SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00390R000300050041-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 13, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Si erpt
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Intentions and
Options in Southwest Asia:
Near-Term Prospects
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI Ildf 80-10006
13 March 1980
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SECRET
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND
OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA:
NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS
Information as of 7 March 1980 was
used in the preparation of this paper
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow's willingness to pay what it anticipated would be an
appreciable political and economic price for its intervention in
Afghanistan stemmed from the deteriorating situation in that country
and overall Soviet strategic interests in the region.
Regardless of the precise mix of motivations and interests
underlying Moscow's decision to intervene, the Soviet military presence
in Afghanistan has placed the USSR in a position to exploit the
vulnerabilities and weaknesses of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors.
The Soviets will continue for tactical reasons to suggest a certain
receptivity to proposals for troop withdrawals. In the next two to three
months, however, they will probably continue their buildup to a total
force of at least eight division equivalents. Following this spring's
counterinsurgency offensive, they are likely to conclude that even more
forces are needed. Regardless of their success against the insurgents, the
Soviets intend to maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan
for the foreseeable future to reinforce their broader regional influence.
Moscow sees its current best option in Iran as one of continuing its
attempt to curry favor with the Khomeini regime. The Soviets are also
maintaining relations with the Iranian left and with Iran's ethnic
minorities, but they are proceeding cautiously lest they further arouse
the anti-Soviet suspicions of Khomeini and his entourage.
Moscow would clearly prefer to achieve its broader aims in Iran
without using military force. However, it could respond to large-scale
Afghan rebel activity in Iran with hot-pursuit forays and cross-border
raids and might consider more massive intervention in response to a
threat of Western intervention, countrywide disintegration, or civil war.
A key element in any Soviet decision to intervene in Iran would be
Moscow's perception of the likely US military response-a response
Moscow recognizes would be influenced by Western economic and
security interests that are far greater than those that were at stake in
Afghanistan.
The Soviet approach to Pakistan will likely remain one of keeping
Pakistan sufficiently uneasy to discourage too much support for the
Afghan rebels and too close an alignment with the United States or
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and
Eastern Europe, National Intelligence Council. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency;
with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency;
with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force and of the Marine Corps.
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China, while keeping alive the option of accommodation to Moscow. In
view of Pakistan's rejection of US aid offers, the Soviets now are
probably more confident that pressure tactics will continue to work
against Islamabad.
Moscow looks upon India as an asset in the effort to limit damage
from. its Afghan invasion and realizes it must now be more forthcoming
to maintain that asset. If the survivability of Pakistan as a buffer state
seemed threatened, however, the interests of Moscow and New Delhi
would diverge.
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DISCUSSION
This memorandum focuses on Soviet intentions in
Southwest Asia as they bear on likely Soviet behavior
during the next six to 12 months.
The Decision To Intervene
The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was
made with careful consideration of the expected con-
sequences and potential problems. Although the Soviet
leaders certainly dismissed the possibility of direct US
military opposition, they probably did anticipate such
adverse international consequences as a setback to US-
Soviet relations, an accelerated buildup of US de-
fenses, increased Sino-American security cooperation,
and negative reactions in the Muslim world.
As for the continuation of the atmosphere of detente
with the United States, Moscow already saw it as being
in jeopardy. Moreover, the Soviets believed the ad-
verse consequences of intervention would be reduced
because of the US preoccupation with Iran and the
internal disarray in Iran and Pakistan. Although the
Soviets may have underestimated the costs, we believe
that they would have intervened even if they had
foreseen what has actually transpired.
Moscow's willingness to pay what it anticipated
would be an appreciable political and economic price
for its intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the
deteriorating situation within that country and from
overall Soviet strategic interests in the region. Moscow
saw that Afghan political and military institutions that
it had helped to mold were on the verge of collapse
and believed that this would precipitate a distinct
decline in Soviet influence over a country that was a
longstanding Soviet client, perhaps transforming it into
another militantly Islamic state.
Apart from more immediate concerns, the Soviets
were also motivated by geopolitical considerations and
strategic calculations. On the one hand, they feared
that a humiliating reversal in Afghanistan would be a
blow to their prestige, slow the momentum of their
advance in the Third World, and damage their credi-
bility with other client regimes. On the other hand,
they hoped that consolidation of firm political and
military control over Afghanistan would facilitate
further expansion of their influence into other parts of
Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
Over the longer term, the Soviets hope through their
presence in Afghanistan to reduce Western and Chi-
nese influence and promote accommodating behavior
throughout the region. This could facilitate their on-
going efforts to gain increased access to air and naval
facilities on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The
Soviets will attempt to manipulate and exploit height-
ened perceptions of their ability to threaten vital oil
resources. They will encourage beliefs that Soviet
cooperation is required to ensure stability in oil sup-
plies and that it must be fostered by providing the
USSR with improved access to the oil resources of the
region.
Afghanistan
The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan with any
expectation that they would be able quickly to estab-
lish effective control over the entire country. To date
they have concentrated on consolidating their control
in Kabul and some other key cities and over major
lines of communication. However, the Afghan insur-
gents have continued the fighting even in areas where
Soviet forces have been active. The Afghan Army has
continued to disintegrate in areas of major resistance,
and the Soviets cannot count on the loyalty of the few
effective units that exist.
The most serious Soviet problem over the near term
is the failure of the Soviet-installed government of
Babrak Karmal to control the cities. The overwhelm-
ing majority of the populace views the government as
a Soviet puppet, and nationalist and Islamic fervor is
fueling broad popular opposition to the Soviet
presence.
Even before the urban disturbances in late Febru-
ary, the Soviets were committing additional forces.
Several weeks earlier, the Soviets introduced one
division that they had been holding in reserve and
began forming several specially configured heliborne
units for counterinsurgency operations. The Soviets,
moreover, are continuing to improve their logistic
capabilities along the border for moving men and
supplies into Afghanistan. Soviet units within Afghani-
stan, some of which are being regrouped into highly
flexible brigades, have recently begun more aggressive
counterinsurgency operations.
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We believe that the Soviets probably plan to build
up to a total force of at least eight division equiv-
alents-120,000 or more men-in the next two to
three months. A force of this size would permit the
Soviets to mount a more extensive counterinsurgency
campaign this spring while maintaining the security of
key urban areas and major lines of communication.
However, such a force would not enable the Soviets to
conduct a full-fledged countrywide counterinsurgency
effort without the support of a more effective Afghan
Army.
Whether the Soviets decide to augment their forces
further will depend largely on the outcome of their
efforts to reconstitute an effective Afghan Army and
on the resiliency of the insurgents following the emer-
gent Soviet offensive. On balance, we believe that the
Soviets are likely to conclude that even more forces are
needed.
Although the Soviets have suggested that cessation
of "external interference" might lead them to begin a
troop withdrawal, they are unlikely to act on such
suggestions in the short run, since neither the Babrak
government nor any Soviet-imposed successor could
survive without major Soviet military support. At this
stage, Soviet talk about withdrawal appears to be a
tactic designed to dampen international pressure and
particularly to drive wedges between the United States
and its allies.
Over the longer run, successful curtailment of the
insurgency and partial stabilization of the Afghan
political situation might enable the Soviets to with-
draw some of their forces, but they would wish to
maintain sufficient forces to ensure their control over
the country. Moreover, even under the most favorable
circumstances there, we believe they intend to main-
tain a significant military presence. Moscow will seek
to use this presence to reinforce the USSR's broader
regional influence and possibly to exploit the vulnera-
bilities and weaknesses of Afghanistan's immediate
neighbors.
Since the collapse of the Shah's regime in early
1979, Soviet policy toward Iran has been aimed at
encouraging anti-Western attitudes there, improving
economic and political relations with the new regime,
and creating a favorable climate for an eventual pro-
Soviet government. The intervention in Afghanistan
has greatly complicated these conciliatory efforts, and
will continue to do so the longer the Soviets stay in
Afghanistan and the more involved they become in
fighting the insurgency there.
Iranian officials have publicly proclaimed support
for their "Muslim brethren" in Afghanistan, and clan-
destine reporting during the last six months indicates
that limited material assistance has already been pro-
vided. Since the invasion, Pakistan and Iran have
moved closer together, spurred by common percep-
tions of a Soviet threat. In the coming months, Tehran
will probably provide the Afghan rebels with media
access for propaganda purposes and support for
liberation offices and refugee camps in Iran. It
will probably tolerate cross-border arms smuggling
and rebel movements. The Iranian Government is
unlikely, however, to provide large-scale support to
the Afghan resistance, at least until it sees how much
support other Islamic nations provide.
While the Soviets have been large indirect benefi-
ciaries of the US loss of influence in Iran, their own
bilateral relations with Tehran have not prospered
under the erratic Khomeini regime. Even before the
invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow failed to establish a
satisfactory working relationship with Tehran.
The Soviets have two basic strategies for enhancing
their influence over their strategic southern neighbor:
- The first-and, we believe, the preferred-
Soviet strategy has been to seek crucial leverage
over a unitary Iranian state in which the Tudeh
Communist Party could eventually become a
significant factor. At the same time, the Soviets,
since the fall of the Shah, have reportedly
increased their covert activities among Iran's
ethnic minority groups and their efforts to
strengthen the Tudeh Communist Party. They
have proceeded cautiously, however, lest they
further arouse the anti-Soviet suspicions of
Khomeini and his entourage. Moscow has taken
care not to derail what will remain its primary
focus of attention so long as Khomeini retains
dominant power-namely, the improvement of
state-to-state relations with an Iranian regime
whose foreign policy has a marked anti-Western
orientation.
- Failing in an effort to achieve primary influence
with a centralized Iranian state, the Soviets might
alternatively seek to encourage centrifugal ethnic
forces in the country, break down central author-
ity, and exploit the ensuing disruption.
Moscow clearly would prefer to achieve its broader
aims in Iran without using military force. As long as
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Iranian support for the Afghan rebels remains at a
fairly low level, the Soviets are unlikely to retaliate
militarily. However, conspicuous large-scale Afghan
rebel activity in Iran could lead to hot-pursuit forays
and cross-border raids. Furthermore, the threat of
Western intervention, Khomeini's death and the loss of
central control over the ethnic areas, or widespread
chaos might tempt the Soviets to claim a threat to their
security and intervene. In so doing, they might use the
1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty as the legal justification, or
the claim that they were asked in by the Tudeh. The
USSR has refused to accept the Iranian abrogation of
the 1921 treaty provisions that allow for direct Soviet
intervention in Iran if the internal situation in that
country or foreign intrigue threatens the security of
the Soviet Union.
Since late 1978, the Soviets have increased intelli-
gence surveillance of the border with Iran and, more
recently, have raised their state of military prepared-
ness. They have no doubt prepared contingency plans
for armed intervention. Some exercises in the Trans-
caucasus Military District earlier this year may have
been a part of this preparation and planning. A key
element in any decision to intervene in Iran, however,
would be Moscow's perception of a likely US response.
Moscow no doubt recognizes that Western economic
and security interests in Iran are considerably higher
than in Afghanistan and that the likelihood of a strong
military US response is thus also far greater.
Pakistan will almost certainly remain under Soviet
pressure to cease all support for Afghan insurgents.
Pakistan's aid to rebel forces so far has been limited.
Even so, Afghan Government forces in the past year
have occasionally shelled refugee concentrations across
the border. The Soviets have confined themselves to
diplomatic and propaganda threats against Islamabad
and have been cautious in their own military oper-
ations near the Pakistani-Afghan border. They are
probably planning, however, for the contingency of
hot-pursuit raids across the Pakistan border and in any
event will attempt to have the border sealed.
Islamabad recognizes its vulnerability to Soviet pres-
sure. It has publicly stated it will resist any attacks
from Afghanistan, but there has been no significant
reinforcement of Pakistani armed forces near the
Afghan border. While Pakistan may eventually at-
tempt to restrict the use of its territory as a sanctuary
by Afghan rebels, the government will find it politi-
cally difficult to move conspicuously in this direction
because of President Zia's carefully nurtured Islamic
image and because of the numerous kinship and ethnic
ties between tribesmen on both sides of the border.
The issue will become increasingly troublesome if
intensified Soviet military operations force the Afghan
rebels to rely more heavily on sanctuaries in Pakistan.
For Islamabad the issue will be complicated also by
the fact that China and some Arab countries will
continue to pressure Pakistan to increase its aid to the
insurgents, although even the Chinese reportedly do
not want to get too deeply involved in activities that
would merely be provocative toward the USSR or
India.
Islamabad views the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan as a long-term military threat that is far
more serious than the immediate border security
problem raised by Soviet counterinsurgency efforts in
Afghanistan. Pakistan is concerned that the Soviets
may intensify their covert contacts with Baluchi and
other tribal separatists in Pakistan or that they may in
other ways attempt to take subversive advantage of
the country's political instability. Even with the new
Soviet threat, however, Pakistan still fears India as its
primary enemy, particularly since the return to power
of Indira Gandhi. Pakistan's feeling of vulnerability
has given Moscow important additional political
leverage.
In view of Pakistan's rejection of US aid offers, the
Soviets now are probably more confident that pressure
tactics will continue to work against Islamabad. Coun-
terinsurgent activities have brought Soviet forces close
to the Pakistani border, but, so long as Islamabad
appears to be keeping the United States at arm's
length, the Soviets are unlikely to exert heavy military
pressure.
Moscow's objectives in Pakistan, particularly in the
short term, are subordinated to Soviet aims relating to
Afghanistan and India. The Soviets have recognized
the concern in India created by the Afghan invasion;
they prefer not to act so precipitiously in Pakistan as to
compound that alarm.
On balance, the Soviet approach likely will remain
one of keeping Pakistan sufficiently uneasy to discour-
age too much support for the Afghan rebels and too
close an alignment with the United States or China,
while keeping alive in Islamabad the option of accom-
modation to Moscow as the price for Soviet restraint.
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India
Afghan developments have underscored Moscow's
basic interest in preserving and enhancing its close ties
to India, which, because of its size, population, geo-
graphic position, and importance in global politics, is
its major Asian counterweight to China. Moscow looks
upon India as an asset in the effort to limit damage
from its Afghan invasion, and realizes it now must be
more forthcoming-in military and economic assist-
ance, for example-to maintain that asset.
India has been alarmed at the implications of this
Soviet aggression so close to home, including the
danger that Pakistan might cease to be a viable buffer.
The Gandhi government has nominally accepted the
position that Soviet objectives in Afghanistan are at
this point limited to securing control in a weak client
border state, but, beyond that, Soviet diplomatic assur-
ances have so far not been sufficient to ease Indian
concerns. Nevertheless, the Gandhi government sees
no realistic alternative to good relations with the
USSR.
Accepting Moscow's refusal to commit itself to a
withdrawal from Afghanistan, New Delhi now sees
overall stability in South Asia threatened principally
by US and Chinese efforts to strengthen Pakistan
militarily. The Gandhi government may try to counter
this with renewed efforts to ease tensions with Paki-
stan. Moscow would not object to this, so long as it took
place in a context consistent with Soviet efforts-
through threats and/or inducements-to limit Paki-
stan's identification with China and the United States
and its assistance to the Afghan insurgency.
If fighting should erupt on the Afghan-Pakistani
border, India would almost certainly press for a
peaceful resolution involving Pakistani restraint in aid
to Afghan dissidents. Such a position would not run
counter to Moscow's presumed interest in limiting
military incidents with Pakistan.
Given the increased polarization that Afghanistan
has brought about, Moscow is probably relatively
sanguine that it can forestall the movement begun by
Indira Gandhi during her first administration (and
continued by the Janata government) toward greater
diplomatic flexibility and easing of tension with
China. As it was, the movement toward rapproche-
ment with China was stalled last year by China's
invasion of Vietnam.
If major fighting erupted between Soviet and Paki-
stani forces and particularly if the survivability of
Pakistan as a buffer seemed threatened, the Indian
response would be less predictable. It might seek to
pressure the USSR by improving relations with the
United States and resuming the process of rapproche-
ment with China. India's aim would be to avoid the
dismemberment of Pakistan and to enable it to survive
as a buffer state.
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