Intelligence Warning

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: October 23, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relea 2003/06106 : CIA-RDP84B00506R00QP0180038-5
23 October 1974
MEMORANDUM, FOR: Chairman, NSCIC
Intelligence Warning
INTRODUCTION
1. In the broadest sense, the function of intelligence is to provide
the policy maker with a forecast of future international developments
that are likely to have a significant effect on U. S. national interests.
This is done on a continuing basis through the production of current
intelligence and estimates.
2. Within this broad, general responsibility to forecast,
intelligence has also a special responsibility to warn the policy
maker of potential developments that are perceived to represent
a special threat to U. S. national interests. Implicit in warning
intelligence 'is the assumption that something might occur which
requires a U. S. response and, thus, the special, focused attention
of the policy maker.
3. Within the overall responsibility of the community to provide
warning lies the more specialized responsibility to provide warning
of military attack against the U. S. or its allies. An even more
specialized responsibility is warning of nuclear attack. (See Tab A
for a graphic display of the progression from the intelligence
NSA, DIA reviews completed
Approved For Release 2003/06/0 'tICIAiI B00506R000100180038-5
 P
Approved For Rele4W 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP84B00506R00001100180038-5
community's "steady state" forecasting role to its role in providing
alerts and strategic wvarning. )
Until recently, the intelligence community has had no established
mechanism to provide explicit warning to the policy maker except.
for the USIB`latch Committee. This was established in 1954, in
response to the so-called Pearl Harb: r syndrome, to provide warning
of imminent military attack against the- U.S. - -Civerx the narrowness
of its charter, it has had little occasion to produce,1wa?nings during
the 20 years of its existence. Its weekly reports, containing
?ssentially negative threat assessments, have been of little, if
any, value to the policy maker. And even with s-'me loosening ever
time of its reporting criteria, e. g. , to cover military developments
in Vietnam, the policy maker has been left unwarned, in any
explicit sense, of a wide range of critical developments -- military,
technological, political, and economic which have deserved his
focused attention. He has been left largely to his own devices to
glean from the mass of t".1 -fished intelli fence products constantly
available to him which items deserve his special attention. The
intelligence producer, af;:er the eveat, has uiauzally be.n able to
demonstrate that in onle way :or.an:ther he f'?ri-ecasteed the event.
But he : as generally assumed no w ?onsibil y to w. arn.
7
Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5
 Approved For Rele; 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP84B00506ROO p0180038-5
TaTE ALERT MEMORANDUM
5. In order to fill this gap in the community's procedures, I
ani in the process of developing a new intelligence art form,, the
Alert Memorandum (AM). Its purpose will be to provide me with a
medium explicitly to warn the members of V ;SAG of a foreign
development of special gravity in terms of U. S. national interests.
6. In recognition of the fact that warning is a responsiloility
the whole community, no special group or office will be established
to produce this document. An alert memorandum can be proposed
by any element of the community; it will be produced by the appropriate
National Intelligence Officer in conj unction with whatever.elemeate of
the community he wishes to call on to do the job. To the extent that
time permits, it will be coordinated among the USIl3 agencies.
STRATEGIC WARNING
7. The possibility of a military attack against the U. S. or its
allies, because of its extreme gravity, requires, in my view, an
additional, discrete, and specialized effort.
S. Generally, U. S. policy interests will require warr-Ing of
military events ?-w v ?ether not M!11-ee often
at an `earlier s`--e of d`aveli)pm?nt than s:rictl
to chnolo sic .l, or economic i Jents.
cw sae , is extremely difficult be cause frequuntly no in tcatio 1s
Approved For Release 2003/06 DP84B00506R000100180038-5
 Approved For Rele s 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP84B00506R0 1100180038-5
exist of the intent to employ military measures until a very short
period before the action is taken. While the decision to launch some
military actions (e. g. , Hitler's invasion of Poland and the Arab
initiation of the October War) almost certainly occurs some time
before the. actions are adopted, in many cases (e. g., Czechoslovakia
in 196--and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974) the decision to use
force is not made until almost immediately before the action is taken.
9. In cases such as these the use of force (or initiation of
hostilities) becomes, early on, one of a range of serious options
addressed by a potential aggressor's top policy-making body.
Capabilities are augmented, sometimes behind a screen of deliberate
deception, to keep this option open and '.hake. it genuinely, or
increasingly, viable. But the actual decision t i exercise this
option, i.. e., to strike, may not be made until very late in the
process rather than at the outset. There will be no evidence early
in the game of firm intent: to go to war -- not because intelligence
is deficient but because no such firm decision. has yet beer made. A
warning keyed to hard evidence of an 'tLa k iec;.sion -- i. e. , a firm
"intent to go to war" -- will in these insta_ ces inevitably come very
Close to the actual initiation of hostilities, too 1i to for cotuatrer-action.
Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA- - T R000100180038-5
 1 J
Approved For Relea 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP84B00 10180038-5
25X1
In this sort of situation, the Intelligence Community needs to give
formal warning when a potential adversary first begins to weigh
initiating hostilities as a serious practical option. The final
decision point may come much later -- long after capabilities are
already ? augment d -- or not at all. (See Tab B a detailed description,
and graphic representation, of how the Japanese kept their options
open up until a few hours prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. )
10. -Indeed the final decision piint is often so much an immediate
or tactical matter that no single system can be expected to bear the
entire burden of giving, such warning. lvlost likely the warning(s)
would be reflected by various elements of the Community in one or
more forms of "critic" communication:
25X1
the FBIS ticker; the 'White House Spot Report; the I.I.A.
Service, and INR briefings; the secure telephone call from the USIB
principal. Only if time permitted would consultation between Community
agencies take place, though the recent introduction of the Nationai.
Operations I:.ntellige ce Y' atch Officer's Net (N(DIIF,,7W;'ON) has improved
poSSibilitiC:S of ..uch consult'w_:7n.
r
11. The c om:+i,_nity'S S rate': is `Na ':!in'; mechanism (the itch
Corn ittee of USI3 and the National indications Center) is in the
,process of ; ein,,77 revised. in its new form it will consist of a small
national-level oversight committee and a small staff Consisting of
Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5
 Approved For Rele,, a 2003/06/06 CIA-RDP84B00506R0W0180038-5
analysts drawn from the major production elements of the communit f.
The committee chairman will be responsible directly to me but will
work in' close coordination with the specialized warning are chanisms
of the Department of Defense. The staff will be co-located with
the NMIC and will rely on the NMIC to perform the 24-hour watch
functions formerly performed by the TIC.
12. The mission of the new Strategic Warning Committee and
Staff will be to assist me in carrying out my responsibility for
providing strategic warning to the National Security Council.' They
will be responsible for providing the earliest passible warning of
military action against the U. S. or its allies. They will also be
responsible for poviding warning of military action in developing
crisis situations, in any area, which could involve U. S. forces..
If, fn_ example, -Arab-Israeli tensions suddenly increased and
culminated in a Syrian attack, against Israel, the strategic -,varning
mechanism would not be responsible for providing warning of this
a ;int. The responsibility Z~/ ul! newt with the corn- rn-_nity :a.-.t la'rge
and the NIOs to produce an Alert The Strategic
a.rn iii; Committee and for
following the >'tua1l'::)n ci s J~ e,-,an
d c terming vil-if,t'ler any inthcat '? 23 s o ? :'~viet military role
6
Approved For Release 2003/06/06 84 000506R000100180038-5
 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP84B00506R009100180038-5
.in the crisis. The personnel of the ?t'"atch mechanism would not
only scan the current traffic for signs of Soviet military movement,
but would bring to bear their special understanding of S iviet alert
and combat readiness procedures, mobilization laws, war games
or exercises, civil defense doctrine and practice, and other similar
material of a type rarely needed for day-to-day intelligence reporting
but absolutely vital when there is a threat. of employment of military
force by a major Communist state. And because this expertise
,presumably would be unique to the strategic warning mechanism, no
other element of the Community wOu1d attempt to compete with it.
Other Cornmunity Efforts .t7-) Improve "'arning
13. A community effort to address the nuclear dimension of the
warning problem was set in train by NSDM 242, "Policy for Planning
the Employment of Nuclear ieapons, 11 issued in January 1974. Ah
Ad Hoc Lateragency Crisis Management Task Force (ICMIF), cha;red,
by J-3 and with representation fr-rn. the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the DCI (IC Staff), JCS, NSC Staff, ASD(I), and DI:A. The
ICMTF in turn created separate t roups to concentrate on erin
iv a....
The ?
revise' 242, aw_aitlln 7r. ._:3? S`?nr~ ?T } ? val V ~?~~
engeadz-r further or an.ratimnal me auras.
14. theoretical level, a veteran analyst in the National
Indications Center has produced a I-Tmnd'oook of N arning i telli^ence
7
Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : C,1A-RDP04B00506R000100180038-5
,11 1.
 Approved For ReleaW 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5
(3 vols. , 1972-74). It is the first of its kind, and has assisted many
in the Community both in understanding the many forms of warning
and in identifying the particular expertise which should be associated
with the strategic warning function.
15. Other projects related to warning are:
a. The establishment by the ASD(I) of an Intelligence an
Warning, Review Panel chaired by the Director of Indications
and Warning in ASD(I). This has led to the formation of an
Indications arid Warning Functional Review Group, which
presently includes representatives from J-3, J-5, NSA, DIA,
State, IC Staff and CIA, as well as :SD(I). ASD(I) has also
commissioned several major warning studies, such as 107ar
in Europe (WINE),
warning hardware requirements,
c. Special attention by the S tidies Anal;.rsis and Gaming
~, rr -+ Cy
J. The
3C?~lishrn_ery o r .'.3_ '.:I+`, 3 c~ li C a"_
9t.af in
Ilj~ e r C13c`_ 3 e $ 3 15's 3 Oz? of
to . a e 'he y ap tr ..,
?t??f t r' ]8
polic levels in the State Ddr,artment.
25X1A5A1
STAT
25X"1 A5A1
Approved For Release 2003/06/ ? eIA I1DP84800506R000100180038-5
 Approved For Releq 2003/06/06 :.CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5
e. The establishment by CL. i of a Committee on Internal.
Organization for Crisis Management.
f. The IC Staff's p, omation of conferencing networks
(NOIWON, NOLAN, CONTEXT, tiiaetr use}, which hopefully
will improve the technical support aspects of warning.
g. The IC Staff's compilation of a Crisis Directory,
intended to link watch centers in operational, intelligence,
and related government agencies.
W. D. Colby
Director
9
Approved For Release 2003/06 ' 'Q^-RDP84B00506R000100180038-5