WEST AFRICA: BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR THE WESTERN SAHEL

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 JireernrAre ni UGLI Gi
ALA 83-10001
January 1983
247
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Intelligence
West Africa:
Bleak Prospects for
the Western Sahel
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Intelligence
West Africa:
Bleak Prospects for
the Western Sahel
This paper was prepared byl Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
with the National Intelligence Council. Comments
and queries are welcome and should be addressed
to the Chief, West and East Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 83-10001
January 1983
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West Africa:
Bleak Prospects for
the Western Sahel
Key Judgments We believe that deteriorating economic conditions and growing social and
Information available political tensions in the states of the Western Sahel-Niger, Mali, Upper
as of 17 December 1982 Volta, Senegal,.The Gambia, and Cape Verde-make for increasing
was used in this report.
instability over the decade and that this will be detrimental to US interests.
These impoverished, drought-plagued nations are prime targets for Libyan
destabilization efforts and attract Soviet political meddling, including
efforts to secure airfields and ports. Although substantial Western aid
helps meet the region's needs, we believe the underlying political, social,
and economic problems are so great that the Libyans and Soviets will for
the foreseeable future find openings to exploit
In our view, the countries of the Western Sahel, with some of the world's
lowest per capita incomes, will remain among the poorest and least
developed. They probably will become even more dependent than they are
on foreign assistance to prevent economic collapse. We agree with World
Bank analysts that the region's embattled governments-staggered by
global recession and near bankruptcy-have little choice but to continue
economic reform measures that include cutting public spending, abandon-
ing socialist policies, and encouraging private enterprise. Despite these
efforts, however, we believe these resource-deficient countries will find it
extremely difficult in the 1980s to achieve sustained economic growth or
assure adequate food for their people.
We believe deep-seated economic, tribal, religious, and political divisions
will be magnified by the inability of whoever governs to reduce population
growth rates (now about 2.5 percent annually), stem rural to urban
migration, and halt declines in living standards. As a consequence, we
expect that support for current governments will erode and that leaders will
face widespread urban protest and violence and frequent coup attempts.
We judge that the Western Sahel will prove increasingly susceptible to
Libyan blandishments as the demand for foreign financial assistance
becomes more acute. Playing on this need and on internal stresses, the
Libyans will prove unrelenting in their efforts to exploit tribal cleavages,
urban discontent, and Islamic dissidence. In our view, the ability of
Sahelian leaders to respond to these challenges will remain limited.
We also believe that Sahelian leaders will seek increased economic and
military aid from Western governments, Western and international finan-
cial institutions, and the conservative Persian Gulf states in an effort to
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ALA 83-10001
January 1983
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maintain their grip on power and to forestall the threat of further Libyan
adventurism. We judge that shortfalls in future Western and international
aid will leave Sahelian states with little alternative but to seek greater
accommodation with Tripoli. We predict that the pressure on the United
States to become more involved in propping up Sahelian states will grow if
France-the region's traditional benefactor-and other donors prove un-
able or unwilling to assume a higher aid burden. In our view, the reliability
of the United States as an ally of friendly African governments will be
measured throughout West Africa increasingly by Washington's willing-
ness to help meet economic needs.
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Options and Prospects 11
1. Western Sahel: Economic Activity
4. Western Sahel: Total Official Development Assistance
Disbursements, 1974-80
3. Western Sahel: Agricultural Indicators
4. Western Sahel: Military Strength, 1981
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Figure 1
Western Sahel: Economic Activity
A I g e r i a
ATLANTIC
Cape Verde
Sal
a
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Praia
*Dakar
Senegal
Banjul
OCEAN,
Al Bauxite
Au Gold
Fe Iron
Mn Manganese
0 Oil
U Uranium
Cotton
Peanuts
Sahel
Malabo
Equatorial Guin
Boundary representation is ? ~'
not napes. My authordarire. Sao Tome and Principe Gabon
J ! to
Fe 1 n
Niamey
Bamako ppeAI Volta N'Djamena
*
0 gadougou
Benin
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West Africa:
Bleak Prospects for
the Western Sahel
Introduction
Reporting from US Embassies over the past year
indicates that the predominantly Muslim countries of
the Western Sahel'-most of them moderate and pro-
Western-will prove increasingly susceptible to for-
eign meddling, especially by Libya. In our judgment,
the ability of these militarily weak and economically
fragile governments to respond to threats from more
powerful countries in the region is limited. Although
many West Sahelian leaders have proved adept at
uncovering and foiling coup attempts, they have had
little success in dealing with the underlying causes of
domestic political instability or the region's severe
structural economic problems. As a consequence, the
area's leaders increasingly look to Western nations-
particularly the United States and France-to provide
greater economic and security assistance.
This paper examines US interests in the Western
Sahel, the region's growing economic, social, and
political vulnerabilities, the threat of outside subver-
sion, and France's role. We thus seek to establish a
baseline for estimating the Western Sahel's prospects
and the resulting implications for the United States.
US Interests in the Western Sahel
US Embassy reporting indicates that since the early
1970s US interests in the Western Sahel have expand-
ed from largely humanitarian concerns to include a
major commitment to the region's economic develop-
ment and a recognition of its geopolitical importance.
In our view, US aid has become an important factor
in maintaining the economic solvency and political
' The Sahel (meaning desert's edge in Arabic) is a geographic belt
that extends along the southern edge of the Sahara from Chad to
the Atlantic Ocean. This paper focuses on the six, little-studied
countries of the Western Sahel-Niger, Mali, Upper Volta, Sene-
gal, The Gambia, and Cape Verde-which share common social,
economic, and political characteristics despite marked variations in
population size, area, and colonial background. Chad, because of
chaotic political conditions, and Mauritania, with its heavy Arab
heritage, are sufficiently different that we chose not to include
stability of the pro-Western governments of Senegal,
The Gambia, and Upper Volta, as well as of Niger,
which is the fifth-largest producer of uranium in the
world. Even left-leaning Cape Verde and Mali, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, consciously strive.
to project a nonaligned image, in part because of their
overwhelming dependence on US and Western finan-
cial and technical aid. According to a Department of
State study, about 25 percent of all US bilateral
development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa for
the 1983 fiscal year-almost $60 million-is targeted
for the six countries of the Western Sahel; an addi-
tional $28 million is earmarked for regional assistance
to the Sahel.
In our view, Niger, Mali, and Upper Volta-located
at the crossroads between North Africa and coastal
West Africa-serve as a buffer between expansionist-
minded Libya in the north and Liberia, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Ivory Coast, where the United States
has significant economic and political interests. The
location of Senegal and Cape Verde on the bulge of
West Africa sets them astride important mid-Atlantic
sea and air lanes. US Defense Attache reporting
indicates that Senegal, site of a major French military 25X1
base, permits ad hoc use of Dakar's airfield by US
aircraft for surveillance of Soviet naval task forces in
the Atlantic and allowed the United Kingdom landing
rights during the Falklands conflict. In addition, the
United States is negotiating'a 10-year agreement for
use of Dakar's airport as an emergency landing site
for the space shuttle
US interests include preventing the Soviets from
gaining military access to bases in the Western Sahel.
We believe the Soviets place some strategic value on
getting such access to compensate for the loss in the
mid-1970s of Conakry, Guinea, as a staging site for
TU-95 naval reconnaissance flights. These flights
presently have to operate from more distant Angola to
conduct surveillance of Western naval forces in the
Atlantic. Cape Verdian President Pereira, according
to US Embassy reporting, has consistently rebuffed
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Table 1
Western Sahel: Political Background
Country
Date of
Independ-
ence
Former
Colonial
Power
Leader
Tribe
Date
Assumed
Power
Type of
Government
Niger
1960
France
President Seyni
Kountche
Djerma
1974
Military
Mali
1960
France
President Moussa
Traore
Mande
1968
Mixed mili-
tary/civilian
Upper Volta
1960
France
Head of State Major
Jean-Baptiste Oue-
draogo
Mossi
1982
Military
Senegal
1960
France
President Abdou
Diouf
Wolof
1981
Civilian
The Gambia
1965
United
Kingdom
President Dawda
Jawara
Mandingo
1965
Civilian
Portugal
President Aristides
Pereira
Mulatto
1980
Civilian
Status of
Opposition
Legal opposition
not permitted
Official one-
party state
Legal opposition
not permitted
14 legal opposi-
tion parties to the
ruling Socialist
Party
National Conven-
tion Party is the
major opposition
party to the rul-
ing Progressive
People's Party
Official one-party
state
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Soviet pressure for military access rights, even though
he has allowed Aeroflot, Air Cubana, and Libya's
United Arab Airlines to transit Sal island's airport as
he has South Africa Airways. In Mali, the Soviets-
the main arms supplier-have upgraded several air-
fields to make them suitable for potential use by
Soviet long-range transport or reconnaissance air-
craft. Nonetheless, President Traore to our knowledge
and that of the US Embassy in Bamako has not
signed a formal military access agreement with Mos-
cow.
The Roots of Domestic Tensions
We believe prospects for the economic development of
the Western Sahel will remain dim throughout the
1980s. In our judgment, the inability of Sahelian
leaders to overcome the region's harsh environmental
constraints and halt declining standards of living will
be a major cause of growing domestic tensions. These
tensions will be apparent in increasing conflicts be-
tween social and religious groups and farmers and city
dwellers. From time to time, depending on the behav-
ior of the armed forces, they may lead to the toppling
of governments.
Dire Economic Straits. Two decades after independ-
ence, the Western Sahel remains one of the poorest
and least developed regions in the world with an
average per capita income of less than $200 a year.
All Sahelian countries remain overdependent on the
export of one mineral or agricultural commodity-
uranium in Niger, cotton in Upper Volta and Mali,
and peanuts in Senegal and The Gambia. The vast
majority of the region's almost 25 million people are
small farmers or herders, but inadequate rainfall (less
than 20 inches per year in many areas) has hampered
attempts to improve agricultural production. Wage
earners make up only a small proportion of the total
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work force-for example, we estimate that less than 1
percent of Upper Volta's population is employed in
the monetary sector-and no Sahelian state has yet
been able to develop a productive and competitive
industrial sector.
The mounting economic difficulties of Sahelian states
stem from faltering demand for the region's exports, a
severe lack of technical and administrative expertise,
extensive corruption, and misguided economic poli-
cies. During the 1970s, the region suffered increasing-
ly from low rates of economic growth, high inflation,
and growing deficits in international payments. Par-
ticularly troubling have been soaring oil import bills;
almost half of the value of Mali's exports in 1981, for
example, were used to pay for petroleum imports.
Those Sahelian countries that increased borrowing to
cover the widening gap between revenues and ex-
penses now find themselves saddled with mounting
debt payments. Senegal, for example, had a total debt
of almost $950 million dollars in 1980-and a debt
service ratio of over 23 percent-and has been forced
to reschedule both its public and its private debt.
In an effort to reverse almost two decades of economic.
decline, West Sahelian states-particularly Senegal
and Mali-are turning away from unproductive so-
cialist-inspired policies, radically paring investment
budgets, encouraging private enterprise, and calling
for nationwide belt tightening. As a condition for
receiving IMF and Western aid, Senegal and Mali
have agreed to reform their economies by limiting
costly consumer subsidies, holding down wage in-
creases, and increasing agricultural producer prices.
Mali's left-leaning President Traore also has replaced
some socialist ideologues in his cabinet with Western-
oriented pragmatists.
In our judgment, Sahelian leaders will have little
success in dealing with the area's severe economic
problems. Considering the region's difficult environ-
ment, lack of domestic markets, and poor overall
record of economic performance, we believe Western
firms will remain reluctant to invest in the region.
Even though some countries possess significant un-
tapped mineral resources-iron ore, uranium, gold,
and possibly oil in Mali, and manganese and bauxite
in Upper Volta-depressed world markets and high
startup costs make prompt development of these
assets unlikely. As a consequence, we believe the
Western Sahel will become increasingly dependent on
foreign assistance to meet even its most basic needs. 25X1
Social and Political Problems. Although we believe
that the vast majority of Sahelians are apolitical and
preoccupied with day-to-day existence, we expect that
tribal, religious, and urban grievances will intensify as
available resources shrink and the competition for
them intensifies. Moreover, the inability of Sahelian
leaders to reduce population growth, stem rural mi-
gration, and increase domestic food supplies will, in
our view, result in increasingly open protest, violence,
and more frequent coups.
Tribalism. We believe tribal identity will continue to
be an important focal point for organizing opposition
against the region's fragile central governments. Our
analysis, supported by academic research, indicates
that tribalism remains a pervasive force throughout
the region and that most Sahelians still view political
and economic issues in tribal terms. Most coup at-
tempts-ranging from Upper Volta's most recent
power grab by soldiers representing the dominant
Mossi tribe to an attempted Hausa-based coup in
1974 against Nigerien President Kountche-have a
Academic analysis indicates that, although tribal
networks help cushion the shock of economic hardship
by providing an informal welfare system based on
extended family obligations, increasing competition
for scarce resources also sharpens tribal tension. In
Niger, for example, we and the US Embassy believe
that the traditional balance between the commercially
dominant Hausa (almost 50 percent of the population)
and the ruling Djermas (about 25 percent of the
population and occupants of most military and civil
service jobs) could be upset. This could occur if the
Hausas perceive that their economic interests are
threatened, that they are being forced to bear a
disproportionate share of economic hardships, or that
they are being blamed for current economic problems.
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0 1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 0 1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
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Aid and Agriculture
Widening budget deficits, growing debt service bur-
dens, and limited access to private borrowing set
West Sahelian countries on a constant search for
foreign aid. Sahelian leaders need donor assistance to
meet recurrent expenditures and are scaling back or
eliminating development budgets. Senegal and Mali
already have reached agreement with the IMF for
assistance, while other Sahelian states are in various
stages of negotiation. Even Niger-which enjoyed a
moderate economic boom in the late 1970s when
world demand for uranium was high-is now in such
straits that it is seeking aid from any source.
The region's desperate financial condition has made
it one of the largest per capita recipients of foreign
assistance in the world. Cape Verde, with a popula-
tion of only 300,000, received $150 million-or about
$500 per capita-in 1981-82 in foreign assitance
grants and concessionary loans.. West Africa reports
that the aid flows. to Upper Volta regularly exceed
the country's budget. The Financial Times of London
reports that between 1974 and 1980 $6.8 billion in
external assistance was committed to the Sahel
region as a whole, and aid is still flowing in at the
rate of $1.5 billion per year. Much of the aid has been
regionally directed. Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Up-
per Volta, and Chad joined later by The Gambia
and Cape Verde-created the Permanent Interstate
Committee on Drought Control in 1973 to combat the
devastating effects of the Sahelian drought. A donor
arm of CILSS-The Club of the Sahel-was formed
in 1976 to organize and administer the region's
various aid programs.
Northern Tuareg and Toubou tribesmen in Mali and
Niger also have resisted attempts by southern-domi-
nated governments to control their activities and limit
their autonomy. US Embassy reporting indicates that
these nomadic and fiercely independent minority
tribes are difficult for central governments to control
Increasing evidence from the World Bank and other
sources indicates, however, that the impact of this aid
is limited. Sahelian nations lack the skilled manpow-
er and economic institutions needed to make the most
efficient use of aid, and most are unable to support
the high recurrent costs of aid projects. As a result,
projects often are abandoned after expensive startup
costs.
This problem is clearest in efforts to overhaul Sahe-
Tian agriculture, which is hampered by its reliance on
unpredictable and uneven rainfall, poor soils, weak 25X1
extension and marketing services, high transportation
costs, and government policies that traditionally have
encouraged farmers to grow export crops. The World
Bank and other international organizations report
that despite massive economic aid, food production
per capita has declined in most Sahelian countries
over the last decade. The food supply problem is
compounded by the growing preference of urban
dwellers for rice and wheat. Because wheat is not
grown in the Sahel and rice often is cheaper to import
than to grow at home, Sahelian governments either
must spend scarce foreign exchange to import popular
staples or depend on emergency aid or concessionary
sales. The US Department of Agriculture estimates
that by 1990 the demand for rice and wheat in the
Sahel could exceed local production by almost
2 million tons.
in the remote northern reaches of the Sahel and that
they are particularly vulnerable to external influences.
For example, the Toubou tribe in Niger spills over
into southern Libya and northern Chad, while the
Tuareg roam northern Niger and Mali, as well as
southern Algeria and Mauritania.
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Table 2
Western Sahel: Social Indicators
Average population
growth rate, 1971-80
Niger Mali Upper Senegal The Cape
Volta Gambia Verde
Mande Mossi Wolof Mandingo Mulatto
43 50 37 41 71
Muslim population 85 60 22 82 90 NEGL
Table 3
Western Sahel: Agricultural Indicators
Major urban food staples
agriculture
Average annual per capita
food production index, 1976-
78 a
rate, per capita food produc-
tion, 1965-79
Niger
Mali
Upper
Volta
Senegal
The
Gambia
Cape
Verde
Sorghum
Rice
Sorghum
Sorghum
Rice
Rice
Wheat
Rice
Wheat
Rice
Wheat
Rice
Wheat
Rice
Maize
85
83
67
76
95
NA
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Figure 3
Western Sahel: Tribal Groups
Bamako
4Z 1
MOSS/ Selected
tribal group
SS L~
Equatorial Guina I
Boundary representation is u' \
not aaaaaray authoritative, Sao Tome and Principe Gabon
Islam. With the exception of largely Roman Catholic
Cape Verde, Islam is the dominant religion in the
Western Sahel, with Muslims composing well over
half the populations of Mali, Niger, Senegal, and The
Gambia. US Embassy reporting and our analysis
suggest that, although fundamentalist movements in
the region still represent a minority view, a limited
Islamic revival is under way in several Sahelian
countries.' We believe that a group of Islamic zeal-
ots-by resorting to violence-could threaten already
weak governments, although in our view radical Is-
lamic fringe groups presently lack the strength, orga-
nization, and leadership to mobilize the entire Islamic
community.
We think the trend toward a greater level of Islamic
consciousness and political activity by Muslim groups
will continue in coming years and add to local ten-
sions. We note that although all Sahelian leaders-
with the exception of President Pereira in Cape
Verde-profess at least nominal allegiance to Islam
and international Islamic organizations, they are com-
mitted to a secular form of government and continue
to maintain close ties with the developed, non-Muslim
world. We believe discontented Muslim clerics may
find urban residents, students, and intellectuals who
are searching for an alternative to the political and 25X1
economic failings of their countries' entrenched,
Western-oriented elites a more receptive audience.
We believe Senegal may be the most susceptible to
rising Islamic ferment. According to the US Embassy
in Dakar, as many as 3 million Senegalese-about
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half the population-may belong to the Muridiya and
Tijaniya brotherhoods, the two largest and most
powerful organizations in the country.' US Embassy
sources also report that Murides hold important posi-
tions in military and government circles, in addition to
brotherhoods will monitor Diouf's actions closely and
continue to work behind the scenes to press him to
make both the form and the substance of Senegal's
government more Islamic.
Urban Residents. In our view, one of the most serious
threats to the region's domestic political stability will
come from the growing dissatisfaction of urban dwell-
ers with their governments' inability to improve living
conditions. In particular, we believe urban residents
will blame governments for periodic food shortages,
cutbacks in services, and rising unemployment-all of
which are partly attributable to rapid urbanization
and shrinking per capita revenue bases. Although not
more than 25 percent of the population of any West-
ern Sahelian country lives in urban areas, urban
residents historically have been better organized,
more politically active, and more volatile than their
rural counterparts. Recent demographic trends in the
Sahel leave little doubt that rapid population growth
(about 2.5 percent annually in most countries), uncon-
trolled urbanization (over 5 percent annually in Mali,
Upper Volta, and Niger), and the widening gap
between rich and poor will make urban residents a
more active and potentially explosive force in Sahe-
lian politics.
Civil servants make up one of the largest classes of
salaried workers in all Sahelian countries, and our
analysis indicates they traditionally have provided an
important pillar of support for both military and
civilian governments. In return, governments have
catered to their interests by providing such benefits as
subsidized food. Public employees, however, as part of
their countries' small wage sector, are vulnerable to
sharp fluctuations in the economy and recently have
been hard hit by inflation and rising unemployment.
We believe the tolerance of civil servants for austerity
measures will wane-especially if governments are
increasingly unable to meet payroll schedules-and
that in the future they will be less willing to forgo pay
raises and accept reductions in their standards of
living. In our view, this problem may become acute in
Niger, where expectations of prosperity were encour-
aged by a short-lived uranium export boom in the late
1970s.
We also expect that labor union pressure to raise
wages and improve working conditions will grow. In
Mali, the US Embassy reports that the National
Union of Malian Workers-although an adjunct of
the country's sole legal political party-has publicly
opposed many of the government's economic reform
measures and last year demanded a 40-percent wage
increase. We agree with the US Embassy's observa-
tion that a grass-roots revolt against both the Malian
Government and the union leadership could develop if
economic conditions-particularly unemployment-
worsen. Labor plays a particularly critical role in
Upper Volta, where unions claim to represent 60
percent of government workers and 40 percent of
private-sector employees. Unions are among the most
powerful and radical interest groups in the country
and have played a key role in the overthrow of four
Upper Voltan governments since independence.
Finally, we believe students will become more restive
as job opportunities dry up and as government auster-
ity measures reduce their prerogatives and privileges.
In Niger, for example, the government last April
backed down when confronted with widespread stu-
dent protests over a new policy requiring parents to
pay for part of a student's education instead of the
state shouldering all the costs. In the longer term, we
believe students may prove more receptive to radical
political or religious philosophies that reject current
leaders and policies. Our analysis, supported by US
Embassy reporting, indicates that this problem may
become particularly manifest in the former French
colonies of the Western Sahel, where students increas-
ingly resent France's continuing dominant cultural
and economic position.
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The Military. In all Western Sahelian states, the
armed forces-although small and moderately
equipped-remain the arbiters of political power. In
our judgment, there is considerable evidence that
governments-be they civilian or military-will face
increasingly frequent threats from disgruntled officers
and enlisted men. In particular, we believe junior
officers may become more frustrated than they have
been by their lack of advancement and by what they
see as the corruption of entrenched senior ranks. Even
in Senegal's traditionally apolitical armed forces, a
demor-
alization over food, clothing, and equipment shortages
as well as resentment over alleged favoritism and
nepotism among senior officers. Upper Volta has
experienced two coups in the past two years, while in
Niger, where the Army has governed for over eight
years and in Mali where it has governed for 14,
Presidents Kountche and Traore have faced numerous
plots and occasional coup attempts
We also believe that dissatisfaction among enlisted
ranks will grow and that populist, egalitarian-oriented
individuals in these ranks will become sources of
political instability. Recent West African coups, such
as those in Ghana and Liberia, indicate that the
ability of officers to maintain control over enlisted
ranks may be declining and that lower ranking per-
sonnel increasingly feel entitled to play an active
political role. Although most Sahelian enlisted men
are poorly educated and ill equipped to govern, we do
not believe this consideration will prevent ambitious
soldiers with a grievance and an opportunity from
moving in reaction to eroding popular confidence in
the government or growing concerns within the Army
over bread-and-butter issues.
We believe that the failed coup attempt in July 1981
in The Gambia may be a harbinger of more radical
coups to come. US Embassy reporting indicated that
the coup was engineered by an obscure Muslim
politician with Marxist leanings in league with low
ranking members of the defense force.
little was known initially about t ey re-
ceived widespread support from urban residents who
were unhappy over food shortages and over the cor-
ruption and mismanagement of the then-l6-year-old
civilian government of President Jawara. Only the
intervention and continued presence of Senegalese
troops has kept Jawara in power. We believe the
proposed confederation between The Gambia and
Senegal-now in the early stages of implementa-
tion-will further institutionalize Senegal's prominent
role in maintaining stability in The Gambia. In our 25X1
judgment, the militarily stronger Senegal will not
hesitate to crush any efforts to establish a radical 25X1
regime in Banjul.
The Libyan Factor
Although US Embassies report little widespread pop-
ular support in the Western Sahel for Libyan leader
Qadhafi or his pan-Islamic policies, the region's frag-
ile central governments, in our judgment, will remain
susceptible to Qadhafi's meddling through the 1980s.
We believe the proximity of the Western Sahel to
Libya, coupled with its large Muslim population,
increasing economic vulnerability, and potential for
greater political instability will offer opportunities for
further Libyan inroads. Domestic opposition groups
lacking the resources to mount an effective anti-
government campaign may become more willing, in
our estimate, to accept Libyan aid. We also believe
that new Sahelian leaders, under strong pressure to
reverse their country's economic slide, might be par-
ticularly receptive to Qadhafi's promises of quick
economic aid or security assistance.
Qadhafij has visions
of ultimately trying to weld Sahelian states into a
pan-Islamic political entity dominated- by Libya and
free of French and other Western influences. We
believe Qadhafi has attempted to increase his influ-
ence in the region by pursuing a two-track strategy.
On the one hand, he has sought to curry favor with
existing governments by providing or promising eco-
nomic support to financially destitute countries. For
example, according to the US Embassy in Niamey,
Libya purchased-at well above world prices-about
25 percent of Niger's total uranium exports in 1981.
Elsewhere, Qadhafi has offered more direct finanical
aid, such as loans of $3
million over the past several years to Mali's financial-
ly hard-pressed government
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Table 4
Western Sahel: Military Strength, 1981
Regular Forces 2,700 - 7,900
Army 2,600 7,500
Navy 0 0
Gendarmerie 800 2,000
Foreign advisers 70 195
a Officially known as the Gambian gendarmerie.
b Militia recruited primarily from party ranks for service in rural
areas.
Includes 200-man Presidential Guard.
d France also stations about 1,200 French troops in Senegal.
e About 600 Senegalese troops have been stationed in The Gambia
since the coup attempt in 1981.
5,360 11,457 0 2,310
5,200 10,196 0 2,200
0 696 0 100
Qadhafi also has attempted to encourage discontent
by capitalizing on tribal, religious, and social divi-
sions. In a small sampling of Libyan subversive
activities in recent years against Western Sahel coun-
tries, we find that Qadhafi has:
Provided, paramilitary training for Sahelians.
hundreds of Malians and Nigeriens-including
Tuaregs-as well as dissident Senegalese and Gam-
bians have received training in Libyan camps for
eventual reinfiltration to their home countries.
? Publicly referred to Niger as "second in line" after
Chad and incited Nigeriens through radio propa-
ganda broadcasts to overthrow the Kountche gov-
ernment. In addition, Qadhafi reportedly has passed
out arms to dissident Tuareg and Toubou tribesmen
in northern Niger and Mali. Most recently, in April
1982, Nigerien officials alleged that Libya was
behind an abortive Tuareg plot to blow up Niger's
major uranium processing plant at Arlit.
? Provided funding and support for dissident Islamic
and student groups.
IQadhafi has been
actively involved with the leading opposition party,
radical student groups, and such religious dissidents
as Ahmed Niasse-a self-styled "Ayatollah. " The
leader of Senegal's strongest opposition party has
openly admitted contacts with Libya.
? Bribed government officials and encouraged them to
defect to Tripoli. In 1981, several Tuareg officials in
Niger resigned their positions and defected to Libya
after possible implication in a Qadhafi-inspired
assassination attempt on Kountche
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In our judgment, the ability of Sahelian leaders to
respond to these and other challenges from Qadhafi is
limited. Although Sahelian states have on occasion
suspended or downgraded diplomatic relations with
Tripoli after particularly egregious examples of Liby-
an interference, we believe most are reluctant to risk
an open confrontation with a militarily stronger
Qadhafi. US Embassy reporting also indicates that
Sahelian leaders hesitate to turn their backs on any
promise of aid or trade. President Kountche in Niger,
for example, has openly admitted to US officials that,
despite Qadhafi's calls for his overthrow, he has no
economic choice but to sell Niger's uranium to any
buyer, including Libya.
The French Role
The financially and militarily weak countries of the
Western Sahel-except for The Gambia and Cape
Verde-historically have depended on France for
most of their economic assistance. The currencies of
francophone states are linked to the French franc, and
France remains their preeminent trading partner.
According to US Embassy reporting, about half of
Niger's trade-both exports and imports-is with
France. In addition, France has provided an impor-
tant military security umbrella for francophone na-
tions by providing arms and training for the armies of
the Western Sahelian states. US Embassy and De-
fense Attache reporting indicates that some 1,200
French troops are stationed in Dakar, and France has
promised to come to the defense of states in the region
that are threatened by external aggression.
In our judgment, Paris-even given its own economic
difficulties-is unlikely to sharply cut back on eco-
nomic aid to the Western Sahel or abandon its
military commitments. Nevertheless, recent US Em-
bassy reporting indicates that Sahelian leaders are
becoming increasingly sensitive to any sign of a
lessening of French interest in the region. We believe
that the traditionally close ties between France and its
former colonies in the region could become strained if
France refuses or is unable to increase its financial
assistance
Faced with a constantly escalating need for more
economic help, francophone states will intensify their
efforts to broaden their Western ties, especially with
Figure 4
Western Sahel: Total Official Development
Assistance Disbursements, 1974-80
Niger
- - - - Mali
Upper Volta
_--- Senegal
- - - - The Gambia
-Cape Verde
the United States. We believe that the newer genera-
tion of Sahelian leaders-typified by Senegalese Pres-
ident Diouf-may be willing, within limits, to carve
out political positions more independent of France and
to express their resentment against what they view as
French "neocolonial" control over the affairs of the
countries in the region.
Options and Prospects
The fate of Western Sahelian regimes will hinge on
their ability to satisfy the basic food needs of their
peoples, secure essential foreign assistance, and con-
trol their domestic and foreign opposition. We see
little prospect, however, for significant improvement
in Sahelian economies, barring an unexpected
strengthening in world demand for Sahelian commod-
ities. Severe debt problems rule out international
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banks as a significant source of funds. As a result, we
believe leaders will have little economic choice but to
press ahead with retrenchment, seek increased assist-
ance from Western and Arab donors as well as the
Table 5
Western Sahel: Selected Sources
of Official Aida b
IMF, and reschedule debts.
In our view, however, Sahelian governments will find
it harder and harder to balance the need for austerity
measures required by international creditors with
demands. from key political groups that their interests
be protected or exempted from economic cutbacks.
African experience suggests that civil servants, work-
ers, students, and soldiers will continue to push for
more benefits regardless of national economic condi-
tions. We also believe that vested interests within
Sahelian governments will press leaders to scrap or
modify any economic reforms, thereby weakening
their impact. According to US Embassy reporting
from Bamako, for example, the Malian Government
is divided over how far economic reforms should be
carried. Some officials reportedly view reform as
merely an effort to repair but not to jettison the
socialist economy, while others-including President
Traore-favor full-scale structural reform, including
allowing the market to set wages and prices, produc-
tion quotas, and employment levels.
If the foregoing analysis proves correct, we believe
Sahelian governments may become more concerned
with holding onto power and limiting dissent than
with dealing with intractable economic problems. In
an effort to buy political time, we believe leaders may
follow a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they
may bow to domestic pressure and abandon austerity
measures, thereby weakening their international cre-
ditworthiness. At the same time, beleaguered regimes
may resort to more authoritarian measures, but in our
view they risk creating more resentment and unrest,
especially if economic conditions fail to improve
France
22.2
29.2
41.1
48.5
United States
7.0
9.0
11.0
9.0
EEC c
17.9
32.7
29.1
9.3
Arab OPEC
2.9
5.5
5.9
7.0
Mali
United States
6.0
15.0
14.0
23.0
EEC
12.0
15.8
31.3
41.6
Arab OPEC
4.6
6.5
3.5
10.3
Upper Volta
United States
10.0
14.0
27.0
36.0
EEC
10.7
47.8
108.5
24.2
Arab OPEC
1.7
2.8
4.5
9.4
The Gambia
a Data for Cape Verde are not available.
b Net disbursements of bilateral and multilateral aid.
European Economic Community aid is multilateral aid only.
people who are politically active. Although wide-
spread violence has been relatively rare, we expect the
We believe, therefore, that the politics of the Western
Sahel will become more turbulent and unstable as the
decade progresses. The weak central governments will
have a difficult time garnering popular support for
much needed economic reforms. We also believe that
future leaders will face better organized and more
hostile opposition as the impact of regionwide eco-
nomic and social changes expands the number of
region will experience more frequent spontaneous
urban outbursts over such issues as food shortages.
Implications for the United States
For the foreseeable future, we believe the Western
Sahel will prove increasingly vulnerable to external
subversion, particularly from Libya. In our view, the
moderate and pro-Western Sahelian leaders may feel
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Table 6
Western Sahel: Communist Economic
Credits and Grants, 1954-81
Extended
Drawn
Latest Grant
or Credit
Niger
54.6
16.2
Soviet Union
2.3
2.3
1978
Mali
248.9
218.1
Soviet Union
99.4
93.7
1981
PRC
126.9
109.3
1981
Upper Volta
56.8
15.2
Soviet Union
5.8
2.6
1978
PRC
51.0
12.6
1978
Eastern Europe
35.0
10.5
1976
The Gambia
17.0
10.2
Soviet Union
0.2
0.2
1974
mounting pressure to reach an accommodation with
Qadhafi-in hopes of forestalling future Libyan sub-
version-if Western and other international economic
aid fails to measure up to their expectations. Libyan
efforts to undermine Western influence and to install
radical regimes in the area also will serve long-term
Soviet interests in promoting regional instability. In
particular, we believe Moscow will continue efforts to
gain access to strategic ports and airfields.
Faced with severe economic problems and external
subversion, moderate, pro-Western Sahelian leaders
probably will intensify requests for food aid as well as
for economic and technical assistance. As a conse-
quence, we envision the region becoming more-
rather than less-dependent on the generosity of the
United States throughout the decade. Moreover, we
believe this role may become even greater if France,
conservative states in the Persian Gulf, and the IMF
cut back or restrict their aid to the region. In our
view, the moderate leaders in the region will measure
the commitment of the United States by Washing-
ton's willingness to respond to Sahelian requests for
aid.
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