GUATEMALA: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL MODERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Intelligence
Guatemala: Prospects for
Political Moderation
Secret
ALA 83-10122
August 1983
Copy 267
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130604-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Intelligence
Political Moderation
Guatemala: Prospects for
Operations.
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 83-10122
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
secret
Guatemala: Prospects for
Political Moderation 25X1
Key Judgments The military government of Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, which came to power
Information available in Guatemala in March 1982, is still seized with many of the same social
as of 20 July 1983 and political problems that have bedeviled that country for years. Although
was used in this report.
a previously growing insurgency has been contained-at least temporar-
ily-the traditional, conservative elites still wield considerable political
power. Moreover, the social problems that triggered demands for change
and spurred Indian support for the insurgency have been aggravated by
Guatemala's recent economic decline.
While trying to deal with these problems, Rios Montt faces formidable
challenges in the months ahead:
? Continued coup plotting and factional rivalries in the military indicate
that the armed forces remain a divided institution. We believe that, as
long as the Army remains largely above the law, it probably can-and
will-act to hamper some of Rios Montt's efforts to implement reform.
In addition, we believe the military's new commitment to moderation
may be tactical and easily abandoned-in favor of more repression-
should circumstances dictate.
? We expect the Guatemalan economy to decline further this year and,
perhaps, to stabilize in 1984. Economic contraction will increase already
high unemployment and hinder government efforts to relieve socioeco-
nomic pressures. In addition, the private sector is overwhelmingly
conservative and opposed to social reforms. These factors are likely to
make economic policymaking increasingly contentious.
? Despite'government efforts to weaken conservative groups, these are
likely to resume entrenched political habits such as fielding assassins and
disrupting new left-of-center organizations. Similarly, extreme leftists
have begun to subvert left-of-center groups in order to press for radical
reforms and provoke a rightist reaction.
? We estimate that the leftist guerrillas remain a potent force of 2,000 to
2,500 full-time armed combatants with the capacity for hit-and-run
raids, economic sabotage, and urban terrorism. Although they are
unlikely to threaten political stability seriously in the short term, they are
just as unlikely to be eradicated.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10122
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
? We believe that a deterioration in regional security would derail political
moderation in Guatemala. A radical leftist victory in El Salvador
probably would provide Guatemalan guerrillas with improved access to
Cuban and Nicaraguan arms and an unimpeded safehaven.
Even in the face of these challenges, we believe that the present trend
toward more moderate government is likely to continue during the next
year or two-provided Rios Montt remains in power. The President has
demonstrated a strong personal commitment to "civilize" Guatemala. He
has adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that combines selective repres-
sion and civic action. He has taken some steps to reduce human rights
abuses and integrate previously excluded social groups-such as Indians,
peasants, and urban workers-into the political and economic mainstream:
? According to US Embassy and other sources, human rights violations
have decreased substantially. Although abuses remain, we judge that the
climate of fear, the widespread indiscriminate brutality, and-more
important-the hostility between peasants and the Army have dimin-
ished noticeably.
? Recent political reforms have stimulated moderate leftist parties and new
organizations representing previously excluded social groups to partici-
pate in the electoral process now getting under way. There are tentative
signs that exiled Social Democratic leaders are following the Guatemalan
situation closely, are considering electoral alliances, and may return to
Guatemala if they obtain guarantees of personal safety.
Overall, after weighing his strengths and weaknesses, we judge that Rios
Montt has an even chance to remain in power for the next one to two years.
His authority rests with the military, whose power is likely to remain
ascendant. In our view, military backing probably will continue as long as
the progress against the insurgents can be sustained and the movement
toward elections is maintained.
A coup attempt in June 1983 and continued dissension in the armed forces
make it plain that the equally likely outcome-Rios Montt's overthrow-is
an ever-present risk. Powerful conservative forces have already stepped up
their efforts to discredit Rios Montt and provoke his replacement by the
Army. His replacement by coup or his assassination, in our view, would
lead to a power struggle in the military and a more rightist leadership and
would probably entail the abandonment of moderate programs.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
In any event, beyond 1985 the probability of steady movement toward
moderate government becomes lower in our estimation. We believe that
extreme ethnic and class differentiation and sharp socioeconomic dispari-
ties will continue to inhibit the development of political tolerance and
compromise-key elements of democracy. Guatemalan society, in our
view, is not likely to support a stable democratic-pluralist system any time
soon; instead, political polarization and fluctuating levels of violence will
increase, and military domination of the political system will persist.
The United States can expect continuing difficulties in exerting a moderat-
ing or stabilizing influence over'Guatemalan political events. The Guate-
malan military's strong nationalist tradition may well lead it, as in the past,
to reject any US aid conditioned on human rights performance. Internal
dynamics, in any case, probably will continue to weigh more heavily in
determining the government's counterinsurgency strategy and the political
process.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Key Judgments
Economic and Social Inequality 2
Insurgent Exploitation of Inequalities 3
A Rigid Political System
3
The Record of Repression
4
Military Consolidation, 1963-82
4
Going for Broke
4
Overplaying the Hand
5
Rios Montt Takes Charge
7
Counterinsurgency Successes
7
Human Rights Improvements
7
Broadening Political Participation.
10
Promising Initial Results
10
Retaining Military Control
11
The Military
12
The Economy
12
The Left and Right Extremes
14
Regional Turmoil
14
Implications for the United States
15
Guatemalan Chronology
17
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Laguna de
TP(nnn05
izacapa
Boundary representation is North Pacific Ocean
not necessarily authoritative.
0
0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Puerto ?
Barrios
Hd1 DU'RA?S`;
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Guatemala: Prospects for
Political Moderation
We believe Guatemala is pivotal in Central America
for US regional interests. Its economy and population
are the largest in Central America. Its proximity to
Mexico's southernmost states-where Mexico City's
authority and presence are weakest-gives it a
strategic significance unmatched by other Central
American nations. Moreover, ethnic, cultural, and
socioeconomic similarities between southern Mexico
and Guatemala's Western Highlands suggest a high
potential for the spillover of any unrest and instability
across their common border. Unfortunately, a radical
outcome of the current struggle in El Salvador would
almost certainly affect future developments in Guate-
mala more than elsewhere in the region.
For three decades, Guatemala has been beset by
escalating cycles of violence and repression. By 1982,
in our view, the situation had become chaotic; be-
tween 400 and 500 people were killed monthly in
politically related violence. Several thousand had dis-
appeared and thousands of others had fled the coun-
try. Virtually every social and political group had
become the target of physical or psychological brutal-
ity from leftwing and rightwing extremists and gov-
ernment security forces alike. In the process, the
country had become increasingly isolated abroad. The
military, which has governed Guatemala through
much of its modern history with the support of
rightwing politicians and conservative businessmen,
had developed a siege mentality and seemed deter-
mined to crush its opponents through repression
against guilty and innocent alike. The ensuing polar-
ization of political forces into extreme right and left
camps, in our opinion, was propelling Guatemala
toward a full-scale civil war and had improved mark-
edly the prospects for a Marxist insurgency.
Since a young officers' coup in March 1982, however,
the government's political, military, and economic
policies have renewed hopes in Guatemala and abroad
that the cycle of violence and repression has been, or
soon may be, broken. Although contradictory signs
remain, the regime of President Efrain Rios Montt
has reduced-at least temporarily-indiscriminate re-
pression and has taken initial steps to reduce political
polarization. Already a significant result of the new
approaches has been the loss of momentum by the
insurgents in their bid for power. Nevertheless, a coup
attempt in June 1983, dissension in the military, and
the recent imposition of a state of alarm-a milder
version of a state of seige-to counter mounting
criticism of Rios Montt by conservative forces under-
score the fragility of the present process toward
moderate government.
In the light of these developments, this paper reviews
the history and causes of Guatemala's political vio-
lence. It assesses the military, political parties, and
the private sector in terms of their potential contribu-
tion to moderate-that is nonviolent, reform-
oriented-leadership. It identifies continuing obsta-
cles to moderation and considers whether the pattern
of violence and exclusion has been broken by the Rios
Montt regime or might be broken over the near term
(one to two years). Alternative political scenarios for
the medium term (three to five years) also are exam-
Instability, insurgency, and terrorism have found fer-
tile ground in Guatemala's deep-seated social and
economic inequities and the most rigid political struc-
ture in Central America. Exposure to modern culture
has eroded the traditional lifestyles of politically
passive social groups-especially the majority Indian
population-and resulted in rising aspirations and
increasing unwillingness to submit to continued injus-
tices and oppression. The ruling elites have viewed
these new demands as a subversive challenge to the
established order. More often than not, they have
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Guatemala
Average for
Central
America
Average for
LDCs
Adult literacy, 1981
(percent)
46
71
48
Urbanization, 1980
(percent)
39
44
32
Life expectancy at
birth, 1980 (years)
59
63
58
Population average
annual growth rate,
1971-80 (average
annual percent)
3.0
2.8
2.4
1981 (US $)
Labor force in agricul-
ture, 1980 (percent)
55
reacted with violence and repression, thus contribut-
ing to social alienation and acceptance of radical
alternatives.
Economic and Social Inequality
Despite impressive economic growth rates-averaging
5 to 6 percent annually-over the past two decades,
life for most Guatemalans remains bleak. In 1981,
according to an official Guatemalan estimate, about
75 percent of the nation's families were living at or
below the poverty line, most of them in rural areas,
where two-thirds of the population lives. Uneven
distribution of wealth and primitive social services-
health, education, and welfare-compare unfavorably
even by Central American standards.
General Factors. Several factors have helped to per-
petuate Guatemala's rural-dominated society. Ac-
cording to a World Bank study, the country's uneven
distribution of wealth and above-average per capita
income by LDC standards owe more to the large
plantations located along the southern coast than to
such newer sectors as manufacturing and mining.
Although Guatemala has Central America's largest
industrial base, this sector has not substantially im-
proved the lot of the typical Guatemalan, according to
the same study. The manufacturing sector is relatively
capital intensive and oriented toward satisfying de-
mand by wealthier Guatemalans and those elsewhere
in the hobbled Central American Common Market.
As a result, it has offered limited new employment in
the cities and provided scant opportunity for the .
growth of an urban labor force.
The Particular Plight of the Indians. The vast major-
ity of rural families-predominantly Indian-live in
the highlands to the northwest and north of the
capital. Most work parcels of land are so poor in
quality and so small that modern farm techniques
generally cannot be used. Dwindling land resources
force several hundred thousand Indians every year to
migrate to plantations along the southern coast, where
they take seasonal jobs. The ruling elites have largely
ignored these groups in the nation's economic and
social development.
Historically, the isolation of the Indians was in part
voluntary; their cultural traditions and way of life
seemed to render them impervious to Western influ-
ence. National authorities thus tended to assume that
the fatalistic, introspective nature of the Indians
would make them impenetrable to radical subversion.
In recent decades, however, growing population pres-
sures have weakened the traditional agricultural econ-
omy of the Indian, making it harder to eke out even a
subsistence living. At the same time, growing expo-
sure to modern culture-through missionaries, relief
workers, and other influences-has undermined long-
established Indian attitudes and behavioral patterns
and provoked a strong desire-especially among
young Indians-to enjoy the benefits of participation
in the cash economy.' The combination of rising
aspirations and lack of economic opportunity has
intensified the plight of the Indians, further alienating
many and making some susceptible to appeals by
revolutionaries, who stepped up their proselytizing in
the highlands during the second half of the 1970s.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
Secret
Insurgent Exploitation of Inequalities. Guerrilla
leaders have attempted for several years to take
advantage of these cultural and economic changes
among the Indians by promising that a revolutionary
regime would bring about improvements that they
could never attain under the present system. The
results of these attempts have been mixed. Although
reliable figures are unavailable, there is ample evi-
dence that one insurgent group, the Guerrilla Army of
the Poor, has created a core of Indian militants and
sympathizers. In addition, Indian activists participate
in the Peasant Unity Committee, a rural labor organi-
zation affiliated with the Guerrilla Army of the Poor.
These insurgent efforts to recruit Indians have been
facilitated in the past by antigovernment sentiment
provoked by the Army's brutal counterinsurgency
tactics and abuses of civilians. Nevertheless, the same
evidence suggests that most Indians have distrusted
the guerrillas as much as they have distrusted the
government, and that the share of the indigenous,
rural population supporting the insurgents has re-
mained small and geographically limited. Meanwhile,
tight security measures and rightwing terrorism have
effectively limited the opportunities for guerrilla oper-
ations and recruitment in urban areas.
A Rigid Political System
Guatemala's political structure itself also contributed
to polarization. It has inhibited pressures for social
change and participation by groups claiming to repre-
sent newly politicized constituencies-such as peas-
ants, labor, and the middle class. The public record
shows that, since 1954, when a rightist coup ended a
decade of social and economic reforms, the nation has
been ruled by elites who view the national government
primarily as an instrument for maintaining social
order, providing minimal services, and allowing the
free market to run its course. Politics has been
devoted to "keeping the lid on" and preventing a
return to power of reformers. identified with the pre-
1954 reform era. The political order that has evolved
depends on an informal coalition of conservative
military officers, wealthy businessmen and plantation
owners, and some middle class rightwing politicians.
They apparently share a tacit understanding that
unpredictable and unmanageable political processes-
such as free elections and greater popular participa-
tion-are inimical to their interests. Moreover, they
seem to be generally convinced that mobilization of
labor and peasants must be prevented or at least
strictly controlled.
In pursuing this policy of political exclusion, the
ruling elites have used legal and extralegal means
under'the guise of democratic politics marked by
periodic elections. Our review of the open literature,
US Embassy reporting,
indicates that, among other
things, the elites ave.
? Killed the leaders of many independent or opposi-
tion organizations that could not be co-opted,
silenced, or frightened into exile.
? Manipulated procedural techniques in electoral and
labor laws to deny or delay legal recognition of
opposition political parties and independent unions.
? Subverted the integrity of the judicial system by
government- and rightwing-sponsored use of death
squads to murder and intimidate judges, witnesses,
and defense lawyers.
Within the elite structure, interconnected and shifting
subcoalitions are formed on particular issues. Conse-
quently, a unified, monolithic oligarchy has not
emerged. Indeed, the public record shows that consid-
erable antagonism and distrust exist among the elite
groups:
? Although some prominent businessmen publicly
have espoused the need for social and economic
reforms, this group and the landowning elite remain
less inclined to accommodate change than the mili-
tary-whose members are recruited from broader
elements of society and generally have less to lose
financially.
? Military officers consider unpatriotic the flow of
capital out of the country from businessmen fearful
of political instability.
? Conservative politicians have resented the tendency
of the armed forces to monopolize the presidency
and its occasional use of electoral fraud to keep
rightwing civilians out of power.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
These potentially disruptive differences, however,
have been dampened by the commonly perceived
threat from the left. Moreover, elite unity has been
reinforced by the predominant view that any efforts to
improve the living conditions of the lower classes
through social and economic reforms would not bear
fruit if leftists, whom the elites consider to be bent on
subversion, are allowed to participate in the political
process.
The Record of Repression
Reform and Reaction, 1944-63
Guatemala has a long history of fratricidal struggle.
Much of the violence in recent decades stems from the
revolution of 1944, which cast out the last in a line of
traditional military dictators. The historical literature
on Guatemala shows that, during his term in office
(1945-51), President Juan Jose Arevalo sought to
break the political and social paternalism of a
plantation-based economy by enfranchising the Indi-
ans, promoting social and labor legislation, and nur-
turing industrialization and export-oriented agricul-
ture. Reformist policies and an expanded government
role in the economy and society brought more diversi-
ty-new industrialists, commercial farmers, manag-
ers, and other businessmen-into the private sector
and awakened segments of the middle and lower
classes to the realization that benefits could be ob-
tained through political action.
Supporters of the old order strenuously resisted
Arevalo's new policies and those of his more radical
successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54), whose re-
gime launched a whirlwind of structural changes,
including agrarian reform. According to the public
record, when Communists became entrenched in the
Arbenz government, the old guard-with US assist-
ance-overthrew it and reversed many of the wide-
spread reforms made during the previous decade. The
country then entered an intensely anti-Communist
phase that grew increasingly violent over the years. F-
Memories of the Arevalo-Arbenz period instilled in
the military and the political right deep suspicions of
any movement even slightly to the left of center.
These suspicions have haunted the political scene
since 1954, and successive regimes and their support-
ers often applied the appellation "Communist" to the
most elementary proposals for reform or steps toward
modernization. Nonetheless, the "decade of revolu-
tion," the conservative coup that ended it, and subse-
quent reactionary policies have left a sense of denied
destiny among reformist and radical forces, as well as
remnants of nationalist resentment against the United
States among younger members of the armed forces.
In November 1960, for example, a group of idealistic
young Army officers declared their opposition to their
government's cooperation with the United States in
training Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion and
began a guerrilla campaign that, although much
transformed and radicalized, lasts to this day.
Military Consolidation, 1963-82
The two decades since 1963 have witnessed the
consolidation of the armed forces as rulers of Guate-
mala. With the exception of one civilian president,
whose policies were subject explicitly to military veto,
all Guatemalan chief executives during this period
were active-duty Army officers. After 1970, the coun-
try was ruled by a series of military presidents, each
of whom had served his predecessor as minister of
defense.
Going for Broke. Several trends combined to augment
the'political power of the armed forces between 1963
and 1982. The Guatemalan military became profes-
sionalized and reached new and higher levels of
institutional loyalty as well as technical expertise. As
in most Latin American countries, however, conspicu-
ously absent from newer professional attitudes was a
dedication to the principle of civilian supremacy.
While the armed forces were forging a sense of
purpose and institutional solidarity and improving
discipline and coordination, civilian society was frag-
menting. The economic elite, once a homogeneous,
tightly knit group of plantation owners, became in-
creasingly complex and diverse as new manufacturers
and businessmen from the service sectors injected
their own views and pressed their own interests. At
the same time, reemerging political awareness among
the middle and lower segments of society undermined
established patron-client relations by making these
segments even less responsive to the will of the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Secret'
economic elite. Moreover, cultural and racial differ-
ences between Indians and non-Indians made united
political action by middle and lower class groups
difficult to achieve
As the traditional civilian structures and institutions
lost their effectiveness, the military took steps to
ensure that no new ones were created to counter its
growing power. Nascent political organizations that
attracted the support of intellectuals, labor leaders,
young professionals, and other reform-minded indi-
viduals were either barred from the ballot or intimi-
dated by repression. Formal steps and extralegal
actions restricted and discouraged the establishment
of political and labor organizations. According to the
public record, hundreds of political activists-
Christian and Social Democrats not involved in armed
activities against the regime-were persecuted or
murdered. Moreover, according to US Embassy re-
porting, the climate of terror was such-especially
after the June 1980 seizure and murder by rightists of
the entire leadership of a labor confederation-that
union members feared to assemble openly.
Somewhat ironically, the appearance of an insurgency
problem reinforced the role of the armed forces in
society. The military reacted to the mounting guerril-
la threat by opening a strong counterinsurgency cam-
paign. As the Army extended its presence to isolated
guerrilla-infested areas, it could justify command of
more national resources and foreign military assist-
ance. As a result, the armed forces became the fastest
growing. element in an otherwise small public sector.
In addition, the military was redefining its mission-
expanding guerrilla warfare courses and emphasizing
such sociopolitical activities as civic action and psy-
chological operations
Overplaying the Hand. The string of military govern-
ments that ruled Guatemala during this period not
only failed to create the conditions for long-term
political stability but progressively undermined the
existing power structure through the increased use of
repression and inability or unwillingness to distinguish
between moderate leftists and radical revolutionaries.
As the military consolidated its already dominant
position in national politics, it often turned its coun-
terinsurgency tactics on real and suspected political
rivals. By 1981, there was little public support for the
continuation of a progressively brutal system.
Although previous governments had sponsored or
approved extralegal activities, the level of official and
officially condoned violence reached unprecedented
proportions during the presidency of Gen. Romeo 25X1
Lucas Garcia (1978-82). According to US Embassy
estimates, between 400 and 500 people were killed
monthly in politically related violence during
January-March 1982. US Embassy reporting indi-
cates that three out of four politically related deaths
during Lucas's tenure were attributable to the govern-
ment's security services and rightwing death squads.
The public record shows that, under Lucas, security
needs were seen as requiring the use of brute force,
and government efforts to curtail leftist terrorism
served to perpetuate the vengeful cycle. Virtually all
sectors of the population participated in-and were
victimized by-political violence. Business and con-
servative political party leaders were targets of leftist
kidnapers and terrorists. In turn, they financed
rightwing death squads. Many labor and left-of-
center political party activists, as well as students,
teachers, priests, and'others who survived, went un-
derground and joined Marxist guerrilla/terrorist
groups or their front organizations. Indian villagers-
terrorized by the Army's brutal counterinsurgency
sweeps-collaborated with the insurgents. Military,
police, and civilian officials were frequent targets of
leftist violence in retaliation for governmental acts of
brutality.
Moreover, the government's inability or unwillingness
to distinguish between legitimate political activists
and radical revolutionaries reached new levels under
Lucas
the Lucas government
embarked on a systematic campaign to murder all
persons considered to be or.to have been involved with
"the left" during the previous 30 years.
moder-
ate elements in the private sector, labor unions,
political parties, and other organizations were killed,
exiled, or driven to join the insurgents and their front
25X1
25X1
2-X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
1980
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
1981
a Total number of deaths due to political violence including probable,
possible. and death squad figures.
organizations. Moreover, the systematic elimination
of moderate leftist and centrist leaders created a
leadership void that facilitated the clandestine pene-
tration or co-optation of many moderate organizations
by the radicals in the insurgent movement.
Still, Marxist guerrillas did not represent a credible
threat to the government until the last years of
Lucas's ultraviolent administration. We estimate that
their numbers more than tripled between 1979 and
1982 from several hundred to approximately 3,000
full-time armed combatants. They controlled large
areas of the heavily populated Western Highlands
and, according to US Embassy reports, had extended
their operations to most parts of the country by 1981.
Jan
1982
On the other hand, the unity of the conservative
forces, which had provided a common front against
the left and allowed for some continuity and short-
termstability, had begun to crumble by 1981. After
two decades of robust economic growth, the private
sector was hit by a severe recession induced largely by
low world commodity prices, the persistent domestic
insurgency, and a poor human rights record that
made foreign financing increasingly hard to obtain.2
A 1981 poll of 223 leading businessmen in the
country's two largest cities revealed a mounting lack
25X1
2bA1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
Secret
of confidence in the government and growing pessi-
deployment of small military units in order to
increase the Army's presence in remote areas where
government authority was sporadic or nonexistent.
25X1
25X1
mism about the future.
some plantation owners had begun
to pay "war taxes" to the guerrillas in order to protect
their properties. Similarly, the large and well-
organized ultrarightist National Liberation Move-
ment, which actively collaborated with the regime in
the killing of reform-minded moderates, at the same
time plotted against military control. Moreover, disaf-
fection had developed within the officer corps itself
over the military government's handling of the insur-
gency and the economy, the country's international
isolation, and the economic privileges enjoyed by the
military high command.
Increasingly concerned about these trends, a group of
Guatemalan Army junior officers on 23 March 1982
toppled the Lucas regime and installed a military
junta headed by retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt. A
highly regarded former Armed Forces Chief of Staff
with a reformist reputation in military circles, Rios
Montt had been victimized by massive electoral fraud
in 1974 when he ran as a presidential candidate for
the moderately reformist Christian Democratic Party.
After a few weeks of confusion and hesitation, the
junta set out to pacify the country by reversing
the insurgents' momentum, improving Guatemala's
human rights record and international image, and
politically integrating previously excluded sectors-
such as peasants, Indians, and urban workers-into
the social and political system.
Counterinsurgency Successes
Rios Montt's primary goal since he assumed office
has been to bring the insurgency under control. For
that purpose, his government has shifted to a counter-
insurgency strategy that emphasizes gaining support
of the impoverished peasant-mostly Indian-popula-
tion in the contested areas, particularly in the high-
lands.
The regime has employed innovative measures that
have yielded political, military, and psychological
benefits in the countryside. These measures include:
? Organizing civilian militia forces-about 350,000
nationwide so far-to saturate insurgent areas with
progovernment units and give the local population a
sense of participation in self-defense on the side of
the armed forces.
? Emphasizing psychological operations, such as am-
nesty programs, and military civic action to provide
food, health care, and equipment to build houses,
roads, schools, and other infrastructure.
A variety of reporting indicates that over the past year
the government has reversed the momentum of insur-
gent gains, setting them back both politically and
militarily. Fighting and government amnesty pro-
grams have reduced insurgent numbers from about
3,000 to a force estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 full-time
armed combatants. The Army has reestablished au-
thority over most of the population and territory
formerly under insurgent control, and it has gained
the support of a substantial number of Indians who
previously provided the guerrillas with food, intelli-
gence, and recruits. Consequently, insurgent attacks
and guerrilla-Army clashes have decreased considera-
bly in both frequency and number from the levels
attained during the last year of Lucas's regime.
Human Rights Improvements
Reporting from the US Embassy as well as media
indicate that human 25X1
rights violations by the Guatemalan Government-
widespread and chronic under former President
Lucas-have decreased substantially to the point
where discriminate violence (that is, targeting guerril-
las) has largely replaced indiscriminate slaughter
since Rios Montt came to power. This change has
been accompanied by a slow improvement in the
country's international image. According to a West
European source of the US Embassy, ambassadors
from European Economic Community and NATO
countries in Guatemala are convinced that the human
rights situation has improved under Rios Montt,
? Replacing less effective large anti-insurgency
sweeps with more aggressive patrolling and broader
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
although excesses continue to occur. The same source
stated, however, that an intensive and seemingly
centrally directed propaganda and disinformation
campaign-we believe by the guerrillas' elaborate
international propaganda networks-is trying with
some success to discredit the Rios Montt government
abroad.
Although we lack the evidence needed to confirm or
refute man s ecific charges of human rights viola-
tions Embassy reporting
indicates at:
The Army used extreme violence against guerrilla-
controlled villages during last year's counterinsur-
gency offensive.
The security forces have detained some students,
professors, and others suspected of having ties to the
insurgents; they have been held for long periods of
time without charges, and a few apparently have
"disappeared."
? The establishment of special, secret tribunals in-
tended to bypass the regular courts has come under
strong criticism at home and abroad for violating
On the whole, however, after a review of all available
information, we judge that the climate of fear, the
widespread indiscriminate violence, and-more im-
portant-the hostile relationship between the peasants
and the Army characteristic of previous Guatemalan
regimes have substantially diminished. Recent travels
by US Embassy officers and foreign journalists in the
Western Highlands, where most of the latest fighting
has taken place, have provided firsthand observation
of human rights improvements in the countryside.
Several thousand Indians in guerrilla-controlled terri-
tory who formerly collaborated with the insurgents,
for example, have sought refuge with the Army after
being displaced by last year's intense fighting. Rather
than seek retribution against insurgent collaborators,
The Military
Under Rios Montt, the military establishment has
expanded its power even further relative to other
competing political actors. Since March 1982, it has
increased its manpower strength from approximately
18,000 to 24,000 and its share of the national budget
from 6 percent to 11 percent. A new command and
control structure provides support for an increased
military presence throughout the country and stream-
lines Army supervision of civilian government person-
nel, police, Civil Defense Forces, and political party
activities at the local level.
la.
Members of the armed forces are highly nationalistic.
They regard themselves as the guardians of the
nation, above and beyond politics. Nonetheless, the
Army is a divided institution. Personal ambitions and
rivalries play a major part, but factionalism in the
armed forces, in our view, also mirrors the social,
political, and economic antagonisms of Guatemalan
society. Most officers come from middle class or
humble origins and resent the venality of the econom-
ic elite. Other officers, mostly at the senior level and
with strong ties to wealthy families and rightwing
politicians, emphasize anti-Communist themes and
the need to restore discipline and order to Guatema-
The Private Sector
Guatemala's economic elite-industrialists, retailers,
financiers, and planters-constitute the country's sec-
ond most important political group. Its members
exert considerable influence through their economic
and financial power.
Although it has undergone considerable diversifica-
tion in the last three decades, the private sector
as was common practice in the past, the military has
fed them; provided medical services, housing, and
clothing; and plans to resettle them in their home
villages whenever possible.
the government is trying to
overcome the indiscipline of individual soldiers and
DIA
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
secret
predominantly adheres to a conservative economic
and social philosophy akin to pure laissez faire
capitalism. This philosophy clashes with a key com-
ponent of the current government's counterinsurgency
strategy, which calls for increased public spending in
the impoverished highlands in order to increase the
loyalty of the peasants and integrate the Indians into
the national mainstream. Indeed, in our view, the
private sector-currently paying taxes at one of the
lowest rates in Latin America-would have to submit
to unprecedented levels of taxation if Rios Montt
were to sustain the momentum against the extreme
left and finance programs to redress the country's
social and economic ills. The public debate over the
proposed value-added tax illustrates the vast gap
between the conservative business community and the
government over the pace and substance of social
reform policies.
The Political Parties
Recently established and not deeply rooted in society,
Guatemalan political organizations are for the most
part personalistic groups without well-defined ideolo-
gies or programs. They lack a tradition of addressing
issues, formulating policy, or sustaining contact with
a constituency. Expediency and the scramble for
government positions have often dictated last-minute
political realignments and discredited most party
leaders. The three oldest groups-the ultrarightist
National Liberation Movement and the centrist
Christian Democratic and Revolutionary Parties-
remain the only ones with any significant grassroots
support. Left-of-center parties were relentlessly perse-
cuted during previous regimes, and their leaders were
assassinated or driven into exile. The National Liber-
ation Movement, which has been responsible for
much of the violence, is generally considered the
small units by developing a program to indoctrinate
troops and field commanders on the need to respect
human rights even during military operations.
The Rios Montt government also has curbed drasti-
cally the activities of quasi-official, rightwing death
wealthiest and best organized party, and the one that
would most benefit from early elections. Although
about 20 new groups have formed recently in response
to Rios Montt's political reforms, these fledgling
parties will need time and government support to
develop organizational, financial, and leadership re-
sources to challenge successfully the power of the
more established and predominately conservative
groups.
Other Groups
The Catholic Church lost its secular power in Guate-
mala as a result of the liberal anticlerical reforms of
the mid-19th century. In recent years, however, the
Church has found itself in an increasingly adversarial
role vis-a-vis the government in reaction to official
repression against militant priests and lay missionar-
ies working with Indians in areas of insurgent activi-
ty. Moreover, Church criticism of the present regime
has mounted as Church officials-concerned about
Protestant inroads among the population-grow in-
creasingly suspicious of Rios Montt's outspoken
evangelical Protestantism.
Labor and peasant groups have not exerted signifi-
cant political influence since the 1954 overthrow of
the Arbenz regime. Private-sector hostility and gov-
ernment repression have prevented the development of
viable labor and peasant movements. The US Embas-
sy reports that only about 10 percent of the labor
force is organized into unions. Recent government
overtures to labor indicate that Rios Montt is more
forthcoming than previous leaders in addressing
union demands. In our opinion, however, these orga-
nizations will find it difficult to prosper in a social
setting that remains predominantly conservative un-
less they receive substantial official support.
squads, which under previous regimes operated in the
capital and other major towns with impunity. Accord-
ing to press reports, several hundred policemen-the
backbone of the rightist hit squads in the past-have
been discharged or turned over to the secret tribunals
in recent months
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Broadening Political Participation
In March 1983, the Rios Montt government began a
long-term program of political reforms designed to
lead ultimately to a restoration of constitutional rule
under military tutelage. The reforms are intended to
stimulate the participation in the electoral process of
moderate leftist parties and new organizations repre-
senting previously excluded social groups. At the same
time, the changes are aimed at reducing the power of
traditionally predominant rightist political parties. A
high-ranking Guatemalan official recently admitted
to the US Ambassador that the regime was actively
engaged in splintering the existing rightist political
groups, which Rios Montt believes are unrepresenta-
tive.
Rios Montt has been reluctant to set an electoral
timetable, strongly suggesting that elections remain a
low priority for him and that he intends to complete
the full four-year term that he was denied by electoral
fraud in 1974. The President has said on several
occasions that he does not intend to run for office in
the elections (probably to be held in late 1985 or early
1986), and we believe he has no plans to remain. in
power beyond them. He has not made any efforts to
organize a personal political power base. We believe,
however, that he wants to buy time to allow new
political groups to organize and draw away support
from the established rightist parties.
Nevertheless, mounting calls for early elections by
conservative politicians, the business sector, and the
Catholic Church were echoed recently by many Army
officers weary of protracted military involvement in
formally running the government. These pressures
have forced Rios Montt to agree tentatively to a
timetable for constituent assembly elections in July
1984. Presidential elections are expected to follow,
but no date has yet been announced.
Promising Initial Results. The reforms have pro-
voked a flurry of political activity. Significantly, the
substantial lowering of the number of supporters
required to form a political party already has caused
some of the large established parties to divide and has
prompted the formation of several new political orga-
nizations, according to US Embassy reports. One
politician has told the US Embassy that as many as
30 groups may try to set up parties. The ultraright-
wing National Liberation Movement, whose extensive
The New Laws Governing Political Activity
The political reforms of Rios Montt are embodied in
three decrees issued on 23 March 1983-the first
anniversary of the young officers' coup. In an effort to
broaden participation, encourage new groups to orga-
nize, and draw away support from existing parties, a
law governing the registration of political parties
reduced the number of signatures required from
50,000 to 4,000. This law also requires that the
parties have viable political organizations in at least
12 of Guatemala's 22 departments. This measure
would give greater representation to rural areas in
the party system and, by the same token, make the
parties more representative of the nation as a
whole-one of Rios Montt's major goals. A future
decree, according to US Embassy sources, will make
voting obligatory for illiterate and literate citizens
alike, further ensuring the participation of lower
class groups in the political process.
Another law called for the establishment of an auton-
omous Supreme Electoral Tribunal to run the elec-
toral process. This Tribunal was inaugurated on
1 July 1983, and its members were selected by the
Supreme Court from a list of 20 candidates submit-
ted by a committee composed of university and law
school representatives. The involvement of university
personnel-often associated with the left-adds to
the Tribunal's credibility as an independent actor.
A third law governs the registration of all voting-age
citizens, a process that reportedly would take approx-
imately a year to complete and is cited by officials as
the reason for prolonging the elections timetable. The
government correctly points out that insurgent forces
have destroyed registration lists in many localities.
Moreover, Rios Montt apparently believes that exist-
ing lists are fraudulent.
financial and organizational resources we believe
would make it the winner in early elections, has
protested the government's delayed electoral timeta-
ble.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
CJGG Vt
The government has reiterated that all groups, includ-
ing the Communist Party, are free to participate in
the electoral process-the first such offer by a Guate-
The government is giving ample signs of its sincerity.
It is trying, for example, to woo Social Democrats and
other moderate leftists away from guerrilla front
organizations. High-ranking Guatemalan officials re-
portedly have traveled to Costa Rica, Mexico, and the
United States to convince exiles to return home and
participate in the political process. While these talks
apparently remain inconclusive, there are some tenta-
tive signs that exiled Social Democratic leaders are
following the Guatemalan situation closely, are con-
sidering electoral alliances, and may return to Guate-
mala if they obtain guarantees of personal safety. We
believe such guarantees are likely to be offered.
Retaining Military Control. To enhance the legiti-
macy of the political opening and to reduce suspicions
about military intentions, Rios Montt and leading
military officers have claimed publicly at various
times that the armed forces will not sponsor a govern-
ment party. Notwithstanding the public claims of
impartiality, however, a strong undercurrent of con-
cern about liberalization apparently exists within the
Gen. Rios Montt (center) with
high-ranking Army officers.F_
Concerns about this threat apparently played a major
part in a recent government decision to increase the
number of military zones, thereby facilitating the
Army's control over political activity nationwide. A
Embassy has reported that a number of military
officers close to Rios Montt apparently are deter-
mined to maintain effective military management of
the political system for the next eight to 10 years,
regardless of the outcome of presidential elections or
the type of constitutional reforms arising from the
current liberalization.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Rios Montt will have to overcome formidable obsta- 25X1
cles in the months ahead. In our view, opposition
activities by both conservative and leftist hardliners 25X1
will grow as the insurgents regroup, political and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
labor union activity picks up, and the economy contin-
ues to slide. These problems could spur popular
unrest, weaken Rios Montt's support in the military,
and possibly lead to a coup and the return of indis-
criminate violence and repression.
Despite the coming challenges, we believe the present
trend toward more moderate government in Guate-
mala is likely to continue during the next one to two
years-provided Rios Montt remains in power. The
adoption of a more enlightened counterinsurgency
strategy, the efforts to broaden popular participation
in the political system, and the tangible improvements
in human rights demonstrate a significant personal
commitment by Rios Montt to "civilize" Guatemala.
Overall, we judge that Rios Montt has an even chance
to remain in power for the next one to two years. His
authority rests with the military, and we believe he
will retain the support of the armed forces as long as
the military progress against the insurgents is sus-
tained and the movement toward elections is main-
tained. Rios Montt's counterinsurgency strategy has
raised the Army's morale, and most officers appear to
recognize-at least for the time being-the vital link
between popular support and the defeat of the insur-
gents. Moreover, the President has been able to isolate
many of his conservative opponents in the military
through frequent command rotations and reassign-
The coup attempt in June 1983 and continued dissen-
sion within the armed forces make it plain that the
equally likely outcome-Rios Montt's overthrow-is
an ever-present risk. Most established political
forces-the private sector, rightist politicians, and the
Catholic Church-have stepped up their criticism of
the President and his policies in order to weaken his
support in the military and provoke his overthrow.
Rios Montt's replacement by coup or assassination, in
our view, would lead to a power struggle in the
military hierarchy and a more rightist leadership and
would probably entail the abandonment of moderate
programs
Constraints on Reform
The Military. Numerous reports of factional rivalries
and coup plotting in the military indicate that the
military remains a divided institution. Moreover, the
Army's newfound commitment to moderation, in our
opinion, may be temporary and easily abandoned in
favor of more repressive policies, if circumstances
dictate. Available information gives us little feel for
what kinds of debates occur within the councils of the
armed forces or for the breakdown of hardline as
against moderate opinion. We believe, nevertheless,
that reformist sentiment in the military is neither
strong nor sophisticated and could be neutralized by
the political and psychological pressures of maintain-
ing law and order
Because the armed forces remain largely above the
law, they will remain a complicating factor in Rios
Montt's ability to implement reform. The coverup of
military responsibility for the murder of three Guate-
malan employees of the US Agency for International
Development last February demonstrates, in our opin-
ion, that Rios Montt does not yet have the power to
carry out his commitment to respect human rights
when the armed forces are implicated.
The Economy. We expect the Guatemalan economy to
decline about 4 percent this year and, perhaps, stabi-
lize at this lower level of activity in 1984. The foreign
exchange shortage is likely to persist as a major
economic constraint, particularly in the critical
import-dependent manufacturing and commercial ag-
ricultural sectors. We foresee little improvement in
export earnings and judge that a new IMF accord,
currently under negotiation, would not attract suffi-
cient foreign funds to revitalize the economy any time
soon. Sharp cuts in public expenditures already are
jeopardizing the government's ability to carry out
promised economic development programs and social
services in the Western Highlands-a vital part of
Rios Montt's counterinsurgency strategy and econom-
ic policy. Economic contraction also will increase an
already high unemployment rate and could hinder
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Secret
Coup Plotting Against Rios Montt
In June 1983, Rios Montt barely survived a plot by
disgruntled military officers-including most major
unit commanders-to remove him.
The attempted coup was a vivid example of the type
of recurring challenges facing Rios Montt in the
months ahead, and it underscored the fragility of the
present process toward more moderate government in
Guatemala. It was symptomatic of the underlying
political, social, and economic problems inherited
from previous regimes-such as military divisiveness,
a deteriorating economy, an active insurgency, and
the retention of considerable political power by ultra-
conservative elites.
The incident, however, also demonstrated that Rios
Montt benefits from several factors::
? The absence of a military or civilian candidate-
acceptable to a wide spectrum of the armed
forces-to replace him.
? The concern among many officers that another coup
could prompt a series of government turnovers that
would hurt the Army's capacity to defeat the
insurgents and delay a return to constitutional
government.
political problems in the near term that are more
fundamental:
25X1
? A portion of the military, motivated by purely LDA"I
personal ambitions, will continue to plot against
him.
? Civilian critics in the business sector, conservative
political parties, and the Catholic Church-al- '
though temporarily quieted by the state of alarm
and press censorship imposed in June-will renew
their opposition activities.
? Inveterate civilian plotters like ultrarightwing lead-
er Leonel Sisniega will try to take advantage of the
military unrest by agitating among discontented
officers.
We believe that a successful coalescence of opposition
forces resulting in Rios Montt's overthrow would 25X1
quickly revert Guatemala to rightwing rule and prob-
ably lead to a return of indiscriminate violence and
repression. Rios Montt probably would be replaced
by a caretaker military government that would at-
tempt to legitimize its rule by calling for early
elections-a principal demand of all powerful
conservative forces. The ultrarightwing National Lib-
eration Movement-the best organized and financed
political party in Guatemala-would be the likely
winner in early elections. Moderate political organi-
zations, in our opinion, remain too weak and frag-
mented to pose a credible challenge to the conserva-
tive groups, even in the absence of such traditional
rightwing methods as fielding deathsquads and elec-
? The existence of important support for Rios Montt
in the officer corps, and fears that a move against
him would irreparably damage the military
institution.
? The President's political acumen and flexibility,
particularly his ability to adopt either hardline or
conciliatory postures and make temporary conces-
sions to his opponents.
Although Rios Montt was able to overcome the most
recent challenge, he will have to deal with other
toral fraud.
Government by the National Liberation Movement
would almost certainly eliminate any possibility of
reforms, aggravate the social problems that spurred
in the past Indian support for the insurgents, and
drive many remaining moderate forces to cooperate
with the extreme left. Moreover, a return to indis-
criminate repression would damage Guatemala's in-
ternational image even further and complicate US
efforts against the radical left in the region.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
government efforts to relieve socioeconomic pressures
that have caused the alienation and radicalization of
many Indians. Moreover, a spirit of cooperation be-
tween the government and local businessmen-crucial
for sustained economic recovery-probably will be
even more difficult to instill than previously.
The private sector, although composed of different
groups with diverse interests, is predominantly
conservative and opposed to social reforms. Rios
Montt's reformist reputation and socialistic rhetoric
irritates many leaders of the private sector, who
regard the President as a Communist. The govern-
ment's announcement earlier this year of a new value-
added tax, which consolidates a number of existing
taxes without significantly raising them, has been so
vigorously opposed by businessmen that implementa-
tion has been delayed until August 1983. Such differ-
ences are likely to continue and make economic
policymaking and any reform efforts increasingly
The Left and Right Extremes. In our estimate, the
remaining guerrillas remain a potent force with the
capacity for hit-and-run raids, economic sabotage,
and urban terrorism. Although they are unlikely to
pose a serious challenge to the stability of the govern-
ment in the next year or so, they are just as unlikely to
be eradicated. Aware that a repressive government
best serves their purposes, the insurgents-in our
view-will continue to concentrate their efforts on
provoking Army brutality and indiscriminate violence
against civilians. We expect them to try to erode
popular confidence in the government again and again
by stepping up their attacks on economic targets and
inciting opposition to the regime from legitimate
political, labor, and peasant organizations.
Rios Montt's effort to weaken the other end of the
political spectrum-the extreme right-is likely to
have some success in the short term, but these
established elements will retain substantial retaliatory
power. For example, their financial and organization-
al advantages give them the wherewithal to resume
their long-practiced political habits, particularly the
fielding of assassins and otherwise disrupting new i
organizations representing peasants, Indians, or urban
workers. Rightwing politicians also are likely to esca-
late their personal attacks on the President by, for
example, seizing the issue of Rios Montt's outspoken
evangelical Protestantism to inflame religious suspi-
cions among the majority Catholic population.
Rightist efforts to discredit the President and provoke
his replacement by the Army recently led to the
imposition of a state of alarm.
We believe that rightwing attempts to undermine the
government probably will intensify in coming months
and may have a debilitating effect upon the armed
forces' willingness to support the President and his
reformist policies.
Regional Turmoil. A deteriorating security situation
in Central America almost certainly would have a
major negative impact on moderate politics in Guate-
Any Guatemalan military
setback while intervening in a neighboring country
almost certainly would bring down the Rios Montt
government. A radical leftist victory in El Salvador
probably would provide the Guatemalan guerrillas
with unimpeded use of Salvadoran territory for safe-
haven and staging attacks. We believe that Cuba and
Nicaragua would be emboldened by a radical success
in El Salvador and would move quickly to use that
country as a major base to supply arms and other
assistance to the Guatemalan insurgents. Such cir-
cumstances probably would strengthen the influence
of conservative hardliners in the military and prompt
moderate policies to be abandoned altogether
)FX'1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
secret
We believe that, in light of Guatemala's political,
social, and economic problems and Rios Montt's
pivotal role, the present trend toward more moderate
government probably will not be sustained beyond the
presidential elections. In our view, any successor
regime is likely to experience instability at least
through the mid-1980s. Extreme ethnic and class
differentiation and sharp socioeconomic disparities, in
our opinion, will continue to inhibit the development
of political tolerance and compromise-key elements
of democracy. These obstacles are unlikely to disap-
pear, short of an unexpected violent social upheaval
whose consequences cannot be foreseen. Thus, Guate-
malan society is not likely to develop a stable
democratic-pluralist system-similar to that in Costa
Rica, for example-any time soon.
Assuming that Rios Montt retains power through
mid-1985, we offer the following broad political sce-
narios through 1988 in the order of their probability:
? Elections are held in 1985; a reformist left-of-
center government is elected; Rios Montt steps
down (45 percent probability). Such a regime would
be highly unstable-and could be quickly toppled if it
tries to push through major reforms. Efforts to
implement social and economic reforms would be
strenuously resisted-probably successfully-by
strong conservative forces within and outside the
military, while labor and peasant groups-formed
during Rios Montt's tenure and now the govern-
ment's main constituency-would press their de-
mands for redistribution of wealth and power. As in
previous periods of social unrest, rightist death-
squad activities against left-of-center groups proba-
bly would resume.
? Elections are held, and a conservative government
is elected; Rios Montt steps down (30 percent prob-
ability). The new government might try to reverse
some of the reform programs enacted during Rios
Montt's tenure. It almost certainly would fail to
satisfy growing demands from peasant and labor
groups for reforms favored by the Rios Montt
government. A reformist military clique could
revolt, but probably would be put down by prepon-
derant law-and-order forces in the Army. The guer-
rillas would probably make inroads among frustrat-
ed moderate leftist groups. In this scenario, the
regime increasingly would resort to repression.
? Promised elections are canceled after a conservative
military group assumes control (25 percent proba-
bility). This scenario could be precipitated by a
successful rightwing coup against a likely reformist
victory in the elections, by serious military setbacks
at the hands of the Guatemalan guerrillas, or by an
insurgent victory in El Salvador. The last of these
would be quickly followed by Cuban and Nicara-
guan expansion of assistance to the radical left
insurgency in Guatemala. A siege mentality almost
certainly would set in, and indiscriminate repression
probably would ensue. A purge of reformist ele-
ments in the military could then be carried out. The
activity of the guerrillas would increase, and their
ranks would swell in reaction to the Army's counter-
insurgency offensives against real and suspected
Communist sympathizers. Fighting between the
Army and better trained and armed insurgent forces
benefiting from increased Cuban and Nicaraguan
assistance would become heavy and widespread.
This scenario could lead quickly to a full-scale civil
war and improved prospects for a guerrilla victory.
Implications for the United States
The United States can expect continuing difficulties
in trying to exert a moderating or stabilizing influence
over political events in Guatemala. Economic and
military assistance would improve the government's
ability to conduct the war and reduce popular support
for the guerrilla movement through judicious use of
force, civic action, and reform programs. We believe
internal dynamics, however, will continue to weigh
more heavily than foreign influence in determining
the government's counterinsurgency strategy and the
political process.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
The military's strong nationalist tradition probably
will lead it, as in the past, to reject US assistance
conditioned on human rights performance or any
other requirements that it perceives to infringe on
Guatemalan sovereignty. We believe that recent
counterinsurgency successes, which were accom-
plished without US assistance, and continuing inter-
national condemnation despite Rios Montt's effort to
reduce human rights abuses have strengthened the
"go it alone" attitude within the officer corps.
Guatemalan
officers view the domestic insurgency as a regional
aspect of the East-West struggle, whereby the Soviet
Union and Cuba seek to weaken the United States.
They believe they are fighting Washington's war and
deeply resent US reluctance to unconditionally supply
military assistance to defeat the rebels. Many officers
apparently regard the United States as an unreliable
ally and, in our opinion, may support a nonaligned
foreign policy orientation less identified with US
regional and global positions than in the past. These
officers point to the struggle in El Salvador and to
what they perceive as the loss of control by Salvador-
ans over their own affairs as the outcome of too close
an association with the United States.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
Secret
Appendix
Guatemalan Chronology
1 July
Gen. Jorge Ubico, the last in a line of traditional military dictators, is forced to re-
sign from the presidency and turns over power to a provisional president.
22 October
A junta led by Maj. Francisco Arana and Capt. Jacobo Arbenz takes power and
calls for free elections.
December
Juan Jose Arevalo, a well-known university professor who had symbolized
resistance to the old order, is elected President.
1946 October
The Guatemalan Congress approves the nation's first social security law.
June
A labor code is enacted, giving unionized urban workers protection against
arbitrary dismissal and recognizing their right to strike.
18 July
Col. Francisco Arana, former junta member and conservative opponent of
Arevalo's reformist policies, is assassinated by unknown assailants.
1950 13 November
Col. Jacobo Arbenz is elected President with 65 percent of the votes cast.
27 June
A land reform law is. promulgated that empowers the government to expropriate
uncultivated portions of large plantations.
May
A shipment of Czechoslovak arms, with which Arbenz planned to arm a peasants'
and workers' militia as a counterweight to the regular Army, is seized at the docks
by the military.
27 June
President Arbenz resigns from office after a US-supported invasion force led by
rebel Col. Carlos Castillo Armas is unopposed by the Army.
17 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
July
Illiterates are disenfranchised, the labor code is revised, unions are disbanded, and
the agrarian reform law is revoked by the Castillo Armas regime.
27 July
President Castillo Armas is gunned down by a young military guard.
19 January
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, a former Army General who had served as Ubico's
Minister of Communications, is elected President.
13 November
A large group of young Army officers-angered by their government's cooperation
with the United States in the training of Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs
invasion-stages an unsuccessful revolt, and some flee to the mountains.
February
Several former military officers who participated in the failed young officers'
rebellion in 1960 begin guerrilla warfare operations in eastern Guatemala.
29 March
Former President Arevalo returns to Guatemala surreptitiously after being invited
by President Ydigoras-despite the Army's opposition-to run in the coming
elections.
30 March
A military coup led by Defense Minister Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia overthrows
Ydigoras and establishes a military junta that abolishes Congress and the
Constitution and rules the country during the next three years.
6 March
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, the civilian candidate of the centrist Revolution-
ary Party, is elected President, but can assume office only after giving the armed
forces a free hand over military and security affairs, including the conduct of the
counterinsurgency war and the naming of the defense minister.
October
The armed forces begin an intensive counterinsurgency campaign aided by
rightwing terrorist groups and assassination squads.
August
US Ambassador John Gordon Mein is killed during a botched kidnap attempt by
leftist terrorists.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
secret
March
Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, former commander of counterinsurgency operations in
eastern Guatemala, is elected President with the support of the Army and
conservative civilians.
November
The government declares a state of siege (until November 1971) and begins a wave
of official terror in response to stepped-up urban guerrilla activity by leftist forces.
September
All 17 members of the Communist Party's executive committee are kidnaped and
murdered by rightwing death squads.
March
Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, the opposition candidate on the Christian Democratic
ticket, wins the elections, but the government imposes the official candidate,
Defense Minister Gen. Kjell Laugerud; demonstrators protest the fraud; Rios
Montt is sent as military attache to Madrid.
12 December
The newly formed Guerrilla Army of the-Poor begins operations with the
assassination of rightist congressman Jorge Bernal Hernandez, a former security
adviser to President Arana thought to have been responsible for the disappearance
of many leftists in the early 1970s.
4 February
A violent earthquake strikes the capital and other areas of the country, causing ex-
tensive physical damage and killing about 25,000 people.
March
Guatemala unilaterally renounces its military assistance agreements with the
United States in reaction to Washington's linkage of aid to human rights
conditions.
March
The Defense Minister, Gen. Romeo Lucas Garcia, is elected President amid
widespread voter apathy.
29 May
Army troops, in support of local landowners, massacre more than 1.00 Indian
peasants, including women and children, in the town of Panzos.
October
Public protests and a general strike force the government to rescind a 100 percent
increase in bus fares in Guatemala City; several union leaders are murdered by
rightists, and the police storm striker-held buildings, arresting 400.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
25 January
Social Democratic Party leader Alberto Fuentes Mohr is assassinated by a
rightwing hit-squad.
22 March
Moderate leftist leader Manuel Colom Argueta is gunned down on a Guatemala
City street.
10 June
Leftist terrorists assassinate Gen. David Cancinos Barrios, the Army Chief of
Staff, in retaliation for the murders of Fuentes and Colom.
September
A new leftist guerrilla group, the Organization of the People in Arms, begins
operations.
31 January
Thirty-eight people are killed when the police storm the Spanish Embassy, which
had been occupied by a group of Indians protesting against repression and the
seizure of their lands; Spain breaks diplomatic relations.
21 June
The entire 27-person executive committee of a labor confederation is kidnaped and
murdered by rightists.
October
Between 200 and 300 guerrillas occupy Solola-a city of 25,000-while other
insurgent units carry out bombing attacks on two other departmental capitals.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84S00552R000300130004-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
Secret
7 March
Despite widespread claims of electoral fraud, President Lucas's Defense Minister,
Gen. Anibal Guevara, is declared the winner in the presidential elections.
23 March
A coup by young Army officers overthrows President Lucas; recent election results
are canceled, and a three-man junta led by Gen. Rios Montt takes power.
9 June
Rios'Montt removes the other two junta members and assumes the presidency and
command of the armed forces.
1 July
The government declares a stage of siege as the Army prepares for the largest
counterinsurgency campaign since Rios Montt took power.
23 March
The government lifts the state of siege and promulgates three laws designed to lead
to a restoration of constitutional rule.
29 June
The government imposes a state of alarm after an apparent rightwing coup
attempt, and Rios Montt-under pressure from Army junior officers-agrees to
set an electoral timetable and dismiss several close advisers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
 Seci Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0
WZL
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP84SO0552R000300130004-0