vice
chairman q/ National People's Congress Stand-
China. For the topmost military leaders who serve in
the highest party bodies, however, the distinction
continues to be blurry.
The consistently martial cast of Communist China's
early program, goals, and exigencies also enhanced
the army's influence in policymaking. These early
years were marked by suppression of remnant Nation-
alist forces or other designated "class enemies," inter-
vention in Korea, an initial five-year plan that empha-
sized heavy industry and military modernization, and
other measures that required substantial military
contributions both in planning and execution.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Nie Rongzhen ... born 1899 in Sichuan ... Vice
Chairman, Military Commission ... member,
Politburo ... "the father of the Chinese atomic
bomb". . . headed the National Defense Science
and Technology Commission until the Cultural
Revolution ... attacked then but came out rela-
tively unscathed ... one of four surviving mar-
shals named in 1955... an intellectual, studied
engineering in Belgium and France... North
China Field Army and Long March veteran ...
generally inactive now ... many recent state-
ments on behalf of expanded role of intellectuals
and science in the military ... almost certainly
backs Deng's goals, but lack of hard information
prohibits placing Nie squarely in reform camp.
The early importance of the military was also reflect-
ed in the presence of soldiers on the highest party
bodies, which has continued over the past 30 years.
Military representation on the Central Committee has
ranged from a high of about 45 percent in 1969 to a
low of about 20 percent in 1956 and at present.
Although the amount of influence members of the
Committee exert as members is open to question,
membership nevertheless confers prominence within
the 39-million-member party, elite status throughout
China, and, presumably, access to the upper reaches
of the party bureaucracy.
Military representation on the Politburo is even more
pronounced. Of its 28 current members, seven are
career soldiers. Three others, including Deng Xiao-
ping, have mainly worked as civilians but now assume
Xu Xiangqian ... born 1902 in Shanxi ... Vice
Chairman, Military Commission ... one of four
surviving marshals ... former primary school-
teacher ... Long March and North China Field
Army veteran . .
discussions ... survived attacks during Cultural
Revolution, but standing in leadership declined
... Defense Minister under Hua Guofeng, appar-
ently compromise choice ... rarely attends public
gatherings, but receives visitors and grants inter-
views at home or in hospital ... most recent
public statements uniformly support Deng's re-
important military responsibilities. Two-Wang Zhen
and Wei Guoqing-currently have an indeterminate
relationship with the military but still retain signifi-
cant PLA ties.'
The military as an institution-as opposed to the sum
of the personal influence of soldier-politicians-gains
influence from its role as a national model for civilian
emulation. This reached its heyday in the years
'On the inner sanctum of the Politburo, its Standing Committee,
two men may be said to represent military "constituencies"-Deng
and Ye Jianying, who since the Third Plenum of 1978 have been
frequently at odds. We believe that both men share substantially
the same views on military affairs but have differed over broader
questions of national policy. Both, however, are probably perceived
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
Secret
immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution, when
everyone was admonished "to learn from the PLA."
This type of exhortation has declined, and, because of
the reform program, a PLA career is not as attractive
to young Chinese as it once was. On some matters,
however-especially the recent drive to revive tradi-
tional moral precepts under the guise of "socialist
spiritual civilization"-the PLA is still held up as a
national exemplar.
The military as an institution undoubtedly draws
influence from its heavy involvement in key economic
and S&T projects. Much of the most sensitive re-
search work is carried out under military auspices or
at military facilities. Until recently, the PLA had
primary responsibility for much state construction,
and retired or demobilized officers routinely received
management positions in civilian enterprises.
Impact of Crosscutting Loyalties
As far as we can determine-and our evidence is
subjective and thin-the Chinese officer corps has not
developed a strong corporate sense-that is, they do
not as yet perceive their profession to be one that
separates them from the rest of society or imposes a
commonality of interests. We can cite no instance of
the Chinese officer corps closing ranks to defend what
might be defined as purely military interest, although
the possibility is high that if such an event occurred
we might not know about it.6
Lacking a strong corporate sense, the potential politi-
cal pressure that the Chinese officer corps can bring
to bear is diminished. Indeed, the military does not
have a uniform point of view. All the shades of
opinion in China are also reflected in the PLA,
although not necessarily with the same emphases.' We
can identify no single, unified "military opinion" or
political interest, no homogeneous PLA opposition to
" Ironically, perhaps, to the extent the military reform program
increases professionalism, the Chinese officer corps will presumably
begin to think and act more in corporate terms. At the same time,
professionalism also implies a diminished political presence, which
interests on traditionally military concerns.
general, the PLA tends to view events in Maoist terms, which are
out of step with Deng's reform program. Nonetheless, many senior
officers, such as Chief of State Yang Dezhi and Defense Minister
Zhang Aiping, support Deng's efforts to professionalize and mod-
Deng's reformist proclivities, and no one officer who
personifies the army's views with the authority en-
joyed by Peng Dehuai or Lin Biao during the Mao
era. In China's current political context, the phrase
"military opposition" can make sense only if under-
stood as the disagreement of one or more senior
officers with a specific policy, and not, as frequently
understood, as wholesale rejection by "the military"
of Deng's entire reform package. The net effect, we
believe, is that it is impossible for any one man to
deliver the military on any question.
Crosscutting loyalties reinforce differences of military
opinion that tend to dilute corporatism in the officer
corps. Each officer has at least one primary institu-
tional affiliation but has other allegiances as well. For
instance, every officer in the Chinese high command
is a party member of long standing, and, having risen
through a military culture that emphasizes discipline
and unity, we believe there is a strong impulse among
officers to close ranks behind the party's line. An
officer may just as likely have primary loyalty to his
service branch or administrative bureaucracy within
the PLA. Purely nationalistic considerations motivate
25X1
E
25X1
most Chinese civilian and military leaders at least 25X1
part of the time and may be especially important
among those soldiers who have had doubts about
Mao's particular vision of Communism in China
Playing the Game: The Exercise of Power 25X1
We know relatively little about the modes of military
involvement in Chinese political decisionmaking.
Since the fall of the Gang of Four, however, we know
of no instance in which an individual soldier-politician
or any presumed group of soldier-politicians threat-
ened to use armed force for personal or political ends.'
We believe that military influence is exerted in three
In the history of the regime, there have been two alleged attempts
to use force in a political matter: the so-called coup attempt by Lin
Biao and the paramilitary contingency plans of Jiang Qing and her
three associates. The facts of these incidents have never been
clarified, and there is some debate over what actually occurred, but
perhaps the most relevant aspect of the two "conspiracies" is that
while PLA loyalties to the political center may have wavered, they
were never severed. Indeed, in both incidents the military stood by
the civilian party authorities and on orders moved against the
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
general ways: participation in party and government
councils; through the media; and in policy implemen-
tation.
Party and Government Councils. In our analysis,
political decisions within the decisive party arena are
reached by consensus, which gives senior soldier-
politicians ample opportunity to shape decisions. Even
Deng, who is first among equals, cannot dictate policy
to his peers. Each member of the leadership brings to
policy deliberations his own ideological, political, and
institutional baggage, and during these initial ex-
changes-while the issue presumably remains wide
open-individual influence is perhaps most pro-
nounced. The soldier-politicians operate as do any
other members of the political elite.'
Military officers often are able to find allies among
civilian leaders, who are equally affected by reform
policies. Rather than clearly defined factions these are
probably shifting coalitions based on specific issues.
We believe that, on resource allocation questions,
soldier-politicians are natural allies of economic plan-
ners and administrators who favor greater emphasis
on central planning and heavy industrial production.
Soldiers who favor a more professional, less politically
active army have allies among civilians who share that
outlook and who stress professional competence rather
than political reliability as criterion for all leadership.
The generation of officers between ages.30 and 50,
who will inherit the positions cleared through Deng's
retirement policy, are probably the PLA's strongest
supporters of reform.1?
' A crucial area of speculation concerns the personal staffs of the
leadership and how they interact. Chinese leaders tend to have a
rather small personal staff but can also task the much larger staffs
that are attached to both policymaking and administrative organi-
zations. The Secretariat, for example, has several subordinate
research offices-for policy, agriculture, and so forth. We know
nothing of how staffers are apportioned among the leadership or
what relative advantages in the routine processes of consensus
building are conferred by various staffing arrangements. The Chief
of China's General Staff has three senior officers who have been
identified as his assistants, and each assistant presumably directs a
" We also believe such alliances occur at the local level. Civilian-
military alliances at the provincial level and lower were also fairly
common during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution.
The central leadership, however, has attempted to reduce the
probability of such alliances by periodically transferring regional
military commanders. There have been three such rotations since
The military, like other groups in China, increasingly
is using the annual meeting of the National People's
Congress, the nominal parliament, to express opinions
on national issues. In recent sessions they have criti-
cized cuts in the PLA budget, rural responsibility
systems that make the army a less appealing alterna-
tive to the farm than it once was, the scale of the shift
of military industries into civilian production, and
morale problems created by wide-scale demobiliza-
tions without sufficient promise of adequate civilian
employment
Publication of these complaints in the party press-
itself a daring departure from the past practice-has
the effect of legitimizing the military's grievances as
well as its right to criticize party policy. The party's
apparent confidence, however, in allowing mildly het-
erodox opinions to air suggests to us that it believes
relations with the army are basically good
The Role of the Media. An important arena in which
both army-party and intraservice disputes are played
out is in China's public media. The PLA has its own
restricted distribution newspaper, the Liberation
Army Daily (LAD), which is edited and published by
the PLA's General Political Department. The over-
whelming majority of LAD's content is uncontrover-
sial. On occasion, however, the LAD publishes views
that stray from the central line, usually as a signed
article or a "contributing commentator" written by an
author who is not on the regular staff of the paper.
Such pieces cannot be regarded as the military posi-
tion on an issue-only editorials have that status-but
they often reflect the views of a sizable group within
the PLA, which, through the media, seeks to influence
opinion among a broader audience.
The Bai Hua and Zhao Yiya incidents are examples
of how the military media attempt to influence policy.
In the spring of 1981, the LAD published an article
by a contributing commentator that sharply de-
nounced "Bitter Love," a screenplay written by an
army writer named Bai Hua. The commentator sin-
gled out Bai and his work as examples of the increas-
ing tendency of China's literary and intellectual com-
munity to question the party's legitimacy and to
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
Secret
criticize the army's behavior during the Cultural
Revolution. The civilian party media-most notably
People's Daily-supported Bai Hua and increased
artistic freedom. The debate was ultimately resolved
in favor of the LAD position and new controls were
imposed on China's artistic and literary community.
On the eve of the 12th Party Congress in late August
1982, the LAD ran a signed article by Zhao Yiya,
another army writer, that implicitly criticized much
of Deng's reform program. In this instance, the LAD
lost and was forced to publish an open "self-criticism"
that called the publication of Zhao's article a "grave
political and organizational error." Whether as pre-
cipitating cause or mere pretext, the August article
also led to the dismissal of Politburo member Wei
Guoqing as director of the General Political Depart-
ment, the military organ responsible for the LAD, and
a new round of media criticism of "leftism" with the
PLA.
Policy Implementation. Military influence over policy
is not exerted solely by the most senior soldier-
politicians. In contrast to their active advocacy at the
political center is the passive resistance of lower level
commanders and commissars, who like other Chinese
officials, sometimes attempt to circumvent policy by
not vigorously enforcing it." Officers are frequently
given only general instructions and have the flexibility
to tailor implementation to specific conditions within
the command. Subsequent noncompliance at times is
effective in pressuring the central leadership to modi-
fy policy. Physical distance from the capital, powerful
support at higher levels, a strong local position with
civilian support, and mixed signals from the center all
work to the advantage of regional military figures.
During the past two years, however, it has become
more and more difficult for local leaders to resist
central policies as the Dengist leadership has consoli-
dated its position.
It Recent complaints in the open media, for example, indicate
Beijing has had difficulty getting unspecified "comrades" to retire
aged officers, to make adequate preparations for demobilization
work, and to sufficiently conduct propaganda on the latest central
Issues in Army-Party Relations
China's obsessive secrecy in military affairs and the
use of slogans make it difficult to understand at times
exactly what is at issue and to distinguish between
commitment and cant. At a minimum, we assume the
majority of Chinese military professionals want for 25X1
their armed forces what soldiers elsewhere character-
istically seek:
? A measure of autonomy in military matters and
sympathetic consideration by civilian politicians of
their views and program to meet national security
needs.
? Recognition of their importance and contribution to
China.
? Modernization of military hardware over time.r__7
25X1
In our judgment, there are pronounced differences on
some policy questions between party leaders and
military officers but none that the military regards as
a matter of life and death. The following review of 25X1
issues in recent army-party relations suggests that a
spirited and on occasion heated dialogue has taken
place, but essentially over priority and pace, not goals.
As a consequence, army-party differences have been
amenable to compromise. Although, as far as we can
determine, the political agenda is clearly dictated by
the civilian leadership, the record shows that Deng
and his allies generally take the views and interests of
the senior soldier-politicians fully into account.
Professionalism and Politics. In the PLA, which is
and will remain a highly politicized army, profession-
alism has had an uneven record. Officers have had to
adapt not only to changing criteria of military exper-
tise but also to repeatedly shifting political require-
ments. In our view, there appears to be substantial
consensus among civilian and military leaders on the 25X1
need to create structures that circumscribe the mili-
tary's political role and preclude the possible manipu-
lation of the army to advance the political ends of one
man or a small group 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
I i 1)s11en' hoar /9/6 in lluhei - - - member.
ll,lrthuto ( ,,runntnder..Jhent artg A1ilitarr
R"Q1, nl a political eni inm lr till Aecn in'stinc't
I?r 'unna/ / ont 1farrh ""(tram rose
Inch ,t ~ orps commander to Politburo during
( altos/ l.'erolut, ,,, dire,ted the General
icaI I)epartrmertt durine ear/r I97Us
rmeru her ?l Politburo .lfaudine C ontntitfee during
10th ( rufral ( ?nNnit i 'e , /()'-? /Y'S, meteor-
t, rtr fir'Iunu'1 the result ,t/lelt10 connerfions,
but 1 r deli", , an'cnri:atiou has generallr
"made appropriate puhlie endorlernertis of I)en,''.c
t, 101M, noes( he ,Unltdere l a ,1t'rr7Q Tote on
the j'olifhuro, but real Gel' mm h" limit ,service
under men, in _'rtd l field 'been' st,fem
I'hc relative weight to assign to the PLA's military
and political activities, however, continues to be con-
tent ions. Our reading of the civilian and military press
as sv.ell as I S military attache reporting suggests that
the majority of' China's senior soldier-politicians favor
a sharper, more exclusively military role. They seek
the attributes of increased professionalism: improved
unit and individual training; regulations governing
ranks, promotions, and career development; and insti-
tutions that clearly establish responsibility at each
level of command. They also seek to reduce the army's
involvement in areas where the army and society in
general have overlapped, such as public security,
civilian construction, and, of course, political activism.
Qin.1iwci ... horn 1914 in /1uhei ... Alternate
Afenther, Politburo . C onnandcr, Beijing illil-
itan' Ration ... a 1)en,q .\Yanpim,' protege .. .
"orurrtander of humming ntilitarn region When
purged in 1967... returned to command
C'hen,i(lu 11,/itar Region in /973, chortlr Otter
rehabilitation of 1)en,g .Aiaopin,g ... a Long
Ifar"h hero ... served under Deng in 2nd held
Arne' .. presumed also to he supporter of Hu
1 afohan,g, perhaps net old Field Arlin connection
a vocal supporter of 1)e'ng's reform priorities.
Civilians are in general agreement with this but above
all want an army on board with the party's policies.
Although interested in a politically nonintrusive
armed forces, civilian leaders by no means want it
"depoliticized" army; they basically seek a "de-
Maoized" army. DeMaoization includes eliminating
from the ranks those remaining officers and men
unalterably committed to Mao's ideas and vision.
Because they are political rather than military profes-
sionals, the army's political commissars stand to lose
positions and authority under military professionaliza-
tion. The General Political Department (GPD), which
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553ROO0100150001-2
Secret
If ang /hen horn 190,1' in Hunan .. ntenther,
Politburo trouhh'dtooter /or Boiling. e.%pe-
/alit in minority areas 1st bold Irnt. and
I onp War, h veteran ,ras member of part,
llilitan ( onuuission prohabli through 12th
fart I s,R'ress and Sitar still he ,,as Minister
o/ .Stilts Iarm, and Land Reclamation /95(t-
/900 Iltrlirct o//issal atl nxntsierial rank to
he, pu//ic/r ridiculed during the ( ultural Reyolu-
iL,n rebounded quickly , but in trouble again
lane /969 worked prinmrilr in national de-
Irne inaIustriaIse, tor in ntid-/97(ts ...strong
carh support o/ Deng and reform priorities. F
directs political indoctrination within the ranks and
most important controls personnel matters, is the
parent unit of the commissars and
has been it haven
To a large extent, many of the recent tensions in
army-party relations in reality are strains in party-
GPi) relations. The Department's importance cannot
be overestimated. Its bureaucratic infrastructure po-
tentially enables a small group of' leaders to quietly
campaign against central policies. The GPD has its
own chain of command, its own media voice, and
oversees the party activities of all units. In this system
of dual command, the political commissar is in effect
a unit cocommander and generally the secretary of a
unit's party committee
Yang De:hi ... horn 19/0 in Hunan ... Chief ol
the PIA General .SinU... Politburo ntenther .. .
Deputt' Secretary General. Military ( ontnti.esiort
.. ,generally unscathed during Cultural Revolu-
tion as commander off Jinan Military Region .. .
later contntanded Wuhan and Kunming Military
Regions ... Long March veteran ....serr'ice in
2nd Field Army system under Deng ..iaopinp,
prohahlr knows Hu I aohang front same period
ntilitare representative on Secretariat. I9X0-
I9R? ... now China's most influential career
soldier ... publicl,r has taken strong re/orrn
Deng and the reformers have had only limited success
in bringing the GPI) to heel. Shortly after Deng's
second rehabilitation in July 1977, Wei Guoging, a
close ally, was named to head the Department,
ment. Subsequent events suggest that what transpired
was a classic instance of "bureaucratic capture," in
which Wei wound up protecting the activities and
viewpoints he was commissioned to eliminate.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553ROO0100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
) ang Shaagkurt .. horn 1907 in Su huan .. .
i'rrnianrnt I I, I, ('hairrnan and Setretarr Gener-
al, tlilitan (ommission ... niennhcr. Politburo
headed parts General Of/icc from 1945 until
purgcd in I96' returned to public life in 1978
rlos ' politicsil sills of Anti! .1 iaopin.g .. ntas
be most potterlul man in the l'1.A . over.cees
dat-to-dsir '4/fairs Ul Alilitsirs ('unnrti.c.ciont ... it
persistent spokesman for militsirs rrhum.c, c.cpe-
I iallr upgraded education regitirenn eirs and
ruunger rommsinder.c ... his age poses prohlcm.s
for re/ormere, vi Ito must soon lind 5 ounger suc-
We believe that if army professionalization is to
proceed smoothly, the party must ensure the absolute
reliability of the GPD to implement revised personnel
policies. In September Wei was replaced by Yu Qiuli
as GPD director, and the public media immediately
embarked upon renewed criticism of' leftism within
the army. Yu almost certainly has the responsibility
for bringing the GPD fully on board with the party
line. Yu will be assisted in his efforts by the coming
party rectification, which formally begins late this
year. If he succeeds, we believe a major source of
army-party conflict will have been defused.
The Central Afilitarl' Commission. Deng and his
military allies have also attempted to symbolically
distance the military from the locus of political power
by making a sharper bureaucratic distinction between
the party and the PI.A. At the heart of this effort is
it Qiuli ... horn 1914 in flung.ri . . Director of
General Political Department, nuvnher ql the
Politburo and Secretariat ... appointment in
September 198' a puzzle ... replaced Wei (iuoq
ing in GPD shakeup Jollox'ing Zhao I it", qi/air
... inherits Wei's mandate to clean house in the
GPD ... 1st Field Ames hackgrountd and Long
5!arch veteran ... active dupe PLA until 1958
.. gtterseards worked in civilian planning hu-
reaucraev heliered a partisan u/ "heavy in-
dustry hr.ct'' approach that Jell into disfavor
Jollossin,g 7hied Plenum ... a.s GPl) director has
been scrupulous/, laith/ul to the reform line in
militarte q//airs. thus perhaps demonstrating that
dUterences over economies do not prey lade agree-
the Central Military Commission, established under
the new state constitution to "direct the armed forces
of the country." In form if not in substance, the new
Commission moves the PLA out from under the direct
subordination to the party's Military Commission,'
which has a heavy contingent of military conserva-
tives, and places it under the National People's Con-
gress, where civilians presumably can exert greater
The (entral Military Commission should not be confused with
the party's Military Commission. The identity of the two names
tiunshi iveivuanhuit seems intentionally to denote it virtual inter-
ch.tngeability. The state organization is generally denoted by the
prefix "central" (:hong_eang). On rare occasions, however, the party
separate party committees from day-to-day administration in all
organizational hierarchies governmental and economic, for exam-
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Secret
/haunt; .Iipin,q horn /9/(I irt.Sit ucan ...
tlnu,ter ?/ National lb/ nse Deputy Sccre-
tar, (,Norval, .tlilitarr Connnissour, .. Depute
fuel. 1'/ I General .Atc(l/ purged in 1967,
rrn,rn,d to 1, tit,' political III" in 1973 . sin'-
''II \iN Ro,v'/tort as load ,ll \ational /)c-
' I, irnre and /a', /nu,G!iv (ominus non and
,lirretor )l ( honest, lilt litart R&1) in /97S .. 3rd
I w 1d Irmo and Iortq l/arrlt veteran .. outspo-
ticn afro, coo of rniI,tan' modernization. in-
crrased R.( 1) ellortI reportedh to trouble in
void N-0, for r(lnsing tN employ in('ontpetent
annYrcttr L'raduan'c at %/)ST( reliable sup-
Lhang Tingla . . . horn around 19/0 . . . provin-
cial origins unknown ... Commander of the
Chinese Air Force ... menther, Politburo ... the
least well-known of (hina'.s senior soldier politi-
cians ... purged during Cultural Revolution,
rehabilitated in 1973, promoted Iron, depute
commander in 1977 ... Air Force once a Lin
Biao preserve, but as highly technical service arm
has large stake in modernization program .. .
regularly speaks in support of reform priorities,
press reports initially suggested
that the party's Military Commission would be abol-
ished following the I 2th Party Congress. This did not
happen, and the ambiguous status of the CMG --no
members have been publicly identified nor has it met
to our knowledge suggests some soldier-politicians,
whom we cannot identify, oppose its activation. The
reform leadership may still seek to transfer command
responsibility to the new state Commission, while
perhaps retaining the party body to establish broad
guidelines. Under this arrangement, party control
would still be effected in the CMC because its
membership would be composed of essentially the
same types of officials we believe are on the current
party Military Commission all having strong party
credentials but presumably without the ancient war-
riors and with a greater percentage of civiliansF_
Modernization Priorities. Although we believe that
civilian and military leaders agree on the primacy of
professionalization in the PLA, there are probably
differences over the relative priority of military mod-
China's national economy to be the first priority. The
civilians argue that the army will eventually reap the
benefits of China's economic growth once current
policies come on track, and, hence, military modern-
ization has the lowest priority among China's "Four
Modernizations" (in industry, agriculture, science and
technology, and national defense).
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
l'he periodic appearance such as during the 1980
session of the National People's Congress of views
critical of the Pt A's low priority and recent attempts
in the public media to rebut such opinions lead us to
conclude that China's soldiers have only grudgingly
accepted the situation. In our view, which is based on
both public and private statements of military spokes-
men, the PI.A's acceptance of the current priorities -
including a cut in China's defense budget turns on a
civilian promise of' increased future outlays.
It is unlikely, however, that this arrangement can last
indefinitely. The statements of PEA spokesmen over
the past two years indicate that, during the life of the
current five year plan or early in the next around
1986 the senior officers expect China's economic
policies to generate the necessary resources for addi-
tional military expenditures. Delay beyond that time
will likely bring this simmering issue to a rolling boil.
"Rice Bowl" Issues
I fforts to modernize on the cheap by bureaucratic
streamlining and personnel measures threaten the
livelihood of many rank-and-file military men and
thus are politically sensitive. The effects of crosscut-
ting loyalties and interservice rivalry undermine the
military's ability to resist these policies, however, and
the demographics of the officer corps also works to
attenuate such resistance as arises. Natural attrition
is claiming many of the old soldiers at whom the most
controversial measures are aimed:
? The reestablishment of ranks, which were abolished
in 1905, is a sensitive matter because it would most
likely be accompanied by regulations governing the
service of officers, as was the case in 1955. These
would impose strict "up or out" criteria on officers
who also have in many cases been serving for 20
years or more in essentially the same posts. The
army high command would also have to determine
at a single swoop who would be a general, who a
colonel, and who mustered out. Plans to restore
ranks have been delayed repeatedly. We believe the
civilian and military reformers can afford to wait on
this measure, as the longer implementation is de-
layed, the smoother it will go. We expect any
trouble that arises when the rank system is finally
implemented to be brief and uneventful.
? Current Chinese recruitment policy favors high
school graduates for the enlisted ranks and military
academy graduates for the officer corps. Both are
sharp departures from the earlier practice of exten-
sive recruitment among the peasantry and promo-
lion through the ranks. The official media admits
the new criteria worries the currently serving, rela-
tively unsophisticated officers who fear the in-
creased competition. In our view, the reformers
seem confident that the gradual personnel turnover
during the next several years will eliminate the
aggrieved and thus defuse the problem.
? The party has offered lucrative retirement benefits
to encourage the PLA old guard to step down, but,
they remain
fearful that they will be left adrift. Despite consider-
able effort, the party has met with only limited
success in clearing headroom for a new generation
of impatient young commanders. If the party can
demonstrate satisfactory personal arrangements
have been made, we expect it will get better cooper-
ation from the army elders."
? The consolidation of commands, such as the Engi-
neer Corps' absorption into the General Staff De-
partment and the downgrading of both the armor
and artillery as independent service arms, will elimi-
nate hundreds of slots now filled by superannuated
officers and political commissars. At the same time,
the demobilization program, which we estimate has
reduced the PLA by about I million men since late
1980, is paring the entire force of its least promising
members." The national emphasis on expertise
leaves many demobilized personnel unqualified for
" The central leadership here seeks to create the momentum
necessary for a "demonstrator" effect. This effort was aided bv the
12th Party Congress last September and the founding of the
Central Advisory Commission for old cadre, where fully one-third
of the scats will be occupied by former officers.
" The published strength of the uniformed PLA was given as 4.213
million following China's 1982 census. This substantially squares
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
Secret
managerial and administrative positions once rou-
tinely filled by former soldiers. On this issue as well,
senior civilian and military leaders seem confident
that the personnel problems can be handled at the
local levels, and we see little probability of a
dangerous strain in army-party relations.
The Legacy of Mao Zedong
Military and civilian leaders have significantly differ-
ent views of Mao, which are rooted in different sets of
needs. Civilian leaders basically want to rewrite
Mao's ideological legacy so that it cannot be used to
attack their program. The frequent attacks in the
Chinese media on the continuing influence of leftism
in the military indicate that the last great repository
of diehard Maoism indeed lies within the PLAT
Some PLA concerns on this score are personal. Con-
servatives in the party and army fear the party's
legitimacy as well as their own careers-which had
been founded on adherence to Mao's thought-could
be irreparably damaged if Mao's ideas and policies
are formally rejected. Other concerns are less self-
centered. Some PLA voices argue, for example, that
for the current period of economic austerity, Mao's
prescriptions for "people's war" and a politicized
military remained the only sure cement for the PLA.
We believe the army is caught in a difficult position;
the rest of Chinese society is being encouraged to
loosen ideological constraints on initiatives and pursue
material rewards at a time when military expendi-
tures are being held down and ideological incentives
are the only ones the army can offer.
The party's verdict on Mao's legacy, the Resolution
on Historical Questions that was adopted at the Sixth
Plenum in June 1981, was a compromise document. It
toned down many of the harsh criticisms of Mao that
appeared in earlier drafts and made concessions to
military sentiments. Mao's mistakes were noted, but
they were presented as the well intended if tragic
misjudgments of a senile old man who, in the final
assessment, was nevertheless "a great revolutionary."
Mao's military writings were salvaged as acceptable
and continue to be touted as indispensable "magic
weapons" of the PLA. Moreover, the resolution
placed the army's role in the Cultural Revolution in a
generally favorable light, noting that it contributed to
the restoration of order in a particularly difficult time.
The extensive propaganda campaign within the army
to study the resolution met with puzzlement and
confusion. The study drive continued in the PLA
longer than elsewhere, far into 1982. The ongoing
turnover in military personnel through retirements,
demobilization, and natural attrition presumably will
assist the party and its military allies in weaning the
PLA from its habitual Maoism.
We suspect, however, that the issue will not go away.
The resolution in our judgment did not mark an end
to the controversy over Mao; it merely moved it to
another stage. Articles in the Chinese press indicate
military leaders are still attempting to thrash out
what parts of Mao's military doctrine remain suitable
for "people's war under modern conditions."
PLA-whether out of sincere concern or political
expedience-believe Deng's economic reforms have
unacceptable social consequences. In particular, the
military press has expressed concern over the influx of
Western values and their impact on Chinese youth. It
has also tied the policies to the rising incidence of
official corruption and the tendency of writers and
artists to produce works that openly or indirectly
question the legitimacy of the party's rule.
The party has to some extent conceded that its critics
are correct by clamping down on corruption and
taking steps to contain foreign influences. At the same
time, military and civilian reformers assert that China
"cannot stop eating for fear of choking." They have
consistently denied that the policies themselves are
flawed and have sought to place the blame on "weak
individuals" who are susceptible to the blandishments
of foreign crooks and the conscious subterfuge of
provocateurs.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84S00553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Ghana's rural "responsibility systems," which are
popular with the peasants and have increased agricul-
turA production, have been a cause for concern in
sonic military circles. B making farming more profit-
able, the policies have diminished the allure of an
:amts career.'' At the sank time, the agricultural
proprann has affected morale within the army because
it penalizes shorthanded families of active duty serv-
icericn. I'hc families are unable to fulls cultivate
;issigned land or, worse, are shortchanged when land
a assignments arc allotted by numbers of tastily men)-
hers. Beijing has responded to these grievances by
promoting a program of preferential treatment for the
rural dependents of serviCell ell. I'
I"', i:rnrnrtions 4gcd niar.chali xis Rnn:hert (LI and h, J1,111 I,
i' nrcign POIIe% imC fhrrtk (hi, l of Sigh I un,q l)c-hi ,, Jormcr delrnvc mi...... r
Lrng Hiuo loo As on pit ilac It ar'llih Part l (ongrccs in .ti't'ptember
I V.1'_'
We believe international relations to be the
pro, nice of a small circle of top leaders, niainly
civilians. As on Al issues, the views of senior soldier-
politicians are taken on board, but the niilitarv's
principal foreign policy role is to execute national
security polio).
Succession Politics
Deng's chosen successor, I lu Yaobang, is also an issue
wadi the ntiliIars. Although I lu heads the party, Deng
actually rules.
I lu's ascendancy at Deng's behest was
not uniforntls acclaimed, particularly in the PI.A, and
I In is still consolidating his political base and must
rely on Deng's support. I lis continuation as general
Irr.g,iIC the tress reern itnaem criteria emphasising III ell CC tna IS,
the I CA,amn remain, the PI 1, na:ain source of manpower=
I o mstancc, rural communities are enjoined its make :allowances
In S .,,t\ icemen away on duty Rhea land is ,apportioned and have
hcen taskCd with the responibilats to snbsidi,e families of militarN
dependents with lood, labor, or other necessities of lile The record
mdi..ucs, ho sever, that peasant communi ies have mle\enl rc-
spondCd to Itenuag's call and must he reminded amtu,ulls during
I,ami.ars -,npl>at the arms",CtisOWN sit their responsibililicsF
I lu's intemperate
criticism of Mao.edong and often zealous advocacy
of extensive reform strike directly at sonic military
interests. Above all the PEA wants a civilian party
leadership that is responsive to the army's concerns,
and, although iron willed and having strong views on
military reform, Deng in our view is regarded as a fair
broker who is able to protect the military from its
more determined critics.
In his effort to gain military support, flu is not
without assets. A e believe that flu has close allies
among the senior soldier-politicians: Yang Dezhi
chief of the General Staff and China's most important
active duty officer and Qin liwei commander of
( ivilian party leaders, for their part, presmnablN want :a general
,ecretan who can keep army-part,, relations on an even keel but at
the same time will not be :awed by the generals and cave in to their
even demand. In our judgment Itu has not set had an opportunity
to fill these requirements, which are now managed h~ Deng.F-
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
Secret
()ut .liwci inetruevs llii ) unhanq VA hi le l)cvt,e Aiaopin~, heni!nly
1rut~ hcS fit,' parade
the crucial Beijing Military Region and a soldier-
politician of growing importance. Hu has also demon-
strated a willingness to court the Pt.A and accommo-
date their interests.'" We believe much of the military
opposition to I Ili comes from the oldest age cohort,
and military opposition should diminish as they die
and Ilu and Deng promote reform-minded officers.
Yoder I)eng
Despite all the pulling and prodding as the party has
sought to bring the army fully on board with the
reform program, we believe army-party relations arc
on an even keel. On balance, what the civilians have
required of the Pl A they have generally received. If
the arms and its leaders at times have gone along
reluctantly, they nevertheless have gone along=
:Although the Pl n, as represented by its senior
soldier-politicians, continues to have a strong political
voice, civilians clearly set China's political agenda.
l'he simple balance of political forces at the pinnacle
In each of hi, erica ice investigation tours throughout China, Ito
ttati invariahk paid a well-puhliciied call on the local garrison to
Liu lluaging ... horn 1416 in Hubei ... ('orn-
niander, PL,I Nave ... Depute ('hici. PLA Gen-
eral Stull .. identified as "a comer" hi' (S
nitlitarv ohserver.c ... protege of Deng .viaopin,i
. ieteran of Dent's 2nd Field .4roti and Long
March ... a tet hnorrat .. has served on Nation-
al Defense Science and Technology (oninti.c.cion
and in ('hinese Acadenty of Sciences- ....cen'ice
in 'Vavv dates to 1450 ... was overall tactical
4 oniniander for ('hinecc assault on Pam el.%,
/ 474 .. on General S t(40 was responsible for
weapons development and acquisition ... visited
( nited .States in 1450 ... strong supporter of
of power suggests to us that informal consultations
within the Deng group alone are sufficient to establish
a consensus on all but the most controversial issues.
Based on the record of the past decade, our most
fundamental judgment is a commonplace one that
needs to be repeated in the Chinese context: in times
of pronounced domestic disorder and disunity in the
political center, the military assumes heightened polit-
ical prominence and influence. When the civilian
center is strong and relatively unified, the military
generally seeks to disengage from high politics and
returns to its normal defense and internal security
roles.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100150001-2
the party's upper echelons
is incapacitated while Wei has few remaining allies in
The reorganization last ycar of the central party and
state bureaucracy, moreover, further reduced the
military's potential for acting by depleting the ranks
of former soldiers in high administrative and ministe-
rial positions. The most recent appointments of army
men to the Politburo Yang Dc/hi, Yang Shangkun,
and Qin Jiwei are closely allied to Deng, as were all
recent civilian appointments. Only two other members
of the Politburo with PLA tics Yc JiaIt ying and Wei
Guoging are generally believed to fundamentally
disagree with many aspects of Deng's reforms, and Ye
We expect the pattern of trade-offs we have seen
before each of the recent major party convocations
the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the 1 1 th Central
Committee and the 12th Party Congress to continue
through the Deng period. For example, the soldier-
politicians retained an unchanged number of repre-
sentatives on the Politburo and continue to have a
sizable albeit reduced contingent on the Central
Committee. Moreover, none of the aged "old mar-
shals" on the Politburo Ye, Xu Xiangqian, and N'ie
Rongzhen were relegated to the Central Advisor
Commission, and the party generally continues to go
slow on forcing the retirement of army elders from the
active ranks. Partly in return for these modest meas-
ures, Deng and his allies won substantial gains in
personnel appointments to the Politburo and Secretar-
iat as well as the Central Committee's formal approv-
al of the resolution on party history and Deng's
\u Alit horn l4'l in Ihlhei Depute ( hilt.
I'l I (enrral .1't ll/ idelli/tied hr ( hinete
l i ntr o/ft, iali as a min,: leader Aortll
( hint l aid irnn veteran vi lilt later terrier to
~I l iels Iran , orpe wlnmwnder durilti