THE ARIANE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE: EUROPE'S ANSWER TO THE US SPACE SHUTTLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00044R000200610001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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% Directorate of Seer
Intelligence
48
The Ariane Space Launch
Vehicle: Europe's Answer
to the US Space Shuttle
An Intelligence Assessment
Seeret
SW 83-10047X
July 1983
copy 410
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t t~ Intelligence
to the US Space Shuttle
The Ariane Space Launch
Vehicle: Europe's Answer
Branch, OSWR,
of the paper. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Ballistic Missile
formerly of OSWR, contributed to the preparation
The author of this paper is
of Scientific and Weapons
Intelligence Council.
Secret
SW 83-10047X
July 1983
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Summary
Information available
as of 16 June 1983
was used in this report.
The Ariane Space Launch
Vehicle: Europe's Answer
to the US Space Shuttle[-
Despite the success of the second operational launch on 16 June 1983, the
1982 failure of the first operational launch of the Ariane, Europe's
expendable launch vehicle (ELV), together with its mediocre test perform-
ance compared with that of US space launch vehicles, leads us to believe
another operational failure in the near future will threaten the Ariane's
commercial success. On the other hand, if no further problems with the
vehicle occur, the Ariane program probably will provide the European
Space Agency (ESA) with an independent space launch capability.
The Space Shuttle, as the United States' reusable space launch vehicle, is
and will continue to be the main Ariane competitor; according to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Shuttle is heavily
booked until about 1986. The Ariane also is booked until about 1986, with
at least 31 contracts and many more under negotiation. Because production
of the US ELVs Delta and Atlas-Centaur was suspended, these vehicles
are expected to provide little competition in the near term; they probably
will become more competitive by about 1986 if, as now planned, their
programs are taken over by private industry, which we would expect to
pursue competitive marketing strategies.
ESA's success in competing with US launch services can be attributed
largely to skillful marketing and to the reduced availability of US ELVs. In
addition to underbidding US prices on several occasions, ESA has offered
favorable financing and the possibility of space-related technology transfer.
The current version of the Ariane (the Ariane 1) can deliver about 4,700
kilograms (kg) into low Earth orbit and 950 kg into geostationary orbit, us-
ing the same boost rocket for all payloads. Four additional Ariane versions
are planned that will launch increasingly larger and heavier payloads, with
the fifth version (the Ariane 5) capable of placing 3,300 kg into geostation-
ary orbit. The first Ariane 5 is scheduled for launch in the 1990s.
The Space Shuttle, by comparison, can place about 30,000 kg into low
Earth orbit. It can deliver a maximum of about 6,800 kg into geostationary
orbit; this capability depends on the satellite payload carried. The Shuttle
can place a variety of payloads into such an orbit, and each payload can use
a variety of boost stages.
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Background
The European Space Agency
Development of the Ariane SLV
Characteristics of the Ariane SLV
2
Ariane Competitive Strategy
4
Financing and Pricing
4
Availability
5
Technology Transfer
5
Other Competitive Tactics
5
Brazil-A Case Study
6
Implications of Operational Launch Failure and Recent Launch Success
7
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The Ariane Space Launch
Vehicle: Europe's Answer
to the US Space Shuttle
The European Space Agency
The US monopoly of satellite launch services, which
began in the early 1960s, led Europeans to seek an
independent space launch vehicle (SLV) capability.
Early attempts to form a viable European space
agency (the European Launcher Development Organi-
zation and the European Space Research Organiza-
tion) failed because of difficulty in obtaining the
cooperation of the British, West Germans, and French
and because of successive technical failures. Nonethe-
less, European countries continued to favor a heavy
SLV for satellites, originally expected to become
operational in 1981.
To this end, in 1975, the European Space Agency
(ESA) was formed. Its members and their shares of
ESA financing are Belgium (4.4 percent), Denmark
(0.7 percent), France (59.5 percent), West Germany
(19.6 percent), Ireland (0.3 percent), Italy (3.3 per-
cent), the Netherlands (2.2 percent), Spain (2.5 per-
cent), Sweden (2.4 percent), Switzerland (2.7 percent),
and the United Kingdom (2.4 percent). The French
manage and control most of the activities of ESA.
Although four French companies spearhead the pro-
duction of the Ariane SLV, over 60 of the subcontrac-
tors are from other member countries as well as
France.
Although the Ariane is ESA's major project, two
other important projects-Spacelab and a communi-
cations satellite program-are under way. Spacelab is
Europe's contribution to the US Space Transportation
System (of which the Space Shuttle is a part), and its
major support is from West Germany, which provides
60 percent of the financing. The communications
satellite program is backed primarily by the United
Kingdom, which provides 65 percent of the financing.
versions. ESA deliberately chose a conventional de-
sign (using proven US technology) to ensure reliabil-
ity, economy, and operational availability.
The first Ariane test launch in December 1979 was
successful.' The second flight in May 1980 failed as a
result of high-frequency vibration. The launches in
June and December 1981 again were successful. In
late January 1982, ESA declared the Ariane quali-
fied, fully operational, and competitive with the US
Shuttle. The announcement was made presumably
because the Ariane had completed three of its four
test flights successfully, but we believe it also
stemmed from ESA's eagerness to make the vehicle
commercially available.
ESA's budget for the four test flights was $590
million, with an additional 20 percent of each year's
budget allocated for a technical contingency fund
(cost overruns). As a result of the May 1980 launch
failure, an amount equal to 12 to 15 percent of the
1980/81 budget was used to correct the vibration
problem.
Because of modifications in the ESA MARCES-B
satellite portion of the payload, the first operational
flight 2 of the Ariane SLV (using the double-launch
"SYLDA" payload system' for the first time) was
postponed by ESA from April 1982 until September
1982. Changes were made to reduce the effects of
electrostatic discharge that had caused a malfunction
of the in-orbit command system of the satellite in late
February 1980.
Agency (CNES).
managed by CNES and ESA. Subsequent operational flights will
be promoted by ESA's commercial company, Arianespace.=
' SYLDA is an acronym for system de lancement double Ariane.
Development of the Ariane SLV
The Ariane SLV program was inaugurated in 1975
with the Ariane 1, the first of five planned Ariane
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On the first operational flight on 10 September 1982,
the Ariane failed when the third stage and payload
crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 14 minutes
after lift-off. From open-source data, we believe the
failure was caused by a malfunctioning turbopump.
The third stage was at an altitude of about 176 km
and traveling at about 6 km per second when it failed.
The two satellites carried (the MARCES-B and an
ESA SIRIO-2) were lost on the flight
The second and most recent operational launch (using
the SYLDA system again and carrying an ECS-1 and
an Amsat satellite) occurred on 16 June 1983 and was
announced as successful by ESA. Several problems,
however, had been encountered in preparing the
Ariane for launch.
he SLV had developed a
guidance-system pro lem, believed to have been a
result of poor quality control during manufacture.
These problems postponed the launch from 3 June
1983 to 16 June 1983.
Characteristics of the Ariane SLV
The Ariane is a three-stage, liquid-propellant expend-
able launch vehicle (ELV). (Table 1 lists its principal
characteristics.) Most of its major components are
produced by French and West German companies
and are shipped to the launch site at Kourou, French
Guiana, where they are integrated. The unsymmetri-
cal dimethyl hydrazine used in the first and second
stages is purchased from the USSR. Production of the
liquid hydrogen used in the cryogenic third stage
takes place in France, but may be moved to the
launch site in French Guiana, where the liquid oxygen
for this stage already is being produced.
The current version of the Ariane (the Ariane 1) can
deliver about 4,700 kilograms (kg) into low Earth
orbit and 950 kg into geostationary orbit, using the
same boost rocket for all payloads (table 2). Four
additional Ariane versions are planned that will
launch increasingly larger and heavier payloads, with
the fifth version (the Ariane 5) capable of placing
3,300 kg into geostationary orbit. The first Ariane 5 is
scheduled for launch in the 1990s.
Arianespace
To manage the financing, production, and marketing
of the Ariane program, on 26 March 1980 ESA
established the commercial company Arianespace.
The company is made up of 50 shareholders-36
European aerospace companies, 13 European banks,
and the French National Space Agency (CNES). The
firm is dominated, however, by French interests and
its directors general have all been French.' It was-
established with a joint stock of 120 million French
francs ($28 million) and with total funds amounting to
179 million French francs ($40 million). The Europe-
an aerospace companies continue to conduct Ariane
basic research and development.
The Grumman Aerospace Corporation was selected
by Arianespace to represent it in the United States (so
far, Grumman has obtained five contracts). Ariane-
space has approached C. ITOH to represent it in
Japan. The French Office for Export of Aeronautical
Equipment represents the marketing firm in other
countries
US Perceptions
Despite the preponderance of US technology in the
European space program, until the late 1970s or early
1980s NASA and the US space industry did not
consider the Ariane a serious challenge to their
supremacy in the satellite launch services field-a
position afforded by the Space Shuttle, the United
States' reusable SLV, and by the Delta and Atlas-
Centaur ELVs. According to public statements by US
officials, the main reason for this lack of concern was
that ESA initially had problems obtaining coopera-
tion among its members and readying the first Ariane
for flight-testing. Even after the first successful test
flight in December 1979, the Ariane program had few
' The director general from 1980 to 1982, Frederic D'Allest, had
worked for CNES for about 15 years. In about mid-1982, D'Allest
was reappointed to CNES as its director general. Seven of the 12
members of the Arianespace board of directors are French; the
remaining countries are represented by the other five board mem-
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Table 1
Characteristics of Ariane 1 Space Launch Vehicle a
Burn
Average
Velocity
Time
Altitude
At End of
(s)
At End of
Burn Time
Burn Time
(km/s)
(km)
First stage
4 Viking-2
Nitrogen
tetroxide
(N204) +
unsym-
metrical
dimethyl
hydrazine
(UDMH)
2 3-8-meter
diameter,
Vascojet-
90 steel
145
Second stage
1 Viking-4
(3-meter
combustion
chamber)
N2O4 +
UDMH
2 A-Z5G
aluminum
alloy
2 A-Z5G
aluminum
alloy
plus
special
cryogenic
tanks
Inertial guidance 300
platform with
digital computer
Double-launch 1,000 (450-550
"SYLDA" per satellite e)
a Four additional versions of the Ariane are planned, each capable of
launching a larger and heavier payload than the previous one.
b In addition to improvements in the performance of each Ariane
version, the Ariane 4 will be usable in six different configurations,
depending on the number and type of strap-on boosters used. The
Ariane 5 is planned to use a new second-stage cryogenic engine with
a thrust of 90 to 100 tons. This stage will replace the second and third
stages of the previous versions. The same engine also is planned to be
used in a booster for European manned spacecraft.
One satellite is carried inside SYLDA
container and the other is carried atop
container but within payload shroud during
passage of payload through atmosphere.
Shroud is jettisoned at about 1 10 km
altitude. Upper satellite is then released,
upper container half is jettisoned, and
exposed second satellite is released.
c Begins operation about 5 minutes after lift-off, at an average
altitude of 140 km, and ceases operation at the moment of injection
into transfer (direct ascent) orbit.
d When launching geostationary satellites, the Ariane places its
payload directly into a transfer orbit. A solid-propellant apogee boost
motor attached to the payload is then ignited to move the satellite
into a geostationary orbit. The same motor is used for all payloads.
e Mass of satellites most in demand for telecommunications.
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Table 2
Capabilities of Ariane and US SLVs
Version
Announced
Initial
Operational
Capability a
Lift-off
Thrust
(kilonewtons)
Mass b Placed
Into Low
Earth Orbit
(200- to 300-km
altitude)
(kg)
Mass b Placed
Into Transfer
Orbit (kg)
Mass of Payload
Placed Into
Geostationary
Orbit
(kg)
Ariane 1
Mid-1983
3
2,450
4,700
1,750
950
Ariane 2
September 1983
3
2,700
4,900
2,100
1,150
Ariane 3
December 1983
3
4,100
5,800
2,400
1,400
Ariane 4
March 1986
3 d
5,500
7,300
3,300
2,000
30,000 e
f
6,800 f
(maximum)
a There will be some slippage in these dates in the near term and
possibly in the long term.
b Includes both payload and boost motors.
c First stage with two solid-propellant strap-on boosters.
d First stage with four strap-on boosters; we do not know whether
solid or liquid propellants, or both, will be used.
prospective customers. With the advent of Ariane-
space in 1980, however, and with the declining avail-
ability of US ELVs, the Ariane program started to
become a serious competitor.
Ariane Competitive Strategy
To promote Ariane launch services, Arianespace of-
fers a number of advantages, notably in financing and
pricing, launch-vehicle availability, and technology
Financing and Pricing. Under Arianespace financing
terms, the customer actually starts receiving revenues
generated from the satellite before the first scheduled
principal payment. By contrast, NASA requires the
full launch price to be paid over a 33-month schedule
before launch.
The Ariane financing terms are complex
Arianespace requires a prelaunch
fee of 20 percent of the total launch price, with the
remainder to be financed at 9.5-percent interest for
five years through loans from ESA-approved banks.
e This mass is the maximum capacity of the cargo bay and includes
the satellites and their payload assist modules (PAMs). PAMs are
rockets used to boost the payloads from low Earth orbit into higher
orbits. While the Ariane will deliver one to two satellites into
geostationary orbits, the Shuttle will be able to launch three, and in
some cases four, satellites into such orbits.
f The mass depends on the satellite payloads and boost stages used.
The payment of the principal by the customer starts
six months after the launch. Although the ESA-
sanctioned banks begin payments to Arianespace 30
months before launch, the customers are required to
pay only the interest on the loan before launch. By
contrast, NASA does not assume responsibility for its
customers' financial arrangements, although under
certain circumstances the US Government may be-
come involved.
Our information on Ariane launch prices, derived
from open sources, is limited. Because Arianespace
can freely adjust its prices for non-ESA members, a
comparison of launch prices for the Ariane and the
Shuttle is difficult. The current price per launch for
the Ariane 1 evidently ranges from $25-30 million.
The current Shuttle price per launch is $20 million for
a Delta-size payload. NASA, however, announced its
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Shuttle launch prices will increase by 85 percent in
1985. The Delta and Atlas-Centaur prices per launch
are $30 million and $50-55 million (the Atlas-Centaur
price depends on the number of launches per year).'
To promote the Ariane program outside Europe,
Arianespace has decided that until mid-1986 ESA
members should pay 25 percent more than nonmem-
bers for launches of their payloads. In some cases,
moreover, Arianespace adjusts its price to non-ESA
members according to the competition and on several
occasions it has underbid US prices. For example, in
late 1978 the agency bid an average fixed price of $26
million against a $27 million price for the Space
Shuttle (equivalent to the launch price for two US
Delta payloads). In late 1982, Arianespace bid $56
million against $60 million for the US Atlas-Centaur.
By contrast, US SLVs have fixed launch prices.F_
Because of the marketing tactics of Arianespace, even
when the Shuttle can offer considerably lower prices,
the Ariane may be chosen; this has been the case, for
example, with Brazil. It has been reported that France
has agreed to buy $58 million worth of Brazilian
goods-the price Arianespace is charging Brazil to
launch two of its satellites.
Availability. In initial efforts to compete with US
SLVs, ESA emphasized the availability of the Ariane.
At the time, availability seemed an advantage since
the United States had decided to suspend production
of the Delta and Atlas-Centaur because of expecta-
tions for the Shuttle.
Although the Delta occasionally still launches satel-
lites, the Shuttle is the only real competitor with the
Ariane. According to NASA, the Shuttle is heavily
booked until about 1986.6 Arianespace representatives
have taken full advantage of Shuttle delays to exploit
the market for launch services. For the next few years,
most customers for satellite launch services are com-
mitted to either the Shuttle or the Ariane. If, as now
' Prices of all SLVs may vary. For example, a price variation of
$3-6 million might depend on whether the cost of a perigee kick
motor is included in launch or payload costs. Other differences
might result from assuming operational costs, from using different
vehicle models, or from other factors.
planned, the Delta and Atlas-Centaur programs are
taken over by private industry, they will offer alterna-
tives to the Ariane after 1986, and we would expect
the marketing strategies of industry to be competitive
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are not taken over by private industry, there will be an
expanded market for Arianespace to exploit.
Technology Transfer. A major competitive tactic of
Arianespace is to offer customers space-related tech-
nology transfer through courses of instruction and
technical support. The French, as well as European
companies with Ariane contracts, evidently have
attempted to sell SLV technology abroad
The most notable example of technology transfer
used as a marketing tool is in ESA's dealings with
Brazil (detailed in the next section).
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Other Competitive Tactics. Until the 1982 launch 25X1
failure, as a competitive tactic Arianespace also had
stressed the reliability of the Ariane. The marketing
agency continues to promise to all its customers that
in the event of a launch failure the launch of another
satellite will take priority for a maximum of 10
months after the demand has been made by the
customer. Further, to guarantee the cost of the launch
and the cost and operation of the satellite during the 25X1
first two to five months in orbit, Arianespace requires
the customer to take out an insurance policy, which
costs about 10 percent of the launch price. It has
recently been reported that Arianespace has been
paying for the policy-another means of attracting
customers.
By contrast, NASA reportedly promises only a "best
effort" at relaunch. The timing of this effort depends
on NASA's schedule. On the other hand, NASA
claims the reliability of the Shuttle is enhanced by the
ability to have the payload checked out in space by its
crew before it is ejected into orbit.
In addition, Arianespace claims the Ariane is special-
ly designed to satisfy the demand for placing satellites
into geostationary orbits. The agency stresses the
Ariane's launch site as an advantage, pointing out
that because the vehicle is launched close to the
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equator it benefits from the extra velocity (about 200
meters per second) imparted at this latitude by the
Earth's rotation. The added velocity allows the vehicle
to place heavier payloads into orbit than would be the
case for boosters with comparable capabilities
launched farther north and in turn permits payloads
to be launched into higher orbits, thereby increasing
satellite life expectancy.
An example of the marketing tactics used by Ariane-
space was a reported attempt in January 1982 by its
director general, Frederic D'Allest, to persuade the
Colombian Minister of Communications to purchase
Ariane launch services. In a letter criticizing the US
Shuttle program, D'Allest made the following points:
? US military launches receive priority over other
launches.
? Because of the technical uncertainties of the Shut-
tle, customers' payloads could be delayed and addi-
tional fees charged to construct satellites.
? Shuttle prices will begin to increase in September
1985.
? The customer will have to pay for his launch even if
the satellite is not ready.
General
According to open sources, Arianespace has been
successful in its marketing. In the first six months
after its establishment, the total value of Ariane-
space's bookings had reached 1.4 billion French
francs ($330 million). The Ariane is booked until
about 1986 (see table 3), with over 31 firm orders and
over 30 options and contracts under negotiation as of
July 1982. Arianespace predicts that between 1985
and 1990 a worldwide market will exist for the launch
of about 200 commercial, weather, and scientific
satellites. According to open literature, the company
originally had expected to launch only about 20 to 30
percent of this number. Assuming ESA meets its goal
of launching 40 to 60 of these satellites for at least
$30 million each, its receipts will total between
$1 billion and $2 billion.
Before the September 1982 launch failure, ESA
prospects looked even more promising as a result of a
decision announced by NASA in June 1982 to reduce
Table 3
ESA-Announced Launch Schedule
for Ariane SLVs a
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Intelsat V-6
L8
November 1983
Intelsat V-7
L9
November 1983
Intelsat V-7
LiO
March 1984
ECS-2
Lll
May 1984
Telecom 1A
L12
July 1984
Telecom 1 B and Westar 6
L13
September 1984
Spacenet 1 and Arabsat 1
L14
November 1984
G Star I and ECS-3
L15
January 1985
SPOT 1 and Viking
L16
March 1985
G Star 2 and Spacenet 2
L17
May 1985
TV-Sat or Satcol 1
L18
July 1985
Satcol 1 and SBTS 2 or TV-Sat
L19
September 1984
TDF-1 or SBTS 2
L20
November 1985
GIOTTO and STC 1
L21
January 1986
Aussat 1 and SBTS 2
L22
March 1986
Aussat 2 and Anik D
its satellite launch schedule during the next 12 years
by over 200 launches and to increase its price per
launch by 85 percent.'
Brazil-A Case Study
An example of an aggressive and tenacious marketing
effort by Arianespace that has been largely successful
is its negotiations with Brazil.
be available in the next few years.
Because of the close association of CNESPwith ESA, CNES has
participated in the marketing of the Arian
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by French specialists at the Brazilian Aerospace
Institutes, beginning in April 1980. An agreement
was reached on a series of courses in the areas of
vector analysis, metallurgy, aeronautical alloys and
methods, micromolecular materials and fiberglass,
compound materials, and quality control. The courses
may have been offered to entice the Brazilians to
accept the comprehensive SLV package the French
had offered Brazil in 1978. After numerous French
proposals and Brazilian counterproposals, the French
realized in about 1980 that the SLV package was
encountering serious problems. There is no evidence
that the courses ever were given. In mid-to-late 1980,
the Brazilians canceled the SLV agreement because
the French would not transfer sensitive technology.
the French believed
Brazil was so important in penetrating the markets of
other Latin American countries that they continued
their efforts. In 1980-81, they began promoting the
Ariane SLV. At about the same time the Brazilians
realized their own SLV would not be ready in time for
its planned initial satellite missions and began ex-
pressing interest in foreign SLVs. In about mid-1980,
the French offered to train 100 Brazilians for three
years in their aerospace industry free of charge. As
part of the package, French professors would teach
courses on the technology of composites (probably
materials) and on the launch and use of satellites. We
do not know whether these courses were part of the
series agreed on earlier, but it appears that in similar
fashion they were offered to entice the Brazilians to
purchase both launch and satellite services from the
French.'
It was also in about mid-1980 that the French started
marketing Ariane launch services through ESA. By
this time, however, the Canadians were offering the
Brazilians a better financial package than the French
to build a satellite. In addition, NASA offered Brazil
a 1985 launch date at $35 million for two satellites (a
lower price and earlier launch date than it previously
' The conditions set by the Brazilian Government to obtain the
satellite contract largely eliminated US bids. (The company had to
be sponsored by its government, had to provide low-interest loans,
had offered). This was 60 percent less than Ariane-
space's $58 million offer. ESA evidently believed it
was about to lose the satellite contract and possible
launch services and began pressuring the Brazilians.
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The French won the launch contract but lost the
satellite bid. the 25X1
number of students and hours of training were cut in
half when Brazil chose the US-Canadian consortium 25X1
SPAR/Hughes to build the satellites. The actual
Ariane launch contract terms were disclosed recently
by the Arianespace director general.
According to the launch contract made public by
ESA, the French financing will be from Credit Lyon-
nais and Banque de Eides Pays-Bas, which together
offered $34.44 million to be repaid in 10 years with a
four-year grace period and an 8.5-percent interest
rate. Another $18.5 million will be repaid within eight
years, with a four-year grace period and an annual
interest rate 2 percent higher than that of the London
Interbank Offered Rate. The complimentary credit
totals $27.44 million, with an eight-year period. The
French banks also will offer, under advantageous
terms, additional credits to be used by the Brazilian
Government for other purposes.
Implications of Operational Launch
Failure and Recent Launch Success
We do not yet know the full effect on the Ariane
program of the September 1982 operational launch
failure and the June 1983 launch success. We believe,
however, that ESA engineers must move quickly for
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the program to be a commercial success. The 1982
failure may have caused the termination of one
contract, and Arianespace has obtained no new con-
tracts since the failure.
The contract that was terminated was for the launch
of the Dutch EXOSAT satellite. Because the Ariane
is booked until about 1986, it would have been
difficult for ESA to launch the EXOSAT before then
without canceling another contract. A major factor in
the cancellation, however, may have been ESA uncer-
tainty about reliability of the Ariane launcher.
We do not know how the failure affected an ESA plan
conceived before September 1982 to add a fourth
stage for the second operational flight and to recover
the first stage for possible reuse. For the recovery
operation, a parachute package was to have been
deployed off the coast of French Guiana after first-
stage burnout. ESA estimates recovery of the first
stage would save about 15 to 20 percent of the cost of
revised its scheduling procedure for flights 10 to 13 to
make up for the April-to-September 1982 postpone-
ment and to meet other commitments. On these
flights the first available satellite would be given
launch priority. ESA also had considered using the
Ariane 3 for the first time on the 11th flight
Ariane and US SLVs normally pay.
One result of the 1982 failure, according to open
sources, probably will be an increase in the insurance
premiums for launch services and satellites. We can-
not estimate the amount of the increase, but most
likely it will result in higher premiums than for US
systems because they have proved to be more reliable.
We expect the increase would be more than the 10
percent of the launch price that customers for the
We believe another operational failure of the Ariane
in the near future could substantially reduce credibil-
ity regarding launcher reliability, especially among
foreign customers-essential to the economic success
of the program. Despite the June 1983 launch success,
the 1982 failure, together with the Ariane's mediocre
test performance compared with that of US SLVs,
leads us to believe another such failure will threaten
the Ariane's long-term commercial success. (The reli-
ability of the Ariane launcher has been 66 percent in
terms of number of successful flight tests, while that
of US space launchers has been over 90 percent.)
Additional Ariane failures also could cause the Euro-
peans to reassess their commitment to the program.
the launch.
The 1982 launch failure set back the launch schedule
by about nine months. As a result of the failure, ESA
revised its launch schedule for later versions of the
Ariane, according to an open source. The first Ariane
2 and Ariane 3 SLVs were scheduled for launch in
1983, the first Ariane 4 for 1986, and the first Ariane
5 for the 1990s. There will be some slippage in the
schedule in the near term and possibly in the long
term. (For announced dates of initial operational
Several more successful flights will be needed to prove
the Ariane SLV is reliable. Barring further problems
with the vehicle, the Ariane program will provide
ESA with an independent space launch capability.
The Shuttle is and will continue to be the main Ariane
competitor.
capability, see table 2.)
We do not know how the 1982 failure and the June
1983 success will affect other scheduling plans of
ESA. Before the 1982 failure, ESA announced it had
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