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• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of OIl
T_. _.,~ --- -
South Africa:
Co-Opting the
Coloreds and Indians
An Intelligence Assessment
ALA 83-10067X
May 1983
COPY ~ O V
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Directorate of
Intelligence
South Africa:
Co-Opting the
Coloreds and Indians
This paper was prepared bye
African and Latin American Analysis
Southern Africa Division, ALA,
ffice
Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate
Operations and the National Intelligence Council
Confidential
ALA 83-10067X
May 1983
25X1
25X1
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South Africa:
Co-Opting the
Coloreds and Indians
Key Judgments The constitutional dispensation proffered last year to South Africa's
Information available Coloreds and Indians by the Botha government will restore to them some of
as oI15 April /983 the rights and privileges lifted by Botha's predecessors over the past 35
was used in this report.
years. But the new provisions are not designed, nor will they lead, in our
judgment, to any changes in the basic policy of grand apartheid or any
diminution of white political control.
The constitutional proposals, which offer a degree of control over commu-
nal affairs to the already favored Coloreds and Indians and a limited role
for them in the national government, are as controversial in the white
community as they are among all of South Africa's other racial groups.
Not all whites agree with the Prime Minister that the changes will co-opt
Coloreds and Indians and thereby almost double the size of the group with
a stake in the status quo. Many white South Africans, including some in
Botha's parliamentary majority, fear that the changes are the first steps on
a long, slippery slope of reform that will begin by compromising white
authority and end by destroying it.
Botha's concerns about white opposition-and its impact on Afrikaner
unity~ould lead him to modify his reform package and delay the process
of ratifying and implementing the changes. It is also possible, but not
probable, in our view, that Botha could lose his nerve in face of rightwing
criticism and shelve the proposals.
On balance, however, we believe Botha will push ahead. He has already ac-
cepted apotentially dangerous split in the ruling National Party and has
shown clearly he is willing to brush aside "extremists" who try to stand in
the way of changes that he argues are necessary to maintain white security.
We believe that Botha, an Afrikaner and lifelong politician, has correctly
gauged white public opinion in South Africa, and that he will win the white
referendum on the issue.
Some Colored and Indian political organizations have cautiously supported
Botha's proposals, although public opinion polls and a variety of other
reporting indicate no more than 30 percent of the Colored population
believes the changes as they are now formulated should be adopted. The
proposals have benefited from the gradual drift of the Colored community
away from close identity with the black majority.
Confidential
ALA 83-10067X
May 1983
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Blacks see the reforms as yet another trick designed to fracture the
nonwhite majority. We doubt that promises by the Coloreds and Indians to
work within the new system to achieve concessions for blacks will quell
black anger and frustration. Some black leaders have warned darkly of
reprisals against Colored and Indian collaborators.
We judge, however, that, despite substantial opposition within every
population group in the country, the changes will be in place within the
next 18 months. At the same time, we doubt the new arrangements will
work effectively and believe the experiment will eventually founder, largely
because Colored and Indian leaders will be unable to show sufficient
progress toward the destruction of apartheid to ensure that their own
followers keep cooperating with the system. Whites will not cease looking
for the right formula to generate support for the status quo, however, and
we would expect continuing rounds of tinkering with the system.
If we are wrong, and the regime succeeds in effecting a working alliance
with Coloreds and Indians-with these groups in a distinctly junior role-
Botha can take considerable comfort in having eased the pressure on South
Africa's whites. The sheer numbers of the larger equation, however, with
blacks constituting nearly three-fourths of the total population, suggest the
reprieve will be temporary. We see nothing in the reforms or in white
attitudes that would herald the kind of significant change that so alarms
the South African right.
By any measure, however, implementation of the constitutional reforms
will represent significant compromise by whites. Because of this, the South
African Government will, as it has in the past, expect approval from the
United States. Because the reforms, in our view, will not satisfy black
Africans either inside or out of South Africa, such approval would at least
marginally complicate US diplomatic dealings in the region. Black African
leaders persist in their inflated notions of US leverage on Pretoria and will
view anything but forthright condemnation of the reforms as US com-
plicity in apartheid.
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Key Judgments
Constitutional Proposals of 1977
4
Continuing White Opposition
4
Colored Reactions
5
Labor Party Support
5
Co-Optation
6
Opposition
6
Indian Reactions
8
Support by the South African Indian Council
8
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South Africa:
Co-Opting the
Coloreds and Indians
Introduction
The South African Government has proposed a new
constitutional structure designed to give the country's
3.5 million Coloreds and Asians a limited role in the
white-controlled political system through participa-
tion with whites in athree-chambered Parliament and
multiracial Cabinet. The reaction to these proposals
by these two minority groups, by blacks-who are
excluded from the new system-and by those whites
who oppose it, will have a significant impact on the
future direction of racial reform in South Africa.
In proposing these constitutional reforms the National
Party government has brought to the forefront of
South African politics highly sensitive questions it has
been sidestepping for over a decade:
? To the Coloreds and Asians (predominantly of
Indian origin), who respectively comprise 9 and 3
percent of the country's total population, the propos-
als offer a stark choice: accept second-class citizen-
ship in a white world with privileges far beyond
those of black South Africans or forsake privilege
and then trust that blacks will remember if and
when they come to power.
Figure 2
South Africa: Population Estimate,
Mid-Year 1983
? To many whites, the proposals raise fears that the
inclusion of Coloreds and Indians will be the open-
ing wedge of a series of reforms that ultimately will
bring down white rule.
? To South Africa's blacks, who comprise 73 percent
of the population, the issue is whether Colored and
Indian acceptance of the new system will strengthen
the white community's ability to resist broader
reforms demanded by blacks.
This paper discusses white motivations in proposing
the new constitution and assesses the near- and long-
term reaction of Coloreds and Indians. It also exam-
ines the implications of the reform process for the
United States.
The Constitutional Proposals
Although US Embassy and press reporting indicate
that the government is still tinkering with details of
the new constitutional system, the outlines of the plan
that have emerged make it clear that the role of
Coloreds and Indians will be carefully defined and
limited. The two nonwhite groups will gain marginally
more authority over their own affairs, but the coun-
try's system of racially separate development will not
be fundamentally altered. Existing apartheid legisla-
tion, which also affects Coloreds and Indians, will
remain in force and separate political institutions will
remain unaffected.
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The central feature of the plan is the provision for the
establishment of separate nonwhite chambers of Par-
liament with authority to legislate on matters relating
to the "communal affairs" of Coloreds and Indians.
The precise definition of communal affairs is still
being debated, but it will probably encompass a
limited range of matters such as primary and second-
ary education, community planning and development,
and some social welfare functions.
Matters of "common concern" that relate to more
than one population group will be dealt with in joint
standing committees made up of representatives from
the white, Colored, and Indian chambers and then
voted on by each body. These will include agriculture,
commerce and industry, defense, foreign affairs, jus-
tice, communications, public works, and finance. Bud-
get legislation-including money provided to the sep-
arate racial groups for spending on their own
affairs-will also be dealt with as a matter of common
concern.
Although each chamber of Parliament will in theory
have equal powers, white, Colored, and Indian repre-
sentation in the three chambers and committees is
expected to be fixed at 4:2:1, a formula that ensures
an absolute white majority on matters of common
concern. When the new system comes into effect, we
expect the current white members of Parliament to
retain their seats, while Colored and Indian members
probably will be selected through elections.
As an additional safeguard to ensure white domi-
nance, the President's Council-currently a govern-
ment advisory group composed of whites, Coloreds,
and Indians-will be reconstituted as a legislative
body and given the role of final arbitrator in legisla-
tive disputes between the three chambers. Of its 60
members, 20 will be elected by-the white chamber of
Parliament, 10 by the Colored chamber, five by the
Indian chamber, and 25 will be appointed by the
president. Finally, the new constitution will create a
strong executive president who will have broad veto
powers as well as authority to assume total control in
times of national emergency.
Once the proposals are put into final language as a
draft constitution, they will be submitted to the
current Parliament as a bill that can be passed by a
simple majority. Following parliamentary approval,
but prior to enactment, the government will call a
white referendum on the new constitution. According
to press reports, the electorate will be presented with a
statement of principles rather than the constitution
itself. Botha has committed himself to abide by the
results of the referendum.
White Motivations and Actions
Numerous South African politicians have made it
amply clear that the fundamental purpose of the
reforms is to buttress white dominance in South
Africa. In general terms, the proponents of the new
system argue that an alliance combining the nonwhite
minority groups-12 percent of South Africa's popu-
lation-with the whites' 15 percent will create a
larger South African middle class with a strong stake
in defending the status quo. A few reform-minded
Nationalists, according to press
have plans for additional reforms that could enhance
further the social and economic status of Coloreds and
Indians and perhaps ultimately co-opt urban blacks.
US Embassy and press reporting indicates that propo-
nents of the new system see potentially important and
practical side benefits to co-opting the two nonwhite
groups. Some Nationalists have advocated extending
mandatory military service to Coloreds and Indians-
and thereby doubling the military manpower pool-as
a price the two groups should be required to pay for
expanding their political rights. Moreover, the govern-
ment, ever mindful of international criticism, is al-
ready using the constitutional changes to bolster its
claims that white South Africa's interest in reform is
genuine.
A Contentious Issue. The new dispensation is also an
attempt to resolve a contentious political and emotion-
al issue that has long divided whites: How to fit
Coloreds and Indians into the structure of the overall
philosophy of apartheid, where all "groups" are to
have a measure of political self-determination. Under
pressure from Afrikaners, early South African gov-
ernments, although dominated by the more liberal
English-speaking whites, began progressively to limit
Colored and Indian political rights. Once the Afrika-
ner National Party took power in 1948, it further
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Figure 3
South African Government Under Proposed Constitution
President
Chairman of the Cabinet
The same term as Parliament,
not member of Chambers
Electoral College
50 Whites
25 Colorgds
13 Indians
Appointed by President.from all three I
chambers and from outside. Divided ~'
~ into cabinet committees,forgroup a/)'airs.~
President's Council
60 members
20 elected by White Chamber
10 elected by Colored Chamber
5 elected by /ndian Chamber
25 appointed by the President
Functions
Advises President on matters of
national importance, final decision
chambers.
L_-- - ---
Parliament
Matters of common interest approved by each of
the three chambers.
White
Chamber
Colored
Chamber
Indian
Chamber
Joint Standing Committees
limited Indian rights and abolished the constitutional
provision that allowed Coloreds in Cape Province to
vote on the common rolls with whites for members of
Parliament.
Even as they were being stripped of their political
rights, questions over how Coloreds and Indians fit
into the theoretical framework of apartheid persisted.
Rightwing members of the National Party proposed
in the early 1970s to give the two groups separate
territorial homelands. Liberal whites, especially from
Cape Province where most Coloreds are located,
argued that Coloreds are really "brown Afrikaners"
who share the same language, religion, history, and
culture with Afrikaners and should be integrated into
white society.
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Denied a political voice at the national level, Coloreds
and Indians, for their part, have expressed strong
dissatisfaction since the late 1960s with the alterna-
tive political institutions the government offered
them. These included two impotent advisory councils,
the "Colored Persons Representative Council" (CRC)
and the "South African Indians Council" (SAIC), as
well as various "local affairs committees" that ad-
vised white-controlled local government.
Constitutional Proposals oj1977. In response to both
Colored discontent and the debate in the white com-
munity, the government created a commission in the
early 1970s to study the Colored question. When the
commission recommended a general enhancement of
Colored rights in a report submitted in 1977, the
government responded to conservative white pressure
by rejecting most of its findings, proposing instead a
new constitution with separate white, Colored, and
Indian Parliaments and a "Council of Cabinets"
drawn from the three chambers.
These proposals, which are the antecedents of the
current constitutional reforms, were soundly rejected
at the time by leaders of the two nonwhite minority
communities. In the aftermath of black riots that had
swept the country in 1976, Colored and Indian lead-
ers-motivated in part by a desire not to antagonize a
black majority that appeared on the verge of mass
revolt-argued that the. new system offered them
insufficient political power, and that by excluding
blacks it perpetuated apartheid.
The government abandoned the 1977 constitutional
proposals two years later and eventually turned the
question of nonwhite rights over to the white-dominat-
ed President's Council for still more study. The
Council-itself created by a constitutional reform
package in 1980-produced the general outlines of
the current proposals in early 1982 and the govern-
ment subsequently approved them with some minor
modification.
Continuing White Opposition. Although the National
Party-whose four regional congresses have endorsed
the new proposals-remains in firm control of Parlia-
ment and polls indicate broad-based white support for
racial reform, Prime Minister Botha still faces politi-
cal risks in pushing his program toward implementa-
tion.' Polls show that many conservative whites, espe-
cially in the Afrikaner community, still reject the
Indians as an alien race unacceptable for assimilation
in white society and the Coloreds as inferior products
of "miscegenation." Both groups, they feel, should be
either left in political limbo or be provided with their
own homelands where they could exercise political
rights.
The issue continues to be played out in the white
political arena. The prospect of a new "reform"
constitution precipitated a split in the National Party
in early 1982 when Andries Treurnicht, then the
leader of the right wing of the National Party,
resigned from the Cabinet and along with 16 other
Nationalists formed the Conservative Party of South
Africa (CPSA~the first Afrikaner parliamentary
opposition party in the 35 years since the National
Party came to power.Z
Since his departure, Treurnicht has charged that the
reforms are a first step toward a process that will lead
to eventual black rule; he is making them a key issue
in efforts to attract support for his new party. Many
still in the National Party share Treurnicht's basic
view and, according to well-informed political sources
of the US Embassy, several senior party officials
would like to water down or even abandon the consti-
tutional proposals as a way of reuniting the Afrikaner
community and bringing Conservative Party members
back into the National Party fold.
To diffuse the rightwing criticism, Prime Minister
Botha promised to hold the referendum on the consti-
tutional reforms among white voters, implying, in
effect, that he will not implement them without broad
In the current Parliament, the Nationalists have 125 seats, the
major English-speaking opposition group, the Progressive Federal
Party (PFP) has 26, the Conservative Party has 18, and the New
Republic Party, a moderate to conservative English-speaking party
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The most accurate reading of Colored and Indian
attitudes toward the constitutional reforms is proba-
bly reflected in a recent poll of urban Coloreds and
Indians. Although its findings are disputed by oppo-
nents of the new system, they are generally substanti-
ated by other surveys. The poll showed that:
? In a referendum, about one-fourth of the Coloreds
would vote for the constitutional proposals as they
now stand and 57 percent would reject them. Seven-
ty percent claimed, .however, that they were either
for cooperation with the new system "in order to
change it for the better" (31 percent) or were for
improving its terms and then cooperating (39
percent).
? Thirty-one percent of the those surveyed supported
the Colored Labor Party; 46 percent supported no
party; and 21 percent had no opinion.
? An overwhelming majority favored black participa-
tion in the system.
The poll of urban Indians produced indications of
somewhat more support for the constitutional propos-
als than among the Coloreds, although an assumed
margin of error may make the small difference even
less sign cant:
? Thirty-one percent claimed they would vote for the
proposals in referendum (as compared with 25
percent of the Coloreds polled) and 53 percent said
they would vote against it (as against 57 percent of
the Coloreds).
? Almost haU'of the sample claimed they wanted
Indian political groups to join the new system in
order to change it for the better while another
quarter claimed they were willing to cooperate with
the new system once it is "improved. "Only one-
fourth of those polled rejected anything to do with
the proposals.
? Eighty fve percent thought it was `bad" to exclude
blackslrom the system.
white support. In our view, Botha believes that the
referendum will favor the reforms and will strengthen
his hand among party conservatives.
In addition to the conservative criticism, a less power-
ful but highly vocal group of white liberals, mainly
English-speakers and led by the Progressive Federal
Party, argues that the reforms do not go far enough in
that they exclude blacks.' Conservatives and liberals
alike are deeply suspicious of the broad power Prime
Minister Botha will have as executive president, fear-
ing even stronger Nationalist political dominance
under the new constitution.
Because of the forces at work in the white elector-
ate-particularly in the right wing of the Afrikaner
community-and the personal capital Botha has in-
vested in his reforms, we believe he would find it
highly embarrassing and perhaps politically damaging
if the Coloreds and Indians were to reject participa-
tion in the new system.
Colored Reactions
The Colored reaction so far to the constitutional
proposals has been divided.
? The Colored Labor Party, the community's major
political organization, has given the proposals quali-
fied support.
? A variety of loosely affiliated local level organiza-
tions firmly oppose the reforms and bitterly de-
nounce the Labor Party's support.
? A majority of Coloreds, while largely apathetic,
seem opposed to the proposals as they now stand but
many also appear prepared to go along with them if
their terms are improved.
Labor Party Support. At its congress in early January
1983, the Colored Labor Party endorsed the constitu-
tional package with the caveat that it would continue
to press for black participation and general reform of
the apartheid system. The final vote for the resolution
supporting the endorsement was overwhelming, al-
though several senior members of the party resigned
in protest.
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In accepting the proposals, and thus indicating its
intention to work within the system for further racial
reform, the party reversed the strategy it followed in
the Colored Persons Representative Council (CRC)
during the 1970s. After it had gained a majority on
the CRC in 1975, the Labor Party frequently refused
to conduct normal business and used the Council as a
platform to demand full political rights for nonwhites
and an end to apartheid. Press accounts indicate that
it was these tactics, which had strong Colored com-
munity support, that led the government to abolish
the CRC in 1980.
Co-Optation. In our view, the Labor Party began to
shift its tactics toward cooperation with the govern-
ment in 1980 after several months of violence that
grew out of a boycott of Colored schools in Cape
Province. The boycott was led by a loose coalition of
radical community organizations-student commit-
tees, taxpayers' groups, sports associations-that
spurned the party's leadership. Both Labor Party
leaders and the government seemed to be startled by
the radicalism of the boycott's leaders and the extent
of their grass-roots support.
The Botha government subsequently began a system-
atic effort to court Labor Party leaders Alan Hender-
ickse and David Curry, who were publicly expressing
their concern about the radical drift in their commu-
nity. The government's purpose appears to have been
to gain the party's approval for the constitutional
proposals even then under consideration in the Presi-
dent's Council.
We believe that the Labor Party leaders decided to
endorse the new constitution-which contained few
important changes from the rejected 1977 propos-
als-for a variety of reasons. One strong motive, in
our view, has been the erosion of popular support for
the party. Since the CRC was abolished in 1980, the
party has lacked a public platform to demonstrate to
the Colored community that it is aggressively pursu-
ing its interests. In the interim, the grass-roots civic
organizations, spawned by the 1980 boycott, have won
significant support away from the Labor Party by
organizing rent strikes and various local boycotts.
Colored leaders undoubtedly view membership in
Parliament and the Cabinet as providing a new
platform.
The view that Labor Party leaders have of the role of
Coloreds in South African society has also evolved in
recent years. We believe that, as the prospect of a
black "revolution" has receded, so has the imperative
Coloreds felt in the 1970s to retain a close identity
with blacks. Many observers also believe that the links
between the blacks and Coloreds that were built up in
the 1970s were significantly weakened in 1980 after
Coloreds, who had prompted many blacks to join their
school boycott, abruptly canceled their own action
when the government acceded to their demands. The
blacks continued their school boycott and, although
they too obtained some concessions from the govern-
ment, felt betrayed by the Coloreds.
Public statements by Henderickse and Curry also
suggest they are convinced that the Coloreds are
being offered the best deal that the National Party, in
the face of continuing pressure from the far right, is
likely to let them have for the foreseeable future.
They are almost certainly mindful of the Conservative
Party's call for the establishment of separate "heart-
lands" for Coloreds and Indians where they would be
given "political rights" in much the same way as
blacks in the "independent" tribal homelands. The
Conservatives also want to apply to Coloreds and
Indians the system of residence permits and immigra-
tion controls now used to limit black migration into
white areas.
Finally, we believe that Henderickse, Curry, and
other aging, once-radical party leaders may be tempt-
ed by the potential salary, patronage, and perquisites
of future office.
Opposition. The size of the hardcore opposition is
difficult to determine, but we believe it does not yet
represent majority Colored sentiment. The most
prominent Colored critic of the constitution reform is
the Rev. Allan Boesak, leader of the Colored Dutch
Reformed Church, chaplain at the influential Stellen-
bosch University, and president of the World Alliance
of Reformed Churches. Boesak recently endorsed an
Indian group's call for a multiracial "United Demo-
cratic Front" against the constitutional proposals. At
least 23 clergymen from his church also have joined
him in his condemnation of the new constitution.
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South Africa's almost 2.5 million Coloreds-gener-
ally considered to be people who are neither white,
black, nor Indian-originated as the product of inter-
mixture between indigenous Bushmen and Hottentots
and either white colonists or Malay slaves. For a
century, beginning in the 1850s, theylormed a sepa-
rate but relatively elite society with political rights
nearly equal to those of whites. Their political rights,
however, were an issue of bitter dispute between the
Afrikaner-controlled Transvaal and Orange Free
State and the English-dominated southern provinces.
At the time of South African union in 1910, the two
white groups adopted a compromise that allowed a
continued Colored franchise in the Cape and Natal
Provinces, with the understanding that Coloreds
themselves could not stand for oflice.
? 1950
Immorality Act made sexual intercourse illegal
between whites and nonwhites.
Population Registration Act required that every
South African be classed according to race and
carry an identity card with this information.
Group Areas Act segregated residential areas.
? 1956
South African Act provided for a separate voter's
role for Coloreds.
? 1963
Colored Persons Education Act put Colored educa-
tion under the Department of Colored Affairs.
The political and social position of the Coloreds soon
began to erode. In 1931 voting rights were extended
to white but not Colored women; the following year
voting quaycation for white but not Colored men
was lowered; in 1945 the registration of whites but
not Coloreds was made compulsory; and, three years
later, the government made Colored registration
more complicated.
Alter the Afrikaans-speaking Nationalists came to
power in 1948, they moved quickly to remove Col-
oreds from the common voting rolls and allowed
them to vote only for jour special white candidates
who represented their interests in Parliament. After
even that limited franchise was abolished in 1968,
Colored interests were represented by advisory na-
tional and local level committees under the white-
controlled Department of Colored Affairs.
The Nationalists also quickly began enacting apart-
heid legislation that applied to Coloreds as well as
other nonwhites:
? 1949
Mixed Marriages Act barred Coloredsfrom marry-
ing whites.
a This review is based on academic studies, press reporting,
and US Embassy reports.
? 1968
Representation of Colored Persons Act segregated
the Colored group politically by removing its repre-
sentatives from Parliament.
Perhaps the most devastating apartheid measure
applied to the Coloreds has been the Group Areas
Act, which has been used to break up longstanding
Colored areas in Cape Town and elsewhere. Today,
Coloreds live throughout the country, but about 70
percent reside in the sprawling and violence prone
bedroom communities in the "Cape Flats" area, -
which stretches for miles beyond now largely white
Cape Town proper.
The result of Colored disenfranchisement and the
application of racial restrictions has been the rending
of their social fabric and the creation of a largely
alienated subculture. A succession of surveys shows
the Colored community to have a high incidence of
alcoholism and job absenteeism and a per capita
crime rate higher than other groups in South Africa.
Although the more affluent as well as the younger
and more educated have debated the proper strategy
to gain greater Colored rights, the predominant polit-
ical attitude in the community revealed in surveys is
apathy and pessimism.
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Indians were~rst brought to Natal-where 80 per-
cent of them now reside-in the 1860s as indentured
agricultural laborers on 10 year contracts. As the
Indian population grew, supplemented by the arrival
of wealthy Indian merchants in the latter part of the
19th century, whites in Natal stopped Indian immi-
gration and began placing social and political restric-
tions on those already there.
In the early 1950s, Indians were stripped of their
voting rightslor Parliament and, in place oja
franchise, were given advisory councils and supervi-
sion by a government department. The government
attempted to repatriate them to India through a
variety of voluntary schemes, but, in the.face of
opposition by the overwhelming majority of the com-
munity, the Nationalists~nally recognized them as a
permanent 'group" in South ~gfrica in 1961.
Indians have bridled under apartheid restrictions in
general as well as under legislation directed mainly
at them. The~rst 'group areas" legislation was
directed primarily at Indian retail merchants in
Durban and other communities where they had be-
come competitive with white businesses. Subsequent
removals have driven many Indians out of the retail
business, which they once dominated, and have tiro-
ken up longstanding Indian residential areas as well.
A strong Indian business community has nevertheless
survived with some Indian merchants reportedly op-
erate inwhite areas through white.lFont partners. One
speciallorm ojrestriction applying only to Indians
has been restrictions on their residence and travel in
the Orange Free State and portions of northern
Natal.
Today South ,gfrica's Indians are concentrated large-
ly around Durban, although smaller groups live in
the Transvaal and in the western Cape. As a group
they are relatively prosperous but their cohesion-to
the degree that it exists-is due largely to external
pressure. The smaller Muslim group (about 20 per-
cent) tend to be more conservative and u/jluent than
the majority Hindus (70 percent), while a growing
number (about 10 percent) are Christian. Within the
two main religious groups cast and sect differences
.further divide the community.
a This summary is based on academic studies, press reporting,
and US Embassy reports.
Two major Colored civic groups in the Cape, the
"Federation of Civic Organizations" and the "West-
ern Cape Civic Association," have issued strident
statements opposing both the government's proposals
and the Labor Party's endorsement of them. The
"Cape Area Housing Action Committee," acting for
23 civic associations, has begun publishing a newspa-
per called Grassroots aimed mainly at building oppo-
sition to the proposals. At least two Cape area trade
unions have also come out against the constitutional
changes.
The most active opponents of the constitutional pro-
posals, according to press accounts, are Colored youth
and students who advocate solidarity with South
Africa's black majority. These young militants have
used violence to break up meetings called by Labor
Party leaders to explain their acceptance of the
government's proposals.
Indian Reactions
Support by the African Indian Council. In early
January 1983 the National People's Party (NPP),
which most observers view as synonymous with the
South African Indian Council (SAIC), quietly fol-
lowed the Colored Labor Party's footsteps by agreeing
' The overwhelming number of the 850,000 South Africans classi-
fied as Asians are Indians. There is a Chinese community number-
ing some 10,000 that enjoys many privileges reserved for whites but
is designated as a nonwhite Asian group. The small Japanese
community, because of Japan's extensive commercial ties with
South Africa, was granted "honorary white" status in the 1960s.
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to participate in the new system, although it specified
several terms it wished the government to meet. These
included relaxation of the Group Areas Act, which
restricts the areas where racial "groups" can live, and
restrictions on Indian freedom of movement in the
Orange Free State and northern Natal.
The NPP as a party does not appear to have any
significant grass-roots support and serves largely as a
personal vehicle for its leader, Amichand Rajbansi,
according to Embassy reporting. Rajbansi, who is also
chairman of the SAIC's Executive Council, formed
the party out of independent members elected to the
council in 1981-an election that drew votes from less
than 10 percent of potential Indian voters. According
to one knowledgeable Indian source, Rajbansi has
asked the government to appoint members of the
SAIC to fill the seats of the proposed Indian chamber
in Parliament.
Neither Rajbansi nor other supporters of the new
constitution have yet undertaken a drive similar to the
Colored Labor Party's effort to gain community
support for the reforms. Rajbansi has publicly called
for a referendum by Indians on the constitutional
reforms, although he has also told the press that he
would favor the government determining Indian sup-
port through an opinion poll and thus avoid a referen-
dum that could be boycotted. The government, for its
part, has begun to publish a newspaper, The Phoenix,
aimed at winning Indian support.
Opposition. The only Indian political party that can
claim any significant following, the Natal Indian
Congress (NIC), sharply opposes the SAIC and the
new constitution. Composed of young, largely Marxist
radicals who reject the new arrangements, the NIC
traces its roots to the Congress movement that was
started by Mohandas K. Gandhi in the 1890s and was
later associated with the African National Congress
until it was banned in 1961. Moribund for over a
decade, the NIC revived in the 19'70s due in large
measure to popular Indian opposition to the SAIC.
Although the government has not cracked down on
the NIC itself, many of its leaders have been banned
and it now operates with a rotating leadership.
Along with the NIC, the smaller Transvaal Anti-
South African Indian Council Committee-a de-
scendant of the Transvaal Indian Congress-has de-
nounced publicly the new constitutional proposals and
plans to boycott any elections for the Indian chamber
of Parliament. The Transvaal group is also attempting
to organize a multiracial "United Democratic Front"
to take the boycott campaign to the Colored and white
communities as well. While the front has received
some expressions of support from important Colored
and black leaders, it has not yet become an effective
protest movement.
Black Reaction
The reaction of black South Africans to the constitu-
tional proposals has been largely muted, but we
believe that most politically aware blacks are nonethe-
less hostile to the reforms and view the willingness of
some Coloreds and Indians to go along with it as a
sellout of black interests.
The "Azanian People's Organization," one of the
most radical self-styled "black consciousness" groups
that has not been banned, has publicly rejected the
government's constitutional proposals as a "white
man's agenda calculated to maintain white domina-
tion." Leaders of the largely black Federation of
South African Trade Unions, which has about
100,000 members and includes some predominantely
Colored affiliates, is "mobilizing" in opposition to the
new constitution, according to press reports, but it has
not yet followed through with significant action. The
banned African National Congress has also con-
demned the new constitution, which it cites as evi-
dence of the white's inability to make reforms mean-
ingful to blacks.
The most strident black critic of the new arrange-
ments is Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi. As an interna-
tional figure in his own right, as the Chief of the large
Zulu tribe, and as the chief minister of the Kwazulu
homeland, he has the stature and relative security
from white intimidation that enable him to speak out
forcefully. He has denounced the Colored Labor
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Party for its decision to support the reforms and has
effectively read it out of the South African Black
Alliance, aButhelezi-led, antiapartheid coalition of
black, Colored, and Indian political groups formed in
the late 1970s. He has also warned that the whole of
South Africa would be "reduced to rubble" if the
government's constitutional proposals are not changed
to include black political participation.
Buthelezi's rhetoric is backed up by the 300,000-man
largely Zulu "Inkatha" movement whose militant and
well-organized members are capable of intimidating
Natal's Indian population as well as the province's
smaller Colored community. His threats are also
supported by a history of Zulu violence. In an event
Indians still vividly remember, Zulus killed over 50
Indians in a riot near Durban in 1949. Since then,
Indian leaders have courted Zulu favor but the rela-
tionship has remained uneasy. Buthelezi has alternat-
ed expressions of benign intentions toward Indians
with statements that the Zulus would be willing to
"wipe them out" if given sufficient provocation.
Notwithstanding his unambiguous rhetorical threats
against would-be backers of the government's propos-
als, Buthelezi's strategy is not clear. He has voiced
support for the Indian-proposed, multiracial United
Democratic Front, and has recently held meetings
with homeland leaders to coordinate strategy, accord-
ing to press reports, but no results have been publi-
cized. In our view, Buthelezi is unlikely to cooperate
with more radical blacks, who consider him an arch-
enemy because of his relative moderation.
Outlook
Short Term. The granting of limited political rights to
Coloreds and Asians will, in our view, continue to
divide and polarize the Afrikaner community because
it represents the first constitutional departure from
the ideology of racially separate development. During
the intense debate that will accompany the constitu-
tional reforms as they move through Parliament and
as they are placed before the white electorate, the
government is bound to suffer occasional setbacks
that will be interpreted by some as harbingers of
electoral doom for the National Party. Conservative
white opponents of the reforms will use the parliamen-
tary debates to offer amendments that water down the
proposals and focus public attention on specific provi-
sions. Their aim will be to compel Botha to withdraw
the constitutional proposals, and thereby hand him a
stinging political defeat-one they hope would force
him to call new general elections. They will continue
to pursue these same aims as they work to defeat the
proposals in the white referendum.
Botha's concern about white opposition-and its im-
pact on Afrikaner unity-could lead him to modify
his reform package and delay the process of ratifying
and implementing the changes. It is also possible, but
not probable in our view, that Botha could lose his
nerve in the face of rightwing criticism and shelve the
proposals indefinitely.
On balance, however, we believe Botha, after invest-
ing so much of his energy and credibility in the
reforms, will push ahead. He has already accepted a
potentially dangerous split in the ruling National
Party, and has shown clearly that he is willing to
brush aside "extremists" who try to stand in the way
of changes he argues are necessary to maintain white
security. In our judgment, the Nationalists are likely
to adopt the new constitution in 1983. Elections for
the Colored and Asian chambers of Parliament may
be held this year as well, and the new system could
well be implemented in 1984. Most observers of the
South African political scene agree that the balance
of forces within the National Party still favors Botha
and that he has the political power and skill to
overcome any new opposition to the reforms that
develops within the party. We believe that Botha, an
Afrikaner and lifelong politician, has correctly gauged
white public opinion, and that he will win the white
public referendum on this issue.
The response of the Colored and Indian communities
is more difficult to gauge. We believe that, to a
significant degree, it will be determined by a combi-
nation of the inducements the government offers and
by the counterpressures applied by blacks. In our
view, Botha could enhance the prospects of accept-
ance by the Coloreds and Indians by doing as little as
expressing a willingness to ease apartheid restrictions
that apply to these two groups. He could also make
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the system more acceptable to both groups if he held
out some prospect that blacks might eventually be
given even a circumscribed role in the new system.
The issue of black political rights, however, is proba-
bly less important to the majority of either community
than it was in the late 1970s. Among many Coloreds
and Indians, we believe, the primary concerns are
their privileged status and, especially among Indians,
protection against the black majority. Colored and
Indian concern about the black rights issue appears to
be more a lingering matter of conscience and a
question of placating a hostile, threatening majority.
Black opposition, in our view, probably will be re-
stricted largely to verbal protest and will not be a
significant factor in the Colored or Indian debate over
the new constitution. Considering South Africa's de-
pressed economy, action through black trade unions-
the potentially strongest protest vehicle-is likely to
be restrained, and what protests do occur are likely to
be quickly suppressed. Should violent opposition oc-
cur, it might have offsetting effects. It would, we
believe, force some Coloreds and Indians away from
supporting the reforms but would force others to
support them as they sought closer association with
whites for protection.
The government, in our view, is unlikely in the short
term to make concessions to Coloreds or Indians that
will attract much more support for the system than
already exists. We expect that the Botha government
will continue to be wary of further polarizing the
Afrikaner community or the National Party. As a
result Botha probably will continue to move cautious-
ly on reform, allowing the conservative white constitu-
ency, in effect, to digest the limited measures now
proposed.
The government may, nevertheless, make some small
gestures toward the nonwhite communities. Botha, for
example, formed acabinet-level commission in Febru-
ary to study the question of political rights for blacks
outside of their homelands-predominantly urban
blacks-although he ruled out in advance the creation
of a black chamber in Parliament. Privately, the
government may hint to Colored and Indian leaders,
in order to string them along, that the reform process
will continue to improve their communities' status,
but we doubt it will make any specific commitments.
We believe that the government may also work
quietly behind the scenes to both cajole and intimi-
date opponents or waverers. To boost its allies, it can
step up the covert financial assistance that we suspect
it may already be giving to the Colored Labor Party
and members of the South African Indian Council,
while moving simultaneously to intimidate Colored
and Indian political groups that oppose the reforms.
Although it will probably try to avoid formal actions
like banning of individuals or organizations, the secu-
rity police may use occasional detentions as well as
harassment to keep the opposition off balance.
In the near term, we believe, about 20 to 30 percent of
the Colored community probably will vote in an
election for the new Parliament-reflecting the extent
of support for the new constitution shown in recent
polls. Because we judge that there will be no signifi-
cant enticements from the government before the
election, we also believe the large body of undecided
Coloreds is likely to stay away from the polls.
Past Indian boycotts of local elections have been fairly
successful, and Indian participation in an election to a
new Parliament may be slightly lower than that of the
Coloreds. If the government perceives that participa-
tion will be much lower than 20 percent, it may
appoint the members of the SAIC to the new Parlia-
ment.
Despite the likely low turnout of Colored and Indian
voters, we believe the government will implement the
new constitution anyway and hope that support for it
will grow in the longer term.
Long Term. We believe the same factors that have
influenced the Colored and Indian reaction to date
will influence their longer term response. In neither
community is the question one of simple political
rights. Both opponents and supporters of the reforms
among these two groups are debating, in effect, the
best strategy for obtaining full economic, social, and
political equality with whites. The supporters of the
new dispensation argue that the new system will give
their minorities a wedge into white society that will
lead to a continuing elevation of their status. If this
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argument is proved false in the next several years, the
new Parliament-like the CRC, SAIC, and the Presi-
dent's Council before it-is likely to be rejected by
the majority of Coloreds and Indians.
Although some liberal Nationalists have an agenda
for continuing racial reform, there is no dynamic yet
visible within the party that is likely to spur the kind
of social or economic reform that would satisfy long-
term Colored and Indian demands. The National
Party, we believe, is likely to remain a fundamentally
conservative institution, even with the loss of its right
wing, until shocked into a different course of
behavior.
As a result, even under the best of circumstances the
new constitutional system probably will not operate
smoothly and will limp along for several years until
the whites conclude they must again "reform" the
system, either to open it up to greater nonwhite
participation and relax apartheid restrictions or to
turn back to a more segregated political and social
structure.
Implications for the United States
Over the past several years, the government of P.V~'.
Botha has looked to the United States for expressions
of approval for its efforts at racial reform. We believe
this expectation of support probably will continue as
South Africa implements its new constitution in the
face of external and internal criticism. As these
reforms will, in our view, satisfy neither nonwhite
South Africans nor the outside world, any such
approval by the United States would at least margin-
ally complicate US diplomatic dealings in the region.
Black African leaders, as well as black South Afri-
cans, continue to have an inflated view of US leverage
over Pretoria and will view anything short of full
condemnation of the reforms as endorsement of
apartheid.
The reforms are also inevitably linked with other
foreign policy issues of concern to the United States.
We believe, for example, that Botha has been able to
proceed with all deliberate speed on the reforms at
least partly because the Namibia negotiations have
been marking time. If the constitutional reforms
remain highly controversial even after they are mple-
mented-as we expect they will-Botha's ability to
make compromises on Namibia that can be portrayed
by his opponents as selling out whites will be limited.
This, in our judgment, will lead to yet further calls
from Pretoria not only for approval, but for patience
and understanding in Washington.
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Appendix
Key Personalities
Allan Hendrickse
Labor Party leader since 1978, he has been involved
in Colored politics for over a decade. Before the
Colored Persons Representative Council was abol-
ished in 1980, he spearheaded the party's effort to
disrupt the Council from within and shunned govern-
ment overtures to co-opt him into the President's
Council. Although he claims the current constitution-
al proposals are far from ideal, he has persuaded the
party to endorse them with the caveat that he will
continue to work for the goal of "one man, one vote in
a unitary state."
Camera Press
Pieter W. Botha
Prime Minister and a relatively liberal Nationalist
from the Cape Province, he believes that whites have
long mistreated the Coloreds and has warned his
fellow Afrikaners that they must "adapt or die" in
confronting South Africa's racial problem. He is
committed, however, to only limited reforms and has
categorically rejected any role for blacks in national
decisionmaking.
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Wide Worldm
Allan Boesak
One of the most influential Colored intellectuals in
South Africa, Boesak strongly opposes the new dis-
pensation. He uses his clerical positions-president of
the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and a
leader in the Colored Dutch Reformed Church-to
condemn the Labor Party's support for the "sham"
constitution, which he claims is designed to entrench
white political domination. He refuses, however, to
abandon his pulpit for the political arena by declining
to take a formal role in leading Colored and Indian
opposition to the proposals.
Andries Treurnicht
Broke away from the National Party in 1982, largely
over its decision to press for limited racial reform.
Now head of the Conservative Party, he has called for
establishment of separate geographic "heartlands" for
Coloreds and Asians where they would be given the
same political rights as blacks in the "independent"
tribal homelands. He claims that the new constitution
will eventually spell "the end for the whites" in South
Africa.
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Chief Minister of the Zulu homeland, he is the most
powerful moderate black leader in South Africa. He
charges that the Coloreds and Indians who have
endorsed the proposals are "selling out" blacks. Al-
though he warns of violence if the constitution is not
altered to include provisions for black participation,
his ability to oppose the new dispensation in the short
term will be severely limited.
Gatsha Buthelezi
Amichand Rajbansi
As chairman of the South African Indian Council, he
has tentatively endorsed the new constitution while
claiming he will continue to press for "the best
constitutional deal" he can for Indians. Considered by
many to be a shrewd opportunist, he represents the
interests of the wealthier segment of the fractious
Indian community and is strongly opposed by the
Natal Indian Congress, the major group in the com-
munity opposed to the reforms.
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