NORTH KOREA S LEAD IN ARTILLERY POSES A CHALLENGE FOR THE SOUTH

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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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North Korea's Lead
in Artillery
Poses a Challenge
for the South
Secret
An Intelligence Assessment
ARMY review
completed.
DIA review
completed.
NGA Review
Complete
Secret
EA 83-10018C
February
Copy 289
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Korea's Lead
in Artillery
Poses a Challenge
for the South
This paper was prepared b
Northeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian
Analysis.
contributed to its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
The paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 83-10018C
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North Korea's Lead
in Artillery
Poses a Challenge
for the SouthF-
Key Judgments The primary battle in a war on the Korean Peninsula would be fought on
Information available the ground, where North Korea has its most substantial edge in combat po-
as of 20 January 1983 tential over the forces of the South. Two of the most important elements to
was used in this report.
measure in assessing the capabilities of armies are firepower and maneu-
verability. Firepower is particularly important in Korea where the terrain
limits maneuvers on a broad scale.
Despite a sustained effort by South Korea to reduce the North's edge in
firepower by adding artillery, a comparison of the inventories on both sides
shows that the South has fallen further behind in most measures of t
artillery capability:
? North Korea now has nearly two and a half times as many artillery
weapons. When measures of capability-aggregate weapons effective-
ness-are applied to the artillery weapons in both forces, the North's
edge is identical to its numerical lead.
? North Korea has nearly one and a half times as many light and medium
guns and howitzers. The South leads in heavy weapons, but neither side
has many. In addition, North Korea has a significant numerical advan-
tage in multiple rocket launchers, which can deliver large amounts of
ordnance very rapidly.
? The North has a substantial edge in salvo weight-a measure of the
amount of explosives that all artillery pieces could fire at one time.
? The North's weapons have a much better firing range than those of
South Korea,
? Mobility favors the North; its large numbers of self-propelled weapons
have several advantages over the towed guns that predominate in the
South. 25X1
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South Korea has certain qualitative advantages in artillery:
? Many of its guns have better accuracy, and it has more effective
munitions.
? The South's doctrine and tactics would allow it to use artillery with more
flexibility and efficiency.
Nonetheless, an examination of the artillery weapons included in a scenario
depicting an all-out North Korean attack against the South shows that the
North's advantages in the initial stages of conflict are markedly similar to
those found when comparing weapons inventories. In this scenario the
South's artillery is substantially outnumbered and outranged.
The North's advantages are reduced when airpower is brought into the
artillery equation, because South Korea's Air Force is superior to that of
the North. For example, the North's lead in explosives delivery shrinks
markedly when the bombs that the aircraft on both sides could deliver are
included in a comparison of salvo weight. The aircraft of both Koreas,
however, are limited by poor weather and darkness-factors that have far
less effect on the performance of artillery. The South's Air Force also
would be taxed heavily by the demand to perform multiple roles in
combat-antiair, antiarmor, and antiartillery. (See appendix A for a
summary of the impact of airpower).
South Korea plans to add more modern artillery weapons and may reduce
substantially the North's lead in range over the next four years. North
Korea's edge in other factors is not likely to change, however, and the
South will remain at an overall disadvantage in artillery. It appears that
South Korea will remain committed to airpower to counter the North's
advantage in artillery, as well as to make up for shortcomings in armor and
infantry.
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Key Judgments
Comparing the Artillery Forces
Weapons Inventories
Explosives Delivery
Comparison by Weapons Caliber 2
Supply and Production
Factors Favoring the South
Accuracy and Elevation
Artillery in an Attack Scenario
UNCODEDA.
The Impact of Airpower on the Artillery Equation
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North Korea's Lead
in Artillery
Poses a Challenge
for the South 'F-
Comparing the Artillery Forces
Both Koreas have been expanding and improving
.their artillery forces at a substantial rate since the
1970s. North Korea had a head start, however, with a
larger force in being and a domestic production
capability already established. In 1975, the South
launched its first Force Improvement Plan, which was
designed to reduce the North's edge in combat capa-
bility. Improvements in artillery were a major part of
the plan; North Korea was estimated to then have a
lead in numbers of artillery weapons of about 2 to 1.
Eight years of Force Improvement Plans increased the
South's inventory of artillery by over 30 percent, but
the gap widened because North Korea accelerated its
own production of artillery (see figure 1). By the end
of 1982, the North had raised its artillery force level
by 77 percent.Z
Figure 1
Comparison of Korean Artillery Weapons
by Number
North Korea
South Korea
Weapons Inventories. North Korea now has the
fourth-largest artillery force in the world. Although it
lags far behind the Soviet Union and China it has
three-fourths as many artillery weapons as the United
States. More important, North Korea has a lead of
2.4 to 1 over the South in numbers and in weapons
quality as measured by aggregate weapons
effectiveness: '
u Inventory numbers reflect only those weapons in active military
units. (See appendix B for a more detailed description of the
In the key characteristics that make up WEV, the
North's artillery ranks high in range, in rate of fire,
and in mobility; the South's in accuracy and reliab25X1
' Aggregate weapons effectiveness is a method used to compare the
capabilities of the equipment of opposing forces through the use of
numeric values. It is determined by summing the weapons effective-
ness indexes (WEI) for all weapons in a class-artillery in this 25X1
case-and multiplying this total by a weighting factor for a
particular class of weapons as used in offense or defense in the
Northeast Asian theater of operations. The WEI are numeric
values for each weapon-based largely on firepower, mobility, and
survivability-as compared to a standard weapon in its class.F
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A good portion of the North's numerical edge comes
from its large number of multiple rocket launchers
(MRLs). Nearly half of them are towed weapons with
short range and a relatively low level of destructive
power. The rest are truck-mounted weapons of larger
caliber with long range.
In numbers of cannon, which are more effective than
MRLs for many artillery missions, the North's lead is
smaller-about 1.8 to 1. If the rather ineffective,
small caliber 76-mm guns are removed from the
comparison, the North's edge in gun tubes drops to
1.4 to 1. Still, the North has the numerical advantage
in guns, and the large number of MRLs and light
weapons add substantial firepower to the lead in
cannon.
Comparison by Weapons Caliber. Comparing the
artillery of the two Koreas by size of weapons can lead
to arbitrary judgments that stress certain advantages
over others that may be of equal or greater impor-
tance. Table 1 displays two different categorizations
of artillery that show how North Korea's numerical
edge is distributed by caliber. Category A was devised
by the US Intelligence Community and groups the
South's 105-mm cannon with the North's 122-mm
howitzers because both serve as light artillery for
infantry divisions.' This comparison also places the
smaller 76-mm guns of the North in a lower category.
The alternative method shown in category B-that
used by the US Army-illustrates a far higher lead
for the North in? numbers of medium weapons: almost
5 to 1.5 It classes North Korea's 122-mm howitzers as
medium-caliber weapons because these cannon have
nearly one and a half times the shell weight and
destructive power of the South's 105-mm howitzers.
The 105-mm gun has similar advantages over the
76-mm gun. Both methods of classifying weapons by
Table 1
Comparisons by Caliber
Category A
Heavy (175 to 203 mm)
24
188
7.8 to 1, South
Medium (130 to 155 mm)
1,794
930
1.9 to 1, North
Light (105 to 122 mm)
3,447
1,308
2.6 to 1, North
Other (under 105 mm)
582
0
Category B
Heavy (161 to 210 mm)
24
188
7.8 to 1, South
Medium (122 to 160 mm)
4,368
930
4.7 to 1, North
Light (under 122 mm)
1,455
1,308
1.1 to 1, North
size include the rather ineffective 107-mm rocket
launcher of the North in the same category as the
South's 105-mm, which is generally regarded as one
of the best light howitzers ever produced.
Both methods of comparison show that the majority
of artillery on both sides fall into the light and
medium categories and that North Korea has more
than twice as many weapons in these classes as South
Korea. The South's advantage in heavy guns is small
in comparison to the total number of weapons.
Explosives Delivery. North Korea's artillery has a 25X1
significant advantage in explosive delivery capability
as measured by salvo weight:
Total weapons 726,119 kg 86,400 kg 8.4 to 1, North
Total gun tubes 118,370 kg 75,600 kg 1.6 to 1, North
Salvo weight is the combined weight of all projectiles
fired by all weapons at one time. This is a simple
measure that does not account for the capability for
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sustained fire, but it provides an insight into where
some of the important strengths lie in the different
types of weapons in the two forces.
MRLs provide 80 percent of the North's capability to
deliver explosives in terms of salvo weight. In many
ways, however, MRLs compare unfavorably with
guns and howitzers, especially in terms of accuracy.
Nor can they be used effectively for sustained fire,
because reload times are slow. Rocket launcher units
usually carry only one reload, and resupply is ham-
pered by the difficulties in transporting the large
quantities of ammunition they use. The flash, smoke,
and burn trails resulting from rocket firing make
them highly. visible targets.
In terms of cannon alone, the North's advantage in
explosives delivery decreases markedly. The salvo
weight for guns and howitzers favors the North by
only about 1.5 to 1. Cannon can provide accurate and
sustained fire. Shells are less subject to wind deflec-
tion than the finned rockets, and powder charges for
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Figure 3
Comparison of Korean Artillery by Range
? North Korea
M South Korea
Under 14,000 Over
14,000 m to 18,000 m 18,000 m
gun. But South Korea has only 12 of these to counter
the North's 350 130-mm guns. South Korea has only
30 other artillery weapons that can match the over
20,000-meter maximum ranges of the North's 900
BM-I1 MRLs, and 280 122-mm field guns.
artillery weapons.
The standard medium howitzers in the North also
outrange those of the South. At maximum range, the
152-mm gun-howitzer of the North will outreach
South Korea's M 114 155-mm howitzer by almost
3 kilometers. The range advantage would allow many
gun batteries in the North to fire on,those in South
Korea while remaining out of range of the South's
In the western sector, for example, South Korean
artillery firing at maximum range from presently
occupied positions would barely reach past the De-
militarized Zone-and only up to 5 kilometers into
accurate range can be determined with much more
precision than the burn time of rocket motors. Cannon
can be reloaded quickly
Some missions can be better accomplished with
MRLs than with cannon, however. MRLs can be
devastating weapons against enemy firing batteries
and fixed defensive lines because they can saturate an
area with large amounts of explosives in a very short
time. The standard truck-mounted MRL in the
North's forces, the BM-11, can fire 30 rounds of
122-mm ammunition to 20,000 meters in less than 30
seconds.
Range. Perhaps the most critical disadvantage of the
South in artillery is that of range. North Korea has
almost 1,700 weapons that can fire at ranges in excess
of 18,000 meters-more than 40 times the number
that the South has (see figure 3). The most effective
counterbattery weapon in Korea probably is the
North's 130-mm field gun with its 27,000-meter
maximum range. The only artillery piece in the South
that can reach or exceed that range is the 175-mm
122-mm rocket launchers firing at less than maxi-
mum range-15,000 meters-have sufficient distance
to cover most South Korean artillery sites. The
North's 122-mm and 130-mm field guns-firing at a
range of only 20,000 meters-would be able to reach
Mobility. North Korea has 12 times as many tracked
weapons as the South (1,400 to 115). On offense, such
highly mobile artillery is vital in providing continuous
fire support for fast-moving mechanized forces.
Mobility is also directly related to survivability. The
ability to fire and move quickly to another position
before being located by the enemy is a valuable safety
factor. Tracked weapons can fire, move, and set up to
fire again 4 to 5 times faster than towed pieces.
Neither the self-propelled guns made in North Korea
nor those currently in use in the South have turrets to
protect the crews, so safety depends on mobility.
Supply and Production. We do not believe either side
has critical shortages of artillery ammunition, but the
North may have a considerably larger stockpile. Both
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Table 2
Numbers and Characteristics of Mortars
North Korea
162
160
8,040
3 rounds per minute
1,900
120
5,700
15 rounds per minute
South Korea
1,343
107
5,650
20 rounds per minute
countries produce most of their own ammunition as
well as their own weapons.
The large number of different caliber weapons in the
North's arsenal could, we believe, cause problems in
resupply. In divisional artillery alone, the North must
provide five different types of ammunition. South
Korea's divisional artillery consists of weapons of only
South Korea has produced copies of vintage US
weapons-the M 101 105-mm and M 114 155-mm
howitzers-since the mid- 1970s. The South recently
introduced a multiple rocket launcher of domestic
design and is ready to begin production of a new
155-mm howitzer that is a modification of the US
M198.
The North makes all of its own artillery and has been
producing copies of towed Soviet and Chinese weap-
ons since the 1960s. It also manufactures a simplified
version of the Soviet 122-mm MRL. In the mid-
1970s, the North began mass production of self-
propelled guns using domestically designed or modi-
fied tracked chassis. A new long-range gun-
apparently of domestic design-appeared in small
numbers in 1978
mobile and have a higher rate of fire.
Mortars. Heavy mortars often are classed as artillery
although the range of fire is far less than that of guns
and howitzers. The inclusion of mortars has little
effect on the artillery equation (see table 2). The
North has one and a half times as many heavy
mortars as South Korea. North Korea's mortars have
greater destructive power because of their larger and
heavier shells. The South's heavy mortars are more
Factors Favoring the South
The South has several advantages that could cut into
North Korea's lead in artillery. South Korea has
better ammunition, its guns are more accurate, and its
doctrine for weapons employment provides a more
flexible system for generating firepower
Ammunition. The South has a distinct advantage in
types of artillery ammunition available. It has a wide
range of nonnuclear ammunition and fuses.
Accuracy and Elevation. As a general rule the South's
weapons probably are more accurate than those of the
North. Although short in range, the now obsolescent
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howitzers the United States used in Vietnam proved
more accurate than Soviet-designed weapons used by
the enemy. South Korean copies of the 105- and
155-mm howitzers have characteristics similar to
Weapons with barrels that can be elevated to high
angles are advantageous for mountainous terrain. The
elevation characteristics of the standard howitzer for
both sides are nearly equal and the North has only a
slight numerical edge-2,508 to 2,384 in these weap-
ons. The rest of North Korea's weapons, however, are
low-trajectory guns and rocket launchers, which
would not be as effective as howitzers in some of the
more mountainous areas of Korea.
Doctrine and Tactics. In general, both sides apply the
tactics of the country where most of their weapons
were designed-the USSR for the North and the
United States for the South. For generating immedi-
ate combat power, South Korea depends on massing
fire from many widely separated elements firing at
high rates on the same target.
part-follows the less sophisticated tactic of massing
a large number of weapons opposite the target to
achieve the necessary firepower. The South's system
allows for greater flexibility in reacting to changing
combat situations. The shock and suppression effects
from both methods are significant.
Both sides use the full range of target acquisition
systems-visual observation, sound and flash ranging,
and radar. But ground and air observers are the most
effective. They can see the results of artillery fire and
call for corrections in distance and direction to
achieve the necessary suppression or destruction of
the targets. Both North and South Korea use forward
observers on the ground, but only the South trains
regularly with air observers.
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Defensive Advantage. In the event of a North Korean
attack, the South's forces would have the advantage 25X1
of fighting in their own territory on familiar terrain.
Because of the unique military situation in Korea,
other advantages normally assumed for the defender 25X1
may not apply to the artillery equation. Both sides
man hardened sites with overhead cover near the
DMZ. Because of its range advantage, the North
should be able to keep some of its artillery in protect-
ed positions for some time before moving it forward to
more vulnerable firing sites.
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Both sides would have to move artillery from positions
farther back to support the attacking and defending
forces in the areas where high-intensity combat is
likely. To achieve the large numerical advantages
specified in their doctrine, the North Koreans must
The South plans to fire more rounds per gun and
howitzer in defense than we believe North Korea
would expend from similar weapons in an offense. In
the opening barrages, however, North Korea's rocket
launchers are capable of delivering more ordnance
than the South's weapons. Over the long term, the
North's edge in numbers of weapons, explosives deliv-
ery capability, and range might offset the capability
to fire more rounds per gun.
Artillery in an Attack Scenario
Neither side would commit all of its artillery in either
an offensive or defensive role along the forward lines
during a conflict. For a more practical comparison, we
devised a scenario in which we measured the capabili-
ties of the artillery that each side would most likely
use during the initial stages of combat. The scenario
postulates an all-out attack in which North Korea
would bring artillery forward, mass its ground forces,
and launch assaults across the DMZ. We made no
attempt to assign the weapons by sector or invasion
corridor because that would presuppose we can deter-
mine the North's attack plans with some accuracy.
In this scenario, we postulated that the number of
weapons used by the North would come from a force
that includes the artillery from 24 infantry divisions
and brigades, plus selected artillery units from corps
and national-level assets that might support the at-
tacking maneuver elements.' For the South, we in-
cluded the defending weapons available from the 12
divisions within artillery range of the forward-edge-
of-battle-area, and the corps-level artillery in all of
South Korea's forward corps.
See Defense Intelligence Agency publication DDB-2600-1142-82
(Secret NF NC), March 1982, North Korean Pre-H-Hour Attack
Scenario Study. (u)
Table 3
Artillery in a Postulated Attack Scenario
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Number of weapons
4,230
1,642 2.
6 to 1, North
Cannon'
2,880
1,624 1.
8 to 1, North
MRLs
1,350
18 75
to 1, North
Explosives delivery
capabilities (kg)
526,122
66,082 8
to 1, North
Weapons with ranges
Over 18,000 m
1,611
42 3
8 to I, North
14,000 to 18,000 m
711
784 1.
1 to 1, South
Under 14,000 m
1,908
816 2.
3 to 1, North
By examining the capabilities of artillery under these
postulated conditions our results are markedly similar
to those found when comparing the total inventories of
guns, howitzers, and rocket launchers (see table 3).
South Korea's artillery force remains, outnumbered,
outranged, and well behind in the capability to deliver
ordnance as measured by salvo weight in this static
comparison. Although the North does not have
enough artillery to mass overwhelming numbers of
weapons all along the front, its edge in numbers
should enable it to concentrate large numbers of 25X1
weapons in ratios greatly favoring the attacker in
selected zones of assault.
Even if the South fired at three times the rate of 25X1
North Korea's weapons, the potential for delivering
explosives over a short period of time would favor the
North substantially because of the large amounts of
ordnance that can be fired by the MRLs. One BM-11
can deliver nearly 40 times as much shell weight as a
105-mm howitzer in a single barrage, and more than
13 times as much as a 155. Resupply problems and
the extended reload times for MRLs, however, could
reduce this advantage significantly for the North over
time.
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The most important factor favoring the North in this
scenario appears to be range. Almost 40 percent of the
North's weapons outrange all but 2 percent of South
Korea's guns and rockets.
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Appendix A
The Impact of Airpower
on the Artillery Equation
South Korea is heavily dependent on its Air Force to
provide additional firepower to compensate for its
disadvantages in artillery. As in other countries
trained in Western-oriented doctrine and tactics, the
South relies heavily on close air support for its ground
forces. North Korea does not use its airpower in the
same way or to the same extent
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Table 4 Metric tons
Salvo Weight for Artillery and Bombs
Total artillery
726
86
Fighters and bombers
642
788
Total
1,368
874
When the capability for delivering bombs by aircraft
is computed as salvo weight for each air force and
added to the tonnage figures for the artillery inven-
tories, North Korea's advantage of over 8 to 1 drops
to 1.6 to 1. This gross measure includes the standard
bomb loads for all tactical fighters and bombers in
both air forces that could be dropped at one time in a
single mission.
Table 4 illustrates the total capability of both sides to
deliver explosives. A more useful measure would
require knowledge of the numbers of aircraft that
each side plans to commit to the air-land battle. In the
South this would depend on the overall combat situa-
tion,
Our gross comparison of salvo weight
shows that the North's artillery has the theoretical
capacity to deliver nearly as many explosives as the
South's Air Force and that South Korea's air delivery
capability exceeds that of the North. North Korea's
MRLs are capable of delivering 75 percent as many
explosives at one time as the entire South Korean Air
Force, and probably just as accurately.
Strengths and Weaknesses
South Korea's Air Force has better aircraft than the
North with greater and more accurate ordnance
delivery capabilities and longer loiter time over target.
The South also has an integrated system for close air
support for the ground forces, which the North lacks.
The South has both airborne and ground-based for-
ward air controllers to request and direct airstrikes in
support of any ground unit.
cumbersome system for air support in which the
requesting unit must go through the chain of com-
mand up to division or even corps level for approval.
We believe, however, that South Korea's airpower
will be strained to meet all of its assigned combat
missions. South Korea's Air Force has few precision-
guided munitions, an extremely limited all-weather
capability, and far fewer forward air controllers than
are employed by US forces. During a conflict, the
South's Air Force will also have to provide air defense
against a numerically superior enemy as well as
support to ground forces that are outnumbered and
outgunned.
North Korea's Air Force is qualitatively inferior to
that of the South, and its support of the ground forces
is expected to be limited after preparatory attacks
against defensive positions of the South Korean
ground forces. North Korea basically has only a clear
weather strike capability. Only the 73 IL-28 light
bombers have a radar-delivery system, and it is old 25X1
.and inaccurate.
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Table 5
Artillery Weapons in Inventories of Active Forces,
North and South Korea
Number
5,847 (total)
900
360
144
132
276
72
60
432
816
96
180
24
582
900
873
122-mm howitzer M-30
122-mm howitzer SP M-1977
122-mm field gun D-74
122-mm gun SP M-1981
130-mm field gun M-46
130-mm gun SP M-1975
152-mm howitzer D-1
152-mm gun/howitzer D-20
152-mm gun/howitzer SP M-1974
122-mm field gun/ 152-mm howitzer
(A-19/ML-20)
Unidentified field guns/howitzers
Unidentified large caliber SP M-1978
76-mm field gun ZIS-3
122-mm MRL truck-mounted BM-11
107-mm MRL towed type 63
Number
2,426 (total)
1,308
105-mm howitzer M 101
900
155-mm howitzer M 114/A 1
12
155-mm gun M59
12
175-mm gun SP M107
72
203-mm howitzer M 115
104
203-mm howitzer SP M 110 .
18
130-mm MRL
The impact of tactics and doctrine was treated only
briefly in this study because we have few details on
changes in the North's methods of operation that are
likely to take place with the large influx of self-
propelled artillery over the last few years. Nor do we
attempt to compare important intangibles such as
leadership and morale. Also, the South's combat
capabilities were tested to a degree in Vietnam 10
years ago, but the North's forces have not seen major
action since 1953.
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 Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100070002-0 25X1
Secret
Table 6
Characteristics of Artillery Weapons
Maximum
Firing
Range
(meters)
Maximum Rate
of Fire per
Minute
Projectile
Weight
(kilograms)
W EI Score '
105-mm howitzer M101
11,500
1.0
15
.71
155-mm howitzer Ml 14/A I
14,600
4
43
.76
155-mm gun M59
23,500
3
43
.76
175-mm gun SP M 107
32,700
1.5
66.7
.87
203-mm howitzer M 115
16,800
1.5
90.7
.76
203-mm howitzer SP M 110
16,800
1.5
90.7
.78
130-mm MRL
23,000
NA
unknown
.80
North
76-mm gun ZIS-3
13,290
15
6.2
.61
122-mm howitzer M-30
11,800
6
21.8
.72
122-mm howitzer SP M-1977
15,300
8
21.8
.79
122-mm gun D-74
23,900
5
27.5
.69
122-mm gun SP M-1981
23,900
5
27.5
.71
122-mm gun A-19
19,750
I
25
.66
130-mm gun M-46
27,490
5
33.4
.82
130-mm gun SP M-1975
27,490
5
33.4
.84
152-mm howitzer D-1
12,390
4
40
.71
152-mm gun/howitzer D-20
17,230
4
43:6
.77
152-mm SP M-1974
17,230
4
43.6
.79
152-mm gun/howitzer ML-20
17,320
2
40
.72
Ui SP M-1978
unknown
unknown
unknown
.87
107-mm MRL Type-63
8,300
NA
8.4
.65
122-mm MRL BM-l I
20,500
NA
19.25
.80
o Most of the weapons effectiveness indexes are those published by
the Department of the Army for 1979 because later compilations
only include a small number of the old weapons still in active use in
Korea. In those cases where scores for new or obsolescent weapons
were unavailable, we developed our own values based on published
scores for comparable systems.
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 Approved For Release 2009/02/12: CIA-RDP84SO0553R000100070002-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/02/12 CIA-RDP84S00553R000100070002-0