AGENDA FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, 30 OCTOBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00890R000400040007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 22, 1981
• Content Type: MF

S E C R E T EXCOM 819037
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DDa Reg1stry
A/ -02/9
22 October 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Robert M. Gates
Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
SUBJECT: Agenda for Executive Committee Meeting,
30 October. 1981
1. The Executive Committee will meet on Friday, 30 October 1981, at
1000 hours in the DCI Conference Room on two items: Proposed Agency History
Program and the Long-Range. Planning Process.
2. History Program. Ken McDonald, the Agency's new Chief Historian,
will briefly highlight and request your concurrence in his proposed program,
which is summarized in Tab 1. The annexes at Tabs A and B contain sample
histories for your perusal.
3. Long-Range Planning Process. Chief of the Planning 25X1
Staff, will outline a proposed long-range planning process that builds on
the experience gained from last year's effort. The proposed process has
been designed to be compatible with the Community 1985 Intelligence Capabilities
exercise and to adapt and provide input to the revised Agency budget process.
You should be prepared to provide the DDCI your views on this topic.
Rbbert M. 9; 1tes
Attachments:
As stated
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OPP/PR 1(22 Oct 81)
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HISTORY STAFF PROGRAM
Executive Summary
1. Goals: To serve CIA by helping preserve its institutional- memory
and historical records, by providing a specialized reference ser-
vice, and by writing its history.
2. Products: Classified histories for use by CIA managers and other
Agency employees. The new program will build on, but differ from,
a previous program that produced mainly component histories by
writers assigned from the offices or divisions. We intend to use
professionally trained historians to research and write Agency
history at a level of generality that will minimize reference to
sources and methods, and in a governmental context that will re-
veal the Agency's place in the conduct of United States policy.
We propose four categories of histories:
A. a short survey history of the Agency
B. studies of the leadership of the individual DCIs
C. a series of topical monographs
D. a multi-volume general history of CIA
We have attached prospectuses for the short survey history and
for a Raborn period general history volume.
3. Other activities: The History Staff is CIA's point of contact
with other U.S. government history programs that use CIA-originated
documents. It also provides an internal reference service on
matters of a historical nature, and proposes to conduct an oral
history program in conjunction with its other research.
4. Staffing: The History Staff currently consists o.r a Chief, Deputy
Chief, and two support personnel.- Two additional historians are
being recruited. Each of the staff historians will undertake one
writing project--ranging in duration from six months to several
years--at a time.
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HISTORY STAFF PROGRAM
I shall not begin with a long argument for the utility of histor-
ical studies for CIA, because I think that this is self-evident., The
CIA cannot plan or act without being influenced by its historical ex-
perience. It is therefore not?a question of whether the. Agency uses
history, but rather of what kind of history it uses, and how well.
"History is simply recorded memory," a distinguished historian has
written. "People without memory are mentally sick. So too are nations
or societies or institutions that reject or deny the relevance of their
collective past."
In this paper I shall propose a program for the CIA History Staff,
which was re-established in November 1980, and which I joined as Chief
Historian in August 1981. Since the History Staff's work will call for
support from all parts of the Agency, we need the Executive Committee's
approval and suggestions before we embark on a new program.
With this program the History Staff expects to serve the Agency
in three ways: by helping to preserve its institutional memory and
historical-records; by providing a specialized reference service for
it and other government agencies; and, most importantly, by writing its
history. The histories we shall write fall into four main categories:
A. a short survey history of the Agency
B. studies of the leadership of the individual DCIs
C. a series of topical monographs
D. a multi-volume general history of CIA.
After a brief account of the History Staff's development 1952-1979
and of its restoration in the past year, this paper will explain how the
History Staff plans to carry out its records and reference functions,
and how it will organize its four history-wri ti_ng projects.
Background
Since Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith appointed Dr. Arthur Darling as
CIA's first historian in 1952 the role and size of the History Staff
have varied greatly. Until the late 1960s the office remained small,
.and professional historians produced well-written and carefully docu-
mented studies.of.the origins and early years of the Agency, and of
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.the development of its organizational structure. In 1968, however,
on the initiative of Col. L.K. White, then Executive Director/Comp-
troller, a large staff of over 20 was organized to supervise an am-
bitious program of."component histories," which eventually involved
hundreds of people throughout the Agency. After 352 of these monographs--
of the much larger number originally projected--had been written, this
program was abruptly halted and the History Staff cut back sharply at
the end of the 1973 fiscal year. By mid-1974, when only one historian
and two support staff remained, they were transferred from the Office of
the DCI to DDA. By the end of 1979 this vestigal History Staff had
been dissolved altogether.
In 1979, even as the History Staff expired, new studies were under
way to determine what kind of history program CIA needed. By mid-1980
the DCI decided to re-establish a history office on a new and more
solid footing. Based on the advice of an internal History Advisory
Committee,
and of an eminent outside
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historian , ency in October 1980 began the
search for a new Chief Historian. Shortly thereafter a Histo Staff
was set up in the Office of the DCI withi 13r
history Ph.D. from NFAC, as Acting Chief ancL permanent Deputy.
The History Staff, which is housed in the Ames Building, has in
addition to its Chief and Deputy, one History Assistant (GS-9), and
one Secretary (GS-6). Its T/O authorizes two additional Historians
(GS-13), whom we are now trying to recruit. Dr. Jack Pfeiffer, Chief
Historian 1974-79, has also been assigned to this office for the current
year, to complete his history of the Bay of Pigs operation .
I ireport of June 1980 and of July 1980 both
genera y agreed on how a new History Staff should be set up, and the
Agency has fairly closely followed these reports' suggestions in re-
storing the History Staff. Both reports also agreed that a compre-
hensive program should not be organized until a new Chief Historian
had taken charge, and this suggestion has given impetus since August
to the inquiries and consultations needed to plan a new program. I
have looked into the work of the History Staff before its demise in
1979 and consulted with people who were associated with it then. I
have talked at least briefly with the DCI, DDCI and all the Deputy
Directors (except Mr. Dirks), and others in the Agency about the direc-
tion that a new program should take. Outside of the Agency I have had
especially useful discussions with the Chief Historians of the Depart-
ment of State, the National Security Agency,-the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and the four military services.
These inquiries were aimed at identifying not only the most
useful purposes that a CIA History Staff can serve, but also the
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principal problems that we can expect to face in pursuing these objec-
tives. Writing history for the Central Intelligence Agency is not like
writing history for any other organization. The benefits of an accurate
record and systematic historical analysis must be kept in constant _
balance with the requirements of security. The measures necessary to
protect secret information and the sources and methods used to obtain
it, must be rigorously observed as the History Staff carries out its
several functions.
Program
The History Staff has three principal functions, which center around
records., reference and writing. Since the writing of history is the
most prominent of these, let us first deal briefly with records and
reference.
Records and Reference'
The records of the CIA are the raw material needed both to provide
a useful reference service and to write accurate and-systematic history.
Although the History Staff maintains some records of its own--mainly the
histories and monographs already produced, and some of the documents and
reference files to support past and future studies--its role with re-
spect to the Agency's records is essentially advisory. The DDA runs an
efficient records management system, which follows general guidance
from the National Archives and Records Service on what records to pre-
serve. Our function is to complement the administrative and managerial
criteria used in collecting records with our professional advice as
CIA historians, to see that important historical documentation is not
lost. We also plan to improve the History Staff's ability to offer
informed advice on what to preserve of the important new kinds of audio,
visual and computer records. In the 1970s the History Staff made a
small beginning in an oral history program, and we now hope to do much
more. By capturing the institutional memory of that rapidly retiring
,first generation of CIA officers, an oral history program .can provide
an invaluable resource for writing the Agency's ~;isto~YI We therefore
plan to organize a modest but systematic oral history interview program,
especially as we press on with our projected general history and studies
of the DCIs.
In dealing with the Agency's records the History Staff also re-
sponds to the requests from other Government offices (e.g. the Depart-
ment of State and NSA historians' . offices, and the Army's Center for
Military History) for access to CIA documents. (DDA's IPD handles such
requests from private researchers.) Agency-originated documents in the
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several presidential libraries account for a large part of these
official requests, and we act as broker in referring such documents to
the Agency components who decide whether or not they can be released
and declassified. This work is the most obvious and frequent in our
liaison role with the historical profession in government, universities,--
learned societies and elsewhere.
The History Staff's reference service is at the intersection of
its records and writing roles. To respond to Agency and outside official
requests to find specific information or to review material for histor-
ical accuracy, we use essentially the same historical records and re-
search skills that we use to write histories. For Agency-wide use the
History Staff has published several classified chronologies and lists
of key personnel that now need up-dating. The large file of component
studies, which covers most aspects of the Agency's activities up to the
mid-1960s, has been especially useful in answering a wide variety of
internal requests for historical information to use in training and
litigation, and to reveal how recurring problems have. been handled in
the past. We expect that our reference capability will be used. more as
the Agency becomes aware that we are in business again.
Histories
Clearly the History Staff's central function is to write history..
As far as I can discover the only real controversy about this role has
centered on the massive "component histories" program carried out
from 1968 to 1973. It may be useful to look for a moment at this old
program before presenting a new program of historical research and
writing.
The component histories program was launched in 1968 as a "catch-
up" program, to produce historical studies of virtually all of the
Agency's activities, operations and components from its beginning to
around 1965. Over 500 separate "histories" were projected, mostly to
be done not by the History Staff, but by people in the components.
Although the History Staff expanded substantially, it served mainly
in a supervisory, editing and review role. Thus 'most of these studies
were neither researched nor written by trained historians, but rather
by officers detached from their regular duties for this work.. The
length of these studies ranges from a few pages to several volumes and
their quality also varies enormously. Some are excellent; most are
mediocre and pedestrian; some are very bad. -Very few qualify as com-
pleted histories; they are narrowly focused preliminary studies designed
principally to capture valuable data and experience that might other-
wise have been lost.- Intended for only limited circulation inside the
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Agency, most exist in but one or two copies. They have proved highly
useful for internal Agency reference purposes, and-they will be impor-
tant sources for later more professional and comprehensive historical
studies. Yet they must be used with caution and discrimination. Mostly
descriptive rather than analytical and often lacking context and
perspective, they can be misleading. The faults in both design and
execution of this "components histories" program became evident to every-
one once some of these studies were released to the Senate Select
Committee in the mid-1970s. I should therefore emphasize at the outset
that we propose no studies along these lines in the program we shall
outline here.
What I do propose is a writing program that will be both of obvious
and immediate usefulness to the Agency, and within the capabilities of
the professional historians allotted to this office. This program in-
cludes four principal projects:
A. a short but comprehensive survey history of the
Agency from its OSS origins to the recent past
B. a continuation of the series of histories of the
- DCIs, which now ends with Allen Dulles's tenure
C. a series of historical monographs on subjects of
continuing interest and importance to the Agency
D. a multi-volume general history of the Agency.
Let us look a little more closely at what will be involved in each of
these projects.
A Short Survey History
For a long time the Agency has needed a readable and reliable survey
of itself for its own people. What we now propose is a succinct classi-
fied one-volume history, to be widely available in the Agency for train-
ing, -reference and critical perspective. A corporate history is
essential for any profession, including the profession of intelligence.
Members of CIA now have only outside histories--of wildly differing
quality and accuracy--to turn to for an account of how the Agency got
to where it is today. The only US government history of CIA is a brief
unclassified annex to the Senate Select Committee hearings, published
in 1976. There is no single work that any Agency employee, whether a
new Career Trainee or a senior executive, can-rely on for an accurate,
authoritative and concise survey of the Agency's history since its
origins in World War-II. Dr. Knapp's?prospectus of what our survey
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history would cover, and of how it might.be organized, is attached
as Annex A.
DCI Histories
In the History Staff's series of studies of the Directors of
Central Intelligence two first-rate histories, each in five typescript
volumes, have been completed, in 1971 and 1973. The first is on Walter
Bedell Smith as ontague, and the second is on Allen
Dulles as DCI, Beyond this, Walter Elder has done
some work on John McCone as DCI.
We propose to continue this series. The present DCI has already
enlisted the cooperation of Messrs. Schlesinger and Helms in this
ente rise, and has arranged for two distinguished retired officers,
and John Bross, to help them in organizing their recollections.
ese DCI histories, by emphasizing the impact of the man on the Agency,
offer a unique view of CIA's work from the top.
Historical Monographs
Monographic studies will allow us to assure priority treatment of
topics that we find of current importance to the Agency, and to pull
together in one account the related efforts of a variety of components.
Moreover, these studies will consider these topics in the larger context
of the government as a whole. This kind of study would treat such topics
as CIA's relations with Congress, its role in the intelligence community,
its part in the development of overhead reconnaissance, and its work
in the Vietnam War. Another example on a large scale is Dr. Pfeiffer's
history of the Bay of Pigs operation, whose fourth and final volume is
nearing completion. In the History Staff files there are also several
excellent draft studies begun in the early 1970s that should now be
completed. Good examples are two studies, by John Bross, SfAT
on forerunners of the intelligence community.
A General History
The largest long-term project in the new history program is the
proposed multi-volume general history. We need to begin a history of
the Agency as a whole, both to describe its development since 1947 and
to draw the main themes of its evolution into a broad synthesis. While
a general history of CIA will be periodized by the tenures of successive
DCIs, it will. not focus (as the DCI histories will) on these men and
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their impact, but rather on the growth of the entire institution and
on its role in the American policy process. This kind of history
must be carefully documented, but we shall try to overcome that tendency
towards encyclopedic fullness of detail that typifies so many-institu-
tional histories. By avoiding elaborate detail a general history can
explain how the Agency has changed and progressed over the years, with-
out using the kind. of particularistic evidence that is most likely to
raise questions of sensitive sources and methods. Any large and com-
plex organization can profit from this kind of institutional history.
When the need for historical perspective and accurate background data
arises, it is a question of whether it is met by relying on whatever
old documents are in the files and the longest memories available, or by
referring to a comprehensive professional history of the institution.
A strong and effective History Staff will relieve Agency components of
having to act as their own historians. A precedent and starting point
for our work is the two-volume general history of CIA's progenitor, OSS,
that the War Department prepared (with Kermit Roosevelt as Chief
Historian) at the end of World War II. To give an idea of what one could
expect to be covered in this kind of general history, Dr. Knapp has written
a sketch account of the volume (or part of a volume) that would treat
Admiral Raborn's period as DCI. This prospectus, attached as Annex B,
illustrates how this large work would put a wide range of apparently
unrelated events and activities into the context of both the Agency and
the government taken as a whole.
Conclusions
The program we have presented here will fully occupy the talents and
efforts of the small History Staff. I should emphasize that we think
it important that professionally trained historians write the projected
histories. Dr. Knapp will undertake the survey volume and I shall start
on the first of the DCI histories (probably the study of James Schlesinger
as DCI). When the two new historians are in place we plan to put one to
work on a volume in the general history (probably for the Raborn period),,
and to assign the other to the first study in the-topical mongraph series.
As our history program evol%res we may need to seek additional help in our-
research and writing projects. Should this be necessary, I would propose.
to arrange for qualified outside historians (good candidates might be
Agency annuitants with historical training and experience) to undertake
specific projects on fixed-term contracts.
I should also note that we need to build a network of interested
and sympathetic officers in the upper echelons of the various directorates.
The willingness of such people to broker arrangements in their components
and serve on all-Agency boards to review completed manuscripts is essen-
tial to our work. As a formal base for such a network we hope to estab-
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lish an internal History Advisory Board, with at least one senior rep-
resentative from each directorate. Our work cannot prosper if we do
not maintain open lines of communication with all parts of the Agency.
Having looked carefully at the history-of the History Staff, I
am confident that we can avoid the more obvious mistakes of the past.
But. this is not enough. Whether the new history program succeeds or
fails will depend on how effectively it helps the Agency carry out its
work and mission. With this in mind, we have tried to fashion a new
program that will be useful, productive and worthy of your trust and
support.
21 October 1981
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Annex A
PROSPECTUS--CIA: THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS
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Antecedents
CIA's institutional roots extend from Maj. Gen. William
-Donovan's efforts during World War II to provide the. US
with an intelligence service and a capability for unconven-
tional warfare--the Office of Strategic Services. In the rush
to demobilize, OSS was abolished in October 1945. Its research
and analysis personnel were transferred to State and the re-
mainder of its employees were put into the War Department as the
Strategic Services Unit.
Advocates of a permanent intelligence organization
won the creation by executive action on 1 January 1946
of a temporary Central Intelligence Group. Rear Adm. Sidney
Souers, USNR, the first DCI, headed it and its related coordin-
ating and advisory boards for six months, during which CIG
accumulated pieces of former wartime organizations such as
FBIS and. began to put out the daily intelligence summa.ry
Pres. Truman requested.
Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, USA (AAF), became DCI in June
1946 and set about building a self-sufficient intelligence
service. He brought in a group.of colonels to run things and
greatly expanded CIG's personnel and functions. During Vanden-
berg's one-year tenure, CIG began to produce intelligence esti-
mates, won authorization to conduct its own research and analysis
and created a large Office of Reports and Estimates to do so.
In addition, it acquired a collection and counterintelligence
capability by annexing SSU (renamed Office of Special Opera-
tions), replaced the FBI as the intelligence unit for Latin
America, established liaison with the
Planning for a post-war realignment of US security
defense, and intelligence institutions had begun as early as
June 1945, with the Eberstadt Commission. Intense maneuvering
continued for two years, as each service and department
attempted to defend or expand it equities. The culmination
came with passage--in the atmosphere of the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan--of the National Security Act of 26 July
1947. In addition to creating an independent Central Intelli-
gence Agency, it also established the National Security
Council, the forerunner of the Department of Defense, and a
separate Air Force. The new organizations came into being
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on 18 September 1947. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the Rear
Admiral who had succeeded Vandenberg, was reconfirmed as DCI.
Hillenkoetter
The transition from CIG to CIA did not cause Major
structural changes--ORE remained a collection of over-
extended regional branches trying to service a wide range of
customers and OSO divided its resources between Headquarters
and overseas stations. The DCI added his own Inspection
and Security Staff, as well as an Executive for Administration
and Management.
In. December 1947, NSCIDs 1 to 6 were issued, outlining
the basic responsibilities of CIA, the Departments, and the
relatively powerful Intelligence Advisory Committee. -Under
NSC 4/a, which assigned covert psychological operations to
nor y a erwar ,' o owing t e Communist coup in Czecho-
slovakia and the Berlin blockade, NSC 10/2 called for a
greatly increased range of covert actions to forestall
Communist expansion.
As a further reaction to the mounting international
tension, an Office of Policy Coordination was created in
September 1948 at the initiative of State Department activists.
Nominally a component of CIA, OPC's head (Frank Wisner) was
named by State, its policy direction came from State and
Defense, and it was directed by its charter to act as inde-
pendently as possible in conducting covert "activities"
other than intelligence collection. OPC grew rapidly and
undertook countless projects. It engaged in paramilitary
planning and material stock-piling, and purchased an airline--
CAT--to keep the planes from falling into Chinese Communist
hands. Interest in East European refugees prompted forma-
tion of the Agency-sponsored National Committee for a Free
Europe, which backed anti-Soviet political warfare projects
such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. OPC opened its
own overseas stations and competed with OSO for sources and
agents.
In July 1948, a committee of private lawyers--Allen
Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa--was appointed
to evaluate intelligence performance under the National
Security Act. Its report, issued in January 1949, was
highly critical of CIA's weak leadership and "o??f -the heavy.
military emphasis in the Agency. Hillenkoetter became even
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less assertive under criticism, and a period of mana
erial
g
drift and unsupervised activities ensued pending his replace-
ment.
The unanticipated outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950 forced the dual issues of the need for a stronger DCI
and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's virtual exclusion of the Agency
from the Far East. During the summer of 1950, CIA began to
provide large-scale paramilitary-support to the US Forces
in Korea In 25X1
August, Pres. Truman nominated Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith,
USA, to be DCI.
Smith
Smith moved rapidly to effect reorganizations that
gave CIA its basic structure for the next quarter century
--major functional activities grouped into a small number of
deputy directorates. He also established the DCI's role
as intelligence advisor to the NSC and set up an office
of the Inspector General to survey the overt components
and monitor grievances.
Less than a week after taking office in October 1947,
Smith announced that the DCI would assume administrative
control of OPC and that policy guidance for covert activities
would come through him, rather than direct to OPC. He secured
the concurrence of State, Defense, and the JCS in this shift
and in the related downgrading of the IAC. In January 1951,
he created the Deputy Directorate of Plans to supervise
both OPC and OSO, which otherwise remained quite distinct,
and brought Dulles into the Agency as the DDP.
In November 1950, it was ORE's turn to be reorganized
into a Deputy Directorate of Intelligence. In the first
phase, Smith created an Office of National Estimates to
take in hand the preparation and review of estimates and
their coordination in the community. An Office of Research,
and Reports was set up and given the specific task of con-
ducting; economic research on the Soviet bloc. In a second
phase, the Office of Current Intelligence was pulled out
to produce the daily report. A new Office of Scientific
Intelligence faced a.period of jurisdictional disputes with
the military before settling on a mission limited to the
study of foreign programs in basic science and medicine.
Some major innovations resulted from these reorganiza-
tions. ORR set out to study the Soviet economy. sector
by sector, using a variety of intelligence sources to compen-
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sate for the denial of access. When OCI was. formed, it
acquired the small group that handled Communications Intell
.igence and began to include COMINT in its Current Intelli-
gence Bulletin--a pioneer step toward all-source intelligence.
The. Office of Collection and Dissemination introduced the
use of machine-assisted document retrieval.
Smith's attempts to clarify OPC's mission led to the
creation in April 1951 of the Psychological Strategy Board
as an NSC sub-committee. Its initial supervision of psycho-
logical operations expanded to overall planning and program-
ming for the Cold War. Tentative steps toward the integra-
tion of OSO and OPC began in.1951, and a merger was finally
announced in July 1952. The DCI kept some controls in
his own hands, notably by moving communications into the
Office of the DCI and by designating the area division
chiefs as his "executives" in the nfP_ ThP
units. In August , Dulles moved up to become DDCI, with
OPC's Wisner taking over as DDP and OSO's Richard Helms
becoming Chief of Operations.
New undertakings during Smith's tenure included the
diverse roles egic
exports, and
an array of operations targeted against Communist inter-
national front organizations.
Dulles
Dulles became DCI in February 1953, a position he
retained throughout and beyond the eight years of the Eisen-
hower administration. Gen. Charles .Cabell,,USAF, was DDCI
during Dulles's entire tenure.
. Another key appointment was that of Richard Bissell in
1954 to be Special Assistant to the DCI for planning and
Cooperation. This was a period o administrative
stability, with highly structured NSC and tVhite House oper-
ations, close collaboration with State where Dulles's brother
was Secretary, a cooperative Congress, and a general accept-
ance of the Agency's role in supporting policy. The most
serious threat to the Agency's image--Sen. Joseph McCarthy's
1953 accusations that subversives were-employed in CIA--was
cut off promptly by Dulles's refusal to submit his people
to the senator's grilling.
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Dulles maintained a deep interest in the details of
clandestine operations, giving other aspects of the DCI
position far less attention. In the 1950's CIA was allotted
the mission of preventing further Communist advances in
Europe, Asia, and Latin America. This work was carried
on in a DDP that was a jumble of area divisions, functional
staffs, and .. special. groups intended to facilitate secrecy
and flexibility but often fostering confusion and duplica-
tion. Projects--which could be initiated anywhere in the
system--were the units of activity.
Paramilitary activity flourished, then declined.
Early efforts to parachute agents into Communist-controlled
areas were given up as fruitless and the Korean truce in
July 1953 reduced the need for field suppor.t.. Successful
efforts against the Huk rebellion in the Philippines were
followed by inability to move Indonesian anti-Communists to
fight in their own cause. War-planning in such fields as
generated little
response in e target countries.
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clearest successes in political warfare. Strictures against
operating within Soviet-bloc countries, however, limited
the Agency to working with the refugees who streamed out
of Hungary after the 1956 uprising.
In 1955, Congress appointed a commission headed by
former President Herbert Hoover to survey the Executive
Branch. It had a Task Force under Gen. Mark Clark assigned
to study the intelligence community and a sub-unit to in-
vestigate CIA. Pres. Eisenhower named a separate special
committee under Gen. James Doolittle to prepare a classi-
fied report on the DDP for the President and barred Clark's
group from duplicating its study, effectively excluding
it from DDP. Doolittle recommended a cut-back to remove
"dead-wood" and some organizational changes that remained
a dead-letter. Under its curtailed charter, the Clark Comm-
ittee found in CIA an over-emphasis on covert activities,
along with inadequate collection and analysis on the Soviet
Union.` As a follow-up to these investigations, CIA sub-comm-
ittees were created in Congress, formalizing the practice of
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making a small number of legislators privy to CIA activity; an
additional DDCI, Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott, USA, was named to
oversee community affairs;. and President Eisenhower named his
own oversight group, later known as the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. A more significant change was
made in 1958 with the creation of the United States Intelli
-gence Board and its network of specialized interdepartmental,
sub-committees.
Several important innovations were made at the working
level. For example, ORR analysts developed new techniques
for determining Soviet military preparedness on the basis
of economic capability. In the first instance, this pitted
Agency estimates of Soviet bomber production against the
much higher figures of the. Defense Department. OCI took
the lead in introducing a new method of delivering intelli-
gence to the President. In June 1961, it inaugurated the
President's Intelligence Check List, a short, pithy document
designed specifically for President Kennedy and delivered
to him every morning.
Other analysts revived the war-time art of. photo-in-
terpretation, and were ready to apply it in 1956 when the
U-2 went into operation. The U-2 was a unique high-altitude
plane equipped with special high-resolution cameras--both
developed in great secrecy under CIA auspices--that permitted
photographic missions over the Soviet Union and other denied
or sensitive areas such as Cuba and the Middle East. Period-
ic missions that filled an enormous number of intelligence
gaps were flown before the system was exposed when Francis
Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. By
that time, developmental work was in progress on an improved
plane and on reconnaissance satellites.
Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba on 1 January 1959,
successfuly concluding his guerrilla war against the Batista
regime. He alarmed Washington with his increasingly close
identification with Communism and, in early 1.960, CIA was
instructed to work on the problem. This instruction scow-
balled into plans for an invasion. by anti-Castro Cuban
exiles, armed, trained, and assisted by CIA with the anti-
cipation that dissidents within Cuba would help assure its
success. The result was the disastrous Bay of Pigs opera-
tion of 17-19 April 1961.
The Bay of Pigs was President. Kennedy's introduction
to the Agency, and colored his impression of it and its--
,leadership.... He remained keenly interested in the Cuban
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problem, but kept on-going efforts against Castro under the
supervision of a small group of close advisors. He also
decided that Dulles would have to go. In November 1961,
one of Dulles's last official acts as DCI was to escort
President Kennedy on a visit to CIA's new headquarters
building in Langley that was just being occupied by both
covert and overt employees.
John McCone, a businessman and engineer, was sworn in
as DCI on 29 November 1961. He expected to function as a
sort of senior intelligence officer to the President, with
whom he had regular meetings in lieu of the former elaborate
NSC schedule. A new high-level group was appointed to 25
review the feasibility and relative risk of bronosed covert
0
McCone meticulously followed all aspects of the recon-
naissance program, laying on exhaustive studies of the state
of the art--both in terms of hardware and of missions--
to try to determine what was needed and how much was enough.
He was an active participant in the long negotiations to
set up a National Reconnaissance Program, put a National
Reconnaissance Office in charge of it, and distribute the
equities between CIA and the Air Force. When the first
efforts brought unsatisfactory results, he pushed the re-
opening of the negotiations.
He was also convinced of the importance of technical
collection programs and of collaborative research on military
problems. With Soviet technological accomplishments frequent-
ly in the headlines, he felt that CIA should have a separate
technical directorate. One attempt failed, but in 1963 he
established the Deputy Directorate of Science and Technology
under Albert Wheelon. It absorbed the pertinent units from
other directorates, except for the Technical Services Division
which remianed in DDP to support operations.
?1Cone was the first DCI to move assertively into the
field of coordinating intelligence community activities.
He had to some degree an ally in Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, who was trying to establish the Defense
Intelligence Agency and cut back the independent role of
the services. McCone's most significant step was to-set
up within CIA a small, high-level staff known as National
Intelligence Programs Evaluation with authority to evaluate
-community-programs, inventory community activities, and
assess their implementation.
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The Agency's performance relating to the Cuban Missile
Crisis of October 1962, during which CIA spotted the arrival
of the Soviet material, confirmed that it included long-range
missiles, and verified their removal, re-established CIA's
stature in the administration. McCone's own standing bene-
fitted from his-having insisted on repeated studies in the
face of initial reassurances.
CIA became involved in Southeast Asia on a large
scale about 1962.
suppor or police and paramilitary
i s in ou ietnam grew by 1965 into full-scale
paramilitary assistance and pacification programs with
their own air support. These were backed by intelligence
collection in the field and by an analytical: working group
at Headquarters. Overall, CIA was not as optimistic as
other departments about prospects for the area.
When Lyndon Johnson became President after Kennedy's
assassination, McCone's influence began to decline, partly
because of personality differences. Instead of getting his
intelligence in private meetings with the DCI, Johnson pre-
ferred to use larger luncheons which increasingly focused
on Vietnam. After the 1964 election, OCI redesigned its
special publication to suit Johnson's work-style and renamed
it the President's Daily Brief. In the spring of 1965,
McCone's impending return to private business was announced.
Raborn
Vice Adm. William Raborn, Jr. USN (ret), was sworn in
as DCI on 28 April 1965, the day US forces intervened in the
Dominican Republic in the face of a perceived leftist threat
against the government there. His first acquaintance with
the Agency, thus, was as it responded to a crisis situation
with a wide range of involvement both in Washington and in
the field. The Dominican problem eventually faded after a mod-
erate president was installed following new elections is 1966.
The US also began its deep commitment in Vietnam shortly
before Raborn arrived at CIA. Bombing raids against North
Vietnam started in February 1965, and the large influx of
troops commenced in April. CIA expanded its efforts
in Vietnam--building up staff and diversifying programs--
to match those of the rest of the government. At Head-
quarters, the DCI named a Special Assistant for Vietnam
Affairs to supervise an elite group of analysts dealing
with all aspects of the problem.
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There was a heightened interest in China, mainly be-
cause of uneasiness over its intentions in Southeast Asia
and its recent nuclear tests. High-level reminders of the
importance of China led to innovative efforts to focus all
kinds of expertise on this one target. Meanwhile, concern
with the Soviets was unabated, particularly regarding their
rapid development. in the missile, space, and nuclear fields.
Satisfactory organization of the national overhead
reconnaissance effort was achieved during the summer of 1965
under a new agreement that interlarded CIA personnel into
policy-making positions and continued both CIA and Air Force
satellite projects. Although satellite collection was coming
increasingly to the fore, manned aircraft were still the
normal platforms for reconnaissance. CIA's new and vastly
superior super-sonic high-altitude plane, the AN-12 or
OXCART, became operational in 1965. Arguments over the risks
involved in its deployment and use kept it under wraps for
several years, though it eventually flew some missions in
Vietnam and an Air,Force version went into regular use.
Raborn was responsive to Pres. Johnson's desire to
establish better CIA rapport with Congress. Substantive
briefings --especially on Vietnam--were given with increasing
frequency, and the Agency's budget presentation was expanded
and embellished. Oversight of the Agency's operations,
however, remained with the designated sub-committees and
was not much affected.
Raborn made only a few changes in the functioning of
the Agency, mainly related to improving efficiency in crisis-
management. Improvements were made in Operations Center
procedures and equipment, rosters of high-ranking duty
officers were initiated, and advanced communications facili-
ties were introduced overseas.
New problems from outside became manifest during Raborn's
t
h
enure. T
e New York Times ran a series of articles that
made unauthori,ed disclo sures about the Agency,-and anti-
government sentiment in the universities began to impede
recruitment and research contracts.
Morale also declined inside the Agency, where Raborn's
unfamiliarity with foreign affairs and bureaucratic naivete
were openly criticized. When he was replaced in June 1966,
employees expressed satisfaction that for the first time a
professional intelligence officer, Helms, was to be made
DCI.
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Richard Helms was sworn in on 1966. His interest lay
in the operational side of the Agency and. this facilitated
his working with Presidents Johnson and Nixon, who wanted
an Agency management that could get things done.
The late years of the Johnson adminstration brought
a contraction in covert activity because of US balance of
payment problems and a resulting general cut-back in overseas
positions. The real water-shed, however, followed a Ram-
parts Magazine expose in early 1967 of the Agency's
funding system for covert action. In response, a presidential
committee headed by Nicholas Katzenbach recommended a re-
alignment of DDP's fundin and a general
review in September, another committee
propose cu ing an Radio Liberty free from the Agency
support. When the reorganizations were completed, many
marginal covert action projects were abolished, the radios
were turned over to public sponsorship, and more secure
funding was arranged for the remaining covert action program.
Vietnam was the prime concern of the Agency in the
late 1960's, though this was punctuated by the Six-Day War
in the Middle East, the Pueblo affair, and the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia--each of which prompted a crisis-
management response. In Southeast Asia, CIA's multi-faceted
efforts (intelligence collection and collation, briefings,
training programs,. paramilitary support, and development
of technical devices) continued. After the Paris Peace Talks
opened in 1968, CIA provided analytical support to the US
negotiators. At home, 1968 was a year of riots and anti-war
demonstrations, with CIA frequently included among the targets.
In response to a White House request, the Agency attempted
to determine what_.foreign backing the dissidents might
have. When the initial results were disappointing, the
effort to trace subversive connections was expanded. under
the rogram.
President Nixon took office in 1969, bringing with
him an acquaintance with the Agency from his vice-presi-
dential days and an apparent distrust of it. He arranged
for Henry Kissinger, his Advisor for National Security Affairs,
to be the DCI's contact on substantive intelligence matters,
and he utilized special groups for oversight and covert
action review.
In December 1970, Nixon asked James Schlesinger of
the Bureau of the Budget to do a study of the intelligence
community. Schlesinger's report raised the issue of as-
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.signing community budget review to the DCI and otherwise
enhancing his status in the community. Because of Defense
Department objections, Helms did not proceed immediately
with community reorganization. In March 1972, however, he
created an Intelligence Community Staff as a replacement
for NIPE. It was a small group, made up exclusively of
CIA employees, and designed to work with the various USIB
committee chairmen.
The foreign affairs preoccupation of the first Nixon
administration was with Vietnam--a preoccupation heightened
by the-leak of the Pentagon Papers in June 1971. This led
to the burglary of the office of the leaker's psychiatrist,
to which CIA later became linked through assistance given
to former-employee Howard Hunt. Lt. Gen. Robert Cushman,
Jr., USMC, was pulled from the DDCI position and eventually
replaced by Nixon's former. aide, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, USA,
in May 1972.
By January 1973 a peace-treaty had been achieved for
Vietnam, a reconciliation with China effected, and the
SALT I and ABM treaties signed with the USSR. CIA's
large paramilitary program in Southeast Asia was abolished
and new tasks were assigned to the Agency--notably verification
of the observance of the arms limitations agreements and
assistance in controlling international narcotics traffic.
On 17 June 1972, a break-in was detected at the
Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate complex,
and among those arrested were Cubans with Agency associations
and James McCord, a former CIA security official. From that
date on, CIA was enmeshed in the scandal as various efforts
were made to implicate or, ultimately, to exonerate it.
Much of Helms' time was taken up trying to distance the
Agency from Watergate and its participants.
After his landslide re-election in 1972, Nixon prom-
ised to revitalize his administration for his second term.
Helms was retired as DCI and cent to Iran as ambassador.
James Schlesinger was named as his successor.
Schlesinger
A week after he was sworn in as DCI on 2 February 1973,
Schlesinger told his staff that he found the Agency smug and
complacent and that he was skeptical that it was providing the
best possible intelligence. He moved quickly--a number of
top officials, some of whom had held key position for years,
were "retired" and replaced without delay. Further down the
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ranks, which he called overstaffed for existing activities
and effective response, he suggested about a 7 percent
cut to permit supervisors to eliminate poor performers.
To shake up internal administration, he abolished the power-
ful Office of Executive Director/Comptroller and established
in its place a small Management Committee with an executive
secretary, William Colby, who served concurrently as the
Deputy Director for Operations (the new name for DDP).
By early 1973, accusations against CIA had begun to
find an audience in Congress, and during Schlesinger's
confimation hearings there were some questions about possi-
ble illegal activities. In the early spring, Helms testified
Schlesinger tried to clean. up whatever problems emerged
and, as press stories surfaced, he ordered an internal inquiry
into Agency links to Hunt's presumably illegal activities.
On May 9, this became a standing memo from the DCI to all
CIA employees to report anything done outside the legislative
charter of the Agency.
A government reshuffle the next day sent Schlesinger
to the Defense Department and elevated Colby to DCI. The
change brought jubilation to CIA employees, and left to
Colby the handling of the responses to the disclosure memo.
Colby
Colby was confirmed by a vote of 83-13 on 1 August 1973,
with Walters serving as Acting DCI in the interim. During
the summer, after Colby had privately informed the intelli-
gence subcommittee chairmen about the existence of the list
of reported illegal_it ies- -tile "Family Jewels"--there were
unofficial hints that the Agency should expect legislation
restricting its freedom of action and protecting it from
political pressures.
Though most of his career had been in the clandestine
services, Colby saw himself as a'manager rather than an op-
erator. As DCI, he particularly wanted to get the DDO to
interact with other elements of the Agency and to break
down DDO's staffs, which he felt had become virtual "duchies".
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The Counterintelligence Staff was the toughest, and it was
not until December 1974 that Colby finally ousted its legen-
dary Chief, James Angleton.
Another major change consolidated still more of the
Agency's technical and military inteligence work in the
DDS;T. The DDO.'s technical services support-, the National
Photo Intelligence Center, and analytical groups specializing
in missiles and other weapons systems were transferred in
this reorganization.
In the fall of 1973, Colby dissolved the Board of
National Estimates which had been at the pinnacle of the
intelligence process during the Dulles years but had become
ingrown and isolated. Its place was taken by the Office
of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers,
headed by George Carver. The first group of about a dozen
NIOs were each responsible for establishing information
needs and managing community research and estimates on a
specific geographic area or functional subject. To accommo-
date the former ONE staff and the remnants of Carver's SAVA,
the Office of Political Research was set up to do in-depth
studies.
Colby made a major change in the way CIA presented
intelligence when, in January 1974, he introduced the
National Intelligence Digest. This was a newspaper-format
document that replaced the Current Intelligence Bulletin.
Published overnight, it was up-dated through the early morn-
ing hours with the latest information on fast-breaking
developments. As another innovation, it was sent to CIA's
congressional committees on a restricted basis.
Other bits of unfinished business were tidied up--a
new comptroller's office was set up some of the ncy's
proprietary airlines were sold, and wa.s
terminated. On 8 August 1974, the raised
Nixon's resignation and Ford's accession to the pres-
idency caused little change at CIA, and the Agency handled
its share of the practical aspects of the transition smoothly.
There was no respite, however, from outside critics, such as
former-employee Philip Agee who began to publish his dis-
closures in October 1974 and Seymour Hersh::who.charged in
the New York Times in December that CIA was involved in massive
illegal domestic operations.
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Colby's time and energy were taken up during most of 1975
by a series of investigations. By executive order, Pres.
Ford in January created a commission under Vice President
Rockefeller to investigate CIA's domestic activites. The
Senate organized the Church Select Committee and the House
set up the Pike Select Committee to conduct hearings on
CIA. By far the most substantial of these was the Senate
Select Committee, which published an exhaustive report in
April 1976.
On 3 November 1975, Pres. Ford announced Colby's dis-
missal as DCI and the appbintment of George Bush to replace
him. Apparently reminded of the impression this change
might have on the continuing Congressional hearings,
Ford a few days later asked Colby to return to the job
until Bush was confirmed, which he did. The confirmation
was delayed until a concession was extracted from Ford that
he would not invite Bush to be his running-mate in the up-
coming presidential election.
Bush
When George Bush was sworn in as DCI 30 January 1976
he faced the task of restoring public confidence in the intelli-
gence community without compromising. its effectiveness. He
quickly appointed Vice Adm. Daniel Murphy, USN, as Deputy
Director for the Intelligence Community and on April 23 he
named Enno Knoche, a CIA careerist, as DDCI to replace Walters.
A new executive order in February clarified policy guidelines
and established new oversight mechanisms. In March, President
Ford expanded and revamped PFIAB as part of his general overhaul
of the intelligence-gathering function.
Although the sensationalized report of the House
Intelligence Committee had been leaked shortly before
Bush became DCI, the bulk of the administrative reforms were
already in place when the Senate Select Committee issued its
final report , Bush took a few additional steps-- --such as
banning CzA use of reporters for inteiligenc.e purposes- -and
the Senate performed its own follow-up with the establishment
of a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Few new covert undertakings--except for starting up
1-were begun during Bush's tenure.
Ins eac, t ere was renewed attention to the problems in
intelligence production.
Earlier studies had pointed out an over-emphasis on
current. intelligence, with resulting-duplication-in
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community current publications and weakness in longer,
more thorough research. In 1976, CIA hired an outside consultant
to re-evaluate the situation and prescribe a remedy. When its
report, was hastily implemented in December, the Deputy Direct-
:--orate of Intelligence was abolished and.the National Foreign
Assessments Center created in its place. While most of the
component offices remained intact, OCI and OPR were eliminated
and two new units, the Office of Regional and Political Analysis
(it later dropped the "Regional") and the Office of Current
Operations, took their place. ORPA was to concentrate
on interdisciplinary research on regional topics, while
a small staff of substantive experts assigned to OCO was to
write, edit, and publish current intelligence.
When Bush resigned just before Pres. Carter's inauguration,
he left an Agency that was recovering from the traumas of
exposure and investigation. It was ready to resume its con-
centration on the collection and production of high-quality
intelligence of a type suited to the maintenance of global
detente which had superseded the waging a Cold War.
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PROSPECTUS - THE RABORN PERIOD
On 12 April 1965, President Johnson announced the
appointment of a new DCI, Vice Adm. William F. Raborn Jr.,
USN (Ret). He was sworn in' on-28 April. The new DDCI was
Richard Helms, a CIA veteran who replaced Lt. Gen. Mar-
shall Carter, USA.
Raborn's predecessor as DCI, John McCone, had been
highly regarded by President Kennedy because of his
correct calls on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the first
Chinese nuclear test. President Johnson, however, found
him less compatible and increasingly excluded him from
the inner circle of presidential advisers. In addition
to their personality differences, Johnson found McCone
lukewarm toward the US build-up in Vietnam and reluctant
to expand the Agency's relations with Congress. Raborn
was a total change. Although he was without experience
in foreign affairs,, he was an enthusiastic, expansive
team-player who wanted CIA to make an independent con-
tribution to the administration and who was accustomed
to keeping in close touch with the military and with
Congress.
The heavy build-up of US military forces in Vietnam
was getting underway in the spring of 1965, but it was
the sudden intervention of US troops in the Dominican
Republic that dominated Raborn's first weeks as DCI.
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251
On 28 April, the day Raborn was sworn in, the Domin-
ican rebels consolidated their downtown stronghold. Am-...
bassador Bennett requested the dispatch of US troops to
protect American citizens, and President Johnson immedi-
ately ordered the Marines to land. References on the 28th
to "leftists" and a few known Communists in the rebel
leadership became by the next day a list of 50-some
Communists associated with the rebellion and concern
about "another Cuba." On the 29th, the number of US
troops in Santo Domingo increased--eventually there were
30,000--and the first delivery of communications gear and
food supplies was made to the loyalists.
During the period of US military activity, CIA greatly
increased its efforts on the Dominican Republic. At Head-
quarters, desk officers coped with a flood of intelligence
and operational messages, analysts produced frequent Sit-
uation Reports, together with memos and briefings of a
more comprehensive nature, and Raborn was a regular par-
ticipant in the high level group under McGeorge Bundy
(later William Moyers that formulated US policy on the
Dominican situation.
President Johnson, having publicly explained the US
intervention as needed to prevent a Communist take-over,
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wanted CIA to identify the Communists and leftist sympa-
thizers leading the rebels-] I
US forces on 30 April secured the area that became
the International Security Zone and by 3 May they had
opened a corridor across the rebel line. Following
these actions, there was an interval devoted to truce
negotiation and political consolidation by both the rebel
government and the loyalist junta. Before the end of
May a loyalist offensive won control of most of Santo
Domingo except for the rebels' downtown stronghold and
produced a new stand-off between the two rival Dominican
governments.
new Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, William Broe,
and withdrawn some of the TDYers. Short-range efforts
to deal with a crisis situation gave way to longer-term
programs designed to restore law and order, to find an
acceptable form of government for the country, and to
devise a new solution to the problem of leftist former
president Juan Bosch.
Three months of mediation efforts by high-level US
officials, sent from Washington and. provided with intell-
igence support by the Agency, and by the OAS finally pro-
duced an agreement. There was to be an inter-American
Peacekeeping Force, a single moderate provisional govern-
ment headed by Hector Garcia-Godoy, and new national
elections in 1966. Another provision--not much. honored
in practice- -called for Care i a-(=odor to hive
n;~c~ i n mr~r c
In the fall, thel turned to
efforts to identify and list leftists returning to the
country and to trace the disposition of arms distributed
by the rebels.
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The agreed arrangements for the Dominican Republic
called for the US, under the nominal auspices of AID,
to assist the provisional government to expand and de-
velop its capability to control the subversion and insur-
Toward the end of the year, Helms reminded DDP that
The crisis in the Dominican Republic gradually petered
out. There was no "new Cuba", but there was considerable
sentiment, especially on Capitol Hill, that the Admin-
istration. had overreacted. Though CIA ..gas not a. Specific
target in this case, some of the bad feelings generated
spilled over onto the Agency in"other contexts later on.
The Vietnam Build-up
Throughout Raborn's tenure, the Agency became in-
creasingly caught up with Vietnam. The bombing raids
over North Vietnam had begun in February 1965 and the
large influx of US troops had commenced in April; the new
DCI worried that he might not be fully informed about the
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impetus for escalation coining from other parts of the Ad-
ministration. As soon as he had a break from the Dominican
crisis, Raborn asked CIA's various analytical offices to
produce studies on indications of Viet Cong willingness
to negotiate, on war trends and battle statistics, and
on the consequences. of escalation. On the operational
side, the Agency maintained its interest in Cambodia and
Laos and its involvement--in political action in South
Vietnamese villages.
To consolidate and give a focus to these diverse
activities, in early July Raborn created a Vietnam Task
Force under Peer de Silva, former COS in Saigon. The
Office of Current Intelligence was realigned to provide
space and people--the DCI said he wanted only "spark plugs"
assigned to this group--and the other components were told
to cooperate. According to Raborn's directive, the Task
Force was to have no formal T/0 or ceiling, and all of its
personnel. were to be on loan. De Silva was expected to
maintain daily contact with Chief/Far East Division.
When it was fully operational, the Task Force's concerns
included Viet Cong organization and morale, Chinese
support for North Vietnam, and population control in
rural South Vietnam. Raborn hoped to use its product to
support the Agency's representative (George.Carver) on
the National Planning Task Force for Vietnam and to make
independent recommendations to the President. On 1 August
1965, de Silva was given full status as Special Assistant
for Vietnam Affairs and the Task Force was renamed SAVA.
A major flap occurred in late July following the
shootdown of a US aircraft and a.drone by surface-to-air
missiles fired from North Vietnam. A study of the loca-
tions and capabilities of SAM sites was demanded, together
with an inquiry into the reasons the field read-out of
overhead photography had. missed the sites. Concurrently,
there was a failure to distribute nrompt..y within the
Agency a cable from Amb. Taylor in Saigon recommending
a US attack on the North Vietnamese SAMs. A post-mortem
called for an overhaul of Operations Center procedures
and for additional urgent study of the SAM problem.
Papers on infiltration routes, transportation systems,
Soviet and Chinese intentions, and other SAM-related
topics proliferated for the rest of the summer. In ad-
dition, a special. interagency Task Force Lookout chaired by
a DDI representative conducted systematic searches for
evidence--without finding any--of surface-to-surface
missiles in North Vietnam._
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The military build-up brought with it an increase in
Southeast Asian activity by a number of other government
agencies, including CIA. There were instances of highly
successful interdepartmental collaboration, such as the
system of combining reports of CIA-sponsored road-watch
teams in Laos with field read-outs from reconnaissance
missions to target attacks on enemy supply routes.
Interdepartmental jockeying for control of individual
activities was common, however. For example, CIA continued
to operate the training center for Vietnamese participants
land to
supervise the more sophisticated Census Grievance Teams.
Members of the military forces began serving, despite CIA
reluctance, in the US advisory role in many of the par-
ticipating villages and urged rapid expansion of the program.
The question of control and funding of the PATs eventually
was referred to the, 303 Committee. CIA and DIA were
jointly tasked with assessing the effectiveness of the
various bombing programs against North Vietnam, with CIA
insisting on an input from the Office of Reports and
Research's economic analysts to produce more realistic
appraisals. The Agency and the military also shared and
disputed responsibilities for overhead reconnaissance and
photo interpretation and for prisoner interrogation.
There was periodic friction with JCS and MACV over whether
the Agency was producing adequate. intelligence on Vietnam
and whether the military was sensationalizing reports to
justify operations.
Relations with the US Embassy in Saigon were generally
better, though ambassadors occasionally objected that the
A enc had overstepped its bounds. The most sensitivo
The number of CIA personnel stationed in Vietnam grew
steadily during this period, with the Saigon Station nearing
employees by early 1966. At Headquarters there were
requests for supplemental funds and calls for volunteers
to go to Vietnam. In October 1965, SAVA, the Office of
Training, and FE Division jointly introduced a 5-day
training course, repeated monthly, for personnel assigned
to Vietnam. As the war stepped up, CIA joined State in
recommending increased benefits for employees and depend-
ents in Vietnam.
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The Vietnam involvement spawned a number of special
serial publications in addition to regular briefings, memos,
estimates, and current reports. In all of them, Raborn
insisted on an emphasis on graphic presentation. The new
serials included a weekly report on Communist statements on -
Vietnam, monthly shipping reports, monthly CIA-DIA all-source
damage assessments, and SAVA's Vietnam Weekly. Some in-
dividual publications, such as a map portfolio and memos
on the organization and objectives of the National Libera-
tion Front of South Vietnam, the number of Chinese forces
in North Vietnam, and Viet Cong morale attracted fairly
wide attention. An ORR paper disseminated in December
1965 concluded that there was not much Communist use of
the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville; it later came in for
considerable criticism.
The war in Vietnam stimulated a number of major
Technical Services.Division projects. One of these--
chemical patch tests to detect evidence through metal
traces that someone had recently fired a weapon--came into
the testing stage in mid-1965. The first field. tests in
Vietnam were not very successful, but results improved
with experience and further chemical research.
ook patch test
kits to Vietnam in April or use by US medical per-
sonnel, and by mid-May the program was declared operational.
When the test team departed, there were 150 kits in use
and the Army was clamoring for more.
TSD was also developing other tests for establishing
the identity of Viet Cong agents. In addition, there was
on-going work on small bombs for jungle use,
delayed fuses, and
beacons to direct aircratt. Raborn a so kept urging
studies to determine and develop an "ideal weapon" for
Viet~a r.ype combat.
CIA's efforts were affected by an increase in local
tension in the spring of 1966. In March, the Viet Cong
attacked the in-
flicting considerable damage. Shortly afterwards, local
Buddhists caused serious disorders in Danang and Hue,
I land prompting the evacuation
of Americans from the latter city. South Vietnamese troops
eventually restored order and the problems caused for US
operations were not lasting.
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Emphasis on China
The US intelligence community was well seized with
the problem of Communist China by the time Raborn became
DCI, with interest centering on China's nuclear program,
its intentions toward Southeast Asia, and early indications
of a split in its alliance with the Soviet Union. A
Quadripartite Conference on China took place in May 1965,
and there were intermittent high-level reminders of the
importance of keeping a close watch on China. From
September 1965 on, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board regularly pushed for intensified work on
China, to which it assigned priority equal to the USSR.
The first requirement was for information on con-
ditions affecting the overhead reconnaissance program, the
most productive source for intelligence on China. In
addition to identifying targets, it was important to find
and evaluate threats to the planes themselves and to be
In addition, the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence
produced studies on China's internal political situation,
its overall economic outlook, its productive capabilities
(in part to determine whether the increased numbers of
military aircraft present in China could have been made
there), and its deployment of military units to North
Vietnam. The Deputy Directorate for Plans did a study of
the Chinese mentality and investigated the political
reliability of Chinese scientists. A major point of pride
was an accurate prediction of China's third nuclear test.
Raborn made a serious effort to respond to the
z)ressures for getter intelli`,ence. on China In July 1965,
he named Gen. John Reynolds , then Chairman of the US
Intelligence Board's Critical Collection Problems Committee,
to serve simultaneously as the DCI's representative for
Chinese matters. His role as program coordinator was
eventually confirmed by PFIAB. Within the Agency, Raborn
expressed a desire to "cross fertilize" components working
on China. In August, therefore, the DDI set up a China
Intelligence Study Group and later laid on preparation of
a current Handbook on China and allocated new slots for
Chinese coverage. By March 1966, the Study Group was re-
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established as the China Task Force underl 1,
of OCI. was designated coordinator of
relations regarding inese studies with academic institu-
tions and charged with seeking out scholars and sources.
Regardless of these efforts, President Johnson continued
to harp on the lack of specific and detailed. information
on Communist China.
Intelligence on the Soviet Union
Concern about the Soviet Union continued without
respite. In 1965-66 it focused on missile, space, and
reconnaissance activities, all of which appeared to be
keeping pace with US developments. Discovery of the
Henhouse radars in August 1965 added strategic defenses
to CIA's list of active targets, after analysis showed
they greatly enhanced Soviet anti-ballistic missile cap-
ability.
CIA faced a heavy demand for briefings on the elusive
"mobile solid-propellant missile" and for studies regard-
ing the probable use of new small silos. (CIA argued they
were to house long-range SS-lls.) The Agency also made
major efforts to respond to policy-makers' queries about
Soviet ABM missiles, ICBM testing, space probes, and re-
connaissance satellites and planes. These efforts also
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Interest in other aspects of Soviet affairs was less
urgent, but they were not neglected. Agency studies on
the weakening Soviet economy, Brezhnev's consolidation of
his political leadership, internal dissidence, and the
early signs of a split wth..,.China were among. the important
products of the analytical offices. In addition, the
massive National Intelligence Survey's General Survey on
the USSR came. out in January 1966.
Some Agency information on the Soviet Union was re-
leased to the public during the autumn of 1965. White
House officials wanted material on the faltering Soviet
economy and its diminishing growth rate made available,
and the DDI concurred provided there was no attribution
to the Agency. The material was ultimately used in a
public address by the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. In addition, a CIA memo on Soviet use of dis-
information was circulated on the Hill and generated a
number of press stQries.
Crisis Reaction
Raborn's tenure was punctuated with a number of in-
ternational crises. A few, which had special impact on
CIA operations, are noted here.
A sudden crisis blew up in mid-August 1965 when India
and Pakistan went to war over the disputed province of
Kashmir. Tension was increased when China threatened to
retaliate against India for allegedly setting up defenses
on Chinese territory. India withdrew and China dropped
its threats, but only after the US had initiated moves to
help India stand up to possible Chinese aggression. A
detachment of U-2s was sent to Asia to fly reconnaissance
missions over the border area if needed
L,'-') m_,,_ ttary'` assistance to
both nci.a an Pakistan was suspended when fighting be an
and the Pakistanis, perceiving a ro-Indian tilt
A t ese developments In - -
ent were closely followed by a Task Force set up in CIA
Headquarters. By late September, the UN had started the
efforts which finally led to a peace agreement signed in
Tashkent, USSR, in January 1966. The pull-back of Indian
and Pakistani troops proceeded on schedule and the US re-
sumed its former relations with both countries.
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Elsewhere in Africa, Ghana's radical leader Kwame
Nkrumah was overthrown by a military coup in February 1966.
In the aftermath of the coup, an elaborate Soviet and East
German TSD-type lab was discovered in Accra.
Overhead Reconnaissance
The immensely complicated and highly expensive matter
of overhead reconnaissance was the most bitterly contested
issue in the US intelligence community in the mid-1960s.
One of Raborn's first requests as DCI-was for information
on the reasons CIA felt it should stay in the reconnaissance
business.
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An intial effort to coordinate programs through a
single National Reconnaissance Officer had gone sour.
The first NRO was an arbitrary and parochial official who
operated the whole National. Reconnaissance Program as if
it were a branch of the Air Force. The negotiation, with
presidential involvement, of a new National Reconnaissance
Program agreement was finally concluded in August 1965,
and everything was more or less put on hold until it went
into effect on 1 October. Raborn followed the last stages
of the negotiations with interest, but was not an active
participant as McCone had been.
The new NRO was a civilian attached to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. a long-time CIA
official, became Executive Secretary o NRP Executive
Committee and Special Assistant to
the DCI, was named to be the CIA official responsible to
the NRO. CIA's succeeded as Chairman
of USIB's Committee on Reconnaissance. under these arrange-
ments, community cooperation on technical and operational
matters and on reconnaissance requirements improved appre-
ciably.
. In 1965 and 1966 the use of satellites as collection
platforms was the frontier technology in the reconnaissance
field- CIA's Corona (K-H 4) and the
I I competed in meeting launch schedules (Corona
established a much better early record) and in establishing
the value of their product--wide-swath, low-resolution
search-type photography and narrow-swath, high resolution
targeting photography, respectively. Corona was also used
to experiment with collecting mapping information and with
repetitive coverage of high-priority targets. For both systems
the take was recovered by air and taken to Eastman Kodak
for processing.
Initial discussion of another satellite program
utiIiz ng were also taking place
during 1965. CIA was one o the key participants because
of its -technological expertise and its role as potential
consumer of the product. When Raborn left, the NRP or
zation was moving toward approval for the project,
~
While satellite collection was coming increasingly
to the fore, manned aircraft were still the normal plat-
forms for overhead reconnaissance. As Raborn took office,
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a new and vastly superior plane under development since
1957 in a highly secret program was just becoming available.
A super-sonic, high altitude, single-seat plane specifically
designed to avoid radar detection and equipped with high-
resolution cameras--the A-12 or OXCART--had been designed,
built. and tested under Agency auspices. The fleet of
12 planes was declared operational in November 1965, and
the next step was the decision, at the highest levels, as
to when and where to use them.
Because of the earlier U-2 incident, the OXCART was
never intended for use over the USSR, and early plans
to use it over Cuba had been dropped as unnecessary.
That left the issue of overseas
for use over China or Vietnam. Such a proposal was made
in the fall of 1965 to the 303 Committee. It was not
approved, though the Agency was instructed to maintain
a quick-reaction capbility.
The arguments for deployment--coming mainly from CIA,
the JCS, and PFIAB--focused on the need for better intelli-
gence on a possible Chinese build-up for intervention in
Vietnam. The arguments against--by State and Defense--in-
sisted that such intelligence was not so urgently needed
as to justify the risks of exposing the aircraft by basing
it The issue remained on dead center through-
out the rest of Raborn's tenure, despite numerous attempts
by the Agency to move it forward.
In the meantime, U-2s remained in use for both regular
and crisis reconnaissance. Most missions were flown by
the Air Force, but CIA managed those for which deniability
was important. An Agency U-2 detachment was deployed to
or possible use along the China border during
the 1965 India-Pakistan crisis. Overflights in that area
were never authorized,
before the planes were rede-
ploy: _4 to the US in November.
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One remaining aspect of the reconnaissance business
was the read-out and analysis of the photography acquired.
Under existing agreements, responsibility for this was
shared between the Department of Defense, which serviced
departmental needs, and the National Photographic Interpre-
tation Center, housed in CIA and staffed by both Agency and
Defense personnel, which serviced national requirements.
In 1965, NPIC was empire-building. For instance,
it arranged to get all post-strike photos from Vietnam
and attempted to freeze out the Air Force's field read-out
station in Japan in favor of its own read-out facilities in
By September, a concerned Bureau of the Budget
asked for a joint CIA/Defense review of PI facilities
and activities to determine which were departmental and
which national.
At the turn of the year, 'NPIC was acquiring iaroe
amounts of new high-performance equipment while disputing
Department of Defense attempts to particpate in funding
research and development for photo interpretation. It
was also loading up with vast new projects--comprehensive
studies of North Vietnam's SAM system, of damage done by
US bombing in South Vietnam, and of the USSR's military
order of battle.--which overlapped research being done else-
where in the intelligence community. These self-initiated
projects caused huge back-logs and manpower shortages,
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which were cited to justify a large and aggressive recruit-
ment campaign. When the Bureau of the Budget indicated
that it required a better justification of NPIC's money
and manpower needs, NPIC's leadership took its pleas for
expansion to its friends in Congress. By the time Raborn
departed, the nature of the NPIC problem was clear, but
its resolution was.still in the future.
Counterinsurgency Programs
General Maxwell Taylor was appointed to PFIAB in
August 1965. He brought with him a strong interest in
counterinsurgency, which was soon institutionalized in the
interdepartmental Special Group-CI and four subcommittees
to coordinate work on aspects of counterinsurgency, of which
CIA chaired the one on intelligence. The Army already had
a large external research nrocrram on ccninterinsuruencv and
Administrative, Budgeting, and Personnel Changes
number of administrative changes were made dtiring
Raborn's tenure, pulling the Agency more tightly into a
single organization and bringing it into closer conformity
with practices elsewhere in the federal government. The
existing organizational structure was kept, but through-
out the Agency there was heightened attention to management
and more concern with planning how things were to be done.
Automated data systems began to come into regular use in
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support of management.
Raborn's first changes addressed the needs he per-
ceived personally--a roster of-senior duty officers
to handle tactical situations and sudden emergencies,
top executives made generally aware of one another's
activities, and clearer channels between the DCI's office
and the operating components.
Improvements in the CIA Operations Center were
Raborn's most lasting legacy. The Ops Center had been
created from the old Watch Office in 1963 to enhance the
ability to focus resources on a crisis situation and to
provide a CIA counterpart to operations centers in the
White House, State, Defense, and NSA. Arriving as he did
just at the beginning of the US intervention in the Domin-
ican Republic, Raborn virtually lived in the.Ops Center
for a couple of weeks and his suggested changes derived
from first-hand experience. To accommodate a President
who kept news tickers in his office, the DCI designated
a special analyst to screen, evaluate, and pass to him
significant press items as they came in. He also insti-
tuted a system of having senior officers, who could define
CIA actions being taken, on duty on weekends. The various
Task Forces worked in or near the Ops Center where they
could use its facilities to get key information to key
officials. Beginning in September 1965, a DDP officer
was assigned full time-to the Ops Center and participated
in the Director's morning briefing. New and stricter
operating procedures were adopted in October 1965. Finally,
in February 1966, an interagency LDX system was installed,
vastly improving the speed and security of communication
among the various operations centers.
Another area of innovation was the budgeting process.
CIA submit., ed its budge c proposal for FY 1967 in a new
expanded format that won high praise from House_ Appropria-
tions Subcommittee Chairman Mahon.
Raborn took President Johnson's cost-cutting directive
to heart. He scheduled an auditorium meeting on the im-
lications of the economy drive and he-indicated his in-
tention to spend two hours a day working on the budget.
Though he was dissuaded from the latter plan on the grounds
that the details wouldn't be available for some time, he
did listen to the directorates' program briefings during
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September and he insisted that their budget figures be
equated directly and meaningfully to the proposed programs.
Cost-cutting was the theme in the fall of 1965, and
some re-evaluating of the Agency's work was done in the
name of economy. The DCI issued a memo reiterating that
the purpose of CIA was to collect and evaluate intelligence
. and indicating that funding would be available only for
activities needed for intelligence. This was the first
e scope o the Cut-back was. established al
apportioned among the major categories of Agency work but
exempting the supplemental funds for Southeast Asia.
By late December, the reduced 1967 budget had been
approved by the Bureau of the Budget and by the President.
On the Hill, however, there was less sense of urgency and
the Agency experienced long delays in getting a hearing
for its expanded and graphic budget presentation. Begin-
ning with FY 1968, CIA's budget submission returned to a
cut-and-dried format.
In addition to economizing in general, the Johnson
administration pushed specifically for a reduction in
government employment. Congress completed in May 1965
legislation on early retirement, and sizable numbers of
Agency personnel took advantage of it. Reduced personnel
ceilings and mandatory fitness reports also encouraged
opposite direction came from the burgeoning need for people
in Vietnam and from federally sponsored Equal Employment
Opportunity and Youth Opportunity hiring programs.
number of Long-time key officials retired, resigned.
or reassigned during this period, and they were re-
placed by men of different background and temperament.
Among the most significant changes were Lyman Kirkpatrick's
resignation in the spring of 1965 (he stayed on through
the summer to work on a 15-year plan for the Agency) and
the appointment of Col. Lawrence White as Executive Di-
rector-Comptroller. When Helms moved up to become DDCI,
he was replaced as DDP by Desmond Fitzgerald. DDI Ray
Cline was reassigned in January 1966 and replaced by R.
Jack Smith. A third Deputy Director, DDSFT Albert Wheelon.
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decided to leave while Raborn was still DCI, but did not
actually do so until a few months after the DCI's departure.
Two retirements at the end of 1965, Director of Training
Matthew Baird and Chief/ORR Otto Guthe, presaged important
changes. Baird was replaced by' a DDP.careerist, John
Richardson, and geographer Guthe was replaced by economist
William Morrell with another economist, Edward Allen, as
his deputy--a team that drastically changed the research
emphasis of ORR. The shifts in top personnel also facili-
tated two organizational changes in January 1966--letting
the Board of National Estimates report directly to the DCI
rather than through the DDI and splitting DDP's Eastern
Europe Division into a European Division and a Soviet Bloc
Division in order to give the latter responsil.ity for all
operations aimed at Soviet or East European targets in
any location.
Along with other planning exercises, a survey of the
Agency's current and future space requirements was under-
taken in September 1965. By the end of the year CIA was
acquiring more space and new facilities. West parking lot
and the helicopter pad were opened at Headquarters, and
Agency staff moved into Magazine and Ames buildings in
Rosslyn. Ground was broken for the new Printing Services
Building--though its construction budget was reduced--
and arrangements were proceeding for the purchase of a
tract adjacent to Headquarters.
Several major advances in communications were intro-
duced in this period, the most notable being voice links
between Headquarters and selected Stations (first tested
in Saigon), use of portable vans to provide communications
support in emergencies (one was on stand-by in
during the Indo-Pakistan crisis), completion o loin
the introductioio of K-
area.
secure phones in the Washington
It was when the Agency reached orut into the academic
community--where it had long maintained smooth relation-
ships with selected schools and scholars--in response to a
mandate to strengthen its competence in.the social sciences
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that it began to encounter anti-CIA sentiment. By the fall
of 1965 the Army's use of scholars for social. research
abroad had been exposed and anti-war
sentiment was growing as the Vietnam build-up progressed.
Visiting high-level Agency officials noted the changed
atmosphere at some Ivy League universities, and CIA
campus recruiters in the midwest were picketed for the
first time in January 1966. Though the recruiters were
supplied with information on how to cope with the new
antagonism, the Agency was slow to appreciate the serious-
ness of the academic hostility.
In April 1966, a newsman asked
for a list of its contacts with CIA, risking exposure of
sensitive technical projects. This promoted a flurry of
efforts at Headquarters to re-evaluate and revise CIA
research contracts with universities. The studies were
overtaken in June, when the was dropped
after a university'official a ml e its existence and the
for t e terminated its research projects
gency.
By the fall of 1965, Agency managment had become aware
that the New York Times was planning a series of articles
on CIA's organization and operation and had served notice,
that there was to be no cooperation with the authors.
When the articles were published in April 1966,.DDP
quickly prepared a damage assessment. The Times series
opened. the gates to a flood of newspaper and magazine
articles on sensitive subjects involving the Agency. Prob-
lems stemming from this activity were compounded by the
highly publicized Heine vs. Raus court case in which
CIA identified one of its agents in order to aid his de-
r--- - - - - -
emigre whom he had accused of being a Soviet agent.
Raborn' s Departure
Raborn had come to the Agency with a reputation from
his time with the Polaris program of being able and will-
ing to work with Congress. His inexperience in foreign
affairs proved a handicap, but he made?a serious and con-
tinuing effort to keep relations good. Contacts with Con-
gress were of two sorts: one, an active program of
inviting Congressmen to Headquarters and providing country
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briefings for those going overseas, especially to Vietnam;
the other, briefings on the Hill regarding substantive
matters and the Agency's own affairs. With regard to the
latter, the DCI continued to insist that only members of
the four designated sub-committees were to be informed.
In practice, it frequently proved difficult to get these
to give much time or attention to CIA.
In the end, it apparently was a problem with Congress--
though not necessarily his own--that led to Raborn's re-
placement as DCI. During the spring of 1966, Senator
Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
was feuding with President Johnson. Out of some murkey
maneuvering came plans for a Senate hearing on Vietnam
and proposals for revising CIA's oversight arrangements.
Raborn had earlier irritated Fulbright by refusing to
answer questions (on the grounds that the committee was
not authorized to receive information on sources and
methods
On t e basis ot circumstantial
evidence, Johnson's removal of Raborn got him peace with
Fulbright and relief from the threatened Senate moves on
Vietnam and oversight, as well as an end to complaints
in the media that Raborn was ruining morale in CIA.
At a press conference on 18 June 1966, President
Johnson announced Raborn's resignation, effective 30 June,
and Helms' elevation to become DCI. Johnson praised
Raborn's dedication and commented that he had originally
agreed to serve for only a limited time before returning
to private industry.
Raborn had been the subject of widespread criticism
from professionals within the Agency who charged that he
had no aptitude for intelligence work. His outsider's
ignorance of the way things traditionally were done and his
eagerness to please his masters in the White House and
in Congress offended those accustomed to considering irt-
telligence a closed society. Furthermore, his obvious
desire to learn--which led him to schedule briefings by
senior and junior officers alike--could not disguise his
basic lack of knowledge of foreign affairs.
Raborn's habit of asking blunt questions did stimulate
some overdue changes. For example, a query as to why
special flights were needed in Vietnam to take post-strike
photography disclosed that US bombers carried no cameras;
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another as to why there was no record of the comments of
expensive consultants' panels led to a requirement that
they make written as well as oral reports. He also in-
sisted--for the first time--that the Deputy Directorate
for Science and Technology and DDP units doing similar
technological research should get in touch with each other
and that there should be technical liaison with the mili-
tary research and development programs.
Most of the changes inside the Agency during the
Raborn period were small and many were impermanent. Out-
side, however, the country moved definitively away from
the clear-cut issues of the Cold War era and into the
contradictions and tensions that surrounded the Vietnam
War. In addition, the immensely expensive overhead re-
connaissance program forced a new evaluation of intelligence
and its costs. The CIA management that succeeded Raborn
had to cope with this new situation and with.the realiza-
tion that media criticism and morale problems stemmed
from far deeper causes than an individual DCI.
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