(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000100120002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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P' E. 1 11C ,IVf atG Va
Intelligence
The Philippines
Implications of Marcos's Moves
Against the Opposition
An Intelligence Assessment
See, : t
EA 83-10043
March 1983
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The Philippines:
Implications of Marcos's Moves
Against the Opposition
This assessment was prepared by
he Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA
Intelligence Council
Secret
EA 83-10043
March 1983
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The Philippines:
Implications of Marcos's Moves
Against the Opposition
Key Judgments Since last August President Marcos has systematically moved against
information available radical opponents in labor, the Church, and the media. We believe the
as of 9 February 1983 crackdown primarily reflects Manila's concern with the recent gains by the
was used in this report.
Communist Party of the Philippines 's New People's Army and its front
groups. According to Agency field reporting, Manila believes elements of
the Church, labor unions, and the media have at a minimum indirectly
supported the Communist Party's expansion, and in some cases actively
joined with the insurgent cause.
Marcos also probably believes the crackdown will enable him to exert
better political control during the period leading up to the legislative
elections next year and the presidential election in 1987. In our judgment,
however, Marcos's insistence on determining the nature of the political
opposition he faces in both elections will lead to continued gains by radical
groups by causing further erosion of the political middle. More important
to the United States over the next few years, Marcos's reluctance to permit
real development of opposition parties and institutions in our judgment will
inhibit an orderly succession.
Marcos probably sees the crackdown as a tactical plus in the military bases
negotiations with the United States. In addition to showing that the
Philippines is. in firm hands, the moves allow Marcos to play up the radical
threat to bolster his demands for increased compensation for the bases. At
the same time, the US-based opposition to Marcos will almost certainly
point to Manila's "repressive" politics to try to forestall easy passage of an
increased bases compensation package by the US Congress. For his part,
after a successful state visit to the United States last year Marcos believes
that Washington has reversed its policy of distancing itself from the
Philippines over human rights issues.
iii Secret
EA 83-10043
March 1983
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Strains in Church-State Relations
2
Shackling the Press
3
Increasing Insurgent Activity
5
Preelection Maneuvering
7
US-Philippine Relations
7
Looking Ahead
8
Implications for the United States
8
Chronology of the Crackdown
11
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The Philippines:
Implications of Marcos's Moves
Against the Opposition
Marcos's Crackdown
After lifting martial law in January 1981, President
Marcos, despite retaining nearly all the powers he had
held under martial law, permitted more lively domes-
tic political activity. Students, dealt with firmly under
martial law, became more openly critical of the
government, and the press printed details of govern-
ment squabbles previously not given full media treat-
ment. For their part, the moderate opposition formed
several new political parties in preparation for nation-
al and local elections. Labor unions responded with a
sharp upsurge in strike activity; in 1981, for example,
there were 260 strikes, compared with 62 the year
before.
In the past six months, however, Marcos has moved
against opposition labor unions, Church workers, and
the press. The crackdown began with the arrest of
labor leaders last August, followed by arrests of
Church members allegedly linked to radical groups,
and the closure of the triweekly opposition newspaper,
the We Forum.
Labor Arrests. The clampdown on labor unions began
on 13 August with the arrest of leftist labor leader
Felixberto Olalia, head of the radical May First
Organization (KMU). Olalia's arrest was followed by
the arrest of KMU Secretary General Crispin Beltran
and Bonifacio Tupaz, President of the Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS). Although more than 60 people were arrest-
ed, only a few labor leaders were subsequently
charged with subversion-the charge most frequently
used by Philippine authorities against political oppo-
nents of the President.
In our judgment the arrests were aimed at unions
influenced by radicals. The unions singled out for
attack, KMU and TUPAS, represent the two largest
leftist unions, together claiming a membership of over
300,000:
? TUPAS is affiliated with the Moscow-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions, although US
Embassy reporting does not believe it is under the
control of the Soviet-oriented Philippine Communist
Party (PKP).
We believe the arrests were prompted by Marcos's
desire to ensure domestic order during his state visit
to the United States in September and to send a signal
to labor unions that neither disruptive strikes nor
political activism would be tolerated.
Although the arrests ostensibly stemmed from govern-
ment charges that Communist insurgents, Muslim
separatists, opposition politicians, and radical labor
leaders were conspiring to embarrass the government
through coordinated strikes, bombings, and assassina-
tions, we believe it is more likely that the existence of
a plot called Operation Skylark by Philippine authori-
ties was a convenient excuse for moving against an
increasingly active and well-coordinated leftwing la-
bor movement
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crackdown, Manila responded to increased labor ac-
tivity by amending the labor code to include harsher
penalties for striking workers; after the crackdown
began, the National Assembly enacted legislation
banning strikes in export industries.
We believe increasing cooperation between leftwing 25X1
unions did contribute to labor strife last year. Accord-
ing to data from the Ministry of Labor and Employ-
ment, strikes in 1982 lasted longer and tended to be
more violent than in 1981 and were directed toward
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TUPAS are members of a radical labor coalition
formed in 1981, Solidarity (PMP), whose potential
strength was demonstrated when it was able, despite a
last minute change in plans, to turn out 15,000
workers in 1982 for a May Day rally. Press reports
indicate that the KMU was also active in organizing
strikes in the Bataan Export Processing Zone, includ-
ing a walkout of 10,000 workers that shut down the
zone for two days last year.
Even more worrisome to President Marcos, in our
judgment, has been the increased role of leftist labor
unions in blatantly political activities. Moderate oppo-
sition politicians claim the KMU has stepped up
organizational efforts in urban centers throughout the
country and that it has links with various Church,
student, and leftwing organizations in Manila, the
Visayas, and Mindanao. In Negros Occidental Prov-
ince last September, for example, the KMU, along
with other student and labor groups, was credited by
the US Embassy with organizing the large turnout
and leftist tilt of an opposition rall b moderate
politicians.
Strains in Church-State Relations. Church-state re-
lations, already strained at the beginning of 1982,
grew worse throughout the year. In July, Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile ordered the military to
conduct an investigation of the activities of radical
clergy, according to US Embassy reports. The Sep-
tember arrest of Father Gore, an Australian mission-
ary and an outspoken defender of sugar workers, on
subversion charges in Negros Occidental capped
months of increasing confrontations between Church
workers and the Philippine military, including arrests
of priests and nuns and raids on social action centers.
The military pursued its case in the press and the
courts, as the government sought to justify its crack-
down on religious radicals in the face of complaints by
Filipinos about military abuses in the countryside (see
Conflicts between Church and military officials occur
most often in rural areas, where the Armed Forces of
the Philippines is fighting the NPA. The increased
militarization of the countryside has resulted in fre-
quent civil rights abuses, according to US Embassy
reporting, and has put local Church officials at direct
odds with the military as parishioners look to the
The Role of the Radical Clergy
A recent assessment of religious radicalism by the
Philippine military underscores their belief that the
CPP has successfully infiltrated most religious orga-
nizations, including the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines, the Association of Major Reli-
gious Superiors, the Basic Christian Communities,
the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Secretariat, and the
National Secretariat for Social Action. In our judg-
ment, however, the total number of religious radicals
The military's moves
against religious subversives thus frequently ensnare
innocent Church workers.
clergy to investigate and mediate disputes. Conflicts
thus stem both from the military's resentment of
Church workers' interference and from the military's
attempts to separate the Church's legitimate social
work among the rural poor from the political work of
the Communist Party.2
Routinely, difficulties between the military and the
Church at the local level are handled on a case-by-
case basis by Church Military Liaison Committees.'
As the confrontation heated up late last year, how-
ever, high-level meetings between the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and
Defense Minister Enrile were held in an effort to
defuse the situation. These efforts failed when the
CBCP, according to reports from the US Embassy,
became enraged at Enrile's turning the November
meeting into a media event, during which he inter-
rupted and embarrassed the bishops. Although Cardi-
nal Jaime Sin of Manila still appears willing to work
with the government to resolve disputes, the CBCP in
late January drafted a pastoral letter highly critical of
The Church Military Liaison Committees were formed in 1973 to
facilitate cooperation between the two institutions. The committees
are made up of representatives from various religious denomina-
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Juan Pour I nrilr .%firtistrr of National Oclemi,
Sim ' 19--', / nrile' is a , low Irit,nd of I'rrsitlevtt
Slrurot artd tilts the' print ipal are Nitre t of ntar
na/ /att , durutg suits It It,, premic l orcr an in
pr', edenird huildup of Ilu' Philippinr Armed
/ or, 's ( apa/ I '. rne'rse'ti~ , and unthtliot6S. Its IS
it, qucw r rn nhunrrl as a pnssihlc Nuri resur to
the government and announced it \sould no longer
participate on the Church \1ilitar Liaison Commit-
tees, clfectivcly killing that organinttion. Instead, in a
move we believe is designed partly to circumvent
Inrilc, the Church will expand its public affairs
committee, which will be empossBred to confer with
all hranclies of government, including the Defense
Ministry and the Armed I orces.
.Shackling the Press. Marcus's arrest of the publisher
of the opposition newspaper W c forum late last year
shocked and dismayed cvcn government supporters,
according to the local press, and has become a cause
celchre for- the moderate opposition. The ness'spaper's
defense team of 41) lawvcrs includes some of Manila's
best known attorneys and reads like a "Who's Who''
of the moderate opposition. I'.ven some military offi-
cers complained to I S I'mbassy officials that the case
is putting increased pressure on the military to con-
vince the public two years after martial lave was
lifted that it is not still living under a military
('ordinal Jaimr.Sin As ('arlinal of Manila sing
11)'0, .loins' Sin IS the leadrr of the Philippine
( atholir ('hur'Ii Basiral(r rotue'rcatirr. he has
rrsiste'd prr'scurete from a ,t'roitint; rarlira/ sic
Aunt of the ('hurt h to opposr the i!mernmrttl
more Inrrefelh Through a poli, t of eritieal
ollahoratiort, he supports most gorenunrnt put
hies but remains a tvtral spokesman for human
We believe Marcos intended to send a strong signal to
the press to toe the line when he ordered the arrests of
publisher Jose Burgos, cx-Senator and columnist
I'rancisco "Sur" Rodrigo, and other members of' the
We Forum staff.' Although thev were charged with
subversion and libel, we believe the real crime of the
W c Forum was publishing a series of articles chal-
lenging the veracity of Marcus's war record. Although
articles critical of the government appear regularly in
Manila dailies, personal attacks on the President and
his family are rarely tolerated and, according to
conversations with I,S I':mbassy officials, editors
know they must present a balance of progovcrnment
and antigovernment views to remain in business,
'A'c ;tl,u believe Marcos meant to ,end it message to the I Sba,cd
uppo,ition l he article, appearing in the lit, 1-rum acre reprinted
loom the l'huhippi,u' 'Situ s, it I S-ha,ed Philippine egtptt,iti'ut teas
recintc
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 1 hrn 11 rarl , ,n , apliIrrs !hr w atim"111 nl I s hast'd oppu-
mv'Lt to 1'ri '/ /'r i ttar, m n'4ardimi hie , I tart' o/ fit,, opptmlitIll
In the pa,t, particularly s~ith the large Manila dailies
that are owned or controlled by allies of Marcos,
offending columnists could be fired as a result of
pressure from the presidential palace. Because the B"c
Iorlim is indcpendentls controlled, hoskever, Marcus
did not ha\e this option, and the paper was closed.
IthougIi this scats the first closure of' a nessspaper
since martial lass was lifted, v%c believe the action ssas
largely a case of ylarcos's reacting to a personal
attack rather than at sharp departure from previous
policy toward the press. Compared sith the major
nessspapers in Manila. ssInch have more than 300,000
(ilk circulation, the S0,000-circulation triwccekl\ B"c
Fourunl did not threaten the governments control of
the media, in our judgment (see political cartoon).F
Before it ss;ts closed, the B g Forum was an important
svntbol to Alarcos's political opponents that legitimate
I'01-111S of dissent would be tolerated. W\ e believe its
closing., however, undercuts confidence in the political
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THAT SHOULD TEACH TN EM A i E ~? )N
nw LI ? 1.1 ~ /
0Mrl f~ f~~d (~211fLll~i~
libertli,ation Marcos promised ssould occur before
\ational Assemble elections next sear. Recent ssarn-
irtgs b\ Marcos on television to the Rlrllc'tin 7hWclt . a
large 'Manila nessspaper, not to print libel, the interro-
gation of six Manila journalists by the 'National
Intelligence Board, and recent nesss reports indicating
that several military officers will press libel charges
against a sseckk new maga/ine indicate that the
President intends to keep a tight lid on the press
\Iarcos's Motives
\\re believe Mareos's erackdossn is aimed primarilc at
,tenoning au increasing tide of dissent in the Philip-
pines and at the increasing ability of the radical left to
attract support.
Although the government is
not in danger of being toppled b\ the rebels, bee
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admitted that Manila is losing the propaganda war
with the NPA and complained that the media was not
presenting a balanced view. In our opinion, the crack-
down also reflects Marcos's intent to control the pace
and extent of political liberalization preceding the
1984 legislative elections and a need to manipulate
domestic political opposition to his best advantage,
with the review of the Military Bases Agreement'
with the United States about to begin
Increasing Insurgent Activity. According to the Phil-
ippine press the
NPA is now able to field platoon-size units. Attacks
by 50 to 60 men are not uncommon, whereas previ-
ously the NPA typically operated in squads of 10 to
12 men.6 In several instances, much larger units have
been operating. For example, according to press re-
ports a unit estimated at between 200 to 300 guerril-
las in January briefly took over a coastal town in
Davao del Norte Province, Mindanao, escaping with
arms, medicine, supplies, and uniforms. The US
defense attache in Manila believes this indicates a
growing sophistication in the NPA's operational capa-
bilities. In addition,
the rat was
conducted with the backup of Muslim rebel forces in
the area-the first indication of significant operation-
officials, including barangay' captains, town council-
men and mayors, and military intelligence personnel,
according to Gen. Fidel Ramos, head of the Philippine
Constabulary
there has been a
steady increase in the mass base of the NPA
the CPP's National Democratic Front has improved
its organization and recruitment work among labor,
student, and professional groups and has also enlarged
its party apparatus in the Bicol region of southern
Luzon, another area of NPA strength. According to
recent polling data, the attitude of the local Philippine
public toward the NPA tends to support the NPA in
regions where insurgent activity is high. Of those who
held an opinion of the Communist Party, 83 percent
of Mindanaoans and 50 percent of Visayans had a
positive attitude toward it, compared with only 11
percent in Manila and 18 percent on Luzon.'
More worrisome to us is growing-although still
sketchy-evidence that the CPP may be seeking
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external support for its operations.
al cooperation between the two groups.
Certain areas, such as Mindanao, have had sustained
high levels of NPA activity since the beginning of the
year, according to the US Embassy (see map). The
deteriorating security situation in Davao prompted
Manila to redeploy its forces in the southern Philip-
pines to cope with the increased rebel activity in
northern and eastern Mindanao.
since anuary six a a
ions have been sent to the troubled region. Moreover,
the NPA is selectively trying to kill local government
In addition, a Spanish cleric with many
years' experience in the Philippines told US Embassy
officials that the CPP had developed a relationship
with Moscow. In our judgment, arms shortages have
been a major constraint on the insurgency's military
activity to date. Even without external support, how-
ever, the NPA could obtain supplies for continued
large-scale operations against the government by hit-
ting military weapons and supply depots with some
regularity
' A barangay is the smallest political unit in the Philippines and is
roughly equivalent to a municipal precinct in the United States.
? The total number of respondents holding positive opinions of t
CPP was much smaller but still significant, in our judgment,
because of the tendency for surveys in authoritarian countries to be
biased in favor of the government. Thirty percent of all respondents
in Mindanao, for example, had a positive opinion of the Commu-
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Revised Philippine Estimates of New People's Army (NPA) Strength, January 1983a
'DP
993 Number of NPA
full-time guerrillas,
by Commission
South
China
Sea
Aindor,
iIsland
1 ~
Bacolodi
505769(545169)3-83
94 yc Luzon
Clark Airbase''
,`
,,//
~~
Subic Bay
e n a
Naval Base M a5-59
Philippine
Sea
"Under direct control of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Philippines.
Northern Luzon Commission
Central Luzon Commission
Southern Luzon Commission
Visayas Commission
Mindanao Commission
Regional Party Committee
boundary
Otherb
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
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We believe Manila has not been able to curb the
growing level of NPA activity, despite recent arrests
of several Communist Party leaders,' the killing of
several others in clashes with the military, and the
high-level attention paid the problem. The CPP has
survived the capture of its top leadership before, and
we believe it will probably suffer only short-term
setbacks from the recent arrests.
Comprehensive counterinsurgency programs designed
by Manila have not worked. A military task force sent
to the troubled Bicol region last June was supposed to
provide a model for the government's counterinsur-
gency operations nationwide, but it had only mixed
success and has since been quietly abandoned, accord-
ing to US officials. In some areas of the Bicol, poor
discipline by the military further alienated the local
population," although in other areas the military
successfully secured roads and prevented the NPA
from collecting taxes.
Preelection Maneuvering. We believe that with legis-
lative elections only a year away and presidential
elections scheduled for 1987, Marcos is determined to
control political activity leading up to these events."
In addition to clamping down on the press, delays in
establishing rules for party-accreditation are in our
judgment part of his preelection strategy. According
to press reports, the National Assembly, which is a
rubberstamp body for the President, was supposed to
decide on questions of party accreditation in January
1982. According to the US Embassy, however, a
government-party caucus has only recently completed
its recommendations for a new election code, but it is
still not clear when the National Assembly will act on
the proposed changes. According to the US Embassy,
some of the basic decisions may not be made final
until early next year. Delaying these decisions, in our
' Among those captured were Noel Etabag and Isagani Serrano,
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; Edgar Jopson, considered by Philippine military au-
thorities to be a leading organizer for the party's front activity, was
'? Three army privates and a junior officer were charged with
killing five civilians in Camarines Norte Province in the Bicol last
July.
" Marcos's ability to control domestic political activity will be
complicated by slow economic growth and Manila's financial
judgment, will only add to the difficulties faced by
Marcos's opponents in organizing effectively before
elections are held next year.
We believe the President nonetheless is interested in
bolstering his regime's claim to political "legitimacy"
derived from the participation of some of the leading
moderate opposition groups in the electoral process.
Because the moderate opposition boycotted the presi-
dential election in 1981, however, Marcos must devise
a formula for ensuring that opposition parties will
participate in the electoral process. According to US
Embassy reporting, the new changes in election rules
are designed to pave the way for credible elections and
entice the opposition into participating. Marcos float-
ed another trial balloon to the opposition late last
year, offering early presidential elections in exchange
for opposition participation in national elections.
In suggesting synchronizing elections for the National
Assembly in 1984 with local and presidential elec-
tions, set for 1986 and 1987, respectively, Marcos, in
our judgment, was well aware that without party
accreditation or sufficient time to organize the -
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offered his moderate opponents a few seats on the
Executive Committee, which oversees the day-to-day
management of the government, if they would partici-
pate in a national election. The "balloon" burst when
the moderate opposition political umbrella, the United
Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), put
conditions on election procedures designed to ensure
their fair conduct-conditions that Marcos dismissed
out of hand. For their part, UNIDO leaders-con-
cerned about their credibility-have rejected similar
overtures from the President for a broader dialogue.
US-Philippine Relations. In our judgment, Marcos's
desire to control the nature of the political opposition
he confronts is also being shaped in part by the
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schedule for the military bases negotiations. On the
one hand, we believe Marcos does not want to permit
even the appearance of a beleaguered regime and risk
weakening his bargaining position with the United
States. On the other, we believe he wants to ensure
that the nationalist rhetoric that accompanies many
opposition rallies can be used to his best advantage in
Washington. As to fearing a backlash from the
United States, a Philippine Government assessment
prepared for Marcos after his trip to Washington last
September indicated that Washington no longer felt
the need to distance itself from the Philippines over
human rights issues.
Looking Ahead
We believe tightening of political controls will not
significantly reduce the insurgent threat in the next
few years and may, in fact, contribute to further gains
by radical groups. We believe restrictions on political
activities have already led to a noticeable leftward
tilt in the rhetoric of moderate political opposition
parties, such as the Pilipino Democratic Party/Laban
(PDP/Laban) and UNIDO. For example, slogans
criticizing the US-Philippine relationship and calling
for the dismantling of US bases have been appearing
at moderate opposition rallies with greater frequency.
In some cases, such as the UNIDO rally in Bacolod,
Negros, last September which attracted perhaps as
many as 80,000 people, the moderate opposition was
able to turn out large numbers only by riding the
coattails of leftwing labor and students and Church
groups. According to the US Embassy, moderate
opposition politicians have been complaining for years
that they are.losing ground to the left. The arrest late
last year of a regional PDP leader at an NPA
safehouse, moreover, points to the more worrisome
problem of continuing Communist Party penetration
of existing political groups.
We believe that a further tightening of political
controls by Marcos and a delay in the development of
authentic opposition political parties will play into the
hands of radicals who are seeking to discredit both the
Marcos government and his traditional political oppo-
nents. We believe Manila is also overlooking funda-
mental causes of the party's success in recent years-
economic grievances and the government's limited
socioeconomic development programs 12 and political
presence in remote areas of the country. In our view,
the threat posed by the left is primarily dependent on
its continued ability to win the battle for popular
support in the rural areas-a war Manila has been
unable so far to devise a strategy to counter
Implications for the United States
As the United States approaches the military bases
review, which begins in April, we believe the political
crackdown will permit Marcos a great deal of flexibil-
ity. He will retain control of domestic politics while in
our judgment being able to point to the radical threat
to his regime to try to extract greater concessions on
military compensation issues.
Marcos's opponents are giving him the
pretext he needs to exploit this issue. According to the
US Embassy, a broad-based coalition calling for the
unconditional removal of US bases in the Philippines
was formed in Manila in mid-February. We believe
Marcos will attempt to use the anti-American and
antinuclear rhetoric of the Philippine left to pressure
the United States on sovereignty issues and establish-
ing war reserve stocks for Philippine use at the bases
At the same time, we believe Marcos may be underes-
timating the negative effects of the widespread crack-
down on obtaining US Congressional approval for the
new financial package that will emerge from the bases
review. In our judgment, the US-based opposition to
Marcos will lobby hard against a large compensation
'Z The National Livelihood or KKK program, which was started in
1981, is an attempt by Manila to address economic problems at the
local level, but it is modest in scope and has been criticized by
political opponents as a patronage vehicle for the First Lady, whose
Ministry of Human Settlements runs the program.
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package and will point to Marcos's political "repres-
sion" to try to forestall increased financial support
and military aid for his regime.
Beyond the bases review, we believe the retreat from
political liberalization that the crackdown represents
is of greater importance. Without the development of
political institutions independent of the President, the
succession process when Marcos departs the scene is
likely to be turbulent. If Marcos dies before his term
expires, he could avoid bequeathing political unrest to
his successor only by first bequeathing the instru-
ments of control. As it is, the power of the Executive
Committee to carry out its constitutional mandate
and oversee a peaceful transition is a large unknown.
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Appendix
Chronology of the Crackdown
13 June
Sisters Zenaida Pineda and Pilar Verzosa, nuns of the
Religious of the Good Shepherd, are arrested in
Batangas and reportedly "framed" by the PC on
murder charges.
21 June
New leftist labor umbrella group-the National Co-
alition for the Protection of Workers' Rights-is
established in Manila, with Felixberto Olalia as
president.
July
The Philippine military reportedly orders an investi-
gation of the radical activities of the Church.
1 August
Olalia, head of the leftwing KMU labor union, openly
calls for revolution at a mass rally in Davao,
Mindanao.
8 August
Two priests and three layworkers are arrested for
possession of subversive documents in Nueva Vizcaya
Province; they are released in the custody of local
Church officials pending further action.
13 August
Olalia and 13 other labor union officials, including
National Federation of Labor President Cipriano
Malonzo, are arrested for alleged involvement in a
plot to overthrow the government; Olalia is only one
held and officially charged with subversion.
31 August
Two thousand students, laborers, and sympathizers
demonstrate in support of Felixberto Olalia. TUPAS
President Bonifacio Tupaz, who is also Secretary
General of the leftwing Solidarity alliance, is among
the demonstrators.
1 September
Tupaz is arrested along with 22 others, six of whom
are later released.
2 September
Catholic Social Action Center on Samar is raided by
military authorities acting with advance high-level
approval.
3 September
Six more labor leaders are arrested in connection with
alleged subversion plot; Manila press headlines fact
that Army reinforcements are being sent to Manila
Electric Company to guard against subversive threat.
11 September
The opposition newspaper We Forum reports that 29
Catholic priests from Albay Province, Luzon, issued a
statement attacking the government for human rights
abuses.
14 September
President Marcos departs Manila for his state visit to
the United States. An antigovernment rally of 1,000
people takes place at the Manila Cathedral.
20 September ?
Father Orlando Tizon and four other suspected CPP
members are arrested during a military raid.
18 August
Crispin Beltran, Secretary General of the KMU is
arrested. Olalia's son Roland and Bicol labor leader
Manuel Valenzuela are detained and then released.
23 September
Bishop Alberto Piamonte'of Iloilo tells American
Embassy officials that police recently raided a social
action center on the island of Panay.
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24 September
Father Gore, an Australian missionary active in orga-
nizing sugar workers in Negros, is arrested for the
murder of the mayor of Kabankalan last March.
25 September
Rally of at least 10,000 workers, students, and moder-
ate opposition politicians held in Bacolod, Negros,
Occidental, protesting human rights abuses by the
military, and alleged government repression of the
Church, press, labor, and students
estimate crowd at 80,000. Large
turnout is attributed to organizational efforts of
KMU and National Federation of Sugar Workers
labor unions. UNIDO rallies later in the fall draw
crowds of up to 40,000, according to US Embassy
reporting.
26 September
General Fabian Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, warns that he has a list of
six priests and nuns identified by the military as
planning subversive activities.
27 September
Church Military Liaison Committee is called into
session to consider the charges against Father Gore.
28 September
Charges are formally filed "against Father Gore and
Father O'Brien in connection with the murder of the
mayor of Kabankalan. Gore denies involvement and
4,000 people demonstrate on his behalf.
29 September
Marcos returns to Manila from the United States.
1 October
Five thousand demonstrators-including students,
union leaders, church workers, and members of the
legal opposition-gather in front of the Manila Ca-
thedral, where they burn effigies of President Marcos
and President Reagan.
3 October
The Superior of the Columban Fathers of the Philip-
pines issues a statement denying Father Gore's al-
leged involvement in subversive activities.
10 October
Social Action Director Father Edgar Kangleon is
arrested on Samar. He later confesses to joining the
Communists.
11 October
Father Zacarias Agatep, a dissident priest who joined
the NPA, is killed in a skirmish with government
troops in northern Luzon.
21 October
Father Gore is released on bail to the delight of 3,000
supporters.
21 October
Cardinal Sin speaks to the Manila Rotary Club about
Church-state relations. He refrains from accusing the
government of a Church crackdown but implies that
recent government actions against the Church are
"hardly a coincidence."
25 November
The Philippines Union for Human Rights-composed
of Protestant ministers and Catholic priests and
nuns-in a seven-point statement addressed to the
government says there is no hope for national recon-
ciliation if the government continues to violate human
rights and urges Manila to stop harassing Church-
men, tribal people, and labor unions.
29 November
Meeting between the military and the Catholic Bish-
ops Conference of the Philippines becomes a media
event staged by Defense Minister Enrile, to the
embarrassment of the bishops, and further strains
Church-state relations. The release of Father Kang-
leon becomes a sticking point during the talks.
1 December
The US Embassy reports that Manila begins legal
efforts to terminate the house arrest of former Sena-
tor Eva Kalaw, executive vice president of UNIDO;
Kalaw, who had-participated in recent UNIDO pro-
vincial rallies, is a codefendent in alleged 1980 plot to
overthrow the government.
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6 December .
Trial of Father Gore continues; 2,000 supporters
demonstrate outside court in Negros.
7 December
Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher of the opposition newspa-
per We Forum is arrested on subversion*charges along
with 10 others.
9 December
Cardinal Sin, in discussions with the US Ambassador,
indicates continued willingness to work with the gov-
ernment to resolve disputes.
10 December
Human rights rallies in Negros draw large crowds.
12 December
An effigy of President Marcos is burned at a rally of
5,000 Church and human rights workers in Cebu
City, Cebu. Father Luis Hechanova,
main speaker.
13 December
"Shock" and "dismay" by local politicians and the
news media in Cebu characterize reactions to arrests
of the We Forum staff.
17 December
Subversion trial for We Forum defendants begins.
21 December
President Marcos, in a televised address, warns the
Bulletin Today against printing libel. Marcos is re-
sponding to the Bulletin's publication of a letter from
political detainees at Bicutan prison which alleged
denial of due process and physical and pyschological
torture.
25 December
Cebu politician Ribomapil Holganza, his son, Dr.
Filemon Alberca, and a handful of NPA commanders
are arrested in an NPA safehouse in Cebu.
6 January
Defense Minister Enrile directs the country's top
military officials to draw up a list of nuns, priests, and
lay workers suspected of antigovernment activities.
11 January
Philippine-language version of We Forum secretly
resumes publication.
14 January
UNIDO rally in Pampanga Province draws crowd of
2,000, far less than 10,000 anticipated.
23 January
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines,
in a draft pastoral letter to be read throughout the
country on the first Sunday of Lent in mid-February,
warns Marcos that his policies are providing "fodder
to revolutionary groups" and says they will no longer
participate in meetings of the Church Military Liai- 25X1
son Committees; a new Public Affairs Committee will I
handle future problems in Church-state relations.
29 January
Five thousand opponents of President Marcos stage a
rally in Manila; government authorities had previous-
ly denied a permit for the rally but allowed it to
proceed anyway.
31 January
Twenty-nine Filipino journalists ask the Supreme
Court to stop the military from interrogating them.
The class action suit is filed one month after six
journalists are called before the National Intelligence
Board to answer questions about stories they had
written that were critical of the government.
3 February
.Cardinal Sin, in a speech before a Church breakfast
fellowship group, charges the government with stifling
dissent, harassing the clergy, and intimidating the
population.
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