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• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
Ethiopia: The Impact of
Soviet Military Assistance
ALA 83-10005
January 1983
Copy 324
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 West/East Africa Division, ALA,
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Operations and the National Intelligence Council
Secret
ALA 83-10005
January 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Ethiopia: The Impact of
Soviet Military Assistance
African and Latin American Analysis,
This paper was prepared b~ Horn of
Africa Branch, West/East Africa Division, Office of
formerly ALA. Comments and queries
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Ethiopia: The Impact of
Soviet Military Assistance
Key Judgments We believe the six-year-old military relationship between the USSR and
Information available Ethiopia-the keystone of close ties between Moscow and Addis Ababa-
as of January 1983 is based on major complementary interests and is likely to endure for some
was used in this report.
time. The Soviets have lavished military aid on Addis Ababa in an effort to
expand their influence in the Horn of Africa and gain access to Ethiopian
facilities. For its part, the Mengistu regime regards the USSR as the only
available source of large-scale military assistance needed to withstand
threats from internal separatism and Somali irredentism-factors that we
believe are likely to persist for some time.
Since 1975 the Soviets have provided more military equipment and
advisers to Ethiopia than to any other Sub-Saharan African country. On
the basis of US Embassy and other reporting, we estimate they have
delivered about $2.6 billion of the $4 billion in assistance that they have
agreed to provide-including provision of 1,700 military advisers-and
have equipped the Cuban combat brigades that form a strategic reserve to
assist Ethiopian forces in repelling another Somali invasion.
In return for its aid, Moscow has achieved substantial influence with the
dominant state in the Horn of Africa and has gained access to air facilities
in Eritrea Province and a small naval facility off the Eritrean coast. In our
judgment, Soviet influence in Ethiopia also gives Moscow a basis from
which to work against Western interests in the region.
With Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Cuban assistance, Mengistu has
enlarged and modernized the Ethiopian armed forces. We assess the
approximately 210,000-man military as the largest and best equipped in
black Africa and more than twice the size of the combined forces of
Somalia and Sudan, both viewed as threats by Ethiopia. Although military
assistance has improved Ethiopia's capability to defend its territory from
conventional attack, we believe it has not given government forces the
ability to overwhelm secessionists in Ethiopia's northern provinces or to
conduct sustained, large-scale offensive actions beyond their own borders.
Addis Ababa has demonstrated the ability to conduct smaller operations-
such as the recent incursions into Somalia-without outside assistance.
The Ethiopians (regard the Soviet 25X1
assistance programs as a collection of stopgap measures which, although
designed to meet immediate needs, are insufficient in concept and execu-
tion. We believe this perception is correct and that Moscow's design is to
ensure continued Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military assistance.
Secret
ALA 83-10005
January 1983
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We e ieve
Moscow will extract some political concessions in return for accepting
The character of Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia is unlikely, in our
judgment, to change substantially over the next few years, although the
overall quantity of arms delivered should diminish. For example, the most
recently signed agreement-providing for $1.7 billion of military aid
during 1981-85-entails annual support at a rate about one-third lower
than during 1976-80. Current deliveries are intended primarily to compen-
sate for combat losses-especially in Eritrea-and for breakdowns due to
heavy field operations or to poor maintenance procedures. We believe
Addis Ababa is not likely to receive large amounts of sophisticated
equipment over the next few years because of the military's shortage of
skilled manpower to operate effectively what it now possesses.
Moscow for its military aid. We presume that payments of approximately
$20 million due in both 1981 and 1982 were made, but by 1984 payments
will increase to over $200 million per year. The magnitude of the Ethiopian
debt gives the Soviet Union leverage to press Addis Ababa for political and
military concessions, such as the establishment of an Ethiopian Marxist
party or access to additional military facilities.
Addis Ababa is deeply in debt to
partial payment and reducing the economic burden.
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We judge that Addis Ababa will continue to rely on Soviet military
assistance to modernize its forces. Despite Ethiopian dissatisfaction with
features of the Soviet military assistance program, the Ethiopians recog-
nize that Moscow is their only source of large amounts of equipment. In
our judgment, Addis Ababa would have to shift its political and diplomatic
stance drastically or acquire significant new financial resources to obtain
arms from European or other sources. We believe both contingencies are
unlikely. We further believe that Ethiopian concern over the growing US
involvement in Sudan and Somalia, the continuing insurgencies in Eritrea
and Tigray Provinces, and Mengistu's political dependence on his Soviet-
backed military for his domestic survival will continue to bind the regime
to Moscow.
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The Soviet Military Assistance Program 4
The Impact of Soviet Involvement on the Ethiopian Military 6
B. Ethiopian Force Levels and Equipment, 1977-83
2. Force Levels and Equipment Inventories in Ethiopia, 1977-83 15
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_
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Ethiopia: The Impact of
Soviet Military Assistance
Moscow has long considered Ethiopia a key African
state because of its proximity to the Red Sea, Indian
Ocean, and Arabian Peninsula and its position as the
dominant regional power. Efforts to establish close
ties with Addis Ababa date back to the early 19th
century and have been pursued by successive govern-
ments in Moscow. In 1976 the Soviets took advantage
of growing strains between Addis Ababa and Wash-
ington, its traditional arms supplier, by moving closer
to the Ethiopian military regime that came to power
after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in
1974. Although the move prompted a resentful Soma-
lia to sever ties with its longtime Soviet benefactors,
the Soviets saw an overriding opportunity to acceler-
ate the reduction of the US presence in Ethiopia and
acquire a better position from which to extend their
influence in the region.
Ethiopia was responsive to Soviet overtures because of
the growing insurgency in Eritrea Province and re-
newed Somali irredentist activity-highlighted by the
expanded operations of Somali-supported guerrillas in
the Ogaden region. Addis Ababa's unsuccessful at-
tempts to obtain increased amounts of military aid
from the United States led to the signing of an arms
agreement with Moscow in December 1976 and a
rapid decline in Washington's position. The Soviet
response to Ethiopia's plea for massive arms assist-
ance after the Somali invasion in July 1977-al-
though belated-cemented the ties between the two
countries. In addition to arms deliveries to Ethiopian
forces, the Soviets provided equipment and transpor-
tation for Cuban troops dispatched to help Ethiopia
repel the Somalis. (See appendix A for more details.)
We find that Soviet perceptions of the strategic
importance of Ethiopia are reflected in Moscow's
provision of more military equipment and advisers to
Ethiopia than to any other country in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
os-
cow's military assistance to Ethiopia since 1975 has
amounted to about $2.6 billion in equipment deliver-
ies and services. The Soviets delivered the bulk of the
equipment in a massive sealift and airlift during the
1977-78 Ogaden war (see table 1)
Soviet support has enabled the Mengistu regime to
expand and equip its military, which now numbers
between 200,000 and 210,000 men and is the largest
in black Africa. Soviet aid has permitted the Ethiopi-
ans to control an insurgency in the northern province
of Eritrea as well as Somali-supported guerrillas in
the Ogaden region. In our judgment, Addis Ababa
also believes it needs a strong military to defend
Ethiopian territory against another Somali invasion-
there have been several such attempts by Somalia in
the past 20 years to press its irredentist claim to the
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with border incursions and occasional air attacks. 0
We believe that Mengistu is partly reassured about
his occasionally disappointing relationship with Mos-
cow by a view that Marxism provides a political
structure and ideology that he can use to fulfill
Ethiopia's long-sought goal of uniting its disparate
population under a centralized government. Thus,
while tensions between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union
exist over several issues, including quality of equip-
ment and repayment terms, we believe that ties will
continue as long as the Addis Ababa government
regards itself threatened.
In return for its assistance, Moscow has gained
military advantages in support of its Red Sea and
Indian Ocean operations. Soviet naval ships have
access to a small naval facility on Dahlak Island and
occasionally visit the Eritrean ports of Massawa and
Assab. In addition, Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine and
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Table 1
Soviet Military Deliveries of Major Equipment
to Ethiopia
1977
Artillery (76-mm, 85-mm, and 130-mm guns; 122-mm
howitzers and rocket launchers)
313
Mortars (82-mm, 120-mm)
430
Armored vehicles (BTR-60, BTR-1 52, BMP-1, BRDM-2)
123
Air defense guns (23-mm, 37-mm, 57-mm, 100-mm)
294
SAM launchers (SA-7)
100
Helicopters (MI-8, MI-24)
5
Air Force
Combat aircraft (MIG-15/17, MIG-21, MIG-23)
65
Transports (AN-12, YAK-40)
Navy
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
(Jan-
Nov)
Total
284
35
47
11
215
905
456
886
544
34
43
54
67
865
190
36
125
122
767
25
125
20
5
19
2
51
50
2
31
148
13
13
1
1
2
4
2
3
5
1
1
4
24
24
9 c
12
21
a Equipment delivered during the massive Soviet airlift and sealift, b Total does not include some 70 Soviet-made T-34 tanks that came
undertaken between November 1977 and May 1978, included from South Yemen.
weapon systems for both Ethiopian and Cuban forces. Some 200 c Three additional launchers were reportedly received in 1978 but
T-55 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored have not been observed at any operational site.
vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns purchased by the Ethiopians
are believed to have been assigned to the four Cuban combat
brigades.
Missile attack boats (Osa-II-class)
Torpedo boats (MOL-class)
Landing craft (T-4s, Polnocny LSM) 2
Air Defense Command
SA-2 launchers (four sites)
SA-3 launchers (three sites)
naval reconnaissance aircraft operate in the Red Sea African power. The Soviets will attempt to consoli-
and Indian Ocean from the airfield at Asmara. The date their position there and use it to continue
Soviets might use their leverage to press Addis Ababa building influence and opposing Western interests in
for access to additional Ethiopian military facilities, the region.
but we doubt they would reduce significantly their
military aid if the Ethiopians did not respond satisfac- Moscow views political stability in Ethiopia as impor-
torily on this point. tant for the success of its policies in the region. It
probably believes that, while Mengistu does not al-
We believe that more important than military access, ways do the Soviet bidding, he is the only identifiable
from the Soviet point of view, is the influence its
military aid has won it in Ethiopia, which is the
dominant country in the Horn of Africa and a major
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person capable of providing stability to the country.
We judge that Moscow will attempt to use its provi-
sion of arms assistance to encourage the creation of
other centers of power, such as a formal Marxist
political party that would be even more receptive to its
urgings than the present military leadership. We
believe, however, that the Soviets will continue to
move cautiously in this area out of concern over
jeopardizing their present stake in Ethiopia
Moscow's military
assistance program in Ethiopia was established
through a series of agreements (including supplemen-
tary contracts and protocols) worth nearly $4 billion
that have been signed since December 1976. This
total includes the most recent agreement-covering
Soviet military assistance for the period 1981 through
1985-signed in early 1981 and,
valued at approximately
The agreements cover:
? Major weapon systems, including ground, air, naval,
and air defense items.
? Support equipment, such as transport vehicles, tools
and maintenance equipment, and communications
gear.
? Consumables, notably ammunition, fuel, lubricants,
spare parts, and uniforms.
? Advisers, including the number assigned and their
responsibilities in the Ethiopian military.
? Military construction to provide basic facilities such
as garages, workshops, and quarters for advisers.
Although the agreements are generous to Ethiopia in
terms of the equipment provided, the Ethiopians are
highly dependent on Moscow, particularly for mainte-
nance, overhaul, and spare parts.
Ethiopians resent the tact that
ment that requires frequent maintenance
tial support items frequently have been late or incom-
plete. We believe that such. shortfalls are to some
extent intentional, designed to foster Ethiopian
dependency and thus provide the Soviets with lever-
Soviet shipments of essen-
age over their client
In our opinion, the Soviet arms sale relationship with
Ethiopia has many other built-in mechanisms for
reinforcing dependency.
military items, such as ship engines, are to be over-
hauled in the Soviet Union rather than in Ethiopia,
where work might be done more cheaply and quickly.
Moscow also requires that aviation fuel and lubricants
used on Soviet-supplied aircraft be purchased from
committed to purchasing all its petroleum from Mos-
cow.' the
Soviets also ignore Ethiopian requests to upgrade
indigenous maintenance facilities and improve the
training of Ethiopian maintenance personnel.
The Ethiopians have purchased most of the military
items at half the list price, with repayment over 10
years at 2-percent annual interest.
Indeed, Ethiopia complains that Soviet repayment
requirements do not take into account Ethiopian
poverty and the financial drain of the military situa-
ddis Ababa has had to pay only a small
portion-$40 million-of the approximately $2 billion
it owes the Soviet Union and that Moscow has
extended the repayment period. We believe Moscow
ultimately will reluctantly settle for only a portion of
the $200 million annual payments due to begin in
1984, but even this will place a further strain on
Addis Ababa's already precarious foreign exchange
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Mengistu requested an easing of repayment
terms when he visited Moscow in October 1982, but
we believe the Soviets refused to commit themselves.
As a result, we believe Ethiopia's resentment of tough
bargaining by the Soviets is likely to be an increasing-
ly troublesome element in its relations with Moscow.
The Soviet Military Advisory Group
The Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in
Ethiopia, established in 1977, now numbers an esti-
mated 1,700 advisers.
Addis Ababa eventually wants to
reduce the Soviet presence because of the financial
burden and the continuing friction between Soviet
advisers and Ethiopian officers. We believe, however,
that the need to maintain a large military force and
relatively sophisticated equipment precludes such a
move.
we judge that the Soviet
advisers currently in Ethiopia are responsible for
providing:
? Advice to senior Ethiopian military officers on
planning and conducting major combat operations
and administrative undertakings.
? Technical and logistic support for complex weapons
systems.
? Basic training for recruits, specialized training for
pilots and weapon system technicians, and combat
training for brigade- and division-level units.
? Political indoctrination for Ethiopian military per-
sonnel.
Organization. In our judgment, the Soviets have
organized their advisory group to parallel the struc-
ture of the Ethiopian armed forces, thereby ensuring
Soviet involvement in almost every facet and activity
of the Ethiopian military. The advisory group is
currently headed by Lieutenant General Demin, who
resides in Addis Ababa with his staff. By virtue of his
position, we believe General Demin assigns senior
Soviet officers to the Ethiopian General Staff, to the
commanders and chiefs of staff of each of the military
services, and to field commands or operational units in
the services.
ost of the senior
Soviet officers and subordinate advisers are assigned
to the five Ethiopian ground force commands: the
Central Command at Addis Ababa, the Western
Command (unlocated), the Eastern Command at
Harar, the Southern Command at Awasa, and the
Northern Command at Asmara. Soviet combat spe-
cialists and political officers also have been identified
at the military operations center in Asmara. Under
the individual Ethiopian ground force commands,
Soviet advisers-combat specialists as well as political
officers-are assigned to each of the 22 regular
infantry divisions. According to attache reporting,
there probably are 10 to 15 Soviet advisers with each
division headquarters and possibly three or four as-
signed at brigade level.' We believe some battalions
may also have Soviet advisers. In addition, Soviet
instructor pilots, flight engineers, and armament spe-
cialists reportedly are attached to the Army aviation
battalion equipped with MI-24 helicopter gunships.
Soviet military officers are assigned pri-
marily as advisers to command-level personnel and as
instructors or weapons specialists at training bases
and operational facilities.
Ethiopian Air Force are involved in MIG-21 and
MIG-23 training as well as instruction in aircraft
maintenance. Compared to the other forces, the least
number of Soviet advisers are assigned to the
Ethiopian Air Defense Command-the smallest force
in the Ethiopian military.
ters. The majority of the Soviet naval advisers are
either engineers, gunnery and torpedo instructors, or
weapons technicians (such as specialists on Styx mis-
siles) who support Ethiopian naval units and facilities
in Massawa and Assab,
Ethiopian infantry divisions consist of four infantry brigades, an
artillery battalion, a tank battalion, an antiaircraft unit, and
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Soviet advis-
ers have provided two vital services: direct combat
support for Ethiopian ground force operations against
insurgents in the Ogaden, Tigray, and Eritrea; and
rear services support.
Soviets have played a lesser role in the
instruction of Ethiopian military personnel, particu-
larly recruits, pilots, and weapons technicians.
The Impact of Soviet Involvement on the
Ethiopian Military
We believe Mengistu's objective in seeking Soviet
military assistance was to build a large, modern, and
efficient military organization that could subdue se-
cessionist groups and defend against Somali forces.
With Soviet military aid and Cuban assistance, he has
had some success in meeting these objectives, particu-
larly in improving Ethiopia's ability to defend its
borders against conventional military attack. We be-
lieve, however, that this has not enabled Mengistu to
create a force capable of suppressing the insurgents in
Ethiopia's northern provinces or conducting sustained
division-sized offensive actions beyond its own bor-
ders. Moreover, the operational capabilities of most
components of Ethiopia's armed forces are heavily
dependent on Soviet expertise
According to US Embassy sources, during the unsuc-
cessful Eritrean campaign in 1982, the commander of
Soviet Ground Forces, General Petrov, spent several
weeks in Ethiopia, presumably advising the govern-
ment in its combat operations. Although direct evi-
dence is sketchy, we believe Soviet advisers are play-
ing a similar role in Ethiopian operations now being
conducted in Tigray Province against an increasingly
active insurgency. In addition, we believe the Soviets
are performing some maintenance and advisory func-
tions for the Ethiopian forces engaged both in fighting
Somali-supported guerrillas in the Ogaden region and
in border skirmishes with Somalia
Soviet military personnel
assigned to units and training facilities avoid their
role as instructors and perform the tasks at hand (for
example, repairing weapons systems) themselves. This
appears to be the normal procedure for Soviet advis-
ers, who probably find it easier to do the work
Despite its continued dependence on the Soviets, the
Ethiopian military is radically improved from 1976,
when it showed all the effects of having been weak-
ened by combat losses and a series of government
purges and power struggles after the overthrow of
Haile Selassie in 1974. In what follows-and in
greater detail in appendix B-we offer some insights
on the changes over this period in Ethiopian military
capabilities
Force Expansion and Modernization
We find the most marked change in the Ethiopian
ground forces, which have expanded from five to 22
divisions. Deliveries of large numbers of Soviet tanks,
artillery, and armored personnel carriers enabled the
Ethiopians to equip the new divisions and to give them
greater firepower and mobility than the armies of
neighboring countries. Soviet-supplied MI-24 assault
helicopters enabled the Ethiopians to form an Army
aviation battalion capable of providing close air sup-
port to combat units. The Army's air defense capabili-
ty, previously limited to small caliber US-supplied
weapons, was also substantially improved, in our
opinion, with the delivery of SA-7 missiles and several
hundred antiaircraft guns
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The Ethiopian Air Force has been rebuilt with the
delivery of Soviet fighter, trainer, transport, and
reconnaissance aircraft. This has given Addis Ababa
the largest and most experienced Air Force in black
Africa. According to our analysis, its proven air-to-air
capability gives it a decided advantage over neighbor-
ing Somalia and over Sudan, Ethiopia's other major
antagonist. We further believe that the Air Force's
extensive air-to-ground experience played key roles in
repelling the Somali invasion cf 1977, in defeating
relatively large-scale Somali Army attacks into the
Ogaden in 1980, and in supporting the Ethiopian
border incursions into Somalia in 1982.
Soviet deliveries of SAM launchers and associated
equipment have enabled the Ethio ians to establish an
Air Defense Command.
The
main commercial and military port at Assab is de-
fended by SA-3s while a mix of SA-2s and SA-3s is
used to defend major airfields and military installa-
tions in the interior.
The Ethiopian Navy has received the least Soviet
attention, and the equipment it has acquired has not
had a significant impact on naval capabilities. Four
Soviet Osa-class missile attack boats represent the
most important addition to the force. These boats,
armed with Styx missiles, are more than a match for
the two long-neglected Osa boats in the Somali Navy,
in our analysis. We believe, however, that mainte-
nance and morale problems, coupled with the length
of the Ethiopian coastline, prevent the Navy from
fulfilling its primary role of coastal patrol.
Force Effectiveness and Readiness
Despite the impressive expansion of the Ethiopian
forces and the relative sophistication of the Soviet
weapons, we believe Moscow's support has little im-
pact on the problems that seriously limit the effective-
ness and readiness of Ethiopian military forces-the
lack of trained manpower and poor logistics. Primari-
ly because of these deficiencies, Ethiopia's armed
forces are heavily dependent upon the Soviets, partic-
ularly in the areas of command and control, combat
planning and employment, logistic support, and weap-
ons maintenance.
Figure 3. Selected Air and Naval Weapons Systems
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 Figure 4. Ethiopian Ground Forces Equipment
Ground Forces. Manpower and logistic support prob-
lems are most apparent in the Ethiopian ground
forces. As a result of rapid expansion, large numbers
of ground force personnel lack the skills to maintain
and operate the Soviet equipment. Qualified person-
nel, particularly maintenance technicians, are spread
so thin that the combat capability of many units is
reduced considerably.
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there is a shortage of trained and experi-
We believe the Army's inefficient supply system
necessitates support from the Soviets for extended
operations. The longstanding failure of the Army to
keep units and supply depots sufficiently stocked with
spare parts-for which some of the blame lies with
the Soviets-also reduces the capabilities of its units.
Air Force. During the 1977-78 Ogaden war, the Air
Force, in air-to-air combat, quickly eliminated the
Somali Air Force. Since that time, the Air Force has
demonstrated some competence in providing close air
support to the ground forces fighting insurgents in
enced officers in many units, adversely affecting
combat performance. Moreover, many officers were
commissioned directly from the ranks, often on the
basis of political reliability rather than demonstrated
competence. This is one reason that Ethiopian com-
manders are forced to rely on Soviet advisers in the
planning and execution of major military operations.
Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden.
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Like the other services, however, the Air Force, in our
analysis, also has personnel and logistic problems that
affect its operational effectiveness, particularly in
sustained operations. Although large numbers of Ethi-
opian pilots are being trained in the Soviet Union, we
believe the instruction takes two to three years. As a
result, operational units still have only a limited
number of qualified MIG-21 and MIG-23 pilots.
Moreover, according to Embassy reporting, the short-
comings of Soviet flight training-particularly limited
flying time and poor instruction in aerial maneu-
vers-require the Ethiopian Air Force to provide
returning pilots with further ground and flight
training.
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The Air Force also has a problem with low operation-
al rates for its aircraft. We believe that less than 50
percent of the country's fighters, transports, or heli-
copters are usually flyable. This is a result of defective
components, Soviet delays in providing spare parts, an
inefficient Ethiopian logistic system, and the inability
of Soviet or Ethiopian maintenance personnel to make
on-the-spot repairs. Many of the repair problems can
be attributed to the lack of preventive maintenance.
Shortages of Ethiopian personnel and technicians for
servicing Soviet-supplied aircraft may account for
this
The Air Defense Command. The Soviet air defense
missiles and radar systems were novel to Ethiopia
when they were delivered in the late 1970s. Because
of this, we believe Addis Ababa has been almost
completely dependent on the Cubans and Soviets for
operational and logistic support while Ethiopian crews
have been undergoing training. Although small num-
bers of Ethiopian personnel have begun to assume
positions as weapons operators and technicians, the
size of the system and the leadtime required to train
crews lead us to believe the Air Defense Command
still has insufficient qualified Ethiopian personnel to
maintain and operate the entire air defense network
alone.
Navy. I (Soviets
have provided Ethiopian naval personnel with engi-
neering, navigation, communications, electronics, and
missile training in the USSR, but the Navy still has
only a limited number of technically trained personnel
to maintain the complex Soviet-supplied equipment.
declining morale
among officers and enlisted men has resulted in
defections, and we believe continuing morale prob-
lems will further reduce the availability of qualified
technical personnel.
---
faulty Soviet equipment also has plagued
the Navy. For example, engine problems on the Osa
missile boats (which were secondhand when delivered)
are common. The engines have to be sent to the Soviet
Union for repair when spare parts to correct such
problems are unavailable. Finally, Ethiopia must rely
on the Soviet drydock at Dahlak Island for major
maintenance on its craft because it lacks its own
facilities.
military aid agreements
and the discussions leading up to them suggest there
are major differences between the Soviet Union and
Ethiopia Tegarding the nature and impact of Soviet
aid. The discussions also give us a glimpse of the
frictions between the partners.
Ethiopians believe the Soviet aid
program is a collection of stopgap measures designed
to meet immediate, short-term problems. The Ethiopi-
ans would prefer to have a program that would
modernize their armed forces on a systematic basis,
streamline organizational structures, upgrade train-
ing, and expand logistic facilities.
Ethiopians believe they
can absorb more assistance than they are receiving
and that the overall effectiveness of the military
would improve proportionately if more resources were
devoted to these modernization efforts. According to
Embass some Ethiopian leaders
are convinced that the Soviet aid program deliberately
reinforces Ethiopian dependency, adding to their re-
sentment of the Soviets.
Soviet View. We believe Moscow dismisses Ethiopian
perceptions and criticisms of the Soviet aid program
as typical of a Third World client's parochialism,
arrogance, and ingratitude. The Soviets probably
believe their support to Ethiopia has been generous,
particularly in view of the comprehensive aid pack-
ages-such as those for the MIG-23 fighter and
MI-24 gunship-that have been offered to the Ethio-
pians. We believe the Soviets also may believe Ethio-
pia has a limited capacity to absorb large quantities of
additional aid. We believe, in fact, that Moscow may
regard Ethiopia's military difficulties-as long as
they remain manageable-as advantageous to Soviet
interests because they ensure Addis Ababa's continu-
ing dependence.
We believe Addis Ababa almost certainly will contin-
ue to rely on Soviet military assistance for the foresee-
able future, thus ensuring a continued heavy Soviet
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influence and presence. Despite Ethiopian dissatisfac-
tion with the current level and focus of Soviet military
aid, Moscow remains the only source willing and able
to sell large amounts of equipment to the Ethiopians
on liberal credit terms. In our view, these military
needs will be sustained by Ethiopia's inability to solve
its major security problems-the insurgencies in Eri-
trea, Tigray, and the Ogaden-in the near term.
To obtain major weapons from other sources, Addis
Ababa, in our judgment, would have to shift its
political and diplomatic stance drastically or acquire
significant new financial resources. Both develop-
ments are unlikely in view of Ethiopia's poor econom-
ic prospects and the leadership's commitment to
Marxism. In our analysis, based upon Ethiopia's
transition from Western to Soviet arms, Ethiopian
leaders probably understand that shifting to another
supplier would compound their logistic problems by
requiring parts and servicing for new equipment while
attempting to keep the Soviet equipment operational.
We believe Addis Ababa has also learned from this
experience that any weakening of its armed forces
encourages the secessionist movements and further
destabilization efforts by Sudan and Somalia.
We believe the nature of Soviet military advice and
assistance to Ethiopia is unlikely to change substan-
tially over the next few years, although the quantities
of arms delivered are expected to diminish. Compared
to the large-scale Soviet arms deliveries in 1977-78,
further shipments of weapons and military equipment
are likely to remain modest in the absence of any new
and significant threat to Ethiopia security. The deliv-
ery of newer, substantially improved weapons is un-
likely because of their cost and Ethiopia's already
substantial debt to the Soviet Union. The shipments
being received are intended primarily to compensate
for combat losses and breakdowns as a result of heavy
field operations or poor maintenance. Newly delivered
equipment also will be used to fill out the specified
equipment needs of existing units
Despite Soviet support, we believe Ethiopian military
capabilities probably will not improve appreciably
over the next few years. The military will continue to
experience a shortage of skilled personnel needed to
maintain the country's advanced equipment and to fill
important midlevel officer positions. While the armed
forces are slowly developing an ability to contain the
various insurgencies, training deficiencies and the
government's refusal to make political concessions
will, in our view, frustrate efforts to end rebellions at
home
We believe the Ethiopian military will continue to
maintain its capabilities against neighboring Somalia
and Sudan, despite its overall problems. Clashes along
the Somali-Ethiopian frontier will increase as Addis
Ababa expands its efforts to eliminate the presence of
Somali-supported guerrillas and Somali regular forces
in the Ogaden region. The Ethiopian leadership's
decision to use direct military force or anti-Siad
Somali dissidents in efforts to topple the Somali
Government will result in continued instability in
Mogadishu and frequent Somali requests for arms
support from the United States and other Western
nations. We do not believe the Ethiopians will launch
a full-scale invasion of Somalia because of Addis
Ababa's logistic problems, the adverse political im-
pact it would have, and Soviet opposition to such a
move. The Ethiopians will, however, encourage and
support expanded Somali dissident activity and apply
direct pressure by occupying additional towns along
the frontier
We believe the Ethiopians will also continue their low-
key assistance to Libyan efforts to overthrow Suda-
nese President Nimeiri. The provision for training
facilities and instructors probably will continue. We
do not, however, envision Addis Ababa employing its
armed forces directly against Sudan out of concern
that this would result in unlimited Sudanese assist-
ance to anti-Ethiopian dissidents.
Despite its size and relative sophistication, we believe
it is unlikely that the Ethiopian military will engage in
any large-scale foreign adventures in Africa. The need
for a large standing army to combat internal insur-
gencies and a recognition of its own military deficien-
cies place constraints on such activity. The Ethiopians
could, however, dispatch advisers if requested or a
small number of combat troops to augment forces
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from other nations. We believe that Ethiopian insist-
ence that the costs for such operations be borne by
others would hinder even such limited deployments.
While we believe Ethiopian-Soviet friction will contin-
ue over the level, costs, and quality of Moscow's
military aid, Ethiopia's concern that the growing US
involvement in Sudan and Somalia is directed against
it serves to enhance the relationship with Moscow. In
the face of the real or perceived threats the Mengistu
regime faces, we believe it is unlikely to break with
the Soviets or seriously move to lessen its dependence.
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Appendix A
The Soviet Move Into Ethiopia
Background
During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia
depended on the United States for its arms and
training. Between 1952 and 1977, the United States
provided nearly $310 million worth of military equip-
ment, including aircraft, tanks, and artillery. In addi-
tion, approximately 3,900 Ethiopian military person-
nel were trained in the United States. The US
objective was to develop a relatively small (about
45,000 men) but competent conventional force to deal
with threats to Haile Selassie's rule posed by a
growing secessionist movement in Eritrea Province
and the arming of Ethiopia's longtime enemy Somalia
by the USSR.
The overthrow of Haile Selassie and his pro-Western
government in 1974 and the establishment of a social-
ist regime in Addis Ababa led to a deterioration in
relations between the United States and Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa severed the military relationship in
April 1977 when the United States refused to supply
massive military assistance to cope with the deterio-
rating insurgent situation and the Somali arms
buildup.
The Soviet Entry
With the development of strains in the US-Ethiopian
relationship, Addis Ababa in 1976 began to respond
to Soviet feelers and approached the Soviet Union and
several Eastern Bloc countries for weapons. This
effort accelerated rapidly after February 1977 when
Mengistu Haile-Mariam consolidated his personal
control and placed the country firmly in the Marxist
camp.
We believe Mengistu turned to the Soviets because of
ideological affinity and Moscow's willingness and
ability to provide quickly the needed assistance. The
Soviet response resulted in a major refocusing of
Soviet military assistance and political relations on
the Horn of Africa. Until then, the Soviets were
Somalia's major arms supplier and had some 1,500
military advisers in Somalia. As part of the Soviet aid
package, Somali officers and technicians also were
trained in the USSR. In return, Somali President
Siad had granted the Soviets access to Somali mili-
tary facilities and allowed them to establish a major
military base at Berbera.
Moscow's conclusion of an arms agreement with
Ethiopia in December 1976 and the subsequent
warming of relations between Addis Ababa and Mos-
cow triggered a steady decline in Somali-Soviet rela-
tions. Somali President Siad apparently reasoned that
a campaign to fulfill the country's irredentist designs
on Ethiopia's Ogaden region had to be launched
before Soviet arms and training could strengthen the
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gion in July 1977. Moscow initially hedged on sup-
porting either country but gradually endorsed Addis
Ababa. Mogadishu responded in November 1977 by
expelling all Soviet personnel and nullifying the Trea-
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After its expulsion from Somalia, Moscow began a I
massive sealift and airlift of military equipment to
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ets equipped and transported four Cuban combat
brigades-about 17,000 troops-to Ethiopia in late
1977 and early 1978 to support the Ethiopian forces
in the Ogaden attempting to blunt Somalia's invasion.
Cuban forces played a decisive role in driving the
Somali Army from the Ogaden. We believe close
logistic and battlefield cooperation between the Sovi-
ets, Cubans, and Ethiopians also were important
factors in the Ethiopian victory.'
We believe the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia
represented a severe, but temporary, setback to Soviet
plans for expanding influence in the Indian Ocean and
Since the end of the Ogaden war 25X1
approximately 11,000 troops and advisers, have not undertaken
major combat operations; we believe they are now employed
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East African areas. They had uncharacteristically
invested in constructing permanent naval and air
facilities at Berbera. The impact of their expulsion
was largely offset by Moscow's new relationship with
Ethiopia. The Soviet leadership probably believed
that Ethiopia had the potential-based on its popula-
tion, size, resources, military base, and traditional role
as an African leader-to be the dominant force in the
region, a major power in African circles, and a power
base for extending Moscow's regional influence. We
believe the Soviets hoped to use military assistance as
leverage to gain influence within the Ethiopian Gov-
ernment. Encouraged by the parallels between the
Ethiopian and Soviet revolutions, the Soviets hoped to
consolidate their position through the formation of a
Marxist party that would create a permanent class of
pro-Soviet leaders. We believe the Soviets probably
reasoned they could then more easily pursue their
interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas.
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Appendix B
Ethiopian Force Levels
and Equipment, 1977-83
In December 1976, the Soviet Union signed its first
major military assistance a reement with Ethiopia.
his initial agreement
provided only for the sale of limited numbers of
armored vehicles, small arms, and air defense equip-
ment, but subsequent accords included large numbers
of more advanced weapons, such as fighter aircraft
and medium tanks. Deliveries of Soviet equipment,
which initially were transferred from South Yemeni
inventories, began in early 1977 and were accelerated
after November 1977 when the Soviets were expelled
from Somalia. Embassy and attache reporting indi-
cate that between November 1977 and May 1978,
Soviet ships and aircraft delivered approximately
85,000 tons of military equipment. (Some of this
equipment was assigned to the newly formed Cuban
brigades in Ethiopia.) Since then, deliveries have
continued, although at a much slower pace, and have
included some newer military equipment such as
MIG-23 aircraft.
Table 2
Force Levels and Major Equipment Inventories
in Ethiopian Military Services, 1977-83
1977 1983
(March) (January)
Manpower 40,000 200,000
Infantry divisions 5 22
Equipment
Tanks 110 550-650
Artillery 115 726-826
Mortars 760 1,100-1,300
Air defense guns 50 655-705
Armored vehicles 170 570-670
Helicopters 24
Surface-to-air missile 125
launchers (SA-7)
Air Forces
Soviet arms deliveries have enabled Ethiopia to in- Force levels
crease substantially the size of its armed forces and Manpower 3,100 3,500-4,000
equipment inventories. Table 2 illustrates this growth, Squadrons 5 12
reflecting not only Soviet deliveries but purchases Equipment
from other countries such as South Yemen, Yugosla- Bombers 3
via, and France. The current equipment levels shown Fighters 35 112
are approximations, reflecting a degree of uncertainty Reconnaissance 12
in our estimates of the totals. This is the result of Transports 11 25
limited information on planned ground force inven- Helicopters 4 30
tories Navy
and the inability to Force levels
account accurately for wornout equipment and com- Manpower 1,400 3,500
bat losses. Estimates in the table include some 200 Units
tanks, about 135 artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored Combatants 1 3
vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns purchased by Noncombatants 2 3
the Ethiopians but assigned to Cuban forces. Equipment
Missile attack boats
Torpedo boats
Motor gunboats
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Table 2 (continued)
Force Levels and Major Equipment Inventories
in Ethiopian Military Services, 1977-83
organized and manned like their Soviet counterparts, the Air
Defense Command would have at least some 2,000 air defense
personnel.
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