ZIMBABWE: THE ZANU-ZAPU RIVALRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200030002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry
ALA 83-10053
April 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry
This assessment was prepared by
Southern Africa Division, ALA,
and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to the Chief,
Secret
ALA 83-10053
April 1983
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.ecrvL
Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry) 25X1
Key Judgments We believe that Prime Minister Mugabe's decision in January to send the
Information available North Korean-trained 5th Brigade to put down growing banditry and
as of 23 March 1983 political violence in Matabeleland marked a turning point in his govern-
was used in this report.
ment's approach to dealing with the opposition and has important implica-
tions for other government policies as well. We believe the move was
intended to destroy Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU) as a political as well as a dissident force and that the effort to in-
timidate the Ndebele people ends any possibility of meaningful-political
reconciliation between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) and ZAPU.
It is clear from US Embassy and press reporting that the repression in
Matabeleland has left ZAPU in disarray, although we doubt the dissidence
will end if only because of the depth of animosity between Zimbabwe's two
major tribal and political groups, the Shona- and the Ndebele-speakers.
We judge it unlikely, however, that there will soon be a large-scale
insurrection, in part because government measures have driven Nkomo
into exile and prevented the creation of an insurgent army.
Nkomo, in our view, will find it difficult to line up sponsors for a movement
in exile:
? Nkomo's old patrons, the Soviets, have been courting Mugabe since the
early days of independence, and, in light of the recent warming of
relations between the two countries-signaled by the first shipment of
Soviet arms to Zimbabwe in March-significant Soviet involvement with
Nkomo seems unlikely.
? Although we believe that South Africa probably will provide enough
support to the Ndebele dissidents to ensure that the Shona-Ndebele
conflict continues to destabilize Zimbabwean politics, we doubt that
Pretoria will adopt ZAPU in the same manner that it backs insurgencies
in Angola or Mozambique, in part because ZAPU's tribal base is too
small-the Ndebele are about 16 percent of the population-and
geographically localized to support a viable insurgency.
Secret
ALA 83-10053
April 1983
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We believe that Mugabe's shift to a hardline approach to dealing with
internal dissidence may presage radicalism on a broader front. Mugabe,
hard pressed by domestic problems and under pressure from party
hotheads to adopt more radical approaches in foreign and domestic affairs,
could well have determined that his moderate tactics have not worked and
that he may as well follow his more doctrinaire beliefs.
Mugabe's rhetoric has become substantially more strident in recent
months, and he has joined some of his more radical colleagues in the
Frontline States in blaming his problems on South Africa and its alleged
Western backers. He clearly resents the criticism the Western press has
made of his handling of Ndebele dissidence, and he has accused US and
other Western media of following a double standard in their coverage of vi-
olence in Matabeleland. We expect the Soviets and their sympathizers in
Zimbabwe to attempt to exploit this state of mind. There is no doubt that
Mugabe's inclinations are toward a Marxist social and economic organiza-
tion. Should the use of more authoritarian political methods to control
tribal rivalry and opposition stimulate these inclinations, Zimbabwe's
reasonably successful economic and political relations with the West could
unravel.
In our judgment the deepening cycle of repression and violence in
Zimbabwe already has undermined an important Western goal: the
creation of a moderate, democratic, multiracial society in Zimbabwe to
serve as an example for South Africa. Rather than encourage those who
are seeking change in South Africa, the Zimbabwean experience now
seems to serve those in South Africa who are resisting political accommo-
dation with the black majority.
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Implications for the United States 6
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Zimbabwe
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry
Introduction
Recent events in Zimbabwe-armed dissidence in the
countryside, retaliatory military depredations against
civilians in Matabeleland, and the flight into exile of
opposition leader Joshua Nkomo-have raised ques-
tions about the stability and political direction of
southern Africa's newest and, until recently at least,
most promising independent state. In particular, the
violent surfacing of tribal and political rivalries has
raised fears that the early successes of the Mugabe
regime in handling a host of social, political, eco-
nomic, and military problems will be undone in a
replay of the tribally rooted violence and repression
that have plagued many other African states. This
paper examines the rivalry between the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe
African People's Union (ZAPU), assesses the impact
of recent developments on domestic stability, and
discusses their implications for the United States.'?
Background
The depth of the rivalry between ZANU-the party
mainly supported by the country's Shona-speaking
majority-and ZAPU-representative of the
Ndebele-speaking minority-makes the confrontation
now under way less surprising than the fact that it has
taken so long to occur. The roots of the tribal enmity
that underlie much of the conflict go back over 150
years when the Ndebele moved north from South
Africa to invade Shona-controlled territory in what is
now Zimbabwe. Better organized and militarily stron-
ger than the scattered Shona clans, the Ndebele
established a kingdom in the area around Bulawayo.
Forced to coexist with the invaders after British
settlers took control of the country after 1890, the
Shona-speaking tribes bridled at the arrogance and
affectations of superiority of the Ndebele, whom they
outnumbered by 4 to 1.
The tribal rivalry gained an overlay of personal and
political animosity during the Rhodesian civil war.
Mugabe and many other Shona became members of
ZAPU when it was founded under Joshua Nkomo's
leadership in 1961. Mugabe joined other breakaway
Shonas in forming ZANU in 1963, and became its
leader in 1974. Nkomo has long tended to treat him
as a young upstart. ZANU-ZAPU animosities in-
creased during the latter phase of the war for
independence when Mugabe's guerrilla forces carried
the brunt of the fighting against Ian Smith's regime
while Nkomo's conventionally equipped and Soviet-
backed army waited out most of the war in Zambia.
ZANU's suspicions that ZAPU was preparing for a
postindependence struggle with ZANU were fueled
by Nkommo's flirtation with Rhodesian whites and
South Africa during the immediate preindependence
period.
The Postindependence Moderation
Mugabe's fears that ZAPU would strike a deal to
overturn the victory ZANU gained in the elections in
March 1980 figured importantly, in our view, in the
pragmatic policy of national reconciliation Mugabe
pursued after taking office:
? Although ZANU won 57 of the 80 seats in Parlia-
ment reserved for blacks and could have governed
alone, Mugabe formed a coalition government that
included his rivals. Nkomo, who refused Mugabe's
initial offer of the largely ceremonial position of
president, was given the Home Affairs portfolio,
with responsibility for the police. Three other
ZAPU members and two whites were also given
ministries.
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? Mugabe also set out to gain the confidence of the
white community, in part because of its importance
to the country's recovery from the economic effects
of international sanctions and the civil war. He also
wanted to convince white leaders that they had
nothing to gain by colluding with Nkomo. Mugabe,
therefore, resisted pressure from his party to attack
white privileges. There was no immediate purge of
whites from the civil service, Army, or police, nor
did Mugabe move to nationalize white-owned lands
and business.
? Similar motives entered into Mugabe's effort to
placate the South Africans, in our view. Even before
the election, Mugabe publicly assured the South
Africans that he would not permit the African
National Congress, the principal antiwhite insur-
gency, to use Zimbabwe as a base for terrorist
operations into South Africa. He also promised
publicly to honor Zimbabwe's $525 million debt,
Mugabe's concerns about collusion between ZAPU
and the whites against his new government tied in
directly, in our view, to the most pressing problem he
faced in the immediate postindependence period-
establishing control over the nearly 100,000 armed
men from ZAPU, ZANU, and ex-Rhodesian units
located throughout the country and in Zambia and
Mozambique. Our best estimates of the forces that
had to be integrated after independence
are as follows:
Rhodesian security forces
13,000 to 15,000
Rhodesian paramilitary
12,000
Rhodesian auxiliaries
16,000
ZANU
21,000 to 23,000
ZAPU
19,000 to 23,000
Police
8,000
owed mainly to Pretoria.
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Although the Ndebele constitute only 16 percent of
Zimbabwe's population, the ZAPU military forces
were equal in size to Mugabe's and, moreover, were
better trained for a possible civil war with the Shona.
The fear that white-led ex-Rhodesian forces would
join-or at least facilitate-a ZAPU military move
against his government undoubtedly was a factor in
Mugabe's drive, with British assistance, to integrate
the disparate military forces into a national army
under the government's control
Growing Strains
Although for the most part Mugabe hewed to his
cautious policy for almost two years after independ-
ence, persistent pressure from hardliners within his
party and festering tensions with ZAPU and the
whites marked the tenuous peace in Zimbabwe. Rela-
tions between ZANU and ZAPU, in particular, were
uneasy at best. Both parties agreed in principle that a
one-party state would provide greater stability than
the existing system, that tribally based parties worked
against national unity, and that the Western-style
multiparty system tended to dissipate the energies of
political leaders through constant campaigning and
parliamentary maneuvering. Sporadic attempts to
unify the two parties foundered, however, on Nkomo's
insistence that talks proceed on the basis of parity.
The demand incensed ZANU hardliners in view of
ZAPU's lopsided electoral defeat.
The tensions generated by ZANU's drive to consoli-
date power and Nkomo's insistence that any merger
of the two parties include a major role for him as well
as for the Ndebele continued to mount. In January
1981 Mugabe demoted Nkomo to Minister Without
Portfolio, leaving ZANU in full control of the security
apparatus. ZAPU remained in the cabinet, but fac-
tional violence broke out between some of the not-yet-
integrated Army units deployed near Bulawayo, the
capital of the Ndebele region of Matabeleland. Over
150 former guerrilla troops were killed before ex-
Rhodesian units-still largely intact-reestablished
control. Within a week of the violence, Mugabe
opened diplomatic relations with Moscow, a move
probably intended to offset any remaining Soviet ties
to ZAPU. The violence also prompted the government
to accelerate the process of integrating the Army to
bring former ZAPU units under stricter control
Nkomo's Ouster. Politically, the moderate phase of
Mugabe's approach to his "ZAPU problem" ended in
mid-February 1982 when he expelled Nkomo and two
of his closest colleagues from the cabinet. Mugabe
tried to justify the move by accusing Nkomo of
plotting a coup and supported his charges by pointing
to the discovery of large caches of arms, ammunition,
and other military equipment on farms owned by
companies run by ZAPU. In our view, however,
Nkomo's ouster marked ZANU's decision to pursue a
strategy of trying to destroy Nkomo politically and to
break the will of the remainder of the ZAPU leader-
ship to resist absorption into a one-party state. Several
factors may have contributed to Mugabe's shift in
strategy-a shift which triggered the violence that has
since plagued Zimbabwe:
? We believe Mugabe was being pressured within
ZANU's Central Committee to tighten the party's
grip on power.
Mugabe's 1982 New Year's mes-
sage, in which he reverted to his traditional role as
spokesman and instrument of the party, almost
certainly had been spurred by a Central Committee
meeting in late December that
reaffirmed the primacy of the
party over the government and decided to increase
the momentum toward a one-party state. At this
meeting ZANU may also have made the decision to
move against Nkomo.
? ZANU concerns over a joint ZAPU-white military
move against the government had probably faded.
The integration of the two guerrilla armies and the
former government's security forces had been com-
pleted-in effect depriving ZAPU of a military
wing. Moreover, ZANU was developing its own
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military cadre-in August 1981 North Korean in-
structors started training an all-ZANU 5th Bri-
gade. Nkomo prophetically charged at the time that
the brigade would be used against ZAPU to create a
one-party state.
? Finally, Mugabe and the ZANU leadership may
have become convinced that South Africa had be-
gun a major campaign to destabilize Zimbabwe,
and that ZAPU, if not colluding with Pretoria, at
least shared this goal. The sabotage of a large
ammunition dump south of Harare in August 1981
and the blowing up of the conference room at
ZANU headquarters in December at a time when
the party's Central Committee normally would have
been meeting probably played a major role in
sharpening Mugabe's suspicions
Ithe growing incidence of
robbery and violence in Matabeleland further in-
creased after Nkomo's top military aides were arrest-
ed in early March 1982. Mugabe's hope that Nkomo
could be split from ZAPU soon proved groundless-
Nkomo drew 60,000 supporters, according to press
reports, to a rally in early April in Bulawayo and
demonstrated that he remained the leader of the
Ndebele
Rising Violence. By mid-1982 dissident activity be-
gan to take on more overtly political overtones. Mu-
gabe's house was attacked in late June and six
Western tourists were kidnaped in late July. Their
release was tied to the freedom of Nkomo's former
military aides. The sabotage, also in July, of Thornhill
Air Force Base-which we believe was carried out by
ex-Rhodesian security personnel in league with the
South Africans-probably heightened government
concern over growing dissident activity and about
South Africa's involvement. Beginning in late July the
Army crackdown in Matabeleland became harsher
and less disciplined. There were several press reports
of excesses against civilians as the search for the
kidnaped tourists was pressed especially hard.
Although Nkomo spoke out publicly against dissident
violence almost from the time it began, his words had
no apparent impact. Many in ZANU viewed his lack
of effect as confirmation that ZAPU was behind the
growing violence. Government discomfort grew as
Western countries remonstrated with Mugabe about
government excesses, especially reports that prison-
ers-including some whites-were being tortured into
giving false confessions. The government's harsh
measures succeeded in temporarily suppressing dissi-
dent activity. Army forces were withdrawn from
Matabeleland and the curfew was lifted by October.
Nkomo's popularity only increased, in the view of
most observers, as the Ndebele rallied to him in
reaction to the government troops' brutality.
Nkomo and Mugabe met in November 1982 for the
stated purpose of getting ZANU-ZAPU unity talks
restarted, but to little effect. Although the two agreed
to appoint delegates to continue discussions, Nkomo
renewed his demand for equal status with ZANU, a
position which, in our view, further convinced Mu-
gabe of Nkomo's unreasonableness and left him pessi-
mistic about the chances of progress. When Mugabe
subsequently appointed as one of his delegates a
ZANU hardliner firmly opposed to any political
accommodation with ZAPU, he seemed to be signal-
ing that he was unwilling to compromise.
Mugabe, in our view, was also concerned about
increased South African pressure.' In August 1982,
Zimbabwean security forces killed several ex-Rhode-
sian servicemen in Zimbabwe, who were later ac-
knowledged by the South Africans to be in their
employ. Mugabe's determination to reduce Zim-
babwe's economic dependence on South Africa led
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him in November to send troops into Mozambique to
guard the oil pipeline from Mutare to Beira. The
pipeline is Zimbabwe's only alternative to supply
routes in South African territory. On 9 December, the
bombing of oil storage tanks at Beira-an act the
South African-backed Mozambican insurgents
claimed was in response to Zimbabwe's decision to
send troops into Mozambique-plunged Zimbabwe
into its worst' fuel crisis since independence.
The "Mailed Fist " Campaign. Renewed violence at
the end of 1982 provoked the government into a full-
scale military campaign against ZAPU. The dissi-
dents attacked cars, buses, and trains and destroyed
government construction equipment; they seized sev-
eral hostages and killed six whites. The 5th Brigade
was sent to Matabeleland in January 1983 with a
mandate to be "relentless in neutralizing dissident
elements," according to Minister of State for Defense
Sekeramayi. Although there were some exaggerated
press reports of atrocities against Ndebele villagers by
the all-Shona brigade, there is little doubt it engaged
in indiscriminate brutality and destroyed property,
including entire villages, in several instances.F_~
the
government's objective in the "mailed fist" campaign
in Matabeleland was, in addition to ending dissident
violence, to eliminate ZAPU as a political organiza-
tion. According to press reports, 5th Brigade opera-
tions were aimed especially at young Ndebele men
and ZAPU political figures. In early March, several
government ministers called publicly for action to
"liquidate" the "dissident infrastructure," a reference
to ZAPU
Government harassment against Nkomo also in-
creased. He was briefly detained in February and his
passport lifted when he tried to leave the country.
Several government ministers said publicly that crimi-
nal charges would be lodged against him. A govern-
ment sweep through Bulawayo resulted in the shoot-
ing of his chauffeur while he was at Nkomo's house.
Nkomo fled the country in early March. Mugabe,
who was at the time on his way back from the
Nonaligned Movement's summit conference in New
Delhi, vetoed moves to negotiate Nkomo's return from
We believe the government intended to arrest Nkomo
and probably is relieved to have him out of the
country. After he fled, the government shut down
several ZAPU offices in Matabeleland, and many
ZAPU officials reportedly followed him into exile.
ZAPU Vice President Josiah Chinamano-a Shona
with little support among the Ndebele-now serves as
acting president and has called publicly for new unity
talks with ZANU.
Strong government censorship has reduced reporting
on the most recent developments in Matabeleland.
The harshness of the government's military campaign
against ZAPU-which may have resulted in as many
as 2,000 deaths-appears to have abated. Attacks by
dissidents on white farmers in mid-March, however,
or renewed violence should Nkomo's military aides be
convicted of treason and arms possession, could trig-
ger new repressive measures.
a minority in ZANU
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still favors political reconciliation with ZAPU. We LDA I
believe the majority-including Mugabe and his clos-
est advisers-are firmly opposed to making any con-
cessions. ZANU probably would sign an agreement
by which a now emasculated ZAPU is absorbed into
ZANU, but any more balking by the minority party
on terms, in our view, probably would cause the
government to outlaw ZAPU, perhaps using renewed
dissident violence as a pretext.
Even if ZANU and what remains of ZAPU should
merge, we expect Ndebele resentment to remain
strong. The government's recent actions have largely
contained the dissidence, but the intimidation cam-
paign against the Ndebele people probably has left
many of them unalterably opposed to the government.
A fair number probably will join the armed dissidents,
now estimated by most observers at about 1,000. The
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10,000 to 13,000 former ZAPU guerrillas still in the
national Army are the largest source of potential
recruits.
We do not believe that a large-scale tribal insurrec-
tion is likely in the near future but do expect that
dissident violence will resume and perhaps expand.
The military occupation of Matabeleland, which the
government says will continue until the violence ends,
probably has prevented, in our judgment, the creation
of an insurgent army. Moreover, neither Nkomo nor
the ZAPU officials remaining in Zimbabwe appear
inclined to lead a call to arms.
Over the longer term, we believe Nkomo will find it
difficult to line up sponsors for a movement in exile.
Neither Zambia nor Botswana-Nkomo's traditional
allies-wanted anything to do with him after he fled
Zimbabwe. Each is already concerned about strains in
its relations with Zimbabwe over Ndebele refugees
and appears determined to avoid provoking Harare
into cross-border operations against alleged dissidents.
No other black African government appears interest-
ed in the plight of the Ndebele.
Despite the suspicion expressed by some ZANU
officials that Moscow might renew its relationship
with Nkomo, the Soviets, in our judgment, probably
view Nkomo as a spent force. Although the Soviets
apparently continued some financial support to
ZAPU in the early days of independence, they have
since courted Mugabe assiduously and, until very
unlikely to jeopardize their recent gains by embracing
a secessionist movement that has no backing in black
Africa.
We believe that if Nkomo turns to the South Africans
for backing, he may find them all too willing to
embrace his cause, but quite stingy when it comes to
actual support, at least over the short term
many of the dissidents fleeing
to Botswana have continued on to South Africa and
probably joined South African special units. During
recent months, however, Pretoria appears to have
refrained from actively meddling in Zimbabwean
affairs. It apparently is content to watch events unfold
in accord with its longstanding dire prophecies for
black-ruled Zimbabwe.
Unlike UNITA-
which is supported by the largest ethnic group in
Angola-and the NRM-which has capitalized on
broad antigovernment sentiment that cuts across trib-
al lines-ZAPU's support is limited to a small portion
of the population (about 16 percent) that is geographi-
cally isolated. The poor prospects for a successful
secessionist movement in Zimbabwe probably would
give pause to even those South African hardliners
pushing partition schemes for their most hostile neigh-
bors. Consequently, we believe South Africa will
provide only limited support to the Ndebele dissidents.
There will be enough to ensure that the Shona-
Ndebele conflict continues to destabilize Zimbabwean
politics but not enough to dismember Zimbabwe.
Without an effective outside backer, Nkomo and his
Ndebele supporters, in our judgment, do not pose a
significant threat to the Mugabe government. We also
believe that the government's effort to suppress the
dissidents will fail and we foresee continued instabil-
ity. Isolated bands of dissidents probably will continue
to operate out of Botswana-and perhaps Zambia-
and could provoke Zimbabwean raids that would
heighten regional tensions. In addition, the violence in
Matabeleland threatens to halt commercial farming.
This, combined with the effects of a second year of
drought, would darken an already gloomy economic
picture.
Implications for the United States
Over the past several months, relations between Zim-
babwe and the West have become distinctly cooler.
Mugabe and other senior government officials have
expressed growing resentment over Western attention
to human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Zimbab-
wean spokesmen routinely dismiss reports of atrocities
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as fabrications of the Western press, and a senior
official recently charged that biased Western diplo-
matic reporting was partially responsible. Zimbabwe
also accuses the West of having double standards-
condemning Zimbabwe while condoning offenses that
are much worse in South Africa. The US Embassy
has commented on the growing inaccessibility of
government officials, especially Prime Minister
Mugabe.
Zimbabwe's anti-South African rhetoric also grew
stronger and more strident in late 1982. In part, this
reflects South Africa's actions in mid-1982. Its proba-
ble complicity in the July sabotage attack on the
Zimbabwean Air Force base at Thornhill, and the
growing numbers of South African-trained ex-
Rhodesians captured or killed in Zimbabwe provide
ready ammunition for Zimbabwe's attacks. There is
also, in our judgment, some scapegoating by the
Zimbabweans. Mugabe's trumpeting of the South
African threat draws attention from his failure to
resolve difficult internal problems. A byproduct of the
growing preoccupation with South Africa-which is
now being linked to the "renegade Nkomo" by senior
ZANU spokesmen-is greater antagonism toward the
United States. Zimbabweans have an exaggerated
notion of the degree of leverage Washington has over
South African leaders and readily blame the United
States for failing to curb Pretoria.
Prolonged violence probably will drive Zimbabwe
further from the West. The rate of foreign private
investment, already low, most likely will decline fur-
ther as potential investors become increasingly con-
cerned about the country's stability. The govern-
ment's repressive policies will make it harder for
Western governments to justify to their own publics
economic aid programs to Zimbabwe. Sweden has
already suspended next year's assistance program
pending review of internal events in Zimbabwe.
Increased instability in Zimbabwe will also create
more opportunities for the Soviet Union. As Harare's
anxieties over security increase, government officials
may tend to ignore pressing economic problems and
instead emphasize the need for military equipment
and training, an area in which the Soviet Bloc has a
comparative advantage over Western countries. If the
South Africans should decide to support strongly an
Ndebele insurgency, Zimbabwe would come under
severe military pressure and, in our judgment, proba-
bly would seek substantial Soviet assistance. Mu-
gabe's recent arms deal with the Soviet Union-a
sharp departure from his traditional anti-Soviet
stance-is particularly ominous from this perspective.
Mugabe's abandonment of a moderate course toward
the Ndebele may be followed by more radical policies
in other spheres, a development that would strengthen
Zimbabwe's growing alienation from the West. En-
couraged by Mugabe's acquiescence in a tough policy
toward ZAPU, ZANU hardliners may push for more
radical approaches toward the whites or the economy.
Mugabe's pragmatism-which has curbed his party's
impulses during the first two years of independence-
may now give way
For the West, the creation of a moderate, democratic,
multiracial society in Zimbabwe was sought as a
potential example for South Africa. It was hoped that
such an outcome in Zimbabwe would encourage those
seeking change in Pretoria. However, the inability of
Mugabe and Nkomo to reconcile their tribal differ-
ences peaceably has reinforced the view widely shared
by white South Africans that African tribalism is
incompatible with Western forms of government.
Rather than encouraging reform-minded South Afri-
cans, the Zimbabwean experience seems to serve
those in South Africa who are resisting political
accommodation with the black majority.
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Appendix
Zimbabwe Chronology
18 April Rhodesia officially becomes independent Zimbabwe, ending 91 years of British
rule.
June Government severs diplomatic links with South Africa, although economic
relations will continue.
October-November Tensions and violence between ZANU and ZAPU elements grow in anticipation
of local elections and the proximity of heavily armed rival guerrilla groups.
Clashes in Bulawayo result in numerous deaths
November Controversial Manpower Minister Tekere goes on trial for his role in the murder of
a white farmer in August during an armed raid by government forces
colleagues. Tekere dismissed
Cabinet shuffle. Nkomo demoted to Minister Without Portfolio, but Mugabe
softens the blow by offering desirable jobs to some of Nkomo's key ZAPU
to complete integration of the armed forces.
Factional violence between ZANU and ZAPU troops erupts, resulting in 150 to
200 deaths, mainly in Matabeleland and Midlands Province. The government,
relying on white-led former Rhodesian battalions, successfully puts down ZAPU
mutinies in several battalions. Clashes continue to complicate government efforts
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20 February Announcement that Zimbabwe has established diplomatic relations with the E
USSR culminates a yearlong campaign by Moscow. 25X1
March Government notes that 13 whites have been killed by dissidents since independence E
almost a year ago. 25X1
Zimbabwe hosts conference of Western donor nations for reconstruction and
development (ZIMCORD) and receives $2 billion in pledges of assistance,
including $225 million from the United States.
23 June Government signs military aid agreement with North Korea to include advisers
and equipment.
July ANC official assassinated in Harare; government blames South Africa.
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North Korean instructors begin training of 5th Brigade.
Government bans political meetings without prior police approval
Military integration program officially ends with graduation of the last of 42
integrated battalions.
the Central Committee normally would have been meeting.
ZANU Central Committee.
Mugabe's New Year's message gives renewed emphasis on primacy of the party;
announces government will adopt only those policies that have the approval of the
subversive activities.
Relations between Mugabe and Nkomo deteriorating. Government accuses some
ZAPU members of collaborating with South Africa and Zimbabwe's whites in
on several ZAPU-owned farms.
5 February Mugabe and Nkomo meet; Nkomo denies knowledge of arms caches.
raided.
Government dissolves 12 businesses owned by ZAPU officials and seizes assets,
including the farms where arms caches were found; ZAPU party headquarters
of unity.
Cabinet shuffle. Nkomo and two other ZAPU ministers ousted; Mugabe publicly
charges that Nkomo was planning to overthrow the government by force. Move
virtually ends the governing coalition of ZANU and ZAPU although ZAPU
Central Committee decides to stay in ZANU-led government for the appearance
ior."
Bernard Chidzero, moderate technocrat, is given increased power over economic
policy. Herbert Ushewokunze, popular among ZANU radicals and with the grass
roots, is returned to cabinet as Home Affairs Minister, with authority over police
and immigration, after being fired as Minister of Health last year for "misbehav-
Late February Desertions from Army and incidents of armed robbery and lawlessness on rise
since Nkomo's ouster.
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Early March Nine white members of Parliament defect from Ian Smith's Republic Front Party
and become independents.
Late March
5 April
16 April
Late April
29 April
I May
March-May
discovery of arms caches.
Former ZAPU military leaders Dumiso Dabengwa (ZAPU National Security
Organization Chief) and Lt. Gen. Lookout Masuku arrested in connection with
Government troops and police are sent into Matabeleland to apprehend dissidents
responsible for lawlessness and violence.
Nkomo gives first major address since his dismissal to a rally of nearly 60,000 sup-
porters in Bulawayo; charges government is trying to impose a one-party state.
Mugabe announces another cabinet shuffle; elevates three ZAPU members to full
cabinet status and adds one new white minister and one deputy. Regarded as a re-
ward to ZAPU members who remained with government after Nkomo's ouster
Government announces intention to clamp down on "bandits and armed robbers,"
whom Mugabe publicly connects with the arms caches and ZAPU~
Nkomo is served with a police notice of intent to prosecute him for holding an un-
authorized meeting.
Sabotage incidents in Beitbridge on South African border damage rail link with
South Africa, electrical installations, and water tank)
Training of all-Shona 5th Brigade by North Koreans ends.
NRM
Oil pipeline from Beira, Mozambique, to Mutare, Zimbabwe, resumes operation
after being closed for 17 years. The line is subsequently subjected to numerous
sabotage attacks by the South African-backed Mozambican insurgency, the
begin to assume greater political overtones
Armed dissidents attack Mugabe's official residence and home of Minister of
National Supplies Nkala, an Ndebele member of ZANU. Actions of dissidents
publicly condemn violence.
Government seals off predominantly western suburbs of Bulawayo and conducts
house-to-house search for bandits and arms; curfew imposed. Nkomo continues to
State of emergency extended for another six months; this is the sixth time since in-
dependence in 1980 it has been extended.
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July-August
2 August
18 August
25 August
released and their fate is unknown.
Six foreign tourists, including two Americans, are kidnaped by former ZAPU
guerrillas, who demand release of Dabengwa and Masuku, cessation of harassment
of Nkomo, and return of confiscated ZAPU property. The hostages have yet to be
subsequently arrested, after they are implicated by lower level officers.
Sabotage of Thornhill Air Force Base. Thirteen aircraft are destroyed or damaged,
including four new jet trainers that had recently arrived from the UK. Three
senior white Air Force officers, including the Deputy Air Force Commander, are
Army crackdown on suspected dissidents and local Ndebele population becomes
harsher and less disciplined in connection with search for kidnaped foreigners.
Mugabe and Nkomo .meet to discuss tensions between ZAPU and ZANU, but
meeting does not result in any improvement in relations.
Three white South African soldiers are killed inside Zimbabwe, allegedly on
mission to sabotage rail link with Mozambique.
supporting armed dissidents.
After initial hesitation, Nkomo finally appeals publicly for locals to support police
and Army efforts to rescue kidnaped tourists and calls upon the Ndebele to stop
20 September News conference called by lawyers of white Air Force officers arrested in
connection with Thornhill Base sabotage. They allege that the officers were
tortured and coerced into signing confessions.
October Moves under way by ZANU and ZAPU officials to get interparty unity talks
restarted.
November Government sends troops to Mozambique to guard Beira-Mutare oil pipeline
against South African-backed sabotage.
from each party to explore the issues.
Mugabe and Nkomo meet to discuss ZANU-ZAPU reconciliation but still far
apart on terms. Agree to establish a small committee with three representatives
independence-and forces Zimbabwe to import fuel by rail via South Africa
Sabotage of oil storage tanks at Beira, Mozambique port, and nearby pumping
station; NRM claims responsibility. Leads to critical fuel shortage-worst since
24 December Armed dissidents attack cars and private buses on Bulawayo-Gweru Road, killing
three people and injuring 21. Most serious dissident activity since summer
.
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New Year's Eve Several incidents of kidnaping and murder of white farmers in Matabeleland
express concern over violence in Matabeleland; ask for government protection
5 January Representatives of Commercial Farmer's Union meet with government officials to
Early January
20 January
28 January
Early February
7 February
10 February
5th Brigade sent into Matabeleland to counter dissidents.
since 5th Brigade was deployed.
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Nkomo holds press conference in Harare, criticizing government for brutal actions
of security forces in Matabeleland; claims as many as 95 people have been killed
killed)
Reports of excesses and brutality of Army 5th Brigade in Matabeleland increasing
and receiving Western press coverage. Newsweek magazine alleges 500 have been
not fully cooperating in return of dissidents.
Treason trial of former ZAPU military leaders Dabengwa and Masuku and five
others opens; they are charged with plotting to overthrow the government. F_
11 February Army Commander Nhongo tells senior commanders of plans under consideration
by government to purge Army of 7,000 to 10,000 former ZAPU guerrillas. F
Mid-February Increasingly strident public statements by Mugabe and other government officials
against ZAPU and Nkomo. Government officials repeatedly deny that Army has
indiscriminately killed civilians, but admit that some innocent people have been
caught in crossfire between government troops and dissidents.
Prague, via Johannesburg, to attend a World Peace Council conference. He is
detained for eight hours and then released; his passport is confiscated
vestigating possible criminal charges against him.
rifles and ammunition, following agreement made in November 1982.
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sent to kill him.
Government troops seal off western suburbs of Bulawayo and conduct house-to-
house search for dissidents. Nkomo's home is raided and his driver shot. Nkomo
goes into hiding. In a secret press conference, he claims government troops were
officials of his personal safety. Chinamano is acting President of ZAPU.
Nkomo arrives in London from Botswana; claims he is not an "exile," will return
to Zimbabwe when he has received "face-to-face" assurances from government
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