PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN THROUGH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B01072R000200160024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 16, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 APR eg
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P.-Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Prospects for Stability in the
Caribbean Basin Through 1984
This paper is in response to your request of
6 April that I develop an assessment of the security
situation in the Caribbean Basin and likely threats
to regional stability through 1984.
Attachment:
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 Wishing on. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 April 1982
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Central Intelligence Agency
Prospects for Stability in the Caribbean Basin Through 1984
Overview
Despite some favorable trends, Central America's slide toward increasing
instability has continued in recent months. Radical leftist movements have
become more active in most of the countries--markedly so in Guatemala--and are
intensifying their efforts to exploit conditions already receptive to insur-
gency and revolutionary growth. External support--primarily from Cuba and
Nicaragua--continues to be crucial in sustaining the insurgencies in E1.
Salvador and Guatemala and in helping to build the infrastructure for radical-
leftist forces in Honduras and Costa Rica.
Especially in El Salvador, the strategy of the guerrillas and their
foreign backers may- change for tactical reasons over the near term. These
groups may step up attempts to explore political solutions that will enable
them to make gains that have not been possible on the battlefield. Such an
approach would allow insurgents to buy time to regroup, rearm and mold unity,
while simultaneously trying to build grassroots political support. Neither
the guerrillas nor Cuba and its-allies have altered their fundamental assess-
ment that power ultimately can only be won through military strength. This
This memorandum was requested by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. It was prepared by the Central America Working
Group, Middle America/Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis and coordinated with the Clandestine Service. Information available
as of 14 April 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments are
welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle America/Caribbean Division,
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prescription and ongoing radical leftist efforts point to an expanding
challenge to US interests in the region through 1984.
In the Caribbean, Cuba will continue attempting to exploit economic
instability to assist the radical left and cause problems for the US. While
opportunities for covert activities will not be ignored, Havana is likely to
emphasize overt approaches. Meanwhile, one particularly encouraging
development is that Cuban actions in the Caribbean Basin have led Venezuela
and Colombia, who perceive a growing threat to their own security, to become
increasingly active in sponsoring diplomatic efforts on behalf of democratic
governments.
El Salvador
Barring a negotiated solution, the leftist insurgency in El
Salvador is likely to remain a threat to regional stability
through 1984. The recent successful election has dealt a major
political and psychological blow to the insurgent cause, but
depending on the makeup and policies of the provisional govern-
ment, these effects may be only temporary. In any event, the
military balance is not likely to shift quickly or decisively in
the government's favor. The insurgents retain strong military
capabilities, and their preparations to disrupt the election have
left them with better arms, more trained cadre, and new supply
routes.
The growing interest in negotiations on El-Salvador that
Cuba has recently demonstrated reflects the Castro regime's
chagrin over the failure of the guerrillas to win a military
victory, and a belief that maintenance of the status quo there is
not to the guerrillas' advantage. Negotiations, on the other
hand, provide time for the guerrillas to regroup and rebuild,
offer the chance of political gains for insurgents, and--by
prolonging the confrontation--buy time in which public opinion in
the US can be exploited to undercut Washington's resolve on
further military support for El Salvador.
As long as there is no political solution, however, the flow
of arms via Cuba and Nicaragua is likely to continue. The insur-
gents are likely to get additional automatic rifles and heavier
anti-aircraft weapons, and may even get light air defense
missiles as well. There has been some improvement in Salvadoran
military capabilities to interdict the arms coming overland or
through shallow water, but the capability to reduce the air and
deep sea traffic remains poor.
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Guerrilla manpower over the next year or so is unlikely to
rise or fall dramatically from the current level of 4,000 to
5,000. Desertion and combat losses will require steady
recruitment and training of new cadre. A rightist provisional
government that undermines reforms would swell the pool of
potential recruits, while a broad government of national unity
that furthers existing reform programs would have the opposite
effect. The condition of the economy will play a similar role,
as will th success of the government's counterinsurgency
campaign.
One factor that could more clearly hurt insurgent fortunes
is the lack of cooperation among the various guerrilla fac-
tions. There have already been recriminations over the failure
to disrupt the elections, and further splits in leftist unity are
likely in the near term. A rightist-dominated government, how-
ever, would provide a rallying point for the insurgents and help
to restore leftist coordination.
For its part, the Salvadoran military hopes to continue to
improve its counterinsurgency capabilities over the next few
years. The strength of the army and security forces is projected
to rise from 28,000 to nearly 40,000 men, providing that suffi-
cient arms can be obtained to equip them. The number of quick-
reaction battalions is planned to reach five or six, one for each
brigade area. This will provide a large enough central reserve
greatly to increase 'the frequency- and-- scale - of offensive opera-- -
tions.
The Air Force plans to get additional helicopters and
special counterinsurgency aircraft such as A-37s or Argentine
Pucaras. The helicopters will aid mobility, and the counterin-
surgency aircraft will be more effective against insurgent
strongholds and base areas than the old French Ouragans and
Fougas currently in the inventory.
Armed forces improvements in leadership, command and
control, and intelligence, however, are likely to be slow in
coming. US training of junior officer candidates will alleviate
a shortage in this area, but many senior commanders are appointed
more for their political connections than leadership ability.
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Guatemala
The guerrillas' major advances in building their ranks and
developing an infrastructure have enabled them increasingly to
challenge the Guatemalan Government. Although insurgent capabil-
ity will almost certainly continue to improve, we do not expect
the guerrillas to gain sufficient strength over the next year or
so to launch warfare on the same scale as in El Salvador. Beyond
that time frame, the ability of the insurgents to topple the
government will depend on events in El Salvador, the extent of
Cuban backing--which is already increasing--and policies pursued
by the Rios Montt government and any successor regimes.
Longstanding and careful efforts by the Guatemalan radical
left to lay the foundation for a successful insurgency are
bearing fruit. From a force of some 1,000 armed guerrillas in
1979, insurgent ranks have grown to an estimated 4,000-5,000--an
increase which reflects patient guerrilla attempts to recruit
among the Indian masses of the Western Highlands. The guerrillas
.have also significantly improved their internal support network
by establishing extensive arms caches and underground tunneling
in their rural base areas. In some isolated highland areas,
where government presence has always been tenuous, the insurgents
are exercising de facto control over the population.
The guerrillas have demonstrated their improved military
capability over the last year or so by initiating a new level- of--
violence. They have concentrated on small scale operations, such
as terrorist killings and bombings, economic sabotage, and
ambushes of security forces, to further insurgent goals,of
bolstering international credibility, discouraging foreign
investment and tourism, and weakening armed forces' morale. The
insurgents' expanding military prowess also has enabled them
temporarily to occupy important provincial towns, and for the
first time a guerrilla unit was able to overrun a military
garrison, which is located in the heart of a region sympathetic
to the insurgents. Generally, however, the guerrillas have
recognized that they are not ready for decisive confrontations
and have avoided pitched battles with the military, even when
retreat has forced them to abandon significant caches of
materiel.
Increased external assistance from Cuba and Nicaragua is
also benefitting the guerrillas. The need for skilled insurgent
cadre will be partially met by the more than 300 guerrillas who
are receiving--or have recently completed--training in Cuba.
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Cuban and Nicaraguan advisers are providing instruction at iso-
lated camps in Guatemala. Cuban and Nicaraguan arms deliveries--
via Honduras, Mexico, Belize, and possibly Costa Rica--are
becoming more frequent and the methods of concealment more
sophisticated. Moreover, Havana's keen interest in accelerating
arms shipments was underscored by its role in promoting renewed
efforts earlier this year to strengthen guerrilla unity.
Guerrilla disunity is partly a reflection of improved per-
formance by the 17,000 member Guatemalan military following a
shift in counterinsurgency tactics last summer. An aggressive
strategy of small unit mobility combined with large scale sweep
operations has led to the destruction of a number of guerrilla
camps, the dismantling of some support facilities, and the dis-
ruption of guerrilla plans to expand operations,
o organize and arm local civilian militia is also helping to
The military's decision
stem guerrilla advances.
Despite these gains, however, continuing deficiencies--
especially in manpower--will hamper the armed forces. The
military recently created,,five new infantry battalions and plans
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to train some 5,000 new recruits this year. The armed forces
still confront a less favorable manpower ratio vis a vis the
insurgents than do their counterparts in El Salvador--and the
Guatemalans must defend a country five times the size of its
southern neighbor. Armed forces leaders recognize that greater
air mobility could help offset limited troop strength and have
recently increased their purchases of US civilian helicopters.
Nevertheless, the military has only 32 helicopters--fewer than
half of which are designed for heliborne operations, and lacks
spare parts and navigational equipment for them. The armed
forces also continue to experience difficulties in coordinating
air, infantry, and artillery during sweep operations--a situation
that underscores the need for improved training.
Gaining the allegiance of the rural population remains
crucial to the outcome of the insurgency, but Guatemalan authori-
ties have been slow to establish a multifaceted counterinsurgency
program. The Lucas administration made some halting steps
through fairly extensive land distribution and an incipient
amnesty effort. These initiatives were largely offset, however,
by lack of commitment to prohibiting security force brutality and
to checking death squad activity. Government officials can take
heart that, despite some insurgent success in exploiting local
grievances, the guerrillas continue to meet indifference and even
resistance in many communities. Guatemala's bleak short-term
economic prospects will favor the insurgents, however, by forcing
the government to cut.back_social_programs and_services.at_a_time_
of mounting unemployment.
It is not yet clear what policies the Rios Montt government
will follow in confronting the guerrillas, but the coup that
installed him has for the first time raised questions about mili-
tary cohesion. Most significantly, the new assertiveness of
junior officers--and the concomitant unease and resentment of
many senior officers--is undermining military discipline. A
major shakeup in the military's chain-of-command, highlighted by
shifts of commanders in all but four major units, will prove
disruptive in the short term. Moreover, the removal of the Chief
of'-Staff, who played a key role in promoting the shift to mobile
tactics last year, may deprive the military of aggressive
leadership. Although intensified activity. by the guerrillas will
probably force'the military to submerge internal squabbles,
infighting may drag on with detrimental consequences for the
counterinsurgency effort.
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Nicaragua
Nicaragua is building an armed force that is intended to
surpass the combined strength of its Central American neigh-
bors. The Sandinistas probably will be in a position to dominate
Central America militarily by at least 1984--sooner but for a
shortage of trained officers and NCOs, financial and logistic
problems, and a lack of proficiency with newly acquired
weapons. Even now, the Sandinistas could probably beat back an
attack by any one potential adversary in the region.
Managua already outstrips its neighbors in military man-
power, armor, and artillery capabilities. Over the next year
Nicaragua will widen its margin, although its principal manpower
effort will be the professionalization of its regular forces. If
as expected the Sandinistas receive MIG fighter aircraft this
year, they will at least match Honduras' Air Force, the best in
the region. In addition, Nicaragua is expected to receive addi-
tional T-54/55 tanks in 1982, enabling it to deploy two armor
battalions.
The Sandinistas' active-duty force of some 21,000 to 23,000
men may reach 30,000 to 35,000 by 1984 if the government can
overcome present recruitment difficulties. Otherwise, the
Sandinistas may be forced to implement a conscription program to
reach this force level. By 1984 they will also have 30,000
reservists sufficiently-trained to be-integrated into the Army_._
These forces will be backed by a substantial number of less
trained militia, perhaps as many as 100,000 to 150,000 men and
women.
The continued military buildup intimidates governments in
the region and encourages the Sandinistas to take much greater
risks in authorizing hot pursuit operations against Nicaraguan
insurgents based across the border in Honduras. Pressures for a
retaliatory strike to destroy anti-Sandinista camps in Honduras
have been building among Nicaraguan leaders for some time. So
far, Managua is attempting to show restraint--a course also advo-
cated by Havana--because of fears that such a move would provoke
a major US military action against Nicaragua. The Sandinistas
prefer instead to retaliate against Tegucigalpa by stepping up
covert activities in support of violent Honduran leftists. As
their military strength grows, however, the Sandinistas probably
will become more belligerent. If so, the danger of a major
conflict is likely to grow over time.
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Nicaragua is more directly responsible for regional turmoil
through its support for armed insurgents in El Salvador and
Guatemala and militant leftists in Honduras and Costa Rica.
Although motivated in part by revolutionary kinship, Nicaragua's
Sandinistas believe that promoting armed struggle in neighboring
countries will disrupt any plans by these governments and the US
to overthrow their own regime. This perception of a direct link
between Central American revolutions and Sandinista survival
means that Nicaragua is unlikely to curtail its promotion of
regional subversion over the next few years.
The foreign advisory presence in Nicaragua is likely to
increase as the military obtains more advanced weaponry. The
number of Cuban military personnel probably will grow beyond the
current level of nearly 2,000 and the Soviet and Eastern Bloc
presence may increase also. Much will depend on whether the
Soviets are willing to take a more direct role in the Nicaraguan
military buildup or continue to rely on Cuba or other
surrogates.
Honduras
While Honduras is not in immediate danger of destabili-
zation, it is being increasingly drawn into the turmoil in the
region. Most significantly, tension between Honduras and
Nicaragua has intensified in recent months and an escalation of
border clashes into major hostilities is a continuing danger.
The domestic radical left remains weak and splintered,-but---
leftist-inspired terrorism--some of which is supported by
Nicaragua--has increased. Although Cuba has stepped up training
of Honduran leftists and is promoting leftist unity, it may
prefer to delay the onset of an active insurgency because major
supply routes for guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala run
through Honduras. The Honduran military would probably not be
able to suppress a serious domestic insurgency supported from
Cuba and Nicaragua, however, without major assistance from the
Relations between Honduras and Nicaragua have deteriorated
markedly in recent months and trends point to continuing
animosity and a desire on both sides to strengthen military
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refugees to Honduras since December to escape Sandinista reloca-
tion efforts has swelled the ranks of anti-regime groups already
based in Honduras.
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Nicaragua and Honduras have significantly increased troop
strength in the border region, and both armies have been placed
at a high state of readiness.
The Honduran armed forces would be at a disadvantage in a
major clash with Nicaragua and thus do not want to provoke one.
The Honduran ground forces, numbering some 13,000 troops, are
poorly armed and lack the communications and transport necessary
to meet anything but minor internal and external threats. The
1,000 man Air Force--at this point still the best in Central
America--is the mainstay of Honduras' defense and deterrent
capability. Its inventory of aircraft, both fighter and
transport, is aging, however, and in need of replacement. The
Air Force also is deficient in the important area of radar
capability.
Enhancing Honduras' ability to fight a conventional war with
Nicaragua would require major weapons deliveries, including
replacement of the Air Force's 14 Super Mysteres. Commander-in-
Chief Alvarez has already asked that the US provide either F-4 or
F-5E fighters free of charge and has requested US help in financ-
ing new Canadian-built transport aircraft. The Hondurans also
need artillery and antitank missiles to offset Nicaragua's
growing armor and artillery inventories. Even with US "dona-
tions," however, Alvarez' overall plan to build up military
strength would have serious economic implications.- Since
continued IMF assistance is tied to a limit on total government
spending, any increases in military purchases could only come at
the expense of social spending, down some 20 percent in real
terms from last year's level.
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In addition, Havana is trying to provoke divisions within
the Honduran military by encouraging some senior officers to
support a policy of neutrality toward Nicaragua and El
Salvador. The Cubans hope especially to pressure Honduras into
backing away from active support for the Salvadoran military and
for anti-Sandinista groups. This Cuban approach has skillfully
played on the fears of some senior Honduran officers about the
constancy of US support.
Costa Rica
Like Honduras, Costa Rica is increasingly being drawn into
the Central American political cauldron. The country's severe
economic slide is giving domestic leftists opportunities to unify
and build bases of support. These leftists have grown more
radical and an unprecedented rise in terrorist actions over the
past year or so presages further disruptive efforts. The radical
left is still embryonic, however, and--given the fact that the
Costa Rican people are strongly anti-Communist--early attempts at
domestic destabilization would be counterproductive. Neverthe-
less, over the longer term Costa Rica's continuing economic--- --
crunch, porous borders, and lack of a viable military force will
make it increasingly vulnerable to the radical left, whose
disdain for democratic processes is growing
Costa Rica, which has no standing army, relies on its 7,000-
man Civil Guard as its first line of defense. The Guard, how-
ever, is poorly trained and generally armed with only pistols and
carbines. Few of its crew-served weapons are in working condi-
tion, almost all ordnance is unserviceable, and cannibalization
of weapons parts is widespread. The Guard's ability to provide
national defense has been further weakened by the country's
severe economic difficulties and by Cuban penetration.
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Efforts at destabilization are mos
likely to come from the more radical elements within the
country's small Communist coalition, who, smarting at their poor
showing in the February elections,.may be ready to engage in
terrorist activities.
Monge and other officials of his National Liberation Party,
aware of at least some of the potential threats to security, plan
to increase the preparedness of the Civil Guard. The President-
elect has also indicated that he will rely on an OAS peace force
to protect Costa Rica's frontiers in any Central American war.
Such a course, he has privately suggested, proceeds from his fear
that a regional conflict involving Nicaragua could spark Irreden-
tist claims-by Managua to Costa Rica's northwestern province of
Guanacaste, and thus lead to a Sandinista invasion.
Guanacaste--where many of Costa Rica's
approximately 10,000. Salvadoran refugees are sheltered and where
pro-Sandinista sentiment allows Nicaragua to maintain plausible
denial--appears to figure prominently as a support base for the
insurgency in El Salvador. Since September 1981, there is
increasing evidence.of:
-- Training camps and weapons shipments by sea and air in
this area.
-- Sandinista recruitment of land squatters and others for
eventual deployment to El Salvador.
-- Salvadoran guerrilla or Sandinista attempts at gaining
control of the refugee camps
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Leftist terrorists are also taking advantage of Costa Rica's
poor security, and during the last year have attempted bombings
and kidnappings with increasing frequency. Recent security force
raids on safe houses in San Jose have uncovered large weapons
stockpiles and other indications of a sophisticated and well-
financed gun-running operation.
Much of this activity appears
designed to aid the insurgencies in El Salvador and possibly
Guatemala, but it has a seriously unsettling effect in Costa Rica
as well.
Panama
The prospects appear favorable for continued political and
socio-economic stability in Panama during the period leading up
to presidential and legislative elections in 1984. Panama has no
domestic terrorism problem, political dissidence is well-
controlled, and economic problems are generally less severe than
those of most countries in the Caribbean Basin. The death of
Omar Torrijos in July 1981 raised immediate and serious concerns
about possible destabilizing power struggles within the National
Guard--which holds most power in Panama--or between officers and
civilians, but-instead, most-Panamanian leaders have agreed to-
maintenance of the status quo.
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Panama's prime security concern derives from Castro's proven
ability to persuade, bully, or bribe key Panamanian officials
into cooperating with him on various levels. Panama has modestly
cooled relations with Havana in the last year, but will likely
maintain ties out of concern that 25X1
foreign radicals in Panama might be employed against the host
government. Regional instability and its potential for spillover
into Panama clearly have increased security concerns among some
military officers, and this could lead to greater competition
between military-.and civilian leaders for resources and decision-
making authority. 25X1
The Caribbean
The Caribbean countries, except for oil-rich Trinidad and
Tobago, have been hard hit by the escalating cost of oil and
other imports and declining prices for their major exports--
sugar, coffee, bauxite. This, in turn, has exacerbated the deep-
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rooted structural problems of such countries as Jamaica, the
Dominican Republic and the mini-states of the Eastern
Caribbean. The result has been high unemployment, serious
inflation, declining GDP growth, huge balance of payments
deficits, and a pressing liquidity squeeze. This economic crisis
threatens political and social stability throughout the region
and creates conditions which Cuba and others seek to exploit.
Cuba is certain to continue its efforts to take advantage of
economic instability in the Caribbean as a means of promoting the
fortunes of the radical left and causing problems for the US.
While opportunities for covert activities will not be ignored,
the main thrust of these efforts will probably be overt, with
Havana depending heavily on sports and cultural contacts, the
media, and direct liaison with the area's political, social,
intellectual, and religious leaders as well as radical leftist
groups. Cuba's purpose in donating a 75-kilowatt transmitter to
Radio Free Grenada, for example, was to provide a friendly
government with the technical facilities for disseminating Cuban
propaganda throughout the Lesser Antilles. The Castro regime
will persist in promoting its own politico/economic system as a
model for overcoming underdevelopment. But as Cuba's economic
problems mount, it is likely to have increasing difficulty hiding
the fact that the massive amounts of Soviet aid are crucial to
the survival --of -the Cuban economy--aid -that- would not be
available to other nations in the region.
Venezuela and Colombia
Increasingly pessimistic about trends in Nicaragua, the
Herrera government in Venezuela is trying to stem radicalization
in Central America by fostering regional cooperation among
democratic regimes and by offering substantial economic
Cuba's growing involvement in Central America and the
Caribbean particularly has aroused Venezuela's apprehension.-
Most Venezuelans believe that their basic political, economic,
and security interests require undercutting Havana's influence in
the area. Hardline elements in the, government favor directly
challenging Cuban initiatives, fearing that Cuba's ultimate
objective is Venezuela's oil reserves. The government's policy
is, however, less aggressive, seeking instead to minimize
polarization in the Caribbean. Herrera does not want to provoke
Cuban meddling in Venezuela's internal affairs or assisting small
domestic insurgent groups.
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Venezuela's concerns have been heightened by the economic
and political implications of a prolonged slump in oil prices and
production--factors that would seriously hamper its ability to
continue to provide such extensive economic aid. The government
fears that dropping oil revenues will worsen already serious
economic and social problems. If the economic situation markedly
declines, extremist groups could exploit latent discontent and
could eventually hope once again to challenge Venezuela's
democratic political system. 25X1
Colombian authorities believe that the Soviet Union and Cuba
are trying to establish Communist regimes throughout Central
America and the Caribbean. They cite Nicaragua as the first
success and the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala as
further evidence of the threat that they believe will reach
Colombia. The Turbay government has embarked on an activist
policy that combines limited economic assistance with coordinated
action by democratic regimes in the area. 25X1
Sharply increased activity by Cuban-supported revolutionary
groups in Colombia is another reason for the government's
activism. The insurgents so far have had fairly limited success
but the persistence of the insurgency underscores the chronic
problems that face Colombia. Extreme social and economic
disparities feed alienation and protest; large, increasingly
unmanageable cities offer a favorable environment for urban
terrorists;_isolated._and__neglected_rura1 areas. provide hospitable - - -
havens. 25X1
The guerrilla threat is not new to Colombia and it is
unlikely that the insurgents could defeat the Colombian armed
forces. Most Colombians reject the political alternative
presented by the guerrillas and prefer their present political
system, however imperfect they believe it to be.
If insurgencies succeed elsewhere in the region, Colombian
officials believe that domestic guerrilla groups will seek a
wider confrontation with the government. They also worry that
Cuba will-.increase its support to these groups, which would
enhance their ability to challenge the government, especially
during the transition to a new administration in August.
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SUBJECT: Prospects for Stability in Central America Through 1984
Distribution:
Orig. Cy #1 - William P. Clark
2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - Exec Registry
5 - ED/DCI
6 - DD I
7 - ADDI
8 - DDI Registry
9 - DDO
10 - Chairman NIC
11 - SA/IA
12 - NIO/LA
13-14 - D/ALA
15 - ALA/MCD
16-17 - ALA Prod. Staff
18-21 - OCO/IMD/CB
22 - C/MCD/ALA
23 - DC/MCD/ALA
24 - C/CAWG/ALA
25 - CAWG FILE
26 - DIVISION FILE
27 - C/CC/MCD/ALA
28-29 - SAD/ALA
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA (15Apr82)
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84B01072R000200160024-5