LETTER TO JAMES W. NANCE FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B01072R000100010016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 18, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2007/0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
Rear Admiral James W. Nance
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Dear Admiral Nance:
Enclosed is our analysis supporting the NSC's request
for a list of items to be considered in any expansion of US
Government measures to embargo technology and end-products
to the Soviet Union.
If the President's embargo is expanded, it probably
should include the items listed in Table 1. We must note,
however, that unilateral US Government actions on these
items likely will have only marginal effects on the Soviet
Union in general.
The President may wish to consider an even greater
expansion of the embargo, encompassing other US Government
Some
tions
i
.
nterac
actions to curtail Soviet-American
suggested action-areas are listed in Table 2.
Sincerely,
03: CIA-RDP84B01072R000100010016 _ 32/
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
cc: James Buckley, State
Meyer Rashish, State
Harry Kopp, State
Fred Ikle, Defense
Richard DeLauer, Defense
Lionel Olmer, Commerce
Lawrence Brady, Commerce
Foster Collins, Treasury
 Approved For Relea
Letter to Admiral Nance:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - AS/DDI
1 - OSWR
7 - TTAC
OSWR/TTAC:
I(15Jan82)
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Technology or End-Product
Agricultural
Machinery
combines
tractors
Table 1; The Effect of Further Trade Restrictions
on Selected Technologies and End-Products
Effect* Remarks
US US/Allies
Small Substantial Even if replaced by foreign suppliers,
the US action probably would raise Soviet
costs and strain Soviet hard currency
reserves. Given poor Soviet and world
harvests, unilateral. USG action could
exacerbate Soviet food shortages.
Allied action could cut Soviet grain
imports by 70%.
Moderate Substantial US action would inhibit long-term Soviet
drive for self-sufficiency.
Allied action would further inhibit this
Microelectronics Moderate Substantial Legal acquisitions, coupled with illegal
ones, have given the Soviets an entire
pol.ysilicon
? printed circuit
boards
? test equipment
* In increasing order of magnitude, from Small through Moderate to Substantial
industry.
US actions would slow Soviet advances.
Allied action would substantially retard
Soviet advances.
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fertilizer
? pesticides
Oil and gas equipment/
technology
? submersibles
? off-shore rigs
drill bits and pipe
? pipeline equipment,
including compressors
recovery chemicals
Construction equipment/materials
? large-diameter pipe
? rolled steel
? bulldozers/excavators/
dumpsters
U ceramics
? composites/powders
? special steel. alloys
O software
? large-frame
minis
peripherals
US and/or Allied action would affect
Soviet agricultural productivity.
Allied action would reduce expected
Soviet oil and gas recovery by 2 or 3
million barrels per day by late 1980s.
Non-US equipment is widely available.
Allied action would cause severe dis-
ruptions in machine building and gas
transmission.
Allied action would inhibit advanced
Soviet work.
US action would be reduced by foreign
availability.
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NC/CNC/robotics
CAD/CAM
mills/foundries/fabrication
precision machinery
Shipbuilding
o floating drydocks
? heavy-lift cranes
* NC: numerically controlled
CNC: computer numerically controlled
CAD: computer-aided design
CAM: computer-aided manufacture
Substantial Non-US suppliers are numerous.
Allied action would seriously hamper
Soviet efforts to boost quality/quantity
in production.
Small Substantial Allied action would curtail Soviet
naval construction and repair capabilities-
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Technology/action
1. Total cut-off of export credits,
including retroactive action on
outstanding credit
2. Terminate maritime agreement
3. Terminate fishing agreement
4. Reduce Soviet commercial
presence
5. Eliminate all S&T* agreements
(including Article 4 exchanges
of technical data with US firms)
not up for renewal in short-run,
including "unofficial" exchanges
(e.g., direct university-Academy
exchanges, Fulbright Scholars,
etc.)
Impact Foreign availability.
Forces Soviets to pay scarce Europeans and Japanese already
hard currency and/or compete offer "below prime" rates but
for market rates increased Soviet demand may
increase cost of borrowing
Shipping and cross-trading Allies have stronger flag-
with and by Soviets would shipping requirements and the
increase their costs and Soviet fleet would not encroach
reduce hard currency earnings on their markets
Deprives Soviets access to
fertile grounds and would
cut Soviet protein consump-
tion
Reduces Soviet presence and
would limit intelligence
service (IS) uses
World fisheries are already
strained; may cause friction
with allied competitors
Soviets would probably shift
commercial activities to
allies
Cuts off direct Soviet
access to US academies and
business
Allies have such agreements
and Soviets are strengthening
them
Commentary
Now suspended
by US only
Now suspended
by US only
Now suspended
by US only
An easy, low-cost
action--if we trade
less, they don't need
commercial offices
These generally are of
one-way benefit to Soviets
and are very difficult
to monitor--no loss to
USG
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6. Reduce or eliminate US
participation in trade
shows attended by Soviets,
and restrict sales presenta-
tions, and industry tours
7. Reduce or eliminate US
presence in international
organizations (e.g., IIASA,
UNDP) with large Soviet
presence
8. Eliminate Soviet access
to USG open source
documents (NTIS, Library
of Congress)
9. Regulated activities of
soviet-owned, US-chartered
companies
10. Restrict imports of Soviet-
origin goods
Cuts Soviets off from Allies could and probably
personnel relations with would pick up slack
US firms and state-of-the-
art technology and reduces
IS involvement
Cuts Soviets off from Allies may pick up tab, but
close contacts with US not likely
experts and reduces IS
involvement
Would restrict Soviet some agreements with Allies
access to USG-sponsored (e.g., British library) must
research be altered
Would weaken Soviet NA
commercial presence,
and use of same for IS
related activities
Reduces the risk of
theft, inadvertent
losses of know-how and
design processes, and
IS recruitment/assessment
threat
A rather simple way of
restricting US "subsidies"
to Soviets, but may cause
problems in multilateral
contexts (e.g., UN)
Would probably require
legal action, but well
worthwhile in any event
Damages Soviet prestige NA
and may crimp somewhat
Soviet hard-currency
earnings
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Mostly symbolic, as we
don't import a great deal
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Appendix: US-USSR BILATERAL TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS
Date for Renewal Notification
Science & Technology
July 8, 1982
Agriculture
June 19, 1983
By Dec. 1982
Artificial Heart
June 28, 1987
Research & Development
Atomic Energy
June 21, 1983
Energy
June 28, 1982
30 day advance
Environmental Pro-
May 23, 1987
tection
Housing and Con-
June 28, 1984
By Dec. 1983
struction
Medical Science and
May 23, 1987
Public Health
Exploration and Use
May 24, 1982
of Outer Space for
Peaceful Purposes
Transportation
June 19, 1983
Studies of the
Dec. 15, 1986
World Ocean
03 - (',IA-RfP84RO1 72R000100010016-1