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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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El Salvador:
Prospects for Negotiations
ALA 83-10055
April 1983 L~ Q
Copy. 2 5 8
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Intelligence
El Salvador:
Prospects for Negotiations
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared b Office of
African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 83-10055
April 1983
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El Salvador: E
Prospects for Negotiations 25X1
Key Judgments The Salvadoran insurgents have launched a series of major military
Information available offensives to force the government to the bargaining table, while renewing
as of 10 March 1983 earlier calls for unconditional talks with San Salvador to reach a peaceful
was used in this report.
solution to the conflict. Although the insurgents publicly declare their
desire to end the fighting, it is our judgment that the "peace" initiative
thus far represents part of a joint political-military strategy to bolster
international support for the guerrillas, promote government disunity, and
buy time for the military struggle. We believe a major insurgent goal is to
disrupt or discredit the presidential elections scheduled for December 1983.
Although
some moderate leftists in the insurgent alliance reportedly are willing to
reach a political accommodation with the government, they have little
leverage because of the domination of the alliance by Marxist-Leninists.
We also believe they would be forced to abandon the insurgent alliance and
would face reprisals should they attempt an independent solution. The
largest and most radical insurgent faction has indicated both privately and
publicly that it does not believe a peaceful solution is possible and would
oppose one in any case.
The government in San Salvador also is built around a loose coalition of
hardliners and moderates, and the internal debate over negotiations has yet
to produce a coherent strategy. Nevertheless, a hard-bought consensus has
evolved among rival parties and the military against any dialogue aimed at
sharing power with the insurgents. The government's recently appointed
peace commission is charged only with offering an amnesty to the
insurgents and an opportunity to join in the election process. While some
moderates in the provisional government might be willing to make greater
concessions to the guerrillas in an effort to seek a peaceful solution, in our
judgment they will continue to be constrained by government hardliners.
On the basis of these factors, we therefore believe the prospects are slim for
any meaningful negotiation on the government's terms. We believe the best
the government can hope for is that a few non-Marxist insurgent leaders-
such as political spokesman Guillermo Ungo-will risk breaking with the
guerrilla alliance and will participate in the 1983 elections. This will not
end the fighting, however, and, unless the military situation deteriorates
sharply, it is unlikely that there would be negotiations on guerrilla terms.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10055
April 1983
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Considering the fragility of the government and the sensitivity of the
negotiation issue, we believe that international pressure for unconditional
talks would precipitate increased turmoil within the civil-military power
structure and would heighten the risk of collapse of the coalition.
Nevertheless, San Salvador's acceptance of foreign calls for talks aimed at
establishing a cease-fire and holding internationally supervised elections
may place the insurgent alliance on the diplomatic defensive and improve
the government's image at home and abroad.
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Recent Insurgent Bids and Government Responses 1
Development of the Strategy 2
Cuban and Nicaraguan Support 3
Program Results and New Initiatives 4
Government Strategy on Negotiations
4
Hardliners Against Moderates
4
Scenarios for Negotiations
6
Implications for the United States
8
A. Organization of the Insurgent Alliance
B. Chronology of Negotiation Efforts by the Salvadoran Insurgent
Political-Military Alliance (FMLN/FDR)
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El Salvador:
Prospects for Negotiations
The concept of a negotiated settlement has been at the
center of domestic and international debate on El
Salvador since the outset of the conflict. In 1980 the
civil-military junta led by the Christian Democrats
introduced an amnesty program and offered to engage
the insurgent alliance in Church-mediated dialogue
aimed at heading off a full-scale war.' Leftist forces
rejected the government's call for talks, choosing
instead to launch a "final offensive" in January 1981
that they hoped would spark a Nicaraguan-style
insurrection. After two weeks the offensive collapsed
and US military aid was extended to the government.
For the two years since then, the left has conducted a
campaign to promote a power-sharing arrangement
with the government in San Salvador.'
This paper analyzes the negotiation strategies of both
the government and the guerrillas and the prospects
for a political settlement during 1983. Especially
highlighted are the various schools of thought within
the leftist alliance and the military and political game
plans of the insurgents. Based on the left's organiza-
tional structure, we examine several plausible negotia-
tion scenarios and consider their implications.
The insurgent alliance has sought to regain lost
support-domestic and international-by portraying
' See appendix A, "Organization of the Insurgent Alliance." The
terms "insurgent alliance" or "the left," as used in this paper, cover
five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla factions, their respective political
fronts, and three small splinter groups of democratic socialists with
whom they are loosely allied. Although deeply divided by tactical
questions, personalist quarrels, and ideological doctrines ranging
from orthodox Stalinism to Maoism, Trotskyism, and Castroism,
leaders of all five insurgent organizations share a totalitarian view
of the future. This totalitarian view, however, is not monolithic in
style or degree. This paper addresses both "hardline" and "moder-
ate" divisions within the Marxist camp and distinguishes them from
the pluralist aspirations of the non-Marxist democratic socialists,
also referred to in this paper as the "democratic left."
itself as the more legitimate governing alternative to
the civil-military power structure in San Salvador.
The most recent formal proposal for negotiations was
offered by the left at the beginning of the guerrillas'
1982 fall offensive
On 26 October 1982, political spokesman Guillermo
Ungo and guerrilla leader Ana Guadalupe Martinez
held a press conference in Mexico City to publicize a
"new" peace plan. The key points of this Proposal for
a Dialogue are:
? The leftist alliance and the civil-military leadership
in San Salvador should initiate a direct dialogue
without prior conditions.'
? Both sides should designate plenipotentiary repre-
sentatives for this purpose.
? Other governments' "good offices" should be em-
ployed to organize and facilitate the dialogue.
? Other public and private interests in El Salvador
should be considered for participation in such a
dialogue.
Government and military leaders view this latest
initiative by the left as another tactical ploy to gain
international support and secure a power-sharing ar-
rangement without having to face democratic elec-
tions, according to US Embassy and press reporting.
Nevertheless, because of international and domestic
pressures, officials in San Salvador privately and
publicly have shown interest in addressing the negoti-
ation issue, but on the government's terms. They have
formed a peace commission and submitted an amnes-
ty proposal for review by the Constituent Assembly.
The proposal calls on the left to renounce violence and
join in the presidential elections now scheduled for
December 1983.
"dialogue" as a preliminary stage in formal negotiations aimed at
producing a mixed democratic/ Marxist government and a restruc-
tured military institution led by "progressive" officers and guerrilla
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reduce US options for greater involvement, and even-
tually drive a wedge between the government and the
armed forces.
judge that the current leftist "peace" initiative is part
of a larger two-track political-military strategy to
bolster international support for the guerrillas, weak-
en the government and the armed forces, and buy
time for a total guerrilla victory. This dual strategy,
moreover, has evolved through considerable debate
and compromise within the leftist alliance-particu-
larly on the part of hardliners, who,
have no intention of bargain-
ing with either the government or the military. We
believe this argues against serious concessions by the
left in any negotiations. Although some democratic
leftists probably are willing to reach a genuine accom-
modation with the government in San Salvador, they
have little leverage in an alliance dominated by
Marxist-Leninists.
Development of the Strategy
The election in March 1982 was privately viewed by
the left as a major tactical defeat and initially
deepened internal divisions among insurgent hard-
Conversely, moderates in the insurgent alliance-
including both Marxist military and political elements
and the democratic socialists-warned that an inten-
sified war could prove counterproductive,
They reasoned that the
Salvadoran public would be further alienated by
attacks on the country's economy, and expressed
concern that both the government and the United
States might react more strongly to such a purely
military challenge. A reasonable negotiation alterna-
tive offered by the left, they argued, would strengthen
domestic and international support for the guerrillas,
We believe these different tactical viewpoints and
other personalist and factional rivalries so strained the
leftist alliance that some compromise had to be
worked out.
a new political/military
policy was issued by the insurgent general command
to its field units. The new guidelines emphasized
military action as the primary component of the
strategy but stipulated that, on the diplomatic front,
the insurgent alliance "would pay lipservice to a
negotiated solution while rejecting negotiations pri-
vately as a viable means to end the war."
Greater public cooperation and coordination between
guerrilla leaders and their political spokesmen have
been evident since the outset of the guerrillas' sus-
tained series of offensives begun last October. In our
view, this underscores the insurgents' dual plan to
advance combat operations while increasing political
pressure on San Salvador to negotiate.
Indeed, simultaneously with their initial October mili-
tary campaign, leftist political spokesmen introduced
a new proposal for negotiations at a press conference
in Mexico City. Shortly before-according to reliable
US Embassy sources-copies of the proposal had
been hand-delivered to Salvadoran leaders by then
acting Catholic Archbishop Rivera y Damas with the
understanding that the guerrillas would reduce opera-
tions and await a private response. The premature
public declaration by the left and its warning that
large-scale attacks would continue until San Salvador
agreed to a dialogue place the sincerity of the ap-
proach in question.
The two-track strategy offers significant benefits and
minimal risks for the insurgents.
even those guerrilla
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now view the negotiation strategy as usefully comple-
menting their military operations, gaining them time
to reorganize front groups, and sufficiently placating
moderate leftists to ensure unity in the alliance. F_
Cuban and Nicaraguan Support
Since the outset of the insurgent war, the Salvadoran
left has received substantial political, logistic, and
material backing from its principal allies, Cuba and
Nicaragua. In our opinion, these two countries remain
deeply committed to Marxist revolution in the region
and therefore perceive they have much at stake
strategically in the fortunes of the Salvadoran guerril-
We believe that Nicaragua is promoting revolution in
El Salvador and radical left causes elsewhere in
Central America as much for reasons of security as
ideology. The euphoria of the Sandinistas following
their victory in 1979 has given way to what they view
as a struggle for survival against hostile neighbors and
agents of the United States,
they recognize that
continuing support for Central American insurgent
and terrorist groups is taxing their own resources
while also threatening to isolate their regime
Thus, we believe Managua's public support for negoti-
ations in El Salvador is predicated on the hope that
the insurgents can strengthen their own base of
popular support and relieve some of the pressure on
Managua. The Sandinistas' biggest fear-as suggest-
ed by US Embassy reporting-is that a
protracted conflict in El Salvador could tempt the
United States to take more direct action against
Nicaragua itself. In our judgment, advocating negoti-
ations in El Salvador is perceived by Managua as a
way of inhibiting greater US involvement in the
conflict. At the same time, however, the Sandinistas
are likely to continue to provide arms and other aid to
the insurgents to sustain the military effort.
Similarly, the Cubans increasingly have publicly indi-
cated their support for negotiations in El Salvador
while championing the guerrillas' military campaigns.
avana has been
disappointed by the inability of the guerrillas to
foment a popular insurrection and is concerned over
what might be the US response to an escalating
conflict. The Cubans are actively seeking to undo the
established order in Central America but do not
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Havana views negotiations as a ploy to buy time for
Salvadoran insurgents and relieve pressures on Cuba
and Nicaragua. Moreover, negotiations in El Salvador
would set a precedent favorable to Marxist groups
elsewhere in the region who are weighing their own
abilities to foment revolution.
Position of the Democratic Left
We believe that calls for a power-sharing arrange-
ment prior to elections by non-Marxists like Guil-
lermo Ungo are compelled by ideological consider-
ations and concern that the totalitarian majority of
the leftist alliance would block by force any incipient
defection from the dual military-political strategy.
Nevertheless, Ungo and his small coterie of democrat-
ic socialists have in the past pressed San Salvador
both publicly and privately for concessions and guar-
antees which, in our judgment, reflect their desire to
contest the presidential elections and possibly to con-
sider a separate peace with the government.
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Although Ungo and his backers-who left the govern-
ment and joined the insurgents in early 1980 largely
because they believed a successful popular insurrec-
tion was imminent-dutifully denounced the March
1982 elections, they probably were impressed with the 25X1
conduct of the balloting and the large voter turnout.
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Since that time, their attempts to have government
leaders in Costa Rica and opposition figures in Nica-
ragua act as intermediaries for a dialogue aimed at
discussing elections suggests they may be concerned
that the December 1983 contest could prove to be an
important watershed they cannot afford to boycott.
While there is no reporting to substantiate duplicity
by the democratic left toward the Marxist majority,
some of their peace feelers-which on occasion have
not been endorsed by the guerrilla leadership-have
appeared independent of the official insurgent posi-
tion they purport to represent. In addition, Ungo
loyalists have told US officials of their party's interest
in running for public office with appropriate personal
safety guarantees. Furthermore, Ungo and other so-
cialists last fall publicly announced conditions under
which they would return and participate in the elec-
toral process, including an end to the state of siege,
reopening of the National University, access to the
media, and release of political prisoners
Program Results and New Initiatives
The insurgents' success so far in implementing their
dual political-military strategy has been impressive
and threatens to increase the costs for San Salvador
throughout 1983. Since mid-October 1982, attacks by
guerrilla forces have disrupted harvests of vital cash
crops and crippled transportation, communications,
and electrical power over a wide area. At least a
dozen towns in four provinces have been occupied by
guerrillas and others contested, with significant losses
suffered by the government in men and materiel. The
military's difficulties in countering sustained guerrilla
operations in several fronts while attempting to pro-
tect vulnerable economic targets have underscored the
increased effectiveness of the insurgents' training,
planning, and logistic support.
Politically, we believe the insurgent dual strategy has
deepened existing fissures in both the armed forces
and the government. Guerrilla successes on the battle-
field have added to existing dissension within the
armed forces over the leadership of Defense Minister
Garcia and have undermined public confidence in the
government's ability to provide security in the towns
and cities, much less in the countryside. Moreover,
insurgent propaganda and "peace" maneuvers in oth-
er countries-particularly in the United States-have
raised serious doubts in San Salvador about the
reliability of friendly governments, according to US
Embassy
We believe that such developments are convincing
both hardline and moderate leftists that their dual
strategy is paying off. The insurgents are likely to
become bolder in both their military and political
initiatives during 1983. In our judgment, guerrilla
strategy for 1983 will be to neutralize through mili-
tary and political actions the presidential elections
scheduled for the end of the year
Government Strategy on Negotiations
Increased efforts by leftists to force negotiations on
their terms have succeeded in heightening domestic
and international pressures on the government in San
Salvador to accede to a power-sharing settlement.
Internal political problems in the government and
military also have reinforced perceptions among left-
ists and neutral observers alike that momentum for a
negotiated settlement is growing. Moreover, com-
pounding the effect of guerrilla exploits on the battle-
field and leftist propaganda abroad have been media
speculation that both Congressional and administra-
tion officials in the United States now favor talks
between San Salvador and the guerrillas.
Nevertheless, as indicated by US Embassy and other
reporting, San Salvador still is firmly committed to
dealing with the leftists only on its own terms. For the
moment, however, such terms and a timetable for
introducing them are unclear because moderates and
hardliners in the government remain deadlocked on
negotiation strategy.
Hardliners Against Moderates
The issue of how to arrange talks is, in our view, as
important to Salvadoran officials as the talks them-
selves. In the wake of the election last year, rightist
forces announced an electoral victory on the grounds
that 60 percent of the vote went to five conservative
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parties. They have claimed a popular mandate that
rejects negotiations in favor of prosecuting the war
against the insurgents more vigorously.
The official position of the right has been stated
publicly by president of the Constituent Assembly
D'Aubuisson:
We will not permit dialogue or negotiations with
the criminal groups of the FDR/FMLN (insurgent
political-military alliance). It would be vile trea-
son and the most absurd politics describable if the
government were to converse with, much less nego-
tiate with, those who have sown such mourning
and destruction among the Salvadoran people,_
Privately, however, civilian hardliners have demon-
strated some interest in discussions with the left,
according to US Embassy and other sources. Al-
though he has publicly denied it, D'Aubuisson at-
tempted last July to meet secretly with insurgent
representatives in Panama City. A colleague of
D'Aubuisson's has confided to US officials in San
Salvador that his party would like to be credited with
a political breakthrough with the left-"a la Nixon
and China"-in order to boost its prospects for victory
in the election.
In our opinion, D'Aubuisson and other ultrarightists
would be willing to conduct talks with the left that
would outline terms for an insurgent surrender and
possible leftist participation in the elections. We also
believe, however, that rightist hardliners will work to
obstruct similar efforts by government moderates in
order to limit public support for the political center
prior to the presidential elections.
Moderates, meanwhile, appear to be gradually co-
alescing around the policy of dialogue espoused by the
liberal Christian Democrats-who cite their 40-per-
cent plurality in the March election as evidence of
their own public mandate. Partisan maneuvers aside,
US Embassy reporting demonstrates that the Chris-
tian Democrats-and independents like President
Magana-have been increasingly successful in seek-
ing common ground with moderate conservatives on
this and other issues to counter the influence of
D'Aubuisson and the far right.
We believe they recognize possible advantages to
engaging the left in talks:
? Government-initiated talks would improve chances
for increased international support for the provision-
al administration.
? This would strengthen the hand of the moderates in
government, increase the momentum of reforms,
and undermine both extremes of the political
spectrum.
? Talks might precipitate serious splintering within
the guerrilla factions, and among regional Marxist
groups as well.
? Such discord would be likely to hamper insurgent
military effectiveness and could reduce their ability
~ to obtain arms from abroad.
One means of initiating this process, according to
discussions between US Embassy officials and Presi-
dent Magana and other leaders, is through the new
peace commission.' The three-man commission, which
includes a Catholic bishop, an independent, and a
private-sector representative, is tasked with helping to
draft an amnesty law for leftist insurgents and politi-
cal prisoners. In our judgment, the commission may
also be given authority to seek talks with leftist
leaders and present terms for peace. The commission,
however, has been the subject of heated debate within
the government, particularly over whether it or the
Constituent Assembly should formulate negotiation
policy. We believe that the government will be hard
pressed to reach a consensus on the terms and the
timetable for a dialogue.
A Consensus on Basic Goals
Despite fundamental differences in tone and rhetoric,
both rightist hardliners and moderates in San Salva-
dor have shown some signs of agreement on the
purpose of a negotiation strategy, if not on the
strategy itself. A common-albeit unwritten-posi-
tion on future talks has emerged in recent months.
Following the March 1982 elections, the establishment of an
elected Constituent Assembly and provisional government led
political parties and groups to consider the negotiation question. In
August, the major parties in government signed the "Pact of
Apaneca"-a document that calls for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict and the creation of political, human rights, and peace
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Ultrarightists, moderate conservatives, and liberals
appear to agree on three major points:
? Dialogue and/or negotiations at the initiative of the
left are unacceptable.
? The left must compete for power in democratic
elections.
? Any talks promoted by the government should have
as their only objective the participation of the left in
elections or its surrender.
We believe this position represents a consensus com-
patible not only with the conflicting aspirations of
rival political parties, but also with the interests of the
military institution. The majority of the officer corps
shares a center-right political orientation that lends
itself to basic unity on the negotiation issue.
the armed
forces appear essentially united in their stand on
negotiations. The armed forces oppose any talks with
the left beyond setting the terms whereby the guerril-
las would relinquish their arms and join in the
democratic process. Most officers believe a dialogue
with the left would award power and legitimacy to the
guerrillas that they have not won militarily or politi-
cally
In our judgment, the military also perceives that:
? Insurgent negotiating terms could place the govern-
ment in the role of the intransigent.
? The left would be pressuring for advantages at the
bargaining table and rebuilding political front
groups even as it continued its military operations.
? Student elements and labor groups allied with the
left would foment additional street violence to press
demands, thus forcing the hand of the security
forces and perhaps setting back elections.
? Engaging in a dialogue could further strain the
unity of the government and military and encourage
coup plotting by civilian and military extremists.
The military high command has stated publicly that
the armed forces will abide by whatever decision the
Magana administration makes on negotiations. Clear-
ly, however, the military's position will weigh heavily
in any such decisionmaking.
civilian officials generally have adopted the
its terms for a dialogue only after having gained the
upper hand against the insurgents on the battlefield.
In our judgment, some form of dialogue between San
Salvador and moderates of the insurgent alliance is
possible, though not likely, before the election takes
place in December. Should talks occur, they could
help convince some non-Marxists to participate in the
presidential election. Even.so, we view as negligible
the prospects for negotiating a comprehensive and
binding solution during this time frame because insur-
gent terms for settlement appear irreconcilable with
the goals of San Salvador.
insurgent hard-
liners believe it unlikely that negotiations will result in
any political settlement. They continue to view their
"prolonged war strategy" as the best avenue to vic-
tory. One guerrilla unit commander publicly has
rejected a negotiated end to the war, describing the
conflict as the "lifeblood" of the revolution and the
"right to fight" as nonnegotiable. The senior spokes-
man for another insurgent faction publicly has echoed
that position, contradicting democratic leftist Ruben
Zamora, who in recent months has called for both a
cease-fire and a dialogue.
Less doctrinaire elements in the insurgent camp be-
lieve, meanwhile, that negotiations offer significant
tactical advantages
They doubt a military victory is possible any
time soon and think negotiations will force reduction
in US aid to San Salvador and buy valuable time to
strengthen their forces. They envision a temporary
political settlement whereby the government would be
rebuilt around elements of the current provisional
coalition and insurgent leaders. According to both
private and public statements by insurgent spokes-
men, the armed forces would be purged of "undesira-
bles" and melded with the five guerrilla factions. The
existing paramilitary security organizations would be
abolished altogether.
military's position that the government should present
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? Talks Occur on Government Terms (30-percent
probability).
sharing arrangement would allow the insurgents to
begin restructuring the country's socioeconomic sys-
tem along socialist lines while consolidating their
political power. Access to the media, labor unions, and
student groups would permit the left to organize a
mass base of popular support. Opponents would lack
the political and military means to reverse this proc-
ess, and pluralism would eventually give way to
control by the Marxist leadership
Assuming that US military aid to El Salvador contin-
ues, we offer three broad negotiation scenarios
through this year in the order of their probability:
? No Talks Occur (60-percent probability).
- The military stalemate continues; the govern-
ment and the guerrillas continue to propagan-
dize the negotiation issue while trying to gain
the battlefield advantage.
- Insurgents intensify their military operations as
they renew calls for negotiations; they seek to
strengthen their credibility and perhaps force a
military coup.
- The guerrillas are pressured by the electoral
timetable; hence their negotiation initiatives are
aimed at preempting the presidential elections.
- The government is unable to establish a consen-
sus for dialogue with the left; it focuses on the
electoral process and an amnesty law as the
formula for reconciliation.
- The amnesty law promotes a few leftist deser-
tions, but is rejected by the insurgent leadership
and the bulk of the rank and file.
- The fighting continues unabated; the govern-
ment is able to keep to the election timetable,
despite stepped-up terrorism and offensive
operations.
- Government gains significant momentum on the
battlefield.
San Salvador reaches consensus on terms and
format for talks with the left; it makes contact,
through intermediaries, with moderate leftist
spokesmen.
Leftist spokesmen attempt to promote official
insurgent terms for dialogue, which are quickly
rejected by the government.
The government offers separate peace for mod-
erate leftists, promising security, access to the
media, and amnesty for any insurgents willing
to lay down their arms.
Splits develop within leftist ranks over the
utility of talks and a proper response; the insur-
gents reduce operational coordination and mod-
erate socialists begin to defect. The government
permits registration of moderate socialist par-
ties; they consider forming a coalition with the
Christian Democrats. '
- The guerrillas continue the prolonged war strat-
egy despite loss of support from the moderate
left; assassinations of Christian and Social
Democrats are carried out by both the extreme
left and right.
- The election is held amid continued violence
and a state of emergency.
? Talks Occur on Guerrilla Terms (10-percent
probability).
- The guerrillas gain significant momentum on
the battlefield.
- The government agrees to mediated dialogue
with insurgent spokesmen; the electoral process
is interrupted and postponed.
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The guerrillas moderate their terms for power-
sharing and promise not to punish military "war
criminals"; a cease-fire is called, but the insur-
gents refuse to lay down their weapons until
after the armed forces are restructured.
Insurgents begin to reorganize rural and urban
front groups; students, teachers, and workers
stage massive demonstrations and strikes to
press more radical changes.
- The situation polarizes rapidly and renewed
fighting breaks out.
Insurgent appeals for dialogue with the government
have raised speculation in San Salvador and abroad
that a political compromise could evolve in the near
term if the process were fully supported by the. United
States and other countries. We believe, however, that
the ability of third parties to usher the government
and the guerrillas to the bargaining table is limited at
present since both sides view the negotiation issue
largely in tactical terms.
So long as this atmosphere persists-and we now see
nothing on the horizon that suggests change-there
will be recurrent international pressure on the govern-
ment of El Salvador to advance negotiation proposals
that offer a bridge to the leftist alliance. These
pressures, likely to come from within and without the
hemisphere, will tend, as they have in the past, to add
to the complexity of US relations with San Salvador
and with our other friends and allies.
Attempts to force the government of El Salvador to
broaden its negotiation stance in an effort to put the
insurgents on the defensive would run the risk of
fracturing the current political-military coalition.
Considering the substantial evidence of the govern-
ment's distrust of insurgent motives for a negotiated
settlement, moreover, we believe that the United
States would be approached to provide material assur-
ances beyond those now contemplated-including
sharply increased military and economic aid-before
San Salvador would make such a proposal.
The key implication of the evidence we have reviewed
in preparing this assessment is that the objective
conditions for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador
probably will remain essentially unchanged over the
course of 1983. There is, however, enough uncertainty
about this outcome and sufficient political sophistica-
tion on the part of the leftist alliance that the
government of El Salvador and its friends need to be
prepared to respond to sudden changes in circum-
stances surrounding a negotiated settlement.
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Appendix A
Organization of the
Insurgent Alliance
DRU-Unwed Revolutionary Directorate. Founded
in Havana in May 1980, the directorate oversees the
entire military-political alliance. Three representa-
tives from each of the five guerrilla factions compose
the 15-member executive board, which is based in
Managua, Nicaragua.
FMLN-Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front. Created by the DRU in November 1980, the
front comprises the five guerrilla factions in a loose
military alliance. The head of each faction serves on
the five-member General Command, which is based
in Managua along with the five separate General
Staffs.
FPL-Popular Liberation Forces. Founded in 1970
as a radical splinter of the orthodox Communist
Party, the group is the largest of the five factions. Run
by 63-year-old former labor activist Cayetano Carpio,
the FPL soon developed from an urban terrorist to a
rural guerrilla movement. Maoist in doctrine, the
faction adamantly opposes a cease-fire, elections, or a
power-sharing settlement.
ERP-Peoples Revolutionary Army. Founded in 1972
by militant students and dissidents of the orthodox
Communist Party as an urban terrorist cell, the group
now is the fastest growing and most aggressive of all
the rural guerrilla factions. An eclectic blend of
anarchists, Maoists, Trotskyites, and Castroites, the.
group is led by 31-year-old former university student
Joaquin Villalobos. The faction favors a power-shar-
ing settlement leading to totalitarian consolidation if
an armed victory is not forthcoming by means of a
popular insurrection.
FARN-Armed Forces of National Resistance. A
1975 breakaway faction of the ERP, this group has
undergone several identity crises to become perhaps
the least aligned and least doctrinaire of the Marxist-
Leninist movements. The most financially independ-
ent, this group is commanded by Ferman Cienfuegos,
a 36-year-old upper class idealist who believes in
pushing for a popular insurrection but is willing to
build a totalitarian system through a temporary
power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador. As a
student in 1971, he and other colleagues in the
Communist youth movement formed "El Grupo," a
band of urban terrorists responsible for the kidnapings
and murders of upper class Salvadorans and foreign
nationals.
PRTC-Central American Workers Revolutionary
Party. Founded in 1976 by leftist patriarch Fabio
Castillo as a regional terrorist organization, the party
has small branches in every country of Central Amer-
ica. A mix of Trotskyite and Castroite elements, the
Salvadoran faction is run by 35-year-old Roberto
Roca, a dissident of the Communist youth movement
at the National University. He and the PRTC Gen-
eral Staff continue to vacillate on whether to support
hardliners or moderates on the negotiation issue.
?PCS-FAL-Communist Party Armed Forces of Lib-
eration. Smallest and least radical of the five insur-
gent groups, this orthodox Stalinist party was founded
in the late 1920s by Farabundo Marti. Its armed
guerrilla wing was established in 1979 following the
Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Leader Shafik
Handal, 52, a member of the upper middle class, has
firm ties to Moscow and has secured considerable
funding and weapons for the insurgent alliance from
the Soviet Bloc and Vietnam. Handal's party is the
strongest advocate of negotiating a power-sharing
arrangement with the government.
CRM-Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses.
Founded in January 1980 as an umbrella movement
comprising the five Marxist front groups-BPR,
FAPU, LP-28, UDN, and MLP.
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El Salvador: Organization of the Insurgent Alliance
Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU)
Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL)
Farabundo Marti
National Liberation
Front (FMLN)
Democratic
Front (FD)
(
!
Revoluti
a~ l
(
o ~
of the Ma
s
e
Popular Social Independent Movement of
National Revolutionary Christian Movement Salvadoran Professionals
People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
Armed Forces of
National Resistance
(FARN)
Central American
Workers Revolutionary
Party (PRTC)
Communist Party-Armed
Forces of Liberation
(PCS-FAL)
Political-Diplomatic
Commission (CPD)
Marxist-
Leninist
(Military
11111111
Popula If , o t
Bloc ( PR
Popular League
28 February (LP 8
Units
Frog FA
L1
' It
i
le I Ir~~. ~I t
jt Ura I I ~r iI
i1i0h lei
Marxist- Democratic
Leninist Socialist
(Political)
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BPR-Popular Revolutionary Bloc. Formed in 1975,
the bloc is the political appendage of the FPL. It is the
largest Marxist front group, composed of numerous
peasant, worker, teacher, student, clerical, and human
rights organizations. General membership has been
greatly reduced by security constraints, defections,
and recruitment into guerrilla ranks. Some BPR
militants remain active in urban terrorism, and others
serve propaganda functions locally and abroad.
FAPU-United Popular Action Front. Created in
1974, the front subsequently became the political arm
of the FARN guerrilla faction and is the second-
largest front group. It controls several Communist
labor organizations, numerous Christian "base com-
munities," and other peasant groups. Many members
inducted into guerrilla ranks while general member-
ship greatly diminished by security constraints, defec-
tions, and casualties of political violence.
LP-28-Popular League of 28 February. Formed in
1977 after a government shooting of protesters in San
Salvador following fraudulent elections, this small
group is composed of a radical mix of students,
teachers, and peasants. Led by members of the guer-
rilla ERP, the Popular League has lost most of its
personnel to the insurgent ranks. Its leaders founded
the ERP clandestine Radio Venceremos more than
two years ago.
UDN-National Democratic Union. Considered the
only legitimate Marxist party by the government, this
Communist Party front movement was built around
trade unions, student groups, and slumdwellers orga-
nizations in 1968. It joined with the Social Democrats
and Christian Democrats in 1972 and 1977 in the
National Opposition Union coalition, and again in
1979 when members became part of the new civil-
military junta. Most of its activists either have joined
the ranks of the FAL guerrillas or left the country.
MLP-Popular Liberation Movement. Created in
1976 as a political front for the PRTC, its small
membership of students and teachers is incorporated
into the PRTC militia.
FD-Democratic Front. Founded in April 1980 by
the three moderate socialist splinter groups that with-
drew from the civil-military junta: MNR, MPSC, and
MIPTES. Total membership probably does not ex-
ceed 300.
MNR-National Revolutionary Movement. Small so-
cial democratic party of Guillermo Ungo founded in
1964. Only a portion of its perhaps 150 card-carrying
members left with Ungo to join the insurgent alliance.
MPSC-Popular Social Christian Movement. A tiny
splinter of militants from the Christian Democratic
Party which broke off in March 1980 and joined the
insurgent alliance. Of perhaps two dozen original
members, only Ruben Zamora and a handful of
colleagues are active.
MIPTES-Independent Movement of Salvadoran
Professionals and Technicians. Also formed in early
1980 as a moderate socialist movement, its original
membership of perhaps 200 now includes only a few
spokesmen for the insurgent alliance.
Democratic/Marxist-Leninist Coalition
FDR-Revolutionary Democratic Front. Formed in
April 1980, this group represents the alliance of the
Marxist-Leninist CRM and the democratic FD. The
front has served as the principal political organization
of the insurgent alliance in charge of propaganda and
fundraising. Its titular leader is social democrat Guil-
lermo Ungo.
CPD-Political-Diplomatic Commission. A seven-
member body representing each of the five Marxist
guerrilla organizations and the FDR. All seven mem-
bers share equal billing as public spokesmen for the
alliance, but are rarely in accord with one another.
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Appendix B
Chronology of Negotiation Efforts
by the Salvadoran Insurgent
Political-Military Alliance (FMLN/FDR)
1981 January-March
Various vague proposals in media and private discussions with Europeans and
Latin Americans about talks with the United States, excluding the Salvadoran
junta.
13 April
West German socialist leader Wischnewski conveys insurgent negotiating terms to
Salvadoran junta during his trip through Central America. Document essentially
calls for talks with Christian Democrat leaders which would lead to negotiations to
be mediated by the Socialist International (SI) in Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, or
Venezuela.
15 May
At press briefing in Santo Domingo, Salvadoran leftist spokesman Guillermo
Ungo calls for a negotiated solution that would center on talks with both the
United States- and the junta. Format initially would be a mediated dialogue by the
SI which would bring a representative of the United States and one other Latin
American government together with Salvadoran Christian Democrats and insur-
gent representatives.
18 August
Political-Diplomatic Commission of the FMLN/FDR releases a new position
paper entitled Armed Conflict in El Salvador and the Position of the FMLN/FDR
To Reach a Just Solution. The paper lists "conditions" to end the insurgent war:
? Withdrawal of all external aid to the junta.
? Repeal of all junta restrictions on civil liberties.
? Release of political prisoners and better treatment of prisoners of war under the
Geneva Convention.
? Humanization of the war by the security forces.
? Guerrilla access to the Salvadoran media.
? All issues of importance to guerrillas must be guaranteed in the agenda of any
negotiations.
28 August
Release of the Mexican-French Joint Declaration recognizing the insurgent
movement as a legitimate political force and calling for mediated talks.
7 October
Daniel Ortega announces a new FMLN/FDR proposal for peace at UN General
Assembly meeting, with FDR's Ungo seated with Nicaraguan delegation. Avoid-
ing use of word "negotiations," Ortega outlines "peace dialogue" without "precon-
ditions" that would be "global in nature," would be conducted in presence of
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interested foreign observers, and would be subject to public progress reports. Aims
of talks would be to form a new political and economic order in El Salvador, and to
integrate "noncriminal" elements of the Salvadoran military with FMLN forces.
15 December
Salvadoran leftist spokesman Ruben Zamora meets with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Briggs to push the case for negotiations and the cancellation of
the March 1982 elections.
January
The FMLN/FDR leadership distributes copies of yet another new.position paper
on negotiations to Mexican President Lopez Portillo, the West German socialist
leadership, President Mitterand of France, Fidel Castro, and several other Latin
and European leaders. Entitled Proposal of the FMLN and FDR in Search of a
Political Solution to the Salvadoran Conflict, the text emphasizes the following:
? Composition of a "broad pluralist government" including the military and the
FMLN.
? "Plebiscite" to take place after six months to ratify new government.
? Policy of strict "nonalignment" for the new government.
? Expanded socioeconomic reforms and new political constitution.
? Restructuring of the armed forces; the Army to remain initially intact but
"reformed," while security forces to be "dissolved." Negotiations will explore
ways of integrating "noncriminal" elements of the military with the armed
forces of the FMLN.
? When negotiations have reached their final stages, a cease-fire can be
"discussed."
The document is signed by FDR leader Ungo and the five guerrilla commanders of
the FMLN.
15 February
FDR spokesman Ruben Zamora spearheads a renewed publicity campaign on US
television, newspapers and magazines, school campuses, and halls of Congress to
argue the points of this latest FMLN/FDR proposal. Focus is on US public
opinion, with moderate conciliatory arguments, soft on facts, and appeals to
negotiate and "stop complete takeover by the Marxist elements of the ever
stronger guerrilla ranks."
February-March
Zamora's efforts correspond to renewed SI, Mexican, Cuban, and Soviet public
statements of support for negotiations.
7 and 14 March
Secretary Haig meets with Mexican Foreign Minister Castaneda in New York
City to discuss Mexico's proposals for mediating negotiations.
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17 March
Ruling party leader Calvani expresses Venezuelan concerns to US Ambassador in
Caracas over reports of Secretary Haig's meetings with Castaneda which suggest
US interest in working with Mexicans toward negotiations with FMLN.
Mid-March
Venezuelan President Herrera Campins reportedly receives FMLN letter on new
negotiations proposal through Venezuelan OAS Ambassador Cardozo who has
secretly met with guerrilla leader Cayetano Carpio in Mexico.
19 March
Cardozo reportedly holds additional secret meetings with the other FMLN
commanders in Managua to discuss disposition of letter already delivered to
Herrera.
22 March
President Herrera holds televised news conference in Caracas-reportedly catch-
ing even his close ministers by surprise-in which he announces receipt of FMLN
letter, which he interprets as a positive sign that the Salvadoran insurgents
sincerely wish to reach a political accord with the junta. FMLN text repeats
earlier public proposals of FMLN "search for peace" in the format of mediated
negotiations. New format emphasizes FMLN desire for a "broad pluralist
government, transformation of economic and social structure in El Salvador," and
respect for human rights. FMLN introduces new language, calling for talks of a
"global character," without preconditions, and public notification of the progress
of the talks. FMLN claims that elections will be part of this "global solution." Let-
ter is signed by all five leaders of the FMLN General Command but makes no ref-
erence to FDR position.
non-Marxist members of the FDR are working
harder behind the scenes to promote informal dialogue with moderates in the
provisional government.
July
FDR President Ungo visits Bonn and Caracas, apparently seeking to make contact
with former Salvadoran President Duarte, who is also visiting those cities.
Ungo and Zamora, and other FDR moderates 25X1
are making concerted efforts internationally to pressure US and Salvadoran
governments to negotiate with insurgents.
August
US Embassy in San Salvador reports that some leftist clergy and intellectuals are
pessimistic about prospects for negotiations, but suggest that elements of the FDR
will consider taking part in coming elections anyway.
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Ungo approaches Costa Rican President Monge to ask for help in convincing the
Magana government to talk with FDR officials. Costa Rican Foreign Minister
Volio visits El Salvador to pass on Ungo's latest negotiating proposals.
September
FDR democratic elements publicly announce that they will consider returning to
El Salvador and competing in the presidential election. They request full
guarantees for their personal safety, access to the media, freedom of organization
for rural unions, and release of political prisoners.
Salvadoran Government and military officials publicly reject any negotiation
proposals that imply a power-sharing agreement with insurgents, and call instead
for all leftist elements to renounce violence and participate in the electoral process.
October
FMLN guerrillas launch new series of offensive strikes against towns in three
northern provinces to regain lost prestige and pressure the government toward a di-
alogue. FDR publicizes new negotiation proposal from Mexico City only days after
earlier copies delivered to Salvadoran Government by acting Archbishop Rivera y
Damas with understanding that the proposal would remain secret until San
Salvador offered its response.
December
FDR hardliner Fabio Castillo publicly denounces calls by FDR moderate Ruben
Zamora for a cease-fire-insurgent spokesmen for FMLN echo that denunciation,
claiming that guerrilla military strategy is not subject to political negotiation by
the FDR.
January
Ruben Zamora privately admits to US Congressional staff members that "dia-
logue" is only a preliminary phase in which leftist terms for "negotiation" will be
outlined. These terms include restructuring the military and government around
insurgent elements before any consideration for future elections.
February
Guerrilla leaders privately commit themselves to reject all efforts to force a cease-
fire but will continue to push for negotiations on their terms.
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Secret
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