(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200140003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Prospects for
Argentine-Soviet
Relations
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Prospects for
Argentine-Soviet
Relations
An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was prepared by
Office
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of Afri an and Latin American Analysis,~
Current Support Division, Office o0 ot~ S viet
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Analysis. I
t was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
and the National Intelligence Council.
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Comments
and queries are welcome and may be
25
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directed to
the Chief, South American Division
ALA
,
or the Chief China-Third World Branch,
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sovA,
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Top Secret
ALA 83-10087CX
SOV 83-10098CX
June 1983
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Prospects for
Argentine-Soviet
Relations
Key Judgments Argentine-Soviet relations have broadened considerably since 1980, partic-
Information available ularly after Moscow supported Buenos Aires during the Falklands conflict.
as oJ'25 May 1983 Grain trade still dominates the relationship, but dealings in other areas are
was used in this report.
expanding as reflected by:
? Improved and expanded bilateral diplomatic dealings and a less hostile
Argentine position on some international issues which are important to
the Soviets.
? Increased Argentine purchases of hydroelectric equipment from the
USSR and interest in joint economic ventures.
? The expansion of pre-Falklands agreements on cooperation in the
nonmilitary use of nuclear power.
? Moscow's success in opening a civil airlink to, as well as a Soviet news
agency office in, Buenos Aires.
? Improved Argentine relations with Cuba and Nicaragua as well as more
open dealings with Soviet Bloc countries.
In addition to using Moscow to shore up Third World and Eastern Bloc
diplomatic support on the Falklands issue, the Argentines, in our view, see
the thaw in their overall relations with Moscow as a means of inducing the
West, especially the United States, to be more forthcoming on a variety of
matters, including Falklands-related diplomatic initiatives. Moreover,
Buenos Aires probably calculates that signals of its willingness to move
closer to the Soviets demonstrate its independence of Washington and
indirectly strengthen its standing in the Third World.
For its part, Moscow has welcomed Argentina's increased receptivity as an
opportunity to make gains at Washington's expense and has cultivated an
image of a distant but powerful supporter of Argentina's interests. The
Soviets have tried to use their expanded political contacts with Buenos
Aires to redress the trade imbalance that has resulted from their heavy
food imports.
Despite the expansion in relations that has occurred, the Soviets are
bumping into inherent limits in the relationship. Argentine military
leaders, as well as most labor and political leaders, are anti-Communist,
are suspicious of Moscow's intentions, and are resisting policies that would
present the Soviets with opportunities for increased influence. Moreover,
there appear to be clear constraints on Argentina's willingness and ability
to alter its foreign political and import policies to favor the Soviets. Most of
these constraints will apply equally to a successor civilian administration in
Buenos Aires next year.
une
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Top Secret
Arms sales, in our view, represent the one area where significantly closer
ties could develop. Moscow has lobbied hard for grain-for-weapons trade to
offset Buenos Aires' favorable trade balance. Although we have no
evidence that Argentina has accepted the USSR's arms offers, Buenos
Aires has signaled-partly for impact on the United States-that it would
be willing to deal with the USSR if full access to Western arms is impeded.
We believe, however, that military leaders will continue to reject major
Soviet purchases as long as they believe they have access to Western
equipment such as air defense systems and combat aircraft. They are
willing to go to considerable lengths, outside regular channels, to acquire
such equipment, in preference to dealing with Moscow.
A turn to the Soviets could be precipitated if:
? The United States was perceived as thwarting Western purchases.
? Washington was perceived as unlikely to attempt to lift the Congres-
sional ban on arms sales.
? The United States was viewed as tilting toward the United Kingdom on
the Falklands.
Even then, in our view, the Argentines would most likely adopt an
incremental approach-more purchases from Eastern Europe or an initial
smaller scale purchase from Moscow-both to test the relationship and to
place pressure on the United States to allow arms sales.
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Soviet Support During the Conflict 2
Commercial Dealings 3
Constraints on Further Strengthening of Ties 6
Sharp Ideological Differences 6
Limited Economic Flexibility 6
Competing Foreign Policies 7
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Prospects for
Argentine-Soviet
Relations
Introduction
Since their defeat in the three-month Falklands con-
flict in June 1982, the Argentines have worked to
strengthen ties with those countries, including the
Soviet Union, that supported their position during the
war. For Moscow, the heightened anti-US sentiment
in Argentina occasioned by the Falklands crisis has
presented new opportunities to expand relations and
ultimately influence. This paper examines the dimen-
sions of pre- and post-conflict bilateral relations and
assesses the prospects for the Soviets to gain a sub-
stantial foothold in Argentina, either through com-
mercial activity or arms sales.
Relations Be,1ore the Falklands Co~tflict. Soviet-
Argentine relations before the Falklands conflict were
built around grain sales and nuclear cooperation.
Moscow became a fairly steady customer for Argen-
tine grain during the 1970s and has emerged as
Argentina's leading buyer of foodstuffs as a result of
the US embargo in 1980. Although the Soviets in-
curred large trade deficits, the arrangement helped
them meet urgent economic needs and undercut the
US embargo.
Cooperation in the nuclear field dates from at least
1975, when Argentina was motivated to approach the
Soviets for reliable sources of nuclear technology and
materials.' For their part, the Soviets hoped that
expanding their involvement in the Argentine nuclear
program-the most advanced in Latin America-
would pave the way for sales of nuclear materials to
other regional states, such as Brazil. In March 1982
Buenos Aires obtained agreement from Moscow for
enrichment services and a ton of heavy water to
complement earlier sales.
Politically, the two sides confined themselves to co-
operating in blocking human rights investigations
within their countries. To protect themselves at annu-
al meetings of the UN Human Rights Commission,
' Buenos Aires is unwilling to satisfy US nuclear export criteria that
require that all nuclear facilities in recipient countries be subject to
international safeguards. Moreover, Argentina regards the United
States as an unreliable supplier due to its nonproliferation policies.
Argentine-Soviet Trade
Sales of grain and other.foodstt