SOUTH AFRICA`S BLACK HOMELANDS: A HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000100020002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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South Africa's
Black Homelands:
A Handbook
A Reference Aid
-SeeFet-
A LA 83-10002
January 1983
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South Africa's
Black Homelands:
A Handbook
A Reference Aid
This paper was prepared by of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. The
of the Office of Central Reference.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division, ALA,
The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
ALA 83-10002
January 1983
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Contents
Page
Introduction
V
The Evolving Homelands Policy
1
Origins
1
Resettlement of Blacks
1
The Setting
4
Grim Economic Picture
4
Troubling Social Indicators
9
Repressive Internal Politics
9
Fertile Ground for Insurgents
10
Bophuthatswana
11
Ciskei
15
Gazankulu
19
Kangwane
23
KwaNdebele
27
KwaZulu
31
Lebowa
35
Qwaqwa
39
Transkei
43
Venda
47
Figures
1. South Africa: Black Homelands (foldout map)
53
2. South African Homeland Legislation
2
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Black Population by Age and Sex, 1970
8
5. South Africa: Black Population Growth, 1970-80
9
Tables
1. South African Homelands: Selected Economic Indicators
5
2. Statistical Summary of the Homelands
51
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Introduction
Information available
as oil December 1982
was used in this report.
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South Africa's
Black Homelands:
A Handbook
South Africa's policy of separate development for blacks is, in our view, in-
creasing the potential for black political activism and racial violence. The
squalid living conditions that prevail in most of the 10 black homelands and
the repressive character of several of the Pretoria-backed homeland
regimes are fueling black discontent and creating new recruits for the
African National Congress (ANC), the principal South African insurgent
group. Recent increases in the frequency and daring of terrorist incidents
inside or near the homelands underscore their growing strategic value as
staging areas and sanctuaries for the ANC. Although we believe these
trends do not pose an immediate threat to the survival of the white
government, they contribute to a further polarization between blacks and
whites, and among whites, over the direction of South Africa's racial
policies.
Even the four homelands that have already been granted "independence"
have, in reality, remained integral parts of South Africa. All 10 of the
homelands depend on South Africa for budgetary support (Pretoria
provides, on the average, about two-thirds of their funds), employment
(more than four-fifths of their wage earners work outside the homelands),
food (only one of the homelands?Bophuthatswana?produces enough to
feed its population), transport access (most are surrounded by South
Africa), and political contact with the rest of the world (South Africa is the
only country recognizing them as independent states). Pretoria's influence
is further bolstered through seconded white officials who occupy key
positions in the local governments. The homelands' police and military
forces also work closely with their South African counterparts.
We believe that Pretoria, in pursuing its policy of separate development,
has unwittingly strengthened the bridge that had long ,connected the
country's rural and urban blacks through steady two-way migration.
Forced resettlement of blacks into the homelands has created a broader
and keener awareness among blacks of both backgrounds of their common
plight. At the same time, the dearth of employment opportunities in the
homelands has led to a steady stream of migration back to white areas,
which continues despite forced removals and an economic recession in
South Africa: The combination of resettlement and migration has forced
many families that just a few years ago were primarily rural or urban to di-
vide their activities between the city and the homeland. Thus, many black
urbanites who formerly had little knowledge of or ties to the homelands
now have relatives there.
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?Some of the leaders of the homelands have become petty .dictators. These
officials, viewed by much of the black populace as stooges of the South
Africans, lavishly display their wealth while most of their people live in
poverty. Some of the homeland leaders have blatantly manipulated the
political process to stay in power. In our judgment, as blacks become
increasingly disenchanted with these leaders, they will be more inclined
toward militant action against them and their backers in Pretoria.
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South Africa's
Black Homelands:
A Handbook
The Evolving Homelands Policy
Origins. South Africa's present homelands policy is
the outcome of more than three centuries of conflict
between whites and indigenous black peoples. When
Dutch settlers arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in
the 1650s, they encountered the Khoisan peoples who
had lived there for millennia. The first recorded
black-white violence in the region occurred in 1659,
when the settlers declared war on the Khoisan for
stealing cattle. Quickly defeated, the Khoisan were
pushed northward and were virtually eliminated by
war, disease, and absorption into the gradually grow-
ing Colored, that is, mixed race, population. Mean-
while, white settlements spread eastward until they
reached the territory of the Xhosa, near the present-
day homeland of Ciskei. Beginning in 1779, and
continuing for a century thereafter, blacks and whites
battled for control of the rest of what is now South
Africa. In the process, blacks were forced into small
pockets of land that eventually became tribal reserves.
By the 1880s, the Afrikaner descendants of the Dutch
settlers had fully subjugated the blacks by force and
turned to legal channels to consolidate their control. ?
In 1894, the government limited black land inheri-
tance to the eldest son. In 1913, the English-dominat-
ed government restricted land ownership by blacks?
who then numbered about 4.1 million?to only 7
percent of the country's area. (Indeed, the British
victory in the 1899-1902 Boer War did not change the
basic concepts of government policy toward the
blacks.) By 1936, the growth of the black population
to 6.6 million had prompted Pretoria to pass the
Bantu Trust and Land Act that pledged a near
doubling of these lands to an area about the size of
Missouri. Progress in transferring the land was slow,
however, and to this day?when the black population
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has grown to nearly 22 million?black-owned land
area has not reached the 1936 goal.'
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Resettlement of Blacks. The Afrikaners, after their
narrow political victory in 1948, added a new twist to
the government's "native policy." While retaining its
restrictions on land ownership and movement, Pre-
toria also began systematically to remove blacks from
white areas. Central to this policy was the creation in
the late 1950s of eight ethnic homelands?later ex-
panded to 10?to which all blacks were assigned on
the basis of language. Bent on solving its "black
problem," Pretoria since 1976 has granted "indepen-
dence" to four homelands?Bophuthatswana, Ciskei,
Transkei, and Venda?and has stripped their resident
and assigned populations of South African citizen-
ship. The remaining six homelands?Gazankulu,
Kangwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, and
Qwaqwa?are officially "self-governing states" with-
in South Africa. (See figure 1 foldout map on page
53.) 25X1 25X1
In mid-1982, South Africa added another new twist to
its efforts to grant "independence" to the homelands
when it announced plans to cede Kangwane and part
of KwaZulu to neighboring Swaziland. In addition to
transferring small impoverished regions and nearly
700,000 black citizens to an internationally recog-
nized country, Pretoria hoped to gain some legitimacy
for its homelands policy. Affected blacks have vehe-
mently opposed the transfers, largely because they
would lose their South African citizenship. In Novem-
ber 1982, South Africa, after reaching an out-of-court
settlement with Kangwane, announced its intention to
' The data in this report were drawn heavily from South African
official sources. Their quality is relatively accurate on government
expenditures, somewhat less reliable on population surveys, and
unreliable on measuring unemployment. The South African Gov-
ernment collects almost no statistics on social and other quality-of-
life indicators. Moreover, Pretoria stops collecting data after a
homeland becomes "independent."
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Figure 2. South African Homeland Legislation
1894 Glen Gray Act
Limits African land inheritance to eldest son.
1913
Native Land Act
Prohibits blacks from Purchasing white-owned land and restricts black ownership to
7.3 percent of the country's area.
1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act
(with amendments in 1945 and later).
Restricts blacks to "locations" in white cities and prohibits them from remaining in a
city for more than 72 hours without a permit unless they hold residential rights under
Section 10 of the act.
1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act
Basis of the homelands policy. Permanently bars blacks from owning nonreserve land.
Expands "reserves" to 13.7 percent of the country's area.
1936 Native Representation Act
Gave blacks indirect representation in Parliament.
945 Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act
Updates 1923 act, further restricting black access to white cities.
1950 Group Areas Act
Zones all of South Africa's territory according to race and creates the legal basis for
the forced resettlement of blacks.
Bantu Authorities Act
Abolishes Western-style systems of
local government in black areas and replaces
them with tribal, regional, and territorial authorities.
Resettlement of Natives Act
Removes blacks from cities and sets up black urban townships.
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act
Recognizes eight "black national units." Does not specifically mention eventual
independence, but implies it. Repeals Native Representation Act of 1936.
Transkei Constitution Act
Makes provisions for self-government and ,eventual "independence."
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Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act
Allows homeland citizenship to be conferred on homeland subjects in addition to
South African citizenship.
1971
Black States Constitution Act
Provides authority to establish organs of local government in the homelands.
1978
Bantu Laws Amendment Act
Prohibits children of black legal urban residents from qualifying for urban residence
if they were born after "their" homeland became "independent."
1982
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill
Restricts black access to white cities by tightening curfews and subjecting employers
who hire illegal migrants to heavy fines. (Withdrawn after widespread private and
parliamentary opposition. Government has announced plans to introduce a replace-
ment bill in the 1983 Parliament.)
back down from the steps it had already taken to
transfer the two territories to Swaziland. A commis-
sion to investigate the question of the transfers will
continue to exist, but it may be years before action is
taken, if ever.
The US Embassy?based on sketchy official South
African data, press coverage, and conversations with
South African officials?has reported the resettle-
ment of 2.3 million blacks from white areas to today's
homelands since 1948. The Black Sash, a white South
African group opposed to apartheid
puts the number at about 3
million. According to official South African reports,
another 1 million blacks are scheduled for relocation
during this decade; the Embassy puts the number at 2
million.
US Embassy analysis of South African data indicates
that resettlement has consisted of:
? Removal of farm tenants and squatters. Tenants
and squatters on white farms have been prohibited
since 1975. resulting in the resettlement of 1.3
3
million blacks. Blacks can now legally work on
white farms only as contract laborers.
? "Black spot" removal. These are small areas in
South Africa where blacks have legally held free-
hold tenure under the Bantu Trust and Land Act of
1936. Between 1960 and 1979, nearly 350,000
blacks were moved to the homelands. Pretoria indi-
cates there are still at least 75 "black spots"?some
critics say 150?with an estimated population of
75,000 yet to be removed.
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? Homeland consolidation. During the 1970s, an esti- 25X1
mated 300,000 blacks were relocated when their
land was exchanged for white-owned land in order
to consolidate homelands into fewer parcels.
? Urban relocation. The South African Government
has removed blacks from white cities and shifted
homeland boundaries in order to include black
townships in adjacent homelands. During the 1970s,
about 175,000 people were uprooted or redistricted
in this manner.
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Venda. Housing in a rural
area
? Strategic removals. Since 1960, some 150,000 to
200,000 blacks have been removed to make room
for dams, highways, and military installations, and
to create a South African "buffer zone" between
Venda and Zimbabwe.
In addition, regulations require that blacks have
official authorization to live in white cities. Between
1967 and 1979, about 5.5 million blacks were investi-
gated and/or tried for violations of these rules. The
vast majority were forcibly removed to their designat-
ed homeland, but many quickly returned to the cities.
Recent US Embassy and press reports show that
racial separation laws already on the books are being
applied even more rigorously than in the past. Still
more restrictive legislation may be passed in the
future; during the 1982 parliamentary session, the
government introduced a bill that called for a sub-
stantial tightening of existing apartheid laws. For
example, employers hiring illegal black migrants
would be subject to a fine of nearly $4,500 per illegal
worker, ten times the fine in the current,law. Wide-
spread opposition to the bill?from whites and blacks
alike?forced its withdrawal in October, but the
government has announced plans to introduce another
such bill next year
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The Setting
Grim Economic Picture. The fragile economies of the
homelands are unable to support the 12 million people
residing there, let alone the 10 million others assigned
to these areas. Their resident populations are largely
dependent on subsistence farming, on Pretoria's
grants?which cover about two-thirds of most home-
land budgets (although homeland leaders correctly
note that these payments match the taxes that autho-
rized black migrants from the homelands pay in White
cities)?and on direct remittances from migrant work-
ers. These workers are recruited through government
labor bureaus to supply the needs of the mines and
urban industrial and commercial firms in white South
Africa. Even with the remittances from these workers,
annual per capita income in the homelands barely
averages $300, leaving the typical resident no better
off than a person in the poorest countries in Africa
Bophuthatswana is a notable exception to these stag-
nant economies. Key advantages in this homeland
include proximity to the Pretoria-Johannesburg indus-
trial complex and a smattering of mineral deposits.
Moreover, a popular, democratic government in Bo-
phuthatswana has successfully encouraged foreign
and domestic investment. The new entertainment
complex at Sun City already has become a major
employer.
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Table 1
South African Homelands:
Selected Economic Indicators
Area
(sq. km)
Assigned
Population,
1980
(thousand)
Resident
Population,
1980
(thousand)
Workers in
White Areas,
1980
(thousand)
Job Entrants Employed
in Local Modern Sector,
1980
(percent)
Per Capita
All-Source Income,
mid-1970s
(US$)
Total
156,828
20,308
10,828
1,811
NA
NA
Bophuthatswana
38,000
2,435
1,329
339
33
250
Ciskei
5,530
1,354
630
84
37
190
Gazankulu
6,750
889
477
44
20
280
Kangwane
3,720
716
160
68
86
190
KwaNdebele
750
380
166
36
NA
NA
KwaZulu
31,000
5,421
3,178
701
25
220
Lebowa
22,476
2,501
1,658
197
40
220
Qwaqwa
482
1,793
155
38
34
210
Transkei
41,620
4,298
2,622
269
15
260
Venda
6,500
521
453
35
55
250
The homelands' agricultural and mineral base is even
more meager than the 13-percent share of South
Africa's territory allocated to these areas would sug-
gest. About 15 percent of the land is arable?roughly
the same as in the rest of South Africa?but this
indicator is misleading. In most homelands soils are
far more depleted than on white farms because of
misuse stemming from the absence of modern farming
techniques and overpopulation?the density is three
times that of South Africa overall and four times that
of Sub-Saharan Africa. Aside from those found in
Bophuthatswana, mineral deposits have been found in
commercial quantities only in Lebowa and KwaZulu.
Efforts by Pretoria since the mid-1950s to attract
industry to the homelands have failed. Those busi-
nesses that have been set up are owned for the most
part by whites or Asians who repatriate their profits
to white South Africa. Despite liberal tax concessions,
subsidized credits, and the absence of a minimum
wage requirement, potential investors are deterred by
inadequate facilities, high transport costs, and a lack
of raw materials. Only about 2,500 jobs have been
5
created annually, far too few for the 100,000 jobseek-
ers who join the labor force in the homelands each
year.
Most homeland residents are impoverished women,
children, and old people resettled by Pretoria or left
behind by the exodus of working-age males. Only 20
percent of South Africa's black wage earners work in
the homelands. The remainder work in white areas;
about 30 percent are daily commuters and 50 percent
are migrants. Employment in the modern sector of the
homelands ranges from a low of less than 15 percent
of the work force in KwaZulu, within easy reach of
Durban and other white cities, to a high of 55 percent
in remote Venda, which has several labor-intensive
tree and tea plantations.
The rate at which unemployed youth return to the
homelands is likely to increase over the next few years
for various reasons. Economic recovery in South
Africa will probably fall short of the 6 percent that
Pretoria acknowledges is needed just to provide jobs
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Figure 4
Black Population by Age and Sex, 1970
Percent
Black Homelands
Males
Age
E 80+ III
E 75-79
E 70-74 7
I 65-69 I
I 60-64 I
I 55-59
I 50-54
45-149
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
12 10
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
0 0
Females
2 4 6 8 10 12
South Africa: Overall
Males
12 10
588375 12-82
2
Age Females
80+
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64 III
55-59
50-54 11
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
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Figure 5
South Africa: Black Population Growth,
1970-80
Percent annual growth
South Africa
Nonhomeland
South Africa
"Independent"
homelands
Nonindependent
homelands
0 1 2 3 4 5
588376 12-82
for new black entrants to the labor force. In addition,
South Africa's urban residence laws are likely to be
more strictly enforced. Based on patterns observed
during the riots that occurred in Soweto and other
black townships in 1976-77, we believe returning
young people will be more politically active than other
homeland residents have been in the past.
Troubling Social Indicators. Soaiing population
growth resulting from resettlement?the homelands'
population rose by an extraordinarily high 4.3 percent
annually during the 1970s?has compounded eco-
nomic troubles and social distress. The upheaval of
resettlement is producing widespread anomie and
psychological depression, according to local health
workers. Endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, more-
over, afflict blacks inside and outside the homelands
far more often than whites. Malnutrition?estimates
by South African scholars put it at 50 percent for
Ciskei children?contributes to a black infant mortal-
ity rate that averages 25 percent in the homelands
compared with 10 percent in South Africa as a whole.
Comprehensive data on education in the homelands
are unavailable, but reporting by the US Embassy in
Pretoria indicates that educational opportunities in
the homelands are far more limited than in white
South Africa. Most teachers in the homelands have no
9
more than an eighth-grade education. For South
Africa as a whole, government spending per white
student is about 10 times higher than for blacks, even
though this represents a significant narrowing of the
gap in recent years. As a result, blacks remain far less
likely than whites to finish high school. Among blacks
themselves, the educational outlook for those living in
white South Africa is brighter than for those in the
homelands, who are excluded from new mandatory
attendance requirements
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Repressive Internal Politics. Most of the homeland
leaders tend to be viewed by politically conscious
South African blacks as instruments of Pretoria and
symbols of the despised homelands policy. These
leaders generally argue that they, as "moderates"
with whom the South African Government is willing
to deal, are the only alternative to the emergence of
more radical leadership. Their ability to influence 25X1
Pretoria is limited, however, because they generally
serve at its pleasure and lack a sizable political
following.2 25X1
Disillusionment with the ability of homeland govern-
ments to deal with their impoverished economies or to
bring about changes in Pretoria's policies has resulted
in waning public interest in electoral politics in the
homelands. Voter participation has been decreasing;
in the 1963 national elections, 68 percent of Trans-
kei's voters cast ballots, but in "independent" Trans-
kei's first election in 1976, only 43 percent went to the
polls. More recently, in Bophuthatswana's general
election in October 1982, fewer than 130 of the
homeland's 250,000 assigned citizens living in Soweto
bothered to vote, although three polling booths were
set up in the township.
Local opposition to their rule has turned some home-
land leaders into petty dictators. Venda's unpopular,
South African-appointed Chief Minister Patrick
Mphephu, for example, has packed the homeland's
legislature with loyal chiefs to ensure his control of
2 A notable exception is KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi,
a popular Zulu chief and head of Inkatha, the largest black political
organization in the country. Buthelezi frequently uses his official
position?and the legal protection it affords him?to criticize
Pretoria. President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana also enjoys
strong popular support in his homeland but has only a limited
national following.
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that body. He has also detained or expelled several
members of Venda's opposition party and other real
and imagined political enemies. Several other home-
land leaders have adopted Pretoria's hardline tactics,
including detentions and bannings to strengthen their
grip on power.
Traditional chiefs and headmen around whom opposi-
tion to the unpopular homelands regimes might co-
alesce have generally found it too risky to oppose
authorities who are prepared to use repression and
who control the traditional leaders' own stipends and
patronage. In addition, the opulent living of some of
the traditional chiefs discourages popular support.
The homelands thus show signs of becoming staging
areas for a rural-based insurgency. Pretoria, in turn,
can be expected to react sharply to prevent the
homelands from becoming major ANC sanctuaries.
We believe South African military and security forces
would not hesitate to enter any homeland?"indepen-
dent" or otherwise?in pursuit of suspected terrorists.
In our view, moreover, Pretoria will use its substantial
political and economic leverage on those homeland
leaders who might be inclined to cooperate with the
ANC.
Fertile Ground for Insurgents
The African National Congress until recently paid
little attention to the homelands. During the 1970s,
only 23 terrorist incidents?mainly such minor acts as
the burning of small buildings?were recorded in the
homelands. This reflects the ANC's emphasis on
targeting economic installations, few of which are
located in the homelands. Most of these incidents
occurred in the last half of the decade and were
concentrated in Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu. Both
homelands are adjacent to foreign countries that
harbor ANC personnel; they are also close to white
urban centers in South Africa.
The ANC is now giving closer attention to the
homelands as it attempts to broaden its strength in
South Africa. It is increasingly selecting economic
targets within or just outside a homeland. Of the more
than 40 major terrorist incidents that occurred in
South Africa during 1981, over half took place either
in or within 100 kilometers of a homeland, primarily
Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu.
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BOPHUTHATSWANA
Bophuthatswana became the second (after Transkei) of South Africa's "independ-
ent" homelands in December 1977. President Lucas Mangope charged at the time
that he had been tricked into accepting independence without a satisfactory
resolution of two issues: the citizenship of members of the Tswana tribe living in
South Africa and the further consolidation of Bophuthatswana's seven widely
scattered territorial units. These issues remain unresolved.
Unlike the leaders of South Africa's other "independent" homelands, Mangope
enjoys public support because of his vigorous and relatively successful efforts at
promoting economic development and his strong record on human rights. Indeed,
Bophuthatswana's constitution contains a Bill of Rights, while South Africa's does
not. The ANC has a higher presence in Bophuthatswana than in the other
homelands, but this primarily results from the homeland's location?adjacent to
the ANC's sanctuaries in Botswana and close to white population centers inside
South Africa.
With a total land area of 38,000 square kilometers?roughly the combined size of
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island?Bophuthatswana is the second-
largest homeland after Transkei. It is also the most ethnically mixed of the
homelands. About two-thirds of the population are Tswana. The largest minority
tribes are the North Sotho (6 percent) and the Xhosa (5 percent); the Shangaan,
South Ndebele, South Sotho, and Zulu tribes each account for about 3 percent of
the population. The sizable non-Tswana population results from the influx of
Africans into shantytowns along the homeland's border, only 25 kilometers outside
Pretoria.
Since 1972, the South African Government has reduced Bophuthatswana from 19
separate parcels of land to seven, primarily through the elimination of a dozen
small black enclaves, or "black spots," in white areas and the resettlement of their
120,000 black residents in other parts of the homeland. In 1979, an official South
African report called for the consolidation of Bophuthatswana into one parcel.
This would require the transfer of 1.3 million hectares of white-owned land to
Bophuthatswana in exchange for the return to South African control of the
homeland's two smallest parcels, totaling about 0.5 million hectares. According to
the same report, the estimated total cost of buying out white farmers and
relocating black and white residents would range between $1.2 billion and $3.6
billion. We believe that South Africa's economic downturn in recent years,
together with opposition by white landowners who might be affected, has
indefinitely sidetracked any moves toward consolidation.
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Except for the South Sotho living in the Thaba `Nchu area, most of Bophutha-
tswana's minorities live in the easternmost parcel, near Pretoria. Minority tribes
that resent being governed by the Tswana majority are becoming increasingly
critical of the Mangope government. Mangope recognizes the potential for unrest
and has taken pains to respond to minority needs for housing and transportation.
His responsiveness and Pretoria's public declarations that no new homelands will
be created have muted calls by the minorities for separation from Bophutha-
tswana.
Bophuthatswana has the healthiest economy of all the homelands. Measured by
availability of mineral resources, degree of industrial development, and per capita
income?which jumped from $150 in 1970 to $410 in 1975 (the latest official data)
and probably has grown steadily since then?Bophuthatswanans are considerably
better off than residents of other homelands. At the same time, Bophuthatswana's
economic health depends largely on external factors:
? Access to the nearby Pretoria-Johannesburg industrial complex.
? A high level of government aid from Pretoria.
? Substantial Western investment.
Bophuthatswana also benefits from the presence of commercially exploitable
mineral deposits and sound governmental management that has spent its revenue
wisely. These broad economic factors are reflected within Bophuthatswana in high
levels of activity in construction, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture.
The Pretoria-Johannesburg industrial complex provides jobs for large numbers of
daily commuters, whose earnings account for 45 percent of the homeland's wage
income. Another one-third of the homeland's workers earn their livelihood locally.
Thus, about 80 percent of the homeland's wage income is earned by residents and
about 20 percent by migrants living in South Africa.
Pretoria's grants have helped finance the construction of extensive new facilities?
office buildings, a parliament, and vast housin! and shopping complexes?in
Mafeking, the capital.
Supported by foreign firms, Bophuthatswana currently exploits deposits of plati-
num, chromite, vanadium, nickel, asbestos, granite, and manganese. In 1979,
mineral extraction contributed 55 percent of the value of Bophuthatswana's cash
economy but accounted for only 10 percent of its paid employment.
The US Embassy in Pretoria estimates that total industrial investment in
Bophuthatswana?mainly from West European sources?now amounts to $250
million. In addition, investments by Israeli and Taiwanese firms have recently
been negotiated by the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation
Bophuthatswana's limited arable land-10 percent of the total?and the home-
land's minimal agricultural development have led the local government to
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introduce large-scale, capital-intensive farms called temisano (or farm together).
These farms, run by farmer cooperatives and provided with expensive irrigation
and mechanical assistance, have been set up in semiarid areas near Pretoria.
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have a demonstration effect on subsistence farmers. It is too early to be certain
whether small farmers have been helped, but in 1981 Bophuthatswana became
self-sufficient in maize, stockpiling enough to carry it through this year's drought.
Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (BDP) won all 72 seats in the
Legislative Assembly in the October 1982 election, Bophuthatswana's first such
vote since "independence." The election, in our view, demonstrated Mangope's
willingness to govern on a democratic basis?unlike any other "independent"
homeland leader. The election had one significant failing: of the approximately
250,000 Soweto residents who are "extraterritorial" citizens of Bophuthatswana,
fewer than 130 bothered to vote, even though three polling booths were set up in
the township.
as a result of Pretoria's efforts
this year to transfer the Kangwane homeland and a portion of the KwaZulu
homeland to Swaziland, there is fresh interest among some Botswanan officials in
absorbing Bophuthatswana and its mineral wealth. The idea of reuniting all of the
Tswana people has been discussed among Botswanan officials since the 1960s.
Mangope's constituents now fear that
Pretoria will try to turn over part or all of Bophuthatswana to Botswana. Mangope
is trying to strengthen ties with Pretoria to ward off this possibility.
Bophuthatswana's security links with South Africa are close. Pretoria contributes
a sizable share of the homeland's defense budget. Even more important, the South
African military has acquired effective control over the Bophuthatswana Defense
Force (BDF) through the stationing of South African officers on loan from
Pretoria.
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Lucas Manyane Mangope has been President of Bophuthatswana since "indepen-
dence" in 1977. His political moderation and cooperation with South Africa have
not prevented him from denouncing Pretoria's apartheid policies. Mangope also
opposes confederation of the homelands with South Africa and Pretoria's plans to
allow blacks living in white South African cities to elect representatives to the
homeland assemblies. He has publicly vowed, however, not to let his homeland
become a base for anti?South African activities.
Mangope was born on 23 December 1923. After receiving a primary teacher's
diploma from Bethel College in South Africa in 1951, Mangope taught high
school. He was named a full-time chief of the Tswana tribe in 1959 and in 1972
became Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, then a self-governing homeland. He
visited the United States in 1971 on a grant from the privately-sponsored US?
South African Leadership Exchange Program.
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CISKEI
Ciskei, which became "independent" in December 1981, is believed by many
South African observers to be the most politically unstable of the homelands. Long
a dumping ground for unemployed, unhoused, or squatting members of the Xhosa
tribe ousted from white areas of South Africa, Ciskei's population is suffering
from rapid economic deterioration, rising unemployment, and severe malnutrition.
these trends, and the Ciskei government's 25X1
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Ciskei's population in 1980 was about 630,000, with an additional estimated
725,000 Xhosa assigned to Ciskei but living in white South Africa. The
homeland's resources are meager: soils are poor, rainfall is erratic, and minerals
are few.
Although many residents have left Ciskei, South Africa has forcibly sent an
estimated 200,000 to 250,000 people there since 1960, according to US Embassy
reporting. Two months before "independence," for example, an estimated 4,000 to
5,000 Africans were removed from a township at the edge of the white town of
Stutterheim, near the Ciskei border, and sent to the homeland. Although
successive generations had lived in the township since 1851 on a freehold basis
granted by the British, Pretoria simply negated their property rights. In addition,
the Embassy reports that the South African Government plans to relocate 75,000
to 100,000 Xhosa from East London in Eastern Cape Province to Ciskei. Embassy
reporting indicates that resettlement camps in Ciskei are seriously overcrowded
and that living conditions in the camps are very poor.
Ciskei is far more urbanized than the other homelands, in part because of its poor
agricultural resources. Over half its residents live in cities and towns. Most of the
urban dwellers live in Mdantsane, near East London, and Zwelitsha, on the edge
of the South African city of King Williams Town. By 1990, the 23-kilometer
Mdantsane-Zwelitsha corridor is expected by South African researchers to have a
population of 700,000, compared with about 400,000 in 1980.
Despite this relatively high rate of urbanization, Ciskei's rural population density
is over three times that of rural white South Africa?a result of forced
resettlement to the homeland. Only 14 percent of the land in Ciskei is arable?
roughly comparable to the proportion of arable land in the rest of South Africa.
Overgrazing of the already poor soil by cattle herds is another problem.
Overcrowding, coupled with primitive agricultural practices and the fact that up to
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90 percent of the adult male population has permanently departed from some
areas, has limited food production in Ciskei to around 10 to 20 percent of the
homeland's needs. An estimated 50 percent of Ciskei's children suffer from
malnutrition. Annually around 10 percent of the infants under age 1 die from
hunger, and about half of the 2- and 3-year-olds are malnourished.
Ciskei is one of the poorest homelands and remains largely dependent on South
Africa for jobs and subsidies. Pretoria underwrites up to 80 percent of Ciskei's
budget. Some 70 percent of Ciskei's wage income comes from outside the
homeland-30 percent from commuters and 40 percent from migrants?leaving
only 30 percent to be earned locally. Because many residents of Ciskei live
adjacent to white South Africa, as much as 80 percent of the wage income is spent
outside the homeland.
Mdantsane, a Ciskei city adjoining East London, further illustrates the homeland's
dependence on South Africa. The city was established in 1963 as a black South
African township, but Pretoria readjusted the boundary in 1966 to absorb it into
Ciskei. Today, with a population estimated at 175,000, Mdantsane is larger than
East London. It attracts people from throughout Ciskei because it is one of the few
places in the homeland within easy commuting distance of white South Africa.
Over half the people living in this city commute daily to jobs in East London.
In an effort to reduce the flow of income out of Ciskei, the homeland government
is making an effort at industrial development in central Ciskei. Only a few
industries have been attracted, however?a result of Ciskei's potential for political
instability and meager economic base. White managers, moreover, are reluctant to
commute the long distance from King Williams Town, the nearest white town in
which they could live.
Ciskei's agricultural performance is weak. There are few storage dams to
compensate for periodic drought. Even more important, in some villages over 90
percent of the working-age males have migrated to either Mdantsane or white
South Africa. In addition, land allocation is controlled by local chiefs, who
frequently allocate plots on the basis of bribes rather than need, compounding the
problem of nonutilization of land.
President Lennox Sebe resisted accepting "independence" until he was convinced
he had obtained a better deal than the other "independent" homelands. His
demands included South African citizenship for Ciskei residents, more land than
Ciskei originally was slated to receive, and a favorable financial arrangement.
Sebe believed the South African Government had agreed to these conditions, but it
subsequently reneged on most of its promises. Ciskeians lost their South African
citizenship, and so far the homeland has received only a small amount of
additional land. The main beneficiaries of "independence" have been Sebe himself
and his political cronies.
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A private poll conducted in Ciskei just before "independence" showed that about
90 percent of the residents opposed it. Although "independence" received a
majority of the vote in a government-run referendum in 1981, most urban voters
boycotted the balloting. Nonetheless, the referendum was cited by President Sebe
and Pretoria as proof that Ciskei residents wanted independence.
Ciskei has evolved into a virtual police state. Since December 1981, Sebe and his
brother, Maj. Gen. Charles Sebe?Minister of Defense and head of the Ciskei
Intelligence Service?have publicly reiterated that they intend to root out all
opposition to the regime.
Major General Sebe, who
formerly worked for South Africa's security forces, tends to parrot Pretoria's
terminology, frequently referring to "ANC terrorists," "the Communist menace,"
"total onslaught," and similar concepts.
By and large, Pretoria has thus far turned a blind eye to the Sebes' repressive ac-
tions, insisting that Ciskei is a "sovereign state" and that South Africa cannot
interfere in its internal affairs.
According to US Embassy reporting, Pretoria's efforts to transfer Kangwane and
Ngwavuma to Swaziland were watched apprehensively in Ciskei because George
Matanzima, Prime Minister of neighboring Transkei and brother of that home-
land's President, wants to absorb Ciskei into Transkei. Unification of the Swazi ar-
eas would create a precedent for merging the two Xhosa homelands, Ciskei and
Transkei. We believe, however, that these homelands are unlikely to be merged be-
cause Pretoria's program of homeland "independence" would suffer a substantial
further loss of credibility if an "independent" homeland?Ciskei?were eliminated
against the wishes of its leadership.
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Lennox Leslie Sebe has been President of South Africa's newest "independent"
homeland since 1981. Sebe lobbied Pretoria for more land, more money, and the
retention of South African citizenship for all Ciskeians after "independence." US
Embassy officials have noted, however, that Sebe was "so intoxicated" by the
prospect of independence that he was outmaneuvered by South African officials
during the negotiations and gained few of his demands. He has instituted a
repressive regime that in our view demonstrates his fear of potential political
unrest in the Ciskei. The President has cooperated with the South African
Government to control increasingly frequent dissident activities among Ciskeian
laborers located in nearby East London. He has encouraged private South African
and foreign investment in Ciskeian industry and has promoted several agricultural
projects, but critical South African journalists and politicians note that these
efforts benefit only a few Ciskeians?mainly the President, his brother, and some
of their political followers.
Sebe was born on 26 July 1926. He earned a certificate from the Lovedale
Teachers Training College in Alice, South Africa, in 1947. He subsequently
taught secondary school and became an administrator in the black school system
of Cape Province. In 1968, he entered the newly formed Ciskei Cabinet as
Minister of Education. In 1973 he became Chief Minister. He is married and has
several children.
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GAZANKULU
Gazankulu, located in the remote, semiarid northern Transvaal, has a weak
economy. Pretoria wants to divest itself of this homeland, but it would have
difficulty turning Gazankulu over to a neighboring country because the homeland
is completely surrounded by South Africa and other homelands. We believe a more
likely scenario is that South Africa will continue to move this homeland toward
"independence."
The Shangaan and Tsonga peoples who make up some four-fifths of the population
of Gazankulu are closely related historically, culturally, and linguistically. Both
tribes speak the Tsonga language. Outsiders tend to use the two tribal names
interchangeably, but the Shangaan and the Tsonga resent being called by the
other's name. The peoples of Gazankulu had difficulty agreeing on a name for
their homeland, so they settled on the 19th-century name of their area of origin in
Mozambique?Gaza?and added the suffix kulu, meaning "big."
During the 1970s Gazankulu's population growth rate rose to 5.8 percent
annually?the highest rate for any homeland except for tiny Qwaqwa?as a result
of forced resettlement of blacks from Johannesburg and white areas of rural
Transvaal. Nonetheless, Gazankulu remains one of the least populated homelands.
An estimated 900,000 people were assigned to it in 1980, but only about half of
them actually lived there.
Gazankulu's economy is severely hampered by the limited number of job
opportunities in the homeland or within daily commuting distance. Nearly 75
percent of Gazankulu's wage earners work outside the homeland: over 60 percent
have migrated to white areas?the second-highest proportion among the home-
lands. Because of Gazankulu's relative isolation from major industrial areas, only
13 percent commute daily. The homeland borders on Lebowa, Venda, and the
Kruger National Park.
Gazankulu's most conspicuous economic activity is in Giyani, the capital, where
the South African Government is financing construction of government buildings,
a mansion for Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwisi, houses for civil servants, and
shopping and banking facilities. The population of Giyani was officially reported
at only 2,000 in 1976, but an estimated 20,000 people now live in the vicinity,
mostly in small mud houses.
Some 45 percent of Gazankulu's workers are engaged in subsistence farming, but
the homeland produces no more than 10 to 20 percent of its food needs. Although
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18 percent of the land is arable, only 3 percent of the land is actually cultivated.
With most of the men working in white South Africa, cultivation is left to the
women, whose other chores leave little time to tend farm plots. Lack of money for
fertilizer, improved seeds, and other inputs also handicaps farming. Yields per
hectare for corn?the homeland's staple?are only about a fourth of the South
African average.
Political Developments Chief Minister Ntsanwisi is under strong and growing pressure from Pretoria to
accept "independence."
To counter Pretoria's pressure, he has sought closer association with the
South African Black Alliance (SABA), an association of black political organiza-
tions headed by KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi that strongly opposes
"independence" for homelands.
Ntsanwisi, like Buthelezi, believes in dealing with Pretoria even while opposing its
actions. Based on limited press reporting, we believe that Ntsanwisi's government
is one of the least corrupt and repressive of the homeland regimes.
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Hudson W. E. Ntsanwisi has been Chief Minister of Gazankulu since 1973. A
vocal homeland leader, he has frequently served as a spokesman for the noninde-
pendent homeland leaders. One of the few homeland leaders respected among
urban blacks, the Chief Minister would like to defend the black cause more
vehemently, but we believe he is unwilling to risk his personal position or the
future of Gazankulu.
Ntsanwisi was born on 11 July 1920. After receiving a B.A. degree in English and
Bantu in 1946 from Fort Hare University?a black South African institution?he
taught school. He subsequently earned a B.A. degree in 1963 and an M.A. degree
in 1965 in linguistics from the University of South Africa, a correspondence
school. In 1963, Ntsanwisi joined the Department of Bantu languages at the
University of the North (in Transvaal) and became chairman of the department in
1967. During 1966 he studied linguistics at Georgetown University on a grant
from the privately sponsored US?South African Leadership Exchange Program.
He returned to the United States as an International Visitors Leader Grantee in
1973. Ntsanwisi is sophisticated and articulate and has written several works on
linguistics. Ntsanwisi is married and has several children.
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KANG WANE
South Africa began negotiating with Swaziland in 1976 on transferring control of
the Kangwane homeland to Swaziland. The major sticking point in the negotia-
tions?Swaziland's demand that it be granted a corridor to the sea?was overcome
this year after Pretoria added a portion of the KwaZulu homeland to its offer. The
late King Sobhuza II of Swaziland strongly favored the land transfers. Sobhuza
envisaged the reunification of all Swazi people and acquisition of a route to the sea
through Ngwavuma as crowning achievements of his 61-year reign. His death in
August 1982, together with Pretoria's recent out-of-court settlement with Kang-
wane of its lawsuit contesting the transfer, have halted the proceedings indefinite-
ly.
Kangwane's 3,720 square kilometers?slightly larger than Rhode Island?makes
it one of the smallest of South Africa's homelands. Kangwane's predominately
Swazi population grew from about 120,000 in 1970 to 160,000 in 1980, due in part
to resettlement but mostly to natural increase. Nearly 600,000 Swazi live in white
South Africa.
The Swazi ethnic group came into being in the early 19th century when several
Nguni tribes were unified under the leadership of King Sobhuza I. The Swazi
people were divided in 1880, when Britain and South Africa forced Sobhuza's
successor, King Mbandzeni, to cede control over the northern and western portions
of the kingdom. The Swazis have remained separated ever since.
In 1963, South African Prime Minister Verwoerd offered to return part of this ter-
ritory to Swaziland?then a British protectorate?but Swaziland's rulers refused,
holding out for the entire area that had been ceded in 1880. In 1977, Pretoria es-
tablished the Kangwane homeland, which encompasses about one-third of the area
ceded by King Mbandzeni.
Kangwane, like most of the homelands, is endemically poor; its current annual per
capita income is only about $315, or about half that of neighboring Swaziland. Ag-
riculture accounts for about one-fourth of Kangwane's economic output, but only
15 percent of its agricultural production is marketed. Scant transport and
communications facilities, the existence of far better investment opportunities in
the nearby Johannesburg area, and Pretoria's longstanding policy of encouraging
manufacturers to locate plants outside the homelands under its border industries
program, have combined to keep industrialization in Kangwane to a minimum.
Government services and small businesses account for most of the homeland's
modern-sector economic activity.
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As is the case with the other homelands, most income is earned outside
Kangwane's borders. Migrants working in Transvaal cities, especially in the
Johannesburg area, remit about 70 percent of the homeland's income. Commuters
working in nearby cities account for another 10 percent.
For Pretoria, amalgamation of Kangwane with Swaziland has been an opportunity
to rectify South Africa's longstanding border disagreement with Swaziland, get rid
of an impoverished region, and remove an estimated 716,000 ethnic Swazis from
South Africa's overall black population of 22 million. The issue gained public
attention last December when the Kangwane Legislative Assembly, angered that
the homeland was not represented in Swaziland's negotiations with South Africa,
rejected amalgamation outright.
In mid-1982, Pretoria stepped up its efforts to shed Kangwane?in our view,
because of the advanced age of the Swazi king and uncertainty about the attitudes
of a successor. South Africa announced in June 1982 that agreement with the
Government of Swaziland had been reached on transferring Kangwane and
Ngwavuma?the northern portion of the KwaZulu homeland?to Swaziland. A
few days later the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and cabinet were abolished
and administration was taken over by the South African Ministry of Cooperation
and Development.
KwaZulu officials filed, and won, three challenges before the South African
Supreme Court. The court ruled that Pretoria had failed to consult that
homeland's government?as required under various South African laws?before
announcing its intention to make the transfer. Kangwane officials also filed suit.
Expecting, in our view, that Kangwane would win its case, Pretoria agreed in
November 1982 to an out-of-court settlement, whereby it would pay all court costs
incurred by Kangwane. At the same time, the Kangwane Legislative Assembly
and cabinet were reinstated. We believe the transfer issue could eventually
reemerge, however, because the commission established to investigate the views of
all parties on the transfers still functions. Moreover, Swaziland continues to insist
on the "return" of the disputed territories.
The question of amalgamation has divided Kangwane's traditional and elected
leaders. During King Sobhuza's reign, Kangwane's traditional headmen and chiefs
supported amalgamation, wanting to be united with Swaziland under its monarch.
On the other hand, the popular Kangwane Chief Minister, Enos Mabuza, speaking
for the homeland government and most of its people, has strongly opposed
unification.
Although most residents of Kangwane seem to support amalgamation, it is
difficult to determine the views of the widely scattered ethnic Swazi population
living elsewhere in South Africa. Chief Minister Mabuza has asserted that these
people oppose any move that would eliminate their South African citizenship and
give Pretoria even tighter control over their access to jobs in white areas.
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We believe that most traditional headmen and chiefs in both Kangwane and
Swaziland still want to pursue the transfers, but that with Sobhuza's death their
ability to influence the situation has been reduced. Moreover, some government
officials in Swaziland, aware of the drawbacks of amalgamating these economical-
ly weak regions, are opposed to the transfers, and now that Sobhuza is gone they
are likely to voice their misgivings openly. The judicial obstacles are surmountable:
since the South African constitution allows retroactive changes in the law, the
Parliament could make the transfer legal by altering the laws that require Pretoria
to consult with the homelands. Amalgamation of Kangwane and Ngwavuma with
Swaziland would set a precedent for turning over other homelands to neighboring
countries with which they are tribally linked, such as Bophuthatswana to
Botswana and Qwaqwa to Lesotho.
In contrast to most of the other small, isolated homelands, Kangwane seems to
have an open, efficient, responsive government. Chief Minister Mabuza has
asserted that during the period in 1982 when the South African Ministry of
Cooperation and Development controlled administration of the homeland, many
civil servants staged a work slowdown and others took extended vacations
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Enos Mabuza, Chief Minister of Kangwane, temporarily lost his position in 1982,
when Pretoria dissolved the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and placed the
homeland under the administration of the South African Department of Coopera-
tion and Development. Mabuza filed suit to reverse South Africa's action, and in
November 1982 Pretoria rescinded its decree in an out-of-court settlement.
Mabuza holds two degrees in psychology from the University of South Africa. He
was a school inspector until he entered politics in 1976. In 1977, as a member of
the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and leader of the Inyandza National
Movement?a Kangwane political party?Mabuza defeated the territory's Chief
Executive Councilor, Mkholishi Dlamini, and served briefly in that post. Subse-
quently, the South African Supreme Court disclaimed the voting results on a
technicality and Dlamini returned to the Legislative Assembly as its head until
1978
Normally quiet-mannered, Mabuza has publicly displayed "controlled, cold
anger" over the South African plan to merge his homeland with Swaziland,
according to US Embassy officials. He is about 43 years old. Mabuza is married
and has several children.
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Geographic and Demo-
graphic Features
KWANDEBELE
KwaNdebele is little more than a dormitory compound for the Pretoria-Johannes-
burg area. South Africa nonetheless is trying to prompt the homeland to accept
"independence" by offering it additional land. Should this effort fail, we believe
that Pretoria might eventually try to turn KwaNdebele over to Bophuthatswana or
to nearby and tribally linked Lebowa.
The South Ndebele people of the KwaNdebele homeland broke away centuries ago
from the Nguni-speaking peoples of present-day Natal. Members of the tribe
subsequently dispersed through much of central Transvaal Province and were
forced to live among their more populous neighbors, especially the Tswana and
North Sotho.
South Africa created KwaNdebele, the last homeland to be formed, in 1977.
Pretoria apparently was surprised by the heightened ethnic tensions that were
triggered by KwaNdebele's birth. Land taken from Lebowa and given to
KwaNdebele intensified ethnic frictions between Lebowa's dominant North Sotho
and the South Ndebele. Moreover, many of the South Ndebele wanted to remain
in Lebowa with their North Ndebele kin, who form a minority in that homeland.
KwaNdebele?a single parcel of land less than half the size of Rhode Island?dif-
fers from the other homelands in that the vast majority of its people have moved
there voluntarily. The US Embassy points to the relative absence of attitudes of
hopelessness and anomie and the presence of a well-organized community
leadership as key factors differentiating KwaNdebele from other homelands.
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The homeland's population was estimated at 32,000 in 1970; today South African
officials estimate it at 166,000 (KwaNdebele officials claim the population is 25X1
500,000). An independent survey by the private South African Human Sciences
Research Council found that 55 percent of the new arrivals came from rural areas
in Transvaal Province, 30 percent from Bophuthatswana (mostly from the
Winterveld squatter area), 8 percent from white urban areas, and most of the
remaining 7 percent from Lebowa.
According to the US Embassy in Pretoria, the South Ndebele value the
KwaNdebele homeland as a place where they are not subject to the control of oth-
er ethnic groups as they were in Bophuthatswana and Lebowa. They are content to
have secure land ownership instead of the uncertainty of squatting in white South
Africa, and they are gratified that their children can speak their native language
in school. They attach particular importance to being able to live within
commuting distance of Pretoria (75 kilometers away) and Johannesburg (125
kilometers away).
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Economic Activity
Political Developments
KwaNdebele has no known mineral resources, limited water supplies, little fertile
land, and scant commercial or manufacturing activity. Nearly all businesses are
family-owned and staffed, and only 5 percent of these employ four or more people.
Most businesses have no electricity or running water. Only 12 percent of the
average household's income is earned within the borders of KwaNdebele, and the
homeland, like many others, is a labor pool for white cities. The number of buses
leaving daily for Pretoria .has doubled in recent months, reflecting the homeland's
population explosion and the dearth of local job opportunities.
The KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly voted in May 1982 to seek "indepen-
dence" from South Africa. According to the US Embassy, Chief Minister Simon
Skosana subsequently predicted that "independence" would not be achieved for
five years, an estimate with which at least one senior South African official agrees.
Before Pretoria grants "independence," KwaNdebele will need the symbols of
nationhood?a capital, office buildings, paved roads, and the like?which it lacks
at present. In contrast to its tough approach with other homelands on the issue of
additional land, Pretoria has announced plans to transfer small portions of land
from Bophuthatswana and Lebowa to KwaNdebele.
KwaNdebele already shows signs of becoming a petty dictatorship. In May 1981,
for example, officials of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations and
the South African Council of Churches were detained by a local headman for 10
hours without any charge being placed against them. According to Embassy
reporting, the detainees concluded that local officials feared the group might
publicize the political conditions they had witnessed in the homeland. Reports in
the South African press indicate that KwaNdebele's cabinet?appointed by
Pretoria?tends to ignore the wishes of the people. Members of the cabinet,
according to these same press reports, are viewed by the population as inexperi-
enced, poorly educated, heavyhanded, and unpopular.
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Leader
Simon Skosana has been Chief Minister of KwaNdebele, the newest South
African homeland, since 1981. Since the mid-1960s, Skosana has led the
movement to unite his South Ndebele people in their own territory. In 1977, he be-
came Chief Executive Officer of the Ndebele Territorial Authority, a forerunner
of the homeland. Despite Skosana's public statements that he favors free
enterprise, KwaNdebele citizens?according to the South African press?have
complained that business opportunities in the homeland are tightly controlled by a
few politicians.
Skosana, who is about 45 years old, is depicted by the South African press as a
prosperous businessman. He attended night school through approximately the
fifth-grade level.
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KWAZULU
KwaZulu has been a self-governing homeland since 1978. Chief Minister Gatsha
Buthelezi has long rejected "independence," but South African Government
spokesmen publicly assert that Buthelezi, by accepting self-governing status,
committed himself to eventual independence. Pretoria, in our view, tolerates
Buthelezi's intransigence because the popular support he gains for taking such a
stance tends to fragment black nationalism in South Africa. Pretoria's efforts to
transfer the northernmost parcel of KwaZulu to Swaziland have been blocked
indefinitely by court challenges. We believe, however, that South Africa could yet
pass legislation legalizing the transfer?even though this would anger the coun-
try's 6 million Zulu.
KwaZulu's fragmented character?the homeland is comprised of 19 large and
about 45 small parcels of land?stems from the confrontation between Boer
settlers, the British, and the Zulus in the 19th century. Originally, Zulus were
protected by the colonial government from encroachment by white settlers, but the
needs of the colonial economy soon won out and the blacks lost much of their land.
In the war of 1879 the Zulus were defeated by the whites, their king exiled, and
their kingdom broken into separate chieftaincies. After 1904, when all African
territory was opened to white settlement, Zulu landholdings fell by 40 percent
within a decade, and many in the tribe were pushed onto less desirable land.
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Today, about half of South Africa's Zulus live in KwaZulu, where the average
population density is four times greater than in the rest of South Africa. The land
is overgrazed and eroded, and malnutrition is common, especially among children.
A drought in 1981 was the worst in KwaZulu's history. Considering the
homeland's estimated population growth of 4.1 percent annually?due in part to
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KwaZulu has virtually no prospect of becoming economically self-sufficient. Like
the other homelands, it is heavily dependent on Pretoria for economic assistance
and employment of a large segment of its population 25X1
An educational system aimed at providing only minimum literary skills has left
KwaZulu short of businessmen and administrators. These factors, together with a
lack of credit and banking facilities, weak infrastructure, and high transport costs,
have severely limited local business ownership. The result is that nearly all of the
industry in the homeland?located almost exclusively in the Isethebe industrial
zone north of Durban?is white-owned.
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Over 90 percent of the homeland's wage earners are employed in white South
Africa. Only 8 percent of KwaZulu's paid employment is within the homeland.
Kwa Zulu accounts for about 10 percent of South Africa's population, but it
contributes less than 1 percent of the total gross domestic product.
Agriculture is primarily at a subsistence level: only about a third of the homeland's
food supply is locally produced. With most of the men and half of the women
working in white South Africa, farming is left to the remaining women, children,
and old people, who manage to cultivate only half the arable land.
A land tenure system, in which individual families are assigned farm plots by the
local chief, is also partly responsible for KwaZulu's low agricultural production.
Zulus have little incentive to invest in the land, conserve the soil, or use good hus-
bandry techniques. Large cattle herds have historically been used as insurance
against drought and as status symbols; they are seldom used for income. Thus, less
than 1 percent of the herd is slaughtered annually, compared with 10 to 20 percent
annually for income-producing herds on white-owned farms in South Africa.
Chief Minister Buthelezi, unlike the leaders of the other homelands, aspires to and
shows some potential for a wider South African political role. Through his
leadership of Inkatha?the National Cultural Liberation Movement?Buthelezi
has been able to build a substantial political base both inside and outside
KwaZulu.
Inkatha, originally organized as a Zulu cultural institution in the 1920s, was
reshaped by Buthelezi in the mid-1970s to mobilize wide support for his political
and social policies. The organization currently claims about 300,000 members-20
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KwaZulu. Makeshift buildings
in a resettlement area
percent of whom the organization says are non-Zulu?making it the largest black
political organization in South Africa. Inkatha's vague platform of black national-
ism calls for majority rule, political and economic equality for blacks, and the
maintenance of Zulu cultural identity.
Buthelezi has consistently rejected "independence" for KwaZulu, arguing instead
for a national political role for blacks. At the same time, he has demanded greater
land concessions from South Africa to consolidate the fragmented homeland.
Pretoria in the past has paid lipservice to KwaZulu's demands for more land, but
opposition from whites and financial considerations have kept Pretoria from going
forward with extensive consolidation of the homeland.
A commission set up by Buthelezi to explore alternatives to "independence" for
KwaZulu released its report in May 1982. It concluded that a joint regional
government for KwaZulu and South Africa's Natal Province?with white, Zulu,
and Indian participation?was both feasible and desirable. Pretoria rejected the
Commission's recommendations, which conflicted with South Africa's plans for
eventual "independence" for all the homelands. Despite Pretoria's rejection, we
believe KwaZulu and Natal officials will continue to strive for some sort of
political association between the two within this decade.
In early 1982 KwaZulu was drawn into South Africa's plan to transfer the
Kangwane homeland to Swaziland when Pretoria added Ngwavuma?the north-
ern portion of KwaZulu?to its offer to the Swazis. Acquisition of Ngwavuma
would give landlocked Swaziland a route to the sea. Three successful court
challenges by KwaZulu officials to Pretoria's right to cede Ngwavuma to
Swaziland have blocked the transfer indefinitely. But Swaziland officials say they
still want the land, and the South African Parliament could pass legislation
legitimizing the transfer, thereby skirting the court decisions.
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Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu since 1978, is one of
South Africa's most dynamic and renowned black leaders. Since 1976, he has also
been president of Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement), South
Africa's largest black political organization. As Chief Minister and head of
Inkatha, Buthelezi leads approximately 6 million Zulu nationwide. Despite his
widespread popularity among the Zulu, Buthelezi has been criticized over the
years by other blacks (and some Zulu) for working solely within the system to
achieve change.
Buthelezi was born on 2 August 1928. He attended the University of Fort Hare
but was expelled in 1950 for taking part in a student demonstration against a visit-
ing British dignitary. He resumed his studies at the University of Natal and
received a B.A. degree in history and Bantu administration. Alert, energetic, and
cheerful, Buthelezi is an eloquent speaker. In 1977, while on a speaking tour in the
United States, he met with President Carter in Washington?the first official
meeting between a South African black leader and a US President. He is a
hereditary chief of the Buthelezi clan.
He is married and has several children.
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Geographic and Demo-
graphic Features
LEBOWA
Lebowa is among the least known and publicized of the homelands as a result of its
relatively remote location in semiarid northern Transvaal and its lack of well-
known political leaders. Despite repeated refusals of "independence" by Chief
Minister Cedric Phatudi, the US Embassy reports that Pretoria wants to divest it-
self of this impoverished homeland. Since Lebowa is not adjacent to and therefore
could not be absorbed by any black African country, we believe Pretoria will offer
financial incentives to persuade it to accept independence.
The people of Lebowa, which became a self-governing homeland in 1972, belong to
a variety of tribes. Most are members of the North Sotho tribal group, but small
numbers of North Ndebele also live there. The North Sotho grouping consists of
12 large tribes, each of which has several subtribes. The various groups had
trouble agreeing even on the name for the homeland; "Lebowa," meaning north,
was a compromise solution.
Demands by members of the South Ndebele group for their own homeland
prompted Pretoria in 1977 to declare an area that had been the southernmost
parcel of Lebowa a new homeland, KwaNdebele. Since then, some of the North
Ndebele in Lebowa have voiced interest in merging with KwaNdebele.
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Lebowa is the third largest of South Africa's homelands, combining two large and
four small parcels in an area slightly larger than Massachusetts. With an assigned
population of 2.5 million in 1980, it also is the third most populous homeland.
About three-fifths of the assigned residents actually live there. Pretoria's resettle-
ment of blacks from white areas, primarily Johannesburg and rural areas in
northern Transvaal, caused Lebowa's residential population growth during the 25X1
1970s to rise to 4.2 percent annually. The population growth rate without
resettlement was 3.7 percent annually, on a par with most other homelands.
During the late 1970s, South African authorities ordered 3,000 to 4,000 North
Sotho who had inhabited a fertile valley in Lebowa for over a century to move to
land that was less productive and farther from white areas. These people had
formed a self-sufficient and stable community for generations, and many had
commuted daily to jobs in nearby white areas.
Pretoria took the area from Lebowa ostensibly to straighten the boundary, but
many of the affected blacks believed they were being removed so that white
farmers could have their fertile land. Most were unwilling to move to poor land or
to give up daily commuting to live instead in single-sex dormitories near their jobs.
As a result, only about 350 people voluntarily followed their chief to the new area.
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Political Developments
Some of the others were forced to join their chief, and about 1,500 fled to a nearby
area in Lebowa, where they settled among their ethnic kin and could still commute
to work in white cities.
Economic Activity
Economic activity in Lebowa consists of subsistence agriculture, chrome ore and
asbestos mining, light manufacturing, retail sales, housing and road construction,
and government service. Locally earned per capita income averaged less than $100
in the mid-1970s. Even the addition of migrant income lifted the per capita
average for the same period to only about $220.
South African subsidies averaged nearly 75 percent of Lebowa's operating budget
in 1975-79?a higher proportion than Pretoria has assumed for most of the
homelands. The South Africans further increased Lebowa's annual allocation
during the 1979-81 period.
Only 20 percent of Lebowa's wage earners work in the homeland. Another 25
percent commute to jobs in nearby white areas?mostly in Pietersburg, about 10
kilometers from the border?and the remaining 55 percent have migrated to
distant white areas, mainly Johannesburg.
Mineral production within the homeland was valued at $75 million in 1979, but
tion has limited the available jobs, profits are repatriated to white South Africa,
processing takes place outside the homeland, and Lebowan wages are spent
primarily in white-owned stores.
Chief Minister Phatudi has consistently rejected "independence" for Lebowa. In
1979 Phatudi established a select committee of the Legislative Assembly to
investigate alternatives for the homeland. The committee's report recommended
rejection of "independence" and also called for territorial consolidation. Even
though South Africa subsidizes such a large share of Lebowa's operating budget,
Phatudi has repeatedly accused Pretoria of financially favoring the homelands that
are willing to accept "independence."
Phatudi seems rapidly to be losing popular support within Lebowa. A long-term
resident of Soweto, Phatudi is considered an outsider by most residents of the
exploration and exploitation have yielded few benefits locally. Indeed, mechaniza-
homeland. According to US Embassy reporting, he also tends to rule by fiat rather
than by traditional consensus building, and his government is generally regarded
locally as corrupt.
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Cedric Namedi Phatudi has been Chief Minister of Lebowa since 1973. He has fre-
quently stressed the homeland government's commitment to free enterprise and
has encouraged private US and white South African investment in Lebowa.
Phatudi has headed the ruling Lebowa People's Party since 1973. Strongly anti-
Soviet, he has been friendly with US Embassy officers in Pretoria. Embassy
officials have noted that because Phatudi rules in an authoritarian manner rather
than by consensus, political opposition to him has developed since 1979. These
same officials also note that Phatudi, who resided in Soweto until the early 1970s,
is regarded as an outsider by many Lebowans. He has also provoked criticism
among local residents through his continued push to rename the homeland capital,
Lebowakgomo, Phatudi City.
Phatudi was born in 1912. After teaching school during the early 1940s, he earned
a B.A. degree in history and the English and North Sotho languages from the Uni-
versity of Fort Hare in 1947 and a B.Ed. degree from the University of
Witwatersrand in 1960. He was subsequently a school principal and supervisor of
education.
Articulate and persuasive, Phatudi is reserved and has a courtly manner. US
Embassy officials have observed that he is vulnerable to flattery. The Chief
Minister has written and published many works in the North Sotho language,
including translations of Shakespeare. He is an elder of the Dutch Reformed
Church. He is married and has several children.
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Economic Activity
QWAQWA
The South African Government is considering two options for the future of the
tiny homeland of Qwaqwa. Pretoria may:
? Decide to give Qwaqwa more land as an inducement to accept "independence,"
even though there is no possibility that this homeland can become economically
viable.
? Choose to give Qwaqwa to neighboring Lesotho, where most of the homeland's
tribal group live.
We believe that the South Africans would prefer to transfer Qwaqwa to Lesotho
but that they will not take any action before the issue of transferring Kangwane
and Ngwavuma to Swaziland is finally settled.
Qwaqwa is inhabited by the South Sotho people, who broke away over 300 years
ago from the Tswana tribe in the region that is now Bophuthatswana and migrated
southward. Almost all of the 135 tribes that make up the South Sotho grouping
now live in Lesotho; only three of these tribes are in Qwaqwa.
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During the 1970s, Qwaqwa's population soared from 25,000 to an estimated
155,000, primarily because of Pretoria's program of removing blacks from the
cities of white South Africa and resettling them in the homelands. Most South So-
tho remained in white areas, however, while others found jobs through hiring
offices in the homeland and subsequently returned to South ikfrica. At present
only about 10 percent of Qwaqwa's assigned population resides there?the lowest
rate of any homeland. Most of the remaining 90 percent live and work on white
farms in Orange Free State or in South African cities, especially Johannesburg.
Pretoria's strategy of enticing blacks to Qwaqwa by not building secondary schools
for them in Orange Free State towns and by expanding Qwaqwa's educational 25X1
facilities beyond the homeland's immediate needs has attracted an estimated
70,000 students. As a result, Qwaqwa has many students, but few adults. Three
out of four of these students come from families remaining in white areas. 25X1
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fact that only one-tenth of the land is arable, population pressure on the land
actually farmed is severe. Moreover, at least one-third of Qwaqwa's good farmland
is occupied by shantytowns that have sprung up in recent years.
Buttressed by Pretoria's heavy budget subsidies and migrant remittances, Qwaq-
wa's governmental expenditures annually exceed locally generated income by
nearly three times. The homeland is unable to produce enough food for its
population and?like most of the homelands?depends on South Africa to make
up the difference.
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Political Developments
The few jobs that exist in Qwaqwa are found in government, construction, and a
few light industries geared to the local market. Economic development is severely
hampered by a lack of good roads, communications, and other facilities. In 1976,
Qwaqwa's local per capita income was about $70. Even if commuter income and
migrant remittances are taken into account, per capita income amounted to only
about $210 per year?roughly on a par with Africa's poorest countries.
Chief Minister T. K. Mopeli has said he will accept "independence" for Qwaqwa
only if the Thaba `Nchu area of Bophuthatswana is included in the package. The
annexation of Thaba `Nchu would approximately double Qwaqwa's size. Bophuth-
atswana and Qwaqwa have long disputed the Thaba `Nchu area, which is
inhabited mostly by South Sotho.
The US Embassy in Maseru reports that Bophuthatswana's President Mangope
has said his government will never agree to give up the disputed area. Nonetheless,
the Embassy reports that Pretoria is considering such a transfer.
Meanwhile, the government of neighboring Lesotho argues that Qwaqwa and
Thaba `Nchu should be part of that country.
in our view, Lesotho would resist absorbing
Qwaqwa because doing so would heavily burden Lesotho's fragile economy.
Nonetheless, if Pretoria were to succeed in transfering Kangwane to Swaziland,
we believe it will press hard?and probably successfully?for the amalgamation of
Qwaqwa, without Thaba `Nchu, into Lesotho.
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Camera Press ?
Tsiame Kenneth Mopeli has been Chief Minister of Qwaqwa since 1975. He has
publicly condemned apartheid, but has stated that change in South Africa can be
accomplished through peaceful means.
Mopeli was born on 20 September 1930. He began teaching school in 1951 and by
1974 he was an inspector of black schools in the Orange Free State. In 1974, he re-
ceived a B.A. degree in Afrikaans and Dutch from the University of South Africa.
Mopeli's political career began in 1969, when he was nominated a member of the
Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly. A son of a hereditary South Sotho chief, Mopeli
was entitled to one of the 26 appointed seats in the 40-member assembly. In 1974,
he relinquished his appointed seat to form the Dikwankwetla Party, which in 1975
won the first general election in Qwaqwa. He was subsequently named Chief
Minister.
Mopeli is quiet and reserved. He has written two radio plays on the history of
Qwaqwa. Until 1971 he was an elder in the Dutch Reformed Church. He enjoys
reading and gardening. Mopeli is married and has several children.
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Geographic and
Demographic Features
Economic Activity
TRANSKEI
Six years after becoming the first homeland to receive its "independence" from
South Africa, Transkei remains mired in poverty and dependent on Pretoria for
budget support and jobs for its unemployed. Transkei citizens, meanwhile, are still
being forcibly removed from South Africa.
President Kaiser Matanzima has suppressed political opposition. In doing so, he
has patterned Transkei's security legislation after Pretoria's and has built up a
security force that depends heavily on South African assistance. Matanzima
supports Pretoria's goal of a South African?sponsored "constellation of states"
comprised of South Africa itself, the homelands, and Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland. The proposed transfer of some homeland territories to Swaziland has
led Prime Minister George Matanzima, the President's younger brother, to call for
creation of a single homeland for the Xhosa ethnic group.
Transkei, largest of the homelands, consists of one large and two small parcels of
land in a combined area slightly larger than Maryland and Delaware. Nine-tenths
of the land is hilly or mountainous, and much of it suffers from severe erosion due
to overgrazing of cattle. Rainfall and agricultural potential are greatest along the
coast and near the border with Lesotho.
Transkei's Xhosa speaking peoples arrived in the area in two waves. The first
group arrived before 1700 from areas to the north of present-day South Africa.
These Xhosa speakers fought a number of frontier wars with Dutch settlers
beginning in the middle of the 19th century. The second Xhosa influx into
Transkei occurred at the end of the 19th century as a result of the Zulu tribal con-
quests in the area of present-day KwaZulu, which forced the Xhosa to move
southward along the coast.
In 1970, about 55 percent of Transkei's assigned population of 3 million lived in
the homeland. By 1980, 59 percent of the 4.3 million people assigned to the
homeland lived there; the increase was largely a result of forced removals from
white South Africa. In addition to the Xhosa, the homeland contains about 75,000
South Sotho and 25,000 Zulu.
Transkei's abundant rainfall and numerous streams that flow out of the mountains
give it the highest agricultural potential of the homelands. A variety of political,
economic, and cultural factors, however, have seriously inhibited agricultural
modernization. The most important of these factors is land tenure. Land is
communally owned and arbitrarily allocated by the local chief. As a result, plots
are small, uneconomic, scattered, and often distant from the family home. The
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Political Developments
government is trying to encourage a more rational approach to land allocation, but
the chiefs oppose any reforms, fearing a loss of their power. Because the chiefs are
the backbone of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party, the laws are not
likely to be changed.
Transkei thus has realized little of its agricultural potential. Nearly 80 percent of
the people practice subsistence agriculture. Only one-fourth of the arable land is
cultivated, and the homeland produces only one-third of its food needs. Most of the
remaining land is used for grazing. Cattle are kept primarily as status symbols and
insurance for hard times, and are a cause of overgrazing and soil erosion. In 1976,
for example, fewer than 1 percent of the cattle were slaughtered, compared with
about 20 percent for white South Africa.
There are only about 50,000 wage-earning jobs in Transkei, and many of these are
in the government. Few people in Transkei can commute to jobs while living in the
homeland because economic activity in nearby areas of South Africa is limited.
Consequently, most workers migrate to distant cities, especially East London and
Cape Town
South Africa pays for three-fourths of the Transkei budget. In addition, it exerts
indirect control through seconded South African advisers, who hold key positions
in various ministries and the Transkei army.
The area that is now Transkei was annexed by Cape Colony in 1894. Whites
maintained jurisdiction until the early 1950s, when they started giving more
responsibility to local people. Self-government was granted in 1963. In 1974, the
Legislative Assembly requested "independence" from Pretoria, which was granted
on 26 October 1976.
Transkei's "independence" did not proceed as planned by President Matanzima.
Pretoria reneged on its agreement that the Transkei people would remain citizens
of South Africa. In addition, Pretoria decided that there would be two separate
Xhosa homelands?Transkei and Ciskei?because whites in the corridor between
the two areas feared that otherwise they would be removed from their land.
Matanzima's Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) won 68 of 75
contested seats in a Legislative Assembly election in 1976. However, the Matan-
zima government's imprisonment of the leader of the opposition Transkei Demo-
cratic Party just before the election, the government's appointment of traditional
chiefs to over half the seats, and the low voter turnout of 43 percent gave the vic-
tory a hollow ring. Within a year legislation had been passed that defined any op-
position to the government or any open suggestions that Transkei was not truly in-
dependent as treasonable offenses. Opposition leaders soon began fleeing to
Lesotho to request political asylum
President Matanzima, anxious to appear decisive after he had repeatedly tried to
acquire more land from South Africa with no results, took a bold step in 1978 by
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Transkei. Dry, treeless land-
scape, useful primarily for cat-
tle grazing
breaking diplomatic relations with Pretoria over the issue. Nonetheless, trade
representatives were quickly exchanged with full diplomatic immunity, and
Matanzima restored full diplomatic relations within two years.
In addition to suppressing opposition by arbitrary arrests and detentions and
passing legislation restricting the press and personal freedom of speech, the
Matanzima brothers have used their positions to enrich themselves financially. To
further reinforce his position, President Matanzima has increased the power, pay,
and privileges of the chiefs, who make up half of the Legislative Assembly.
According to the Embassy, the chiefs see Matanzima as their benefactor and
support him on all issues. The Embassy describes the Matanzima brothers as
feared rather than admired by most of the population.
The Transkei Government in November 1979 banned 34 organizations, including
the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and all
Black Consciousness organizations. The list of banned organizations virtually
duplicated Pretoria's list. Detentions of many leaders of the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) effectively eliminated that party by 1980.
Transkei's 800-man defense force virtually collapsed when South African advisers
were pulled out after diplomatic relations were severed in 1978. Even before this,
however, the force had been capable only of ceremonial functions and limited
operational duties. Matanzima fired the force's Transkeian commander in 1981
and replaced him with a white former Rhodesian officer. Today the force is
trained and led by hired whites and funded largely by Pretoria.
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Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima has dominated the politics of Transkei since 1976,
when South Africa granted the homeland "independence." He served as Trans-
kei's Prime Minister from 1976 until he assumed the presidency in 1979.
According to US Consular officials in Durban, Matanzima rules with little
restraint through a docile National Assembly and an inner circle of traditional
tribal chiefs. Generally feared by the people, Matanzima has imposed laws that
make it a crime to criticize the homeland's president or its government, and he has
moved swiftly to arrest Transkeian critics of his regime. Black and white South
African critics of Matanzima have compared his harsh regime to that of South Af-
rica. These same _critics have called him a puppet of Pretoria, partly because he
spearheaded the effort in the mid-1970s to convince the Transkei regime to accept
South Africa's offer of "independence." According to US Consular reporting,
Matanzima recognizes his dependence on Pretoria and has, therefore, generally
accommodated South African wishes. Matanzima's younger brother, George, is
Transkei's Prime Minister.
Matanzima was born on 15 June 1915. After receiving a B.A. degree in law and
politics in 1939 from the University of Fort Hare, Matanzima began his political
career. In 1940, he became chief of the Tembe people?a subgroup of the Xhosa
tribe. He passed the Transvaal bar exam in 1948 and was elected Chief Minister
of Transkei in 1963. Matanzima has been divorced twice. He and his present wife
have several children.
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Geographic and Demo-
graphic Features
Economic Activities
VENDA
Venda, "independent" since September 1979, is located in a remote area of
northern Transvaal near South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
Its isolation has hindered the development of industry and ensured a high rate of
emigration to white South Africa and a heavy dependence on subsistence
agriculture. In addition, Venda's unpopular President Patrick Mphephu has used a
variety of tactics to suppress both real and imagined political opponents.
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The Venda tribal group is linguistically related to the Shona of Zimbabwe and the
Sotho of the northern Transvaal. The Venda first moved into the area from
Zimbabwe in about 1700. Contact with whites began in 1836, but it was not until
the early 20th century, after the Anglo-Boer War, that the Venda were brought
under the administrative control of the Transvaal Government
Venda is located in the most fertile part of northern Transvaal. Only 10 percent of
the homeland is arable, but nearly two-thirds of that area is under cultivation.
Roughly the size of Delaware, Venda is divided into one large and one small
parcel. Between 1970 and 1980, Pretoria's forced resettlement drove the rate of in-
crease in resident population to over 5 percent annually, increasing the population
from about 270,000 to 450,000.
Venda is the most isolated of all the homelands from centers of white population.
Nearly all of its farmers engage in subsistence agriculture because there is scant
incentive to produce crops for distant cities. As is the case in several other
homelands, the large number of cattle in Venda has led to overgrazing, resulting in
excessive soil erosion.
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One bright spot, however, is a 40,000-hectare tree plantation?planted in the
1940s by the South African Government and now controlled by the Venda
Government?that will shortly begin yielding wood for processing and sale to
South Africa. The US Embassy reports that, if the plantation is successful, it may
be expanded by another 9,000 hectares. A 500-hectare tea plantation has started
production; conditions for tea cultivation are excellent, but inefficient operations
and high transport costs make Venda's tea about twice as expensive as other tea
imported into South Africa. 25X1
Local efforts at industrial development have failed. Venda has virtually no
supporting services for industry, and transportation and communications links with
South Africa are few. An industrial development consultant hired by Venda a few
years ago concluded that it was futile to try to create local industrial jobs because
Venda is destined to remain a labor exporter. Of the more than 3,000 people who
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Venda. Women carrying water
(u)
Political Developments
enter the homeland's labor market annually, most depart for widely scattered
cities in white South Africa in search of employment. Moreover, a high proportion
of local income is spent in white-owned stores in nearby white areas, or in local
stores that are covertly owned by Indian merchants who send their profits out of
Venda.
The US Embassy describes Mphephu as a semiliterate and unpopular figure who
has Pretoria's support because he can be manipulated easily. Mphephu has been
rejected twice by Venda voters, but he has stayed in power by packing the
legislature with nominated chiefs who outnumber elected representatives.
Venda held its first election in 1973. Mphephu's Venda National Party (VNP) was
opposed by the Venda Independence Party (VIP). The VIP won 14 of the 18
contested seats. Mphephu then whisked the 42 appointed chiefs, who constituted a
majority of the Venda Parliament, away to a nearby resort. On their return, after
several days of feting, they all backed Mphephu, who became Chief Minister.
The VIP was again victorious in the 1978 election, winning 31 of the 42 contested
seats. Mphephu, using emergency powers, detained a number of the newly elected
VIP legislators until the appointed chiefs had chosen him as Prime Minister. At
"independence" in 1979 Mphephu was installed as President.
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Venda. Lack of facilities and
employment opportunities lead
many men to migrate to white
cities
Mphephu had 14 people arrested following an ANC grenade attack in late 1981 on
a police station in the capital in which two policemen were killed. The detainees in-
cluded four of the nine Lutheran pastors in Venda who had ministered to the 60
percent of the Venda population that is Lutheran. The four were tortured,
according to the US Embassy in Pretoria.
Alarm over the detentions and reported torture was widespread. Even Die
Vaderland, an Afrikaner newspaper that favors Pretoria's homelands policy,
attacked the Venda Government. Mphephu's government subsequently dropped all
charges against the clergymen in exchange for pleas of guilty to lesser charges.
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The VIP, according to US Embassy reporting, plans to step up the number of po-
litical rallies and other activities. The party is led by Gilbert Bakane, who claims
to have the support of 80 percent of the Venda people, including most of those liv-
ing outside the homeland. Bakane, who lives in Soweto, recognizes that he will be
detained if he returns to Venda to take his seat in parliament. Aside from its oppo-
sition to "independence," the VIP differs little from the VNP. Both parties are
moderately socialist and opposed to the ANC.
We believe ANC infiltration into Venda from Mozambique and Zimbabwe is a
distinct possibility because of their proximity and?in Zimbabwe's case?tribal
and cultural ties. To prevent such penetration, the Venda National Force (VNF),
an anti-insurgency unit with about 600 personnel, patrols the north of the
homeland in cooperation with the South African Defense Force (SADF). Aside
from these patrols, the VNF's activities are primarily ceremonial. The VNF, like
the security units of the other "independent" homelands, is subordinate to the
geographic commands of the South African Defense Forces.
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Patrick Ramaano Mphephu has been President of Venda since he led the
homeland to accept "independence" from South Africa in 1979. Since that time,
the Western press has characterized him as a manifestly unpopular, corrupt, and
incompetent administrator. Although Mphephu has long had the support of the
South African Government, South African diplomats in Venda have confided to
US Embassy officials that Mphephu lacks sound political judgment. These
diplomats have also stated that Mphephu, despite his autocratic ways, does not
control the government and that traditional chiefs frequently act independently
and only later inform him of their actions.
Born on 4 February 1925, Mphephu holds a junior certificate?the equivalent of a
fifth-grade education?from the Vendaland Institution. In 1951, he became
chairman of the local tribal authority and of the newly formed Ramabulana
Regional Authority?a legislative body. According to a British press report,
Mphephu speaks haltingly in his native language and needs an interpreter for
others. He is married.
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Figure 1
South Africa: Black Homelands
Lebowa
a debele KangJine
ran aal Louievil
Maputo
*
.Keetmanshoop
Mbabane
SWAZI AND
Hotazel?
FreeKimberley State
Bloernfontein?
Thaba Nchu
(Bophuthatswana)
.Bitterfontein
Middelburg.
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
? Beaufort West
Gteat FIsh
Cape Town
N
Port Elizabeth
East London
Durban